Effects of Price Competition and Increases in Managed Care on Outcomes
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Transcript of Effects of Price Competition and Increases in Managed Care on Outcomes
Effects of Price Competition and Increases in Managed Care on Outcomes
Kevin Volpp, M.D., Ph.DR. Tamara Konetzka, Ph.D.
Julie Sochalski, Ph.D.Jingsan Zhu, M.B.A.
Funding support from Doris Duke Charitable Foundation and VA HSR&D
HMOs have grown rapidly throughout the United States
HMO Enrollment in United States
0102030405060708090
Millions
Policy Context
• California passed selective contracting legislation allowing price competition in 1983 – led to rapid growth of managed care
• Price competition reduces rate of increase in hospital costs, profit margins, services to uninsured
• Little is known about effects of competition on quality of care
Revenue per discharge increased more slowly in markets with greater price competition
6000
7500
9000
10500
12000
13500
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
low competition and low MCP high competition and high MCP
Source: Calculated from California Hospital Annual Financial Disclosure Reports
Important Policy Questions
• Did price competition worsen outcomes?• Managed care organizations have economies of
scale in shopping for better quality providers
• However, growth of managed care shrinks price-cost margins
• Does price or quality competition predominate? Are effects of increased managed care growth similar in more and less competitive hospital markets?
• Did outcomes worsen to larger degree for the uninsured?
Data used
• California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) hospital discharges linked to State death certificates 1991-2001.
• OSHPD financial data 1990-2001
• Sample: 1991 and 2001 patients with principal diagnosis of AMI, stroke, hip fracture, GI bleed• Short-term acute-care hospitals.
• Final sample size: 316,883 discharges from 507 hospitals
Calculation of hospital markets
• Fixed radius used to define hospital markets
• Hospital market concentration, managed care penetration calculated from discharge data
• Price Competition = interaction between hospital market concentration and growth of managed care.
• Compare main effect of hospital market concentration, effects of increased managed care penetration in more and less competitive markets
Empirical Approach
• Long difference patient-level linear probability models predicting 30-day all-location mortality
• Adjustments for:• Patient characteristics - age, gender, race, payor, Elixhauser
comorbidities
• Common intertemporal trends
• Hospital factors - hospital fixed effects
• Effects of hospital market concentration, increases in managed care in more and less competitive markets from 1991-2001
phthtzhtyhtxhttphthpht HHIxyearHHIMCPMCPHospitalYearrPatientchaDeath )()()Pr( 3210
30-day mortality rates (all 4 conditions) changed at similar rates in more and less
competitive markets
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
low competition and low MCP high competition and high MCP
Patients in more competitive hospital markets generally fare better
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
AMI Gi Bleed Stroke Hip Fx
percentage point
change in mortality
Insured
Uninsured
*p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value <0.01
***
*** ***
Among insured, growth in managed care generally beneficial but less so in more
competitive markets
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
AMI Gi Bleed Stroke Hip FxPercentage point change in
mortality
Increases in MCP inlow comp areas
Increases in MCP inhigh comp areas
*** *
#
*p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value <0.01
# p-value < 0.05 for difference between high/low competition
Among uninsured, effects of increases in managed care more ambiguous
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
AMI GI Bleed Stroke Hip FxPercentage
point change in mortality
Increases in MCP inlow comp areas
Increases in MCP inhigh comp areas
**p-value < 0.05 ***p-value <0.01
##p-value < 0.01 for difference between high/low competition
***
##
Conclusions
• Among the insured, increases in managed care penetration lowered mortality in less competitive markets but less beneficial in more competitive markets• Suggests quality competition dominates less competitive
hospital markets but price competition bigger factor in more competitive hospital markets
• Among the uninsured, effects are more ambiguous. No clear evidence that the uninsured fared worse
• Growth in managed care appears to have larger effect on mortality than hospital market concentration
Limitations
• Generalizability to other states, other measures of quality of care?
Policy Implications
• It appears that savings on hospital care in California have been achieved without worsening quality
• Price competition improves quality of care for patients in less competitive areas but patients in more competitive hospital markets fare relatively worse
• The key question is whether these findings hold true for other conditions
Positive and negative effects on AMI mortality were greatest from 1983-1991
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1983-2001 1983-1991 1991-1997 1997-2001
Increases inMCP in lowcomp areasIncreases inMCP in highcomp areas
## ##
***
**
Sig. difference from 0: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01; Sig. difference high comp vs. low comp: #p<.10, ##p<.05
Findings for 1990s similar using 30-day all-location mortality