Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Hiroshima .

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Effects of Nuclear Weapons

Transcript of Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Hiroshima .

Effects of Nuclear Weapons

Hiroshima

• https://youtu.be/gwkyPvlWPMO

kilotons

• kilotons of dynamite equivalent are the units used to measure the blast effects of a nuclear weapon.

• 1 kiloton is 1000 tons or 2,000,000 lbs

What FERC says about EMP

• http://www.ferc.gov

• Go to FERC and put EMP into search machine

Testimony of Joseph McClelland Director, Office of Energy Infrastructure Security Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Before the Committee on

Homeland Security and Governmental AffairsUnited States Senate

July 22, 2015

• In 2001, Congress established a commission to assess and report on the threat from EMP.

• In 2004 and again in 2008, the commission issued reports on these threats.

• One of the key findings in the reports was that a single EMP attack could seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid.

• Depending upon the attack, significant parts of the electric infrastructure could be “out of service for periods measured in months to a year or more.”

• It is important to note that effective mitigation against solar geomagnetic disturbances and non- nuclear EMP weaponry can also provide an effective mitigation against the impacts of a high-altitude nuclear detonation.

• To provide a significantly more agile and focused approach to these growing cyber and physical security threats, the Commission established the Office of Energy Infrastructure Security – or OEIS – in late 2012.

• Its mission is to provide leadership, expertise and assistance to the Commission, other federal and state agencies and jurisdictional entities in identifying, communicating and seeking comprehensive solutions to significant potential cyber and physical security risks to the energy infrastructure under the Commission’s jurisdiction.

• This includes threats from geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) and electromagnetic pulses (EMPs). OEIS also assists in the identification of key energy infrastructure facilities for the application of best practices. OEIS has been able to recruit and develop deep subject matter expertise to collaboratively perform its task.

The bureaucracy is kind of alarming actually

• Energy.gov Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability

• Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER)

• http://energy.gov/oe/mission/infrastructure-security-and-energy-restoration-iser

• FERC Office of Energy Infrastructure Security (OEIS) http://www.ferc.gov/about/offices/oeis.asp

On a more positive note:• “Power companies to create a stockpile of transformers to counter attacks or natural disasters,”

Peter Behr E&E reporter• EnergyWire: Friday June 12, 2015

• An unpredictable solar storm could hit Earth with only a day's warning and, if it knocked out a large number of transformers, could cause economic damages of more than $2 trillion and cause disruptions lasting up to two years, according to a Lloyd's of London report.

• http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060020138

• H.R. 2244• Introduced in House (05/08/2015)• This bill requires the Department of Energy (DOE), acting through the Office of Electricity Delivery

and Energy Reliability, to submit to Congress a plan to establish a Strategic Transformer Reserve for the storage, in strategically located facilities, of spare large power transformers in sufficient numbers to temporarily replace critically damaged large power transformers.

• DOE may not establish a Strategic Transformer Reserve until Congress has approved the plan.

Effects of Nuclear Weapons

• https://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/www/effects/ 644 pages

• Prepared and published by theUnited States Department of Defenseand theEnergy Research and Development Administration

Effects of Nuclear Weapons

• http://www.atomicarchive.com/Effects/

• Detailed explanations of – Thermal effects– Blast effects– Radiation effects– Long-Term effects

Choose your target and yieldhttp://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/

Medical Consequences of Nuclear War

• The Nobel Peace Prize 1985International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

IPPNW History

• The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) is a federation of national groups dedicated to mobilizing the influence of the medical profession against the threat of nuclear weapons.

• Currently, there are IPPNW affiliated groups in 40 nations with several groups in the process of formation, representing a total of more than 145,000 physicians and health professionals worldwide.

IPPNW

• A long-standing professional association between two leading cardiologists, Dr. Bernard Lown of the Harvard School of Public Health, and Dr. Yevgeny Chazov of the USSR Cardiological Institute, was the impetus for the formation of IPPNW.

• An exchange of letters between the two led to an extraordinary meeting of six Soviet and American physicians in Geneva in December of 1980. That meeting provided the four point consensus that has been the basis of IPPNW activity since then.

IPPNW

• 1. That IPPNW would restrict its focus to nuclear war;

• 2. That IPPNW physicians would work to prevent nuclear war as a consequence of their professional commitments to protect life and preserve health;

• 3. That IPPNW would involve physicians from both east and west and would seek to circulate the same factual information about nuclear war throughout the world;

• 4. That although IPPNW might advocate certain steps to prevent nuclear war, the organization would not take a position on specific policies of any government.

The medical, environmental, and humanitarian consequences of nuclear war

• https://youtu.be/Ug-DJtvHFE0

EMP Attack on US Would Be ‘Catastrophic’ Congress Told

An Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack on the United States, whether manmade or naturally occurring, could result in the deaths of nine out of ten Americans through starvation, disease and the collapse of modern society,

warned Dr. Vincent Peter Pry, a member of the congressional EMP Commission and executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security.

• http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/emp-attack-on-us-would-be-catastrophic-congress-told/1b5e33a26545ac5ebf9398f00064dc0a.html

ElectroMagnetic Pulse (EMP)

• http://fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/emp.htm

• In July 1962, a high-altitude nuclear test dubbed Operation Starfish, conducted 400 kilometers above Johnson Island in the Pacific Ocean, first raised widespread concerns over electromagnetic pulses.

• During the course of the test, the recording instruments continually malfunctioned and affected electrical equipment more than 1,400 kilometers away in Hawaii.

• The root cause of the problem? • An electromagnetic pulse. This discovery led the

U.S. military to harden many of the country’s strategic defense systems, such as missile silos, against EMP effects, but little was done to implement measures to protect civilian infrastructure.

• That practice has remained virtually unchanged despite the ever-increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons and ever-increasing U.S. military and civilian dependence on electricity-based infrastructure.

• An EMP has three main components: • (1) An electromagnetic shock disrupts

electronics, such as communication systems;• (2) an effect similar to lightning rapidly

follows and compounds the first component; and

• (3) the pulse flows through electricity transmission lines, overloading and damaging transmission distribution centers, fuses, and power lines.

• 6/18/2013--Introduced.• Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity

from Lethal Damage Act or SHIELD Act • Amends the Federal Power Act to authorize the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), with or without notice, hearing, or report, to order emergency measures to protect the reliability of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure whenever the President issues a written directive or determination identifying an imminent grid security threat.

• Directs FERC to consult with governmental authorities in Canada, Mexico, and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) regarding implementation of emergency measures.

• Prescribes: (1) implementation procedures; and (2) related cost recovery measures affecting owners, operators, and users of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure.

• Directs FERC to require any owner, user, or operator of the domestic bulk-power system to implement measures to protect the system against specified vulnerabilities.

• Requires FERC to issue an order directing ERO to submit for approval, within 30 days, a reliability standard requiring implementation, by any owner, operator, or user of the bulk-power system in the United States, of measures to protect the bulk-power system against an identified grid security vulnerability (including a protection plan with automated hardware-based solutions).

• Directs FERC also to order the ERO to submit reliability standards to: (1) protect the bulk-power system from a reasonably foreseeable geomagnetic storm event or electromagnetic pulse event (EMP); and (2) require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure their adequate availability to restore promptly the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event of destruction or disability as a result of attack or a geomagnetic storm or EMP.

• Directs the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to: (1) develop technical expertise in the protection of electric energy systems against either geomagnetic storms or malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic weapons; and (2) share it with owners, operators, or users of systems for the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy located in the United States and with state commissions. Library of Congress Summary

• https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2417/summary