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TableofContents

ACronymsAndAbbreviATionsiACknowledgemenTsiiiexeCuTivesummAryiv

1.ConTexTs:voice,violenceandConflictPrevention1

1.1Constructiverolesofelectionsforconflictprevention2

1.2destructiveelection-relatedconflict3

1.3Theeffectsofelection-relateddestructiveconflictongovernanceanddevelopment5

2.AnAlysis:Causes,Patternsandmonitoringofelection-relatedConflict7

2.1Thecontextandpathwaysofdemocratization8

2.2electoralsystemsandconflictdynamics8

2.3exploringrootcauses10

2.4motivesandmethods14

2.5Phasesoftheelectoralcycleandcommonpatternsofviolence20

2.6monitoringelectoralconflict22

3.PlAnning:strategiesandPrinciplesforConflictPrevention25

3.1workingtogether:Coordinatingapproaches26

3.2workingthroughouttheelectoralcycle28

3.3Highlightingvaluesandprinciples30

3.4emphasizinginternationalandregionalnorms35

4.ProgrAmming:examples,issuesandoptions37

4.1Promotingsocialcohesion37

4.2Civilsocietyandpublicengagementinitiatives38

4.3Facilitatingconstitutionalandlegalframeworkreform44

4.4workingwiththeelectoralmanagementbody45

4.5securitysectorengagementandelection-relatedsecurity47

4.6electionmonitoringorverification48

4.7electoraldisputeresolution48

5.ConClusion:somelessonslearnedfromundPexperience51

5.1undPsuniquerole51


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5.2entrypointsandsustainableprogramming52

5.3minimizingrisks,maximizingreturns52

5.4overviewoflessonslearnedfromcasestudies53


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Annex1.lessonslearnedQuestionnaireforundPCountryTeams57Annex2.Casestudy:bangladesh59Annex3.Casestudy:ghana63Annex4.Casestudy:guyana67Annex5.Casestudy:kenya69Annex6.Casestudy:lesotho79Annex7.Casestudy:nigeria83Annex8.Casestudy:sierraleone87Annex9.samplePeacePactandCodeofConduct(guyana2006)94Annex10.references97

boxesbox1.Constructiveanddestructiveconflict3box2.electoralsystemchoicesandelectoralconflictconsiderations10box3.Actorsandagentsinelectoralconflict13box4.evaluatingcausesofelection-relatedviolence:Analyticalindicators15box5.matchingelectiontypetoconflictconsiderations18box6.Theelectoralcycle28box7.illustration:Conflictpreventionoversuccessiveelectoralcycles29box8.regionalorganizationprinciplesonelectoralprocesses:36ThesAdCParliamentaryForumsnormsandstandardsbox9.TheiFeseverPrograminkyrgyzstan2005:lessonslearned42box10.electoraladministrationandconflictprevention:keyquestions46

PersPeCTives

PersPective1.electoralviolenceandconflicttrackinginNigeria200723derrickmarco,institutefordemocracyinsouthernAfrica(idAsA)PersPective2.Whatvaluesunderlieconflictpreventionapproaches?31Chrisspies,formerPeaceanddevelopmentAdvisor,undPguyana,andmikeJames,formerundPelectionsunitmanageringuyanaPersPective3.refugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonsinelectionprocesses34brettlacy,nationaldemocraticinstituteforinternationalAffairs(ndi)PersPective4.PreventingelectionviolenceinGuinea-Bissau:40theroleofthecitizensGoodwilltaskForce

evanHoffman,CanadianinternationalinstituteofAppliednegotiation(CiiAn)PersPective5.Guyanasmediaduringthe2006election43mikeJames,FormerProgrammanagerofundPselectionProgramunit,andTimneale,CommonwealthmediaAdvisor


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Acronymsandabbreviations

ACEACEKnowledgeNetwork

BCPRBureauforCrisisPreventionandRecovery(ofUNDP)BDPBureauforDevelopmentPolicy(ofUNDP)BECBangladeshElectoralCommissionBCPBasotholandCongressPartyBNPInAnnex2:BangladeshNationalParty

InAnnex6:BasotholandNationalParty(Lesotho)

CGWTFCitizensGoodwillTaskForce(Guinea-Bissau)CMCCodeMonitoringCommittee(SierraLeone)DACDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(ofOECD)DPAUnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs

DPKOUnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsEADUnitedNationsElectoralAssistanceDivisionECKElectionsCommissionofKenyaEMBElectoralManagementBody

ERSGExecutiveRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General,UnitedNationsEVERElectionViolenceEducationandResearchProgram(ofIFES)

GECOMGuyanaElectoralCommissionGGPGenderandGovernanceProgram(ofUNIFEM)GPAGuyanaPressAssociation

IDASAInstituteforDemocracyinSouthernAfrica

IDEAInternationalInstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistanceIDPInternallyDisplacedPerson

IECIndependentElectoralCommission(Lesotho)

IFESInternationalFoundationforElectoralSystemsINECIndependentNationalElectionCommittee(Nigeria)IOMInternationalOrganizationforMigrationIPAInterimPoliticalAuthority(Lesotho)IPPPInternationalPeaceandProsperityProject(Guinea-Bissau)IROInter-ReligiousOrganization(Guyana)JDBFJointDonorBasketFund(Nigeria)

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KANUKenyanAfricanNationalUnionKNCHRKenyanNationalCommissiononHumanRights

LCDLesothoCongressforDemocracyMDGMillenniumDevelopmentGoalMMPMixedMemberProportional(electionsystem)

MPMemberofParliamentNECNationalElectoralCommission(SierraLeone)NDINationalDemocraticInstitute

NGONon-GovernmentalOrganization

OCHAUnitedNationsOfficeoftheCoordinatorofHumanitarianAffairsODMOrangeDemocraticMovement(Kenya)OSCEOrganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope

PMUProgramManagementUnit(UNDPKenya)PNUPartyofNationalUnity(Kenya)PPRCPoliticalPartyRegistrationCommission(SierraLeone)

PRProportionalRepresentationSADCSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunitySLPSierraLeonePolice

UNUnitedNationsUNAMSILUnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninSierraLeoneUNDESAUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs

UNDPUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNIFEMUnitedNationsDevelopmentFundforWomenUNIOSILUnitedNationsIntegratedOfficeinSierraLeone

UNVUnitedNationsVolunteersUSAIDUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

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Acknowledgements

TheprojectonelectionsandconflictpreventionwassponsoredbytheUNDPOsloGovernanceCentre(OGC),DemocraticGovernanceGroupofUNDPsBureauforDevelopmentPolicy(BDP/DGG).ItwasledbySiphosamiMalunga,formerGovernanceandConflictAdvisoratOGCandcurrentlyDemocraticGovernancePracticeLeaderattheUNDPSub-RegionalOfficeforEasternandSouthernAfrica,andLindaMaguire,ElectoralAdvisoratBDP/DGG.Asoneoutputoftheproject,thisGuideonElectionsandConflictPreventionrepresentstheculminationofacollaborativeeffortbetweenBDPandtheBureauforCrisisPreventionandRecovery(BCPR).

ThisGuidewasauthoredbyaleadingacademicspecialist,TimothySisk,oftheJosefKorbelSchoolofInternationalStudies,UniversityofDenver(USA),togetherwithChrisSpies,aformerUNDPPeaceandDevelopmentAdvisorinGuyanaandpresentlyanindependentconsultanttoUNDPandother

internationalorganizations.

TheprojectwasaidedbytheworkofaTechnicalGroupthathelpedinitiallyshapeit,providedassistancewiththedesignofthecase-studytemplate(Annex1),andreviewedthetextatvariousstagesofitsevolution.MembersoftheTechnicalGroupincludedChetanKumar,CelineMoyroudandEugeniaPiza-Lopez,allfromBCPR.SubstantiveinputtotheGuidewasalsoprovidedbyJavierFabraandBjrnFrdefromOGCandAleidaFerreyrafromBDP/DGG.

ManyUNDPstaffinthefieldsharedtheirexperiences,providedinputand/orrev

iewedthecasestudies.InadditiontotheGuidesprimaryauthors,amongthosewhocontributedinthisregardwereMargieCook(Kenya),MikeJames(Guyana),AnandKumar(Nigeria),JessicaMurray(Bangladesh),CleverNyathi(SierraLeone),AndriesOdendaal(GhanaandLesotho)andOzonniaOjielo(Ghana).

SeveralexternalauthorsgraciouslyprovidedinsightsfortheGuideintheformofwrittencontributionstovarioussections.TheyincludedPeterEicher(independentconsultant),EvanHoffman(CIIAN),BrettLacy(NDI),DerrickMarco(IDASA)andTimNeale(Commonwealth).Thetexta

lsobenefitedfromthecopy-editingofJeffHoover.

Noteontext

OneoftheauthorsofthisGuide,TimothySisk,insomecasesrelieddirectlyandextensivelyonmaterialandpapershepreviouslypreparedonthistopic.NoneoftheoriginalsourcematerialssomeofwhicharecitedinthisGuidehavebeenformallypublishedelsewhere,howe


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ver.

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ExecutiveSummary

ThisUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)publication,ElectionsandConflictPrevention:AGuidetoAnalysis,PlanningandProgramming(identifiedthroughoutastheGuide),isdesignedasaknowledgeproductforpractitionersinthefieldofgovernanceandelectoralassistance.Itidentifiesstrategicapproachesandformsofprogrammingthatcanhelptoanticipateandpreventthetypesofviolentconflictthatfrequentlyaccompanyelectionsandsetbackdevelopmentinemergingdemocraciesorpost-warsocieties.TheGuideprovidesreaderswithpracticaloptionsandtoolsforprogrammingdesign,earlywarningandconflicttracking.Itpresentsvaluablelessonslearnedfromtheprevious,extensiveexperienceofUNDPanditspartnerorganizationsinthefield.TheinformationprovidedintheGuidereflectsUNDPbestpracticeasitrelatestothebroaderframeworkforUNengagementinelectoralassistance.

ThroughouttheGuide,theknowledgegainedfromresearchandanalysisispairedwithperspectivesofleadingpractitionerstoshowhowelectoralassistanceprogrammingcanbeadaptedtomitigateconflict.TheGuidealsoputselectoralassistanceintothebroadercontextofUNDPsemphasisondemocraticgovernanceandconflictprevention,wherebythelegitimate,accountableandeffectiveexerciseofstateauthoritycontributestotheconstructivemanagementofsocialchange.

Inrecentdecades,therehasbeenarapidlyexpandingrelianceonelectoralprocessesastheprincipal

waytolegitimizegovernanceatnational,regional,andlocallevels.Today,mostgovernmentsintheworldclaimlegitimacythroughsomeformofelectoralprocesses.Whenelectionsmeetglobalstandardsoffairness,administrativeprofessionalismandrespectforhumanrights,theyprovidepopularsupportandlegitimacyforboththesittingandelectedgovernments.Assuch,appropriateelectoralprocessesemphasizethepeacefulmanagementofsocialconflictthroughpublicdialogue,vigorousdebate,andtheauthoritativeselectionofleadersthroughagreedrules.Whileelectionsinthemselvesareonlyoneelementofdemocracy,theycreatethebasisfordemoc

raticgovernancebyensuringthatleadershavecredibleandacceptedmandatestogovern.Whenpeoplehavetheopportunitytoparticipatefreelyinpubliclifeandtochoosetheirleadersthroughafreeandopenprocess,theyarelesslikelytofeelaneedtoresorttoviolencetoresolvetheirdifferencesortomaketheirvoicesheard.

Atthesametime,however,becauseelectoralprocessesarefundamentallyaboutt


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heattainmentofpoliticalpower,ofteninhigh-stakescontexts,theycansometimesbeacatalystoracceleratorofconflict.Experienceshowsthatelectoralcontestscanelevatesocialtensionsandprovokeviolence,especiallywhentheelectoralprocessitselfisnotperceivedtobefreeandfair,orwherethoseseekingtoretainorgainpoliticalpowerhavefewornoqualmsaboutresortingtoextraordinarymeasuresincludingtheuseofforcetowin.violenceismostlikelytoeruptinsituationswheretherearealsootherunderlyingorrootcausesofconflict,suchasexclusion,inequalityorahistoryofethnictensions.Countriesemergingfromcivilwarhaveanespeciallyhighpotentialforconflictduringelectoralprocesses.Inrecentyears,fromAfghanistantoZimbabwe,politicalviolencehasaccompaniedelectionprocessesbefore,during,andaftertheactualdayordaysofballoting.Electionsdonotcauseviolence,buttheprocessofcompetingforpoliticalpoweroftenexacerbatesexistingtensionsandstimulatestheescalationofthesetensionsintoviolence.Electionsthusposedistinctopportunitiesandchallengesasakeyelementofgovernancedesignandprogrammingtopreventviol

entconflict.

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ThisGuidedescribeswaysinwhichUNDPelectoralassistanceprogrammingcancontributetoconflictpreventioninelections.Thematerialpresentedheredrawsoninsightsfromscholarlyandpolicy-orientedliterature,aswellasonthereflectionsofpractitionersinthefieldandthefindingsofpartnersontheground.Theaimistomakethisknowledgeavailableandaccessible,especiallyforuseinfutureUNDPelectoralassistanceundertakings.

ThematerialintheGuideisorganizedintoseparatesectionsfocusingoncontext,analysis,planning,programming,andlessonslearned,asdescribedbelow:

..

SECTION1outlinesthecontextsofelectoralviolenceandexplainsthelinkagesbetweenelectionsandconflict.Itunderscoresthatelectoralprocessesareessentialtodemocracyandgoodgovernance,contributingtolegitimacyforgovernmentsandservingasamechanismforaccountabilityandforcitizenvoice.Thesectionexplainsthedifferencesbetweenconstructivea

nddestructiveconflict.Itdescribeshowfairandcredibleelectionscancontributetoconflictprevention,whereassomeelectionsdeemedfairornotcanalsobecomeacatalystforviolenceinsituationswheretensionsorconflictalreadyexist.Itpointsouthowelection-relatedviolenceoftenhasdevastatingeffectsongoodgovernanceanddevelopmentandhowintegratingconflictpreventionstrategiesintoelectoralprocessescanhelppreventthis.

..

SECTION2providesanextensiveanalysisofthecausesandpatternsofelection-relatedviolence,includingthecontextofdemocratizationorpoliticalchangeinthecountry;theeffectsthatvariouselectoralsystemsmayhaveonexacerbatingorreducingconflict;andhowthenatureofpoliticalmobilizationinacountrymayaffectthelikelihoodofconflict.Thesectionexplorestherootcausesandincentivesforelection-relatedconflict,includingthehighstakesofelectionoutcomesintermsofthedistributionofpowerandresources.Itdiscussesmotivesforandtypesofelectionviolence,andshowshowdifferenttypesofviolencemayrelatetodifferentphas

esofanelectoralcycle.Thesectionhighlightslikelyindicatorsofelection-relatedconflictandconsidershowdifferenttypesofelections(presidential,parliamentary,local)mayengenderdifferenttypesofviolence.Inconclusion,thesectionexplainshowcomprehensivemonitoringofinstancesofconflictcanbehelpfulindevelopingstrategiestomitigateviolence.

..


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SECTION3setsouttheimportanceofstrategicplanningtoensurethatelectoralassistanceincludesafocusonconflictpreventiontoensurethegoodworkdonethroughelectoralassistanceprogrammingisnotundonebysubsequentoutbreaksofviolence.Itdescribeshow,withproperplanning,conflictpreventionstrategiescanbemainstreamedintointernationalelectionassistancethroughacoordinatedapproachtoprogrammingonelections,democracy,governance,humanrights,genderandpovertyreduction.Anotheraspectofmainstreamingdiscussedinthesectionistheimportanceofworkinginacoordinatedmannerwithallrelevantactorsdealingwithelectoralassistanceandrelatedissues,includingthosesupportingelection-relatedinstitutionsandgroupssuchasthejudiciary,legislatures,policeandcivilsociety.Thesectionexplainshowconflictpreventioneffortsshouldbeintroducedatallphasesoftheelectioncycle,inlinewithUNDPspreferredapproachofprovidingelectoralassistancethroughoutthecycle.Thesectionprovidesmultipleexamplesofvaluesandprinciplesthatcanunderlieeffective

approachestoconflictprevention,includingespeciallytheconceptofproceduralfairnessandtheimportanceofusinginternationalandregionalnormsandstandardsasabasisforactionandprograms.

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..

SECTION4describesandgivesexamplesoftypesofexternalassistanceprogrammingthathavebeeneffectiveinmitigatingelection-relatedviolence.Itexplainshowbuildingsocialcohesionasensebyallgroupsofbelongingcanbeacriticalelementofsuccessfulprogramstopreventaresorttoorresumptionofviolence.Thesectionconsidershowprogramssuchasvotereducation,workshopsforpoliticalpartiesandtrainingforelectionstakeholderscanbeusedasvehiclesforconciliationandconflictprevention.Itoutlinestheimportanceofinvolvingandsupportinglocalcivilsocietyorganizationsinconflictpreventionefforts,recognizingthattheyareoftenbetterplacedtoactmoreeffectivelythantheinternationalcommunity.Othertypesofelectoralassistanceprogrammingthatcanbeeffectiveinmitigatingconflictarealsoexamined,includingi)reformofconstitutionalandlegalframeworks;ii)strengtheningandbuildingthecapacityofelectoralmanagementbodies(EMBs);iii)providingappropriatetrainingandsupp

ortforpoliceorotherservicesinvolvedinelectionsecurity;iv)electionmonitoring(bothdomesticandinternational);andv)electiondisputeresolution.

..

SECTION5outlinessomeofthemanylessonslearnedfromUNDPsextensiveexperienceofprogramminginsituationsofelection-relatedconflict.Theseinclude:

thenecessityofbuildingtrustamongkeyplayers;

theimportanceofdevelopinganelectoralsystemthathasbroadsupportamongcompetingpartiesandcandidates;

thecriticalroleoflocalownershipandoflocalstakeholdersplayingaleadingroleinsuccessfulviolence-preventionefforts;and

theneedtoinvolvearangeofkeyconstituenciesandcentresofinfluence,includingthemedia,thesecurityservices,politicalparties,civilsocietyleadersandother


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sinprogramstopreventconflict.

Withthesepointsinmind,UNDPhasfoundthatelectionsprovideanentrypointformanytypesofconflictpreventionprogramming,includingtrainingandeducationprojects,capacity-building,stakeholderconsultations,legislativereview,andassistanceinotherfields.ExperiencehasshownthatUNDPhasauniqueroleindevelopingprogramsinregardtoelectionsandconflictbecauseitiswidelyperceivedasanimpartialarbiterandbecauseitcanmobilizetechnicalexpertiseandcoordinatedonors.Anotherimportantlessonlearnedisthateffectiveprogramsinconflictpreventionlikeeffectiveprogramsofelectoralassistancearealong-termprocess.

Inadditiontothefindingsandrecommendationsinthemaintext,readerswillfindmaterialin:

boxes,inwhichkeyfindingsorexplanationsarepresentedinareadilyaccessi

blemanner;

..

perspectivesfromleadingpractitionersfromUNDPpartnerorganizationsandscholars;and

..

casestudiesthatoffersomespecificexamplesandthathighlightthewaysinwhichUNDPcountryofficeshaveapproachedthechallengeofprovidingelectoralassistanceincontextsof

destructiveconflict.

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TheAnnexesattheendoftheGuidebeginwithalessonslearnedquestionnairethatcanserveasatemplateforevaluationoffutureUNDPprograms.TheAnnexesalsoincludesevencasestudiesofcountriesinwhichrecentUNDPelectionassistanceprogramminghasincludedasubstantialfocusonconflictpreventionormitigation:Bangladesh,Ghana,Guyana,Lesotho,Kenya,NigeriaandSierraLeone.TheAnnexesendwithasamplepeacepactandcodeofconductdevelopedandagreedtobypoliticalpartiescontestingthe2006electionsinGuyana;theyofferagoodexampleofapracticalstepthatcouldserveasamodelforothercountriessituationswhereelectoralcontestspresenttheriskofviolentconflict.ReferencesattheendoftheGuidepointreaderstofurtherinformationandtoacademicstudiesofconflictandelections.

Thematerialinthisguideisnotintendedtobeprescriptive.Itiswidelyacceptedthatthereisnoperfectelection.Establishedandemergingdemocraciesalikeareconstantlyseekingtoimprovetheconductandadministrationofelectionsthroughadaptationstotheirelectoralp

rocesses,changestotheirelectionsystemsorlegislativeframeworks,improvementsintrainingandeducation,andmoreeffectiveuseofinformationtechnology.Everyelectionprocessisunique.Eachfacesitsownlocalconditions,pressuresandchallengesthatareunlikelytofitneatlyintoatemplateforchange.Inseekingtodesigneffectiveformsofelectoralassistancethatwillhelptomitigateconflict,therefore,theGuidemakesclearthatitisvitaltothinkcreatively,toremainflexibleandtoensurethatdomesticpartnersandstakeholdersarefullyinvolvedin,andcommittedto,theprocess.

Becausenoelectionisperfect,eachcarrieswithitthepotentialofheightenedconflict,which,inmanysituations,candegenerateintoviolence,withdireeffectsonnationalstability,democracyanddevelopment.Therearemanystarkexamplesofthis,amongthemtheassassinationofPakistanipoliticalleaderBenazirBhuttoinDecember2007whilecampaigningpriortogeneralelections.Inthemostseriouscases,crisesinelectoralprocesseshavebeenacriticalacceleratoroftensionsthatledtocivilwarortherelapseintoviolenceinsomepost-warsituations,forexample,inBurundiin1993andinLiberiain1997.

PerhapsnosituationunderscorestheurgencyofunderstandingthecomplicatednexusbetweenelectionsandconflictpreventionmorethantheexperienceofKenyainlate2007andearly2008.DespiteasustainedandsignificanteffortbytheUNandtheinternationalcommunitytoavertconflictandviolencewellbeforethepoll,duringvoting,andinthetumultuouspoliticalcrisisthatemergedaftertheannouncementofresults,violenceflaredandescalatedalongparty-pol


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iticalandethniclines,resultinginmorethan1,000deadandhundredsofthousandsofpeopledisplaced.TheKenyaimbrogliounderscoresakeyfindinginthisGuide:electoralprocessesthatarefraughtwithfraud,mismanagement,orexcessivepoliticalinfluencecantapintounderlyinginequalitiesandtherebystimulatedeeper,serioussocialconflictandunderminetheadvanceofhumandevelopment.TheKenyaexperiencealsounderscoresthedifficultiesofdesigningandimplementingsuccessfulprogramstomitigateconflictinelections,evenwhenthepotentialforviolenceisevidentwellinadvance.

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OtherexamplesinthisGuide,however,illustratehowstrategiesinsomecountrieshavebeensuccessfulinlimitingorentirelyavoidinganticipatedviolence.The2006generalelectionsinGuyanawereoneexampleofhowconflict-preventionprogramsledbylocalleaders,withinternationalsupport,transformedwhatwasexpectedtobeaviolentelectioncontestintothemostpeacefulelectioninthecountryshistory.The2007parliamentaryandpresidentialelectionsinSierraLeonedemonstratedhowatransparent,well-managedandinclusiveprocesscanresultinapeacefulandcredibleelectionevenwhileacountryisstillstrugglingtorecoverfromtheeffectsofaviciouscivilwar.TheDecember2008parliamentaryelectionsinBangladeshshowedhowchangestospecificelectionprocedures,inthisinstancethecreationofavoterregisterwithphotographs,couldcontributetobuildingconfidenceandalleviatingtensionsthathadledtoviolenceinpreviouselections.

AkeyconclusionthatemergesfromthisGuide,therefore,isthatsuccessinconflictmitigationinelectionsoftenrequiresthedevelopmentofcomplexstrategiesinvolvingmanyac

torsandvariedapproaches.Whentherootcausesofconflictexist,conflictpreventionshouldbeanintegralpartofelectoralassistanceprogramsbyUNDPandothers,notonlyintheimmediaterun-uptoahigh-profileelectionevent,butjustasimportantthroughoutthefullelectoralcyclewherethemostfruitfulopportunitiesforinstitutionalandindividualcapacitydevelopmentoccur.Ultimately,thesuccessoftheprogramswilldependtoagreatextentonthepoliticalwilldisplayedbythenationalgovernment,thepoliticalpartiesandotherelectionstakeholders.

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1CONTEXTS:

Voice,ViolenceandConflictPrevention

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CONTEXTS:1CONTEXTS:1Voice,ViolenceandConflictPrevention

?

Whatarethelinkagesbetweenelectionsandconflictpreventionandhowdoesdestructiveconflictaffectgovernanceanddevelopment

Whensuccessful,electoralprocessesofferameansofchannellingsocialconflictintorespectfulandconstructivedebateandcommonrulesforchoosingauthoritativerepresentativesofthepeoplewhocanserveinexecutive,legislative,andotherinstitutions.Today,itiswidelyunderstoodthattheultimateguarantorofsocialpeaceisrobustdemocraticinstitutionssuchaselections(MallochBrown2003).Electionsthatgivevoicetothepeopleareinessenceacriticalmeansofsocialconflictmanagementthroughpeacefuldeliberationsanddecision-makingprocessesinwhichwinnerscarryoutpromisedpolicyinitiativesandprogramsandlosersare

givenopportunitytoserveasaloyalopposition,andtotryagaininfuturecompetitions.

Electoralprocessesofferasafe,predictable,rule-boundmethodforarbitratingpoliticalandsocialconflictsthroughtheselectionofrepresentativesorthedefinitiveresolutionofquestionsbeforethecommunity(asinreferendums).Whenelectionsarecrediblyconducted,theyimbuethegovernmentwithlegitimacygarneredbytheconsentofthepeople,improvingthecapacityofthestatetoensurecommunitysecuritythroughlegitimateauthorityundertheruleoflaw,andto

improvelevelsofhumandevelopmentthrougheffectivegovernance.Credibleelectionscreatelegitimategovernmentsthatenjoypopularsupportforprogramsandpolicies.

Ontheotherhand,preciselybecauseelectionprocessesareconteststhroughwhichpoliticalpowerisretainedorpursued,andsocialdifferencesarehighlightedbycandidatesandpartiesincampaignsforpopularsupport,theycanoftengeneratevulnerabilitiesfortheescalationofconflictintoviolence.Indeed,itisquiteclearthatelectionprocessesinrecentyearssometimes

catalyzedconflictbefore,duringandaftervotingday.Tensionsmayriseintherun-uptoelectionprocessesassomecandidatesmobilizealongextremistlinestowinsupport,asrivalfactionsvieforvotesandtosecureturf,andaspartiesorfactionsseektoweakenoreveneliminateopponentsineffortstoseekorretainpoliticalpower.Duringtheelectionevent,aswell,violencesometimesspikesinthedaysbeforeorduringvotingasthedramaofthecontestunfolds.After


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thevote,thereisthecontinuingpotentialforpost-electionviolencewhenallegationsoffraudandcorruptionemerge,orwherethosedissatisfiedwiththeoutcomesofelectionstaketothestreetsor,inthegravestinstances,thebattlefield,tochallengeresults.

Thus,electoralprocessescancontributetopeaceortheycanbecatalystsofconflict.

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1.1ConstructiverolesofelectionsforconflictpreventionHowdocredible,fairlyconductedelectoralprocessescontributetomanagingsocialdifferencesandthepeacefulpursuitofpoliticalpower?Intheoryandinpractice,electionshelpmanageandprocessconflictinthefollowingways(seealsoBox1):

Generatinglegitimacy.Whenelectoralprocessesarecredible,approachingtheidealoffreeandfair,andwhentheyareinclusiveofallelementsofsocietythroughawell-consideredlawofcitizenshipandofvoterregistration,themandategivenbythepeopletovictoriouscandidatesandpoliticalpartiesimbuesgovernancewithlegitimacy.Legitimategovernmentsaremorelikelytomanageconflictpositivelythanillegitimateones.

Reflectingthewillofthepeople.AsDerrickMarcooftheInstituteforDemocracyinSouthernAfrica(IDASA)writes,Credibleelectionsmustbeunderstoodaselectionswherethewillofthepeople[has]beenexpressedinanenvironmentthatisfreeofintimidation,violence,coercion,fullyparticipatoryandenablingforthevoterstoexercisetheirrighttovote.Thetermcredibleprovides

amuchbroaderframeworkformeasurementincludingtheenvironmentinwhichtheelectionsoccurredthantermssuchasfreeandfairandlegitimate.ItalsoleavestheresponsibilityofdeclaringanelectionfreeandfairtotheEMB[electoralmanagementbody]thatislegallyboundtomakethefinaldeclarationontheoutcomeoftheresultsandtheelectionsgenerally.1

Choosingrepresentatives.Goodelectoralprocessesdonotpre-judgethenatureofsocietyandwhoshouldrepresentwhom;indeed,electoralprocessesareaboutdefiningwhatismeantbyrepresentation.Thatis,agoodelectoralprocesswillallowsocietyonitsowntodeterminethenatureofitssimilaritiesanddifferences(Ellis2006).Representationmaybegeographic,ideological,identity-based(religion,ethnicity,orgender)oralongother


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lines.

..

Agenda-setting.Electoralprocesseshelpestablishwhatissuesarebeforethecommunity.Theyhelpdefinewhicharepriorityissues,andpresentvariousoptionstorespondtothosechallenges.Campaignsthussetagendaswithcandidatesarticulatingtheirpriorityissues.

..

Voiceandeducation.Electoralprocessesgivevoicetothecitizens,ideally,inthattheyprovideanopportunityforeachindividualinthepoliticalcommunitytoonpollingdayspeakaspoliticalequalsastheycasttheirvote.Eachvote,andeachpersonsvoiceorview,isheardequallyonthatday.Atthesametime,inconsideringhowtheywillvote,votersareeducatedonpolicyissuesbycandidates.Ideally,voterslearnaboutwhatpoliticalleadersthinkthekey

issuesare,andtheylearnthroughdebateanddiscourseabouttherangeofpossiblepublicpolicyoptionsandcosts,consequences,andconsiderationsforeach.

WrittencontributionofDerrickMarco(IDASA)tothisGuide(seePerspective1).

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BOX1....Bywayofcaveat,notallelectionsareaboutpoliciesandissues;indeed,acommoncriticismisthattheyareoftenaboutindividualorcandidatepersonalityorcharisma.Manyelectoralprocessesarecharacterizedbyfewarticulatedpolicydifferencesamongthepartiesandverylittleevidenceofvotereducationorofadiversityofviewsonpolicyissuesbeingraised.

Whetheranygivenelectoralprocessfulfilsallofthefunctionsmentionedaboveisaconsequenceofitsoverallquality,oftendescribedintermsofanelectionbeingeitherfreeandfairornot.AsReynoldsandElklitargue,Thegreatestfailingofelectionassessmenttodatehasbeenthetendencytoseeelectionqualityin

bimodalterms.Theelectioniseithergoodoritisbad,orwhenafudge[qualification]isrequired,itissubstantiallyfreeandfair.Butthereisnodoubtthatthequalityofelectionsacrosscasesandacrosstimecanbeseenasexistingona

continuum.Inessence,oneneedstolookattheprocessandoutcometogaugeafullpictureofelectionquality.(ReynoldsandElklit2005:3)

1.2Destructiveelection-relatedconflictAclearfindingfromrecentexperienceisthat

electoralprocessescanstimulateorcatalyzedestructivesocialconflict:Burundi,Cambodia,Ethiopia,Guyana,Haiti,Kenya,SriLanka,andZimbabwearejustafewoftheexamplesofcountrieswhereelectoralprocesseshavebeenpersistentlyviolenceridden.Inthemostdestructiveinstancessuchasthe1992presidentialelectionsinAngolaorparliamentarypollsthatyearinAlgeriaelectionsandtheiroutcomescanoftenbeastrongstimulantforviolencethatescalatestothelevelofcivilwar.



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Election-relatedviolencecanbedefinedas:

Actsorthreatsofcoercion,intimidation,orphysicalharmperpetratedtoaffectanelectoralprocessorthatariseinthecontextofelectoralcompetition.Whenperpetratedtoaffectanelectoralprocess,violencemaybeemployedtoinfluencetheprocessofelectionssuchaseffortstodelay,disrupt,orderailapollandtoinfluencetheoutcomes:thedeterminingofwinnersincompetitiveracesforpoliticalofficeortosecureapprovalordisapprovalofreferendumquestions.2

CarlDundas,acontributortoonlinediscussionsthroughtheACEElectoralKnowledgeNetworkaspartoftheresearchforthisGuide,3makesausefuldistinctionbetweenviolenceaimedatdisruptinganelectionbythosewhohavenointerestinaparticularelectiontakingplace,andelectionviolencetriggeredbytherivalrybetweencontestingpoliticalpartiesandorcandidates.

Someofthecommonunderstandingsaboutthenatureandattributesofelectoralviolencearethefollowingfindingsfromscholarlyresearchandpractitionerreflection.

Electionsdonotcauseviolence.Instead,therootcausesofconflictareoftenfoundindeep-rootedeconomic,socialorpoliticalissuesindisputeandintheallocationof

poweramongvarioussocialforcesthattheelectoralprocessaffects.

Electoralviolenceisasub-typeofpoliticalviolenceinwhichactorsemploycoercioninaninstrumentalwaytoadvancetheirinterests

orachievespecificpoliticalends.Similarly,societiespronetoexperiencingelection-relatedviolencearenormallyvulnerableto

broaderorotherkindsofpoliticalviolence.Colombia,India,Indonesia,KosovoandSriLankaareexamplesofinstancesinwhichelectoralviolenceisembeddedinabroadercontextoflongstandingsocialconflict.

Electoralviolenceincludesacts,suchas


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assassinationofopponentsorspontaneousfisticuffsbetweenrivalgroupsofsupportersandthreats,coercion,andintimidationofopponents,voters,orelectionofficials.Threatandintimidationareformsofcoercionthatarejustaspowerfulasactsofviolencecanbe.Indeed,onepurposeofactsofbroaderintimidationsuchastossingagrenadeintoacrowdofrivalsupporters4istoinducefearandtointimidate(e.g.,tosuppressmobilizationorvotingbythatgroup).

Violentactscanbetargetedagainstpeopleorthings,suchasthetargetingofcommunitiesorcandidatesorthedeliberatedestructionofcampaignmaterials,vehicles,offices,orballotboxes.

Howtheelectionprocessandadministrationisdesigned,managed,andimplemented

hasastrongbearingonelectoralviolence.Thoseelectionsconsideredtobefree,fair,andtransparentarelesslikelytoexperienceelectoralviolencethanthosewhereallegationsofmismanagementordeliberatecheatingareprevalent.

2Inanotherusefuldefinition,Fischer(2002:4)offersthisdescription:Electoralconflictandviolencecanbedefinedasanyrandomororganizedactorthreat

tointimidate,physicallyharm,blackmail,orabuseapoliticalstakeholderinseekingtodetermine,delay,ortootherwiseinfluenceanelectoralprocess.Electionsecuritycanbedefinedastheprocessofprotectingelectoralstakeholders,information,facilities,andevents.

3Aspartoftheresearchmethodologyforthisreport,queriesweresentouttothemembersoftheACEElectoralKnowledgeNetwork(seewww.aceproject.org)andreplieswerereceivedfrommanypractitionersaroundtheworld.Theinsightsfromthisonlineinformationsharingaregenerallyreflectedthroughoutthisreportand,

insomeinstances(suchasthisone),arenotedspecifically.

4SuchanincidentoccurredinApril2004duringacampaignrallyinSrinagar,thecapitaloftheIndianstateofJammuandKashmir,inthecontextofIndiasnationalparliamentaryelectionsofthatyear.SeeGrenadeAttackatMehboobasRally:ThreeKilled,Cameramanamong7InjuredTheTribune,25April2004.Online:www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040426/main1.htm.


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Asthelastpointsuggests,thereisacomplexlinkagebetweenelectionviolenceandelectionfraud,orcheating.5Inonedirection,theemploymentofcoercivemethodstogainvotesoraffectoutcomesisitselfaformofelectionfraud.Ontheotherhand,massivecheatingorfraudsuchasconspiraciestobribevoters,tamperingwithballots,fallaciouscounting,orothermeasures(suchasreleasinglargenumbersofprisonerstovote)canbethestimulusforaviolentreaction.Indeed,oneofthecommonreasonsformassmobilizationandviolentresistancetostateauthorityisallegationsofstolen,cheating,orfaadedemocracy.6

1.3Theeffectsofelection-relateddestructiveconflictongovernanceanddevelopmentInmostinstances,election-relatedconflicthasdevastatingeffectsongovernanceanddevelopment.Whensuchviolenceoccurs,itoftenimpairsthefunctionofthegovernmentalinstitutionsthatemergefromprocesseswhereviolencehas

taintedthefairnessoftheprocessandthelegitimacyofelectionoutcomes.7AsscholarKristineHglundobserves(Hglund2006:2;emphasisinoriginal):

Fromtheperspectiveofdemocraticpolitics,violenceandinsecuritymayaffecttheelectionresultsortheoutcomesofelectionsinvariousways.Threatsandintimidationmaybeusedtointerferewiththeregistrationofvoters.Voterturnoutmaybeinfluencediflargesectionsofthepopulationrefrainfromcastingtheirvotesduetofearofviolence.Assaults,threats,and

politicalassassinationsduringtheelectioncampaignmayforcepoliticalcontenderstoleavetheelectoralprocessorpreventelectionsfromtakingplace.

Fromtheconflictmanagementperspective,violencemayhaveanegativeimpactbypolarizingtheelectoratealongconflictlinesandinextremecasesleadtonewoutburstsofviolence.Insituationsofinsecurity,appealsforlawandorderareoftenamoretemptingalternativethancallsforreconciliation.

Thereisaclearlinkagebetweenviolentconflictandlimitedhumandevelopment.InthePhilippines,forexample,thoseprovincesthathaveexperiencedthemostelectionviolencearealsothosethataremostimpoverished.8Electionviolence,likeotherformsofviolentconflict,canmeandevelopmentinreverseasincidentsofviolenceunderminegovernmentlegitimacy,scareawaydomesticforeigninvestors,andresultinlowlevelsofsocialtrust.9


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5Foranextensiveanalysisofwhatconstituteselectionfraud,seeLehoucq(2003).6Onthenotionoffaadedemocracy,seeLarge,JudithandSisk,Timothy,Democracy,ConflictandHumanSecurity:PursuingPeaceinthe21stCentury,Chapter4(2006:113-150).7Thequalificationinmostinstancesisneededbecause,insomesituations,rebelgroupchallengesmayincreasepublicsupportforrulingregimes.Forexample,GarciaandHoskinarguethefollowinginregardtoColombia:Violencechallenges,butdoesnotnecessarilydelegitimizeelectoralpolitics:Thedynamicofviolencegeneratesnegativeeffectsupontheelectoralprocess,andtheimpactofpoliticalviolenceuponelectoralparticipationsuggestsagrowingchallengetodemocraticinstitutionsandorganizations.However,inacountrysuchasColombia,withalongtraditionofinstitutionalizedelections,thepoliticalinstitutionsmayshowaremarkableresiliencetotheassaultsofarmedgroups,which,whiletakingtheirtoll,failtounderminethelegitimacyassociatedwiththeelectoralprocess.SeeGarcia,MiguelandGaryHoskin,PoliticalParticipationandWarinColombia,CrisisStatesProgrammeBriefingPaperNo.14,December2003.OnlineinPDFformat:www.crisisstates.com/download/bp/bp14.pdf.8PantinoandVelasco(2006)note:ThesouthernislandofMindanaoandtheAutono

mousRegionofMindanao(ARMM)routinelyregisterhighratesofelectionviolence.TheARMMalsohappenstobetheregionwiththelowestsocialindicatorsandthehighestmiseryindex.Itsvulnerabilitytomachinepoliciesisalsohigh.Machinepoliticsmeansthattheballetofthepoliticiansorganization,i.e.,networks,alliances,andbailiwicks,andcampaignstructuredeterminestheelectionoutcomes.9Thephraseisdescriptiveoftheeffectsofcivilwarondevelopment,butitisalsoaccuratewhenemployedtoareasexperiencinghighlevelsofpoliticalviolence.SeeHoeffler,AnkeandMartaReynal-Querol,MeasuringtheCostsofConflict,CentrefortheStudyofAfricanEconomies,UniversityofOxford,April2003.



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Ontheotherhand,itispossibletoalsoseethecausalconnectionsbetweenunderdevelopmentandviolencetheotherwayaround:sharpinequalitiesinthedistributionofwealth,power,oraccesstosocialbenefitsmakemoresocietiesmoresusceptibletoviolence.Althoughitisdifficulttodefinitivelydescribecausalconnections,thelinkagebetweenelection-relatedconflictanddevelopmentisdescribedbestintermsofaviciouscycleinwhichstrifeandunderdevelopmentaremutuallyreinforcing.

Thisfindingsuggeststhatconflictpreventioninelectoralprocessescanalsohelpturntheviciouscycleintoavirtuousoneinwhichmorecredibleelectionscontributetolegitimategovernanceandthustogreateropportunitiesforhumandevelopment.



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2ANALYSIS:Causes,PatternsandMonitoringofElection-RelatedConflict

ANALYSIS:CAUSES,PATTERNSANDMONITORINGOFELECTION-CONFLICT


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2

ANALYSIS:

Causes,PatternsandMonitoringofElection-RelatedConflict

Whataretheunderlyingandproximatecausesofelection-relatedviolence

?

Inthetwoweeksaheadofthemuch-anticipatedAdditionally,armedinsurgenciesinpartsofthe

Philippinescongressionalandlocalelectionson14May2007,thecountryschiefofpoliceoperations,WilfredoGarcia,reportedthatsome22politicianshadalreadybeenkilledandabout80election-relatedviolenteventshadoccurredinthefourmonthsofofficialcampaigningthatprecededthevote.10Sincethepeoplepowermovementlauncheddemocratizationinthecountryin1986,eachsubsequentelectioncycle

hasbeenfraughtwithwidespreadelection-relatedviolence.

Inthisexample,observersattributedapatternofelection-relatedviolenceinthecountrytoseveralinterrelatedfactors,suchasahistoryofintenserivalryamongpoliticalclans,starkcompetitionforgovernmentpoststhatcarrythepotentialforpowerandaccesstoresourcesandstatelargesse,andabroadercultureofviolenceinwhichsmallarmsareplentifulandofteninuse.11Accordingtothepolice,powerfulpoliticiansoftenhavetheirownprivatearmies

andsomemembersofthesecurityforceswerealsoactingtoprotectorservepoliticalbosses.

countrysteppedupattacksduringtheelectionprocess.12

Althoughthereisnocommondatabaseonelection-relatedviolencespecificallyormoregenerallyonpoliticalviolence,evidencefromtheseandmanyothercasessuggeststhatelection-relatedviolenceiswidespread.Accordingtoatleastonestudythatsoughttoquantifytheextentoftheproblemincross-nationalresearch,

atleasthalfoftheelectoralprocessesobservedin2001featuredsignificantelection-relatedviolencebefore,duringorafterthepivotaldaysoftheelection(Fischer2001).Whilenosingletheorycanaccountforalltherootcausesofelectionviolence,thereisconsensusthatthreeelementsarecritical:thecontextofdemocratizationorpoliticalchangeinwhichviolenceoccurs,theeffectsofelectoralsystemchoiceonconflictdynamics,andthenatureandpatternsofpolitical


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mobilization.

Boxes4and5attheendofSection2provideanoverviewofthesethemesandanalyzethevariousindicatorsanddynamicsofelection-relatedconflict.Thesummariesintheboxesmaywell

10Magato,Manny,PhilippinePoliceWarnofRisingPollViolence,Reuters,24April2007.Some12Senateseats,235HouseofRepresentativesseats,and18,000localgovernmentofficeswerecontestedintheelections.Mostelectioncampaignsinthecountryhavebeentaintedbyviolence;duringthe2004presidentialrace,forexample,some140peoplediedinelection-relatedviolence.

11Pantino,PatrickandDjorinaVelasco,ElectionViolenceinthePhilippines,FriedrichEbertStiftungPhilippineOfficeOnlinePapers,atlibrary.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/50071.pdf.

12AbombblastinTucarongontheislandofMindanao,on9May2007,wasattributedtotheinsurgentsandasrelatedtotheelectionprocess.



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serveasanassessmenttooltoidentifywaysinwhichconflict-preventionprogrammingcanbedesignedtomitigatethemostlikelyorprobablescenariosinwhichconflictmayescalate.Thesub-sectionthatfollowstheseboxes(Section2.5)mayalsobehelpfulinthisregard.

2.1ThecontextandpathwaysofdemocratizationThecontextofdemocratizationmatterssignificantlyinevaluatingthewaysinwhichelectoralprocessesmaybeacatalystofviolence.Thecurrentliteraturetendstofocusonelection-relatedviolenceinseveraldistinctcategories:

countriesintransition,whichhaveexperiencedtransitionsfromauthoritarianorsingle-partyruletomultipartypoliticsbutwhichareconsideredtobepartial,unconsolidated,faade,orgray-zone(mixed)systems

andwhichmaybeespeciallypronetoorvulnerabletoconflictduetotheuncertaintiesoftransitionthatthesesocietiesexperience(asinthePhilippines,notedpreviously,whichsawaninitialtransitiontodemocracyin1986,morethan20yearsago)(Carothers2002);

consolidatingdemocracies,whichremainsusceptibletoshocksandrequirefurtherdeepeningofdemocracytobuildresilience

inthesystem.Forexample,Guyanahasbeenaformaldemocracysince1966,butthequalityofdemocracydeterioratedasethnicallybasedpolitics,economichardships,ColdWarrelatedideologies,andmigrationtooktheirtoll.For50yearsGuyanaexperiencedcontinualelection-relatedviolence,perpetratedmostlybysupportersofthosewholostpower.13The2006electionswerethefirstelectionsthatwerefreefromseriouselectionviolence;

..

post-warsocietiesundergoingawar-todemocracytransitionandinwhichelectionsareseenasacriticalturningpointintheimplementationofapeaceagreementbutinwhichi)disarmamentanddemobilizationmaybeincomplete,ii)socialdivisionandenmityrunsverydeep,iii)thosewhorejectthetermsofthepeaceagreementmaycontinuetooperate,and/oriv)inwhichtheeconomicand


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socialeffectsofwarremainstrong(e.g.,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoin2006);and

situationsofreferendumstoratifypeaceagreements(asinNorthernIrelandandtheRepublicofIrelandinMay1998,apollinwhich71percentofvotersinNorthernIrelandvotedinfavouroftheBelfastAgreement)ortodeterminethesovereignstatusofadisputedterritory(asinTimor-Lestein1999,inwhichnearly79percentofvotersoptedforindependencefromIndonesia).

2.2ElectoralsystemsandconflictdynamicsAnotherimportant,evenpivotal,factorintheevaluationoftheconditionsunderwhichelectionsstimulateviolentconflictisthestrongimpactspecifictypesofelectoralsystemshaveonconflictmanagement(ReillyandReynolds

2000;Reynolds,ReillyandEllis2005).14

Therelationshipbetweentherulesofelectoralcompetitionandthelikelihoodthattheywilleitherameliorateorgenerateconflicthasbeenthesubjectofconsiderablescholarlyanalysis(Lijphart2004,Norris2004,Reilly2006,Reilly2001,ReillyandReynolds2000),ashasthemorespecificquestionofelectoralsystemchoiceinpost-warsituations(Blanc,Hylland,andVollan2006).15Whileotheraspectsofelectoral

13

ForanassessmentofGuyana,seeajointIFESreportfrommid-2006,GuyanaEVERReport1:ReviewofJune20-July11,2006.OnlineinPDFformat:www.ifes.org/files/EVER_Report_guyana_1.pdf.

14ForadetailedevaluationofelectoralsystemsandUNDPsroleintechnicalassistancearoundelectoralsystemchoiceandreform,seethe2004PracticeNoteElectoralSystemsandProcesses.OnlineinPDFformat:www.undp.org/governance/docs/ElectionsPN_English.pdf.

15Foranauthoritativeguidetoelectoralsystems,seeReynolds,Andrew,BenReill

y,andAndrewEllis,etal.2005.ElectoralSystemDesign:TheNewInternationalIDEAHandbook.Stockholm:InternationalIDEA.



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processesareequallycritical(suchaselectionadministration,describedbelow),theelectoralsystemisseenbyspecialistsasacrucialfactortoanalyzepreciselybecausetheelectoralsystemdeterminestherulesofthegameunderwhichelectionsareheld.Suchrules,importantly,determinestronglywhowillbeincludedandexcludedingoverningcoalitionsfollowingelectoralevents.Amongthecriticallinkagesbetweenthetypeofelectoralsystemandelectoralviolencearethefollowing:

Thestructureofthepartysystemoftenflowsfromelectoralsystemchoice,becauseelectionrulesprovideincentivesanddisincentivesfortheformingandmaintenanceofcoalitions(Reilly2006).Electoralsystemshavestrongeffectsonhowmanypartiesform,whetherandwhentheymaycoalesceorbreakup,theirprospectsforgainingpower,andvarious

socialdivisionsthatmightexistwithinanygivenpoliticalcommunity(e.g.,municipality,region,orcountry).

Thewaysinwhichcandidatescrafttheirappeals.Insomesituations,itmaybepossibletoinducecandidatesforcertainkindsofofficetoadoptcertaintypesofappeals.Acommonexampleisrequirementsforapresidentialwinnertocarryacertainminimum

percentageofthevotesinasignificantnumber,andoftengeographicallydispersedset,ofregions.Withthisrule,itisoftenessentialthatanywinnerwillhavehadtoappealtoatleastsomevotersthroughoutthecountry.Asaresult,itishopedthatpresidentialcandidateswillbeunifiers,notdividers,ofsociety.

Theoverallcharacterofthecontestintermsofwhatthecompetitionisfor.Theelectoral

system,whichinmoretechnicaltermstranslatesvotesintoparticularseatsorpositions,isaboutdetermininghowarulingcoalitionforms.Winner-take-allsystems,includingplurality/majoritysystems,givethewinnersofacertain

thresholdofvotesforexample,50percentinsimplemajoritysystemsandevenlessinpluralitysystemsallthepowertomakedecisionsfortheentirecommunity.Thereis


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widespreadconcernthatsuchsystemsmayhavethepotentialtocreatedissatisfactionandcatalyzeviolenceinsocietieswheredemocracyisnotwellestablished.Othersystems,too,suchasthealternativevoteortwo-roundsystems,havesimilarwinner-take-alleffects(Lijphart2004).Proportionalsystemsgivevariouspoliticalpartiesamoreequalshareinpoliticalpowerinrelationtotheirshareofoverallvotescast.

Itisacommonprescriptionforcountrieswithconsiderablesocialdivisions,especiallyalongethnic,religious,orotheridentitylines,tomovefromawinner-take-allsystemtoonethatarguablymoreconsistentlymirrorsthediversityofsocietyinlegislativeorrepresentativebodies:proportionalrepresentation(PR).Fromtheexperiencesofrecentyears,thereisgoodreasontoconsiderthisadvice.PRelectionsincountriessuchasSouthAfrica(1994,1999,and2004)orNorthernIreland(1998,especially)havebeenseenasanalmostnecessarychoiceforpeace:theygiveapremiumtoinclusionoverexclusionand

toideallybroadversusnarrowrepresentation.

Intheend,however,thereisnosinglebestelectoralsystemtofitallcontexts,andthechoiceofelectoralsystemisneverapurelytechnicalone.Thoseinvolvedinelectoralsystemchoicethusfacetoughdecisionsbecauseitisoftendifficulttoknowpreciselyhowanelectoralsystemwilloperateinaparticularsociety.Consequently,itisimportanttoevaluatetheeffectsofelectoralsystemchoiceonconflictdynamicsbothatthemomentwhenelectoralsystemchoiceismade(ofteninconstitution-makingprocessesorin

peacetalks),andhowcurrentsystemsinplaceaffectconflictdynamics.(SeealsoBox2.)



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BOX2........2.3ExploringrootcausesExplanationsofthecomplexrelationshipsbetweenelectoralprocessesandconflictanalysisfocusonthestakesofcompetition;expectationsaboutwinningandlosinginelectioncontests;andtheincentivesthattheelectoralprocesscreates,orhowtherulesoftheelectoralgamemayproviderewardorreturnforcertainbehaviouroraction.

Thestakesinvolvedinelectoralcontestscanbeconsideredinseveraldifferentwaysandinvariouscontexts.Acommoncauseofelectionviolenceisthatthestakesofwinningandlosingvaluedpoliticalpostsareinmanysituationsandespeciallyinconditionsofhighscarcity,povertyandinequalityincrediblyhigh.Whenwinningastateofficeisthekeytolivelihood

notjustforanindividual,butforhisorherentireclan,faction,orevenethnicgroup,partiesandcandidatesoftenrefusetocontemplatethe



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consequencesoffailure.Studiesofelection-relatedviolenceoftenhighlighttheperpetuationofhighlypersonalorpatronagepoliticsorasysteminwhichpoliticiansaregang-likebossesthatcontrolresources(suchasaccesstojobsandincome)anddispensepublicservicessuchashousing,healthcare,orlucrativegovernmentcontracts.

Thus,thestakesofelectionsareoftenseenasopportunitiestoengageincorruptionandeconomicrent-seeking.Thisinturnleadstohighlyfactionalizedpoliticsoftenalongreligious,sectarianorethniclines,oralongparty-politicaldivideswherecontrolofthestateleadstothereinforcementofclassdivisionsoralonglinesofsocialdifference.Researchershaveobservedthatpersistentlycloseandreinforcinglinksamongcontrolofthestate,economicopportunityandidentitypoliticsknownashorizontalinequalitiesstronglycontributetothelikelihoodofviolentencounters(Stewart2001).

Whilemuchfocusisplacedonnationalelectionsashigh-stakescontests,inweakstateenvironmentsmuchelectionviolenceisquitelocalizedbecausethestakesofwinninglocaloffices(suchasmayoralcontests)arealsoquitehigh.Researchonlocalelectionsindicatesthataccesstogovernmentpoweratthemunicipallevelisastrongdriverofelection-relatedviolence.AsiaanalystDarleneDammnotesthatinCambodia,Atboththelocalandnationallevel,electionviolenceoccursintheformofdirectintimidationofvotersthroughviolencedirectedatspecificindividuals,andatthenationallevel,violence

additionallyoccursintheformofperpetratorsattemptingtocontrolsocialinstitutionsthatinfluencevoteropinions,suchasthemediaorcivilsociety(2003:3).Likewise,centralgovernmentauthoritiesinCambodiahavefailedtoprosecuteperpetratorsofelectionviolenceatthelocal

level,accordingtoDamm.TheCambodiaexperienceillustratesamoregeneralpoint:ironically,effortstoachievemoreresponsiveandeffectivegovernancethroughthedecentralizationofpowermayalsoraisethestakesoflocalcontestsandthusincreasetheincentivesforelection-related

violence.

Electionviolencecanalsobegeneratedasaconsequenceoftheexpectationsoftheplayersintheelectoralcontest:theymayexpectorimaginethefruitsofvictoryortheperilsandrisksofloss.Electionsmayexacerbatesocialconflictunderconditionsofhighuncertaintyabouttheoutcomesandundersituationsofhighcertaintyalike;exploringthelinkagebetweenexpectations


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andviolenceisacomplicatedproblem.

Forexample,whenthereishighuncertaintyabouttheultimateoutcomeoftheelectoralprocesswhenmarginsofvictoryarequiteclosethereisagreaterlikelihoodthatallegationsoffraudwillleadtofrustrationandpotentiallytoviolentclashes,orwherepartiesmayuseviolencetoaffectuncertainoutcomesbytryingtolimitvoterturnoutofopponentsexpectedsupporters.Forincumbentsinofficewhoseektomaintainagriponpowerbutwhofeartheuncertaintyofapossiblemajoritysupportforoppositionparties,theuseofviolenceandintimidationtoassureawinatthepollsisacommonallegation;intherun-uptotheparliamentaryelectionsofMarch2005inZimbabwe,reportedlyoppositionleaderswerearrestedandtortured,thepresswasintimidated,andinternationalobserverskeptaway.16Asimilarpatternwasseeninthehotlydisputed2008electionsinthatcountry,inwhichtherewerewidespreadallegationsofelectionviolenceperpetratedagainsttheoppositionbetweenthefirstandsecondroundofpresidentialelections,

whichultimatelyledtheoppositioncandidatetowithdrawfromtherace.17

16Sisk,Timothy,ElectionsinFragileStates,BetweenVoiceandViolence,paperpreparedfortheInternationalStudiesAssociationAnnualMeeting,SanFrancisco(USA),2008.Online:www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/3/3/4/pages253347/p253347-1.php.Forafullanalysis,seetheInternationalCrisisGroupreport,Post-ElectionZimbabwe:WhatNext?ReportNo.93,7June2005.Online:www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3499.

17

InJune2008,UNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-Moonexpressedhisdeepregretabouttheconductoftheelectionsandurgedtheirdelay.Online:www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sgsm11650.doc.htm.



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Certainoutcomescanalsogenerateelectoralviolence.Whenpartiesarequitecertainoflossorexclusioninanelectoralcontest,especiallywhentheyexpecttobepermanentminorities(tolosenotjustonce,butagainandagainduetopatternsofidentityvoting),thecertaintyofoutcomesisalsoastrongcausaldriverofviolence;thepost-electionviolencestemmingfromthecontroversial2005electionsinIraqseemstofitthispattern.Whenapartyorfactionexpectstobesystematicallyexcludedfrompoliticalpower(intheIraqcase,theerstwhilepowerfulSunnicommunities,describedbelow),theymaywellturntoviolencetoeitherpreventtheirexclusionortopreventtheelectionssuccess.

Becauseoftheperceivedlikelihoodofpermanentexclusionasaresultofelectionoutcomes,violenceisoftencausedbysupportersandfringeelementsratherthantheparties(officially)themselves.InthecaseofGuyana,forinstance,anoppositionleadersaidthefollowingaboutthepreviousroundofelectionviolence:Wedidnot

condonetheviolenceandwetriedtostopit,butweunderstoodwhysomeofoursupporterstooktherouteofviolence.18

Thatelectoralprocessesproducewinnersandlosersisanindicatoroftheircapacitytocatalyzeortoopenwindowsofvulnerabilitytoviolence:whenastronglyinsecurepartyorfactionexpectstobesystematicallyexcludedfrompoliticalpower,itmaywellturntoviolencetoeitherpreventitsexclusionortopreventtheelectionssuccess(Hglund2004).Thus,itislikelythatatleastsomeoftheinsurgentviolencein

IraqfollowingtheU.S.-ledcoalitionsoccupationafter2003canbeexplainedbytheexpectationsoftheSunniminorityofethnic-censusvotingelectionsandthusthelikelihoodofaShiite-dominatedgovernmentthat,incoalitionwithKurdishparties,woulddominateindefinitely.19Likewise,inSriLanka,electionviolencehasbeen

seenasanendemicfeatureofabroadersocialconflictreflectedinthecountryslong-runningcivilwar(Hglund2006).

Conflict-exacerbatingelectionoutcomescan

bemitigatedbyapre-electionpower-sharingpact20thatdeterminesthefateoftheelectionwellbeforetheballotsarecast.Negotiationofpactsisstronglyencouragedwhentherearesignificantchallengestoelectionsorwhenanespeciallypowerfulpartyorfactionseekstoboycottanelection.Thischallengeofpermanentexclusionisoftenfoundwhereaminorityethniccommunityandalargeethnicmajorityliveinthesamecountryorelectoraldistrict(s)andin


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situationsinwhichpeopleareexpectedtovotetheiridentityelectionsmaybecomeanethniccensus.Theill-fated29February1992referendumonBosnianindependencefromtheformerYugoslaviawasthetriggerthatignitedthecivilwar,inpartbecauseofSerbfearsofbecomingapermanentminorityinanindependentBosniaandHerzegovina.Thatwouldhavebeenasignificantchangeinbothrealandperceivedpower,giventhatSerbswerethelargestidentitygroupintheformerYugoslavfederationasawhole.

Incentivesalsoaffectthelikelihoodofelection-relatedviolence.Acentralfactoroftencitedistheroleofso-calledethnicentrepreneurspoliticalleaderswhoarticulatebeliefsinkinshipbondsandcommondestiny,andwhomobilizeandorganizegroupstopressgroupclaims.Ethnicentrepreneursmaybeperceivedasbenigninterestaggregatorswhoserveacriticalrepresentativefunction,orasmanipulativeandexploitativepower-seekerswhomobilizeonethnicthemesfortheirownindividualaggrandizement.Politicalleaders,seekingtocapitalize

andgainonmasssentiments,outbidmoderatesbydecryingactsofaccommodationasasell-outofgroupinterests,citingcollectivebetrayalandhumiliation.Manipulationofidentitytoframe

18Communicationwiththeauthor(ChrisSpies).

19Forananalysisofthepost-occupationviolenceinIraq,includingissuesregardingelectionissues,seeDiamond(2005).Forabroaderanalysisoftheissuesofethniccensusvoting,expectationsinelectoralcontests,andtheeffectsofelectoralsystemchoiceinsuchconsiderations,seeReilly(2007).

20Forarecent,comprehensiveanalysisofthedebateovervariouspower-sharinginstitutions,seeRoederandRothchild(2005).



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disputesinethnictermsbypoliticalleadersheightensthebreadthanddepthofinter-groupconflict.Ethnicoutbiddingandmassresponsivenesstoplayingtheethniccardisanespeciallyacuteproblembecauseamoderatemultiethniccentreisoftenunabletosustainitselfagainstthecentrifugal(outward-spinning)forcesunleashedbytheheatedrhetoricofethnicintolerance.21

Somecountrieshavedecidedthatonewaytomanagethetendencyofpartypoliticstocontributetoethnicenmityistobanpoliticalpartiesthatpurporttorepresentanethnic,tribal,orracialidentity.Whilethismaybeeffectiveinsomecircumstancesinreducingethnic-basedconflictandpowerstruggles,inothersitmaycontributetoasenseofalienationamongminoritygroups

thatcancontributetotensionsandviolence,oritmayberegardedasanunjustifiedlimitationontherightsofpersonsbelongingtominorities.22Itisimportant,therefore,toevaluate

howpoliticalpartiesthatdefinethemselvesasbroadlynationalistorstandingforeveryoneinaunitedcountrydefinethepoliticalcommunityandwhetherthesepartiesaresufficientlyinclusivetodrawinmembersofminoritygroupsandtaketheirinterestsintoaccount.Theconcernwithidentity-basedpartiesisthatinthecacophonousenvironmentofnewlyformedtransitionaldemocracies,politicalpartieswithverynarrowmandatescanseizepowerondivisiveethnic,racial,orreligiousthemesandenddemocracy,ironically,throughtheballotbox.At

BOX3..........21Theproblemofethnicoutbiddingisnotonlyoneoferrantormanipulativepoliticalleadership,butalsoamoregeneraloneofcollectiveaction.Ifappealstoethnicsolidaritydidnotresonateamongthepopulace,politicalleaderswouldhaveverylittleincentivetoresorttothem.Foraformaltheorytreatmentoftheproblemofoutbidding,seeRabushkaandShepsle(1972).Forupdatedarticulationandanalysisoftheseissues,seeReilly(2001,2007).

22

ThehandbookGuidelinestoAssistNationalMinorityParticipationintheElectoralProcess,OSCEOfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights,Warsaw,2001,pointsoutthattheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasruledconsistentlythatanyrestrictionsonfreedomofassociationshouldbenarrowlyconstrued,andthatthisprincipleappliestominoritypoliticalorganizations,providedthattheyactdemocraticallyanddonotcallforviolence.Online:www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_13589.html.


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leastonestrategicentrypointforthemitigationofsocialtensionisthroughtheskilfulregulationofpoliticalparties.

2.4Motivesandmethods

Violenceperpetratedtoaffectanelectoralprocessbegsanimportantquestion:whoaretheperpetrators,andwhataretheirmotives?Whileitisimpossibletomakeabroadgeneralizationinresponsetothisquestion,acarefulandsystematicanalysisofthecausesandmanifestationsofviolenceneedstoaddresstheusuallyorganizedandpurposefulnatureoftheproblem.Althoughsmall-scaleactsofviolencemaybeperpetratedbyloneindividuals,usuallyendemicorchronicelectionviolenceistheconsequenceofextensiveorganizationandmobilization.Moreover,assuggestedinthedefinitionprovidedinBox1ofdestructiveelectoralconflict,atleasta

significantportionofelectoralviolenceisnotaccidentalorspontaneous(asriotousclashesamongrivalgroupsofsupportersmightbe);violenceispurposefulorinstrumentalandthusisorganizedandmobilized.Overall,theliteratureonpoliticalviolencesuggeststhatextensiveorinstrumentaluseofviolencerequiresleadership,organization,andresources.23

Leadership.Theimplicationisthatinstrumentalviolenceisstrategiccalculatedtoachieveaspecificeffectandthatthearticulationanddesignofstrategiesinwhichviolenceisanelementrequiresaleadershipcohort.(Thisunderstandingabouttheroleofleadersin

mobilizationforviolencehasstrongimplicationsforconflictprevention,asdescribedinSection3).

Organizationalfactors.Likewise,thereisastructuralororganizationalaspectofmanyactsofviolence.Whetherinitiatedfromwithinpoliticalpartiesorfrommilitiasorarmedgroupsassociatedwithpoliticalparties,large-scalepoliticalviolencerequiresanorganizationalelementthatbridgesleadersandrank-and-file;thatcreatesthelogisticalrequirementsneededtoperpetrateacts;and


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thatcreatesanassociationalorcommunityrepresentationdimension.Often,suchorganizationsarepoliticalpartiesthemselves,butsometimestheycanbemorelooselyorganizedandlinkedtocivilsocietyorganizations.Likewise,researchhasshownthatlinkagesbetweenpoliticalgroupsandorganizedcriminalelementsoftenconstitutethekeyorganizationalaspectrequiredforextensiveelection-relatedviolence.

Resourcecapacities.Finally,theliteratureonpoliticalviolencealsofocusesontheimportanceofresourcesthatallowleadersandorganizationalstructurestofomentviolence.Suchresourcesmaywellbehuman,inthepresenceoflargenumbersofoftenyoung,disaffected,andcommonlyunemployedyoungmensusceptibletorecruitment;or,resourcescanbematerial,suchasaccesstomoney(e.g.,fromtradeindrugsorotherlootable

goods)oraccesstosmallarms.

23Forworksonsocialandpoliticalviolence,seeforexample,Tilly,Charles,ThePoliticsofCollectiveViolence(2003).DonaldHorowitz,inthefinalchapterofhisbookTheDeadlyEthnicRiot,providesanespeciallycogentandclearevaluationofalternativetheoriesofviolence,arguingthatattheendofthedaytheessentiallyorchestratednatureofpoliticalviolencecanbedescribedascalculatedpassion(Horowitz2001:523-525).



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BOX4ContextApervasivecultureofethnicrivalriesandviolence..Aproliferationofpersonality-drivenpoliticalparties..Corruptionandafragilejusticesystem..Perceptionsofunresolvedhistoricalinjustices..Internationaldynamics(e.g.,bilateraldonorsinsistenceonpushingforelec-..tionsagainstthewishesofoneoftheparties)ProcessactorsElectionsareseenasaneventinsteadofalonger-termprocess..Lackofadequategroundrules(codesofconducts)orcontested..legalcontexts.Zero-sumapproachestodecisionmakinginsteadofexploring..commonground.Weakfacilitationofmeetingsandforums.Protocoldictatesthatpowerfulindi-..vidualsleadnegotiations,nomatterhow(un)skilledtheyareinprocessissuesortheextentoftheiremotionalorsocialintelligence.Lackoforganizationaldevelopmentassistanceforelection-relatedbodies...Resistancetoandrejectionofadvicefromwell-meaningelectionexperts,..especiallyaproposoftheindependenceoftheEMBNeglectoftheattitudinaldimensionofdividedsocietieswhichreferstositu-..ationsinwhichdifferentgroupswithinastatedonotperceivethemselvesaspartsofthesamenationalcommunity24

Lackofemphasisonattitudesandvalue-basedleadership(e.g.,thebeliefthat..aprocedurallyflawlesselectionwillguaranteeacceptanceoftheresultsandhealingofrelationships)Fundraisingfromundisclosedbenefactors..RelationshipfactorsTheattitudesandbehaviourofpoliticiansandofficialsoftenhavedestructive..effectsonrelationships,especiallyaselectiontimedrawscloserLackoftrustinEMBoramongthemembersoftheEMB..Elite-drivenstyleofelectionsasopposedtosimpleandtransparent..communicationprocesses

ContextApervasivecultureofethnicrivalriesandviolence..Aproliferationofpersonality-drivenpoliticalparties..Corruptionandafragilejusticesystem..Perceptionsofunresolvedhistoricalinjustices..Internationaldynamics(e.g.,bilateraldonorsinsistenceonpushingforelec-..tionsagainstthewishesofoneoftheparties)ProcessactorsElectionsareseenasaneventinsteadofalonger-termprocess..Lackofadequategroundrules(codesofconducts)orcontested..legalcontexts.Zero-sumapproachestodecisionmakinginsteadofexploring..commonground.Weakfacilitationofmeetingsandforums.Protocoldictatesthatpowerfulindi-.

.vidualsleadnegotiations,nomatterhow(un)skilledtheyareinprocessissuesortheextentoftheiremotionalorsocialintelligence.Lackoforganizationaldevelopmentassistanceforelection-relatedbodies...Resistancetoandrejectionofadvicefromwell-meaningelectionexperts,..especiallyaproposoftheindependenceoftheEMBNeglectoftheattitudinaldimensionofdividedsocietieswhichreferstositu-..ationsinwhichdifferentgroupswithinastatedonotperceivethemselvesaspartsofthesamenationalcommunity24Lackofemphasisonattitudesandvalue-basedleadership(e.g.,thebeliefthat


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..aprocedurallyflawlesselectionwillguaranteeacceptanceoftheresultsandhealingofrelationships)Fundraisingfromundisclosedbenefactors..RelationshipfactorsTheattitudesandbehaviourofpoliticiansandofficialsoftenhavedestructive..effectsonrelationships,especiallyaselectiontimedrawscloserLackoftrustinEMBoramongthemembersoftheEMB..Elite-drivenstyleofelectionsasopposedtosimpleandtransparent..communicationprocesses24WolpeandMacDonald(2008)



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BOX4(contd)PoliticalfactorsWeakgovernancecouldmeanthatgovernmentsmayactaspotentialinstiga-..torsofviolence25Extremepoliticalfluidityandrecurringinter-partyconflict..Lackofpoliticalpartyguidance/capacity..Intra-partydivisionsandpowerstrugglesoftenleadingtoaproliferation..ofpoliticalpartiesalonglinesofoverlappingsocialdifferencesofidentityandclass26Non-consensualpoliticalre-demarcationofelectiondistrictboundaries..UnclearmandatesofEMBs,exacerbatedbytheelectorateshighexpectations..thattheEMBshouldinterveneincasesofcorruptionUnresolvedissuesfrompreviouselectionsandfailuretocorrectpastmistakes..27Politicalcultureofthepoliticsofthebreadwinnersduetothefactthatelected..officialsdogetasalaryandwouldthereforeprotecttheirjobsatallcostsPoliticalcultureofseeingelectionsasagameofwinnertakesall..28Politicalcultureofblamingversusproactivedialogue..Pre-maturevictoryclaims..Non-acceptanceofelectionlossesevenwhentheresultsareaffirmed..orverifiedbyneutralthird-partymissionsExclusion,insomecases,mayleadtoviolentconflictbecauseitprovidesthe..

grievancesthatgeneratepotentialsupportforprotests29,butmanyexcludedgroups,ontheotherhand,donotresorttoviolenceMediaBiasofandaccessibilitytothestatemedia..Absenceofbroadcastlegislation..Unregulatedproliferationofpersonality-drivenandpoliticalcandidate..sponsoredradioandTVstationsthatareoftenguiltyofhatespeechandincitementtoviolenceLackofcodesofconduct,whichallowsundisciplinedandconflict-generating..programsandtalkshowhoststofuelviolence(asinGuyana,MalawiandRwanda)PoliticalfactorsWeakgovernancecouldmeanthatgovernmentsmayactaspotentialinstiga-..torsofviolence25

Extremepoliticalfluidityandrecurringinter-partyconflict..Lackofpoliticalpartyguidance/capacity..Intra-partydivisionsandpowerstrugglesoftenleadingtoaproliferation..ofpoliticalpartiesalonglinesofoverlappingsocialdifferencesofidentityandclass26Non-consensualpoliticalre-demarcationofelectiondistrictboundaries..UnclearmandatesofEMBs,exacerbatedbytheelectorateshighexpectations..thattheEMBshouldinterveneincasesofcorruptionUnresolvedissuesfrompreviouselectionsandfailuretocorrectpastmistakes..27Politicalcultureofthepoliticsofthebreadwinnersduetothefactthatelected..officialsdogetasalaryandwouldthereforeprotecttheirjobsatallcosts

Politicalcultureofseeingelectionsasagameofwinnertakesall..28Politicalcultureofblamingversusproactivedialogue..Pre-maturevictoryclaims..Non-acceptanceofelectionlossesevenwhentheresultsareaffirmed..orverifiedbyneutralthird-partymissionsExclusion,insomecases,mayleadtoviolentconflictbecauseitprovidesthe..grievancesthatgeneratepotentialsupportforprotests29,butmanyexcludedgroups,ontheotherhand,donotresorttoviolenceMediaBiasofandaccessibilitytothestatemedia..Absenceofbroadcastlegislation..


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Unregulatedproliferationofpersonality-drivenandpoliticalcandidate..sponsoredradioandTVstationsthatareoftenguiltyofhatespeechandincitementtoviolenceLackofcodesofconduct,whichallowsundisciplinedandconflict-generating..programsandtalkshowhoststofuelviolence(asinGuyana,MalawiandRwanda)25Stewart(2001):7-826Patel(2007):22327AHumanRightsWatchbackgroundbriefingabouttheNigerian2007electionsnotedthefollowing:Violence,actualandthreatened,restrictstheabilityofordinary

voterstoparticipateintheforthcomingelectionsandwillempowersomepoliticianstosubverttheelectoralprocessbeforeandduringtheAprilpolls.ThisispreciselywhathappenedinNigerias2003elections,andyettheauthoritieshavedonelittletopreventtheemergenceofsimilarabusesin2007ortodealwiththemeffectivelyinplaceswheretheyhaveoccurred.Online:http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0407/4.htm.

28JonathanMoyo,aformerministerofinformationandcurrentindependentMPinZimbabwe,commentedasfollowsataMassPublicOpinionInstitutePublicSeminar

inHarareon31May2007:Ihavecometoappreciatethatreformerswhowantanewdemocraticconstitutionmustbepreparedtodothenecessarypoliticalworkthatcanenablethemtoimplementthatconstitutiononlyifandwhentheyareinpowerthroughthedemocraticprocess.Inmyview,itisunrealisticforapoliticalpartytoexpectitspoliticalprogramthatmayincludeanewconstitutiontobeimplementedbyitsrivals.Thatsnothowpoliticsplayoutintherealworld.Everypoliticalparty,togetherwithitsassociatedorganisations,mustcarrytheirowncross.

29Thesociallyexcludedaregenerallyseverelyeconomicallydeprivedandlackacces

stopoliticalpower.Becauseoftheireconomicsituation,theyappeartohavelittletolosebytakingviolentactionindeedsomemightgainbygettingsomesortofemploymentinrebelliousarmies,whiletheyarelikelytobesanctionedtolootandmakeotherillicitgains.Stewart,Frances,Socialexclusionandconflict:Analysisandpolicyimplications.OnlineinPDFformat:www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON34.pdf.InMalawi,electionviolenceinoneofthedistrictseruptedwhenindependentcandidateswhowereexcludedfromtheMulti-partyLiaisonCommittee(MPLC)didnotfeelboundbythecodeofconduct(Patel2007:231).



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BOX4(contd)AdministrativeinadequaciesEMBswithoutadequatecapacityorlackinginimpartialityandtransparency..Unresolvedissuesfrompreviouselections,e.g.,thefailuretorecordandlearn..frompastmistakesLogisticalflawsandinaccuratedatabasesandvoterlists..Failuretosecureandtightenoperationalprocedures,e.g.,tallying,..announcementoftheresultsPoorcommunicationi)betweenelectioncommissionsandparties,andii)from..thoseentitiestovoters.Lengthyandinadequatelyexplaineddelaysintheannouncementof..electionresultsAbsenceoftransparencyinelectionresulttabulation..Lackoftransparencyinprocurementofelection-relatedresources,including..suppliesandpersonnelAbsenceofaneffectiveandimpartialjudiciaryorothersystemtoresolveand..provideremediesforcomplaintsCorruptionAbuseofstateresources..Voterigging..Impunityenjoyedbypoliticalleaders..

Actorsinvolvedinillegaleconomicactivitiessponsoringcandidatesor..controllingmediaSecurityandpolicingReactionarypolicing..30Policeinactiontoapprehendculprits..Lackofcapacitytoinvestigate..Availabilityofsmallarms..AdministrativeinadequaciesEMBswithoutadequatecapacityorlackinginimpartialityandtransparency..Unresolvedissuesfrompreviouselections,e.g.,thefailuretorecordandlearn..

frompastmistakesLogisticalflawsandinaccuratedatabasesandvoterlists..Failuretosecureandtightenoperationalprocedures,e.g.,tallying,..announcementoftheresultsPoorcommunicationi)betweenelectioncommissionsandparties,andii)from..thoseentitiestovoters.Lengthyandinadequatelyexplaineddelaysintheannouncementof..electionresultsAbsenceoftransparencyinelectionresulttabulation..Lackoftransparencyinprocurementofelection-relatedresources,including..suppliesandpersonnelAbsenceofaneffectiveandimpartialjudiciaryorothersystemtoresolveand..

provideremediesforcomplaintsCorruptionAbuseofstateresources..Voterigging..Impunityenjoyedbypoliticalleaders..Actorsinvolvedinillegaleconomicactivitiessponsoringcandidatesor..controllingmediaSecurityandpolicingReactionarypolicing..30Policeinactiontoapprehendculprits..


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Lackofcapacitytoinvestigate..Availabilityofsmallarms..30FrancesStewartsaysthattheoverwhelminglymostimportantissuethatmakesgroupstaketoviolenceasagainstpeacefulprotestappearstobegovernmentreactions.CitingexamplesinAceh(Indonesia),Guatemala,SriLankaandothercountries,Stewartsaysthatpeacefulproteststurnviolentwhengovernmentstakeviolentandexclusionaryaction.Theseactionsunifyrebellinggroupsandturnmainlypeacefulprotestsintoviolence.Shenotes:Incontrast,incountrieswhichhaveavoidedmajorviolence,thegovernmentreactstosmallviolentincidentsbytryingtosortouttheissues(Stewart2001).



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BOX5TypeofelectionElectoralsystemconsiderationsConflictconsiderations/commontypesofviolenceseenIssuesandanalysisPresidentialBydefinitionare..majoritarian,winner-take-allcontestsMaybesingleor..two-roundUsuallyhigh-stakes..contestsStaterepressionofoppo-..sition;destabilizationofvoters;crystallizationofconflictamongtwoprin-cipalfactionsMuchdependsonthe..incentivesgenerated

bythedetailsoftheelec-toralsystem,includingwhethertherearesuper-majorityrequirementsElectionsforpresidents..withlimitedexecutivepowersarelikelytobelesscontentiousParliamentaryCommondistinction..betweendistrictorconstituencyvotingforoneormorecandidates;inPRlist,forpolitical

partiesCanleadtoveryhigh..disproportionalityinoutcomesdependingonthetypeofelectoralsystemused,especiallyinfirst-past-the-postelectionsCanbemixedinmyriad,..oftencomplicatedwaysPoliticalpartiestendto..featuremoreprominentlyinparliamentarypolls

Partyandcandidate..rivalriesaremostacuteEffectsofboundary..delimitationstronglyaffectidentityconflictdimensionsElectionviolenceisnot..evenlydistributed,andcertainhigh-riskareascouldbemappedprior


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toelectionstoidentifytheseareasCriticaltodetermining..theextenttowhichanelectionresultisbroadlyinclusiveofacountrysdiversityTypeofelectionElectoralsystemconsiderationsConflictconsiderations/commontypesofviolenceseenIssuesandanalysisPresidentialBydefinitionare..majoritarian,winner-take-allcontestsMaybesingleor..two-roundUsuallyhigh-stakes..contestsStaterepressionofoppo-..sition;destabilizationof

voters;crystallizationofconflictamongtwoprin-cipalfactionsMuchdependsonthe..incentivesgeneratedbythedetailsoftheelec-toralsystem,includingwhethertherearesuper-majorityrequirementsElectionsforpresidents..withlimitedexecutivepowersarelikelytobelesscontentious

ParliamentaryCommondistinction..betweendistrictorconstituencyvotingforoneormorecandidates;inPRlist,forpoliticalpartiesCanleadtoveryhigh..disproportionalityinoutcomesdependingonthetypeofelectoralsystemused,especiallyinfirst-past-the-postelections

Canbemixedinmyriad,..oftencomplicatedwaysPoliticalpartiestendto..featuremoreprominentlyinparliamentarypollsPartyandcandidate..rivalriesaremostacuteEffectsofboundary..delimitationstronglyaffectidentity


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conflictdimensionsElectionviolenceisnot..evenlydistributed,andcertainhigh-riskareascouldbemappedpriortoelectionstoidentifytheseareasCriticaltodetermining..theextenttowhichanelectionresultisbroadlyinclusiveofacountrysdiversity18ELECTIONSANDCONFLICTPREVENTION


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BOX5(contd)LocalandmunicipalCanbemayoralor..council(ormixed),mirroringpresiden-tialandparliamentaryconsiderationsSimilarchoicesamong..electoralsystemsLocalizedrivalryand..attacksoncandidatesmorelikelyCompetitionmay..behigh-stakesforcontroloflocalpowerandresourcesPersonalizedattacks..oncandidatesandcommunitiesLocalelectionsinvolve..hundredsandeventhousandsofcandidates

andpotentialoffices,andbecauseofthescalemorediffuseopportu-nitiesforinterventionstrategiesConstituentassemblyChoosing..representativesforconstitution-makingprocessesTendtobePRin..someform

Oftenveryhighstakesas..thecompositionoftheassemblyaffectscoreconstitutionalmattersAlthoughrarein..occurrence,suchelectionsbecauseoftheirhighstakesdeserveespeciallyconflict-sensitiveassistancemissionsReferendumsMajority-rule(50percent)..orsuper-majority

(66percent+)require-ments;or,infederalsystems,sometimesarequirementthatacertainproportionofstatesorprovincesapproveOftenresolvemajor..issues,includingsovereignty


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Cancontributetoor..workagainstpeaceMaygeneratesignificant..pre-andpost-electionviolenceLosershaveintense..preferencesthatmaysurfacemuchlaterCanleadtoarmed..rebellionormassriotingCommonlyusedto..decidemajorissuessuchassovereignty;however,manyanalystsquestionwhethersuchmeasuresareappropriateforsuchvolatilequestionsLocalandmunicipalCanbemayoralor..council(ormixed),mirroringpresiden-tialandparliamentaryconsiderations

Similarchoicesamong..electoralsystemsLocalizedrivalryand..attacksoncandidatesmorelikelyCompetitionmay..behigh-stakesforcontroloflocalpowerandresourcesPersonalizedattacks..oncandidatesandcommunitiesLocalelectionsinvolve..

hundredsandeventhousandsofcandidatesandpotentialoffices,andbecauseofthescalemorediffuseopportu-nitiesforinterventionstrategiesConstituentassemblyChoosing..representativesforconstitution-makingprocesses

TendtobePRin..someformOftenveryhighstakesas..thecompositionoftheassemblyaffectscoreconstitutionalmattersAlthoughrarein..occurrence,suchelectionsbecauseoftheirhighstakes


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deserveespeciallyconflict-sensitiveassistancemissionsReferendumsMajority-rule(50percent)..orsuper-majority(66percent+)require-ments;or,infederalsystems,sometimesarequirementthatacertainproportionofstatesorprovincesapproveOftenresolvemajor..issues,includingsovereigntyCancontributetoor..workagainstpeaceMaygeneratesignificant..pre-andpost-electionviolenceLosershaveintense..preferencesthatmaysurfacemuchlaterCanleadtoarmed..

rebellionormassriotingCommonlyusedto..decidemajorissuessuchassovereignty;however,manyanalystsquestionwhethersuchmeasuresareappropriateforsuchvolatilequestionsAGuidetoAnalysis,PlanningandProgramming19


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2.5PhasesoftheelectoralcycleandcommonpatternsofviolenceDespitetheabsenceofacleardatasetoreventheexistenceofabroadlyacceptedtypologyofelection-relatedviolence,itisclearthattherearecommonpatternsofviolenceseenacrossvariouscasesoracrosstimewithincases.Likewise,itisusefultocataloguethetypesofelection-relatedviolencethatarecommonlyassociatedwithatypicalelectioncycle.31Inthissection,thephasesofanelectoralcyclearerelatedtocommontypesofviolenceseenduringeachphase.32

Phase1:Thelongrun-uptoelectoralevents(18monthstothreemonthsprior)

Duringthisphase,thetargetsofelectoralviolenceareoftenincumbentstateofficialsoremergingcandidatesfrompoliticalparties.Rivalryviolencecanbewithinpartiessuchascontestsbetweenhard-linersandmoderatesoramongvariousfactionsdrawnonotherlinesorbetweenpoliticalparties.Oftentheobjectiveof

politicalviolenceduringthisphaseistoeliminateorweakenanopponent,toaffectearlytheshapeandnatureofthevotingprocess,ortoestablishadominantpositionwithinaparticulardistrictbyeliminatingorthreateningpotentialadversaries.Commontypesofviolenceseeninthisperiodinclude:

intimidationorremovalofindependentjudges;

intimidationortargetingofelectionofficialsorsecurityforces;

intimidationorharassmentofjournalists;

incitementtoviolenceinthemediaorotherpublicforums(suchasplacesofworship);33

policeorinternalintelligenceservicestargetingofmeetingsofoppositionfigures;


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protecting,expanding,ordelineatingturforno-gozones;and

hostage-taking,kidnapping,extortion.34

Phase2:Thecampaignsfinallap(threemonthspriortoelectionday)

Campaignconflictofteninvolvesrivalry-basedviolence,effortstointimidateorinfluencevotersandcandidates,andeffortstoaffectparticipation(usuallytolimititthroughcreatinginsecurity);often,suchviolenceintensifiesinthefinalweeksleadinguptoelections.Forexample,lessthan24hoursbeforevotersweretocastballotsinTaiwanspresidentialelectionsinMay2004,PresidentChenShui-Banandhisvice-presidentialrunningmate,AnnetteLu,wereshot

andinjuredbyunknownassailants.35InPakistan,formerPrimeMinisterBenazirBhuttowasassassinatedinDecember2007whilecampaigningforareturntooffice.Commonpatternsofviolenceseeninthefinallapsofcampaignsinclude:

clashesbetweenrivalgroupsofsupporters;

attacksonelectionrallies,candidates;

bombscares;

31ForacomparativeanalysisofelectionviolenceinEastAfrica,seethestudyconductedbytheFriedrichEbertStiftung,PoliticalandElectoralViolenceinEastAfrica,WorkingPapersonConflictManagementNo.2(2001).

32Anelectioncycleusuallyreferstoaperiodofatleastoneyearpriortoanactualelectionevent.

33InGuyanatherelativelackofelectionviolencein2006isattributedbysomecommentatorstotheabsenceofthreeprominenttalkshowhosts,whoarebelievedtobepartlyresponsiblefortheincitementofdisgruntledoppositionfactionsduringthepreviouselectionin2001.Onetalk-showhostisstillawaitingtrialafter


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fiveyearsonachargeoftreasonandislinkedbytheauthoritiestotheattackonthepresidentialofficesthatledtoafirethatdemolishedpartofthebuilding.Anothertalk-showhostwasgunneddownbyagroupofassassinsinJanuary2006,andthethirdhadmigratedtotheUnitedKingdom.

34Insomesituations,suchasinNigeria,hostage-takinghasalsobeenseentorisedramaticallyintherun-uptoelections.SeeNigeria:SharpRiseinHostageMaybeLinkedtoUpcomingElections,Reuters(AltertNet)2February2007(online:www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/42c5ee17c5a9427fff7e1fedf6244e44.htm).InthisandinothercasessuchasthePhilippines,theincreaseinkidnappingappearstoberelatedtoeffortstouseransommoneysascampaignfunds.

35Someoppositionpartiespubliclyspeculatedwhetherthewoundswereself-inflicted,astheyarebelievedtohavegeneratedconsiderablesympathyvotes.Anofficialinvestigationpointedtoasinglesubject.Chenwentontowinthepollbyanarrowmargin.



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attacksorintimidationofelectionofficials;andPhase4:BetweenvotingandproclamationTheperiodbetweenvotingandproclamation

attacksonobservers,domesticandinterna

whileelectionofficialsaretabulatingresults,or

tional.

duringtheperiodbetweenafirstandsecondPhase3:Pollingday(s)roundofelections(incasesofrun-offs)can

Pollingdaycanbeespeciallybloody(asinEgyptinDecember2005,whenallegedlysomevoterswerekeptawayfromthepollsandconfrontationsemergedbetweensecurityforcesandvoters).36However,therearealsointerestingcasesinwhichtherun-uptoelectionswereparticularlyviolent,butsomewhatsurprisinglytheactualdaysofvotingturnouttoberelativelypeaceful.37SouthAfricascelebratedtransitionalelectionsofApril1994areonesuchexample;despitepredictionsofviolentencountersbasedonseriouspre-electionconflictinsomeprovinces(notably

KwaZulu-Natal),theactualdaysofvotingwerequitepeaceful(perhapsbecauseoftheextensivesecurityforcedeployments).Whenvotingdaysareviolent,commontypesofelectionviolencearethefollowing:

attacksbyarmedrebelgroupstodisruptthepolling,tolimitturnout,ortoattacksecurityforcesorpolicestations;

intimidationofvoterstocompelthemtovote,ortostayaway;

attacksonelectionadministrators,observers


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orpollingstations;and

physicalattacksonelectionmaterials,suchasdestructionofballotboxes.

beespeciallyperilous.Forexample,intheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoelectionsinOctober2006therewasadramaticescalationofviolencethatoccurredfollowingthefirstroundofpresidentialelectionsandasecondround.38Violenceduringthisperiodcantakeseveralforms:

armedclashesamongpoliticalparties;

violentclashesamonggroupsofrival

supporters;

vandalismandphysicalattacksonpropertyofopponents;and

targetedattacksagainstspecificcandidatesorpoliticalparties.

Phase5:Post-electionoutcomesandtheiraftermath

Perceptionsoffraudulentorstolenelectionsareastrongpredictorofviolence;electionsofthistypecanprecipitatearmedconflictandevencivilwars.Atthesametime,vehementminoritieswhohavelostinelectioncontestsperceivedasfraudulentmayalsoturnoutinthestreetstoprotesttheoutcome.Governmentsmayrepressprotestswhentheyhaveconductedafraudulentpoll,creatingtheclassicdilemmabetweenmass

actionandthegovernmentssecurityimperatives.Forexample,followingaUNsponsoredindependenceconsultationon30August1999onthesovereignstatusofthethen-EastTimor,

36SeeSlackman,Michael,Election-DayViolenceFuelsAngerinEgypt,NewYorkTimes,9December2005.Online:www.nytimes.com/2005/12/09/world/africa/09iht-egypt.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Election-Day%20Violence%20Fuels%20Anger%20in%20Egypt&st=cse.


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Asreportedinthisarticle,thereareallegationsthattheviolencewasperpetratedbyelementsoftheincumbentgovernmentineffortstokeeplikelysupportersoftheMuslimBrotherhoodawayfromthepolls.

37ThispatternhasbeenobservedbyRappaportandWeinberg(2001).38SeetheInternationalCrisisGroupReport,SecuringCongosElections:LessonsfromtheKinshasaShowdown,AfricaBriefingN42,2October2006(online:www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4412)andTenseCongoAwaitsPollasUNRescuesPolitician,Reuters,27October2006(reprintedonline:www.thezimbabwestandard.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15213&catid=3:international-news&Itemid=58).



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hundreds(andperhapsthousands)diedinarampageofkillingallegedlyorganizedbyIndonesianarmedforcesandlocalmilitiasinapunishmentcampaignasaconsequenceofthestrongmajoritysupportforindependence.TheviolenceonlyebbedfollowinganAustralian-ledmilitaryintervention.39Someexamplesofpostelectionviolenceinclude:

attacksonrivalswhohaveeitherwoninelections,orweredefeated;

violentstreetprotestsandeffortsbyarmedriotpolicetomaintainorrestoreorder;teargas,firingonprotestors,attacksbyprotestersonpropertyorthepolice;

emergenceofarmedresistancegroupsagainstanelectedgovernment(asinAlgeriain1992);or

escalationorperpetuationofethnicorsectarianviolence(asinIraqin2005).

2.6MonitoringelectoralconflictInrecentyears,practitionershavedevelopedimpressivetoolstomonitorortrackelection-relatedconflictbytypeandlocationovertime,aswellasinnovativemethodsofreportingsuchresultsandthenlinkingtheresultstospecificinterventionsdesignedtomanageandmitigatetheconflict.AttheforefrontoftheseeffortshasbeentheworkofDerrickMarcooftheInstituteforDemocracyinSouthernAfrica(IDASA),whohasbeeninvolvedindevelopinganintegratedapproachinNigeria.HisexperienceishighlightedinPerspective1.

39Foranaccountandanalysis,seeChopra(2000).



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PERSPECTIVE1.ELECTORALVIOLENCEANDCONFLICTTRACKINGINNIGERIA2007

DerrickMarco

InstituteforDemocracyinSouthernAfrica(IDASA)

IDASANigeriatrackedelection-relatedconflictandviolenceduringthe2007electioncycle.40Thesystem,calledanInformation-CommunicationHub(I-CHub),funct

Elections and Conflict Prevention

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