Egyptian Myth and Discourse Myth Gods and the Early Written and Iconographic Record

8/10/2019 Egyptian Myth and Discourse Myth Gods and the Early Written and Iconographic Record

1/26

Egyptian Myth and Discourse: Myth, Gods, and the Early Written and Iconographic RecordAuthor(s): John BainesSource: Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 81-105Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/545669.

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2/26

EGYPTIAN MYTH

AND DISCOURSE:

MYTH,

GODS,

AND

THE

EARLY WRITTEN

AND ICONOGRAPHIC

RECORD*

JOHN

BAINES,

University

of Oxford

I.

CHARACTER AND HISTORY

OF THE

PROBLEM

FOR

decades,

a

number

of

Egyptologists

have

seen the definition

and

status

of

myth

as one

of the

most

problematic aspects

of

Egyptian religion

and texts.

The

essential

difficulty

with

the

concept

of

myth

has

been,

on the

one

hand,

the

divergence

between

the

ample

attestation

of

many

Egyptian

deities

and

groupings

of

deities,

and,

on the

other

hand,

the near

absence

of

narratives about the

gods

that can

easily

be

termed

myths.

Scholars

have

questioned

the existence of

myths

in earlier

periods

and

have been

perplexed

by

the

variability

of

mythical

motifs. This attitude

contrasts

with

those

of

students

of

many

ancient

cultures and

most

complex

societies,

in

which

myth

is

seen

as

a

central

repository

of

values,

many

myths

are known

in the

literary

record,

and

the

problem

of

defining myth

may

be

given

a subordinate

position.

*

Abbreviations

of

works

cited

frequently

in

this

article are

as

follows:

Conceptions:

Erik

Hornung,

Conceptions

of

God

in

Ancient

Egypt,

trans. John

Baines

(Ithaca, New York, 1982) (revision of Der

Eine

und die

Vielen:

Altagyptische

Gottesvorstellun-

gen

[Darmstadt,

1971];

French

trans. Paul

Cou-

turiau

[from

the

English],

Jean-Paul

Bertrand, ed.,

Les

Dieux

de

l'Egypte:

L'un

et le

multiple,

Civilisa-

tion

et

Tradition

[Monaco,

1986],

with

additional

revisions);

GOF:

Gottinger

Orientforschungen

IV.

Reihe:

Agypten

(Wiesbaden,

1973-);

Lichtheim:

Mir-

iam

Lichtheim,

Ancient

Egyptian

Literature:

A

Book

of

Readings,

3

vols.

(Berkeley,

1973-80);

Mythe:

Siegfried

Schott,

Mythe

und

Mythenbildung

im

al-

ten

Agypten,

UGAA 14

(Leipzig, 1945);

Past :

John

Baines,

Ancient

Egyptian

Concepts

and

Uses

of

the

Past:

3rd to 2nd

Millennium

B.C.

Evidence,

in Robert Layton, ed., Who Needs the Past?: In-

digenous

Values

and

Archaeology (London,

1989),

pp.

131-49;

Seth: Herman

te

Velde,

Seth,

God

of

Confusion,

Probleme der

Agyptologie

6

(Leiden,

1967);

Verborgenheit :

Jan

Assmann,

Die

Verbor-

genheit

des

Mythos

in

Agypten,

GM

25

(1977):

7-

43;

Verhaltnis:

Eberhard

Otto,

Das

Verhaltnis von

Rite

und

Mythus

im

Agyptischen,

Sitzungsberichte

der

Heidelberger

Akademie

der

Wissenschaften,

phil.-hist.

Ki.

1958,

no.

1

(Heidelberg,

1958);

Wirk-

lichkeit :

Friedrich

Junge,

Wirklichkeit

und

Abbild:

Zum

innerigyptischen

Synkretismus

und zur

Welt-

sicht der Hymnen des Neuen Reiches, in Gernot

Wiessner, ed.,

Synkretismusforschung-

Theorie

und

Praxis,

Gottinger

Orientforschungen:

Grundlagen

und

Ergebnisse

1

(Wiesbaden,

1978),

pp.

87-108;

Zeu-

gung :

Jan

Assmann,

Die

Zeugung

des

Sohnes:

Bild,

Spiel,

Erzahlung

and

das Problem

des

agyp-

tischen

Mythos,

in Jan Assmann

et

al.,

Funktionen

und

Leistungen

des

Mythos:

Drei

altorientalische

Beispiele,

Orbis Biblicus

et

Orientalis

48

(Freiburg,

Switzerland

and

G6ttingen,

1982),

pp.

13-61.

This article

is an initial

discussion

of the

status

of

myth

in

Egyptian

texts.

I do not consider

attesta-

tion from

periods

after

the New

Kingdom,

which

is

uncontroversial.

I

hope

later to

present

a

study

of

Egyptian myths

on the basis of the

position

presented

here.

For reasons

of

space,

I

omit

non-German

traditions

of

scholarship

and restrict

discussion

of

questions

of

definition.

A

preliminary

version

was

given

at the

University

of

Chicago

in March 1989.

I

am

grateful

for

the

invitation

to

attend,

to

Stephen

Parker for

organiz-

ing

my

visit,

and

to

participants

for

many

useful

comments.

That version

was later

presented

to

a

seminar

at

the

University

of

Michigan

to

whose

members

I am indebted

for

discussion. I

should

also

like

to thank

Christopher Eyre,

Erhart

Graefe,

Rolf

Krauss,

and Peter Machinist

for

comments on

drafts,

and Richard Parkinson for much help. Work was

aided

by

a

Humboldt-Stiftung

fellowship

at

the

Uni-

versity

of

Mtinster.

[JNES

50

no. 2

(1991)]

@

by The University of Chicago.

All

rights

reserved.

0022-2968/91

/

5002-0001$1.00.

81

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3/26

82

JOURNAL OF

NEAR EASTERN

STUDIES

This article offers

a

critique

of the

Egyptological

approaches

and

suggests

alternatives

to

them,

focusing

on

the

German

tradition,

which is the

only

one with

a

continuing

discussion

of the

status

of

myth.

Outside

these

discussions

the

problems

of the

presence

and absence

of

myths,

and of the relation

between

the written

record and

whatever

myths

there were in other

contexts,

have

hardly

been raised. The

possibility

that

there

were no

narrative

myths

in

some

periods

should be

taken

seriously

because

societies

with few

myths

do

exist,'

but

that

might

be rare in a

complex

state.

It should also

be

asked

whether

myths

are

as

ideologically significant

as

is

often

assumed.

Early

scholars,

notably

Heinrich

Brugsch,2

tended

to

exploit

the

fragmentary

evi-

dence

and assume

that there

had been

numerous

myths relating

to

the

many

deities;

the

task was to

order

the

material,

especially

in

regional

terms,

and to

reconstruct the

cults

and

assemble

evidence for

myths.3

The evidence

they

used is

often

scattered

or

consists

only

of

allusions

or

evocations.

Brugsch's principal

successor was Hermann

Kees,

whose

work

culminated

in

Der

Gdtterglaube

im

alten

Agypten.4

This

approach

is

appropriate

for late materials because of the amount of information

they preserve,

often

regionally

organized;

here it continues to

be

pursued.5

It

assumes that

available evidence

is

only

a

fraction

of what there

was both

in

quantity

and

in

range

of

genres.

Writers who have

moved

away

from

these

approaches

have attended

more

closely

to

the form

and statements of the

sources

themselves,

partly

to

the

exclusion of

their

position

in

a wider

context of

religious

conceptions

and

action.

There has also

been a

change

of

temporal

focus. Whereas

earlier

Egyptology

tended to

concentrate on

more

recent

periods,

especially

for

religion,

later

scholarship

has turned

increasingly

to

earlier

times,

with their

sparser

and more

problematic

evidence. The

growing

emphasis

on

sources

contrasts with

the rather

absurd

interpretation

of Kurt

Sethe,

who

suggested

(with

reserve)

in

Urgeschichte

und

iilteste

Religion

der

Agypter6

that relations between

gods

could be

mapped

fairly

directly

onto

events

in

order

to

model

prehistory

as far

back

as the fifth

millennium

B.C.

Such a

construct

could be

proposed

only

if

contexts

and

mechanisms

of

spoken

and

written

transmission were

largely ignored.

Because of

hypotheses

such as this

one,

it

is

understandable

that

these scholars'

breadth of

approach

should

have been

ignored

or

discredited.7

Sethe and

Kees

also

showed a

certain

rationalistic

contempt

for

religion

and reduction

of

its

implications

to

politics

and

factional

struggle.

The

reaction

against

these

aspects

after

World War

II

was

probably

reinforced

by

antipathy

to

this

reductionism and

to

the

nationalism

of these

academi-

cally

illustrious

scholars.

I

See,

for

example,

E. E.

Evans-Pritchard,

The

Zande

Trickster,

Oxford

Library

of

African

Litera-

ture

(Oxford,

1967),

pp.

31-32;

general

context

pp.

11-13.

2

Heinrich

Brugsch,

Religion

und

Mythologie

der

alten

Aegypter

(Leipzig,

1885-88,

1891).

3

For

the

nineteenth-century

controversy

on

Egyp-

tian

gods,

which

is

closely

related to that

mentioned

here,

see

Conceptions,

pp.

17-26.

4

Hermann

Kees,

MVAG

45

(1941;

2d

ed.,

Berlin

[East],

1956);

historical

outline:

preface,

pp.

v-vii,

introduction,

pp.

1-4,

with

acknowledgement

of

Brugsch.

5

For

example,

Adolphe

Gutbub,

Textes

fonda-

mentaux

de la

thdologie

de

Kom

Ombo,

2

vols.,

Bibliothbque

d'Etude 47

(Cairo, 1973).

Jean

Yoyotte

has

contributed

many

studies

in

this area.

6

Kurt

Sethe,

Abhandlungen

fdir

die Kunde

des

Morgenlandes

18:4

(Leipzig,

1930).

7

See

positive

assessment of

Sethe's work

in,

for ex-

ample,

Jacques

Vandier,

La

Religion

egyptienne,

2d

ed.,

Les Anciennes

Religions

Orientales

1

(Paris,

1949),

p.

31. J.

Gwyn

Griffiths,

The

Conflict of

Horus

and

Seth

from

Egyptian

and

Classical Sources: A

Study

in

Ancient

Mythology,

Liverpool

Monographs

in

Archaeology

and

Oriental

Studies

(Liverpool,

1960),

basically

followed

Sethe's

reconstruction;

see

Hans Bonnet's comments in his review of Griffithsin

OLZ 57

(1962):

472-74;

Seth,

pp.

74-80.



4/26

EGYPTIAN MYTH

AND

DISCOURSE

83

The

first

author of the

post-Kees

generation

to discuss

the

problem

of

Egyptian

myth

was

Siegfried

Schott.8

The

point

of

departure

for

his

approach

was the

vast

range

of

brief

statements,

particularly

in

the

Pyramid

Texts,

that allude

to events

in

the world

of

the

gods. Studies of Giinther Rudnitzky9 and Eberhard Otto'o built on Schott's book on

myth,

and on his

study

of the

hypothetical

function

of the

Pyramid

Texts

in

royal

mortuary

rituals,1

o elaborate

a

theory

of the close connection

between

Egyptian

myth

and

ritual. This

theory

arose

almost

independently

of the widerdiscussion-now

largely

ignored-of

the

relation

between

myth

and

ritual

and the

putative origin

of

myth

in

ritual.12

Schott's basic conclusion

was that the

Egyptians

had no

true

myths

before

Early

Dynastic

times

and

that

traces

of

their formation

could

be seen in the

Pyramid

Texts.

His

position

has seldom

been

seriously

disputed,

as

against

being ignored

or

built

upon. 3

He

considered

that

there

was a time

when

stories

or

folktales

about

the

gods

existed on the one hand-he called narrativesMdrchenand the early Egyptians'mental

universe

mdrchenhaft14--and

rituals were

performed

on

the

other,

without

there

being

any

essential

connection

between the

two. There

were thus

myth-free

(mythenfrei)

rituals16

and

myths

perhaps

developing

separately

from

them.

In

that

period,

rituals

were

believed

to be

innately

efficacious,

whereas

by

the Old

Kingdom

this

conviction

withered,

so that

the

rites

then came to

be

associated

with

myths,

whose

authority

resacralized

them and

rendered them

effective

once

more.

Because

ritual

thus

had

priority

over

myth, myths

might

be either

created

or

distorted

in

the

process

of

using

them

in

rituals.

Many

of the

mythical

elements

encountered in

ritual texts

can

be

reduced

to

just

a

few

motifs,

particularly

the

restitution of

the

healed

eye

of

Horus. If

these important ritual texts were representative of the range that existed, or of oral

traditions

and

religious

practices,

there

could

hardly

have been

a

coherent

body

of

myth

behind

this

jumble.

The

fullest

and most

sophisticated

study

in

this

area,

by

Jan

Assmann,18

takes

the

argument

about

myths,

rather than the

one

about

rituals,

a

stage

further

and

proposes

8

Siegfried

Schott,

Spuren

der

Mythenbildung,

ZA'S

78

(1942):

1-27;

Mythe-dedicated

to

Kees.

Schott

reported

(p.

vii)

on

difficulties

Heinrich

Schai-

fer

had

experienced

in

assembling

myths

for

a

pro-

posed

collection of

Near

Eastern

texts.

9

Giinter

Rudnitzky,

Die

Aussage

iiber

das

Auge

des Horus : Eine altdgyptische Art geistiger Ausse-

rung

nach

dem

Zeugnis

des

Alten

Reiches,

Analecta

Aegyptiaca

5

(Copenhagen, 1956).

10

Verhiiltnis.

11

Herbert

Ricke,

Bemerkungen

zur

aigyptischen

Baukunst des

Alten Reiches,

vol.

2,

with

Siegfried

Schott,

Bemerkungen

zum

iigyptischen

Pyramiden-

kult,

BABA

5

(Cairo,

1950);

cogent

critique,

often

ignored:

Hans

Bonnet,

Agyptische

Baukunst

und

Pyramidenkult,

JNES 12

(1953):

257-73.

12

See,

for

example,

Siegfried

Morenz,

Agypt-

ische

Religion

(Stuttgart,

1960),

pp.

85-88,

who

stated

that in

Egypt

evidence

for

early

relations

between

myth

and ritual

was

lacking. Aspects of his

approach,

which

distinguishes

between

genuine

(eigentlich)

religion

and

primitive

magic,

are

prob-

lematic. For

a

survey

of

the

myth-ritual

question,

see Walter

Burkert,

Homo

Necans:

The

Anthro-

pology

of

Ancient

Greek

Sacrificial

Ritual

and

Myth,

trans.

Peter

Bing

(Berkeley, 1983),

pp.

29-34.

13

Schott's

exposition

is

confusing,

in

organiza-

tion rather

than in

style,

and has

consequently

been

rather little

used.

His clearest

formulation is

the

summary Die alteren

G6ttermythen,

in Literatur,

Handbuch

der Orientalistik

1,

1:2,

2d

ed.

(Leiden,

1970),

pp.

90-98.

14

See,

for

example,

Mythe,

pp.

88-90.

15

Essential

exposition Mythe,

chap.

4,

pp.

83-109.

16

See

especially

Otto,

Verhiiltnis,

p.

9;

idem,

An

Ancient

Egyptian

Hunting

Ritual,

JNES 9

(1950):

164-77;

see

also

Verborgenheit,

pp.

15-16.

Burkert

cites Otto

in Homo

Necans

and also

assumes

a

priority

of ritual over

myth.

While this

must be

true

of the

evolution of

mankind,

it does

not

mean

that

this

priority

need be

posited

for

the

rituals of

any

accessible

human

culture.

17Some points derive from extensions of the

theory,

notably

by

Otto.

18

Verborgenheit.



5/26

84

JOURNAL OF NEAR

EASTERN

STUDIES

that there

were

no

narrative

myths

until

perhaps

the Middle

Kingdom,

or more

certainly

the New

Kingdom

(see

sec.

II,

pp.

85-92

below).

Assmann

returned to this

theme in

a

discussion

of

the

motif of

the divine

child centered

on scene

cycles

of the divine

descent

of the

king

and

referring

to sources

ranging

as far as the Greek Alexander

Romance.19

In this

article,

which cannot be

easily

reconciled with the earlier

one,

Assmann

con-

cludes

that the

irreducible

core

in a

myth

is not

its

narrativity

so much

as

its

iconicity. 20

This

shift

allows him to

integrate

his notion

of

a

Konstellation

(see

sec.

II,

p.

86

below)

with

that of

myth,

but it

strays

to the

opposite

extreme

to his first

article

in

virtually

eliminating transitivity

or

narrativity.

Assmann's iconic

analogy

is

prob-

lematic

because,

as

he

notes,

there is

little

preserved representation

of

myth

in

pictorial

compositions.

The term iconic is a

metaphor

for the tableau-like

presentation

of

religious

conceptions, especially

of

solar

beliefs,21

rather

than

a

description

of the

scene

cycles

or

of

myths.

After

Assmann's first

article,

Friedrich

Junge22

published

a

synthesis

of

Egyptian

syncretism

and its

position

in

religious

beliefs. This

usefully

integrates

relevant

ap-

proaches.

Junge

brings

together

strands

of

scholarship

which have

tended

to

interpret

the

character

of

evidence for

Egyptian

myths

in different

ways:

as

exhibiting

unusual

features

of

the

myths

or

of the

structure

of the

pantheon.

In

his

analysis,

it exhibits

both.

Emma

Brunner-Traut's

entry

Mythos

in

the

Lexikon

der

Agyptologie23

builds

partly

on

Assmann's first article and

accepts

his closer

circumscription

of

myth.

She

sees

difficulties with his

rejection

of

mythical

content from the

Pyramid

Texts

(see

sec.

III,

pp.

93-95

below)

and

remarks

that so few

texts are

preserved

from the

Old

Kingdom

that

the absence

of

mythical

narratives should

not

cause

surprise. By

implication,

either

there could have

been such narratives but

they

have not

survived-as is

largely

true

of

later

periods-or

narratives of

myths

were restricted to the oral domain and so have

disappeared; myths

could

then

still

have

existed

in

early

times.

There has been no

outside evaluation

of

the

discussion initiated

by

Schott.24

Although

most

scholars

ignore

these

writings

and

continue

to

assume that the

Egyptians

had

myths

in

all

periods25

and that

the record for

them

poses

no

special problem,

the

issues

raised are

important.

Among

questions

that

arise are the

position

of

myth

in

the

central

Egyptian

cult of the

gods

and in

beliefs about

the

underworld and

the

next

world;

relations

between the

various contexts of

use of

mythical

materials;

the

media

in

which

mythical

materials

were or

were not

recorded;

and,

more

generally,

the

use

of

written

19 Zeugung.

20

Ibid.,

pp.

38-42.

21

Assmann

has discussed textual

and

interpretive

aspects

of

these

repeatedly,

esp.

Re

und

Amun:

Die

Krise

des

polytheistischen

Weltbilds

im

Agypten

der

18.-20.

Dynastie,

Orbis Biblicus

et

Orientalis

51

(Freiburg,

Switzerland and

G6ttingen,

1983);

brief

exposition:

idem,

Die

'Haresie'

des Echnaton: As-

pekte

der

Amarna-Religion,

Saeculum 32

(1972):

111-16. For

pictorial

forms,

known

primarily

from

coffins and

vignettes

to

the

Book

of

the

Dead,

see

Erik

Hornung,

Die

Tragweite

der

Bilder,

Eranos-

Jahrbuch 48

(1981):

183-237.

22

Wirklichkeit.

23

LA,

vol.

4,

cols.

277-86.

24

Heike

Sternberg,Mythische

Motive

und

Mythen-

bildung in den iigyptischen Tempeln und Papyri der

griechisch-r6mischen

Zeit,

GOF 14

(Wiesbaden,

1985),

pp.

14-20,

summarizes the

positions

of

Schott

and

Assmann

usefully

but

does not

go

beyond

them.

She

announces

another relevant

work

entitled

(p.

20,

n.

2):

Das

Verhaltnis

von

Magie

und

Religion

im

alten

Agypten.

Untersuchungen

anhand der

sog.

magischen

Texten,

insb. des NR

und der

SpZt

(Teil-

thema:

Mythische

Motive in

den

magischen

Texten.

Zur

Verkniipfung

von

agyptischer

Religion

und

Magie),

GOF.

25

For

example,

Rudolf

Anthes,

Mythology

in

Ancient

Egypt,

in

Samuel

Noah

Kramer,

ed.,

Mythologies of the Ancient World(Chicago, 1961),

pp.

15-92,

drawing

together

the

conclusions

of

numerous

articles of

the

1950s.



6/26

EGYPTIAN MYTH

AND DISCOURSE

85

records.26

One

important

reason

why

sources

constrain

the

way

in which the

problem

presents

itself

may

be

that

they

in turn are constrained

by

formal

restrictions

and

by

their

position

in written

tradition.27

The

analysis

of

myth

stretches

what can

be

achieved

with available sources

and

brings

out

problems

of

the ancient

deposition

of

evidence.

Before

addressing

some

of these

issues,

I would like

to

review

Assmann's

and

Junge's

views.

II.

DISCUSSIONS

ASSMANN,

DIE VERBORGENHEIT

DES

MYTHOS :

THE LATERFORMATION

OF

MYTH

Assmann's views

on the

scarcity

of

myth

are

stated more

strongly

in his earlier

article

than in

his later

study,28

but he

hardly

indicates

in

the latter how far

his views

have

shifted.

It is

convenient to

base a discussion

on his

first,

more

sharply

formulated

exposition

(cited

in

this

section

by simple

page

number).

Assmann does

not

define

myth formally,

but he

understands a

myth

as a

tale about

the

divine

world

that

has true

narrative

qualities,

such

as a

beginning,

middle,

and

end.29

He

shows that

pre-New

Kingdom

mortuary

literature

is

non-narrative,

so

that

this

corpus-the

principal

body

of

available

texts-cannot be

used

directly

to

substan-

tiate the

existence

of

myths

in

early

periods.

Events in the

world of the

gods

that

are

mentioned

typically

in

the

Pyramid

Texts

have been

very

variously

interpreted,

but

they

do

not form

narratives

and hence

do not

qualify

as

myths.

To

call

them

allusions

to

myths

is

to weaken

the

implications

of their

presence

in

the

texts,

in

which

they enact,

rather

than

evoke,

an

identification between

a

ritual action

and

a divine

occurrence;30

they

are

performative. 31

chott

therefore

called them

citations,

a

usage

that

begs

some

questions by

ascribing

to the

myth

an

existence

separate

from

its

citation,

while

perhaps

not

suggesting

strongly enough

the

force of the

myth's

presence

in

a

ritual.

Assmann

denies

mythical

character

to

a

category

of

Pyramid

Texts

which

Schott

termed

hymns

with

a

name

formula

(Hymnen

mit der

Namensformel)

(p.

14).

Similarly,

the

Ramesseum

Dramatic

Papyrus,32

much

discussed for

possible

mythical

associations,

is not

a

narrative of

a

myth,

but

a

ritual

(of

uncertain

identification)

that

draws

heavily

on

events in

the

world of the

gods

(pp. 15-21).

Assmann

denies

mythical

character to

narrative

fragments

in

Middle

Kingdom texts,

of

which the

most

significant

is

the

Horus

and

Seth

episode

in a

papyrus

from

Illahun;

he

suggests

that

this is

part

of

a

magical

spell

rather

than

a

separate

narrative

(see

sec.

III,

pp.

85-86,

99

below).33

It

26

Cf.

Past.

27

Brunner-Traut

(n.

23

above)

sees the

issue in

this

way.

28

Zeugung.

29

Pp.

20-21.

The

point

is

expounded

more

fully,

but

not

very

clearly,

in

Zeugung,

pp.

30-31 with

p.

54,

nn.

85-86;

pp.

56-67,

n.

121.

30

A

conclusion of

Schott

that

is

reiterated

by

Assmann, for example, pp. 8-9 with nn. 2, 5; pp. 18-

20,

esp. p.

20,

n.

28.

31

Assmann

has used

this term

in a

related

sense

(e.g.,

Re

und

Amun,

pp. 50-51),

but it

is

absent

from

this

article.

32

Kurt

Sethe,

Dramatische

Texte

zu

altiigypti-

schen

Mysterienspielen,

UGAA

10

(Leipzig, 1928),

pp.

83-264.

33 P. 33 with n.

52. Text:

F. Ll.

Griffith,

The

Petrie

Papyri:

Hieratic

Papyri from

Kahun

and

Gurob

(Principally

of

the

Middle

Kingdom) (Lon-

don, 1898), pl. 3, no. VI.12, p. 4; see also Seth, p. 38

with n.

6.



7/26

86

JOURNAL OF

NEAR

EASTERN

STUDIES

would

follow

that the earliest

securely

attested

mythical

narratives

were

of New

King-

dom

date,

most

of them

being

narrowly

literary

or

embedded

in

magical

texts.34

Because

no

early

mythical

narrative

is

preserved,

Assmann

gives

priority

to

what

he

terms

Konstellationen

of

deities--relatively

fixed

groupings

of them

and

relations

among

them;35

his

concept

is central

to his

thinking

about the

pantheon.

He

sees

the

divine and human or real

worlds

as

being

so close to each

other in

early periods

as

to

preclude

people's

conceptions

of deities from

being

sufficiently

detached

for

the

formula-

tion of

myths

(p.

14).

This

view

raises

questions

about

the

shape

and

configuration

of

a

pantheon

that

has

no

mythical

organization.

Its

apparent

implication

that

myth

is

in

some

way

not

serious,

or less serious

than

a

Konstellation,

seems to involve

assuming

that

narrative

myths

of the

type

that is at issue

cannot have

a

fundamental

significance

(sec.

III,

pp.

99-100

below). Although

the

centrality

of

myth

may

indeed

have

been

overemphasized,

it

would be

questionable

to

generalize

this view

to the rest of

Egyptian

society,

or more

broadly

to

myths

as

a whole.

It

also

seems

to

imply-perhaps

uninten-

tionally-that

myths

can be used for

only

one

purpose

in

any

period;

there is no

reason

why

this

should be

so.

Assmann's

separation

of

the

divine

and

real

worlds

is

problematic

because it

could

suggest

that the

world

of

the

gods

is not

real.

For the actors

that

world

is

real,36

even

if

its

status

may

be less

straightforward

than

that of the

human

world. Assmann

sub-

sequently

distinguishes

between

the

real

world,37

which

includes such

sacred activities

as

temple

and

mortuary

cults,

and

the

everyday

world

(Alltagswelt),

in

which

magical

practices

take

place

in

an

extra-temple

setting.

Yet

although

there is a

distinction

between

temple

or

mortuary

cult

and

other

religious

practices,

this

need

not

be

one

between the

real

and

the

everyday. Many

usages

of

magic

occur in

less

tightly

ordered

contexts,

but in relation to

magic

and

causality-as

against

sanctity

and

decorum-the

Egyptians

do not

seem

to

have

distinguished

sharply

among

contexts,

and

they legitimized

magic

as

something

the creator

had

given

to the

created

world

in

general.38

Magic

was

a distinct

force

that

could also be

personified

as a

major deity

or

creator,39

but it

was

integral

to

the

cosmos.

The

real

world

which

Assmann

proposes

is

the

elite

Egyptian

society

and

cosmos,

excluding

anything

outside

official

religious

practices

and beliefs

and those

who

might

have

access to

them.

One

could

distinguish

between

narrowly

instrumental

practices

and ones in

which

magic

or

religion

was

involved,

but

this

distinction

would

cut

across

analytical

notions of

the

real

and

the

everyday.

In

addition,

the

instrumental

or

34

This

applies

even to

the

Destruction

of

Man-

kind,

which

is

preserved

in

royal

tombs:

see

Hornung

et

al.,

Der

iigyptische

Mythos

von

der

Himmelskuh:

Eine

Atiologie

des

Unvollkommenen,

Orbis

Biblicus

et

Orientalis

46

(Freiburg,

Switzerland

and

G6ttin-

gen);

Lichtheim,

vol.

2,

pp.

197-99

(part only);

Nadine

Guilhou,

La

Vieillesse

des

dieux,

Institut

d'Egyptologie

Universit6

Paul-Valery

(Montpellier,

1989).

Scholars

have

reconstructed

the

skeletons of

numerous

mythical

narratives

from

such

sources.

35

P. 14

with

refs.;

Wirklichkeit,

passim.

36

See pp. 10-13, where Assmann argues in favor

of a

perspective

which

is not

that of

the

actors;

but

see

p.

18,

n. 24

where he

accepts

the

reality

of the

world of

the

gods.

37

Junge, Wirklichkeit,

p.

89,

applies

Assmann's

terms more

broadly,

and

I

think

more

usefully, say-

ing

that

the real

world is the

entire

factual

(tat-

siichlich)

environment of

a

person,

the

experien-

tial

horizon of

the

religious

subject

in

nature

and

society.

This definition

could

be too

broad

because

it is

hard to

see

what a

fact

would

be

here.

38

See

Hornung,

Conceptions,

pp.

207-11.

39

Herman

te

Velde,

The

God

Heka

in

Egyptian

Theology, JEOL 21 (1970): 175-86.



8/26

EGYPTIAN MYTH AND DISCOURSE

87

obvious

is itself

culturally

constructed and

circumscribed.40

Except

for its

ignoring

of

magic,

Assmann's

definition of the real

world

might

have

been

acceptable

to

the

Egyptian

inner

elite,

but a broader measure

is needed. These notions

may

also

be

largely

dispensable.

Although

there is

a

significant

development

in the

New

Kingdom

and later

attestation

of

myths

in

magical

texts,

I

see

no

easy

way

to connect this with

changes

in the status

of

the

real,

the

everyday,

and

their

sanctity

and relations.

Further,

the

apparent

predominance

of

groupings

of

deities

in

earlier times

may

not be as

directly

related to

a

strong

presence

of

the

reality

of the

gods

on earth as Assmann

proposes.

These

groupings

continued

to exist

later,

in

periods

from which

myths

are more

certainly

attested,

and

the

groupings

are in

many ways

abstract in character.

Assmann,

like

Morenz before

him,41

uses

a model

of

secularization,

into which this

conception

of

the

real and

the

everyday

is

integrated.

The model

is

problematic,

and

other

writers,

including myself, have suggested an almost opposite pattern of development. The

difference in

interpretation

here

lies

partly

in

using

definitions

of

religion

that

devalue

magic42

and

partly

in

views

of

such central social

phenomena

as

kingship,

where

I

would

see

complex

conceptions

from an

early

date.43

If

by

secularization

were meant

pluraliza-

tion

or

the

partial separation

of

social and

power

relations

from

religious

life,

agreement

might

be

possible.

Even

then, however,

the

diversity

of

social

and

ideological

foci

in

early

periods

may

have been underestimated.

For

later

periods, especially

the

New

Kingdom,

Assmann cites

magical spells

and

calendars

of

lucky

and

unlucky days

as

being

rich in

narrative

elements

about

the

gods.44

He

concedes

to

these

a

more

strongly mythical

character,

terming

them

mythi-

cal statements (or 'realizations of myths': mythische Aussagen), rather than myths. A

feature which demonstrates that some

examples

are not

simply

narratives of

myths

is

first-person

form,

which

occurs

in

two

texts

incorporated

in

magical

spells.45Myths

are

almost

universally

narrated

in

the

third

person,

as

Schott

implied

when

he

termed them

what

people

narrate about

the

gods. 46

Epics

often

include

first-person

speeches by

deities but within

a

third-person

framework.

First-person

form

is

characteristic of

non-narrative utterances of

deities-aretalogies47-or

of

complex

works of

literature.48

The

first-person

form in

the

magical spells may

lie

between

aretalogy

and

literature:

it

adds to

the

weight

of

the

deity's

statement and

assimilates

the

narrative to

literary

types.

40

See Clifford Geertz, Common Sense as a Cul-

tural

System,

in

idem,

Local

Knowledge:

Further

Essays

in

Interpretive

Anthropology (New

York,

1983),

pp.

79-93.

41

Morenz,

Agyptische

Religion,

pp.

6-15;

idem,

Die

Heraufkunft des

transzendentenGottes in

Agyp-

ten,

reprinted

in

idem,

Religion

und

Geschichte des

alten

Agypten:

Gesammelte

Aufsditze,

ed.

Elke Blu-

menthal et

al.

(Weimar,

Cologne,

and

Vienna,

1975),

pp.

77-119.

42

See

Morenz,

Agyptische

Religion,

pp.

85-87.

43

For

these

points,

see

my

articles

Interpretations

of

Religion:

Logic,

Discourse,

Rationality,

GM

76

(1984): 47-50; Practical Religion and Piety, JEA

73

(1987):

80-83;

and

The

Origins

of

Kingship

in

Egypt,

in

David

O'Connor

and

David

P. Silver-

man,

eds.,

Ancient

Egyptian

Kingship:

New

Investi-

gations (in

press).

44

Emma

Brunner-Traut,

Gelebte

Mythen:

Bei-

trdge

zum

altiigyptischen

Mythos

(Darmstadt,

1981),

pp.

18-33;

idem,

Tagewahlerei,

LA,

vol.

6,

cols.

153-56.

45J. F.

Borghouts,

Ancient

Egyptian Magical

Texts,

NISABA:

Religious

Texts in

Translation

Series 9

(Leiden, 1978),

nos.

90-91,

both

Late

Period.

46

In

Literatur,

Handbuch

der

Orientalistik

1,1:2

(Leiden,

1970),

p.

90;

cited

by

Assmann,

p.

13.

47 See

Assmann,

Aretalogien,

LA,

vol.

1,

cols.

425-34.

48See my articles, InterpretingSinuhe, JEA 68

(1982):

35;

Interpreting

the

Story

of the

Ship-

wrecked

Sailor,

JEA

76

(1990):

69-70.



9/26

88

JOURNAL OF NEAR

EASTERN

STUDIES

Among

other texts

that constitute

mythical

statements,

Assmann

cites the

stories

about

the

gods, notably

the

late New

Kingdom

Horus

and

Seth,

which

he

characterizes

as

entertainment

literature;

for some

purposes

he also includes

the narratives

in

magical

texts. There is an

inconsistency

here. Assmann

grants

the status

of

mythical

statement

to

narratives

in

New

Kingdom magical

spells

but

denies

that

status to

the

Middle

Kingdom

Horus

and Seth

example

because it

may

come from

a

spell.

The

only way

that

I can

see

to

save this

interpretation

would be to

assume that a

single

example

did

not

provide

the

critical

mass

necessary

to

posit

the existence

of

mythical

narratives

or statements

in

the

Middle

Kingdom

(sec.

III,

p.

99

below).

Assmann

then

presents

a

model of the

relation

between

myth

and

mythical

state-

ment. His central

category

of

mythical

statements

consists of

the texts

which

narrate

myths

or

episodes

of

myths.

Although

he

states

that the

essence

of

myth

is

narrative

structure,

the

myth

itself

is not

identical with

any

one

narrative

of its

episodes

or of

a

selection of

them.

Mythical

statements

may

stand

in

various

relations

to

(presumably

narrative)

myths.

Assmann

proposes

three

relations,

which

may

be

characterized as

(i)

instrumental

or

analogical

(handlungsbezogen);

(ii) argumentative

or

etiological

(wissensbezogen);

and

(iii)

literary

or

noninstrumental

(situationsabstrakt).

These

types

correspond

to the

use

of

mythical

material in

such

contexts

as

(i)

magical

texts;

(ii)

encyclopedic

or

discursive material

such

as the

Memphite

Theology ;49

and

(iii)

liter-

ary

narratives

such as

Horus

and Seth.so

These

types

and

sources

correspond

one-to-

one

in

the

model on

his

p.

37.

Assmann

seems

to assume

that

these

functional

relations

operate

transformations on

the

myth

and

thus

produce

the

mythical

statement -the

text

or text

passage.

Thus,

the

myth

is

in

some

respects

an

analytical

abstraction. It

is a

fixed

entity

to

which the

different

occurrences

relate,

but it

is not

available

for

direct

investigation.

This

status

may

be

one the

myth

must

assume in

modern

study,

but it

is

unlikely

to

be that

conceived

by

the

actors,

and

it

is

necessary

to

insist on

the

reality

of

myths

for

them.

These

are

detailed

problems

in

Assmann's

model. It

reifies the

relation

between

myth

and

mythical

statement

into

a level or

process

of

its

own

rather

than

a

mode

of

realization.

Such an

intervening

level

can be

validly

supplied

if

there

is

a

strong

transformation

between

myth

and

mythical

statement.

This

may

happen

with

a

magical

formula,

where the

narrative's

structure is

influenced

by

what the

spell

is

designed

to

achieve or

by

its

formal

properties.

The

model,

however,

reifies

not

just

this

relation

but

also

the

structure of

the

myth.

There is

no

clear

reason for

assuming

that this

structure

should be fixed. In

many

cultures differentversions of

myths

vary

widely,

either in

detail

or

in

basic

features

of

their

narratives. The

relationship

between

mythical

statement

and

myth

is

thus

one

between

two

variables,

not

between

a

fixed

entity

and

a

variable

one. In

addition,

a

realization

or

mythical

statement

may

affect

the

underlying

myth:

their

relationship

can be

reciprocal.

Some

features

may

prove

resistant

to

transformation.

Two

magical

spells

that use

the

sojourn

of

the

infant

Horus in

the

marshes

as

part

of

recipes

against

snakebite

state

that

49

Hermann

Junker,

Die

politische

Lehre

von

Memphis, Abhandlungen

der

PreussischenAkademie

der

Wissenschaften,

phil.-hist.

Ki.

1941:6

(Berlin,

1941),

pl.

1;

trans.,

Lichtheim,

vol.

1,

pp.

51-55.

50

Alan

H.

Gardiner,

Late-Egyptian

Stories,

Bib-

liotheca Aegyptiaca 1 (Brussels, 1932), pp. 37-60;

trans.,

for

example,

Lichtheim,

vol.

2,

pp.

214-23.



10/26

EGYPTIAN MYTH AND

DISCOURSE

89

Isis was

coming

from

the

weaving

shop. '

Although

this

detail,

which

J. F.

Borghouts

suggests

alludes

to the

spinning

of the shroud

of

Osiris,

does

not seem

to be

germane

to

the

spells,

it

is retained

as

coloring.

In

Assmann's

terms,

part

of a

mythical

statement

has adhered

to

the

myth

and

appears,

without a

specific function,

in another

mythical

statement.

The main

difficulty

with

Assmann's

three-level

model is

that it can

imply

almost

the

opposite

of

what

he

proposes.

His

position

is

that

myths may

not have

existed

before

appropriate mythical

statements

are

attested. Yet his

argument

otherwise

suggests

that

the absence of

mythical

statements

would

say

little

about the existence

or

nonexistence

of

underlying

myths.

If

so,

there

could have been

myths

in

periods

from which

no

narrative evidence

for

them

is

preserved.

He

concedes this

point

at

first

(p. 9),

but

does

not

return to it. The

essential

supporting arguments

for

the

later

stages

of

his

exposition

are

two:

(1)

the

existence of

myths

implies

an

ontological

distance between the

divine

and

real

words

(p. 23),

and

yet

their

inextricable

involvement with

each

other,

as

shown

in

early

rituals,

is

incompatible

with

such

a

distance;

and

(2)

the

detaching

of

divine

and real involves

a

disenchantment

and

the

creation of a

temporal

frame

between

them. Assmann

dates both of

these

assumed shifts to

the First

Intermediate

Period

and later.52

If

the

posited

resacralization

of

ritual

through

association

with

the

world of the

gods

is

added

to

this

picture,

three

stages

would

have

led

to the

formulation of

myths.

In

the first

stage,

there

were

myth-free

rituals

that

were

efficacious

without divine

involvement. The

position

and status

of the

gods

and

any

possible

myths

would be

a

separate question

for

this

stage.

In

the

second

stage,

rituals

acquired

divine

involvement,

but from

a

pantheon

that

was

so

strongly

immanent

and,

it

seems,

so

pliable

in

evocation,

that

myths

were not

created

or

invoked;

instead,

smaller

groupings

of

deities

and

divine events

sacralized

rituals.

Assmann

terms

this

sacralization a

sacramental

exegesis

(sakramentale

Aus-

deutung)

(pp.

15-25).

Here

his

analyses

raise no

problems

and the

term

sacramental

is

useful

and

revealing.

He

does, however,

assume

that

a

mythical

presence

would be

a

contradiction in

terms

(p.

28,

n.

28),

and

this

seems to

imply

that

myths

could

not

be

incorporated

into

rituals,

unless

an

extensive

narrative were

present.

If

the

parallel

of

the

Passion

story

and its

role

in

the

Mass is

used,

both the

Last

Supper

and

the

Crucifixion

and

Body

of

Christ contribute to

the

sacramental

exegesis

of

the con-

secrated bread

and

wine,

but there

are

also

narratives of the

Passion in

other

contexts

(including

ones that

may

be

read out at

another

point

in

the same

performance,

perhaps

fusing

two

types

of

liturgy).54

For the

outsider,

the

Gospel

story

is

a

myth,

and

its

mythical

status and

religious

centrality

will

be

strengthened

rather

than

weakened

by

its

mobilization

in

crucial

rituals. There

are

evident

differences

between

the

two

cultural

contexts,

but

these

need not

suggest

that

the

use

of

fundamental

narrative

events

in

51

Borghouts, Magical

Texts,

pp.

25

(no.

34),

59

(no. 90),

with

p.

103,

n.

91.

52

Esp.

pp.

39-43.

By

implication,

there

would be

little

point

in

looking

for

myths

in

a

period

in

which

these preconditions were lacking. Assmann suggests,

however

(p.

6,

n.

6),

that an

effort

would be

worthwhile.

53

Assmann

formulates

(pp.

20-21)

conditions for

speaking

of a

myth

being

invoked

in

a

ritual as

(1)

narrative

coherence

and

(2)

a

location in time

and

place

that

would

turn

a

ritual

repetition

into a

mythical evocation.

54

Whether

this is

a

correct

historical

reading

of

the

origin

of the

Mass is

not

relevant

here.



11/26

90 JOURNAL

OF

NEAR EASTERN

STUDIES

either should

not be

termed

mythical.

Neither an

Egyptian

ritual

nor the

consecration

of

the

bread and

wine contains an extended

narrative

of

a

myth,

but the treatment

of

the

divine world in this context

is

not

revealing

for the

question

of the

presence

or

absence

of myths in the wider religion and culture.

In

the third

posited

stage,

divine and

real

worlds moved

apart

and

myths

came

to

sanction

some

ritual

actions,

notably

in

magic,

while

also

serving

other

functions

in

other

types

of

text. This

usage

was not

sacramental and

applied

to more

secular

affairs.

There is

solid

evidence

for the third

stage,

and,

if this

were

the sole

point

at

issue,

it

would remain

only

to

discuss to which

period

such a

description

should

apply.

The

hypothetical

first

two

stages,

however,

are based on some

extent

on

arguments

from

silence. If

they

are not

accepted,

a new

hypothesis

about

the

early

status and

presence

or

absence of

myth

must be

formulated;

in

part,

this

could

apply

the

third

stage

to

a

period

earlier than

that

for which

it was

envisaged (sec. II, p.

93

below).

The

thrust

of

Assmann's

argument

is

to demonstrate how

the

formation

of

myths

and

their

integration

into

religious

and

non-religious

life

can

be

brought

further down in

the

historical

period, beyond

Schott's

dating

to

the

Early Dynastic

Period or

Otto's

to

that

time

and

earlier. 5

His

recognition

of

this

continuing potential

for

the

emergence

of

myths

is

valuable:

myths

could have

originated

or

developed

and

varied

throughout

historical times.56

Such

development

might

be

blocked

if

there

were a

canon of

texts

encapsulating

the

truths

of a

culture or

body

of

belief,

like

the

sacred

books

of

world

religions;

even

there,

myths

develop

and

change

around a

relatively

fixed core. Alter-

natively,

a

small-scale and

short-lived

society's myths

might

focus

around

episodes

of

origin

which

would

lose

their

meaning

if

new ones appearedthat were sited closer to the

present.

Egypt

is not like

either

of

these

cases,

and

Egyptian

sources

distinguish

between

myths

about the

gods

and

historical

traditions

(which

could

also be

termed

myths)

about

human

beings;

myths

that form a

historical

charter

might

merge

these

two

categories

rather

more.

These

points

do

not

qualify

Assmann's

contention

about the

evolution of

myth

in

later

times,

but

they

may

suggest

a

range

of

possible

forms of

myth.

Conversely,

as

Assmann

initially

accepts,

the

continual

evolution of

myths

does

not

imply

that

none

could

have

an

early

origin.

There

is evidence

against

Assmann's

view

that the

First

Intermediate

Period

created

a

disenchantment

which

allowed

myths

to

appear.

He cites

as

support

for

his

position

Ulrich

Luft's

statement

that

only

the Instruction

of Ptahhotpe provides an Old King-

dom

allusion to the

notion of

the rule of

the

gods

on

earth.58

Assmann

dates

that

text to

55

Verhiiltnis.

Assmann

says

(p.

9,

without refer-

ences)

that

for

most

Egyptologists

it

is

unthinkable

that

myths

originated

in

the

historical

period.

The

approach

of

Sethe and

Kees

could

tend to

exclude

late

formation,

but,

beyond

an

assumption

(which

he

accepts)

that

myths

do

not

treat the

immediate

present,

it

is

not

clear

what he

has in

mind,

and

it

would

be hard

to

find

such

views in

other

fields.

56

Here

Sternberg,

Mythische

Motive,

is

useful.

See also Wolfgang Schenkel, Kultmythos und Mar-

tyrerlegende:

Zur

Kontinuitait

des

digyptischen

Den-

kens,

GOF

5

(Wiesbaden,

1977).

57 The

presentation

of the

origins

of

society

in

king

lists,

with

their

antecedent

listing

of

dynasties

of

gods,

is relevant here.

See

Donald

B.

Redford,

Pharaonic

King-lists,

Annals

and

Day-books:

A

Contribution

to the

Study

of

the

Egyptian

Sense

of

History,

SSEA

Publication 4

(Mississauga,

Ontario,

1986).

For a

Mesopotamian

parallel,

see

Piotr Mich-

alowski,

History

as

Charter:

The

Sumerian

King

List

Revisited,

JA

OS 103

(1983):

237-48.

58

P. 29, n. 43, citing 'Seit der Zeit Gottes',

Studia

Aegyptiaca

2

(Budapest, 1977):

47-78.



12/26

EGYPTIAN MYTH

AND DISCOURSE

91

the

Middle

Kingdom59

and thus would

eliminate

all such evidence.

Although

the

dating

is

plausible,

the conclusion is

invalid because

formulas

mentioning

antiquity,

closely

related

to that

evoking

the

rule of

the

gods,

are

attested from the Fourth

Dynasty,

among the oldest continuous

texts.60

The Egyptians may thus always have had a

conception

of an

ideal,

probably

mythical antiquity,

from which

the

imperfect

present

world

was

temporally

removed.

It

cannot

be

proved

that this

conception

included

the

rule of

the

gods

on

earth,

and

hence a mediation between divine and

human as well

as

descent from one to the

other,

but there is no

good

reason

for

excluding

this

possibility.61

On

general grounds,

it

is

preferable

to credit

early

Egyptians

with

a more

complex

and nuanced view

of the

cosmos

than Assmann

and

others

would

allow because

their

position

implies

a

lasting

blindness to

the realities of

existence which is hard

to

parallel

in

other

cultures.

It

suggests

that

fundamental transformations

in

cosmology

took

place

during

later

periods

when

display

did

not

change

so

markedly.

Political

struggle

articulated in terms of conflict between gods occurred as early as the Second Dynasty.62

This

use

of

the

divine

world

in

human

affairs

is

unlikely

to

have

manifested

unreflect-

ingly

an

inseparability

of the

two,

as

Assmann

posits

when

he assumes

a

lack

of

ontological separation.

Rather,

it

may

show

an

awareness

of

interpretive possibili-

ties-in the

sense that

people

relate human

events

meaningfully

and

constructively

to

divine

ones-and

of

propaganda.

A

low-level

argument

for

the view that there

was

no

one

period

when

disenchantment

set in

is that the

gods

do not

simply

live

on

earth.63

In

all

accessible

periods, they

were

worshiped

in

cult

images

within

shrines

in

temples,

but

they

were

not

thought

to

be

identical with

those

images.

The First

Dynasty

comb of

King

Wadj,64

n

which

Horus is

depicted as a falcon in a bark in the sky while a second falcon surmounts the royal

serekh in the

field

beneath,

shows the distant

realm of the

god

while

he is

also manifest

on

earth

(in

this

case

as

the

king,

who

is

additional to

his cult

images).

Since

the

gods

were

not

only

or

principally

on

earth,

people

might

not

apprehend

them in

any

straightforward

way.

One of the

main

purposes

of the

cult was to

invoke their

presence

on

earth

in their

statues.

The

connection between

myth

and

disenchantment

should be

questioned

in

any

case.

This notion

seems

to

be

derived from

societies such

as ancient

Greece,

in which

defining

myths,

for

example

in

Homer,

were

distant from

the

present

social

realities of

Classical

times

and were the

objects

of some

skepticism

and

open

discussion.65

Even

there,

however, the myths had serious significance and were discussed and mobilized for the

59

Cf.

Assmann,

Schrift,

Tod

and

Identitift:

Das

Grab

als

Vorschule

der

Literatur

im alten

Agypten,

in

Aleida

Assmann et

al.,

eds.,

Schrift

und

Geddiicht-

nis:

Beitriige

zur

Archdologie

der

literarischen

Kom-

munikation

(Munich,

1983),

pp.

64-93.

60

Hans

Goedicke,

Re-used

Blocks

from

the

Pyra-

mid

of

Amenemhet I at

Lisht,

Publications of the

Metropolitan

Museum

of Art

Egyptian

Expedition

20

(New York,

1971),

nos.

6, 60,

pp.

20-23,

105-6;

see

also

Past,

p.

135.

61This qualifies the position of Past, p. 134.

Schott,

Die

alteren

G6ttermythen, p.

93,

n.

2,

suggested

that a

dynasty

of

gods

could have

been

included on the

Palermo

Stone.

62

See

The

Origins

of

Kingship

in

Egypt.

63

Conceptions,

pp.

227-30.

64

Cairo

Museum,

JE

47176;

R.

Engelbach,

An

Alleged

Winged

Sun-disk

of the

First

Dynasty,

ZAS

65

(1930):

115-16;

excellent

photograph

in

Jaromir

Malek,

In

the Shadow

of

the

Pyramids:

Egypt

during

the

Old

Kingdom

(London,

1986),

p.

35.

65

Cf. Paul

Veyne,

Did

the

Greeks

Believe

in Their

Myths?: An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination,

trans.

Paula

Wissing

(Chicago

and

London,

1988).



13/26

92 JOURNAL OF

NEAR EASTERN

STUDIES

present,

as

in the

tragedies performed

at

major

Athenian

festivals.

The cults

of

the

Olympian

gods

continued

for

many

centuries after

the

first

signs

of

skepticism.

There

are

comparable

discussions

in

Egyptian

literary

texts66--not

as it

happens

in

mythical

contexts-which do not seem

to have led to

any general skepticism.

I see

no

reason

why

discussions should not have occurred

in

periods

from

which

they

are

not

attested.

One

may

suggest

that no

specific

time

of disenchantment should

be

sought,

and

that the

gods

could

have been near and

far,

taken for

granted

and

questioned

in

their

wisdom,

in

any

period.67

Since

they

were

not

purely good,

a

simple

attitude

to

them

would be

difficult

to

maintain.

The

multiplicity

of

approaches

to

phenomena

and

of

relations

between divine and

human almost

requires

some

detachment.

Whereas

the

sacramental

use

of

the

gods

described

by

Assmann seeks to

bypass

detachment,

mythical

narrative

may

belong

in

this

broader context of

negotiating

relations

between

the

divine

and the human

and

comprehending

the

human

predicament.

To

model

a

conceptual space

for

such

phenomena

is

different from

demonstrating

that

they

occurred

(sec.

III,

pp.

99-103

below),

but the

notion that

myth

performs

similar functions

is

a

cross-cultural

commonplace.

In a

sense,

the

view

of

early

times as

a

period

when

divine

and

human were

in

close

contact is an

Egyptological myth

with

some of the

etiological

function of

many

ancient

myths.

In

the modern

context,

such

an

age

of

innocence

both

legitimizes

conceptions

of

the

pristine

Egyptian

state and

fits

an

analogy

between

the

duration of

Egyptian

civilization and a

lifespan

that

passes

from

innocence

through experience

to

senescence.68

It is one of

many

manifestations

of

the

difficulty

of

comprehending

the

duration

of

ancient

cultures.69

This

argument

need

not be

pursued.

The chief

conclusions to

emerge

from

reviewing

Assmann's contribution

are

that

no

easy

line

can

be drawn

between

early

periods,

from

which

myths

are

not

attested

in

mythical

statements,

and

later

ones in

which

they

are

found;

and

that

myths

could

have

emerged

throughout

the

historical

period

(pp. 39-43).

Assmann

and

Heike

Sternberg70

are

probably

right

to

say

that

the

Late

Period was the

heyday

of

Egyptian

myths.

JUNGE:

WIRKLICHKEIT UND

ABBILD

Junge's

rather

schematic

approach

tends

to

see

myth

and

religion mainly

in

terms of

aetiology

and

legitimation,

but

it

is

significant

for

its fusion

of

the

ideas of

Erik

66

See,

for

example,

Gerhard

Fecht,

Der

Vorwurf

an

Gott in

den

Mahnworten

des

Ipuwer

(Pap.

Leiden

1

344

recto,

11,

11-13,

8:

15,

13-17,

3):

Zur

geistigen

Krise der

ersten

Zwischenzeit

und

ihrer

Bewiltigung,

Abhandlungen

der

Heidelberger

Akad-

emie

der

Wissenschaften,

phil.-hist.

KI.,

1972:1

(Heidelberg,

1972); idem,

Agyptische

Zweifel

am

Sinn

des

Opfers:

Admonitions

5, 7-9,

ZAS 100

(1973-74):

6-16;

Mordechai

Gilula,

Does God

Exist?,

in

Dwight

W.

Young,

ed.,

Studies

Presented

to Hans Jakob Polotsky (East Gloucester, Mass.,

1981),

pp.

390-400.

67

Because

early

sources

do

not

include

general

discussion

of

the sort

known

from

later,

it

may

be

very

difficult

to

establish this

point.

68

The

purest

example

of

such a

vision,

which

also

informs

much

popular

writing

on ancient

Egypt,

may

be John

A. Wilson's

The

Burden

of

Egypt:

An

Interpretation

of

Ancient

Egyptian

Culture

(Chi-

cago,

1951).

69

For

the

assumption

that

the

First

Intermediate

Period

brought

on the

sense of

Egyptian Myth and Discourse Myth Gods and the Early Written and Iconographic Record

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Transcript of Egyptian Myth and Discourse Myth Gods and the Early Written and Iconographic Record