Egypt's Evolving Civil-Military Relations _ Stratfor

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    Egypt's Evolving Civil-Military RelationsAugust 13, 2012 | 2155 GMT

    Summary

    KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/GettyImagesEgyptian President Mohammed Morsi

    Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi on Aug. 12 announced the retirement of the country's topfive officers from military service. Defense Minister and head of the Supreme Council of theArmed Forces Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. SamiAnnan were both given top civilian posts as advisers to the president, while the air and navalchiefs along with the air defense chief were also retired from service and given top civilianpositions. Second-tier commanders took over from the retired officers, while unconfirmed reportsin Egyptian media suggest that the deputies of the promoted commanders have taken over theposts vacated by their superiors.

    The military needs to secure its influence in the new political system in which the president is nolonger drawn exclusively from the armed forces, which had been the case in Egypt since Lt. Col.Gamal Abdel Nasser established the modern Egyptian republic through a military coup in 1952. Itis also grappling with internal tensions due to younger officers' frustrations over a lack ofopportunity for promotion. The president's move may have partially addressed both issues. Giventhat the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces had heavily circumscribed Morsi's powersjust before the June presidential election , it is unlikely his decision was a unilateral one, and itmay have been made in cooperation with the ambitious younger members of the armed forces tonudge out the aging military leadership.

    AnalysisEgypt's second- and third-tier commanders and the general staff officer corps have for some timebeen displeased with the top brass's refusal to relinquish posts and allow those below a chanceat promotion. Indeed, Stratfor sources in Cairo said resentment reached an all-time high after the2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak and has not subsided. The internalschisms have received little attention amid the larger struggle between the military and the

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    Muslim Brotherhood for control of Egypt, but the recent retirements, promotions andreassignments suggest that an internal restructuring within the military was also under way.

    Tantawi has been at the helm of the military establishment since the 1990s. He gave no

    indication that he intended to retire, and it is unlikely that his or the others' retirements werepurely voluntary. Instead, they likely came as a result of pressure from subordinates who chargethat the professionalism of the military as an institution is harmed when the normal flow ofpromotions is disrupted and aging generals remain at the helm for too long.

    The retirements and promotions come at a time when the military is searching for a newarrangement that will preserve its authority now that the country has moved away from thesingle-party model to a multi-party one with competitive elections. The military has alwayswanted to resume ruling from behind the scenes and leave day-to-day matters of governance tocivil authorities, and the new civilian assignments for the now-retired generals will likely be theconduit through which the defense establishment maintains its oversight of the political system.

    In addition to Tantawi and Annan, who were made presidential advisers, the former air forcechief will become the head of military production. Likewise, the former naval chief has reportedlybeen named head of the Suez Canal Authority, an important revenue-generating asset for thecountry, and the former air defense chief was named chairman of the Arab Organization forIndustrialization, a military development group. Under this arrangement, the military can go backto operating key state institutions through retired commanders, as was the case under AnwarSadat and Mubarak. Unlike previous times, however, these commanders will be working with apresident whose background is in the Muslim Brotherhood, not the military. Furthermore, thesethree appointments show that the defense establishment will be able to continue to dominate thecountry's economic sector.

    Since Mubarak's ouster and the beginning of Egypt's political transition , the MuslimBrotherhood's efforts to assert its power have repeatedly been countermanded by the military,

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    and Morsi's decree could similarly be reversed. However, Tantawi reportedly consented to themove, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces released a statement saying the shiftswere settled via negotiation between the president and the military, indicating the military will notdirectly challenge the moves.

    Under the new arrangement, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces remains powerful, but its

    composition and leadership have changed. Sensing an opening, Morsi has already issuedpresidential orders beyond what may have been agreed upon with the military. Morsi canceled aJune 17 constitutional addendum issued by the ruling council and amended the constitutionaldeclaration issued on March 30, 2011, with one that grants him full executive and judicialauthority as well as the power to set all public policies in Egypt and sign international treaties.The declaration also gives Morsi the right to form a new constituent assembly tasked withdrafting an Egyptian Constitution should any future developments prevent the current assemblyfrom carrying out its responsibilities.

    These presidential orders have not been implemented, and the judiciary or the military is likely toblock them from ever being enacted just as they have done with previous initiatives intended toempower the legislature or the president. While Morsi may have achieved a symbolic victory inremoving long-serving members of the former Mubarak regime from their military posts, themilitary had its own reasons for going along with the moves -- reasons that are intended toincrease, not reduce, the military's influence over the civilian government. Furthermore, Morsi isunlikely to exercise unencumbered authority any time soon, especially with the new constitution,which will likely limit the powers of the president, being drafted.