"AD-AI1V 953 DUPUY (T N) ASSOCIATES INC DUNN LORING VA F/S 15/7STRATEGIC. TACTICAL AND DOCTRINAL MILITARY CONCEPTS. THE DETERR-ETC(U)APR 80 G HAMMERMAN DNAO01-79-C-0285

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STRATEGIC, TACTICAL AND DOCTRINALMILITARY CONCEPTSThe Deterrence Concept: A Synthesis Based on a Survey

of the Literature

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19. KEY WORDS rContinue on tev~er- side if necessary and identify by bltock number)Nuclear Deterrence Flexible ResponseCounterforce Targeting Mutural Assured Dest-uctionCountervalue Targeting Selective Nuclear Targeting

Finite Deterrence

20 ABSTRACT (Cntlnoe on reverse side If necessary and identify b block number)

Includes an evaluative, integrative survey of the literature on deterrence,1946-1979; a presentation of the essential components of deterrence; acontrast of counterforce strategies with finite deterrence, and of thecyclic alternation of these approaches in U.S. theory and policy; and anexamination and assessment of recent criticisms of deterrence.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ~ vdn~o

The concept of deterrence has recently come under attack fromtwo directions -- from what might loosely be called "hawks" and"doves." Some members of the defense community argue that deter-rence has been outmoded by the Soviet arms buildup andfor a nuclear war-waging capability, and suggest that deterrencebe abandoned in favor of US war-waging strategies and buildup ofweapons and forces, a posture which they view as something differ-ent from deterrence. On the other hand, some academic critics ofdeterrence, most of whom favor less military spending, have carriedout historical or theoretical studies that purport to show deterrenceas unsuccessful; these critics generally urge less emphasis ondeterrence and more stress on political/diplomatic methods ofexerting influence.

In addition, some advocates of deterrence visualize it as akind of symmetrical model in which each of two opponents has aninvulnerable retaliatory force and a vulnerable population -- thekind of deterrence usually called finite deterrence, and sometimes,in recent years, MAD (for mutual assured destruction). Theseadvocates tend to view any deviation from this particular model asa betrayal of the deterrence concept.

The coxiclusion of the present report is that the deterrenceconcept is basically sound, is appropriate to the nuclear age,and is not necessarily outdated, and that what may have appearedas disqualifying flaws in it have actually been distortions of it.

This conclusion has developed from an extensive, although byno means exhaustive, survey of the literature on deterrence from1946 through 1979. (A bibliography of about 85 of the works reviewed,with annotations, is appended to this report.) From this surveyit appears that the history of deterrence theory can be summarizedas follows (the dates are approximate and the periods overlap):

* 1946-1955. Beginnings of deterrence theory. The basicnature of the concept articulated.

I " 1

e 1956-1965. The "golden age." Refinements and clari-fications of deterrence theory; major synthesizingworks.

* 1966-1970. Inactive period for deterrence theory.* 1971-present. Critical reevaluation of deterrence

theory.

Essentials of Deterrence

Deterrence is the restraining of one's opponent from a courseof action by communicating its unpleasant consequences to him.Nuclear-age deterrence, which is the kind of deterrence consideredin this report, implies using possession of nuclear weapons todeter the use of nuclear weapons, and sometimes to deter otheractions. Nuclear-age deterrence grew out of the struggle by de-fense thinkers and policy makers in the West to gain some intellec-tual and practical control over the enormous power of nuclearweapons. Its development was stimulated by the determination,born of World War II experience, to assure peace through militarypreparedness. It was early pressed into service in the defense ofWestern Europe against a perceived Soviet threat, being used tocompensate for the inferiority of the conventional defensive forcesavailable to the West. This double role of US deterrence -- todeter a nuclear attack on the United States and also to deter anyattack, nuclear or conventional, on Western Europe -- has posedpermanent logical and practical problems.

The classic literature on deterrence, from Bernard Brodie'sfirst 1946 essays and Winston Churchill's 1955 speech in the Houseof Commons, through the "golden age" writings of Raymond Aron,Brodie, Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, Albert Wohlstetter, andothers, yields the essentials of the deterrence concept.

The fundamental requirement of deterrence is the credibilityof the threat that is implicitly posed. Credibility depends onthe opponent's perception of the threat -- it has to be credibleto him. It also has to be real; bluffing is not adequate for de-terrence. The essential components that must exist, and must beperceived by the opponent to exist, are a nuclear force that isable to survive a first strike, if necessary, and still dounacceptable damage, combined with the will or intent to retaliate.Even if these essential elements are preisent, deterrence can beundermined if the force is provocative through sheer overwhelmingsize or disposition. (If it were vulnerable, i.e., not survivable,it could also be provocative by providing a tempting target andby appearing designed to strike first, rather than survive a firststrike; this is another reason why survivability is an essentialrequirement of the deterrent force.)

2

Deterrence is not an isolated structure, unrelated to theactual use of force. There has to be a credible bridge betweendeterrence and the actions that would be taken if deterrence shouldfail. Without this bridge, credibility fails and deterrence fails.

Counterforce Strategies and Finite Deterrence

Deterrence strategies may be classified as counterforce orcountervalue, on the basis of the targets they threaten to destroy.Counterforce strategies aim at destroying enemy missiles in theirsilos or over enemy territory. Countervalue strategies aim atdestroying what the enemy values, usually interpreted as a largefraction of the population and industry. Counterforce strategiesare more in harmony with traditional principles of military stra-tegy and morality, but countervalue strategies call for smallerforces and are claimed by their advocates to be more humane, since,if both sides subscribe to the countervalue approach, neither willever be willing to strike the other, and nuclear war will theore-tically be surely and permanently prevented. This kind of symme-trical mutual deterrence is usually called finite deterrence (asindicated above, p. 1).

Since the 1950s, there has been a pattern of cyclic alterna-tion between counterforce strategies and finite deterrence in USdeterrence theory and policy. The countervalue approach of "mas-sive retaliation" was followed by the ascendance of counterforcestrategies until about 1963, when there was a turn toward finitedeterrence. Finite deterrence in the rather extreme form of bi-lateral mutual assured destruction -- each side capable of wipingout about aquarter of the other's population and half the other'sindustry after receiving a first strike -- underwent reevaluationand adjustment, beginning about 1969. There currently appears tobe a strong trend within the defense community toward a return to

counterforce strategies.

Conclusions

The report concludes that the deterrence concept still appearssound and relevant to present circumstances, and that the mosttelling criticisms of it are actually criticisms of ways in whichit has been distorted:

0 Deterrence requires, above all, credibility, and therecan be no credibility without a believable link be-tween the deterrence posture and the action that willbe taken if, despite that posture, the other sideattacks. The threat to kill 25% of the Soviet popula-tion while the US population is exposed to attack lacks

3

any credible link between threat and action, and thusis not in accord with sound deterrence theory.

o Deterrence requires an invulnerable retaliatory force,and cannot remain effective if the US retaliatoryforce becomes vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

o The retaliatory force has to be capable of doing un-acceptable damage, but unacceptable damage is a func-tion of what the opponent values. A thorouqhlyinformed view of what is valuable to the opponentis necessary if an effective threat is to beposed.

e Deterrence, for the United States, has to be consistentwith commitments to allies. Thus, it must either bebelievably extended to include nuclear strikes againstany state that attacks US allies or it must be backedup by other provisions for defending them.

o Deterrence cannot be static. It has to be constantlyreassessed and adjusted to changes in technology, thebalance of forces, and the world political system.

o Deterrence requires the will of leaders and societyto provide the forces necessary for an effective deter-rent threat and the intent to follow through withaction, even at great risk and sacrifice, if deterrenceshould fail.

4

PREFACE

This report was prepared by Gay Hammerman, with theresearch assistance of Dee Alyson Horne and James J.Knights. Allen R. Clark made important contributionsto the portions of the paper dealing with theory ofgames. Useful insights and bibliography were contributedby Angus M. Fraser and Graham Vernon, and the reportwas reviewed by Trevor N. Dupuy and Grace P. Hayes.

5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

*EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .. . . ..... . .. ...... .

* ~PREFACE.. .. .. ............ ...... 5

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS......... .. .. ..... 7

DEFINITIONS.............. .. .. .... 9

DETERRENCE CLASSIFIED BY WHAT IS DETERRED...........11

BEGINNINGS OF DETERRENCE . .. ..... ...... 13

Nuclear Weapons . .. .......... .... 14

Preparedness as War Prevention...... .. .... 16

Churchill's Formulation............... 16

Summary of the Concept and Its Early History. 17

THE GROWTH OF THEORY............... ..... 18

The Theory of Games . . . . . .. ........ 1

Major Contributions . .. ....... .... 19

ESSENTIALS OF DETERRENCE......... .. .... 23

A WAY OF LOOKING AT DETERRENCE THINKERS............26

THE CYCLIC HISTORY OF DETERRENCE................28

Counterforce Strategies ... . . . . . . 28

Finite Deterrence............ .... 29

Protecting Soviet Invulnerability . . . . . . 31

Chronology of Deterrence Cycles . . . . . . . 33

DETERRENCE FOR EUROPE .... ............. 37

THE DETERRENCE CONCEPT IN THE 1970s ... . . . . 40

The Moral Absurdity of MAD............. 41

Soviet Buildup and Attitudes.. .. .. ..... 42

Selective Nuclear Targeting (SNT) . . . . . . 43

Attacks on Deterrence from the "Antiwar" Side .44

The Societal Dimension .. ...... ..... 44

CONCLUSIONS............ .. .... . . . 45

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... .. .. .. .. ....... 47

6

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1 The Structure of the Deterrence Concept. .24

2 Levine's Five Schools of Arms Policy. .. .... 27

3 A Rough Chronology of Deterrence Cycles .. . 34

4 Deterrence Theory and Policy: Their Relationshipin Time.. ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ......35

Recently deterrence, like most institutions that achieveany longevity, has come under attack from two opposing sides.Many tough-minded defense-community analysts see it as an ob-stacle to realistic war-prevention and war-fighting strategies.Colin Gray, for example, has written of it recently in tonessuitable for the obituary page. (Gray 1979) When Gray writesof the late Bernard Brodie that the years 1946-1978 bound hiscareer as a strategist, one can hardly escape the image of atombstone for deterrence itself, to whose development Brodiecontributed so much. At the same time, some sixties-genera-tion, antiestablishment academics, seeing deterrence as a hos-tile, negative strategy, are eager to dismantle it in favor of"other kinds of international relationships" that do not involvethe threat of force. (Morgan 1977:214-15) It is a conclusionof this paper that the deterrence concept is soundly based andstrong, and that it is largely distortion-- of the concept, bothby its opponents and by some of its ill-informed advocates,that have opened it to attack.

Definitions

No discussion of a concept can begin without a definition,and there are many available for deterrence. None of them seemsto offer more than a good standard dictionary does, and theOxford English Dictionary will be used as the reference here.

The root and original meaning of the word deter is tofrighten away, but the OED's third subdefinition is probablycloser to the word's most common meaning in everyday, nontech-nical usage: "To restrain or keep back from acting or pro-ceeding by any consideration of danger or trouble." This notonly is the most usual general meaning but also is closest tothe meaning deterrence has had since its appearance as the labelfora nuclear-age concept after World War II. It is true thatthe word terror has been prominently used in the rhetoric ofdeterrence and that nuclear weapons inspire well-merited terror,but the emotional tone of deterrence is relatively dispassionate.The emphasis is not on fear but rather on prevention by the dis-play of unpleasant consequences in contrast to prevention by the

9MADIN"PAS3 UKhM-W 11USD

use of force. With simplicity as an aim, the working definitionfor this paper will be this adaptation of the OED's words:

Deterrence is the restraining of one's opponent froma course of action by displaying its unpleasant con-sequences.

However, deterrence has certain connotations in its nuclear-age strategic sense, and they cannot be woven into a one-sentencedefinition. Following are some of them:

First, deterrence in the current sense is something new,and is specific to the nuclear age. It developed in response tothe characteristics of nuclear weapons. The general idea of pre-venting attack through a display of strength is ages old, but,as Andre Beaufre has said, "The term is new . . . bearing witnessto an attitude of mind quite different from that of the past andclearly the product of the existence of nuclear weapons." (1965:23; emphasis added.) No study that fails to recognize thedeterrence concept as a product of the nuclear age can say any-thing very useful about it.

Second, the great dependence on prevention through thedisplay of consequences is a special characteristic of nuclear-age deterrence. "What is new is . . . the tendency to rely veryheavily, if not absolutely, upon the effectiveness of the threatto employ deterrent forces." (Coffey 1963:2) As far as stra-tegic nuclear forces are concerned (nuclear weapons mounted onintercontinental ballistic missiles), deterrence has been vir-tually the only US strategy for their use against an adversaryand virtually the only US response to the threat of such weaponsin the hands of an adversary.

Third, an aspect of this heavy dependence on prevention,namely the fact that nuclear-age deterrence includes self-deter-rence, is worth noting. It has been characteristic of post-World War II US deterrence theory and policy that they havesought not to use nuclear weapons, even when there was littledanger of retaliation; and the avoidance of all use, not justenemy use, has been part of the deterrence concept from thebeginning. This effort has been pursued ad absurdum in recentyears by some advocates of finite deterrence, and some arms-control advocates, to include making sure that the Soviet Unionwill not be inferior in retaliatory striking power to the UnitedStates.* However, there is no reason to denigrate or apologizefor the fact that US deterrence theorists have always had as abasic goal the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, even bythe United States, and have tried to construct strategies that

*See discussion of finite deterrence, below.

10

would make such use as unlikely as possible. Again, this self-restraint is a product of the same nuclear destructiveness thatcreated deterrence in the modern sense, and is an inherent partof it.

Fourth, largely as a result of historical circumstances,including the development of the logical system known as thetheory o~f gamnes, and also the development of the high-speedcomputer, deterrence has been not just a general display of over-whelming strength but a peculiarly calculated display of conse-quences. The theoretical advantages and disadvantages of variousdecisions on the use of strategic weapons by each of two adver-saries are calculated. In addition, there is "the attempt tostructure [the deterrent forces] so that they can inflict a given

-and therefore calculable -- level of damage upon anothercountry." (Coffey 1963:2; emphasis added.)

Finally, deterrence is a Western, and specifically aUnited States, concept. Although it was presented to the worldby an Englishman, and owes much of its clearest exposition toFrench thinkers, essentially it is American in origin and develop-ment. Even as Churchill described it in eloquent language in1955, he acknowledged that the United States would have primaryresponsibility for carrying it out. In elegantly summarizingthe theory, Raymond Aron has implied that it was partly hisdistance from the creative work -- which had been done in theUnited States -- that allowed him to see it with clearer per-spective. (1964:31) Deterrence is not a Soviet concept, andthis fact has many implications, some of which will be discussedbelow. In this paper, the point of view will be understood tobe American. Unless the context makes clear another meaning,it will be understood that when deterrence is discussed, whatis meant will be deterrence by the United States, or the UnitedStates in company with its allies.

Deterrence Classified by What is Deterred

For the ease and clarity of the discussion that follows, itseems well to classify deterrence at the outset into categoriesbased on what is deterred in each case, and to establish consis-tent terms for these categories. Four kinds of deterrence may

be distinguished on this basis:

usualy Deterrence of direct attack on the United States,usullyvisualized as massive nuclear attack. This deterrence

is assumed to be effected by the destructive capability of thesurvivable US retaliatory force. The US retaliation, shoulddeterrence fail, has generally been assumed to be automatic,with no decision necessary, and thus this kind of deterrenceis sometimes termed, especially by British writers, passive

deterrence. It could be called strategic nuclear deterrence,and it could be called SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan)deterrence, since the US SIOP embodies the threatened retalia-tion that presumably makes this kind of deterrence effective.It is Herman Kahn's (1960) "Type 1" deterrence and Brodie's(1959:273) "basic" deterrence. In this paper, it will be calledstrategic nuclear deterrence.

o Deterrence of attack against NATO countries. Anyeffort to use the US strategic nuclear capability to deterattacks against allies or others is called extended deterrence.From the beginning of deterrence theory in the decade followingWorld War II, extended deterrence for Western Europe has had aspecial importance, sometimes being seen as an integral part ofstrategic nuclear deterrence. An attack on NATO is clearlyperceived by the US leadership and attentive public to be in adifferent category from attacks on other non-US territory, anddeterrence of such an attack thus forms a distinct category.In this paper, such deterrence will be termed deterrence forNATO.

o Deterrence of attack against non-NATO allies andfriends. Strategic nuclear deterrence has been extended atvarious times -- explicitly, by implication, or by widely heldassumption -- to deterrence of attacks against countries towhich the United States has treaty obligations and/or perceivedmoral obligations of special weight. These include, or haveincluded, Japan, Korea, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, andTaiwan (as the Republic of China).* This kind of extended de-terrence will be termed deterrence for non-NATO allies.

o Deterrence of other aggressive acts and provocations.For a brief period in the 1950s, the period of "massive retalia-tion" policy, an effort was made to extend strategic nucleardeterrence to cover any moderately serious aggression or provo-cation, but it was almost immediately recognized- that such adeterrent threat was not effective because it was not credible.No one would have believed that the United States would attackthe Soviet Union with nuclear bombs over a new Soviet-instigated

I invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces, much less overSoviet support for an insurrection in, for example, Indochina.Then, in the late 1950s, and especially the early 1960s, therewasa strong US emphasis on using the possession of strong,flexibile, conventional forces to prevent such threats to

*The Secretary of Defense's Defense Report for fiscal year 1979stated that the United States has a "particular interest" in theindependence and territorial integrity of Western Europe, Israel,Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. (p. 17)

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international stability. The term deterrence was applied to this* approach also.*

A considerable amount of recent literature on deterrencedeals with this kind of deterrence of moderately provocativeactions by the implicit threat of nuclear or nonnuclear militaryforce. (Morgan 1977; Naroll et al. 1974) However, there areserious difficulties in grouping-it along with strategic nucleardeterrence and extended deterrence, and, in fact, in calling it'deterrence" at all.

Deterring and dealing with moderately aggressive and provo-cative acts is basically indistinguishable from traditionalstatecraft, in which some kind of threat is always at leastindirectly implied. Traditional statecraft, in fact, is whatthis kind of "deterrence" is. It is different in kind, notjust in degree, from nuclear strategic deterrence and extendeddeterrence. It does not necessarily involve nuclear weapons orthreats, and it does not carry the other connotations of nuclear-age deterrence that have been discussed above. Extrapolatingthe results of statecraft "deterrence" efforts in an effort tolearn more about the effectiveness of strategic nuclear deter-rence and extended nuclear deterrence is, in the author's opin-ion, usually misleading and unproductive. There are not enoughsimilarities between the two categories to make the processvalid *

This paper will deal primarily with strategic nuclear deter-rence, deterrence for NATO, and, to a lesser extent, deterrencefor non-NATO allies. It will refer to deterrence of moderatelyprovocative acts, those not involving direct threats to theUnited States or its allies, as statecraft, or statecraft "deter-rence."

Beginnings of Deterrence

*Now that deterrence has been defined, the next task is toexamine its inner nature, to try to discover the essential com-ponents that make it up. It seems most useful to start the workby looking at the beginnings of deterrence. This is not done asa historical exercise, but rather because such a tremendous

*This kind of de~terrence is Kahn's (1960) "Type 3" deterrence-- defined as deterrence of "moderately provocative acts."(His "Type 2" deterrence was deterrence of "extremely provoca-tive acts.")**The bibliographic entries for Morgan 1977 and Naroll et al.1974 expand this point.

13

volume of material has been written on deterrence, and the con-cept has been nolded into so many different forms during the past34 years that the soundest approach seems to be to try to iden-tify what has been essential from the start.

Nuclear Weapons. The beginnings of the deterrence conceptappeared very soon after the headlines announcing the atombombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although they apparentlyreceived relatively little attention at the time. BernardBrodie wrote in 1946: "Thus far the chief purpose of our mili-tary establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chiefpurpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no otheruseful purpose." (1946b:76) Here is the fundamental idea:using nuclear weapons to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

Brodie's 1946 words have recently been criticized by somewho see a necessity for being prepared to fight a war, if needbe, rather than simply constructing theories and forces toprevent it. (Pipes 1977; Gray 1979) However, the words haveto be taken in the context of their time and seen for what theywere, an effort to grapple realistically and responsibly withthe enormity of nuclear destruction. This was a time in whichmany opinion leaders were saying that there must be one worldor none, that an international government to control nuclearweapons was the only way to avert a global holocaust. Realisticobservers, like Brodie, recognizing that no utopian worldgovernment was going to be created, and rejecting the idea thatthe alternative was an eventual global war far more deadly thanthe devastating one just ended, chose and developed the conceptof deterrence.

What were the specific characteristics of nuclear weaponsthat these early writers were struggling to come to terms with?The first was their extraordinary deadliness and destruction,in relation to the size of the weapon and the short time inwhich it performed its destruction. The firebombing of Tokyohad done more damage in one night than the bombing of Hiroshima,but not in one minute from one airplane. A second characteristicwas the generally assumed one that there could be no defenseagainst these weapons. (See e.g., Beaufre 1965:24.) A thirdwas the conclusion from these two characteristics that theseweapons were extraordinarily suited for massive, decisive sur-prise attacks. It was correctly assumed that the United Stateswould soon lose its monopoly over nuclear weapons and that itwould have to face the possibility of a surprise attack fromthe Soviet Union. Brodie's answer was that a surprise attackwould not work if the attacker's cities would also be destroyed-- even i*f evacuated they would hold the physical plant on whichthe nation depended. Thus surprise attack with nuclear weapons

14

might not be so tempting to an aggressor after all. (Brodiegave a Jacob Viner credit for first suggesting and elaboratingthis view, the essence of deterrence.) With all this in mind,Brodie urged that the "first and most vital step" for theUnited States was to be ready to carry out nuclear retaliationin kind. But he made it clear that the retaliation itself wasnot the point, that he was not suggesting that anything verydesirable would be gained by retaliation. It was the threatof the retaliatory force, its ability to avert war, tha wasthe point. That is the context for Brodie' s statement thatthe chief purpose of our military establishment must now be toavert war. There is no defense against nuclear weapons, heaffirmed, but their effects can be mitigated to some extent.Possession of these weapons can be used to deter their use bya potential aggressor against one' country. If this deterrenceis to be effective one must possess nuclear weapons deployedin a retaliatory force that is invulnerable to surprise attack,while willingness to use that force must be communicated to thepotential enemy in conjunction with measures to reduce thedamage hostile weapons could do to one's country.

If surprise attack was to be prevented by the threat ofretaliation, then the retaliatory force had to be invulnerableto a surprise attack, that is, survivable. Brodie made thispoint specifically. "If the technological realities makereduction of vulnerability largely synonymous with preservationof striking powerthat is a fact which must be faced." (Brodie1946b:77) He also felt that the whole society should be madeas invulnerable as possible, to avoid offering temptation.

(1946b:77) Invulnerability was an inherent part of deterrence.Civil defense was an aid to deterrence, not just a means ofsaving some people if an attack came. "We wish to reduce ourvulnerability in order to reduce the chances of our being hitat all." (1946b:104) Thus deterrence in its essence appearsclearly in this very early work, and may be summarized asfollows: There is no defense against nuclear weapons, althoughpassive defense measures can reduce the damage they do. Pos-session of these weapons can be used to deter their use by anaggressor against one's country. If this deterrence is to beeffective, one must possess nuclear weapons deployed in a reta-liatory force that is invulnerable to surprise attack. Civildefense protection for one's population will enhance deterrence.

Brodie made several other still relevant and still repeatedpoints in 1946: He acknowledged the argument already being madethat possession of nuclear weapons would be a power equalizerfor small countries, and argued against it. (70, 77n) Herecognized that, while deterring war, nuclear weapons would notnecessarily prevent an aggressor nation's committing one depre-dation after another while using the threat of nuclear war to

15

prevent resistance (later called "salami tactics"), until1 finallya status quo nation like the United States could no longer avoidwar, no matter how terrible. (85) He urged dispersal of indus-tries and population to reduce vulnerability. (104-05)

Preparedness as War Prevention. Although deterrence is hereconsidered as a nuclear-age concept, there is some continuitybetween the pre-World War II trend toward preparedness as thebest way of preventing aggression and the post-World War IIdeterrence concept. And although the nature of nuclear weaponswas almost certainly the most important factor in the develop-ment of deterrence, the preparedness trend played a role also.

In the United States and Western Europe there had been astrong body of public opinion in the 1930s that saw armamentsand their makers as largely responsible for war and saw disarma-ment as the most hopeful road to war prevention. As Hitler'sconquests accumulated, the weight of influential opinionshifted to viewing military weakness as an invitation to aggres-sion. In the United States the shift in the balance of publicopinion seems to have come about the summer of 1940, with thefall of France. Since that time, it seems safe to say, a con-sensus of influential Americans and a majority of the US publichave favored a strong national defense establishment in peace-time as the best preventive for war. Thus deterrence of massivenuclear attack by the possession of invulnerable retaliatoryforces took its place in a cluster of post-World War II secu-rity instruments that included collective security (the alliancesystems Americans had previously shunned) and, in the 1960s,upgraded conventional forces and special forces. In this sense,deterrence is a direct descendant of the devotion to prepared-ness that developed during World War II.

Churchill's Formulation. As Fred Ikie has said (1974:269), itwas Winston Churchill who first presented to the world at largethe concept of deterrence. Churchill's statement came in 1955,after the detonation of hydrogen bombs by the United States andthe Soviet Union, and the awesome nature of those events seemsalmost palpable in his speech. Churchill presumably acquiredthe heart of the deterrence concept from US thinkers via USstatesmen. In addition to clothing the concept in Churchillianlanguage -- "by a process of sublime irony . . . safety maywell be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twinbrother of annihilation" -- Churchill made basic points aboutits nature. Like Brodie, he stressed that the retaliatory forcemust be invulnerable, must be immune against surprise in thesense that surprise must not be able to prevent retaliation.(Churchill 1955:1092) He also emphasized the importance ofclearly cominunicatinq the nature of the deterrent weapons sys-tems. Once the opponent understood clearly what he could

16

expect in case he attacked, Churchill said, "You might go todinner and have a friendly evening." (1092) (Churchill con-sistently used the substantive plural noun deterrents, notdeterrence, possibly because he was thinking and talking aboutspecific British nuclear deterrent forces that were beingcreated, and thus saw deterrence in terms of units of deterrentpower.)

Churchill discussed another aspect of deterrence, presentalmost from the beginning, and already implied in US Secretaryof State John Foster Dulles' s "massive retaliation" speech ofthe year before. The Soviet Union was greatly superior in con-ventional forces, but the overwhelming nuclear power of theUnited States, supported by the British deterrent, could com-pensate for Soviet conventional superiority and deter Sovietconventional attack against Western Europe. This continuingthread in deterrence theory -- the protection of Europe -- wasto prove a tangled one. As long as the Soviet Union wasmarkedly inferior in nuclear weapons, Western nuclear weaponscould indeed logically deter conventional attack and also deterstrategic nuclear attack. But as Soviet military strengthgrew, the strain of trying to put US nuclear strength in twoplaces -- compensating for conventional inferiority in Europeand deterring strategic nuclear attack -- was to become evident.In any case- Churchill clearly expressed one of the early andlingering aspects of deterrence -- the idea that the greatpower of nuclear weapons could be used as an all-purpose deter-rent against a conventional threat as well as against nuclearthreats.

A Summary of the Concept and Its Early History. Deterrence,* then, grew out of the struggle to gain some intellectual and

practical control over the enormous power of nuclear weaponsand out of the war-born determination to keep the peace throughmilitary preparedness. It was early pressed into service tocompensate for conventional-forces inferiority in the defenseof Western Europe.

* The basic deterrence concept from the beginning was thatattack by nuclear weapons could be deterred by maintaining aninvulnerable retaliatory force capable of wreaking great des-truction on an aggressor nation, by communicating clearly topotential aggressors the existence of this force, and by com-municating the determination to use it. It will be noted thatthe concept was simple and easy to grasp, not abstrusely intel-lectual, and that the essentials of later theory were therefrom the beginning, as was one of deterrence's permanentIdilemmas -- how to protect Europe. The ideas were clearly com-municated to the world by a political leader before any complextheoretical work on the subject had been carried out by profes-sional defense analysts.

17

The Growth of Theory

The great productive age of deterrence theory was the period1956-1965.* During these years, against a background of growingnuclear arsenals and the acquisition by both the United Statesand the Soviet Union of intercontinental ballistic delivery mis-

r siles (ICBMs) , deterrence theory was refined by civilians trainedin mathematics and the natural and social sciences. Very littlethat is new has been written since 1965, and anyone who rereadsthe classic works of c. 1960 is bound to be struck with the pre-ciseness of their relevance to the period c. 1980. Before sum-marizing the contributions of that period it seems appropriateto discuss briefly another development -- in addition to theintercontinental missiles -- that influenced the developmentof theory in the period.

The Theory of Games. Deterrence is known, especially by itsdetractors, for dependence upon complex calculations of behaviorbased on a logical, highly structured approach to decision making.In reality, the logic of deterrence is extremely simple. Neitherits essential formulation, which has been outlined in the pre-ceding section, nor its development during the decade 1956-1965,required any esoteric logical tools. It appears highly likelythat deterrence would exist, with all its essential character-istics, even without the logical theory -- called the theory ofgames -- that is often associated with it.

However the theory of games did appear on the Western intel-lectual scene at about the same time nuclear weapons did, and itdid offer a logical approach for dealing with the problem of twopowerful opponents, each possessing destructive power of a magni-tude previously unknown. The mathematician John von Neumann hadproved the basic theorem of the theory of games in 1928, but theinfluential book that introduced the approach to a wide audiencewas The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), by vonNeumann and Oskar Morgenstern, an economist.**

What von Neumann had proved is something that is not atall intuitively obvious: If two players are engaged in a zero-sum game, that is, a game in which one player wins to the sameextent that the other loses, there is one best strategy for each

*Colin Gray (1979) terms this period the "golden age" of deter-rence theory, and the dates used here are taken from his paper.Gray marks the beginning of the period from the publication ofWilliam Kaufman's 1956 essay "The Requirements of Deterrence"(see bibliography).

**Schelling (1960) presents a good explication of the theory asit applies to international relations (see bibliography).

18

player to follow, and that strategy does not depend on guessingor deducing what the other player plans to do. It is the beststrategy, in the long run, whatever the other player does. Thisstrategy is the minimax strategy, the strategy that minimizesthe maximum gains the opponent can make. Furthermore, in thelong run, each player can do no better than follow the minimaxstrategy; there is no need to keep shifting strategies in re-sponse to what the opponent does.

There are several facts that should be noted about thesebasic theory-of-games statements, before one applies them tomilitary strategy or deterrence theory. First, they apply onlyto zero-sum games. Theory of games becomes much less clearbeyond zero-sum games, and war is not always a zero-sum game.One side does not necessarily win when the other loses -- oneside's loss may also be the other side's loss. Also, the mini-max strategy is a pessimistic strategy, that is, it assumes theworst possiblc case and then minimizes the damage that can bedone. It does not allow for high risks and great gains.Finally, the minimax strategy is only proven best over the longrun, that is, when the game is played many times. If one isconcerned with only one very high-stakes game, it may seemwiser to change the cards one holds or the rules of the gamethan to count on the eventual triumph of the minimax strategy.

Theory of games, despite its mathematical elegance, has notproven very useful in its applications either to economics or tomilitary strategy. It has proven useful in operations research,however, with effective applications to such problems as stra-tegies of submarine hunting and planning deployment of antibal-listic missiles. In deterrence theory, it was responsible fora number of refinements, e.g., the matter of signaling commit-ment to a given course of action, and it probably determi-ned tosome extent the kind of rational assumptions that were made andthe generally dispassionate, logic-exercise tone of much of the

* writing about deterrence. The way in which theory of games wasseized upon and interpreted by some analysts also seems to havehad an influence on the development of one approach to deterrence

-finite deterrence, which is discussed in a later section ofthis paper.

Major Contributions. Of the many thinkers who did importantwork in the development and refinement of deterrence theory inthis "golden age," the most significant were probably Brodie,Henry Kissinger, Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter. Summarizing twolandmark contributions.- Wohlstetter's "The Delicate Balanceof Terror" (1958), and the chapters on deterrence from Kissinger'sThe Necessity for Choice -- will provide a concise statement ofthe theory.

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Although the necessity for the retaliatory force's surviv-ability had been recognized from the beginning by thinkers li1keBrodie, the point had not been hammered home to the attentivepublic. Wohistetter did this. He made it clear that the UnitedStates could not sit back and enjoy deterrence in the beliefthat central nuclear war was impossible because both superpowershad nuclear weapons and ICBMs. He stressed that a retaliatoryforce had to be invulnerable to surprise attack -- survivable --in order to deter it, and he specified just what constitutedsurvivability: The surviving force had to have command andcontrol capabilities intact under postattack circumstances, andhad be able to reach the enemy, penetrate enemy defenses, anddestroy targets. Furthermore, once such a force was designed,procured, and deployed, constant vigilance would be needed tokeep it survivable. Technology changes very quickly, and nuclearweapons give a great advantage to an aggressor. The currentapplicability of this classic of deterrence hardly needs to bespelled out.

Kissinger, writing in the context of what was believed tobe an inexorably approaching missile gap in the Soviet Union'sfavor, not only made all the basic points about deterrence butmade them in ways that are stunningly relevant twenty yearslater as the United States again sees, with much more solidevidence, approaching Soviet superiority.

Like Wohlstetter, Kissinger stressed T~hat a constantlychanging approach was necessary. There could be no settlinginto a static posture. He stressed invulnerability (surviva-bility), and added the importance of nonprovocativeness incombination with invulnerability: A force that was invulnerableto surprise attack simply because it was so large that someof it was bound to survive would look threatening and wouldinvite a preemptive attack. It was just as effective, and farless provocative, to achieve invulnerability by dispersal,hardening, and -- especially stressed by Kissinger -- mobility.He was in fact arguing for something like the projected (as of1980) MX missile, as well as for submarine-launched missiles(SLBMs). At the same time, Kissinger pointed out the eternalfact of tradeoffs in developing and buying weapons -- forexample, greater mobility means less effective command and con-trol. To minimize the inevitable weaknesses and vulnerabilitiesof the various kinds of retaliatory forces, Kissinger recommendeda mix, a suggestion that prefigures the strategic triad.

Kissinger stressed credibility. Again, this had been recog-nized from the beginning. Churchill had stated that strengthmust not only exist but must be communicated to the adversary.Kissinger hammered the point home. Credibility was basic. Theabsence of any civil defense efforts in the West undermined

20

credibility. The gap between deterrent policy and the strategyfor fighting a war undermined credibilty. "A threat is effec-tive only if it is believed." (15) "Nothing is more urgentthan to harmonize our deterrent policy with a strategy we areprepared to implement." (57) Kissinger was writing in the con-text of reaction against the "massive retaliation" approach ofthe mid-1950s. Twenty years later he would be saying much thesame thing, and apologizing, in effect, for having taken a dif-ferent position in the interim.*

Kissinger also attacked the problem of how much damage aninvulnerable retaliatory force had to do in order to deter."Unacceptable damage," clearly, but what, he asked, was that?As Churchill had, he acknowledged that a state-controlled societycould probably accept more damage than a democratic society,that our threshold of unacceptable damage to population and in-dustry was probably lower than that of the Soviet Union.

A large part of Kissinger's analysis was devoted to exploringthe theoretical combinations of vulnerability and invulnerabilityin a bipolar adversary relationship. It is here that the theoryof games influence appears strongest, that the work is most ab-stract, and that the results have seemed to cause the most prob-lems when applied to the real world. Logically, if both sideswere vulnerable,** the situation would be highly dangerous, withall-out nuclear war almost inevitable, because each side wouldbe in the position of losing its missiles if it didn't use themagainst the other. The most stable situation would be for bothsides to be invulnerable. The other possibilities would bemoderately unstable, with temptations for one side or the otherto carry out a surprise attack or a preemptive attack. (Thechart below is adapted and simplified from Kissinger 1960:34)

USSR Vulnerable USSR Invulnerable

US Vulnerable Highly unstable Very low US deterrence againstdeliberate surprise attack

USHigh US deterrence Mutual deterrenceSagainst all-out war

*See newspaper accounts of Kissinger's Brussels speech of September1, 1979.**In the current essay the same shorthand Kissinger used is beingused: Vulnerable means having a vulnerable retaliatory force; in-vulnerable means having an invulnerable (survivable) retaliatoryforce.

21

This analysis shows logically where the interests of both sideslie -- in mutual deterrence by invulnerable retaliatory forces.It is a useful tool for exposing those interests. In applyingit to the real world, however, many factors have to be considered,including the two sides' differing perceptions of the real situ-ation, and the differing extent to which they may wish to avoidwar.

Assuming that mutual invulnerability would be achieved,Kissinger explored the problem of structuring and targeting theretaliatory force. Targeting could be either counterforce(against enemy strategic forces) or countervalue (against enemypopulation centers and industries). A strategy that employedonly countervalue targeting was a finite deterrence strategy,a term reflecting the limited forces it required and implyinga relatively static and permanent posture.* Kissinger weighedthe advantages of counterforce strategy against finite deterrenceand concluded that while counterforce is theoretically farbetter, it is almost ruled out for a country that renouncesstriking first, since there would presumably be few enemy mis-siles left for a retaliatory force to hit, and the retaliatingcountry would need to put its surviving missiles where theywould do the most damage -- against cities. However, he believedthat some counterforce capability was necessary. Without it,our thieat to retaliate would not be credible. It was notcredible that a president would sacrifice millions of Americansfor no military purpose. Some counterforce capability wasnecessary to deter "salami tactics" by the enemy -- picking offone submarine at a time, for example. Even with some counter-force capability, Kissinger believed that only a threat againstthe survival of the United States could be deterred by strategicnuclear forces. He discussed the suggestion sometimes made thatuncertainty as to how the United States may respond will beenough to deter, given that it possesses a large, survivableforce. Dubious about the effectiveness of uncertainty, he feltit was important to put strict limits on it. Uncertainty aboutexactly what we would do might be a good thing, but there shouldbe no uncertainty that we would respond.

Kissinger presented the ingredients of effective deterrencein the form of a mathematical statement: deterrence depends onthe magnitude of retaliation times the likelihood of retaliation,**If either is zero, the product is zero, and there is no deterrence.

*Finite deterrence is discussed more fully below, pp. 19-22.

**Intent and will are virtually equivalent to likelihood inthis context, although this may not be immediately obvious.

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(58) This equation appears in various forms throughout thedeterrence literature. Force times will equals deterrence(Gallois 1961:109,164) and D =FI -- where D is deterrence, Fis the magnitude of the force, and I is intent (Seybold 1979)

-- are two such expressions.

Finally, Kissinger stressed the importance of being ableF to fight limited war as a means of strengthening deterrence of

all conflict and of providing an opportunity, should deterrencefail, for reaching a settlement before "the automatism of theretaliatory forces takes over." (59-60) In other words,Kissinger believed that the capability to successfully fight li-mited war provided the best deterrence for NATO and non-NATOallies, that it provided the best deterrence against other pro-vocative and aggressive acts, and that it could effectivelysupport strategic nuclear deterrence of attack upon the UnitedStates.

Essentials of Deterrence

What, then, is essential to achieve deterrence, as theclassic concept developed in the period from the mid-1950s tothe mid-1960s? The essential prerequisites will be presentedhere in an order that indicates the way in which they dependupon each other, that is, in a kind of architectural structure.Figure 1 shows the structure graphically.

The fundamental requirement is credibility. Clearly im-plied in the earliest literature, credibility began to bestressed as the essential prerequisite in the middle and late1950s, in reaction to the "massive retaliation" pronouncementsof 1954. Massive retaliation was an attempt to use strategicnuclear forces to carry out statecraft deterrence. As DeanAcheson wrote in 1958, "This forces us back to the essence ofdeterrence -- that the threat shall be credible." (47)

On what does credibility itself depend? First and indis-pensably on the perception of the opponent. The threat has tobe credible to him. Deterrence is at its core a psychologicalphenomenon, a "matter of the mind." This was recognized early.Churchill stressed the importance of communicating Western capa-bilities to the Soviet Union. Much more recently, when Secretaryof Defense James Schlesinger announced the selective nucleartargeting policy in 1974, it was said that he was not so muchchanging policy as making it clear and public that the UnitedStates had options other than assured destruction -- in otherwords, making an input to Soviet perceptions. (Sherman 1974)

23

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One of the characteristics of deterrent thought in the l970s, aswill be discussed below, is more awareness of the complexity ofSoviet perceptions, including a recognition that mere communica-tion of the threat of dangerous consequences is not enough.Soviet reception of the communication is influenced by Sovietexperience, power structure, and military culture.

Assuming that the deterrent threat can be perceived accurately,what are its essential components? We can visualize it as sup-ported by two pillars. The first is the nuclear weapons force,which must be able to survive a first strike, and must be capableof inflicting damage unacceptable to the opponent. The second isthe intent or will to retaliate. This will to retaliate must beexpressed in the strategy and plans for fighting a war if deter-rence fails. Even the largest force does not deter if the intentto use it is perceived as weak and if there are perceived to beno coherent strategy and plans for using it.

Even if all the essentials of deterrence are present, how-evet, and even if the threat of disastrous consequences is cre-dible to the opponent, deterrence theoretically can be underminedif the force is provocative through sheer overwhelming size ordisposition. If the force looks like a first-strike, ratherthan a retaliatory, force, and if it makes a tempting target,deterrence may collapse as the opponent launches what he seesas a preemptive strike. What is sometime called "overdeterrence,"in the sense of overthreatening an opponent (e.g. Albert 1972:49-50) is not overdeterrence at all but rather a failure ofdeterrence as a result of provocative behavior or dispositions.A force may be made survivable without being made more provoca-tive, through hardening, dispersal, or, especially, mobility.

Here then are the fundamentals of deterrence. It must becredible and nonprovacative. It achieves its credibility byeffectively communicating to the adversary a powerful, surviv-able retaliatory force and the will to use it.

Deterrence is not, however, an isolated structure thatstands or falls on how well it is put together. There has tobe a bridge between deterrence and defense, between deterrenceand what will be done if deterrence fails. Otherwise, credibilityfails and deterrence in turn fails. This necessary link, thewill and ability to follow through with action, was recognized

p very early. It was the lack of any coherent, believable stra-tegy and forces for action that made the critics of massiveretaliation condemn it in the 1950s. In the early 1960s forcesand strategies were developed for limited war, and considerablework was done on planning for graduated response, intrawardeterrence, and the termination of war if general nuclear wardid occur. However, limited war and graduated response suffered

25

a somewhat damaged reputation during the Vietnam war, and thatwar also absorbed energy and attention that might otherwise havebeen devoted to adjusting and updating strategic nuclear deter-rence. In the later 1960s, strategic nuclear deterrence hardenedinto a static concept and posture that gave little attention tothe capability to wage a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union,if that necessity should arise. This may have weakened deter-rence, but it did not invalidate the deterrence concept.

A Way of Looking at Deterrence Thinkers

In discussing the history of deterrence, it will be neces-sary to mention deterrence thinkers with varied points of view,and these thinkers have to be grouped into some kind of cate-gories for reasonably clear exposition. All categories arearbitrary and misleading to some extent, but the ones most oftenused in discussions of public policy -- liberal and conservative,leftist and rightist, hawk and dove -- are extraordinarily so,and pose a formidable barrier to understanding the positions ofthinkers and writers on deterrence.

The most useful taxonomy known to this author is that pre-sented by Robert A. Levine in his 1963 book The Arms Debate, andit has therefore been adopted for this paper. Levine groupsthinkers and writers on defense matters in a horseshoe-shaped-array, stretching from "antiwar systemist" to "anti-Communistsystemist." (Figure 2)

Two modes of classification are embodied in this diagram.Defense thinkers are classified as to their purposes as thoseprimarily concerned with preventing war, especially thermonuc-lear war; those primarily concerned with arresting or reversingthe expansion of Soviet communism; and those who do not fiteasily into either group because they do not put either objectiveclearly above the other. Levine's terms -- antiwar, anti-Communist, and middle -- have the great advantage of deaing withreal motivations, unlike such terms as left and right. Theyavoid the pitfall of suggesting that any serious US thinker onarms matters is prowar or pro-Communist. And they also have thevirtue of simplicity.

The second mode of classification is by the degree of changein arms policy recommended by defense thinkers. Recommendationscan be either marginal, that is, for small increments of change,or systemic -- for large changes affecting entire systems. AsLevine points out, "radical" would be the more usual term forsystemic, but the latter avoids the invidious connotations of theformer.

26

PriariY I Mddle" Primarilyanti-war j nfti-Cow tufljgt

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AS Figure 2 shows graphically, the two kinds of systemists,antiwar and anti-Communist, are close to each other in theirabsolutism, although diametrically opposed in what they feel ismost important in defense policy. Between them are ranged theantiwar marginalists, the middle marginalists, and the anti-Communist marginalists, who have in common the fact that theirrecommendations tend to be based on compromise, gradualism, andrecognition of the values of several different courses of action.

Although Levine does not apply his categories to thinkingon deterrence, specifically, they work well in discussing it, andwill be used several times in the remainder of this paper.

The Cyclic History of Deterrence

The hardening of deterrence into a static concept in thelater 1960s may be seen as part of a cyclic pattern in the his-tory of deterrence, in which finite deterrence has been followedby an emphasis on counterforce strategy, which in turn has beenfollowed by a return to some form of finite deterrence.* Beforediscussing the cycles, it is necessary to say something moreabout the terms.

As indicated above (p. 14), strategic nuclear targetingpolicies may be classified, on the basis of what they intend todestroy, as counterforce or countervalue. Counterforce targetswere originally defined as enemy strategic missiles, either un-fired or still over their home country. The definition hassince been broadened by some analysts to include all kinds ofenemy military forces.** Countervalue targets have traditionallybeen defined as cities -- population centers and industry -- butwould now be defined by some to be whatever the enemy valuesmost, which might give such means of political control as thecommunications system more countervalue importance than largenumbers of people. Counterforce strategies are those that makeuse of counterforce targeting in achieving deterrence, and inplans to wage nuclear war if deterrence should fail. Finitedeterrence is usually used as the term for strategies employingcountervalue targeting.

Counterforce Strategies. A counterforce strategy involves morethan simply targeting Soviet forces. In the first place it ismost suited for a first-strike strategy. A nation that wished

*Albert (1971:7) has pointed out the cycle phenomenon.**This broadening of the counterforce concept has caused confu-sion. New terms are probably needed for strategic targets thatdo not fall in the classic counterforce or countervalue cate-gories.

28

to launch a nuclear strike first, either as a surprise attackto eliminate an enemy or in response to extreme provocation andto alter an intolerable situation (a US response to a Sovietassault on Western Europe is the prime example), would presumablylaunch a counterforce strike. The enemy missiles would stillbe in their silos, the enemy could, theoretically, be disarmed,and his cities could be held hostage for his nonretaliationagainst the cities of the attacking nation. A nation that wishedto use a counterforce strategy, or have it available for use,would also -- in the event, at least -- need to have some civildefense protection for its population, in case the enemy reta-liated, and would want some kind of defense against enemy mis-siles (ballistic missile defense -- BMD), if possible. The forceto carry out a counterforce strategy must have special charac-teristics: accuracy, the ability to destroy hardened targets,enough size to disarm the enemy and still have forces in reserveto hold cities hostage against the threat of retaliation bysurviving enemy forces. The advantages of a counterforce stra-tegy are its flexibility -- few or many targets of various kindscan be attacked; its believability as a deterrent and utilityin war; and its relative sparing of noncombatant lives. Thechief disadvantages are the great expense required to create acounterforce force; the impossibility of striking many counter-force targets if one strikes second, after a massive enemystrike, when many or most of the enemy missiles have alreadybeen fired; and the provocativeness, in the eyes of some analysts,of such a strategy. This last point will be discussed furtherbelow, under finite deterrence.

Finite Deterrence. Finite deterrence by its name implies a static,limited approach to deterrence, and it seems fair to say that thisis what its advocates favor. This approach seeks as small a re-taliatory force as can produce deterrence. Its targeting strategyis therefore generally countervalue, since it is presumably byhitting cities that one can do -- or threaten -- the most damagewith the fewest weapons. Finite deterrence is mutual deterrence,and its theoretical foundations are in the concept represented inthe chart on p. 13. If both sides in a bipolar adversary rela-tionship have invulnerable retaliatory forces capable of doingunacceptable damage to the opponent, neither can attack. Thisis theoretically the most stable and theoretically the mostdesirable situation. Even if one side has many more weapons thanthe other, if the inferior side has an invulnerable force capableof doing unacceptable damage it can still deter its opponent.Deterrence is still symmetrical, even if the size and quality ofthe forces is highly unequal.

The advantages of finite deterrence are its relatively lowcost and the promise it seems to hold out that deterrence can beestablished and then forgotten about, allowing the nation to

29

focus on other matters. it may be said without flippancy thatit is an approach that appeals to people who do not feel eitherthreatened or expansionist, that is, to most Americans. It isat least superficially the most satisfactory approach from apurely logical point of view, assuming that both opponents sharethe opinion, so evident in the early deterrence writings, thatstalemate, symmetry, and stability describe the most desirablesituation. *

The influence of the theory of games can probably be seenin the finite deterrence approach. From a simplistic point ofview, the theory of games seemed to promise that, if the UnitedStates assumed the "worst case" -- a direct niuclear attack onthis country -- and followed a strategy that would theoreticallyenable it to deter such an attack (by the capability of doing"unacceptable damage" after such an attack) , then no matter howmany missiles and warheads the Soviets deployed, no matter howgreat their conventional weapons buildup, there was no way inwhich the United States could improve on its position, and theSoviets were merely wasting money and effort by trying to. Toreason this way, however, is to distort seriously what the theoryof games says. The minimax strategy guarantees that one willlose as little as possible, over the long run, given the resourceseach side possesses, in a zero-sum game. However, if one sidegreatly increases the strength it can apply to the game, theother side is likely to suffer. The theory of games does notdeal with the matter of relative strengths.

The weaknesses of finite deterrence begin with the factthat it requires a survivable force that can do unacceptabledamage, and that, while this can be a finite force, it cannotbe an unchanging force unless one's opponent cooperates. ifone's opponent does not accept the view that symmetry is bestfor both sides, it may find ways of making one's retaliatoryforce vulnerable and may also take measures to protect its valuetargets to such an extent that unacceptable damage cannot bedone them. Unless the situation is remedied, the opponent can thenlaunch coercive attacks and at the same time withhold forcesthat deter one's deterrent (Nitze's phrase, 1976). Of courseit is true of all deterrence, not just finite deterrence, thatit must be constantly adapted to changed situations. (See,for example, Kissinger 1960:24) However, advocates of finitedeterrence tend to deny, forget, or ignore this reality, andthe fact that it vitiates one of the apparent advantages of the

* finite deterrence approach.**

*In reading the summaries of 1950s writings in Brody (1960), oneis struck by this recurring theme.

**For an extreme example, see Hohenemser (1974).

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Protecting Soviet Invulnerability. The fundamental weakness ofFinite deterrence, imp-lied above,: may be stated plainly: If itis to work, both sides must embrace symmetry. Neither side cantamper with the invulnerability of the other's retaliatory force.This rule, as it has been adapted by US advocates of finitedeterrence, has meant not simply recognizing that mutually in-vulnerable retaliatory forces produce the most stable situation,but actively seeking to protect the invulnerability of the adver-sary. Oskar Morgenstern, writing in 1959 (Gallois 1961:53),outlined the reasoning behind the belief that it is actually tothe interest of the United States for the Soviet Union to havean invulnerable retaliatory force: A false alarm of a nuclearattack could force a state without a secure retaliatory forceto fire cff its missiles, whereas a state with a secure retali-atory force could ride out the hypothetical attack, could waitand see. Thus if the Soviet Union had a secure retaliatoryforce, accidental war, and the destruction of the United States,could be avoided.

Herbert Scoville (Scoville and Osborn 1970:16) implies thatthis kind of symmetry is an essential aspect of deterrence:

What, then, can be done when the elimination ofthese weapons appears beyond the realm of immediatepossibility and when protectioai cannot be obtainedby physical. means? Reliance must be placed uponDETERRENCE. Nuclear war can be prevented today onlyby making the consequences of its initiation clearlyunacceptable to all parties. Each nation must un-equivocally understand that the other, even aftersuffering the maximum conceivable surprise first-strike, can nevertheless produce an unacceptable levelof "assured destruction" in retaliation. . . . Onlyif a mutual second-strike capability is absolutelyclear to both parties will there be reasonable confi-dence that neither nation would consider initiating~nuclear war.

It should be noted that not only the deterrence, but all thebasic, implicit assumptions of this point of view are symmetrical.The writer, in the interests of preventing a human disaster, islooking at the situation from the point of view of both antagon-ists, and is deciding what would be best for both of them. Hethen recommends that one of them carry out this policy, in theinterest of both, and of humanity. This approach does not ade-quately take into account even such basic factors as the asym-metry of goals of the United States and the Soviet Union-- thedifference between a status quo power and an expansionist, or atleast actively revisionist, power.

31

It is not just Scoville and the antiwar marginalists of theFederation of American Scientists who have advocated a protectiveattitude toward Soviet invulnerability. According to Fred Mke(1973:277), the shift in US policy to mutual assured destructionafter 1963 was motivated largely by the US defense and arms-controlestablishment's view that if we denied ourselves defense againstSoviet forces and curtailed our ability to hit Soviet forces, theSoviets might be expected to reciprocate and we could thus achievestability and prevent more arms buildups by both sides.

The decision not to seek protection for the US population atthe same time that we were taking care not to make Soviet missilesvulnerable to our attack should be noted. A comparable proposalby advocates of finite deterrence is to deal with the problem ofthe vulnerability of US ICBMs to Soviet attack (a vulnerabilityarising because the Soviets have not in fact reciprocated by pro-tecting our missile invulnerability) by phasing them out. Thereasoning is that once the Soviets have made these weapons vul-nerable they then become a tempting target for a Soviet firststrike, and we should remove them.*

It thus might be fairly said that finite deterrence has givendeterrence a bad name. Advocates of finite deterrence have tendedto equate the two. The influential and attentive publics havebeen encouraged to make this same assumption by the fact that USdeterrence policy during the late 1960s and early 1970s appearedto be a finite deterrence policy. However, it is not true thatdeterrence equals finite deterrence. Although the deterrencetheorists saw mutual invulnerability of retaliatory forcesas the most stable and therefore most desirable situation forboth sides (e.g., Kissinger 1960; Schelling 1960), there was neverany conclusion, nor could there be one, that this was the onlykind of deterrence. For the United States to achieve deterrence,it had to have an invulnerable retaliatory force, credibly capableof doing unacceptable damage, the credible will to use it, andnonprovocative force dispositions. The requirement to protect theSoviet Union's retaliatory force, or to avoid having a vulnerableretaliatory force by simply dismantling a large part of the force,or to insure that one's own population was defenseless againstattack, were not seen as a part of deterrence in the early writings(before 1963). On the contrary, deterrence was seen by its greatexplicators as requiring constant vigilance and change, and re-quiring the real and perceived ability and will to wage nuclearwar if deterrence should fail. The basic theme of Kissinger'sThe Necessity for Choice was that Americans had to give up theirillusions that their country's survival, much less its security,could be achieved-without much effort.

*See Washington Post story on Federation of American Scientistsreport, January 27, 1974. See also Hohenemser (1974).

32

Chronology of Deterrence Cycles. Even the most general chronologyof deterrence is difficult to construct without distortion, becauseone is dealing with both deterrence theory and US official deterrencepolicy, and the two do not always coincide. For example, therewas apparently never any real theoretical underpinning for thepolicy of massive retaliation. However, the shifts can be roughlycharted in the following way. (Figure 3 illustrates the followinghistorical summary, and Figure 4 displays the relationship in timebetween some landmarks in deterrence theory and some in deterrencepolicy.)

The policy of massive retaliation, announced in 1954, calledfor US response to Communist-nation provocations of all kinds withwhatever actions the United States deemed appropriate to its in-terests, whether or not these responses matched the provocationsas to geographical location or weapons systems. The response couldinclude a nuclear strike, whether or not the provocation wasnuclear. By implication, US nuclear superiority was to be usedto deter all kinds of aggressions. Massive retaliation was a kindof finite deterrence, in that it assumed countervalue targeting,a minimum amount of force in being, and a relatively static de-fense posture.*

The developing deterrence theorists responded to massive reta-liation with a much less simplistic, more complex approach todeterring aggression. The flexible response policy of the Kennedyadministration included a build-up of conventional forces for state-craft deterrence and careful planning for the use of strategicweapons, if strategic nuclear war should come, in ways that wouldcontrol damage to the United States and bring the war to an endas soon as possible. US retaliatory-force invulnerability andnonprovocativeness were stressed. Counterforce targeting waspart of this planning, and Secretary of Defense McNamara supportedcounterforce strategies until 1963. The reasons for their aban-donment are not entirely clear, and in fact the capability todeliver counterforce strikes was probably never abandoned.

The shift in policy was probably due largely to two causes:the hope that the Soviet Union would adopt a complementary finitedeterrence posture, thus stabilizing the arms race and providingtheoretically stable nuclear deterrence; and the great expense ofachieving the capacity to destroy increasingly invulnerable Sovietstrategic forces. The expense problem increased as the Vietnamwar consumed more and more defense funds, and the symmetrical

*The author recognizes that many finite-deterrence advocates (Lowe1964, for example) would not agree with this classification of mas-sive retaliation. It is true that, unlike later forms of finitedeterrence, it did not call for symmetrical mutual deterrence.

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Finite CounterforceDeterrence Strategies

1945

1950

massive1955 retaliation

1960 flexibleresponse

1965

MAD

1970 selectivenucleartargeting

1975 Pres. Carterconsiders

minimum deterrenceSALT II debates

1980

Figure 3. A rough chronology of deterrence cycles.

34

Year Arms DevelopmentI Event Theory Policy

Hiroshima

1945- US A-bomb (Nagasaki

Brodie: Nuclear weapons can preventuse of nuclear weapons; invulnerableretaliatory force for deterrence;

Czechoslovakia; civil defense

Soviet A-bomb Berlin blockade [George Kennan's "Mr. X" article:Containment of communism as US

195) Korean War national strategy]

US H-bomb

Soviet H-bomb

tactical nuc. Dien Bien Phu; "massive retaliation"weapons Geneva Confer-

1955 ence Churchill speech: mutual deterrence,deterrence to protect Europe

Arab-Israeli

War; HungarySoviet ICBM

"missile gap"

issue raised

Wohlstetter: "Delicate Balance ofTerror": Complex requirements for

1960-SLB Polaris deterrence; Morgenstern: Soviet

tested invulnerability is in US interesttKissinger;

Necessit for Choice:

crdblt;invu neab styplu Kennedy: US must have survivablecredibility; inuerability plus 2d-strike force to deter attack an

Soviet reported mrcatiueness; mutual invulner-hardening ICBMs ability gives greatest stability US or ally

McNamara, June, Ann Arbor: Counter-force targeting, conventional build-

up, flexiblP response; Oct.: assureddestruction: 2d-strilo force that cando "unacceptable damage"

US escalation

1965 - in Vietnam

US Air Force

test-launches

its first MIRV McNamara strongly opposes ABM,supports mutual assured destruction

Czechoslovakia Defensecommunity

studiesNixon: "realistic deterrence"; "self-onselective help at lover edge of spectrum";sencletiv strategic efficiency

.970 -nucleartargeting

Soviets pass SALT 1; US

US in total Vietnam pull-strategic mis- out Ikle: Strongly rejects MAD, advocatessile launchers selective and flexible targeting

Schlesinger: selective nuclear

First opera- South Vietnam targeting

1975 -tional Soviet falls; Angola

MIRVs

Gray: Favors deterrence throughability to wage war effectively; Countervailing strategy: response againstfavors adopting a theory of wide spectrum of targets plus Survivable

Iran; SALT I victory retaliatory force to inflict assuredAfghanistan

destruction

Figure 4. Deterrence theory and policy: their relationship in time.

35

finite-deterrence stance of what is now generally called mutualassured destruction became hardened and static.*

Under MAD, the United States offered a situation in whicheach side would have an invulnerable retaliatory force capable ofcarrying out the assured destruction of a given fraction of theadversary's population and industry, a fraction assumed to repre-sent an unacceptable loss. (Twenty percent to 25% of the popula-tion and 50% of industry are the figures most often given.) Civildefense and ballistic missile defense were to be renounced by eachside. It was never part of MAD doctrine that only populationcenters and industries were to be targeted; the death and destruc-tion percentages were ways of measuring the destructive capabilityof the retaliatory force, not necessarily goals for destruction.However, the renunciation of civil defense implied that US citieswere being offered as hostages guaranteeing no US attack, andreciprocation was expected from the Soviet. Secretary of DefenseMcNamara' s strong and public opposition to ABM (anti-ballisticmissile) deployment probably did more than anything else tocrystallize the concept the attentive public had of deterrence asequal to finite deterrence, with mutual assured destruction theoperative deterrent threat and vulnerability of populations anecessary part of effective deterrence.

About 1970, with the coming of the Nixon administration, theliterature of the deterrence analysts, most of it unpublishedexcept within the defense community, began to call again for flex-ible targeting, and to suggest various counterforce strategiesand combinations of counterforce and countervalue targeting.This movement culminated in Secretary of Defense Schlesinger'sannouncement of selective nuclear targeting in 1974. Since thattime there has been a small epicycle whose turn toward finitedeterrence took place when President Carter, just before he tookoffice, called for a study of the feasibility of relying on some200 or 250 strategic nuclear delivery missiles (Hoeber 1978:53),and in general appeared under pressure from advocates of finiteand minimum deterrence. However, the trend quickly turned awayfrom finite deterrence. The approach of the SALT II ratificationdebates, and the SALT Congressional hearings themselves, haveelicited a considerable body of writing favoring counterforce capa-bilities. These recent developments will be further discussedbelow ("Deterrence Thought in the 1970s").

*Reciprocal assured destruction would be a more objective term,with a less pejorative acronym. The term mutual assured destruc-tion seems to have been coined by opponents of the policy.

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Deterrence for Europe

From Churchill's 1955 speech to the House of Commons toKissinger's 1979 speech in Brussels, the use of US nuclear powerto protect Western Europe from Soviet attack has been a persistentand increasingly troubled theme. The problem is broader thanthe security of Europe alone, including the whole matter of"extended deterrence" (see Dornan 1979:209-10) for all countriesto which the United States has treaty obligations. Europe,however, reveals the essence of the problem, as a region imme-diately facing superior Soviet and Eastern European strength anda region whose independence is so intimately involved with USvalues and interests that this country has fought two wars inits defense -- or so it may be strongly argued -- even withouttreaty obligations.

Churchill suggested that US nuclear power would compensatefor the inferiority of NATO conventional forces, at the same timethat it was deterring Soviet nuclear attack against the UnitedStates, and Dulles's massive retaliation pronouncements of theprevious year had also claimed this all-purpose role for USdeterrence. However, when the first Soviet ICBM was launched(1957) , and it became clear that the United States was readilyaccessible to direct nuclear attack, it was less clear that USnuclear strength- could be counted on to protect Europe. TheFrench decided to seek an independent deterrent force, believing,as General Pierre Gallois cogently explained (1961) , that nuclearweapons could be launched only in defense of an absolutely vitalinterest, to ensure one's country's survival, and that the UnitedStates could not be expected to stand ready indefinitely to launchsuch weapons in defense of Europe.

President Kennedy, in his 1961 budget message, made an author-itative statement of US deterrence policy that reiterated the com-mitment to NATO and other allies:

Our strategic arms and defenses must be adequate todeter any deliberate attack on the United States or ourallies -- by making clear to any potential aggressor thatsufficient retaliatory forces will be able to survive afirst strike and penetrate his defenses in order to in-flict unacceptable losses upon him. (Coffey 1963:4)

This is a clear statement of the requirements for deterrence:a survivable force capable of doing unacceptable damage. However,as Joseph Coffey pointed out, it does not solve the problem of"rendering credible our intent to respond to attacks on ourallies, when such response involves initiating a thermonuclearwar." Coffey could have bluntly said that there was an internalinconsistency in Kennedy's statement that we would deter an attack

37

on our allies because we could survive a first strike and inflictunacceptable losses. Suppose our allies were attacked and wewere not? Then there would be no question of our surviving afirst attack. We would have to make a first attack. Would we?Could it be a disarming strike? If not, would we strike Sovietcities and invite the destruction of our cities? Or would westrike at as much of the Soviet force as possible and be preparedto ride out a countercity attack and still have forces left toinflict unacceptable damage? This last alternative, a counter-force strategy, would appear most reasonable in action and con-vincing as a deterrent, and although it is not what Kennedy saidin 1961, we know that the Kennedy-McNamara administration wasmoving in that direction. However, it was a very expensive course,and the trend toward finite deterrence in the form of MAD set inwithin two or three years.

The problem of Europe's defense did not go away. The Kennedyadministration' s approach to deterrence called for upgrading con-ventional forces to deter conventional attack, and NATO countrieswere urged to provide more such forces for their own defense.But this raised another problem, especially in the minds of someEuropean leaders. If NATO was stronger conventionally, would theUnited States be less likely to use its strategic nuclear forcesto protect it? Would the Soviet Union perceive that this was so,whether it was or not, and thus be more likely to attack? Tacti-cal nuclear weapons also posed a problem in Europe. Could they beused to compensate for conventional inferiority without bringingon a strategic nuclear war? In 1969, Thomas Schelling said, inCongressional testimony,

There are . . . areas of strategic thinking in whichwe have made very little progress during the past decade.One is an old problem, and the lack of progress is not dueto lack of trying. It is how to couple our strategic re-taliatory capability and our regional defense capabilityin a meaningful doctrine.

The question whecher the tactical use of nuclear weap-ons must lead, or needs to lead, to total escalation isnot one on which any of us seems closer to a persuasiveanswer than ten years ago. The question whether a conven-tional capability in Europe or elsewhere enhances thestrategic deterrent, by promising timely and unflinchingresponse, or degrades the strategic deterrent by providingevasive alternatives, is one that the American governmentand some European governments argued to a standstill.(Albert 1972:33)

Behind these questions of the role of tactical nuclear andconventional weapons remained the central question of deterrence

38

for Europe: Will the United States strike first with strategicnuclear weapons to defend Europe? Mk6, in 1973, pointed outthe incompatibility of symmetrical mutual deterrence, based onmutual assured destruction, with strategic deterrence as a shieldfor Europe:

Our current strategic posture is afflicted by a deep butstrangely concealed contradiction. Those of our forcesthat serve to protect our NATO allies are still largelydesigned and operated in accordance with the earlier stra-tegy threatening, in response to a major conventionalattack, a nuclear first strike that would seek to disarm[a counterforce strike]. But our global deterrence pos-ture now has to meet the opposite requirement: to eschew,and through agreement mutually to preclude, a nucleardisarming capability. (Ikl& 1973:277-78)

One of the chief purposes of the Schlesinger doctrine ofselective nuclear targeting, enunciated in 1974, was to make somekind of strategic nuclear initiatives in defense of NATO credible.Even though the United States could not expect to disarm theSoviet Union with a first strike, and thus could not use such athreat to deter attack on Europe, it could pose the threat oflimited nuclear strikes against military targets in the Sovi-tUnion that would cause damage outweighing what the Soviets mighthope to gain in Western Europe.

But would the United States actually launch such attacksand bring down Soviet attacks on its people? And if it wouldnot, would the threat to do so be credible? And without credi-bility, how could there be deterrence? Kissinger's remarks toleading Western European military specialists in September 1979put the matter as clearly and bluntly as possible: "Don't youEuropeans keep asking us to multiply assurances we cannot pos-sibly mean and that if we do mean, we should not want to exe-cute, and which if we execute, would destroy our civilization."*

Kissinger called for the development of a new counterforcecapability, and took responsibility for having himself contributedto the theories of ti.e past that he was denouncing."* It is truethat Kissinger had argued for MAD, in supporting the anti-ABMagreement of SALT I, saying that as long as the offensive missilesof each side had "unchallenged access" to the population centersof the other, deterrence was assured. (Dornan 1979:216) Indoing so, he had ignored his own advice of 1960 that absence of

*New York Times, September 2, 1979, p. 8.

**Los Angeles Times, September 2, 1979, p. 4.

39

civil defense, and of a bridge between deterrence and war-fightingcapability, undermined credibility and thus undermined deterrence.

Certainly MAD was, in retrospect, a completely illogicalchoice for a nation like the United States with far-flung allianceresponsibilities. Being a close, finite, symmetrical system ofmutual deterrence, it was incapable of being extended by theUnited States to include deterrence of attack against NATO. Whenit became clear that the Soviet Union was not cooperating in theMAD system, so that even the deterrence that system had seemedto promise -- deterrence of direct attack against the UnitedStates -- was not permanently ensured, a time for changes had come.

The Deterrence Concept in the 1970s

A number of factors have influenced the deterrence conceptduring the past decade. They may be summarized as these:

o A return of the attention of the defense communityand the attentive public to deterrence, and specificallystrategic nuclear deterrence, following the end of theVietnam war.

o An increasing awareness of a consistent and massiveSoviet buildup in conventional and nuclear weapons andforces, beginning in the early 1960s.

o An accompanying awareness that Soviet leaders didnot share US views on deterrence and were not cooperatingin maintaining stable, symmetrical nuclear deterrence.

o The examination of the US defense posture and capa-bilities brought about by the SALT II negotiations andratification debate.

0 An increasing concern about the moral implicationsof attempting to prevent nuclear war by assuring the deathof scores of millions if deterrence should fail.

o Attacks on the validity of deterrence, both from the"antiwar" end of Levine's spectrum and from the anti-Commu-nist end.

o The development of selective nuclear targeting (SNT)to provide more US options than simply a strategic nuclearspasm or no response, and to communicate these options tothe Soviets.*

*Selective nuclear targeting has been chosen for this paper inpreference to the more commonly used limited nuclear options,and to flexibile options. The terms are not synonymous, althoughthey are often used interchangeably. SNT seems most accuratefor most purposes and least easily confused with other, similar-sounding terms.

40

To these might be added a trend much less pronounced thanthe others, but evident in some French and British writings,especially, toward concern over whether the Western democracieshave the will to support adequate defense establishments and tofight a war for their ultimate values if necessary.

These factors will not be discussed one by one; in somecases their existence and influence appear self-evident, andthey are listed only to call them to the reader's attention.Some, however, will be treated more fully.

The Moral Absurdity of MAD. The threat of mutual assured de-struction of huge parts of the Soviet and US populations as atechnique for preventing war has always been a paradox. It seemedodd that the taking and yielding of millions of hostages couldbe the most humane way to deal with the threat of nuclear war.To those who thought about it, it also seemed odd that the UnitedStates would choose to cancel out the power of the one class ofweapons in which it was still superior in the 1960s. And con-sidering our alliance obligations, it might seem odd that wewould, in effect, sign a mutual nonaggression pact with the SovietUnion and use the lives of several million American citizens toguarantee it. (See Kahn, 1960:40) But paradoxes can expresstruth, and it was believed that this one did: Assured destructionof each other's societies in case of attack would prevent suchan attack and thus offer the most humane program for saving lives,while attempting to save lives by civil defense, ballistic missiledefense, or planning strikes against enemy weapons would make warmore likely and would be ineffective in saving lives if war came.

However, in the middle 1970s a strong reaction to the moralimplications of assured destruction was setting in. As Ikle' putit, "Tomas de Torquemada, who burned 10,000 heretics at the stake,could claim principles more humane than our nuclear strategy; forhis tribunals found all his victims guilty of having knowinglycommitted mortal sin." (Ikle 1973:281) Henry Rowen, writing onproliferation, spoke wryly in passing of a strategic model whichassumes that "only the prospect of civil devastation is stabiliz-ing" and that "at least one and preferably each of the governmentsshould commit itself to a policy of national suicide."* ColinGray has recently forcefully pointed out the logical'as well asthe moral absurdity of the approach, asking how we can plan tomake an assault that would be mere revenge if it came second andwould bring on our destruction if it came first. (Gray 1979:55)

*In Albert Wohlstetter et al. (1977), "The Military Potential ofCivilian Nuclear Energy: Moving Towards Life in a Nuclear ArmedCrowd?", Minerva 15:516.

41

Soviet Buildup and Attitudes. It seems unlikely that without theattention-consuming and funds-absorbing war in Indochina, the MADapproach to deterrence could have remained so long firmly ensconced,in view of the vigorous Soviet buildup. The awareness of thebuildup, that it was indeed a push for superiority and not merelya catching up with the United States, plus the concurrent and corol-lary awareness that the Soviet Union was not buying the mutualdeterrence program offered by the United States, have had a varietyof effects.

Some members of the influential and attentive publics do notrecognize any problem, feel that the United States has been as pro-vocative in weapons procurement and deployment as the Soviets,feel that Soviet superiority is insignificant and only a waste ofSoviet money as long as the United States has enough missiles toensure unacceptable damage, and see no need for a change in deter-rence posture from the mutual assured destruction of the late1960s.* Although Colin Gray (1979:72) states that MAD in any pureform has been virtually abandoned by those in the defense and armscontrol communities, there seems to be a good deal of it left inCongress and among the influential public, including academicpeople.

Another group, more articulate, with more specialized know-ledge, and composed of people who would fall in the anti-Communistmarginalist portion of Levine's spectrum, believe it is urgentthat the United States respond with an upgrading of its militarycapabilities carefully designed to meet the Soviet threat. AsGray says (1979:62), this group is "edging toward" the idea thatthe utility of nv'clear weapons in nonuse, which is truly at theheart of nuclear-age deterrence, is a wrong idea, and may havehad a deleterious effect on Western security. Gray (1979),Richard Pipes (1977), and Paul Nitze (1976) have effectively setforth variants of this point of view.

One specialized response has been greater and more sophisti-cated efforts to discover just what Soviet perceptions of deter-rence and defense are, including a return to some of the work thatwas done in this area in the 1950s and then neglected.** What hasemerged is an understanding of a Soviet concept of deterrence thatequates deterrence with the ability to fight and win a generalnuclear and conventional war. What could deter more effectively,the Soviet leaders ask, than "an imposing offensive arsenal backedup by the best possible active and passive defenses?" The Soviet

*See, for example, New York Times editorial, "Arms Control Out ofControl," August 15, 1979; Morgenthau 1979.

**See discussions and citations of the work of Herbert Diner-.-einand Raymond Gartoff, Pipes 1977:27, 27n.

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leaders are not concerned with protecting the surviability of theUS retaliatory force, or with the other requirements of symmetricalmutual deterrence. For them, deterrence is deterrence by theSoviet Union, and deterrence is enhanced when Soviet power isstrengthened. *

Clearly a new US view of deterrence, an adjustment of theconcept and the strategy, is required. Deterrence was a Westernconcept that developed out of an awareness of the enormity ofnuclear weapons and also out of great Western, and specificallyUS, superiority in these weapons. It developed into a symmetrical,mutually deterring and mutually protecting model suited to approxi-mate equivalence in nuclear strength of bipolar adversaries, andwas offered to the Soviet Union in this form. The model did not'it Soviet perceptions of what Soviet protection called for, andwas not accepted. It is not logically impossible, and should notbe practically impossible, to continue to use nuclear weapons todeter the use of nuclear weapons, but it cannot be a deterrencebased either on superiority or on equality Plus a mutual agreementthat each side will retain the inimpeded power to ravage theother's population.

Selective Nuclear Targeting (SNT). The chief policy responsefor buttressing deterrence in the 1970s has been the approachof targeting available strategic forces in such a way that alimited counterforce strike, or strikes, could be made in re-spcnse to a provocation less extreme than direct attack on theUnited States. The search for new targeting options began inearnest early in the Nixon administration, and was especiallyencouraged by Kissinger, then National Security Adviser. Thenew policy was crystallized in NSDM (National Security DecisionMemorandum) 242 and presented to Congress and the public in1974 by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, who, while on theRand Corporation staff, had done early work on the new targetingoptions. (Schlesinger 1968)

A good deal of thought within the defense community hasgone into choosing the appropriate targets. Counterforce andcountervalue targeting categories have become somewhat blurred;most targets can no longer easily be classified as one of theother. With Soviet silo missiles largely hardened, and thusmaking less rewarding targets, the understanding of counterforcetargets has been broadened to include military forces of allkinds. Instruments of the Soviet government's control over thecountry, such as the rail connections with Soviet Asia have beencited as appropriate targets. (Albert 1971; Sherman 1974)

*Snyder 1977:11; Howard 1979:975-86. Quotation from Snyder.See also news story quoting Andrew Marshall, San FranciscoChronicle, July 29, 1979, p. B6.

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Assured destruction, i.e., countervalue targeting, was to remaina capability. Schlesinger's approach, which also called forresearch and development of new weapons systems, was attacked inthe press and Congress -- as the "Schlesinger doctrine" -- formaking nuclear war more feasible and thus weakening deterrence.This criticism ignored, and probably was ignorant of, the factthat counterforce strategies had been a part of deterrence theorysince the 1950s; that the symmetrical, "stable," mutual deterrencemodel is only one possible deterrence strategy; and that thebelievable bridge from deterrence to action has been viewed asan essential requirement of effective deterrence almost from thebeginning. The key reason why SNT should produce more effectivedeterrence than MAD is the unbelievability that what is threatenedin MAD would be carried out under any conceivable circumstances.

It may be mentioned here that one response of the 1970s tothe Soviet buildup and implicit rejection of MAD has been a movetoward a "launch on warning" policy. This means that if our ICBMsare becoming vulnerabile, we will behave the way a vulnerablepower is in danger of behaving under the theory of games modelof vulnerability (see p. 13) and use, rather than lose, our missiles.(Ikl6 1973:274-76)* The possibility that we might do this couldindeed make a Soviet attack less likely, but the policy would makeaccidental war dangerously more likely and would compound the moralproblem by ensuring the destruction of Soviet cities whether ornot a Soviet attack had actually been launched. It does not appearto be strongly supported within the defense community.

Attacks on Deterrence from the "Antiwar" Side. There has been somediscussion above, in the section on Soviet buildup and attitudes,of recent criticism of deterrence itself by some strongly defenseoriented analysts. Mention should also be made of the strong cri-ticisms of the deterrence concept from the antiwar (in Levine'smodel) side of the spectrum, most of them in the form of scholarlystudies by members of the academic community. For discussion ofseveral such works, the reader should see the bibliographic entrieson George and Smoke 1974, Naroll et al. 1974, Morgan 1977, andSteinbruner 1976. In general, these works do not deal with stra-tegic nuclear deterrence, but rather with statecraft "deterrence."Some attack the theory-of-games underpinning of much of the "goldenage" refinement of deterrence theory. Some, notably George andSmoke's work, are of much more value than others, but it seemssafe to say that none of them threatens the validity of the stra-tegic nuclear deterrence concept.

The Societal Dimension. Michael Howard, in a recent article, haspointed out that the societal dimension of strategy stressed byClausewitz, the will of the society to support the military effort,

*Ikl6 lists advocates of the policy, which he rejects.

44

has been undervalued and in fact virtually unnoted in recentyears. (Howard 1979) He suggests that MAD doctrine was a ra-tionalization for abandoning the civil defense programs thatpeople in some Western countries, and especially the UnitedStates, were unwilling to accept because of their expense andtheir disruptive effects. He then points out the irrationalityof contemplating initiating nuclear operations, as we wouldprobably have to do in response to any Soviet attack on NATO,without preparations for protecting our societies. Howard alsopoints out the necessity for society's support of military pre-paredness: "The maintenance of adequate armed forces in peace-time, and the will to deploy and support them operationally inwar, is in fact a symbol of that social unity and politicalresolve which is as essential an element in nuclear deterrenceas any invulnerable second-strike capability." (Howard 1979:983)

Another English student of Clausewitz, R.A. Mason, alsowriting in 1979, has suggested that the West's center of gravity,in the Clausewitzian sense, its center of strength against whicha shrewd opponent would direct his energies, is "not in our mili-tary strength, conventional or nuclear, but in the fundamentalnature of democratic Western society or in the sources of economicpower that sustain it," and that the shrewd opponent might attackour public opinion on the one hand and . . . the heart of ourinternal and external economic resources on the other."*

The SALT II debate in the United States has had some impactin bringing public attention and strategic concepts closer to-gether, but there still seems a very large gap between the makingof decisions within the defense community and the minds of thepeople who will be called upon to support them.

Conclusions

After 33 years the deterrence concept has shown itself, notsurprisingly, open to attack from several points of view. Deter-rence strategy has been revised, and will need further revision.However, the circumstances that created deterrence have not changed.Strategic nuclear weapons are still so destructive that avoidingtheir use is profoundly important, and the basic deterrence con-cept appears valid and strong. Most of the criticisms of deter-rence are aimed at distortions of it that have neglected its es-sential elements, elements implicit from the beginning and clearlyarticulated by 1960.

*"The Challenge of Clausewitz," Air University Review 30 (March-April 1979) :76.

45

e Deterrence requires, above all, credibility, and therecan be no credibility without a believable link between thedeterrence posture and the action that will be taken if, de-spite that posture, the other side attacks. The threat tokill 25% of the Soviet population while the US population isexposed to attack lacks that link between threat and action.

* Deterrence requires an invulnerable retaliatory force,and cannot remain effective if the US retaliatory force be-comes vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

* The retaliatory force has to be capable of doing unac-ceptable damage, but unacceptable damage, like the other com-ponents of deterrence, is dependent on the opponent's percep-tion. Thus effective deterrence depends on a highly informedappraisal of what is of value and utility to the opponent'sleadership, and a careful structuring of the now-limited re-taliatory forces to target those values and forces.

* Deterrence, for the United States, has to be consis-tnet with commitments to allies. Thus it must either bebelievably extended to include nuclear strikes against anystate that attacks US allies or it must be backed up by otherprovisions for defending them.

e Deterrence cannot be static. It requires constantvigilance, and adjustment to changing technology, changesin the balance of forces, and changes in the internationalsystem.

9 Deterrence requires the will of leaders and societyto provide the forces required for an effective deterrentthreat and the intent to follow through with action, evenat great risk and sacrifice, if deterrence should fail.

46

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction

This paper is focused on the concept of deterrence, andan attempt has been made to keep the bibliography focused inthe same way. Theoretical explorations of the nature of deter-rence have been included, and also somewhat more practical ex-plorations of strategies that may make deterrence work better.Works discussing specific weapons systems and their role indeterrence have not been included, although a number of themhave been read. Highly theoretical works on decision makingand conflict resolution generally have not been included.

For annotations to be useful, judgments have to be given.A strong effort has been made to be fair. It is almost impos-sible, and a disservice to the reader, not to argue ad hominemto some extent, in the sense of taking into consideration anauthor's other writings, his apparent--even if unspoken--concerns, and his implicit assumptions. To do this fairlyhas meant that some of the less useful works are discussedmore fully than the more valuable ones, so that a substantiated,if abbreviated, case could be made for criticisms rendered.

It will also be noted that in many cases major works in thefield have been treated more briefly than minor papers. Thishas been done with the thought that it may not be worth thereader's time to search out the minor papers, but that a summaryof their statements may be useful, while the major works should,and can more easily, be examined first hand. Se% ral of themajor works are also discussed in the body of the paper.The bare minimum of indispensable works on deterrence isprobably these: Aron 1964, Brodie 1959, Kissinger 1960,and Wohlstetter 1958.

The practice of using the present tense in discussing theworks in the bibliography has been used throughout. Thus, whena man is described as expressi ig certain views in a 1963 bookwith the words "The author states . . -," it should be understoodthat he may well have changed his views since then, or may indeedno longer be alive. Although this practice may cause some prob-lems, it seemed to avoid more.

47

ACHESON, Dean1958 Power and Diplomacy

Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.

[A section headed "The Limitation of Massive Retaliationas a Deterrent" (pp. 46-53) attacks the Eisenhower-Dullespolicy of using the strategic nuclear capability as adeterrent to all forms of aggression, worldwide. Achesonalso urges civil defense as a support for deterrence.]

ALBERT, Bernard S.1971 A Direction for Strategic Deterrence in the 1980's

General Electric: PhiliadelphiaPreliminary Draft, Not for Public Release

[Part of the search for less-than-spasm targeting thatled to Schlesinger's selective nuclear targeting.Albert's approach is to identify specific Soviet sen-sitivities, select targets whose destruction wouldseverely strike at these sensitivities, and aim weaponsat these targets that can destroy them while doingminimum collateral damage. The sensitivities he iden-tifies include ability to maintain central control,ability to conduct war, resources to sustain key elementsof the population, and ability to defend against externalthreats, specifically threats from China. The capabilityfor assured destruction would be maintained. A signifi-cant and useful paper, although the author's argument isnot very clearly presented and the accompanying chartsare somewhat confusing.]

1972 "Objective Deterrence": A White Paper on Expanded"Realistic" Deterrence for the 1980's

General Electric: PhiladelphiaNot for Public Release

[An extension of the author's 1970 paper, which is morecomplete and more useful.]

ARON, Raymond1964 The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy, trans.

Ernst PawelDoubleday: Garden City, N.Y.

[Chapters 1-3 provide what is probably the best summaryand analysis of the development and character of stra-tegic nuclear deterrence theory and its application tothe defense of Western Europe.]

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BEAUFRE, Andre1966 Deterrence and Strategy, trans. R.H. Barry

Frederick A. Praeger: New York

[A lucid work that directly addresses the issue of thedeterrence concept. Beaufre makes the following points:The capacity for riposte is the key to nuclear deter-rence. The capability to reduce the riposte is the keyto nuclear initiative. The first strike must be acounterforce strike. The second strike must be primarilycountervalue. (If it should be executed it would attackwhat the other side values most; in order to deter itmust turn those things--cities, factories, other valuedresources--into hostages.)Beaufre clearly feels nuclear deterrence serves a valuablepurpose, beyond deterring strategic nuclear use. Presum-ably part of that purpose is the protection of WesternEurope. He believes that the fear of a possible firststrike is fundamental to deterrence, that the disappear-ance of that fear would be a great loss. For him,absolute nuclear stability is a danger; he sees the goalas overall stability through nuclear deterrence. Hewants to prevent war, not just nuclear war. Because USstrategy is basically defensive, he sees the necessityfor offensive potential to keep the Soviet Union withinlimits. He sees a counterforce capability as necessary.(In this connection, the reader may note Colin Gray'sNew York Times letter [Gray 1977], stating that theUnited States would probably strike first in any nuclearexchange, making a limited strike in response to a Sovietattack on Western Europe.)]

BRODIE, Bernard1946a "War in the Atomic Age"

The Absolute Weapon, ed. Bernard Brodie, pp. 21-69Harcourt Brace: New York

[The first sentences of this paper take the reader backto the period when many influential people were sayingthere must be world government and international peaceor world destruction, and when it was also being saidthat the atomic bomb was the complete offensive weapon,and that since there was no defense against it, it madesurprise attack irresistible. Brodie's was a voice ofreason, asking if these things were really true, ifthey had to be true, and what could be done to changethem. One does see certain inadequately examined assump-tions, growing out of the historical circumstances ofthe time, notably the assumption that cities had to bethe targets of atomic bombing.]

49

l946b "Implications for Military Policy"The Absolute Weapon, ed. Bernard Brodie, pp. 70-107Fi Harcourt Brace: New York

[In this article can be seen the beginnings of the deter-rence concept: surprise attack will not work if carryingit out would mean that the attacker's own cities wouldalso be destroyed; even evacuated they hold the physicalplant on which the nation depends. He gives a Jacob Vinercredit for first suggesting and elaborating this view.Brodie makes the point that the different thing aboutthe atomic bomb is not the amount of destruction it cancause but the tremendous concentration of the violencewithin a short space of time. See the section of thecurrent paper headed "Beginnings" for a fuller summaryof Brodie's points.]

1959 Strategy in the Missile AgePrinceton University Press: Princeton, N.J.

[Chapter 8, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," (pp. 264-304), isthe relevant portion. Brodie's approach to deterrenceis that it grows out of the nature of nuclear weapons.Deterrence of general nuclear war, and limitation oflesser wars, spring from the idea that total nuclearwar must be avoided at almost any cost, since thereis a very good chance that it would destroy the onlyvalues for which it would be worth fighting. (p. 269)Brodie feels deterrence also fits the fact that theUnited States is a status quo nation with culturaltaboos against hitting first. He says, however, thatwe need a first-strike capability to defend our alliesand because there will be some provocations that callfor it, short of direct attack on the United States; heacknowledges that such a capability will be hard toachieve. Brodie stresses invulnerability of the retal-iatory force and credibility of the deterrent threat.He stresses the fact that strength cannot be judgedby the weapons held before a strike, but only by thosethat can survive. He points out that an opponent could

I hit our retaliatory force and spare our cities, and thatwe must have a strategy to deal with this possibility.He stresses the bridge between deterrence and defense:"The strategy of deterrence ought always to envisagethe possibility of deterrence failing." (p. 292) BrodieIso sees value in stability, defined as a situation inwhich neither of the two opposing powers has the capa-bility of destroying the retaliatory forces of theother. He sees this condition a.; preferable for theUnited States to a situation in which the Soviet forcewas vulnerable and ours invulnerable, because in sucha case the Soviets would theoretically be tempted tofire a preventive or preemptive attack.]

50

1978 "The Development of Nuclear Strategy"International Security, 2:65-83

[Includes historical survey of deterrent thought since1964 and analysis of requirements for deterrence.Brodie opposes "limited nuclear options" as he seesthem. (He favors full incorporation of tactical nuclearweapons into US forces in Europe.) The paper includesa critique of Pipes's 1977 paper, with which Brodiedisagrees. He also disagrees with the strategic assess-ment of the Committee on the Present Danger.]

BRODY, Richard1960 "Deterrence Strategies: An Annotated Bibliography"

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4:443-57

[Excellent five-page introduction providing an analyticsummary of the various approaches to deterrence. Ex-cellent annotations for 38 works. Reading through thisbrief paper provides a quick and extremely useful over-view of the deterrence thought of the 1950s.]

BUNDY, McGeorge1978 "Maintaining Stable Deterrence"

International Security 3 (No. 3, winter 1978-79), 5-16.

[Bundy says that deterrence has worked, and that whatwe need to meet the threat of the Soviet build-up isforces so adjusted and supplemented as to continue toprovide credible deterrence. He cites and agrees withGeneral Maxwell Taylor's statement that 'whatever realmilitary meaning there is in 'essential equivalence'is subsumed under the concept of 'crediole and high-confidence deterrence'." He believes that for effec-tive deterrence the strategic nuclear forces do notneed to be larger than at present; that the strategictriad should be maintained; that our land-based missilesshould be made invulnerable (and that there is ampletime to do this safely); that there should be greatlyincreased emphasis on redundant and survivable command,control, communication, and intelligence; and that alaunch-on-warning policy would be a serious mistake.]

CARLIN, Robert J.1979 "Strategic Deterrence in the Age of Detente"

US Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1979

(A provocative article presenting a point of view whichhas some elements in common with Kissinger's at Brussels(September 1979). Carlin suggests that we should reeval-uate the concept of extending a nuclear umbrella over

51

Western Europe, and should communicate to our alliesthat avoiding a US-USSR war is our prime concern andthat we will come to their aid only if it seems to bein our best interests. He opposes flexible responseoptions because they make lower levels of US-USSRconflict possible and therefore, in his judgment, makestrategic nuclear war more likely.]

CHURCHILL, Winston1955 "Defense Through Deterrents"

Vital Speeches, 21:1091-94

[Significant as the first presentation of deterrenceto the world at large, for Churchill's clear exposi-tion of the basic concept, and as probably the firstmajor statement on deterrence following the develop-ment of the hydrogen bomb. See the body of thispaper for a discussion of Churchill's major points.]

COFFEY, Joseph I.1963 "Human Factor in Deterrence"

unpublished, c. 1963Bendix Corporation: Ann Arbor, Mich.

[This is a good early discussion of the nonrationalaspects of decision making, as these are related todeterrence. Coffey points out the difference invalues between opponents, the fallacy in deterrence'sassumptions that avoidance of nuclear war overridesother values for the opponent as it does for us, d-;f-ferences in perceptions and judgments, the very largenumber of variables in any real-life decision-makingprocess, difficulties in communicating intent, andcultural (in the broadest sense) differences that af-fect decision ..akilnq.]

1971 Deterrence in the 1970'sUniversity of Denver Monograph Series in World

Affairs, No. 3University of Denver: Denver, Col.

[Coffey outlines the shift in the strategic balance infavor of the Soviet Union and asks what effect thiswill have on deterrence. Finding that the United Statesand the Soviet Union have the power to destroy eachother and that nothing either can do will change thatsituation, he concludes that deterrence need not beseriously jeopardized by the strategic balance shift.He bel' 7es that it would be difficult for the SovietUnion tj exploit superior strategic power for politicalpurposes, that the mere prospect of a nuclear exchange"1may well suffice to induce caution," and that it thus

52

may be unnecessary for the United States to maintainmore powerful forces than the Soviet Union.]

COLLINS, John M.1976 "'Counterforce' and 'Countervalue' Differentiated"

Congressional Record 122 (No. 75): E2734-2735,May 20, 1976

[Collins's definition of counterforce includes alloffensive (or retaliatory) strategies and weaponsthat could degrade an enemy's military capabilities.He thus includes weapons and strategies aimed at "soft"military targets as well as those aimed at missilesin, or out, of hardened silos. His list of targets,however, makes it clear that he is not speaking oftroop concentrations and other targets related to con-ventional war, but only to enemy strategic capabili-ties, both offensive and defensive, and to the command,control, and communications centers that support them.

Collins lists four assumptions about counterforcecapability and argues that none is unqualifiedlysound: (1) only those counterforce targets relatedto hard targets are dangerously destabilizing; (2) theterms counterforce and first strike are synonymous;(3) first strike capabilities are intensely provoca-tive; (4) provocations inevitably encourage preventiveor preemptive wars. The discussion is useful and thearguments against these assumptions generally con-vincing, except in the case of the last point. Al-though provocations may not lead to preventive or

* preemptive wars, it would appear that by definitionthey encourage them.]

1979 "Principles of Deterrence"* Air University Review, 31:17-25

[Collins suggests principles of deterrence comparableto the traditional principles of war (cf. Reed 1975).His are preparedness, nonprovocation, prudence, pub-licity, credibility, uncertainty, flexibility, paradox(sometimes it is necessary actually to fight a war inone place in order to preserve deterrence elsewhere),independence, and change. These seem to be a mixedcollection of elements essential for deterrence (credi-bility, nonprovocation), guidelines for conduct of de-terrent strategy (flexibility, prudence, preparedness),and a descriptive comment (paradox). The article ishelpful in stimulating thought on deterrence, and thebibliographic footnotes are excellent. The author'sidiosyncratic style, replete with epigrams and alJ it-eration, is a serious distraction.]

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD1977 "The Neutron Bomb Arms Control Impact Statement"

August 3, 1977, H8498-H8502

[This document includes both the arms control impactstatement for the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) anda Library of Congress Congressional Research Serviceevaluation of it. The LCR evaluation discusses mattersnear the heart of deterrence, nuclear threshold, stra-tegic balance, military stability, and strategic equi-valency. It asks, for example, what the relationshipis between nuclear threshold and deterrence: does theERW's presumed enhancement of deterrence depend on alowering of the nuclear threshold?]

CONOVER, C. Johnson1977 US Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence

Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif.

[This is a summary of the literature on deterrence,1972-1977, plus some observations by the author.Conover presents a huge array of views by more than60 analysts, but the paper is difficult to followbecause it lacks emphasis. The author does providea useful section on uncertainty and stability, andraises worthy questions on the tradeoffs betweenthese two factors. A firm LNO (limited nuclear op-tions) advocate, he includes telling arguments againstfinite deterrence.]

DAVIS, Lynn Etheridge1975/76 Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New

American DoctrineAdelphi Paper 121International Institute for Strategic Studies: London

[This is a useful summary of LNO's. It has been cri-ticized by Colin Gray (1979) for giving a misleadingimpression of Schlesinger's approach, as embodied inNational Security Decision Memorandum 242, by overem-phasizing LNO's.]

DE WEERD, Harvey A.; William Jones; and Ralph E. Strauch1971 National Decision Systems and Limited Strategic Operations

RAND Report R-539-PRRAND: Santa Monica, Calif.[A discussion of the problems that may be expected inthe decision-making process in executing a policy oflimited strategic operations.]

54

DORNAN, James E.1979 "US Strategic Concepts, SALT and the Soviet Threat:

A Primer"Comparative Strategy, 1:201-22

[Excellent summary of US national attitudes on war,force, and deterrence. Provides good summary, withquotations,of "overkill" school of analysts.]

ENTHOVEN, Alain C.1963 "American Deterrent Policy"

Kissinger 1965:120-34

(A reprint of a speech made in 1963, this is an argu-ment in support of the ongoing build-up of conventionalforces as essential to the credibility of deterrence:"Threats to blow ourselves up along with the aggressorare not likely to be credible." (p. 126) Also containsa very clear, concise statement of the argument for theexistence and significance of the nuclear threshold,and for respecting it. (pp. 123-124)]

FAIN, Janice S.1975 "Ethics and Nuclear Warfare"

Unpublished paper. Available from author, CACI,Arlington, Virginia.

[Useful for its unusual perspective, that of a writerwith a US defense community orientation dealing at asophisticated level with issues of ethics as they re-late to nuclear deterrence policy. Includes good sum-mary of "just war" concepts and discussion of theirapplication to nuclear deterrence. Discussions ofvarious schools of thought on the ethical implicationsof nuclear war.]

FREY, Frederick W.1979 "The Adequacy of Our Conceptual Tools for Dealing with

a Proliferated World"International Political Effects of the Spread ofNuclear Weapons, John Kerry King, ed., pp. 198-225

Papers for a colloquium sponsored by the Central Intel-ligence Agency and Office of the Assistant Secretaryof Defense for International Security Affairs

GPO: Washington (Stock Number 041-015-00105-1)

[A survey of current methodology for the study of inter-national affairs. Frey concludes that the conceptualapparatus is rich and often insightful, but uneven andundisciplined. He comments on what he terms the super-ficial psychologizing of some strategic analysts, es-pecially in expressing the concept of "rationality" insuch phrases as "only a madman . "and "it would besuicidal to ..

55

WP

GAIL, Bridget (pseudonym)1979 "NATO, Kissinger and the Future of Strategic Deterrence"

Armed Forces Journal International, November 1979,pp. 58 ff.

[Forceful critique of Kissinger's September 1979 Brusselsspeech, with a discussion of extended deterrence for NATOand an analysis of the speech's implications for the al-liance and the future of deterrence. Includes extensivepassages from the speech and states that all quotationswere checked against a tape of the remarks as actuallydelivered.]I

GALLOIS, Pierre1961 The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age,

trans. Richard HowardHoughton Miff lin: Boston, Mass.

[Gallois makes the case for a French deterrence force,or rather, for any small or medium power having a de-terrence force. He suggests that the United Statescannot be expected indefinitely to mean that it willreally launch a nuclear attack in defense of its alliesif, with ICBMs in the Soviet Union, to launch such anattack would bring about its own destruction. Europeanpowers must have their own deterrents. Although it mayseem that a small country cannot deter the powerfulSoviet Union with a few weapons, it can do enough damageto outweigh the relatively small gain to the SovietUnion from seizing it. Gallois deals with the questionof the vital interest for which a democratic nationwould launch a nuclear attack, with the question of pub-lic opinion, and with the problem of the gap betweenofficial policy and public support in a democracy.Gallois feels population centers must be the targets,certainly for small nations that must seek the capa-bility to do as much damage as possible if they are toachieve deterrence.]

1979 "The Future of France's Force de Disuassion"Strategic Review, 7:34 ff.

[This paper does not deal with the deterrence concept,except by implication. Gallois sees France's force dedisuassion as of increased importance, now that theSoviet Union has accurate long-range nuclear weaponsfor use against Europe. He points out that weapons thatare "theater" for the United States are strategic forFrance. He suggests that an attack on NATO would benuclear from the beginning, given the accuracy and sur-prise capabilities of the new weapons.]

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GEORGE, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke1974 Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and

PracticeColumbia University Press: New York

[In this major, thoroughly researched work George andSmoke deal entirely with deterrence of crisis andlimited-war situations (i.e., statecraft deterrenceand marginally extended deterrence), which they acknow-ledge to be quite different from strategic deterrence.The book is based on 11 historical cases, 1948-1962,all of which are judged to repres .nt failures of deter-rence. The authors conclude that deterrence has beendepended upon too heavily in US foreign policy, andthey urge a policy of influence in which deterrence(threat) plays a lesser role. In addition to exten-sive unannotated chapter-by-chapter bibliographies,there is valuable annotated bibliography embedded inthe footnotes. The prenuclear historical section iswell done, the authors seeking episodes and effortsthat are truly comparable to nuclear-age deterrence.This is one of the few works on deterrence that in-cludes an informed discussion of the theory of games,apparently the only one cirtical of deterrence thatdoes so.]

GOURE, Leon1979 "The Civil Defense Factor in the Strategic Balance"

National Defense, September-October 1979, pp. 45 ff.,reprinted in US Air Force, Current News, Main Edi-tion, Part 2, October 22, 1979, pp. 9-F, 10-F.

[Concise but substantive description of Soviet civildefense program and analysis of its place in Sovietwar-waging capability and overall military strategy.Convincingly argues the credibility of US deterrence

* is undercut seriously by Soviet civil defense.]

GRAY, Colin S.1971 "What RAND Has Wrought"

Foreign Policy, No. 4, fall 1971, pp. 111-129

[Gray criticizes civilian strategic thinking of themid-1950's to mid-1960's for (1) being dominated byan "economic conflict" model; (2) being too optimisticabout transferring theory to policy; and (3) havingbeen stagnant since the middle 1960's because many ofthe leading thinkers went into government in the early1960's. His argument appears open to criticism on thegrounds that "economic conflict" is a misleading wayto describe the theory of games, and that if (1) and(2) are true, it seems surprising that (3) is given asa criticism. The article provides a very useful

57

historical survey of deterrence theory. Gray urgesrenewed attention to the "prenuclear classics ofstrategic thought,'' a revival that appears to be takingplace with the recent interest in Clausewitz.]

1977 "Defense: What the MX is all About"New York Times, October 19, 1977, Letter to the Editor

[In defending the MX, Gray gives as his first point "tomaintain or restore deterrence." He suggests that theUnited States is "almost certain to be the first super-power to need to launch strategic nuclear weapons (par-ticularly, if not exclusively, in response to somegalloping disaster in Europe)," and that it will wantto launch a 'very limited' first strike." (Italics inoriginal.)]

1979 "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory"International Security, 4:54-87

[An extremely useful article with rich bibliographicfootnotes. Gray's basic poi-"- is that the United Statesnow has no strategic doctrine and no agreed-on strategicforce posture. He urges adopting a theory of victory,i.e., goals that would constitute victory for the UnitedStates if it should be forced to fight a war, and con-structing a strategy designed to achieve such a victory.He points out that the overwhelming emphasis on deter-rence has led to a lack of seriousness about the conductof war, which in turn has weakened deterrence. Gray'sstrategic force posture would include targeting theSoviet regime's political control, including its mili-tary strengt 'h. (His views on targeting are similar tothose of Albert 1971.) The paper includes a clear sum-mary of the two current (late 1979) schools of thoughton nuclear deterrence: (1) the inheritors of MAD, whofavor deterrence through the capability of inflictingpunishment and who see security as based on the logicof technology--if both sides have invulnerable effectiveretaliatory forces, no one can win, no one can attack;and (2) thore who favor deterrence through the "expec-tation of a militarily effective prosecution of war,"because the Soviet Union is rejecting MAD and the tech-nological basis for MAD is being eroded (the US retali-atory force is becoming vulnerable). Gray says thelatter group is "edging toward" the idea that the util-ity of nuclear weapons in nonusL may actually be wrong,may have had a bad effect on Western security.]

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GUSTAVSON, Marvin R.1979 "A Dynamic View of Deterrence"

Comparative Strategy, 1:169-82Reprinted from US Air Force, Current News, SpecialEdition, August 2, 1979

[Gustavson urges that more attention be given to a dyna-mic, constantly changing configuration of weapons andforces for deterrence. A key element of the deterrencethus achieved would be the time required by an adversaryto reconsider and reconfigure his forces in the light ofa new and qualitatively different deployment by theUnited States. Gustavson also stresses the deterrentvalue of uncertainty, another result of dynamic deter-rence. He believes that, using this approach, deterrencecould be greatly enhanced by relatively small quantita-tive changes. As examples of the effectiveness of inno-vation, he cites the value of a primitive radar capabil-ity to the British in the Battle of Britain (not as adeterrent in this case, but operationally); the problemscreated for the Soviets by the introduction of the firstPolaris submarines (considerably greater problems thandoubling the number of boats would pose later); and theimpact on US planning of the first evidence of Sovietantisatellite interceptor capability. He stresses thegreater value of qualitative superiority in contrast tonumbers alone in public and leadership perception ofthe balance of forces. Gustavson does not favor qualityand innovation alone, stressing that long-term strengthis essential when the adversary has adapted to an inno-vation. He does feel, however, that it is unlikely thatthere can be a permanent, static mutual deterrence thatcan be established and then left alone.]

HAMMERMAN, Gay M.1965 "Summary of US Deterrent Strategy Theory"

Military, Political, and Psychological Implications ofMassive Population Casualties in History, September1965, Vol. 4

HERO Report for Combat Developments Command, Headquarters,US Army

(A concise statement of deterrence theory.)

1966 "Attitudes on War and Weapons"National Strategic Concepts and the Changing Nature of

Modern War, 2:113-31HERO Report prepared for the US Air Force office of

Scientific ResearchHERO: Washington, D.C.

arms and strategy matters.]

59

HOAG, Malcolm W.1961 "On Stability in Deterrent Races"

World Politics 13:505-27

[A valuable, relatively early theoretical work thatdistinguishes bewteen deterrence, defense, and victory,and contrasts the kind of arms each might be expectedto require.]

HOEBER, Amoretta M., and Francis P. Hoeber1975 "The Case Against the Case Against Counterforce"

Strategic Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (fall 1975)Reprinted in Congressional Record, 122 (No. 94):

E3446-3447

[Provides counterarguments to many of the points made inSherman 1975. The Hoebers reject the assumption thatgreater accuracy is inevitably provocative, assertingthat the United States will have no incentive to attackSoviet silos with a first strike, no matter how accurateits missiles, because of the great advantage the SovietUnion has in numbers and throw weights of missiles.

The Hoebers would define counterforce to refer to allmilitary targets, including supply depots and concen-trations of reserve forces.

HOEBER, Francis P.1978 "How Little is Enough?"

International Security, 3:53-73

[Hoeber favors a counterforce strategy, opposes finitedeterrence, especially the kind of minimum deterrencethat had recently been suggested by President Carter(as few as 200-250 strategic nuclear missiles). Heargues that lowering missiles below a certain levelwould be destabilizing, dangerous to US security,threatening to alliance cohesion, conducive to conven-tional war, and lead to excessively high expendituresfor conventional weapons buildup.]

HOFFMAN, Stanley1979 "New Variations on Old Themes"

International Security, 4:88-107

[Very useful summary of the continuing problems inherentin the NATO alliance, with full attention to problems ofdeterrence.]

HOHENEMSER, Kurt1974 "Declining Deterrence"

Environment, November 1974, Reprinted in US Air Force,Current News, December 1, 1974, pp. 5-F-8-F

[Writing from an arms-control point of view, the authorsuggests that as weapons systems (ICBMs, SLBMs) becomevulnerable to counterforce weapons they be phased out,leaving only a minimum invulnerable force as deterrent.He suggests that if the United States acquires a coun-terforce capability to match the USSR, it does not havean invulnerable deterrent, but rather a tempting target.He suggests that to acquire a counterforce capability

60

would be to start an arms race in vulnerable weapons andthus be dangerous. The argument is open to attack for(1) not indicating how the United States is to see thatthe weapons its missiles are becoming vulnerable to arephased out; (2) not indicating how the danger of havingno more, or fewer, missiles than future newly nuclearpowers would be met; (3) grouping mobility along withaccuracy and throw weight as characteristics that do notmake ICBM forces less vulnerable, whereas mobility doesin fact contribute greatly to invulnerability; (4) sug-gesting that counterforce-capable weapons are more vul-nerable than countervalue weapons, which seems logicqllyinsupportable; he may mean that they are more provoca--tive, since there is a great advantage to the attackerin striking first if he can disarm his adversary. Thearticle includes an excellent definition and explanationof throw weight.]

HOWARD, Michael1979 "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy"

Foreign Affairs, 57:975-86

[Howard sees strategy as having four dimension: opera-tional, social (both pointed out by Clausewitz), logis-tical, and technological. He points out the weaknessof current Western deterrent strategy in the operational(conduct of war) and social dimensions. He believes itis unclear that the West has the will to conduct opera-tional defense, or initiate nuclear war, or protect itspeople. He sees Soviet efforts to attain the capabilityto fight a nuclear war and to protect leaders and keyelements of the population as not necessarily indicatingaggressive intentions but as simple common-sense measureswhich the West should emulate. Not to do this is toweaken deterrence seriously.]

HUGHES, G. Philip1978 "Cutting the Gordian Knot: Theate:--Nuclear Force for

Deterrence in Europe"Orbis, 22:309-22

[Hughes lays bare a central dilemma with regard to thedefense of Europe. As matters stand, NATO must deter aSoviet nuclear attack while simultaneously using tacti-cal nuclear weapons itself to bolster its deficient con-ventional forces. He asks, if NATO's tactical nuclearweapons really deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons, donot Soviet tactical nuclear weapons deter NATO use ofsuch weapons to bolster conventional forces? Hughesbelieves that both NATO missions cannot be accomplished;one must be given priority. Since deterring a S Dvietnuclear attack is of paramount importance, the im-balance in conventional forces must be rectified byupgrading NATO's conventional capability. He also

61

believes theater nuclear forces must be upgraded ifthey are to be an effective deterrent, and he makessome specific suggestions. This is a provocative andvery lucid article.]

IKLE, Fred Charles1973 "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?"

Foreign Affairs, 51:267-85

[A significant article, this is probably the best ex-pression of the rejection of MAD and the advocacy ofselective and flexibile targeting that were emergingin the early 1970's. Ikl' suggests various historicalreasons for the views, accepted in the late 1960's,that nuclear forces should be designed almost exclu-sively for retaliation, that retaliation must be onemassive, swift strike, and that it must kill a size-able and specified proportion of the Soviet population,with the Soviets having the same ability to kill asizeable portion of the US population. He points outlogical inconsistencies in the approach, and the greatdifficulty in defending its morality. He urges aban-doning the idea that threatening the mass killing ofpeople is necessary; targeting military, industrial,and transportation assets; and abandoning the idea ofan instant launching of most of the retaliatory forcein favor of highly invulnerable forces available formuch later launching.]

1980 "NATO's 'First Nuclear Use': A Deepening Trap?"Strategic Review, 8:18-23

[Urges deterrence for Europe through development ofsecond-strike theater nuclear capability, able to re-spond to any level of Soviet attack, with ability todestroy military targets in the Soviet Union. Alsourges making more use of deterrent effect of upgradedconventional forces. Makes strong case that thethreat of "first use," meaning the threat to introducenuclear arms into a conventional battle, is now out-moded, no longer fits the strategic balance in Europe.Makes other good points, including suggestion that theUnited States needed strategic superiority to compen-sate for lack of martial discipline and singleminded-ness. (p. 21)]

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES1960 "Lexicon of Terms Relevant to National Security Studies

on Arms and Arms Control," and "Appendix to the Lexi-con of Terms" (appendix by James E. King, Jr.)

IDA:SS(P)-l, Annex 1Prepared for Seminar on Deterrence and Arms Control,

Washington, D.C., July 25-27, 1960, sponsored byInstitute for Defense Analyses

Institute for Defense Analyses: Washington, D.C.

(Useful definitions. Those in the appendix are especi-ally thoughtfully prepared. Many of them are littleessays on the concepts defined. The lexicon has theadditional historical value of pinning down how theseterms, including, for example, counterforce and deter-rence, were used in the literature and regarded by aninformed analyst in 1960.]

KAHAN, Jerome1975 Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing US Strategic

Arms Po1ilcyBrookings Institution: Washington

(Probably the most comprehensive presentation of deterrenceand related strategic matters since Kissinger 1960. Thefocus is on "stable deterrence." See also entry forSpeed 1979.]

KAHN, Herman1960 The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence

RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif.Revised and enlarged version of article in Stanford

Research Institute Journal, 4th quarter, 1959

[Much of Kahn's analysis seems written for 1980 as wellas 1960: mutual-homicide balance of terror is a shakything. For it to work, both sides, not just the West,have to accept it completely, and the Soviets apparentlydo not accept it. "Even if we have acquired the highest-quality Type 1 Deterrence [strategic nuclear deterrence]capability, we must still be able to fight and survivewars." (p. 40) To get into the position in which wewould be unwilling to start a war under any circum-stances "would be equivalent to disowning our allianceobligations by signing a non-aggression treaty with theSoviets--a non-aggression treaty with almost 200 millionAmerican hostages to guarantee performance." (p. 40)This paper includes a clear presentation of Kahn'sclassification of deterrence into three types, which isreferred to in the body of the present paper. Much ofthis paper, including the Type 1, 2, and 3 deterrenceclassification, was incorporated into Kahn 1961.]

1961 On Thermonuclear WarPr~inceton University Press: Princenton, N.J.

(in portion dealing with deterrence, Kahn here includesa critique of minimum and finite deterrence. His class-ification of deterrence into Types 1, 2, and 3, dependingon what it deters, is also included in this book.]

63

r

1965 On Escalation: Metaphors and ScenariosFrederick A. Praeger: New York

[This book deals only indirectly with deterrence, butthe appendix, "Relevant Concepts and Language for theDiscussion of Escalation," includes very useful dis-cussion of deterrence terminology. In analyzingdeterrence by effectiveness on a six-point scale fromminimum to "stark" (virtually absolute), Kahn interest-ingly uses number of population casualties as the mea-sure of extent of deterrence.]

KAUFMANN, William W.1956 "The Requirements of Deterrence"

Military Policy and National Security, ed. William E.Kaufmann

Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J.

[An important early essay. Kaufmann is responding tothe massive retaliation policy announced two yearsearlier. He attacks that approach for making a threatthat is not credible, stresses that credibility is es-sential to deterrence, and sees it as made up of cre-dibility of intentions, credibility of capability, andcredibility of cost (i.e., credibility that the aggres-sor's gain will not be worth the cost). He suggeststhat credibility of intentions is based in part on USand allied public opinion, and he stresses this point--Howard's (1979) "societal dimension." "There mustbe genuine evidence of popular support" for the announcedintentions of government leaders in a democracy, ordeterrence is not credible. (p. 20)

Kaufmann's definition of deterrence: "Essentially,deterrence means preventing certain types of contin-gencies from arising." (p. 17) He includes in deter-rence rewards given as well as punishments threatened.(p. 31) The deterrence concept, as he treats it, lacksconnotations of terror, and could be equated with dis-suasion. He implies that deterrence is achievingsecurity without resorting to violence. (p. 12)]

KISSINGER, Henry A.1960 The Necessity for Choice

Harper & Row: New York

[This landmark book is discussed at some length in thesection of the present papcr headed "The Growth of Theory."]

J1965 Problems of National Strategy (ed.)Frederick A. Praeger: New York

[A valuable collection of readings representing a vari-ety of points of view. Kissinger's brief introduction

64

to Part I, on strategic doctrine (pp. 9-16), is auseful interpretative summary of the history of USdoctrine, 1945-1965. For especially relevant indi-vidual papers included in the book, see entries inthis bibliography for Erithoven, Szilard, Waskow, andWohlstetter. I

LAMBETH, Benjamin S.1975 Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy'

RAND Paper Series, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif.

[This paper, by an analyst influential in the movementfor selective nuclear operations, examines Soviet atti-tudes and strategy that might limit US efforts to useselective targeting. Lambeth states that before 1967 theSoviets rejected any target restraint, saying that anynuclear war would inevitably be an all-out war. How-ever, he suggests that this may have been because theSoviets' nuclear force was then relatively small andlacked survivability, leading them to believe that theycould win a war only if they struck first with all theirforces. "Selective targeting" to the Soviets simplymeant establishing targeting priorities that would causeas much destruction as possible. By 1967 the Sovietstrategic forces had become sophisticated enough toaccomodate a more flexible policy, and Lambeth statesthat by 1975 the Soviets were at least admitting thepossibility of thresholds between theater and intercon-tinental war, and between nuclear and conventional warwithin a theater.]

LATTER, A.L.; E.A. Martinelli; and W.B. Wright1970 A New Strategic Deterrent Policy (U). Secret.

RAND Report RM-6321-PRRand Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif.

[T.his paper is part of the search for new ideas ondeterrence policy of the period c. 1970, in response tothe great recent Soviet buildup and the requests of thenew administration. The authors are dealing with de-terrence of a massive surprise attack; they assume ex-plicitly that, if such an attack can be deterred, otherattacks can also be deterred. They suggest that assureddestruction of 20-25% of the Soviet population and 50%of Soviet industrial capacity might not be a threatsufficient to deter Soviet attack, since Soviet leadersmight feel that winning a war (in their terms) andruling the world were gains sufficient to compensatefor this loss. The Soviets might feel they could ac-complish this by massive attacks on US forces and popu-lation centers, plus a few Western European cities,while keeping additional strategic forces in reserve.

65

In seeking ways to deter this possible threat, theauthors consider and reject any attempt to increaseSoviet casualties as too costly in view of diminishingreturns. They suggest (1) retaining a reserve withlong survivability--deeply buried and at sea on Posei-dons; (2) retaining a survivable force dedicated to thedefense of Europe; and (3) keeping the assured destruc-tion policy and capability.]

LEE., William T.1978 Summary of Soviet Concept of Deterrence and Force

DevelopmentUnpublished revised draftFiles of Defense Nuclear Agency

[Good, concise summary of Soviet view of deterrence andbalance (correlation of forces), and of Soviet procure-ment and deployment policy. Lee says Soviet literaturepresents a "one-dimensional view of deterrence: theUSSR and its allies must deter the US/NATO coalitionfrom a nuclear attack. Hence any change in the generaland military balance of forces in favor of the USSR/PACT strengthens deterrence while any change in favorof US/NATO increases the risk of war." (p. 1) He statesthat the Soviets regard nuclear war as too destructiveand risky to be initiatied, but that they intend to beready to fight and win a war, if deterrence fails. (p. 2)]

LEVINE, Robert A.1963 The Arms Debate

Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.

[An extremely useful book 15 years after its publication,despite the fact that it deals with specific writers andissues of the early 1960's. Levine groups writers on de-fense matters in a horseshoe-shaped array, from antiwarsystemist to anti-Communist systemist. The two kinds ofsystemists are close to each other in their absolutism,although diametrically opposed in what they feel is mostimportant in defense policy. Between them are rangedthe antiwar marginalists, the middle marginalists, andthe anti-Communist marginalists, who have in common thefact that their recommendaticns tend to be based on com-promise, gradualism, and recognition of the values ofseveral different courses of action. This taxonomy pro-vides a valuable tool for anyone investigating the liter-ature of deterrence, helping to reveal the unspokenassumptions and personal, nonexplicit agendas that colorostensibly objective analysis. Levine's own analysis isas clear, logical, and objective as any could be. (Heidentifies himself as a middle marginalist, somewhattoward the antiwar marginalist side of the category.)]

66

LOWE, George E.1964 The Age of Deterrence

Little, Brown: Boston, Toronto

[A history of deterrence theory from 1952 to 1963.Lowe divides theorists and policymakers into two groups,which he calls Utopians and Traditionalists. Thesecategories are not defined precisely, and the taxonomyappears too gross to be very useful: For example, theTraditionalist category includes such widely diversethinkers as Dean Acheson, Paul Nitze, J. Robert Oppen-heimer, Robert E. Osgood, and Raymond Aron. In general,Utopians view nuclear weapons as simply weapons, to beused like any others; place great faith in technologyand constantly seek a technological breakthrough thatwill solve US military problems; and are supported byAir Force general officers. Army and Navy officers,on the other hand, tend to be Traditionalists, favoringdiplomatic pressure and conventional forces to solve USdefense problems. (The book's stress on service rival-ries and their very high correlation with policy issuesreflects the period when it was written.) Lowe seesfinite deterrence as the only real deterrence, andstrongly criticizes counterforce strategies as war-winningstrategies that imply a preemptive first strike andstimulate arms racing. (pp. 242-50) The book does makea number of sound and provocative points and is especi-ally useful for its relatively detailed account ofpolicy changes and its many quotations from speeches,press conferences, and interviews.]

MccGWIRE, Michael1979 "Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy"

International Security, spring 1979, pp. 134 ff. Re-printed in US Air Force, Current News, Special Edi-tion, no. 453, August 15, 1979

[Includes brief, very useful discussion of Soviet viewof deterrence (pp. 4-5 of reprint), and provocative,closely reasoned analysis of genesis of contemporarySoviet military doctrine, which MccGwire sees as a re-sponse to the 1961 nuclear initiatives of the Kennedyadministration (sharp increase in Polaris and ICBMproduction) and the early "crusading rhetoric" of thatadministration (pp. 7-9 of reprint).]

67

METCALF, A.G.B.1978 "The JCS Reports"

Strategic Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, winter 1978, editorialReprinted in Current News, Weekend Edition, March 19,

1978

[An attack on deterrence, with deterrence understoodas reliance on capability for assured destruction, incontrast to acquisition of forces and weapons, plustraining and contingency plans, for fighting a war.]

MORGAN, Patrick M.1977 Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis

Vol. 40, Sage Library of Social ResearchSage Publication: Beverly Hills, Calif.

[The author, who has also written on "participatorydemocracy" and the "military-industrial complex,"appears to be using the concept of deterrence, whichhe sharply criticizes, to attack the US defense es-tablishment and the very existence of military power.His analysis of the deterrence concept is weak and in-consistent. For example, he gives illustrative examplesthat are not deterrence in the usual sense but ratherthe conditioning of behavior by means of punishment.(p. 17) Morgan favors working toward "dismantling agood part of nations' deterrence machinery whilestressing other kinds of international relationships."(pp. 214-15; emphasis added) He does not suggest howwe are to dismantle the deterrence machinery of anynations but our own.]

MORGENTHAU, Hans J.1979 "The Mutual Ability of Utter Destruction"

Baltimore Sun, August 9, 1979, p. 17[Morgenthau appears to take an anti-"overkill" positionalthough he does not use the term. He holds that wi.Ianuclear arms, unlike the case with conventional arms,more weapons do not mean more strength. He suggeststhat it does not matter if the Soviet Union has moreweapons and more accurate weapons, so long as we haveenough to "destroy" them.]

NAROLL, Raoul; Vern L. Bullough; and Frada Naroll1974 Military Deterrence in History: A Pilot Cross-

Historical SurveyState University of New York Press: Albany, N.Y.[The authors are cultural anthropologists primarily in-terested in adapting the anthropological technique ofthe cross-cultural survey to historical studies. Onthe basis of their 20 randomly selected decades takenfrom a long span of human history, they find no statis-tical correlation between deterrence as they understandit--i.e., large and highly regarded armaments held by a

68

powerful country in a defensive stance--and peace.This ambitious work is seriously damaged by the authors'failure to explore and define the concept of deterrencewith any care at the outset. They do not cite the stan-dard works by Brodie, Kissinger, Kahn, Wohlstetter, andothers that deal with the deterrence concept in the realcontemporary world. The works cited are in general ab-stract and theoretical, or minor and irrelevant. Also,since most of the bibliography cited is from the 1950's(a single minor 1962 work is the latest), the bulk ofthe literature on the subject has been missed. Thestudy itself is open to many criticisms, includingthese: The states chosen for examination were selectedbecause they were "most conspicuously involved in con-flicts with other states" (pp. 330-31), so it is notsurprising that the authors found that war was not pre-vented. Traits, such as quality of military forces,were all coded either present, absent, or no data,whereas in reality these characteristics have to beseen and coded on a continuum. The authors make fewclaims for the significance of their findings on deter-rence (p. 359), and in this they are wise.]

NITZE, Paul H.1976 "Deterring Our Deterrent"

Foreign Policy, No. 25 (winter 1976-77), pp. 195-210

[Nitze discusses various ways of assessing the relativestrategic nuclear capabilities of the United States andUSSR, and states that the best way is to compare whatforces would remain after an exchange in which the USSRattacked the United States and the United States retal-iated by reducing Soviet reserve forces to the greatestuseful extent. He says that by this, as well as byother, simpler measures, the USSR is steadily gainingan advantage over the United States. Having reachedthe conclusion that the Soviets are acquiring the capa-bility to fight a nuclear war, Nitze makes a stron tcase for speedily and greatly increasing the US survi-vable counterforce capability.]

1979 "Preserving the ICBM Leg of the Triad"National Defense, July/August 1979, p. 30

[Nitze offers a strong argument for mobile ICBM's(MVPS). In a virtual paraphase of Wohlstetter 1959,he stresses the necessity of survivability and listsits requirements: "Surviving forces must be appro-priate for their mission, responsive to command andcontrol, able to penetrate defenses. . ., and capableof destroying targets that must be eliminated."]

69

i

ORBIS1974 "Focus on Military Balance, US Strategic Forces, and

the New Targeting Doctrine"Orbis, 18:655-769

[An issue focused on this topic, with eight articlestreating various aspects. Excellent source for deter-rence theory of the early 1970's. The paper by WilliamR. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett on "Strategic Adap-tability" is especially useful.]

PIPES, Richard E.1977 "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a

Nuclear War"

Commentary, 64:21-34

[Important article that introduced to a wider informedaudience, outside the defense community, the evidence

that the Soviet Union has a policy of achieving thecapability of fighting nuclear war, has a strategy forsuch a war, and has increasing capabilities for it.]

POIRIER, Lucien1972 "Deterrence and the Medium-Sized Powers"

Military Review, November 1972, pp. 22-34

[Lucid, provocative exposition of the French view, withuseful comments on deterrence in general.]

QUESTER, George H.1966 Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of

Modern Strat, jyJohn Wiley and Sons: New York

[Inevitably more useful from its inception than Narollet al. 1974, also a treatment of prenuclear deterrence,because it takes a clinical approach (studying onerelevant case in depth) rather than a statisticalapproach, and the former is much better suited to thesubject. Quester takes the case of aerial bombard-ment, regarded by interwar governments as having thedestructiveness that nuclear weapons have provided inreality. He analyzes the "bomber threat," 1899-1945,and discovers factors applicable to understandingnuclear deterrence. The book's conclusions are rathervague.]

70

IMW W1978 "Can Europe Really be Defended?"

Encounter, 51:6-19

[Thorough, well-argued paper on advantages of precisionguided missiles and urbanization of the North GermanPlain for the defense of NATO. Very little that is re-levant for the concept of deterrence, but does touchupon the relationship of defense and deterrence: "Isit 'deterrence' when wars are avoided simply becausethe attacker would lose many more troops and vehiclesthan the defender? Whatever it is, 'deterrence' orjust 'defence,' it tends to produce peace, which iswhat we want."]

REED, Robert H.1975 "On Deterrence: A Broadened Perspective"

Air University Review, May/June 1975Reprinted in US Air Force, Current News, Special Edi-

tion, May 29, 1975, pp. 1-10

[in context of Soviet-US "essential equivalence,"author essays formulating principles of deterrencecomparable to the traditional principles of war. Hisprinciples are credibility of means, credibility ofwill, clarity of intent, controlability, flexibility,negotiation, unity of effort, economy of effort, andinterdependency. This seems to be a mixed group,including some principles, notably the first two,that are absolutely essential to achieving deterrence,and other, like negotiation and economy of effort thatare, rather, only very helpful in successfully conduct-ing a policy of deterrence. Interdependency (of allies)would seem to be a factor that should be recognized,but not placed in the same category as credibility.It is hard to justify the absence of survivability ofthe retaliatory force, surely an essential principle ofdeterrence in the nuclear age.]

ROWEN, Henry S.; and A.M. Hoeber1974 Strategic Forces and Changing World Political Trends (U).

Confidential.General Research Corporation Report, DRC 74-31025, July 1974Prepared for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;

supervised by Defense Nuclear Agency[Stresses importance of "dual criterion" in targeting----considering both expected damage to intended targetsand expected damage to nontargets, i.e., people and f a-cilities the United States might wish to preserve.Includes analysis of various target arrays according tothe dual criterion, taking into account the accuracy ofthe newer weapons. Among the conclusions: there is aneed to rethink the assumption that any attack on targetsin the Soviet Union implies general nuclear war or evennuclear war; the formerly sharp distinction betweentheater and strategic forces is now less clear; attackson economic targets are increasingly feasible, and it isincreasingly feasible to distinguish between attacks oncivilian populations and attacks on war-supporting in-dustry. Good background for forming judgments on deter-rence theory in the 1970's and 1980's.]

71

SCHELLING, Thomas C.1960 The Strategy of Conflict

Oxford University Press: New York

[Chapters 1 and 2 are a clear explication of the theoryof games as it applies to international conflict.Schelling makes it clear that the assumption of "rationalbehavior" in the theory is one made for analytical pur-poses, because it provides a tool for analyzing conflict,not because anyone believes that people or nations neces-sarily behave that way. It can produce results, but theyhave to be looked at in the light of reality, not acceptedblindly. Assuming rationality and then proceeding tocertain decisions does not mean saying that "only amadman" or " no rational person" could do otherwise.But when Schelling writes about what "we have learned"and "we have recognized" in the 12 years since deter-rence became announced policy, 12 years in which thetheory had been refined and improved, he lists somethings that were learned only through the logicalextension of the theory, not through real-world events,notably, "We have learned that the threat of massivedestruction may deter an enemy only if there is a corres-ponding implicit promise of nondestruction in the eventhe complies, so that we must consider whether too greata capacity to strike him by surprise may induce him tostrike first to avoid being disarmed by a first strikefrom us." (pp. 6-7)]

1966 Arms and InfluenceYale University Press: New Haven, Conn.[Treats certain refinements of the deterrence concept:the matter of communicating commitment (that the stakeis really so high for the deterrer that he would useforce to fend off losing it); the matter of thresholds,including the nuclear threshold; the whole matter ofusing force indirectly, as a threat, rather than direct-ly, as force. Lucid, well-presented arguments; terse,but with an ample number of examples to make the pointsclear.]

SCHLESINGER, James R.1968 Rationale for NU-OPTS (U). Confidential.

RAND Corporation Report R-1608-PRPrepared for US Air Force Project RAND, December 1968;

Reissued September 1974

[Th2 autflor'9 summary describes the report as "apreliminary exploration of the strategic and politicalrationale for sub-SIOP options." Begins with the prob-lem of the Soviet Union having acquired a secure secondstrike force, so that a US first strike is no longer afeasible option, and the implications of this situationfor US obligations to allies: if Europe is attacked,we must "do something," and yet "the inherited beliefthat we should implement the SlOP is not very attrac-tive." (pp. 2-3) Schlesinger stresses the need for

72

"exploitable asymmetry below the level of all-out spasmwar" (i.e., a US advantage in force strength or invul-nerability), if sub-SIOP operations are to be effective.Otherwise, our ability to fulfill our commitments toNATO will rest on "a war of nerves."]

SCHWARTZ, Urs1966 American Strategy: A New Perspective

Doubleday & Co., Inc.: Garden City, N.Y.

[Good general introduction to US deterrent strategyand other strategic concepts. The Swiss author achievessome objectivity and balance from his European perspec-tive. Includes useful summaries of the contributions ofKaufmann, Kissinger, Brodie, Levine, and others.]

SCOVILLE, Herbert, and Robert Osborn1970 Missile Madness

Houghton Mifflin: Boston, Mass.

[This is a primer on strategic weapons, deterrence, andarms control, from a moderate arms control point ofview (antiwar marginalist, in Levine's taxonomy).The format and cartoon-type illustrations make thisbook look frivolous, but it is serious and solidenough to be a journal article.]

SEYBOLD, Calvin C. (Maj., USAR)1979 "Mutual Destruction: A Deterrent to Nuclear War?"

Military Review, September 1979, pp. 22 ff.Reprinted in US Air Force Review, Current News, Main

Edition, Part II, September 20, 197-9

[The author's thesis is that Western, and specificallyUS, economic strength, rather than the threat of assureddestruction, has deterred the Soviet Union from initia-ting war. His argument is constructed in rigid syllogismstyle, using statements selected from a relatively smallnumber of sources. The paper is of interest not onlyfor its thesis but as an example of a number of recentpapers flatly declaring the bankruptcy of mutual assureddestruction as a strategy.]

SHERMAN, George1974 "A New Nuclear Scripture"

Washington Star-News, April 15, 1974

[Concise, clearly presented historical background forand exposition of the "Schlesinger doctrine," NSDM242, and changes at that time in targeting doctrineand research on new weapons systems. Recommended by

* t Lambeth (1974) as an especially good presentation ofthis material.]

73

SHERMAN, Robert1975 "The Case Against Counterforce"

Strategic Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (spring 1975)Reprinted in Congressional Record, June 2, 1976, pp.E3063-3066

(This article does not present a simplistic finitedeterrence position, but rather makes a closely argued,sophisticated case against counterforce strategies andcapabilities, using considerable specific data. How-ever, much of the data on Soviet capabilities is nowoutdated, and current, greatly increased Soviet capa-bilities weaken the argument.]

SNOW, Donald M.1979 "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking: An Overview and

Review"International Studies Quarterly, 23:445-86

[A survey of recent discussion of deterrence strategyand of force structuring for deterrence. Includes acritique of MAD, an account of the Soviet militarybuildup, and a discussion of the adequacy of US stra-tegic forces and strategy. The author concludes thatMAD is basically sound, and that limited nuclear op-tions may be dangerously destablizing.I

SNYDER, Glenn H.1961 Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National

S', curityPrinceton University Press: Princeton, N.J.

[Snyder begins by distinguishing between deterrenceand defense: deterrence means discouraging the enemyfrom taking action; defense means reducing our costsand risks if deterrence fails. Deterrence, he says,does not vary directly with capacity to fight wars;certain forces could deter well but not defend well,while others might be good at limiting damage anddenying territory (defense) but not very good atdeterring. We have to measure our forces on both thedeterrence and the defense yardsticks and gauge theiraggregate worth, so that we can make intelligentchoices about new systems. He concludes that an op-timum mix of deterrence and defense is needed. Snyder'sanalysis becomes very complicated and academic at times.He does not bridge the gap between deterrence anddefense in the sense of showing ways in which the capa-bility to defend could support deterrence. His sugges-tions for estimating aggregate worth on the two yard-sticks sound as though they could lead to the worstkind of cost/effectiveness analysis, in which weaponssystems that are very good for a single task are re-jected in favor of those that are not very good for anyof several tasks.]

SNYDER, Jack L.1977 "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited

Nuclear Operations"Project AIR FORCE Report (RAND)RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif.

[A very useful exploration of Soviet attitudes and thereasons for them, centering on a Soviet "strategicculture" formed by historical, geopolitical, and psy-chological factors. In the Soviet view, Snyder says,deterrence is based on the ability to defeat the enemyand therefore to discourage his attack. He suggeststhat the question to ask is not "Will the Soviets useflexible options?" but rather "Are the Soviets mentallyprepared to think about flexible options?"

SPEED, Roger D.1979 Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s

Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, California[A concise, lucid, balanced treatment of deterrence.Includes a very useful overview of deterrence historyand theory. Comparable to Kahan 1975 in breadth andclarity, but more nearly up-to-date and giving moreattention to counterforce options and the importanceof survivability.]

STETNBRUNER, John1976 "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New

Conceptions"World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2, January 1976Reprinted in US Air Force, Current News, March 4, 1976,

No. 84

[Steinbruner criticizes the "rational" (basically, theoryof games) approach to analyzing decision making and advo-cates his own approach, the "cybernetic feedback theoryof decision." Steinbruner's approach may more accuratelyrepresent what happens psychologically in decision making,but his applications of it do not appear to be more rele-vant to the real world of strategic policy formation thanthe approach he criticizes. There is no recognition, atleast in this paper, of differences in US and Sovietassumptions, decision makers, and decision-making processes.Steinbruner recommends no more deployment of offensiveweapons; an emphasis on research and development, andspecifically R&D not immediately related to actual weap-ons; and withholding deployment of new weapons "in theabsence of gross strategic imbalances." AlthoughSteinbruner's analysis is, in the current author's view,skewed by unspoken assumptions (he appears to be anantiwar marginalist far to the antiwar side, in Levine'sspectrum), this is a serious and substantial paper withsome provocative and significant points.]

75

SZILARD, Leo1964 "'Minimal Deterrent' vs. 'Saturation Parity'"

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1964Kissinger 1965:376-91

[Szilard, a scientist and arms control advocate, urgesminimal deterrence, i.e., nuclear strategic arms reduc-tion to the point at which each superpower retains onlyforces sufficient to kill 25 million inhabitants of theother country.]

WASKOW, Arthur1962 "The Theory and Practice of Deterrence"

Kissinger 1965:59-84[Levine (1963) classifies Waskow as an antiwar marginal-ist, but on the basis of this paper he appears to be anantiwar systemist. He believes that the only true deter-rence must follow the model of deterrence of criminalactivity by government's threat of punishment, and thatsince such deterrence on an international scale requiresinternational government and national disarmament, de---terrence is currently unobtainable. The "practical

WATTENBERG, Ben J.1979 "It's Time to Stop America's Retreat"

New York Times Magazine, July 22, 1979, p. 14

[Well-argued, basically hortatory article, urgingstronger US posture and policies. "The old chestnutof 'peace through strength' never made better sense."]

WOHLSTETTER, Albert1958 "The Delicate Balance of Terror"

Kissinger 1965:34-58

[This influential paper forcefully makes the case fordeterrence as a complex matter requiring more than asizable force of nuclear weapons and delivery missiles.Wohlstetter's points are summarized and discussed inthe body of the present paper.]

ZEIBERG, Seymour L.1979 "Strategic Systems Outlook"

National Defense, July/August 1979, pp. 26 ffReprinted in US Air Force, Current News, Main Edition,

Part II, August 15, 1979

[The author, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense forResearch and Engineering (Strategic and Space Systems),gives an overview of 1979 strategic posture. He touchesbriefly on deterrence, stability, and strategic balance.]

j 76

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ATTN: T. JonesU.S. Army Comd & General Staff College

DOD Salt Task Force ATTN: Combined Arms Rsch LibraryATTN: Dir Nuclear Policy U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency

Field Command ATTN: CSSA-ADLDefense Nuclear Agency2 cy ATTN: FCPR, J. McDaniel

77

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (Continued)

U.S. Army FA Msl Sys Eval Gp Office of the Chief of Naval OperationsATTN: ATZR-MG ATTN: OP-OOKATTN: K. McDonaldATTN: ATSF-CD Surface Warfare Officers School Cmd

Department of the NavyU.S. Army Forces Command ATTN: Combat Systems Dept

ATTN: LTC StrummATTN: AF-OPTS Naval Ocean Systems Ctr

ATTN: Code 4471

U.S. Army Foreign Science & Tech CtrATTN: DRXST-SD-1 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

U.S. Army Infantry School Assistant Chief of StaffATTN: ATSH-CTD Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

U.S. Army Intel Threat Analysis Detachment ATTN: INAATTN: IAX-ADT ATTN: INOT

ATTN: INEU.S. Army Intelligence Ctr & School

ATTN: ATSI-CD-CS Assistant Chief of StaffStudies & Analyses

U.S. Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency Department of the Air ForceATTN: Library 4 cy ATTN: AF/SAMI

U.S. Army TRADOC Sys Analysis Actvy Deputy Chief of Staff

ATTN: ATAA-TAC Operations Plans and ReadinessDepartment of the Air Force

U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Comd ATTN: AFXOOTRATTN: ATCD-N ATTN: AFXOXFMATTN: ATOO-NCO

Strategic Air CommandU.S. Army War College Department of the Air Force

ATTN: Library ATTN: XPATTN: DO

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ATTN: XPFS, Maj GermeraadATTN: XOXO

Marine Corps ATTN: STIC (544SIW)Department of the Navy ATTN: NR

ATTN: DCS (P&O) Strategic Plans DivCommander-in-Chief

Marine Corps Dev & Education Command U.S. Readiness CommandDepartment of the Navy ATTN: J-3

ATTN: Commander OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Naval Intelligence CommandATTN: NIC-O Central Intelligence Agency

3 cy ATTN: OSWR/NEDNaval Material Command

ATTN: PM-23 Federal Emergncy Management AgencyATTN: MAT-O0 ATTN: Assistant Associated Dir

ATTN: MAT-046ATTN: MAT 08T-22 Office of International Security Policy

ATTN: PM/ISPNaval Postgraduate School

4 ATTN: Code 1424, Library U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament AgcyATTN: A. Lieberman

Naval Submarine SchoolATTN: Commanding Officer DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS

rnaval War College Lawrence Livermore National LabATTN: Code E-11, Tech Svcs ATTN: L-9, R. Barker

ATTN: L-21, M. GustavsonOffice of Naval Rsch

ATTN: Code 200 Los Alamos National LabATTN: Dir

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations4 cy ATTN: NOP g51

78

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Sandia National Labs Pacific-Sierra Rsch CorpLivermore Lab ATTN: D. Gormley

ATTN: DirR & D Associates

Sandia National Lab ATTN: P. HaasATTN: Dir 2 cy ATTN: A. Field

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS R & D AssociatesATTN: Director

Analytical Assessments CorpATTN: A. Wagner Rand Corp

ATTN: LibraryBDM Corp2 cy ATTN: J. Braddock University of Rochester

ATTN: NAVWAGBoeing Co

ATTN: J. Russel Santa Fe CorpATTN: D. Choate ATTN: D. Paolucci

Hudson Institute, Inc Science Applications, IncATTN: H. Kahn 2 cy ATTN: J. MartinATTN: C. Gray

Science Applications, IncInstitute for Defense Agalyses ATTN: J. Goldstein

ATTN: M. ScherT. N. Dupuy Associates, Inc

Kaman Tempo ATTN: T. DupuyATTN: DASIAC 4 cy ATTN: G. Hammerman

Pacific-Sierra Rsch CorpATTN: H. Brode

79

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FILME