EJKM Volume 11 Issue 2

Editorial for EJKM Volume 11 Issue 2

This is my first editorial, as I have just recently become the editor of the Electronic

Journal of Knowledge Management, following a long period as a paper reviewer. I feel

very honoured to be able to contribute to the continued success of our journal at a

challenging time for the KM discipline. While the field has evolved significantly since its

emergence in the early 1990s and attracted a high level of interest across both the

academic and the practitioner communities, any comprehensive review of recent

publications across the discipline might produce some sense of dj vu, as many are

concerned that limited progress is being made in the broader recognition of the

discipline in the academic community and in the adoption of good KM practices.

Thus, while we continue to solicit papers on any aspect of KM, we would especially

encourage authors to consider contributing papers that can add rigour to the many

theories in the discipline as well as those that can demonstrate successes in the

practical application of theory in the field

In this issue, we have six papers that provide interesting and contrasting insights. We

have two theoretical papers (one revisiting the tacit explicit dimension, the other

knowledge governance frameworks) three interesting case studies (examining graduate

students personal knowledge, air force incident reporting and manufacturing firms

external knowledge search) and a survey of the perspectives of more than 500 Basque

CFOs on valuing intangible assets.

Ilkka Virtanens In Search for a Theoretically Firmer Epistemological Foundation for the

Relationship between Tacit and Explicit Knowledge is an insightful revisitation of one of

the most frequently used (and often abused) concepts in KM. Following a re-

examination of the original work of Polanyi (1958) and the perspective provided by

Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), he proposes an improved epistemological model for tacit

knowledge that should be of interest to most KM researchers.

In another theoretical paper, David Johnsons Governing Frameworks for Sharing

Actionable Knowledge discusses the importance of context in KM activities and

examines four alternate governance frameworks (formal, informal, markets, and

professional) for interaction within organisations.

Elaiza Benitez, David J Pauleen and Tony Hoopers From Information Gatherers to

knowledge creators: The evolution of the post-graduate student examines the evolution

of graduate students skills in personal information and personal knowledge

management. It should be of interest both to students entering postgraduate studies

and those who supervise graduate students.

In A Form to Collect Incident Reports: Learning from Incidents in the Swedish Armed

Forces, Ulrica Pettersson provides an excellent and detailed case study in an unusual

116

and interesting environment, but one from which lessons can be generalised to many

other situations where there is a need to capture experiential knowledge to improve

subsequent performances of complex activities, such as incident reporting.

In The Search for External Knowledge, Rebecca Purcell and Fergal McGrath take an

Interpretivist approach in examining three Irish manufacturing firms to determine how

they carried out external knowledge search, developing a practical framework for

external search activities.

Finally, Real Options in the Valuation of Intangibles: Managers Perception, by Beln

Vallejo-Alonso, Gerardo Arregui-Ayastuy, Arturo Rodriguez-Castellanos and Domingo

Garca-Merino, examines the challenges in financial valuation of intangible resources

and examines a specific method for such an evaluation. Focusing primarily on SMEs in

the Basque Country, they demonstrate the relevance of the method examined, while

highlighting the very limited capacity of firms and their CFOs to under stand and apply

the concept.

These articles are a robust demonstration of the good work that is being done in the KM

discipline. I trust readers will find them of interest and encourage all those interested in

the KM field to consider our journal as a useful outlet for their work and would very

much like to hear from those of you interested in making additional contributions to the

journal, perhaps by acting as one of our paper reviewers.

Ken Grant

Ryerson University

[email protected]

117

ISSN 1479-4411 118 ACPIL

V I In Search for a Theoretically Firmer Epistemological Foundation for the Relationship Between Tacit and Explicit Knowledge The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management Volume 11 Issue 2 (pp118-126) available online at www.ejkm.com

In Search for a Theoretically Firmer Epistemological Foundation for

the Relationship Between Tacit and Explicit Knowledge

Ilkka Virtanen

School of Information Sciences, University of Tampere, 33014 University of Tampere,

Finland

[email protected]

Abstract. Tacit knowledge has become one of the most used buzzwords in many scientific areas, especially in the area of

knowledge management, during the past twenty years. In the mainstream of contemporary KM literature the concept of

tacit knowledge has been brought in a relatively rough way alongside the traditional conception of knowledge (explicit

knowledge) without further analysing the theoretical coherence of the resulting epistemology. Moreover, tacit knowledge

T factors have led to puzzling or even internally contradictory epistemological views. We critically analyse the predominant

epistemological views in the knowledge management literature from the theoretical perspective. We outline a

P W although knowledge management is relatively new scientific area, its roots should be firmly grounded in the philosophical

problems concerning knowledge if it is expected to present credible theories that could support knowledge management

practices.

Keywords: epistemology, explication, explicit knowledge, Polanyi, tacit knowledge, theory of knowledge

1. Introduction

For over two decades tacit knowledge and its relation to explicit knowledge have been widely discussed topics

in the fields of management studies, information system science and particularly in knowledge management

KM I P KM literature to the widely supported claim that organizations could achieve competitive advantages by using

effectively their unique knowledge (see e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). As a result, the focus of KM literature

shifted from explicit forms of knowledge to softer and more complex resources of knowledge that were not

stored in information systems but held in human minds. Since then hundreds of scientific papers and reports

have presented possible procedures, models and theories for making tacit knowledge representable by

converting it to explicit knowledge. The innermost aim of these suggestions is to harness valuable personal

understanding and insights to common benefit in organizations.

However, analysis of epistemic views discussing the relation between tacit and explicit knowledge, and

particularly the ones that stress the importance of making tacit knowledge explicit, shows that the concept is

often used in inconsistent, even misleading ways. According to Cowan et al (2000), very often the meaning of

the concept itself remains literally tacit. Various authors (e.g. Grant 2007; Wilson 2002; Tsoukas 2003) have

argued that the fundamental content of the concept has been misinterpreted. This suggests that the subject

area is still inadequately studied.

Conceptual clarity is not important only from the perspective of internal theoretical consistency of KM; KM is a

multidisciplinary field of science, which means that it should communicate with other relevant fields of

science. This naturally becomes difficult if central concepts adopted outside the field are redefined. Instead,

theoretical statements from different disciplines should refer to the same set of phenomena (Bunge 1967).

The focus of KM is evidently on the management and use of knowledge, which means that the area is above all

practical. In this sense it may seem doubtful to introduce profound epistemological considerations to the

practices of the field. However, the moment we begin to discuss theories of knowledge creation and

explication of tacit knowledge we cannot avoid epistemological consideration because we have to know what

we are theorizing about; from the scientific perspective the problem is significant because theories based on

vague concepts are themselves vague and hence close to meaningless.

Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management Volume 11 Issue 2 2013

www.ejkm.com 119 ACPIL

The question about the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge is important because it lies in the

very heart of the KM theory. Although N T iginal theory has been revised and modified (see e.g. Nonaka and Peltokorpi 2007), the epistemological foundation (namely the classification of knowledge

into tacit and explicit) of their original theory has gained a dominant role as the basis for epistemology in the

KM theory (Maasdorp 2007 M N T the epistemological distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge has been so influential that even the

whole field of KM has been defined basing on it. For example, according to different authors KM means

ed process for acquiring, organizing, and communicating both tacit and explicit knowledge (Alavi and Leidner 1999: 6); T of explicit knowledge held in artefacts or as tacit knowledge possessed by individuals or

S 63); knowledge asse C-Carrin 2006: 34).

Theories can be considered as a systemization of practice, and as such they serve as a framework for making

sense of the subject area. Respectively, indefinite theoretical frameworks may cause wider problems for the

practices of the field by directing research to wrong lines. For example, technology developed to mine tacit

knowledge of the users is of little value if it is unclear what exactly should be mined. Grant and Qureshi (2006)

remark that many KM projects have stated as their aim the conversion of tacit to explicit knowledge, and

storing and sharing it by developing proper ICT-systems for the purpose. These projects, however, often have

had very limited success (Grant and Qureshi 2006). As Grant (2007) suggests, this might have very negative

effects on organizations.

Tacit knowled opposed to articulate, explicit knowledge (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Baumard 1999; Steward 1997).We

argue that one key factor behind the conceptual vagueness of the concept of tacit knowledge is the lack of

profoundly studied epistemological foundation of the relation between tacit and explicit knowledge.

Generally, the meanings of theoretical concepts are determined by the scientific theories in which they occur

(Tuomela 1973). Accordingly, to attain a better theoretical understanding of tacit knowledge and its relation to

explicit knowledge we have to go P and not just for picking up one concept but to assess the theory as a whole because not only the expression providing a definition of the concept but that

entire theoretical context signifies the concept to be defined (Tuomela 1973).

W P gical foundations upon which the theories of application of tacit knowledge rest-- P mentioned and referred basically by every author. The concept has been brought alongside with the

traditional conception of knowledge, which leads to theoretical confusion as will be shown. We critically

analyse the two epistemological theories (knowledge as tacit and explicit categories; knowledge as spectrum)

that seem to have wide influence in the contemporary KM literature. Based o P sketch an epistemological model that aims to conceptual clarification of tacit and explicit knowledge and the

relationship between the two. We examine in this work the components of which different conceptions of

knowledge consist in order to compare them and to assess their internal consistency. The aim of this work is to

point some flaws in the mainstream epistemic view of KM and present more coherent epistemological model,

P

2. Epistemologies of KM literature P Based on the foundations of positivist epistemology, the majority of the contemporary knowledge literature

develops typologies that distinguish between different types of knowledge (Hislop 2005). The most common

distinction, and also the one that we are interested in, is between tacit and explicit knowledge. This view can

be considered significant because the most cited authors of knowledge management and intellectual capital

literature1

(e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Davenport and Prusak 1998; Steward 1997) embrace it, and many

1 A B -review of knowledge management and intellectual capital literature that surveyed all

citations of the topic (about 60 publications in total) in three major knowledge management journals (Journal of Intellectual Capital,

Journal of Knowledge Management and Knowledge and Process Management.

Ilkka Virtanen

www.ejkm.com 120 ISSN 1479-4411

authors after them have adopted it (e.g. Johannessen et al 2000; Kikoski and Kikoski 2004; Seidler-de Alvis and

Hartmann 2008). The tacit/explicit distinction came to prominence in KM literature through the work of

N T M N T express the foundation of their epistemology clearly:

I O s explicit knowledge, which can be articulated in formal language including grammatical statements, mathematical expressions,

specifications, manuals and so forth. This kind of knowledge thus can be transmitted across

Hever, we shall argue, a more important kind of knowledge is tacit knowledge, which is hard to articulate with formal language. It is personal knowledge

embedded in individual experience and involves intangible factors such as personal belief,

perspective, This view treats (explicit) knowledge in a traditional way, namely defining it as justified, true belief. For

N T I adopt the tradit A view makes is that (explicit) knowledge is objective and discrete entity (Hislop 2005). As tacit knowledge is

seen convertible into explicit knowledge, the most crucial KM process is to identify the sources of significant

tacit knowledge and codify that tacit knowledge to explicit (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Steward 1997; Kikoski

and Kikoski 2004).

However, this view has some theoretical problems, and we next discuss briefly the two most significant of

them.

First, Polanyi never said that there existed two types of knowledge ontologically although many authors claim

so (e.g. Baumard 1996; Spender 1996; Jasimuddin et al. 2005). I P knowledge are related to two different kinds of awareness, subsidiary awareness and focal awareness respectively. The

things that we are attending to and that we are consciously aware of (e.g. propositional belief, mental image,

external object, read sentence etc.) belong to focal awareness. However, all focal awareness is dependent on

subsidiary awareness that consists of variety of clues, elements and processes (personal knowledge structures,

emotional processes, past experiences, motor responses etc.) that enable focal awareness giving rise to the

personal meaning of its contents. This is the structure of all acts of knowing (Polanyi 1969). Hence, the focal

object is always identifiable and in this sense explicit, whereas subsidiary content is unidentifiable, tacit. In

addition, the two kinds of awareness are mutually exclusive; when the attention is switched to something

hitherto subsidiary, it becomes focal losing its subsidiary meaning (Polanyi 1964). Most importantly, this tacit-

explicit structure concerns all acts of knowing; tacit knowledge is not a separate category of knowledge but an

integral component of all knowledge. Hence, to divide knowledge into two categories is not only

P to knowledge. Also other authors have H W T G P L M which I P theory of knowledge, whose vital component the tacit dimension is. Tacit dimension is present in all knowledge.

Second, the categorisation of knowledge into tacit and explicit and the idea of conversion of tacit knowledge

into explicit knowledge leads to puzzling, even internally contradictory, overall epistemology. For example,

Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) originally saw rather unproblematic that something subjective and intangible (as

they characterised tacit knowledge) became converted justified, objective and true belief. However, the

process of explication (or externalization) does not explain how tacit knowledge becomes justified and true.

T P hat specifically due to the tacit dimension of knowledge it could never be objective or fully justified.

The epistemology that divides knowledge into two categories has also one practical constraint that does not

coincide with our everyday experience. For example, I might be able to articulate reasons why I choose one

option over another being, however, unable to exhaustively explain all the factors that have affected my

choice. In this sense the described epistemological view is a rather rigid because knowledge is defined either

- A definitions of these two categories of knowledge become unavoidably vague in the case of borderline

instances of knowledge.



It has been argued (e.g. Hislop 2005; Tsoukas 2003; Brown and Duguid 2001) that tacit-explicit dichotomy

P I in a sense that it is a compromise between polanyian epistemology and traditional definition of knowledge,

which leads to non-realistic epistemic view. Supposedly for these reasons this perspective has been afterwards

modified to more workable theory of knowledge that recognizes the inseparability between tacit and explicit

knowledge better but still supports the idea of sharing of tacit knowledge.

The modified view is based on the idea that all knowledge exists on a spectrum (or continuum) that runs from

tacit (uncodified) knowledge at one extreme to explicit (codified) knowledge at the other (Leonard and

Sensiper 1998; Hall and Andriani 2003; Jasimuddin et al 2005). Leonard and Sensiper (1998) remark that most

knowledge exists in between these two extremes, which is the main modification compared to the tacit-

T P namely the idea that knowledge has both tacit and explicit dimensions. The position of knowledge on the tacit-

explicit spectrum is then determined by its tacit-explicit mix (Jasimuddin et al 2005). This epistemic

perspective2

is described (as we understand it) in figure 1.

Figure 1: Knowledge seen as a spectrum. According to this view knowledge-spectrum has tacit and explicit

ends. Hence, any given instance of knowledge has a tacit part and an explicit part unless not taken from either

of the ends

However, as a theory of knowledge this view also has some illogical or at least unexplained features. First, the

explicit pole of the knowledge P P of wholly explicit knowledge (because all knowledge is tacit or based on tacit knowledge, see Polanyi 1966).

However, it would be obviously simple to modify the model and figure 1 so that in the explicit end knowledge

only approached explicitness but the continuum ended before total explicitness. In fact, Leonard and Sensiper

A ompletely H MA K as a spectrum where one extreme is seen as completely tacit and implicit knowledge and the other as

completely explicit or codified knowledge It is an interesting question how different instances of knowledge then are situated in the continuum. For

H A end. It might be possible to present scientific theories are anything but explicit; the theory of gravitation probably represents very different kind of

things to a novice compared to its meaning to an experienced physicist based on their experiences and existing

2 T -view, only described in a different manner. For example, Edwards (2009) presents

knowledge as two circles with the tacit part as a smaller circle within the bigger, explicit circle. The size of the inner circle (tacit part) varies

depending on the level of tacitness/explicitness of the particular instance of knowledge. Hence, the relational amounts of tacit and explicit

parts of any instance of knowledge can be presented with this model in an analogical way to the way an instance of knowledge is

T E um-view.

Ilkka Virtanen


knowledge structures, among others. Exactly this is the significance of the tacit dimension that enters into

every act of knowingand why completely explicit end of the spectrum is not very realistic. Second, spectrum-view of knowledge also seems to lead to relatively sharp tacit-explicit dichotomy as many

authors apply it as a background theory for sharing of tacit knowledge (e.g. Leonard and Sensiper 1998; Hall

and Andriani 2003; Jasimuddin et al 2005). Let us observe any given instance of knowledge on a knowledge

spectrum; it has a tacit and an explicit part. In order to share tacit knowledge we should codify it first (Nonaka

and Takeuchi 1995; Hall and Andriani 2003). The process of codification means that tacit knowledge is

converted explicit. Hence, a certain amount of the tacit part of that particular instance of knowledge would be

replaced by explicit knowledge. This means that the proportion of explicit part to tacit part grows and hence,

that particular instance of knowledge must shift towards the explicit end of the spectrum if the codification

succeeds.

Consequently, the same knowledge can exist in various points in the spectrum. In a logical sense this means

that the same instance of knowledge can exist in various forms in the knowledge spectrum. Thus, a

presupposition of the process of explication/externalization/codification of tacit knowledge always

presupposes also two different forms (or categories) of knowledge. For example, Hall and Andriani (2003: 146)

U C H C C T more or less the same knowledge of music can exist in two different forms of knowledge, tacit and explicit.

Basically this leads back to categorization of knowledge and some kind of knower-independent, objective ideal

of knowledgewhich, again, are issues that Polanyi wanted to criticise with the concept of tacit knowledge. Third, even if it were assumed that some tacit knowledge could be traced, supposedly most of it would remain

hidden. This means that it is impossible to specify the amount of tacit knowledge that a given instance of

knowledge includes. Following from that, it is also impossible to specify the location of any given instance of

knowledge on the kn T - C view it takes into account that there nowledge. Besides that it does not seem to - M view makes it rather clear that tacit knowledge is dependent on knower and explicit knowledge is independent

of knower, the spectrum-view does not provide very clear explanation of the role of the knower in the process

of knowing. Evidently, tacit end and explicit end represent knower-dependent and knower-independent

knowledge respectively, but what about the instances in between? Accordingly, the spectrum-model is argued

to provide a unified conception of knowledge but it cannot explain what knowledge is. Hence, although it covers different types of knowledge, no supporters of this view have

provided further explication of the nature of knowledge in general suggesting that the view has not been

considered completely.

3. Towards theoretically firmer epistemology

We base our understanding of the nature of knowledge on the polanyian argument that knowledge requires

active participation of the knower and is hence knower dependent. Knowing is an act of a particular individual.

The claim that there is knowledge in itself, without a concrete knowing subject, is fantastic (Bunge 1974).

Whenever however, carry for the most part information, which only a knowing mind can assimilate, understand and

incorporate into its own knowledge structures (Wilson 2002). Despite the various ways to codify and store

someone). When we know something, we engage in that what we know and cannot be neutral or indifferent

in relation to it; we have no means to abstract the knowledge from our life and experiences by the means of

which we understand that knowledge.

If the knower dependency of all instances of knowing is accepted it means that the tacit dimension of knowing

also enters in all types of knowledge as Polanyi argues; knowledge is represented in the mind of the knower

and it is thus necessarily dependent on the processes and elements that take part in the forming of that

representation. In this sense even an instance of knowledge that is presented in an explicit form (e.g. a note

written on the paper) has a tacit dimension. The conscious representation in turn forms the explicit dimension

of knowledge.



It is important to bear in mind that knowledge presented in an explicit form can only be originated from a

relatively clear representation in the mind; we can articulate and describe only things that we are conscious of

L I P processes in subsidiary awareness. In this sense for example any proposition is equally explicit whether we

read it, hear it said by another person or come to think it spontaneously by ourselves. The main point is that

explicitness of knowledge does not refer only to the form in which a given instance of knowledge is presented;

the clarity of knowledge and the way we regard it is not dependent on the form of presentation of that

knowledge. Hence, in the epistemic sense explicitness refers to the coherence of knowledge, which in turn

refers to origins and justifiability of the belief in question.

In sum, given that knowing occurs within a human knower, all knowledge has necessarily a tacit dimension

that refers to subconscious or otherwise subsidiary processes and elements that reflect the experiences of that

particular knowing subject, but are also typical to any human cognition. As a result of the tacit factors the

knower forms a focal conception of the matter, which represents more or less explicit knowledge. Hence, all

instances of knowledge have tacit and explicit parts (Polanyi argued that all knowledge can be tacit, that is, an

instance of knowledge that does not have an explicit part. However, in this case even the knower does not

consciously know that he is knowing something tacitly and such a situation can be considered as a special case

of knowing that simply cannot be commented on much). When this basic structure of knowledge is taken into

account, knowledge can be further divided into categories in a suitable way (for example in a way adopted

from psychological memory research: conditioned knowledge, semantic knowledge, episodic knowledge,

procedural knowledge). Importantly, all categories in the model should manifest this structure. The basic

structure of knowledge is described in figure 2.

Figure 2: The structure of knowledge. Knowledge has a tacit part upon which the possible explicit part is

founded.

All instances of knowledge manifest this structure, even if knowledge is further categorized in a suitable way

depending on the context. In this figure is presented an example of categorization adopted from the

psychological memory research

It is useful to relate this conception to the traditional definition of knowledge (knowledge as justified, true

belief) in order to clarify it. The starting point of knowledge in the traditional definition is the belief; knowing

something posits that the thing being known must be believed. However, according to this definition we must

distinguish correct beliefs from incorrect ones. Thus, the belief must somehow correspond to the state of

things in reality in order to be considered knowledge. This, however, is still not enough because for example a

lucky guess could be interpreted to be knowledge. Therefore there has to be some grounds for holding a

certain beliefthe belief must be justified. Indeed, traditional theory of knowledge as a branch of philosophy is most basically a theory about epistemic justification (Pollock and Cruz 1999).

Whereas the traditional analysis of knowledge described above starts from the belief and the analyses

P form the belief. In P . This idea is described in figure 3.

Ilkka Virtanen


Figure 3: T P K I P ief represent explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge refers to belief forming factors that cannot be fully traced. In this sense tacit

knowledge can be understood as an internal justification for the focal belief. Instead, the traditional approach

to knowledge studies justification and truthfulness of propositional beliefs

This view suggests that knowledge has two types of justification. External justification refers to justification in

the traditional sense; the requirement to objective explanation/argumentation of how that belief has been

attained. It is specifically related to the ability to publicly present evidence supporting a claim (Niiniluoto

1999). Thus, (external) justification is directed at the belief or other form of representation that the knower

holds. But all evaluations of beliefs derive from belief-forming processes (Goldman 1986). In this sense the

idea of internal justification comes close to the basic argument of naturalized epistemology according to which

epistemic status of a belief state depends on psychological processes that generate and sustain it (Kitcher

1992). Accordingly, natural cognitive and physiological processes involved in the process of knowing refer to

internal justification of the formed belief and cannot be bypassed in an analysis of knowledge. Instead of being

particularly interested in the norms that justify human knowledge, Polanyi stressed the importance of

confidence in human cognitive capacities in understanding reality.

The epistemological conception presented above has considerable strengths compared to the two models

predominant in the KM literature discussed in the section four. First, instead of simply picking up the concept

P logical environment, P T P mainly because of considerably different conceptions of the requirement of justification of knowledge. Second, we express clearly the knower-

dependency of knowledge. Every individual knows in his own way, from his basis. Interestingly, this has been

originally the starting point of knowledge sharing but from the theoretical perspective the idea seems to get

lost somewhere en route. Third, as other critics have also suggested tacit knowledge is narrower phenomenon

that KM literature intimates in the sense that our narratives, beliefs, impressions etc. do not represent tacit

capacity.

4. Conclusions

The predominant epistemological conceptions behind the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge

and the idea P theory. As a result, the epistemological foundations behind the tacit knowledge discussion tend to wake more

questions than provide answers. This has led to confusion and inconsistency in the discourse concerning tacit

knowledge and its relation to explicit knowledgeeven up to a point that some critics (e.g. Wilson 2002; Grant 2007) have claimed that the concept of tacit knowledge has become meaningless nonsense.

The origin of the problem of conceptual vagueness is that the concept of tacit knowledge is taken from an

epistemological environment that differs radically from the theoretical environment that it has been brought

to. In order to get the concept function in the new context it has been interpreted very loosely. Moreover,

given that one of most important functions of theoretical models (for example the models of explication of



tacit knowledge) is to make predictions, it is obvious that models including poorly defined concepts make

wider amount of predictions--up to a point at which the made predictions are anything but accurate, reliable

or even very clear. Therefore not surprisingly, in the case of tacit knowledge it is somewhat simple to report

positive results in the experiments concerning explication or externalization of tacit knowledge because some

subjects regardless of the used method. Instead, a little attention seems to have been paid on the question, in

T P KM understood traditionally as justified true belief simply is too narrow to explain human way to know and act in

O P consideration of pre-logical phases of knowing that unavoidab P broadens the scope of knowledge as he accepts feelings and intuitions not only as valid but also as necessary

P -dependency of knowledge (that knowledge is necessarily dependent on the subjective processes and elements that take part in the forming of the focal

part of knowing) is also well justified from the psychological perspective.

We have suggested a simple epistemological model that is in line with polanyian theory of knowledge. We

argue that this model provides more coherent foundation for KM theory than the two epistemological views

that are predominant in the contemporary KM literature. Given that tacit knowledge is inarticulate and

inaccessible by definition, we suggest that in attempts to classify knowledge the focus should be on different

crystallization of (focal) knowledge that is difficult to articulate. Hence, we would like to stress that our aim is

not to criticize the goals and methods of knowledge sharing in general but to develop the aspects that are

shown to be inconsistent in the present KM theory.

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W T T Information Research, vol 5, paper no. 144.

ISSN 1479-4411 127 ACPIL

J D Governing Frameworks for Sharing Actionable Knowledge The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management Volume 11 Issue 2 (pp127-138) available online at www.ejkm.com

Governing Frameworks for Sharing Actionable Knowledge

J. David Johnson

University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA

[email protected]

Abstract: A fundamental necessity for the transfer of actionable knowledge is that it must occur within a context. This

essay suggests that governing frameworks provide the medium within which it becomes possible to share actionable

knowledge. To support this claim the notion of governing frames is first explicated. Frameworks provide the basic support

structures for sharing knowledge within organizations through the development of an inextricable linkage between context

and meaning often found in the underlying foundation for governance structures. Each of the classic governing frameworks

discussed, formal, informal, markets, and professional, has different manifestations of key structural elements,

relationships, elements, context, configurations, and temporal stability and thus different implications for sharing

knowledge. The strengths and weakness of the various frameworks for understanding the sharing of knowledge in

organizations are exemplified by focusing on two exemplar problems: information seeking and clinical and translational

science. In conclusion, the concept of governing frameworks offers a new way of looking at the often intractable problem

of sharing knowledge in our ever more complex organizations. A compelling focus of future research is how these

frameworks are negotiated in an increasingly professionalized world where specialists must integrate their activities in

interprofessional teams.

Keywords: organizational structure, governing frameworks, actionable knowledge, sharing, information seeking and clinical

and translational science

1. Governing frameworks for sharing actionable knowledge

The absence of a role for context in organizational behavior not only leads to inadequate explanations for

individual attitudes and behavior, but also makes it impossible to develop a common paradigm for micro and

macro organizational research (Cappelli and Sherer, 1991, pp. 55).

A fundamental necessity for the transfer of actionable knowledge is that it must occur within a context. In

general, in conceptualizing our world, we have a tendency to focus on objects rather than their grounds

(Stocking and Holstein, 1993), focusing on messages or individuals, for example, rather than the contexts

within which they are embedded. We concentrate on the processes we are interested in rather than on the

more diffuse social contexts that frame, embed, and surround them. This essay will focus, then, on the

relationship between governing frameworks, one instantiation of context, and structure in shaping the sharing

of actionable knowledge in organizations.

Traditionally three senses of context have been used in organizational research (see Johnson, 2003, for more

detail). First, context is seen as equivalent to the situation in which an individual is immersed, with situations

viewed as more important in determining behaviors than individual traits or dispositions. Second, contingency

approaches move toward specifying active ingredients that have specific, predictable effects on various

processes. Third, major frameworks for meaning systems or interpretation are increasingly seen as critical to

various processes. Since the first two of these senses have been extensively explored in the literature (e.g.,

Johnson, 2003), here we will focus on the more recent developments concerning frameworks and governance

structures, the mechanisms by which contexts are operationalized, and become real for organizational

participants.

Increasingly generating and manipulating knowledge is seen as a core function of our econ (MacMorrow, 2001, pp. 381). Greater knowledge intensity leads to greater profitability for commercial firms, higher levels of

innovation and, ultimately, knowledge has become the source of wealth creation and economic growth

(Florida and Cohen, 1999, Leonard, 1995, Stewart, 2001). This is critical for organizations, since knowledge

becomes something you can do something with. As a result it often leads to strategic advantages since

organizations who have the best understanding of their environment and then act on them accrue competitive

advantages.

Knowledge runs the gamut from information, to explicit knowledge, to tacit knowledge, to wisdom, with a

variety of distinctions made between these terms in the literature. While there is a generally recognized



ordering among these terms, with wisdom having the least coverage of the other sets, they are often used

interchangeably and in conflicting ways in the literature, resulting in some confusion (Boahene and Ditsa,

2003).

experience (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998, pp. 113, italics in original).

Knowledge is also something that is inherently social (Brown and Duguid, 1998, Barnett, 1988, Orlikowski,

2002), bound to particular contexts (Barnett, 1988, Swan, 2003, Tsoukas and Valdimirou, 2001), and something

that can be communicated to others, even if it may take considerable effort and require the development of

mutually agreed upon symbols which is greatly facilitated by governance frameworks.

Knowledge sharing (also termed diffusion, dissemination, transfer, and adoption) has been a compelling issue

in a variety of areas including technology transfer between developed and developing nations, between

organizations, and within organizations. Here I primarily focus on internal organizational transfer. Since

knowledge transfer among organizational units can provide opportunities for learning, cooperation and

creativity, it has been directly related to organizational innovation (Tsai, 2001), as well as a number of other

organizational processes (Reagans and McEvily, 2003). To be effective, transfer implies a level of

understanding that enables action (Jensen and Meckling, 1995). In this essay it is suggested that governing

frameworks provide the medium within which it becomes possible to share actionable knowledge. Innovation

diffusion is ultimately a social process of information seeking and transfer of ideas perceived as new such as in

clinical and translational science problems discussed in concluding this essay.

2. Frameworks as governance structures

A frame, or the act of framing, usually refers to putting a perspective into words when one encodes a message

(1979) providing, for example, a definition, meaning, or conceptualization of an issue in a conflict situation

(Putnam and Holmer, 1992). The concept of framework has a long history in the social sciences (e.g., Schon

and Rein, 1994, Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), especially in relation to discourse processes (Goffman, 1974).

Frames have been viewed as inherently delimiting, providing individuals with a situated context for action and

for interpretations of particular 'strips of activity' (Goffman, 1974).

The concept of frames is most commonly used to indicate both a way of viewing the world and of subjectively

interpreting it, acting as sense-making devices that establish the parameters of a problem (Gray, 1996). A

fundamental property of communication is that interpretation depends on context. Frameworks are both

windows on the world and lenses that bring the world into focus, at the same time they filter out some stimuli

(Bolman and Deal, 1991). Often understandings attributable to various frameworks assume a taken-for-

granted reality among interactants. Indeed, frameworks perform a number of critical functions for

interactants: they are shared conversational resources; they provide a common emotional tone; they insure

quicker responses; and they also provide a basis for temporal stability by insuring more continuous responses

(Collins, 1981, Benson, 1975).

Here the focus will be on governance frameworks that provide a more encompassing context for interaction

within organizations. A framework for interaction is the set of interrelated conditions that promoting certain

levels of shared understanding of meanings, orient interactants to the nature of the event, and establish the

ultimate purpose of continuing interaction (Johnson, 1997b, Johnson, 1998). A framework, then, is the ground

that opens doors to social worlds of situated knowledge and governing rationalities. Frameworks provide the

basic support structures for sharing knowledge within organizations through the development of an

inextricable linkage between context and meaning often found in the underlying foundation for governance

structures.

3. Governance structures

Governance implies the imposition of order by a common authority by allocating legal or quasi-legal

entitlements and obligations (MacKechnie & Donnelly-Cox, 1996, pp. 46).

Structural research has been a primary focus of research on transfer and it has been centrally concerned with

F social systems whose members are more closely linked by communication networks have a stronger diffusion

David Johnson


(Rogers, 2003, p. 235). Structure determines what is possible in large organizations since it enables action within a governance framework. Without a predictable

pattern of recurring relationships, coordinated activity, such as knowledge transfer, within the organization

would be impossible. The more constraints that exist, the more things occur in predictable patterns; the more

people know about their organization. Extensive reviews of the prior literature on structure has identified five

common elements in most of its definitions; relationships, entities, configurations, context, and temporal

stability (Johnson, 1992, Johnson, 1993) H configuration of communication relationships between entities within an organizational context" (Johnson,

1992, pp. 100).

As Table 1 details each of the governing frameworks we will discuss, formal, informal, markets, and

professional, has different manifestations of these key structural elements. As detailed below, each of these

frameworks has been separately developed within different theoretical traditions. Johnson (1997b, 1998,

2009) has then integrated them by developing scales associated with them for empirical tests, applied them to

case studies, and articulated their relationships to managing knowledge networks.

Table 1: Relationships between structural elements and governance frameworks

Governance Frameworks*

Structure

Elements

Formal Informal Markets Professional

Relationships Hierarchical Sentiments Exchanges Normative

Entities Positions People Traders/Brokers Professionals

Context Rules System Social/Personal/

Climate

Embeddedness Practice Standards

Configuration Organizational

Chart

Sociogram Bazaar Guild/clan

Temporal

Stability

Equivalent to

O Limited Dynamic Generations,

Common Law

Knowledge Rules Emotional

Intelligence

Explicit Tacit

*(Johnson, 2009, pp. 62)

A formal approach was the earliest systematic specification of the underlying basis for interaction within

organizations and in many ways the other frameworks were established in opposition, or counterpoint, to it

(Johnson, 1993). In fact, informal communication studies, the precursors to the modern interest in

communication networks, became a residual category including a wide array of potential frameworks (e.g.,

sentiments, informal influence, and so on) for interaction. Thus, exchange rests on individuals pursuing their

rational self-interest common to markets, while normative frameworks depend on operations of larger

collectivities most clearly represented in the professions. The introduction of tacit knowledge also suggests a

need for the more explicit introduction of culturally related normative elements captured most clearly in the

professions. Let us know turn to a more explicit discussion of these four governing frameworks.

3.1 Formal

Administrative rationality in the Weberian sense has always been a central concern of the formal approach

(e.g., Thompson, 1967) and with it has come the assumption that structures are designed to control behavior

in such a way as to produce efficient/effective operations (Pfeffer, 1978), controlling competitive instincts to

produce cooperative behaviors. Thus structures are conceived as fitting into a rational plan, rather than

viewed as representing rationality after the fact (Weick, 1969).

Formal frameworks essentially represent the bureaucratic world of the organization, with its specification of

patterns of super- and sub-ordination and other hierarchical relationships between positions in a relatively

permanent system of rules (Weber, 1947). An hierarchy provides a framework for action by specifying control

patterns, routinizing production, and implementing plans (McPhee, 1988). The kinds of behavior individuals

can engage in are specified in company manuals and output targets are detailed in formal performance reports



(Baliga and Jaeger, 1984), laying the ground work for much of the common explicit knowledge with the

organization. Usually formal frameworks require only a limited form of knowledge, based on system rules,

training, and a legalistic understanding of relationships between positions best exemplified by the

configurations embodied in the organizational chart. Actors are presupposed to be driven, or motivated, by

the requirements of the positions they occupy within a specified organizational chart.

Knowledge transfer in formal structures is best accomplished if couched within this relatively limited frame

which is especially conducive for sharing explicit, organizationally sanctioned knowledge. Often formal

structure codify in rigid rules who is responsible for sharing knowledge and how it can be transmitted.

3.2 Informal

Often interaction results in collective sentiments; thus, friendship and other more emotional bases for

relationship then provide the underlying basis for ties between people. Traditionally this has been cast as a

primary basis for informal communication structures. The shared understandings characteristic of these

relationships are often dependent on the depth of emotional involvement. Sentiments recognize the often

neglected place of emotions (Mumby and Putnam, 1992) and the desire for affiliation in organizational life.

The degree of affiliation felt between interactants determines the temporal stability of relationships which can

be fleeting and the degree to which parties' sentiments may override other bases for relationships, such as

exchange.

Knowledge transfer within this governing frame often depends on sophisticated understanding of the climate

of the social system embodied in a high level of emotional intelligence. This level of understanding is essential

to minimizing resistance and overcoming the uncertainty that is often associated with the change that

knowledge sharing entails.

3.3 Markets

Recently, yet another view of structure, a market approach, which shares much with both network and formal

approaches, and rests on economic and exchange assumptions, has emerged. Markets focus on exchange

relationships between traders or brokers (see Table 1) and the paramount importance of trust often emerging

from actors embedded in social systems in characterizing them (Kirman, 2001, Granovetter, 1985, Johnson,

1996) which has led to social capital perspectives on brokerage relations (Sawyer et al., 2003). In this view

individuals are seen as driven to maximize rewards through their interaction with each other.

Obviously, an exchange relationship can rest on extremely rudimentary understandings of others, based on

such fundamental issues as fair price and trust that the other party will follow through on bargains.

Relationships are seen from a utilitarian perspective, with the primary bases for continued relationships

resulting from a perception of mutual gain creating dynamic changes in social systems depending on changing

rewards. Indeed, we may seek exchanges with others because they are not like us and they have resources

that we do not possess.

Networks of explicit information exchanges, which also contain market elements, are particularly useful

structures for organizations composed of highly skilled work forces who possess knowledge not limited to

particular tasks (Powell, 1990). Indeed, more generally it has been argued that knowledge sharing may be best

accomplished by market-like structures because of problems in recognizing the significance of information and

communicating it effectively and efficiently (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). This form of decentralization

often reduces the possibility of information overload within these organizations, and attendant delays and

imperfect planning orders. Thus, in organizations like universities it may be better to minimize intrusive formal

structures and promote wide-ranging interactions, while providing a framework in which trading relationships

can occur, much like ancient bazaars.

3.4 Professional

Modern expertise comes partly at the expense of narrowness, and of ignorance about what other people do

(Becker and Murphy, 1992, pp. 1146).

David Johnson


I T e (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, pp. 204). These professions come together in organizations to pursue loosely defined larger objectives (e.g., universities and the pursuit of knowledge). Relationships

between and among professions are often governed by such normative expectations (Cheney and Ashcraft,

2007). Professionals reinforce normative isomorphism in institutional theory terms, where all firms come to

act in the same manner, especially under conditions of uncertainty where mimicry is often the safest course

(Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). Unfortunately little theoretic attention has been focused on professionals (Lammers

and Garcia, 2009, Pratt et al., 2006), especially on their interrelationships and micro level processes in

organizations (Chreim et al., 2007), such as knowledge transfer, so we will discuss them in somewhat greater

detail than the other frames here.

Most work on the professions has focused on how they establish (and protect) their jurisdictions and maintain

their status within broader social systems. Knowledge is seen as a key tool in these processes (Lammers and

Garcia, 2009, Abbott, 1988, Macdonald, 1995) bodies of knowled (Larson, 1977, pp. xi), and thus is an incidental focus of traditional research. Knowledge is intimately related with credentialing and training and

the formal (and often legally, state enforced) differentiation of specialties in societies generally and

organizations specifically (Macdonald, 1995). Relatedly, the development of tacit knowledge plays a key role in

distinguishing professionals (Larson, 1977) and their relative competence (Schon, 1983). So, intraprofessional

status often results from the ability of a profession to do non-routine work (Abbott, 1981) to apply old knowledge in new ways to solve novel or unforeseen problems.

Over the last three decades cultural factors, which norms encapsulate, have assumed a central place in our

theories of organizations. Culture is seen as providing an interpretive framework within which communication

is possible; a macromedium for interaction (Johnson, 1993). Perhaps nowhere in our society is socialization

more intensive than in the preparation of a professional with societies often delegating enforcement of

practice standards to professional bodies. They, in turn, jealously guard their prerogatives, especially in

relation to knowledge claims in specific areas (Cheney and Ashcraft, 2007), since these claims often define

what the profession is and its relative status (Abbott, 1988). Their natural reluctance to share professional

knowledge is further exacerbated by the more general reluctance to share knowledge with others if they are

thought incapable of understanding it (Hew and Hara, 2007).

A key element of this socialization is the development of elaborate semantic systems of tacit understandings

(von Hayek, 1945) that are difficult to share. The more elaborate and refined the framework, the more

effective the communication within the profession (and that much more difficult outside of it). An advantage

of strong cultures is their enhancement of shared understandings between actors and a norm of adjustment

through consultation within a system of mutual authority that governs competition (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975).

Clan controls result in high goal congruence and common interests, most appropriate when transformation

processes are imperfect and measures of outcomes are low (Turner and Makhija, 2006). Interaction

configurations are also provided with a normative base that expresses the underlying cultural values. This

strong emphasis on socialization of succeeding generations reinforces the temporal stability associated with

professions on a near common law accretion of knowledge.

Nonaka (1991) developed a more dynamic, interactive approach to these issues focusing on the implications of

the spiral of knowledge and its articulation (converting tacit to explicit) and internalization (using explicit to

T ion to develop insights into deeper problems (e.g., financial trends) then articulate them, as financial brokers do, to specific

buy and sell recommendations for their clients. However, once true expertise is developed, the professional

may have a very difficult time translating it for the novice or generalist (Hinds and Pfeffer, 2003). Professions

(Abbott, 1981).

Expert knowledge does depend on the application of traditional knowledge to which the seeker is in many

ways a servant. The freedom of members of these communities rests on certain obligations and systems of

mutual authority that also entail personal judgments (e.g., scientists making hypotheses, lawyers preparing

briefs). This process is accorded respect by society and certain things are left to communities of specialists to

pursue; the mutual adjustment of these specialists then determine the ultimate directions of the societies of



which they are a part. Mutual adjustment depends in turn on consultation or, in the case of business,

competitive forces. However, this system of spontaneous order has several limits: one, the public good can be

surrendered to these personal judgments; two, society is ruled by a privileged oligarchy; and, three, it can drift

in directions determined by no one (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975).

Some more cynical observers of the professions suggest that perhaps the most powerful motivation for

doctors and lawyers to keep up-to-date is the ever present threat of a malpractice suit (Paisley, 1993). Most

other professions do not have similarly compelling external motivations to keep current; they do not have

sanctions for 'remediable ignorance,' for actions which duplicate or overlook existing knowledge (Paisley,

1980). These professions can in effect conspire to say it is pointless to try to keep up. They also have

substantial interests in the preservation of personal knowledge unique to their professions by insuring there

are heavy information costs to memberships in their priesthood, discouraging intermediation. However, never

has secret knowledge been more accessible to those who are interested in it.

3.5 Negotiated order

The forgoing frameworks are ideal types. It is possible for an individual to act with others with their unique mix

of the forgoing frames, to choose among themselves what frame (or combination of frames) will govern their

interactions. It is also possible for two interactants to decide mutually on an idiosyncratic basis for interaction

(Nathan and Mitroff, 1991). This possibility creates the underlying conditions for change (Strauss, 1978).

Indeed, the absence of a dominating frame, or the lack of rigid specification when one or another applies,

creates the possibility of flexibility within an organization.

So two parties communicate with each other to arrange the nature of their future interaction by mutual

agreement. This negotiation is designed to establish a stable ordering of the relationship governing

interactions within it, to move to a state where the underlying base for the interaction is taken-for-granted. At

times this negotiation might be explicit, verging on contractual terms, at other times it might grow out of

ongoing interactions.

4. Discussion

Within organizations, governance frameworks differentially impact knowledge transfer. Formal structures tend

to lessen contact and contracting costs, but may not be very efficient at finding the optimal price. There is also

a quite natural human tendency to exercise ever more control when performance problems are experienced,

which may (Williamson, 1994, pp. 91). Informal approaches focus on the emotional impact of knowledge sharing focusing

on issues such as potential points of resistance. Strong professional norms can severely restrict the content

and interactants available to individuals, but interestingly, because of the increased sophistication of shared

understandings, they can enhance the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. They also can improve efficiency

by clearly delineating roles and relationships. In contrast, exchange based transfer have few barriers, but

limited breadth and only moderate levels of effectiveness and efficiency, in part because of the differential

understanding levels of the parties.

In general, it has been argued that there are three approaches to organizational phenomenon (Lee et al., 2004,

Ferratt et al., 2005): universalistic; contingency, and configurational which focuses on bundles of attributes

that exhibit synergestic, nonlinear effects on outcomes. This focus on commonly occurring clusters of

attributes which can be linked to performance (Lee et al., 2004) is also linked to the classic system concepts of

equifinality (Gresov and Drazin, 1997). By focusing on sets of practices, with the adoption of one limiting the

adoption of others because of complementarity/fit/gestalt issues. Gestalts are feasible sets of internally

consistent configurations, with research findings suggesting configurational approaches are more predictive of

outcomes than others (Lee et al., 2004). For example, Andersen and Segars (2001) found that IT enhancing

communication supported a decentralized decision structure that was associated with higher financial

performance. Each of the governance frameworks can be seen as relating as a configuration to a variety of

different organizational outcomes such as knowledge sharing. In this section we will focus on the issues of

what types of knowledge can be shared and where it might come from, then we turn to two exemplars of

these processes, clinical and translational science and information seeking.

David Johnson


The critical knowledge that is the focus of transfer in formal settings is a set of rules and routines that can form

the basis for information processing. In informal governance structures knowledge of personal affiliations and

coalitions is critical to determining the political acceptance of different types of knowledge. Markets are best

suited for the transference of knowledge as a commodity that most often takes on explicit, limited forms,

although in certain situations it may have special significance, somewhat akin to insider trading, because of the

ability of one of the parties to use it for their unique benefit. Finally, professional knowledge is often tacit

based on years of experience and as a result difficult to transfer. In addition, professionals often jealously

guard their secrets and are reluctant to share them with outsiders.

This quick sketch also raises some interesting issues of where new perspectives come from and what is the

nature of the knowledge that is transferred. Interestingly, the first three frameworks focus on the processes by

which knowledge might be shared, while professional knowledge is also concerned with this in developing a

unique approach to problems, it also deals with content more directly. So, fundamentally, these frameworks

provide the overall institutional frame in which knowledge can be shared. One of the reasons why transfer has

proved so difficult is that they must all be operating in concert with each other. Thus agents are needed to

facilitate transfer of tacit knowledge who operate simultaneously within several frames, a key role for

management in the modern organization (Postrel, 2002).

One of the basic problems with relying exclusively on what goes on within an organization is that there is a

finite limit to the number of new ideas that can be produced from the same elements of a knowledge set

(Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Professions play a unique role in determining where is it substantive change within

organizations comes from. In many ways strong professions transcend particular organizations and make their

boundaries more permeable. Membership in a profession provides access to a much larger, scalable tacit

knowledge community outside the organization (Lammers and Garcia, 2009). These much broader tacit

networks, especially associated with professional institutions, become the primary vehicle for external learning

(Lammers and Garcia, 2009, Van der Krogt, 1998). This is a key shortcoming of the other approaches to

governance which primarily focus on what happens within the firm

Professionals seek answers to their questions wherever they may easily be available, whether inside or outside

the organization. Indeed, professional membership is likely to diminish organizational identification (Lammers

and Garcia, 2009). Sophisticated search agents and brokers only accelerate this trend. This is a unique

advantage of a professional framework - they are scalable, they bring the world outside in (Newman et al.,

2006), becoming a more modern version/extension of the classic cosmopolitan/local distinction (Gouldner,

1957).

The relationships between diverse professional groupings, who jealously guard their domains, is an

increasingly critical problem, particularly in health care settings (Clark, 2006, DA ). P onal autonomy and (Sicotte et al., 2002). However, balancing cooperation and competition must be achieved, most notably in sharing information that is in the

interest of the collective, in spite of individual motivations to hoard (Kalman et al., 2002). The greater effort

that is devoted to specialization, which implies you benefit from the work of others, the more reluctant

someone will be to give up what they know, especially to perceived free riders. Some have suggested that the

best motivator for knowledge sharing is a sense of collectivism and reciprocity (Hew and Hara, 2007).

4.1 The clinical and translational science problem

There is a widely held view that the U.S. is not receiving the full value for its investment in biomedical research

(Colditz et al., 2008, Real, 2008, Lee, 2007). While there are over 10,000 randomized trials of new intervention

approaches every year, very few innovations are ever widely adopted (Grol and Grimshaw, 2003). Drug

companies have also expressed concern about the length of time it takes for their investments to pay off and

their low success rate, with only 1 in nine compounds eventually achieving government regulatory approval

(Berelson and Steiner, 1964). While there has been growth in evidence reviews that inform practice there also

is a growing gap in their implementation (Colditz et al., 2008). Of course, this is emblematic of a larger problem

in translating research into professional practice common to many disciplines including communication,

management (Reay et al., 2009), and information science (Garnett, 2011).



Clinical and Translational Science Institute's began to be funded by NIH in 2006. They were established to be

the home for clinical research within Academic Health Centers and to improve their resource base by

establishing linkages to industry and other health care organizations enhancing the level of community

engagement, while at the same time increasing the control of NIH over their direction (Robertson and

Williams, 2009). They are also designed to provide the critical infrastructure needed for traditional academic

training and linkages to clinical research resources (Robertson and Williams, 2009). The key problem faced

AHC

The reasons why it takes nearly two decades to transfer knowledge into routine medical practice are complex

and still poorly understood (Sussman et al., 2006). Changes in practice are rarely easy and require

collaborations between disciplines in very complex systems (Grol and Grimshaw, 2003). In the 1970s and 80s,

in recognition of the difficulties in knowledge translation, the dominant conceptual model came to focus on

the inherent differences between research and policymaking communities with the two communities theory

stressing that the inherent differences between them were often intractable (Jacobson et al., 2003).

Translational research often demands that there be communication across disciplines, which often runs into

basic problems that scientist have in communicating well with people from the practice community (Sussman

et al., 2006).

If we apply the framework of governance structures to this problem we can easily see why it has proved so

intractable. First, AHC have a layering of formal bureaucracy that constrains many research processes (e.g.,

human subjects protections, animal usage, and so on). Then, we have an informal structure governed by

sentiments and political coalitions that can prove difficult to negotiate and which is particularly important

traditionally for physicians who often place more weight on reputational standing of their colleagues in

adopting new practices than on bureaucratic dicta. Next, we have market exchanges and the inevitable

question of what is in it for me and who can I trust. Finally, we have the strong, compelling normative interests

of a multiplicity of professions. In some ways, all of these forces need to be aligned for successful

implementation, although adoption and creation may only depend on one. So new ideas are created, but it

may take nearly two decades to align all the frameworks.

When moving from the bedside to the community we face the additional problem that these factors become

even more diffuse, since the formal structures of government regulations and insurance guidelines is not

bolstered by the bureaucracy of the AHC. Further market relations and sentiments become much more diffuse

and fractured, so the only constant is the professional framework within which practice is embedded. All this

makes the information sharing and seeking components more critical for widespread practice implementation.

4.2 Information seeking

Not only to people initiate sharing of information they possess with others, which has been the primary focus

of the literature on knowledge sharing, but individuals often initiate sharing on their own based on their

perceived needs. In doing this they must decide on the objects of their searches. Will a health professional

who needs information seek it from the formal structure of the organization, will they depend on friends, will

they exchange their knowledge with other health professions in teams, or will they rely on the advice of

colleagues in their own profession.

Sadly, in a series of studies, Hersh has demonstrated that the information seeking practices of health

professionals are very problematic which further impedes effective sharing. So, an experimental study by

Hersh, Crabtree et al. (2002) showed that students of medicine and nursing were only partially successful in

applying the results of medical database searches to clinical questions. Subjects did the best in interpreting the

implications of medical literature for prognosis, and worst in applying retrieved documents to questions of

diagnosis and potential harm to the patient. An earlier analysis by Hersh (1998) of existing studies concluded

that literature searches exhibit poor recall of potentially relevant items, their results typically address only a

small port retrieval for medical doctors are unclear.

Johnson (1996, 1997a) has summarized the basic approach to information seeking of individuals with Case

(2012) in a more recent review making very similar arguments. First, people seek out information that is the

most accessible. However, second, having access to information means very little if an individual does not have

David Johnson


the proper information seeking skills and training to retrieve it. Third, people follow habitual patterns in their

information seeking. Fourth, face-to-face, interpersonal communication is the preferred mode of

communication for information seeking. This creates some real problems of scale when people move outside

of the physical proximate setting of AHC. Fifth, different types of persons use different sources of information.

This is further reinforced in medical setting by professional norms and standards of care which may differ

somewhat from profession to profession in a health care team. Finally, there are cognitive limits on the

amount of information individuals can process, especially in short term memory. All of this is further

complicated by the near chaotic framework typical of modern health care with multiple frameworks and

players within each of them coming into play (Lawrence, 2002).

5. Conclusion

The corporations take on the task of putting appropriate specializations together to exploit the synergistic

advantages thus accruing. The business executive becomes (Fuller, 2010/1962, pp. 80).

As this quote suggests the problem of bringing together different professions to share knowledge has been

with us for a long time with Fuller maintaining that Alfred North Whitehead early in the 20th

century traced it

to the increasingly specialized training of professionals at our universities. This created what was termed the

Whitehead Dilemma of ever deepening problems. So, a compelling focus of future research is how these frameworks are negotiated in an increasingly

professionalized world where specialists must integrate their activities in interprofessional teams.

Managers need tacit knowledge, deep understanding for fundamental change, but this knowledge is

supported by existing frameworks and various inertial forces. This can result in coalitions and power struggles,

which often are a by-product of tacit knowledge. A key social outcome of more specialized tacit knowledge is

the problems of concertative control resulting in conformity and influence within groups which makes

intergroup action much more difficult. While we need the support of others, they also limit our action.

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