Elegy for Maket

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New Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2004

REVIEW ESSAY

Grays Elegy for Market Utopianism

ANDREW LINKLATER

The hope that science would increase social power over nature, liberate humanbeings from ignorance and superstition, and increase freedom is one of thehallmarks of the Enlightenment. The revolution in science and technologyencouraged the conviction that suffering resulting from the vulnerability of thebody, the operation of natural forces and the functioning of repressive institu-tions could be diminished if not eradicated.1 Marxs thought and the Marxisttradition were exemplars of this new-found faith in human potentialities. Ofcourse, few on the Left now subscribe to the progressivist or teleologicalconception of history which suffuses Marxs writings; and no serious thinkertoday has the faith in technology which informed Lenins belief that freedom canbe realised by combining collectivisation and electrification. Horkheimer andAdorno argued that the technological forces which enlarged human power overnature also made totally administered societies possible. The tyranny of SovietMarxism, the rise of Fascism and the Holocaust destroyed the na ve faith in theprogressive nature of modernity. What, if anything, can be salvaged from theEnlightenment project has been debated by social and political theorists eversince.

Horkheimer and Adorno saw no escape from pessimism and despair, but eachheld on to the Enlightenment theme that lending voice to the suffering was anecessary condition of truth; Adorno called for a form of self-reflection which

worked against the brute predominance of all collectives which threatened toannihilate the different.2 He called in a striking passage for a new categoricalimperative which would ensure that Auschwitz, or its like, would not happenagain.3 His belief that this struggle would never be completed resonates withmore recent critical approaches which do not abandon the project of modernitywhile scaling down their political aspirations because of the failed utopias ofrecent times. For Habermas, the contemporary radical mind should be informedby an enlightened suspicion of the Enlightenment; ethical inquiry should focuson the procedures which can be used to establish principles of coexistence; it

Andrew Linklater, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth,Ceredigion SY23 3DA, Wales, UK.

ISSN 1356-3467 print; ISSN 1469-9923 online/04/030429-11 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/1356346042000259866


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should eschew the quest for a rational account of a substantive and universalis-able form of life in the wiser post-metaphysical age; and the grand aspiration foremancipation should be replaced by the more modest task of increasingunderstanding. Others, including several poststructuralist writers, display simi-

lar ambivalence towards the Enlightenment. Foucault, it will be recalled,maintained there is no need to be either wholly for or against the Enlightenment.More generally, very few on the Left harbour the illusion that the forms ofsuffering mentioned earlier can be eradicated forever, and most are acutelyaware that all proposed remedies for human misery can generate new forms ofdomination. Belief in a never-ending assault on the different causes of humansuffering is the version of the Enlightenment project which commandsordeserves to commandmost support in radical circles at the current time.

Until recently, the second great heir of the Enlightenmentliberalismdidnot have the same need to rethink its attitudes to modernity, the reason being that

liberals have typically rejected the view that political projects will ever succeedin substituting harmony for conflict. Liberals have repeatedly argued that thegreat plurality of beliefsa condition to be cherished rather than merelytoleratedwill always defeat efforts to refashion society. A rational approach topolitics must therefore lower its sights to consider the social and politicalframework that will enable diverse world-views and interests to coexist with theminimum of coercion and interference. Of course, liberals have not beenimmune from demands to re-examine their fundamental beliefs about theprogressive nature of Western modernity. E.H. Carr maintained that the 19thcentury liberal belief in a natural harmony of interests anchored in free tradereflected the standpoint of the comfortable powers which ignored the wideninggulf between haves and have-nots in international politics.4 Numerous wel-fare liberals have echoed this concern in their disagreement with a free marketliberalism which does not pause to think seriously about national and globalsocial justice; and they have pointed, like Carr before them, to the biases of ahuman rights culture which places the entitlement to liberty above the right tosubsistence or to an equitable share of global resources.

Over several books John Gray has developed a powerful critique of thesoulless liberalism which dominates contemporary political lifea pervertedform of the liberal ethos which worships the free market as the engine ofeconomic growth, which believes untrammelled capitalism can reduce suffering

and enlarge freedom, and which supposes that a rational design for the improve-ment or perfection of human affairs can be applied across the world as a whole.This critique is all the more interesting because it is made by a major New Rightthinker of the 1980s. Gray argues that this liberal world-view suffers the sameflaw as all forms of secular humanism by virtue of repeating the errors of theEnlightenment which have their origins in Christian monotheism and theChristian doctrine of salvation. Enlightenment thinkers transformed this into aproject of universal human emancipation which insisted that the individualscould free themselves from the limits that frame the lives of other animals byusing growing scientific knowledge to perfect their societies.5 The neoliberal

faith in progress is accused of perpetuating the view that politics can remakesocial structures and transform human drives. Although Gray does not make this

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exact point, the upshot of his argument is that economic liberalism deserves thesearching examination of core beliefs about history and progress which wasundertaken by socialist thinkers in response to the theoretical and politicalfailures of the revolutionary Left.

Grays assault on free market liberalism raises several questions. How does hecharacterise this standpoint and what does he regard as its central defects? Whatis novel about this critique, and what can be found in previous challenges toliberalism? Finally, where does Grays condemnation of market utopianismleave the Enlightenment project, and how does it compare with socialist andother radical critiques of the utopias of the Left?

Market utopianism

Gray maintains that the United States today is the last great power to base its

policy on (the) Enlightenment thesis that it is possible to supplant the historicdiversity of human cultures with a single, universal civilisation.6 Marketutopianism has been successful in appropriating the American faith that it is aunique country, the model for a universal civilisation which all societies arebound to emulate.7 The USA is alone in supposing that the global expansion ofunregulated capitalism can bring about the betterment of the human race. Withthe collapse of bipolarity, it has been free to globalise its vision of unregulatedcapitalism at a time when the prestige of free market thinking has rarely beenhigher. Gray adds that this conception of the progressive globalisation of marketrelations is inextricably linked with the pervasive influence of religious beliefsin US society and politics. A peculiar conjunction of economic ideology andreligious faith separates the USA from the great majority of Western liberaldemocracies where the Enlightenment belief that modernity leads inexorably tosecularisation has largely been validated and where, additionally, the commit-ment to a social market which promotes community and cooperation is strongerthan in the USA. Curiously, the USA does not fit the model of a modern societythat has been inherited from the Enlightenment. Yet it is more pervaded byEnlightenment superstitions and illusions than any other late modern culture.8

Gray adds that the USA and most European societies are drifting apart in termsof core aspirations and beliefs, but the more important trend has seen thejuggernaut of the free market weaken social markets in Europe with the effect

that pervasive individualism has rendered the European social-democraticproject obsolete.9

The critique of market utopianism

There are at least four dimensions of Grays critique of market utopianism. Thefirst is that the triumph of the market is responsible for large-scale suffering in theform of economic insecurity, for widening inequalities within liberal societies andacross the wider world, and for creating a populous underclass that is denied therewards of material growth. A second argument is that free markets destroy family

relations and erode local communities with consequent increases in the level ofcrime. Free markets, Gray argues with reference to the dominance oflaissez-faire

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ideology in Victorian England, do not develop of their own accord, but requirestates for their establishment and survival. The tragedy of the exercise of statepower in the market utopias is that the forms of solidarity to which human beingsusually turn in critical moments have been seriously weakened; the state has

drawn back from obligations to protect the vulnerable from economic insecurityand is now powerless to foster new solidarities or to revive old ones. Socialtensions have appeared in liberal economies as the have-nots react to the vulner-abilities that result from the states retreat from preserving social markets. Suchproblems might be augmented by future capitalist economic crises of which theAsian crisis is a sobering foretaste. Insulated from any kind of political account-ability, the global market is much too brittle to last for long; it is in the logicof globallaissez-faire that financial crisis will eventually impact in the heartlandsof the system.10 Indeed, Gray argues, without offering much support for thisthesis, that the contemporary global order is probably more brittle than the liberal

international economic order that collapsed in 1914.

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A third argument is that the global operation of market forces knows no barriersin the sense of recognising the impending exhaustion of natural resources and thegrowing likelihood of violent resource conflicts. A fourth argument is that marketutopianism is based on the serious error of thinking that a specific politicalexperiment and local cultural form can produce lasting benefits for the wholehuman race. Here Grays argument divides into separate themes. One is that thespread of capitalism has not secured the global triumph of the American freemarket; many different varieties of capitalism exist, including the anarcho-crimi-nal form that has thrived in post-Soviet Russia and the family-based capitalismthat seems suited to Chinese culture and other mutations may develop in future.12

A second and more fundamental point is that the Enlightenment hope for auniversal civilisation has been undercut not only by the multiplication of capital-ism in the modern world but also by the growing revolt against the West andWestern values. More than any other event, the terrorist attack on 11 September2001 has struck at the idea that modernity must take a Western liberalorAmericanform. Far from being a throwback to medieval times, Al Qaedaresembles fascism by being a distinctive way of being modern. 13 Alternatively, itcan be understood as a unique combination of pre-modern, modern and post-mod-ern attitudes in which enmity to the West is linked to the modernist mythdefended by revolutionary anarchists in 19th century Europe that a new society

could be created through spectacular acts of violence.14 The revolt against thebelief in a vision of a universal civilisation places a special burden on the Westto work for a more tolerant, multicultural global order. The question which Grayasks is whether the USA with its belief that free markets are the key to freedomeverywhere is up to the task of promoting peaceful and productive coexistenceamong peoples and regimes that will always be different.15

Post-Enlightenment politics

Very little in this critique of free market liberalism is particularly new; as noted

earlier, similar lines of criticism can be found in Carrs writings and in Marxscritique of capitalism. In Carrs condemnation of free market liberalism, there is

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the same broad critique of the urge to universalise a particular culture, of thetendency to protect sectional interests under the guise of promoting all humanneeds and of structures that cause profound insecurities and attendant politicalconflicts. We must look beyond this literature for reflections on one of the

themes which troubles Gray, namely, the failure to deal with the revulsionagainst Western values. The importance of the revolt against the West was acentral theme in Bulls writings and in more recent arguments about the need forjustice between diverse cultures in a post-European world society, although Graydoes not engage with this literature.16 Major differences exist between Graysstandpoint and these arguments that the West has much to do to promote justicebetween cultures in the modern world. Most of these thinkers are broadlycommitted to some version of the Enlightenment project since most think thatthe purpose of critique is to make the case for, and to identify the possibility of,improved political structures. Particularly in his more recent work, Gray breaks

the nexus between social critique and transformation by rejecting this politicalproject.This has not always been his conclusion. He argued in False Dawn that a

regime of global governance is needed in which world markets are managed soas to promote the cohesion of societies and the integrity of states. Only aframework of global regulationof currencies, capital movements, trade andenvironmental conservationcan enable the creativity of the world economy tobe harnessed in the service of human needs.17 Moreover, a global tax oncurrency speculation, as proposed by the economist James Tobin, may be anexample of the kind of regulation that would render world markets more stableand productive.18 In Endgames, published a year earlier, he defended acommunitarian liberal perspective that contended that the liberal value ofautonomy can be protected only in the context of a public culture of whichmarket exchange is only a subordinate part.19

In his two more recent books, Gray dispenses with global problem-solvingapproaches precisely because they are scarred by the Enlightenments belief inexpanding human control over the world, in forcing it to become more compliantwith human needs and in striving to make it steadily more predictable. Graybreaks with his earlier position in interesting ways, not least by combining hisdystopia with non-Western ideas to produce a troubling mix of pessimism andquiescence.

There are many reasons for Grays abandonment of a liberalism that iscommitted to the goal of humane globalisation. One reason is that environmentaldegradation is uncontrolled and irreversible. The upshot is that resource deple-tion spurred on by the growing world population will validate Malthuss darkprognostications about escalating violence, but this will be made more danger-ous and intractable by being intertwined with religious and ethnic enmities.Moreover, as in the case of other animal species, when humans overshoot thecarrying capacity of their environment famine, plague or war will cull theirnumbers.20 Green political thought and practice aims to reverse environmentaldecay, but its strategies generally reveal its entrapment within the Enlightenment

world-view that envisages greater mastery of external nature and society.21

Inany case, it is highly doubtful that the necessary deflation of human aspirations

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can take place given the religious quality of the modernist commitment toprogress.22 The depth of Grays pessimism is evident in his question of whatcould be more hopeless than placing the Earth in charge of this exceptionallydestructive species.23 Contra the humanist imperative, he argues that human

beings have an eternal predatory streak and an unquenchable fondness forkilling which science simply magnifies.24 A reduction of the worlds populationand a large-scale switch to low-impact technologies might ease the strain,25 butmounting global problems will only be solved by the operation of physicalforces as Nature extracts its revenge for all the harms which the human specieshas done to it. The Gaia thesis, with which Gray sympathises, foretells thatnatural forces will correct the hubris of humanism.26 The foreseeable extinctionof the human species is not self-evidently lamentable: Homo sapiensis only oneof very many species, and not obviously worth preserving. Later or sooner it willbecome extinct. When it is gone, the Earth will recover. Long after the human

animal has disappeared, many of the species it is bent on destroying will still bearound, along with others that have yet to spring up. The Earth will forgetmankind. The play of life will go on.27

Gray argues that resource conflicts will demonstrate there is no escape froma world of predatory states.28 His most recent book extends this narrative byarguing that the terrorist attacks on the USA have turned liberal states intoHobbesian surveillance states dedicated to the eradication of terrorist organisa-tions that can organise violent attacks on the USA and other societies fromsecure havens within failed states. A new type of imperial governance isemerging to deal with the consequences of collapsed states and with the decisivefeature of globalisation that is the diffusion of the instruments of violence.29

More will be said about Grays interpretation of the Enlightenment in amoment. One recent assessment of that epoch finds more to support than rejectin its approach to cruelty, domination and exploitation, and in its hostility towar.30 From this standpoint the Enlightenment cannot be reduced to the triumphof instrumental rationality and it remains the critical starting-point for contem-porary struggles for emancipation, for understanding the radically different andfor countering excessive power. Gray is too well-versed in Enlightenmentthought to reduce it to a single register, but is inexplicably reluctant to ask howits positive side can be used to preserve an emancipatory standpoint that removesthe dangers of hubris. Instead of asking what can be salvaged from the

Enlightenment, Gray draws insights from the Ancient Greeks who did not lockthemselves in the modernist enthusiasm for perpetual striving; he turns toOriental thinking in which life is not wasted agonising over alternatives, but isdevoted to pursuing a way of living in which one never has to choose but canrespond effortlessly to situations as they arise.31 Gray also borrows fromSchopenhauers renowned pessimism. The point is to abandon the aspiration ofremaking the world through politics and to embrace instead the vita contempla-tiva with its regard for the mysterious notion of groundless facts and for awilling surrender to never-returning moments.32 This is hopelessly vague but theimmediately following passage plunges further into vacuousness: Other animals

do not need a purpose in life. A contradiction to itself, the human animal cannotdo without one. Can we not think of the aim of life as being simply to see?33

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Significantly, Gray does not flinch from making grand claims about the aims ofhuman life, but the culmination of his disillusionment with the free market is anargument for the contemplative life. This immediately raises the question of whyGray has not made the case for a political project which tackles the human

problems he has documented.

Can we have our Enlightenment back please?

There would seem to be little point defending the Enlightenment project ifGrays more apocalyptic predictions that the most predatory forms of capitalismmay bring a violent or sudden end to the human enterprise are right, but wehave not reached this stage yet. Grays argument that market utopianism causesmajor social dislocation and destroys non-Western cultures calls up images of aless destructive and more tolerant philosophy of public affairs whose foundations

can be found in the Enlightenment. Gray recognises that the tolerance, which isneeded to ensure that diverse forms of life coexist, is an Enlightenment valuethat is shared by many religions and philosophies outside the West.34 It isdifficult to reconcile this more subtle reading of the Enlightenment with Graysdominant complaint that its main thinkers were committed to a view of humanprogress in which different cultures are made into a single universal civilisation.Gray might protest that non-Western philosophies often have the advantage overthe Enlightenment because they are not wedded to an anthropocentric project,but even here there is need for great care because one of the thinkers who Grayregards as symptomatic of modernist failingsnamely, Bentham35made sen-tience central to his moral philosophy, as did Frances Hutcheson. As Singer hasargued, the result was a philosophy which most certainly did not privilegehuman over animal pain and suffering.36 What might be made of these philo-sophical dispositions is the missing question in Grays shift from New Rightradicalism to the renunciation of progressivist politics.

Silence on this matter is surprising given that Gray recognises that Enlighten-ment thinking cannot be reduced to the desire to expand logics of control. Humeis regarded as one of the more sagacious Enlightenment thinkers because he sawhistory as a succession of cycles in which civilisation alternated with bar-barism,37 but this scepticism is thought to explain his marginal role in the eyesof those who are most strongly committed to the Enlightenment project. Some

readings of the Enlightenment have argued that this bleaker, or at least moresceptical, reading of human affairs and human history is less the exception thanthe rule. One maintains there was little confidence in progress in any fieldamongst French writers prior to the close of the 18th century. Indeed, cyclicaltheories of history prevailed or existed alongside the most progressive grandnarratives; writers such as Holbach, and Diderot on occasion, focused onperpetual flux rather than (on) evolution in any particular direction; Mon-tesquieu thought the political project was to postpone predictable decline.38

These thinkers may well have thought they were living in an age moreenlightened than the past, but this was often accompanied by a philosophically

informed and politically principled scepticism towards the grand narratives oftheir forebears and contemporaries.39 From this vantage point, the project of

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modernity might amount to little more than an effort to protect the civilisingprocess from permanent and ineliminable destructive urges. If this reading of theEnlightenment is correct, then Grays observations about the Occidentaltwilight and the need for post-humanism are guilty of neglecting the achieve-

ments of the Enlightenment.40

There is a strange parallel between Grays post-liberalism and Horkheimerand Adornos post-Marxism, which reduced the Enlightenment to a project ofdomination, leaving later thinkers such as Habermas with the task of recoveringits ethical protestations against torture, slavery and other examples of domi-nation. Vogel argues that Enlightenment thinkers such as Condorcet and Fosteropposed the cruelties of colonialism while Montesquieu stood for the destruc-tion of pathological loyalties and Voltaire vigorously defended toleration. Vogelnotes that the moral sentiment of compassion for suffering was essential to theEnlightenments defence of cosmopolitan citizenship and politics.41 The stress

then was as much on criticising the causes of human misery than on envisagingand striving to create a world free from conflict where the government of menreplaces the administration of things. A recurrent theme in Grays writings isthat market utopianism causes economic insecurity and unnecessary suffer-ing, but Gray does not regard this as a possible starting point for a globalethicindeed, such a project is ruled out by his unsubstantiated claim that moralphilosophy is a branch of fiction.42 The obvious question to ask is where Graysplea for a contemplative attitude towards the world leaves the question of humaninsecurity and suffering. Enlightenment thinking as developed by Kant and Marxanswered this question by analysing counter-hegemonic movements that developa conception of the good society through political action. Grays position seemsto be that all counter-hegemonic movements (including Green movements andpost-modernism) are just the Enlightenment in a new guise since all areultimately committed to a politics of expanding human control over society.43

Post-modern thinkers in particular have every reason to be bemused by Graysclaim that they hope for a social condition in which all our (conflicting) hopescan be satisfied.44

Gray comes close at many points to a poststructuralist ethic of respectingradical differences. The global order needs to be refashioned, he argues andrightly, to make the world more hospitable to non-Western cultures and values.What results from this argument is support for the pluralist conception of

international society which was defended by Vattel in the 18th century and byEnglish School writers such as Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson in more recenttimes. According to the pluralist approach, state sovereignty is to be defended aspart of the disavowal of all political projects that seek to impose any particularset of moral values on the whole world. Gray reflects this standpoint in hisargument for a world order in which governments are left alone unless theycause harm to outsiders.45 As many writers have argued, the problem with thisline of argument is that ethical pluralism is often frustrated, rather thanprotected, by state sovereignty. Gray is caught up in an internal contradictionhere. To take ethical pluralism seriously one must think about how best to make

the transition from a sovereign to a post-sovereign world order, but Gray cannottake this path because of his opposition to grand theorising along the lines of the

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Enlightenment. To defend the sovereign states-system is no less an exercise ingrand designs and one that comes at a price, by compromising the ideal ofcultural diversity and much else besides, including the belief that humanarrangements need to be revised to tackle economic insecurity and unnecessary

suffering.The problem is not insoluble, but it almost certainly leads back to the

Enlightenment and to thinkers such as Kant who were concerned not only withthe harm that states do to each other but with the states violence to its owncitizens and with the harms that resulted from the expansion of global commer-cial society. The main choice here is between two grand projects: between theKantian vision of a world order, which gives all individuals protection againstunnecessary suffering, and Grays flawed defence of the international states-system. In short, the political theory of the Enlightenment and the moralsentiment of compassion for suffering which animates so many of its key

writings offer a way of imagining an improved world order that addresses thehuman problems which Gray has documented in his critique of market utopi-anism. The point is not to abandon the Enlightenment, but to work through itslegacy in the way that Habermas did in response to Horkheimer and Adornospessimism, and as Foucault did in his parallel engagement with Kants philoso-phy and political thought.

Grays disillusionment with market utopianism leads him to abandon grandpolitical projects that have the purpose of alleviating the suffering it causes. Sogreat is the fear of being tarnished by the unintended consequences of grandprojects that safety is found in adopting a contemplative standpoint, even thoughthis seems to abandon the suffering to their fate. Hegel called this standpoint thebeautiful soul. It is a form of self-consciousness which is withdrawn into theinmost retreats of its being so that the ego is all that is essential, and all thatexists. This orientation lacks force to externalise itself, the power to make itselfa thing and to endure existence. It lives in dread of staining the radiance of itsinner being by action and existence. And to preserve the purity of its heart, itflees from contact with actuality, and steadfastly perseveres in a state ofself-willed impotence. It becomes a beautiful soul where its light dims and dieswithin it, and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air. 46 In theend, all this form of consciousness can do is play with itself.

The collapse of faith in a certain liberal grand metanarrative explains Grays

flight from contact with actuality. There has been a move from the position ofthose that want to understand too much and too quickly: they have explanationsfor everything to the perspective of those who refuse to understand: they offeronly cheap mystifications. The author of these words adds that the only wayforward lies in investigating the space between these two options.47 The middleground as far as Grays trajectory is concerned can be found in that strand ofEnlightenment thinking which believes that a primary function of politics is toprotect human beings from pain, humiliation and related forms of suffering.Defending this position is all the more necessary in the case of the intellectualwho supported New Right ideology despite the predictable miseries its im-

plementation would cause. The victims of that failed utopia deserve rather morethan an invitation to view the world more clearly through a lens cut from

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deflated political aspirations. Gray asserts that the social-democratic ideal ofreducing poverty and material inequalities, and creating a more just distributionof meaningful opportunities within nation-states and across the whole world, isunworkable because of the successes of economic liberalism, but his writings do

not undermine the claim that the social-democratic project is the legacy of theEnlightenment and needs to be supported and strengthened at the present timein response to the insecurities and suffering caused by market utopianism.

Notes

1. The three forms of suffering discussed in Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents(Hogarth Press,

1939), p. 28.

2. Joshua Cohen,Interrupting Auschwitz (Continuum, 2003), p. 38.

3. Ibid., p. xvi.

4. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 19191939(Macmillan, 1946).5. John Gray,Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and other Animals (Granta, 2002), pp. xiii, 4.

6. John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (Granta, 1998).

7. Ibid., p. 104.

8. Ibid., p. 126.

9. Ibid., p. 216; and John Gray, Al-Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern(Faber & Faber, 2003), p. 23.

10. Gray, Al-Qaeda, pp. 48, 523.

11. Gray, False Dawn, p. 67.

12. Gray, Al-Qaeda, p. 56.

13. Ibid., p. 20.

14. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 176; and Gray, Al-Qaeda, pp. 13.

15. Gray, False Dawn, pp. 1056, 132 and 235.

16. Chris Brown, The Modern Requirement? Reflections on Normative International Theory in a Post-West-ern World, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1998), pp, 33948; and Richard

Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge University Press,

2001).


18. Ibid., p. 200.

19. John Gray, Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought (Polity, 1997), pp. 1516.

20. Gray, Al-Qaeda, p. 60ff.

21. Gray, Endgames, p. 158.

22. Ibid., p. 173.

23. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 17.

24. Ibid., pp. 4 and 92; see also p. 28.


26. Ibid., pp. 163, 16970 and 172; see also Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 34.

27. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 151.

28. Ibid., p. 178.

29. Gray, Al-Qaeda, p. 97; and Gray, False Dawn, p. 216.

30. Ursula Vogel, Cosmopolitan loyalties and cosmopolitan citizenship in the Enlightenment, in: Michael

Waller & Andrew Linklater (eds), Political Loyalty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2003), pp. 1726.

31. Gray, Straw Dogs, pp. 11415.

32. Ibid., pp. xv and 199.

33. Ibid., p. 199.


35. Ibid., p. 119.

36. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Mans Inhumanity to Animals (Paladin, 1977),

pp. 267.37. Gray, Endgames, p. 136.

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38. Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment: The Pelican History of European Thought 4 (Penguin, 1968),

p. 150.

39. Karen OBrien, Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge

University Press, 1997), pp. 1011.

40. Gray, False Dawn, p. 193; and Gray, Endgames, p. 61.

41. Vogel, Cosmopolitan loyalties.42. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 109.

43. Ibid., p. 184.


45. Gray, Al-Qaeda, pp. 11314.

46. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. Baillie (George Allen & Unwin, 1949),

pp. 6656.

47. Giorgio Agamben, quoted in Cohen, Interrupting Auschwitz, p. 146.

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