MIGRATIONPOLICY PRACTICEISSN 2223-5248

Joint Managing Editors:• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• FrankLaczko(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• KarolinePopp(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Coordinator:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Assistants:• MyleneBuensuceso(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)• AnnaLynConstantino(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Committee:

• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopmentCentre,Lagos,Nigeria)

• RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)

• JuanCarlosCalleros(StaffOfficeofthePresidentofMexico)

• DavidCostello(Commissioner,OfficeoftheRefugeeApplications,fromtheGovernmentofIreland)

• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)

• NeliEsipova(GallupWorldPoll,NewYork)

• AraceliAzuaraFerreiro(OrganizationofAmericanStates–OAS,Washington,D.C.)

• PhilippeFargues(MigrationPolicyCentre–MPC,Florence)

• LukasGehrke(InternationalCentreforMigrationPolicyDevelopment–ICMPD,Vienna)

• ShahidulHaque(MinistryofForeignAffairs,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofBangladesh)

• MichelleLeighton(InternationalLabourOffice–ILO,Geneva)

• PietroMona(SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation,FederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Berne)

• WilliamMcClure(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,Washington,D.C.)

• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopmentInitiative,Brussels)

• HilmarSchneider(InstitutefortheStudyofLabor–IZA,Bonn)

• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,NewDelhi)

• MariaStavropoulou(GreekAsylumService)

• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg)

• MaiaWelbourne(CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

A Bimonthly Journal for and by Policymakers Worldwide

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MigrantsattheGreekislandofLesbos.©IOM2016

IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Integration at the Crossroads of Employment: Report of the IQ Symposium “Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany and Europe” Fabian Junge and Liam Patuzzi

Migration and integration from a holistic perspective: Experiences from PortugalPedro Calado

Policies for labour market integration of refugees in SwedenBernd Parusel

Migrants and migration policies for innovation in EuropeAlessandra Venturini

International migration seen through the lens of Amartya Sen’s capability approachSabrina Juran

The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than everJulia Black, Ann Singleton and Arezo Malakooti

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Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE2IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

WelcometothenewissueofMigration Policy Practice,whichfocusesprimarilyonissuesoflabourmarketintegrationofmigrantsin

Europe.Inparticular,thisspecialissuesummarizesaselection of presentations from the recentNetwork“IntegrationthroughQualification(IQ)”symposiumonlabourmarketintegrationofimmigrantsinGermanyandEuropethatwasheldinBerlinon6April2016.

The first article, by Fabian Junge and Liam Patuzzi(AgencyfortheDevelopmentofProfessionalEducation(Entwicklungsgesellschaft für berufliche Bildung)),outlines themainconclusionsof the IQsymposium.ThisincludesacalltoalldecisionmakersinEuropetoincludelong-termintegrationchallengesintorelevantpolicies and to approachmigrant integration issuesthrough their labourmarketdimensions.Ultimately,however, one of the symposium’s conclusions isthat integration programmes require commitment,patienceandresilienceoveralongperiodoftime.

The second article, by Pedro Calado (HighCommissioner for Migration of Portugal), discussesPortugal’svisionandpoliciesonmigrantintegration.Asfrom2007,PortugalhasbeenadoptingtheActionPlansforImmigrantIntegration,whichdefinetherolesand particular measures of each relevant ministry.Portugal’s policies are also based on the StrategicPlanforMigration,whichoutlinessome106practicalmeasuresonmigrantintegration.

Thethirdarticle,byBerndParusel(SwedishMigrationAgency),discussesSweden’spoliciesonlabourmarketintegration of refugees, which are often regardedas progressive and ambitious. Sweden’s integrationpolicy aims to ensure equal rights, obligations andopportunities for all, irrespective of ethnic and

1 Solon Ardittis isManaging Director of Eurasylum Ltd. FrankLaczko isHeadoftheGlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre(GMDAC) at the International Organization for Migration(IOM) in Berlin. They are the co-editors of Migration Policy Practice.

culturalbackground,andeverystepofthereceptionprocess for newly arrived immigrants is focused onthemfindingajob.

Thefourtharticle,byAlessandraVenturini(Universityof Turin and Migration Policy Centre, EuropeanUniversity Institute), discusses migrants’ roles ininnovationpoliciesinEurope.Thearticlestresses,inparticular,thatanypolicythatfavourstheadmissionof highly skilled workers, particularly through theEuropean Union’s Blue Card scheme, should bepursuedandencouraged.

In addition to the above presentations from the IQsymposium, this issue of Migration Policy Practice includes:anarticlebySabrinaJuran(PopulationandDevelopmentBranchoftheUnitedNationsPopulationFund)oninternationalmigrationseenthroughthelensofAmartyaSen’scapabilityapproach;andanarticleby Julia Black, Ann Singleton and Arezo Malakooti(IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre) whichdiscussesIOM’slatestfindingsonmigrantdeathsontheCentralMediterraneanroute.

We wish to thank all the contributors to this issueof Migration Policy Practice, and in particularFabian Junge and Liam Patuzzi, for inviting selectedparticipants from the IQ symposium to preparearticles for this journal. The editors would also liketoencouragereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinasurvey,whichaimstohelpusidentifyour readers’profiles, the institutions they representandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Shouldyouwishtoparticipateinthissurvey,pleaseclick here.n

Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 3

ThroughoutEurope,thesharpincreaseinrefugeeimmigration since mid-2015 has sparkedprofoundchallenges,cuttingacrosspolicyareas

andlevelsofgovernment.Whilethemajorreceivingcountries have been struggling to organize humaneand orderly reception, the relationship betweengovernmentshasoftenbeenpolemicandcontentiousoverissuessuchasbordermanagementandasylumquotas.

Inanattempttocounteracttheseheatedtones,thesymposium“LabourMarketIntegrationofImmigrantsin Germany and Europe”, held on 6 April in Berlin,intended to enable a constructive European debateon the longer-term challenge of integration. TheeventwashostedbytheGermanFederalMinistryofLabourandSocialAffairsandtheNetwork“Integrationthrough Qualification (IQ)”, in cooperation withMetropolis.About150participantsfromgovernment,administration, civil society and academia attendedtheevent,mostlyfromGermany,aswellasfromotherEuropean and non-European countries. Speakersincluded Thorben Albrecht, State Secretary at theGermanFederalMinistryofLabourandSocialAffairs;Howard Duncan, Executive Head of Metropolis;Naika Foroutan, professor at the Berlin Institute forIntegration andMigrationResearch (BIM); ElizabethCollett,directoroftheMigrationPolicyInstitute(MPI)Europe;andThomasLiebig,SeniorMigrationExpertat the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment(OECD).2

Theaimofthesymposiumwastoseizetheopportunityoffered by the current political momentum aroundmigration and asylum in order to examine thebroader state of integration policy in Germany andEurope.Althoughrefugeeswereinthespotlight,thelabourmarketsituationofimmigrantsingeneralwas

2 Theprogrammeandthefulllistofspeakersareavailableat:www.netzwerk-iq.de/symposium-en.html

Integration at the Crossroads of Employment: Report of the IQ Symposium “Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany and Europe” Fabian Junge and Liam Patuzzi1

1 Liam Patuzzi and Fabian Junge are project officers at theAgency for the Development of Professional Education(EntwicklungsgesellschaftfürberuflicheBildung,EBB),whichis responsible for the national-level coordination of theNetwork“IntegrationthroughQualification(IQ)”inGermany.

alsodiscussed.Themaingeographical focuswasondevelopments in Germany, a country that urgentlyneedstodeviseeffectiveintegrationpathsforthehighnumberofrefugeeswhohavesettledinthecountrysincelastsummer.3

Info Box: Network “Integration through Qualification (IQ)”

The symposium “Labour Market Integrationof Immigrants” was co-hosted by the Network“Integration through Qualification (IQ)”. Since 2005,theNetworkIQhasaimedtoimprovelabourmarketaccess for migrants in Germany. With around 380projects nationwide, the Network IQ works in thefollowing three fields of action: counselling oncredentialrecognition; jobtrainingformigrants;anddevelopment of intercultural competence for publicinstitutionsandtheprivatesector.TheNetworkIQisfundedby theFederalMinistryofLabourandSocialAffairs and the European Social Fund. The FederalMinistryforEducationandResearchandtheFederalEmploymentAgencyarestrategicpartners.

Thisconferencereportsummarizesthemainaspectsdiscussed at the IQ symposium. For the sake ofsimplification,theyareorganizedintotwodiscursivelevelscharacterizedbymutualinteraction,andalsobysomedegreeofcontradictionandasymmetry:policyandpolitics.

Policy: Coordination, leadership, early intervention and long-term investments

In her keynote speech, MPI Director ElizabethCollett presented the strong variation in the levelof labour market participation of immigrants inselectedEuropeancountries,basedontheresultsof

3 AccordingtotheInstituteforEmploymentResearch(Institutfür Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB), 1,092,000refugeeswereregisteredbytheGermanimmigrationauthorityin 2015, of whom 810,000 are currently still in Germany.See: IAB,Typisierung von Flüchtlingsgruppen nach Alter und Bildungsstand, Aktuelle Berichte 6/2016 (Nuremberg, IAB,2016)(availableonlyinGerman).

4 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

amulti-countrystudyconductedbytheMPIandtheInternational Labour Organization (ILO).4 Beyond allthe differences observed between States, the studypointsatbarriers to the labourmarketparticipationof immigrants thatcanbe found inmostofEurope.They can be grouped into two main categories,which were both addressed at the symposium:1)barriersrelatedtotheskillcapitalandtheindividualresourcesofmigrants;and2)barriersrelatedtothedegree of coordination and “openness” of labourmarketactors,suchaslowinstitutionaltransparencyordiscriminatorypractices.

LabourandSocialAffairsSecretaryThorbenAlbrechtbrieflyoutlinedGermany’sintegrationpolicyprogressinthepastdecade.Particularlysince2005,thefederalgovernment has been very active in establishing alegislative framework to improve the integrationof resident migrants and in increasing Germany’sattractivenessasadestination for skilled foreigners.In Secretary Albrecht’s view, these steps forward,combinedwitharobustlabourmarket,areareasonforoptimismwithregardtoGermany’sabilitytobringa largenumberofrefugees intoemployment.Whilethere is no doubt that this process will take timeandconsiderablepublicinvestment,itmayalsoholdsignificant economic potential for a country whoseworking-age population and skill base are shrinkingduetodemographicdevelopments.

In a day of intense exchange, several steps for theimprovement of the labour market situation ofimmigrants were identified,many of them focusingspecificallyonthepresentpoliticalpriorityofrefugeeintegration:

• Ensuring an early start of integration measures:AsOECD SeniorMigration Expert Thomas Liebigremarked, it is important to make integrationservices available at an early stage upon arrival,not only to immigrants with a stable residencestatus but also to asylum-seekers with goodprospectsofbeinggrantedrefugeerights.Abasicintegration package, including language courseswith a vocational component, the assessmentof professional skills and training schemes,should be accessible nationwide. Provisional

4 Theresearchproject“TheLabourMarketIntegrationofNewImmigrants in Europe: Analysis and Policy Evaluation” wasconductedbetween2012and2014by theMigrationPolicyInstitute (MPI) and ILO-MIGRANT, with funding from theEuropeanCommission.

estimates suggest that up to 30 per cent ofthe refugees coming to Germany in 2015 haveformal qualifications.5 Many more are expectedtohaveinformalornon-formalcompetencies,asa resultofworkexperience forexample.Hence,investing inearly skill assessmentandcredentialrecognition becomes essential. In countries likeGermany and Sweden, fast-track integrationchannels for refugees with professional skills inhighdemandarebeingdevelopedandrolledoutnationwide,butcomplexchallengesremain.Inthehighly formalizedGermansystemofprofessionaleducation, for instance, the validation of non-formalskillsisstillfraughtwithdifficulties.

• Investing in long-term integration paths:Bringing refugees into employment is a processthat requires severalyearsand thatneeds tobesupportedandmonitoredevenafterthefirstentryinto work. Sustainable integration can only bereachedifcareeradvancementismadepossible,as Collett underlined. The economic benefit forthehost country canonlybe tapped if skills aredevelopedandconsolidatedovertime.

• Ensuring systematic policy learning and scaling up good models:Thehabitoffundingsmall-scaleand short-term projects with poor evaluation,whichiswidespreadinmanyEuropeancountriesaswellasattheEuropeanUnionlevel,needstoberevised.A lotof knowledgeandexperiencegetslost inwhat JanRath (University of Amsterdam)referred to as “the project carousel”. It ismuchmoreproductiveto identifyeffectiveapproachesand subsequently scale themupand/or channelthemintomainstreamservices.

• Collecting empirical evidence in order to recognize potential and to build on it:Inordertodeviseintegrationpoliciesthataredrivenbyfactsratherthanbymisconceptions,theavailabilityofgood data (both on themigrant population andontheeffectivenessofpolicies) iscrucial,asJonSimmons(UKHomeOffice)pointedout.Thelackof solid statistics about the sociodemographiccharacteristics of recent refugees is one of themain hindrances to devising adequate policyresponses in countries of arrival, includingGermany.Havingadetailedpictureof thetargetgroupoffersessentialindicationstopolicymakers.

5 IAB, Flüchtlinge und andere Migranten am deutschen Arbeitsmarkt: Der Stand im September 2015, IAB-AktuelleBerichte 14/2015 (Nuremberg, IAB, 2015) (available only inGerman).

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For instance, first estimates show that a largepercentageofrecentrefugeesinGermanyareveryyoung,6whichclearlypointsattheneedforstronginvestmentsinvocationaleducationandtraining.The highly regarded dual apprenticeship systeminGermany can prove an invaluable resource inthiscontext,asSecretaryAlbrechtandProfessorForoutanstressed.

• Strengthening the intercultural awareness and openness of public employment services, employers and other labour market stakeholders:The high unemployment rate of qualifiedforeignersthroughoutEurope7hintsatbarrierstothelabourmarketthatgobeyondtheskillcapitalofmigrants.SandraKerr(BusinessintheCommunity,UnitedKingdom)raisedtheissueofdiscriminationandunconsciousbiasintherecruitmentpracticesof employers, while Michael van der Cammen(FederalEmploymentAgency,Germany)providedaninsightintotheprocessofinterculturalopeninginhisorganization.Theseandothercontributorsshared the view that integration and adaptationefforts cannot be expected only from migrantsbutalso fromlabourmarketactorsandthehostsociety.

• Improving the coordination of actors:Thepanellistagreedthat,withregardtogovernment, thekeyis striking a good balance between distributingintegrationpolicyresponsibilitiesacrossportfoliosand providing clear institutional leadership. Ifintegration policy competence is a prerogativeof only a few ministries, policy objectives, andmeasuresrisktobebiasedandpartial.Alongthisline, Wilhelm Adamy (Confederation of GermanTrade Unions) criticized the predominance ofsecurityconcernsthat,inhisopinion,characterizethe integration policy in Germany, due to thecentralroleoftheFederalMinistryoftheInterior.

6 About30percentofallasylum-seekersinGermanyin2015werebetween16and25yearsold.See:IAB, Typisierung von Flüchtlingsgruppen nach Alter und Bildungsstand, AktuelleBerichte 6/2016 (Nuremberg, IAB, 2016) (available only inGerman).

7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)/EuropeanUnion,Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In(Paris,OECDPublishing,2015).

Allowing a degree of regional autonomy withinone country can foster policy experimentation andinnovation, as Vanessa Ahuja (Federal Ministry ofLabour and Social Affairs, Germany) pointed out.Liebig, however, warned that regional peculiaritiesshouldnotcomeatthedetrimentofunitarynationalstandards in the provision of support: integrationsuccess shouldnotdependonan immigrant’splaceofresidence.

AsthepositiveexampleofPortugalshows,afruitfulcombination of a whole-of-government approachand effective coordination and leadership can bereached through the right institutional setup. Inthis country, the High Commissioner for Migrationdirectly respondingto thePresidencyof theCouncilof Ministers has enough institutional leverage toreach effective interministerial cooperation. At thelocal level, this has resulted in the creation of one-stopshopsforimmigrants:asuccessfulmodelthatbynowisinternationallywellknown,butthat,infaceofthe present scenario, still carries great inspirationalpower.

Lastly,theinvolvementofnon-governmentalactorsisalsocrucial.Whilecivilsocietyorganizations,migrantassociationsandlabourunionswereallmentionedasimportantpartners,aspecialaccentwasplacedontheroleofemployers.Employersdeterminethedemandofthelabourmarketandarethedecisivegatekeepersintowork:therefore,itisessentialtoinformthem,toconsultwiththem,andtoinvolvetheminthedesignandprovisionofintegrationregulationsandsupport.Ultimately,thesuccessfulintegrationofrefugeesintoemploymentwilldependonemployers’contributionto creating sustainable integration paths, such asthroughtheprovisionofinternships,in-housetrainingandadvancementopportunities.

Politics: Establishing a narrative of solidarity and inclusion

A greater degree of controversywas reachedwhenthe discussionmoved to the level of politics. Here,thetermisused inabroadsense,asthedomain inwhichthequestionofnational identityisposedandthemeaningofintegrationisnegotiated.

ProfessorForoutanexpressedherconcernaboutwhatshe considers a remarkable setback in the politicalnarrativeonintegrationinGermanysincethestartoftheso-called“refugeecrisis”.Inheropinion,thenew

6 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

integration lawplannedby the federal government8

epitomizes this trend, as its stipulations regardingpossible sanctions carry the implicit accusation thatrefugees are unwilling to integrate into the hostsociety. Thus, a historic opportunity was missed todefineintegrationastheguidingprincipleofamoderndemocracy based on solidarity and equal access toparticipation,ProfessorForoutanobserved.

In response, Secretary Albrecht highlighted thepositive sides of the law. Leaving aside the level ofpolicy, where it establishes a broader provision ofintegration services and improves their accessibilityforcertaingroups,italsorepresentsabigstepforwardinthepoliticaldiscourse,asitacknowledgesthefactthat a large portion of recent refugees will stay inGermanyandtheymustbegiventhechancetotakepartinsociety.

Commenting on the integration debate in Germanyand theUnited Kingdom, Simmons called for a lessemotional and more pragmatic approach based onfactualevidence.Heatingthedebatecarriestheriskof creating rigid ideological divisions,which are nothelpful in designing good policy or for the politicalclimate. The fears that immigration sparks in somesections of the population should not simply bedismissed. Rather, they should be countered bymaking the entire population feel included in thechangethatistakingplaceandthatthegovernmentistryingtoshape.

Despite the differences of opinion, the speakersagreed that the discussion on integration shouldbe embedded in the broader debate on inequality.Placingtoostronganaccentontargetgroupsdefinedby ethnicity and nationalitymay lead us to neglectthefactthatbarriers,disadvantagesandexclusionarydynamics in the labour market often dependmorestronglyonother factors,suchas incomeandsocialclass.

8 Shortly after the IQ symposium, on 13 April, the governingcoalitionagreedonthemaincornerstonesoftheintegrationlaw. Thedraftbillwas approvedby the cabineton25May,andwasdebatedbytheGermanParliamenton3June.See:Deutsche Welle, “Merkel presents new refugee integrationlaw as ‘milestone’” (25 May 2016), available from www.dw.com/en/merkel-presents-new-refugee-integration-law-as-milestone/a-19281722

Conclusion

All in all, the IQ symposium stayed true to itsmaingoals:ononehand,urgingdecisionmakersthroughoutEurope to include long-term integration challengesintotheirview;ontheother,sendingout thesignalthat European cooperation carries importantpotentialinthispolicyarea.Approachingintegrationbyfocusingonitslabour-marketdimension,whichisinherentlysolutionoriented,helpedtobringaboutafactualandproductivediscussion.

Inevitably, not all important aspects could beaddressed with the same depth. The symposiumwas clearly characterized by a predominance ofgovernment perspectives, even though there wasbroad agreement that government cannot single-handedly manage the challenges at stake. Futureexchangeonthistopicshouldmorestrongly includeother standpoints, particularly from the employers’side.

Ultimately, participants agreed that integrationneeds commitment, patience and resilience overa long period of time. In his closing remarks, JanRath, European Co-chair ofMetropolis, argued thatobstacles,frictions,perceivedsetbacksandapparentimmobilityallbelongtothedynamicofthisprocess.Integrationmaybemovingonslowlyattimes,butitisalwaysmovingon.Thisisnottosuggestthatdifficultiesshouldjustbepassivelyendured;onthecontrary,itisvitaltoaddressthem,butwithaconfidentlookintothefuture.n

The fears that immigration sparks in some sections of the

population should not simply be dismissed. Rather, they should

be countered by making the entire population feel included

in the change that is taking place and that the government

is trying to shape.

Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 7

Although the proportion of the foreignpopulationinPortugal ismoderate(3%ofthetotal population – ofwhom 1% are nationals

of the European Union), settlement of immigrantshasbeenraisingnewchallengessincethebeginningof this century. As a result, major investment inthe development of integration policies and in thereinforcement of the integration services providedbythepublicadministrationwasmade.Thepoliciesand approaches adopted led to the internationalrecognitionofPortugalasoneof thecountrieswiththe best integration policies (Huddleston et al.,2015; Huddleston, Niessen et al., 2011; Niessen etal.,2007;UNDP,2009;IOM,2010).In2011,theHighCommissionforMigration(AltoComissariadoparaasMigrações,I.P.,ACM),thePortuguesepublicinstitutewith the interministerial and interdepartmentalmissionofpromoting the integrationof immigrants,also received the first prize in the European PublicSectorAwardin2011.2

The work carried out by the ACM is founded ona global and integrated vision of the migrationphenomenon. Portugal foresees immigration as anopportunity for development in which integrationplaysakeyrole inbuildingasocietythatrecognizesimmigrants’ economic, demographic, social andculturalcontributions.

The Portuguese vision of migrant integration isinspiredinthehistoricalexperienceofthePortuguesethroughout the world and time. The cultural andsocial experience of the 4.5 million citizens ofthe Portuguese diaspora is a relevant part of theexplanation for the adoption of an interculturalsocietymodel,wheredifferentculturalandreligioussystemsnotonlycoexistbutalsointeract.Thismodelis based on the mutual respect of immigrants andthehost societywithin the limitsof the ruleof law.Interculturalitystrengthenspeaceandsocialcohesionthroughdialogueandequality,preventingthe“clashof civilizations” and social tensions fromdisjunctionbetweendifferentcommunities.

2 EuropeanPublicSectorAward2011,undertheme2,“OpeningupthePublicSectorthroughCollaborativeGovernance”.

1 Pedro Calado is the High Commissioner for Migration ofPortugal.

Migration and integration from a holistic perspective: Experiences from PortugalPedro Calado1

In2014,theACMwasrenamed3anditsmissionwasextendedtoincludemigrantsthemselves.Thismeansthat, in some areas, thework carried out has beenexpanded to the refugees and asylum-seekers andalsotothePortugueseemigrants,aworkcarriedoutinclosecooperationwiththeMinistryofForeignAffairs,mostlybyreinforcingtheirconnectiontoPortugal.Itthusbecameapublicinstitutiontomanagemigrationasawholeandtopromotetheintegrationofmigrantscomprehensively, namely by providing supportservicesforallmigrants.

Being a country that traditionally has not receivedmany asylum requests, according to data from theImmigrationandBordersServiceandthePortugueseCouncilforRefugees,Portugalreceived772requestsuntilOctober2015.Thispresentsanincreaseof126per cent in relationwith the same period in 2014.4Portugalextended thesameanswers to thecontextoftherefugeecrisisandiscoherentinitshumanisticand intercultural approach to this new inflow. Inrecognitionof thissolidaritycrisis,severalstrategieswere defined to raise awareness and preventdiscrimination (e.g. dissemination of brochuresonmyths and facts about refugees). Additionally, aholisticanswer(e.g.housing,education,work,health,language) was defined – in articulation with civilsociety organizations and municipalities. Refugeesare expected to integrate into Portuguese localcommunities(andnotbeconcentratedincentresforrefugeesorlargeurbanconcentrations).InMay2016,PortugalwasoneofthethreeEuropeancountriesthathadrelocatedmorerefugees,guaranteeingitspartofthecivilizationalchallengethatEuropeisfacing.

The Portuguese experience based its success onestablishing a cross-cutting government agency.The ACM mainly focuses on the implementation,monitoring and evaluation of integration plans,outlining measures to be implemented by the

3 PreviouslyreferredtoastheHighCommissionforImmigrationandInterculturalDialogue.

4 Formoredetails,contacttheImmigrationandBordersService(www.sef.pt)andthePortugueseCouncilforRefugees(www.cpr.pt).

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different relevant ministries for immigrants, andthe service provision of the National ImmigrantSupportCentres (theone-stopshops).Theone-stopshops were created in 2004, and bring together anumberofservicesandpublicinstitutionswithwhichimmigrants need to engage in their integration intothecommunities.Throughshared responsibilityandpartnership among various government levels, thecentres host eight different ministry services underthesameroof.

Portugal has clarified the integration policy optionssince 2007 through the Action Plans for ImmigrantIntegration,whereeach relevantministry’s role andmeasuresaredefined. The scopeof this instrumentwaswidenedandreinforcedafter2014, in linewiththeupdatedmissionoftheACM,intheStrategicPlanforMigration.5ThePlanfollowstheholisticapproachand involves all ministries, being defined around106practicalmeasures andorganized into thematicsections. The Plan was publicly discussed, and civilsociety – including immigrant associations – washighlymobilizedtogiveinputs.

Additionally, Portugal has been defining severalrelevant measures for raising public awareness ofwelcoming and integration of migrants and for thepromotion of interculturality, such as: reinforcinginformationsystemsandsupport;supportingpolicieswith facts through the Migration Observatory;influencing public opinion towards tolerance anddiversity(namelythroughthejournalismawardsandpublicationofbookcollections).

Portugalcreatedin2002theImmigrationObservatory,whichwasrenamedMigrationObservatory6in2014,aspartoftheACM.Investmentinintegrationmonitoringcanguaranteepoliciesthatprovideamoreeffectiveresponsetomigrantneeds,butmainlyitisanefficientway to better invest resources. Improving statisticalsources and administrative data, and fomentinggovernment decisions to promote the evaluationofthemeasuresandpoliciesandultimatelyassesstheireffectiveness can be a challenge. To tackle this, theObservatory promotes dialogue between academiaand political decision makers on the definition,discussionandevaluationofpublicpolicies,includingethnic and racial discrimination issues, in order to

5 See www.acm.gov.pt/-/plano-estrategico-para-as-migracoes-pem-

6 Seewww.om.acm.gov.pt/

deconstructmyths,representations,andstereotypesaboutimmigrantsandimmigrationingeneral.Attheendof2014,theObservatory launched Immigration in Numbers,anewbookcollectionwhich includesaspecial chapter on racial and ethnic discriminationin the first volume (data from the past decade,2001–2012).

Empowerment as a success factor for improving the integration of migrants

Asidefromthealreadydescribedstructure,oneofthemostimportantfactorsforimprovingtheintegrationof migrants has been the active participation ofmigrantsinthedesignofintegrationpolicies.Aimingto empower and increase migrants’ sense of co-responsibility and belonging, Portugal has beenpromotingtheparticipationofmigrantcommunitiesin the implementation of integration policies,contributing to a state of mutual transformation.Someofthemeasurestakenincludetheincorporationofinterculturalmediators(withmigrantbackground)inpublicadministrationservices,thesupport–atthetechnical and financial levels – and empowermentof migrant associations and migrant leaders (131associationsrecognized),andtheparticipationinthediscussionandvalidationofmigrationpoliciesintheConsultative Council for Migration.7 The Council isthebodyforconsultation,support,andparticipationinthedefinitionofbroadlinesofactionoftheACMand in decision-making, ensuring the participationand collaboration of public and private entities inthe definition and implementation of migrationpolicies. It provides a space and opportunity fordiscussion and collaboration, with representativesfrommigrantcommunities,workingsidebysidewithrepresentativesfromministries,socialpartners,tradeunions,employers,privatefoundationsandothers.

Main challenges

Afteralltheinvestmentsmadeoverthepastdecade,the economic and financial crises created addedchallenges for policymakers. These included therisk of a shift in public opinion regardingmigrationissues, the vulnerability ofmigrants as a group (theunemployment rates increased and the families’incomes decreased), and the potential negativeimpactonthepublicbudgetallocatedtointegrationpolicies.

7 Created in 1998 under the name Consultative Council forImmigrationAffairs.

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Despite the economic stagnation, unemploymentgrowth and the public deficit, it is important toacknowledge that the Portuguese society has beenabletopositivelycontinuetowelcomeandintegratemigrants. According to the 2015 Eurobarometersurvey,8only3percentof thesurveyedPortugueseconsidered immigration a problem (compared with23% for the EU-28 average), unemployment beingthemostimportanttopicofconcerninPortugal(63%,comparedwith 42% in the EU-28), followed by theeconomicsituation(28%,comparedwith21%intheEU-28). This positive attitude towards immigrationcontinues to be very important in terms of publicdebate and legislative activity. Portugal shows aglobal social calm in relation to the questions ofimmigration,demonstratedthroughalackofseriouscasesofxenophobia,racismorbasicgeneralhostilityfeltbyimmigrants.Furthermore,politicalpartieshavenot used immigration as a political topic of debate,norhasananti-immigrantsentimentdevelopedintopublicopinion.

Several services were reinforced and policies weredeveloped toprotect themost vulnerablemigrants.To combat the immigrant unemployment growth(as it happened for nationals) and the decrease inincome for immigrant families, the ACM createdand reinforced several employment programmes.OneistheInterventionProgrammeforUnemployedImmigrants, which strives to facilitate the social,cultural andprofessional insertionof the immigrantpopulationlegallyresidinginPortugalthroughspecialvocational training, adult education and trainingcourses, occupational programmes, and access tothe job centre services. There are alsoemploymentsupport offices in the National Immigrant SupportCentres, which seek to support job offers andprofessional training to immigrants. Several socialprogrammesand serviceswere also reinforced (e.g.social support offices in the National ImmigrantSupport Centres, voluntary return programme). TheACM created a support programme for immigrantentrepreneurship, valuing the potential of theentrepreneurship of many immigrants and makingtrainingcoursesandtechnicalsupportavailableinthedefinitionofbusinessplansandaccesstomicrocreditfor migrants who want to create their own jobsand/oranalternativetounemployment.TheStrategic

8 European Commission (EC), Public Opinion in the European Union: Final Results,Eurobarometer83,Spring(Brussels,EC,2015). Available from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf

Plan for Migration continues to strengthen andconsolidatemeasurestosupportmigrantpopulation,includingconcernfortheeconomicframework.Familyreunificationand thewelcomingprocessduring thisglobalcrisisweresimplifiedbyextendingtherangeofdocumentswhichimmigrantscanproduceasproofofincome.

Acknowledging the importance (and even thereinforcement) of the integration of immigrants,Portugal started to benefit from European Fundsin the past years to upscale its integration servicesand/or maintain its efficiency in the context ofeconomic and financial crises and public budgetcutting. Hence, despite all challenges, Portugalcontinueditsworkinthisareawiththefundamentalsupport of European Funds (e.g. European SocialFundandEuropeanFundfortheIntegrationofThird-Country Nationals), assuring the continuity of theworkcarriedoutinthelastdecades.

Conclusion

Portugal is recognized for its integration policiesfollowing an intercultural model and extends theseto all migratory cases, including to refugees andasylum-seekers. Its success is based on a whole-of-government approach, reflecting the complexity ofintegrationinsociety,celebratedinnationalplansthatoutlinethetransversalgoalsof thegovernmentandthe responsible entities accountable to reach them.TheACMhasledtheimplementationoftheseplansand is responsible for the holistic prized one-stop-shopmodel.This integrationapproach isa two-wayprocess,inwhichthemigrantrepresentativesactivelyparticipate in the definition of national policies andprogrammes. This relationship leads to an evolvingmutualtransformationwhereallsidesdetainamorecomprehensiveunderstandingoftheinherentneedsof theirposition. Presently, themain challengesaregreatly affected by the ongoing financial crisis andinclude the integration of migrants into the labourmarket,recognizingtheimportantroleofthemigrantcommunityincontributingtothePortuguesesocietyandmaintainingthepositivepublicopinioninregardtomigration.

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Portugal,onthebasisofitsexperienceinthepast20years,9 hasbeen supporting integrationas aholisticchallenge,basedonawhole-of-governmentapproach.Theintegrationofmigrantsisatransversalprocess–reflecting the economic, political, juridical, health,cultural and social aspects of migrants’ lives. Thiscoherentprocesscanbeachievedonlyon thebasisofpartnership,coordinationandcommonaims.Thisapproach isbeneficial fortheeffectiverealizationofintegrationgoals,andformigrants,inbeingprovidedwithcoherentandmoreefficientservices.

Considering the growing migratory challenges,the Portuguese option was to have a nationalmechanism for the integration of migrants and toprioritize integration as a transversal folder, notlimited to the management of migratory flows orlabour market interests. The creation of a publicdeliverance structure, such as the ACM, was ofabsolute importance, therefore assuring that allhorizontal levels of governance (differentministriesand agencies) and also that the vertical levels ofgovernance are mobilized (regional, local and thirdsector).Havinganagencythatisinterministerialandresponsibleforthecoordinationofallstakeholdersisveryrelevantfortheoutcomesachieved.n

References

EuropeanCommission(EC)2015 Public Opinion in the European Union:

Final Results. StandardEurobarometer83,Spring.EC,Brussels.Availablefromhttp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf

High Commission for Migration (Alto ComissariadoparaasMigrações,I.P.,ACM)

2015 Strategic Plan for Migration.ACM,Lisbon.Available from www.acm.gov.pt/-/plano-estrategico-para-as-migracoes-pem-

9 In 1996, Portugal created the High Commissioner forImmigration and Ethnical Minorities, which is knownnowadaystheHighCommissionforMigration.

Huddleston,T.etal.2015 Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015.

Barcelona Center for International Affairs,Barcelona; Migration Policy Group,Brussels. Available from http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex-2015-book-a5.pdf

Huddleston,T.,J.Niessenetal.2011 Migrant Integration Policy Index III.British

Council and Migration Policy Group,Brussels. Available from www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/migrant_integration_policy_index_mipexiii_2011.pdf

InternationalOrganizationofMigration(IOM)2010 The World Migration Report 2010

– the Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change. IOM, Geneva.Available from http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=37&products_id=653&language=en

Niessen,J.etal.2007 Migrant Integration Policy Index. British

Council and Migration Policy Group,Brussels. Available from www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/migrant_integration_policy_index_mipex_ii-2007.pdf

ReisOliveira,C.,M.AbranchesandC.Healy2009 Handbook on How to Implement a One-

Stop-Shop for Immigrant Integration.High Commission for Immigration andIntercultural Dialogue (Alto Comissariadopara a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural,ACIDI),Lisbon.Availablefromwww.oss.inti.acidi.gov.pt/

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)2009 Human Development Report 2009 –

Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. UNDP, New York. Availablefrom http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf

Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 11

Policies for labour market integration of refugees in SwedenBernd Parusel1

Introduction: Sweden – a country of immigration

Forseveralyearsnow,Swedenhasbeenoneofthemain immigrationcountries inEurope,andespecially one that has provided permanent

protectiontoalargenumberofrefugeesandpeoplefleeing fromwarand conflict zones, especially fromthe Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Iraq.In 2015, Sweden had – despite its relatively smallpopulationof9.8million–thethirdhighestnumberofasylum-seekersthatwereregisteredinaMemberState of the European Union (EU) (163,000 asylumapplicants),manymore than largerMember States,suchasFranceandtheUnitedKingdom,had.

Theprotection rate forasylum-seekers inSweden isrelatively high, too,whichmeans that amajority ofthose applying are indeed allowed to stay. In 2015,72 per cent of all asylum decisions made at firstinstance were positive.2 Latest population statisticsshow that in 2015, about 16.5 per cent of theSwedish population was born in another country,3and according to the Organisation for EconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),abouthalfoftheforeign-bornpopulationoriginallycametoSwedenasrefugeesorasfamilymembersofrefugees.4

2 Eurostat,“EUMemberStatesgrantedprotectiontomorethan330000asylumseekersin2015”,20April2016.

3 Source:StatisticsSweden[www.scb.se].

4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), Working Together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children in Sweden (Paris,OECDPublishing,2016),p.13.

1 DrBerndParuselisamigrationexpertattheSwedishMigrationAgency.Hehaswrittenthisarticleinapersonalcapacity.TheauthorwishestothankAntonAhlénoftheSwedishMigrationStudiesDelegation (Delmi) for reviewingand improving thisarticle.

Figure 1: Asylum applications in Sweden, 2006–2015

Source: Swedish Migration Agency.

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Thelargenumberofnewrefugeearrivalsthroughoutrecent years, and especially in 2015, constitutes amajor challenge for Sweden. Despite emergencymeasures, there have been serious bottlenecks inthe reception system for asylum-seekers, and theprocessing times for asylum applications are takinglonger. As regards integration, there are problems,too,suchasadramaticshortageofaffordablehousing,which no longer only affects Sweden’s bigger citiesbutevenremoterregionsofthecountry.Thiscausesdelays in the settlement process and immigrants’integration activities, such as language learning,trainingandjob-searching.

Thecapacitiesofthelabourmarkettoabsorbnewlyarrived beneficiaries of protection are also limited.AccordingtoarecentOECDstudy,oneyearfollowingthe end of the official introduction programme fornew arrivals, which usually takes two years, only22percentoflow-educatedmenfoundemployment.For women, the employment rate was a meager8percent.5Inasimilarvein,areportbytheSwedishMigrationStudiesDelegation(Delmi)recentlyshowedthatonly30percentofallimmigrantsthatarrivedasrefugees in 1997–1999hada job after two years inSweden,andeven10yearsaftertheirfirstarrivalonly65percentwereworking.6OthercurrentchallengesregardingintegrationinSwedenconcernalackofstaffinschools,thehealth-caresystemandmunicipalities’socialservices,whichallhavetocopewithaugmentedworkloads.

Amid the refugee crisis in 2015–2016, theGovernment of Sweden declared that the countryurgently needed a “respite” to copewith themanychallengesarisingfromthearrivalofasylum-seekers.Their number had to be drastically reduced, it wasargued. Beneficiaries of protection would in thefuture only be granted temporary stay, and theirright to family reunificationwouldbe limited to theminimum,asrequiredby internationalandEU laws.At Sweden’s Schengen borders, border checksweretemporarily reintroduced and, since January 2016,bus,trainandferrycompaniesarenolongerallowedtocarrypassengerswithoutidentitydocumentsfromneighbouringDenmarktoSweden.7

5 Ibid.,14.

6 P. Joyce, Integrationspolitik och arbetsmarknad,kunskapsöversikt 2015:3 (Stockholm, Delegationen förMigrationsstudier,2015),p.29.

7 B. Parusel, “Sweden’s U-turn on asylum”, Forced Migration Review,52:89–90(2016).

At the same time, however, the integration policyof Sweden was also scaled up considerably. TheGovernment made more funding available forintegrationmeasures,andanumberofnewinitiativeswere launched,especially to improve labourmarketinclusion. This article aims to provide an overviewof labour market integration policy in Sweden.It looks both into the general preconditions andguidingprinciplesforimmigrantintegration,andintospecificmeasures for newly arrived beneficiaries ofinternationalprotection.

Basic principles and preconditions for labour market integration

Swedish migration and integration policies areoften regarded as progressive and ambitious,8 anddespite the challenges mentioned and the recentturntowardsamuchmorerestrictiveasylumpolicy,the Government still commits to a positive view ofmigration,highlightingpotentialgainsinsteadofrisks.On its website, the current minority governmentconsisting of the Social Democratic Party and theGreens states that it wants to “ensure a long-termsustainablemigrationpolicythatsafeguardstherightof asylum and, within the framework of managedimmigration, facilitates mobility across borders,promotes needs-based labour migration, harnessesand takes into account the effects of migrationon development, and deepens European andinternationalcooperation”.9

AmongthepublicandinpolicycirclesinSweden,theintegration of immigrants is mostly evaluated anddiscussedintermsofconcrete,measurablesuccessesand failures, such as labour market participationrates,migrants’access tohousing,problemsrelatedto segregation, language acquisition or the uptakeofsocialbenefits.Symbolicorvalue-relatedmatters,such as migrants’ adaptation to the host country’straditions, as they manifest themselves in othercountries in, for example, integration contracts orrequirementstosymbolicallyconfesstobecomepart

8 Forexample,the2015editionoftheMigrantIntegrationPolicyIndex(MIPEX),whichevaluatesandcomparesmigrationandintegrationpolicies in 38 countries, Sweden scoredhighest.Seewww.mipex.eu/

9 GovernmentOfficesofSweden,“Migrationpolicyobjectives”(2014). Available from www.government.se/government-policy/migration/migration-policy-objectives/

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ofanationalcommunity,areofmuchlessimportanceinSweden.10

While the Scandinavian welfare state today is aneager advocate of free trade and a liberal marketeconomy, also acceptinggrowing income inequality,itstillboastsarelativelylargepublicsectorandofferscomprehensive social security systems. These areavailabletoallregisteredinhabitants,irrespectiveoftheir nationality.A fundamental accessprinciple forwelfareisthatanyonewhostays,orcanbeexpectedtostay,inSwedenforoneyearorlongerwillenjoythesame social rights and claims as all other residents.This means that only migrants with short-termresidencyareexcludedfromthewelfarecommunity,and asylum-seekers, as long as their application forprotectionispending.

Asylum-seekers normally have access to the labourmarket as long as they reveal their identity to theauthorities.Whileratherfewmanagetoactuallyfinda job while waiting for a decision on their asylumrequest,thosewhodomayfinditeasiertocontinuetheir integration trajectory once they are grantedrefugee or subsidiary protection status. When anasylum-seeker has worked in Sweden for at leastfour months, they may stay in Sweden as labourimmigrants even in case the asylum application isrejected.11 As regards preconditions for successfulintegration,another facilitating factorwas thatuntilrecentlybeneficiariesofprotectiongenerallyreceivedpermanentpermits.Thus,theydidnotneedtoworryabouttheirprospectstoremaininSweden.

The economic and labour market conditions inSwedenarecertainlymorefavourableforintegratingalargenumberofbeneficiariesofprotectionthaninmany other countries. The economy is performingwell, unemployment is small, and the State is ableto increase funding for integration measures whenneeded.12

10 B. Parusel, Focus Migration – Country Profile Sweden(Osnabrück,InstituteforMigrationResearchandInterculturalStudies; Bonn, Federal Agency for Civic Education, 2015),p. 7. Available from www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/Country%20Profile%20Sweden_2015_0.pdf

11 C. Calleman, “– Byta spår’ – Ett nålsöga mellan asyl ocharbete”, in: Arbetskraft från Hela Världen – Hur blev det med 2008 års Reform?(C.CallemanandP.HerzfeldOlsson),SwedishMigrationStudiesDelegation(Delmi)Report2015:9(Stockholm,Delmi,2015),pp.290–331.Availablefromwww.delmi.se/upl/files/123142.pdf

12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), Working Together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children in Sweden(Paris,OECDPublishing,2016),p.17.

The integration system in a nutshell

For the Government of Sweden, the goal of itsintegrationpolicyistoensureequalrights,obligationsand opportunities for all, irrespective of ethnic andcultural background. Labour market inclusion is apriority. “Work is the most important means for aperson tobecomepartof society,” theGovernmentargues. Accordingly, every step of the receptionprocess of newly arrived immigrants is to focus onthemfindingajob.13

The central legal framework for integration policiestodayistheIntroductionActof2010.14Ittransferredthe overall responsibility for the integration ofnew arrivals from the municipalities to the PublicEmployment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen). Overallpolitical responsibility for integration policies lieswith the central government in Stockholm, whereintegration is regarded as a cross-ministerial task.There is no separate integration ministry anymore,buttheLabourMarketMinistryplaysacoordinatingrole.Locally,the290Swedishmunicipalitiescarryoutpractical integration measures, not least languagecourses. They are supported by private actors andnon-profitorganizations.

The Introduction Act provides integrationmeasuresforallnewarrivalsofworkingage(20–64years)whohave been granted a residence permit as refugeesor as entitled to subsidiary protection or nationalhumanitarian statuses. Young unaccompaniedmigrantswhoare18or19yearsold,aswellasfamilymembers of beneficiaries of protection, who haveappliedforfamilyreunificationwithintwoyearsafterthearrivaloftheirsponsors,arealsocovered.

Oncetheasylum-seekersaregrantedapermit, theywillhaveanappointmentat thePublicEmploymentService, which is responsible for finding them amunicipality for permanent settlement and fordeveloping an individual integration plan. This plannormallyforeseesintegrationactivitiesof40hoursperweek,fortwoyears.Atthecentreoftheintegrationplanisalanguagecourse(“Swedishforimmigrants”),which is arranged by the respective municipality

13 Government Offices of Sweden, “Goals and visions ofintroduction of new arrivals” (2014). Available from www.government.se/government-policy/introduction-of-new-arrivals/goals-and-visions/

14 Law2010:197(“Lagometableringsinsatserförvissanyanländainvandrare”).

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and accompanied by civic integration courses,internshipsorjobtraining.Largermunicipalitiesofferdifferent types of language courses, including basicliteracy courses, or specialized courses for peoplewith certain skills, such as health care or crafts. Ifrelevant, the Public Employment Service can alsorefer the person to institutions that can validatetheir qualifications obtained abroad. For each dayan immigrantparticipates in themeasures foreseenby the integration plan, he or she receives a dailyallowance.Apartfromreducedallowances,orlosingthem altogether, there are no sanctions in case ofnon-compliance.

New initiatives for better labour market integration

In 2015, the Government started opening up “fasttracks” into the labour market for newly arrivedimmigrants with education or skills in shortageoccupations. To pave the way, the social partnerscanapplyforfundsforpromotionanddevelopmentmeasures. At this writing, fast tracks have beenestablished for chefs (cooks), butchers, teachers,preschoolteachersandseveralregulatedprofessionswithinthehealth-caresector(e.g.doctors,nursesanddentists).Thefast-trackinitiativeisintendedtoboostlabour market integration while at the same timealleviatingskillsshortages.

Additional fundingwas alsomade available in 2016for the reception of newly arrived immigrants inthe Swedish municipalities, to increase the PublicEmployment Service’s administrative capacities, andfor offering asylum-seekers meaningful activitieswhile they wait for a decision on their application.Thisisintendedtospeeduplabourmarketintegrationonce an individual is allowed to stay. Examples ofsuchactivitiesareearlyskillsidentificationmeasures,internshipsorstudiesoftheSwedishlanguage.

Asregardsthevalidationofskillsobtainedabroad,thePublicEmploymentServiceisplanningtoincludebriefsupplementary education measures into refugees’individualintegrationplans,whereappropriate.Eventhisisthoughttospeeduplabourmarketparticipation,and to address the problem of immigrantsworkingbelow their qualification levels (brain waste).Furthermore, the Government has established the“100club”,aninitiativethatforeseesthatthePublicEmploymentServiceoffersspecialpackagesolutionstobiggercompaniesthathavealabourdemandandwanttocontributetotheintroductionofnewarrivals.

Whenacompanycommitstoemployingatleast100newly arrived refugeeswithin three years, they canmakeuseof special placement services and receivewagesubsidiesfromtheState.

Whileitistooearlytojudgetheeffectivenessofthesenewmeasures,itisclearthattheirsuccesswill,toalarge degree, depend on whether the settlementprocess can be improved. Since early March 2016,it is not voluntary anymore for the 290 Swedishmunicipalitiestoacceptbeneficiariesofprotectionforsettlement. Instead, new arrivals are now allocatedthrough a flexible distribution key that takes intoaccount, among other things, the characteristics ofthe local economy, unemployment, the size of themunicipalityandthedegreetowhichithaspreviouslyaccommodatedasylum-seekers.TheGovernmenthasdeclared thatnewarrivals shouldbebrought closertothemoredynamicregionsofSweden,whereitcanbeeasierforthemtofindjobs. It isalsohopedthatthenewsettlementpolicywillboosttheconstructionofnew,affordablerentalapartments,thusaddressingthe lackofhousing forpeoplewith limitedfinancialmeans,whichaffectsnotonlyimmigrantsbutalsotheSwedish-bornpopulation.15

Among the political parties, labourmarket partnersand civil society organizations, there has recentlybeen an intensive debate about an alleged lack of“simple” jobs for immigrants in Sweden and aboutloweringsalariesforunskilledworkinordertospeedup labour market participation. For a society thatis still characterized by social democratic thinking,however,suchapolicy,whichwouldinevitablymeanwidened income inequality and the emergence ofan immigrant underclass, would be a drastic andcontroversialsteptotake.

Longer-term perspectives

Asaconsequenceofthestronglyincreasingnumberofasylum-seekersin2014andafter,Swedishsocietyin general, and major key institutions such as theMigration Agency, the Employment Service, thePoliceandthemunicipalitiesinparticular,havelatelyexhibited signs of overburdening and fatigue. TheGovernment’srecentrestrictiveturnaroundonasylumaimsatmakingitpossibleforthemtocatchupwith

15 Boverket,Nyanländas boendesituation – delrapport,rapport:2015:10.(Karlskrona,Boverket,2015).

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their tasks.And indeed, as thenumberof incomingapplicants decreased drastically in early 2016, thetimeseemsright for improvingexistingsystemsandtestingnewideas.

An obvious risk, however, is that the new policyto grant beneficiaries of protection temporaryresidence permits instead of permanent ones, andto limit their right to family reunification,willmakeintegration more difficult, thus counteracting anypositive initiatives on the integration policy side.A refugeewho isuncertainabouthisorher longer-termperspectivetoremain,andwhoworriesaboutfamily members left behind, is certainly less likelyto wholeheartedly focus on establishing himself orherselfinanewcountrythanonethatfeelssafe.ThenewSwedishpolicyisambiguousinthisregard;thereis an obvious tension between immigration controlobjectivesandintegrationpolicytargets.

As recently confirmed by the OECD, Sweden is inprinciple well prepared to address the challengesassociated with high levels of protection-relatedimmigration.16 This is true both regarding theavailabilityofStatefunding,includingwagesubsidies,overall economic performance, and the integrationandwelfarestructuresalreadyinplace.Despitethis,thepublicdebateaboutimmigrationandintegrationis likely to intensify. In autumn 2015, the EU’sEurobarometersurveyshowedthat53percentoftheSwedishpopulationregardedimmigrationasthemostpressing policy issue in their country, as comparedwithonly24percentduringtheyearbefore.17Giventhe salience of immigration and integration issues,related topics will remain high on policymakers’agendas for quite some time, and the exact futurecourseofactioninSwedenisdifficulttopredict.n

16 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), Working Together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children in Sweden(Paris,OECDPublishing,2016),pp.17–18.

17 European Commission (EC), PublicOpinion in theEuropean Union, Standard Eurobarometer 84, Autumn (Brussels, EC,2016),p.3.

References

Boverket2015 Nyanländas boendesituation – delrapport.

Rapport:2015:10.Boverket,Karlskrona.

Calleman,C.2015 –Byta spår’ – Ettnålsögamellanasyloch

arbete. In: Arbetskraft från Hela Världen – Hur blev det med 2008 års Reform?(C. Calleman and P. Herzfeld Olsson).Swedish Migration Studies Delegation(Delmi) Report 2015:9. Delmi, Stockholm,pp. 290–331. Available from www.delmi.se/upl/files/123142.pdf

EuropeanCommission(EC)2015 Public Opinion in the European Union.

Standard Eurobarometer 84, Autumn. EC,Brussels.

Eurostat2016 EU Member States granted protection to

morethan330000asylumseekersin2015.20 April. Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-16-1491_en.htm

GovernmentOfficesofSweden2014aMigration policy objectives. Published 27

November 2014; updated 12 February2015.Availablefromwww.government.se/government-policy/migration/migration-policy-objectives/

2014bGoals and visions of introduction of newarrivals. Published 27 November 2014;updated 9 March 2015. Available fromwww.government.se/government-policy/introduction-of-new-arrivals/goals-and-visions/

Joyce,P.2015 Integrationspolitik och arbetsmarknad.

Kunskapsöversikt2015:3.DelegationenförMigrationsstudier,Stockholm.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment(OECD)

2016 Working Together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children in Sweden.OECDPublishing,Paris.

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Parusel,B.2015 FocusMigration–CountryProfileSweden.

Institute for Migration Research andIntercultural Studies, Osnabrück; FederalAgency for Civic Education, Bonn, p. 7.Available from www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/58623/sweden

2016 Sweden’s U-turn on asylum. Forced Migration Review 52,pp.89–90.Availablefromwww.fmreview.org/solutions/parusel.html

. . . the Government still commits to a positive view of

migration, highlighting potential gains instead of risks.

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At present, migration is an issue difficult toaddressinEuropeduetoconflictinginterests.On the one hand, the ageing European

population creates a demand for immigration,and therefore Europe should look at the migrationphenomenon in a positive andbenevolentway andsupportanopenmigrationpolicythatmakesiteasyforforeignerswithskillsinhighdemandtoentertheregion.

Population ageing in Europe

InEurope, theold-agedependency ratio–definedastheratiobetweenthepopulationoftheelderly(peopleaged65yearsorover)andtheworking-agepopulation(peopleaged20–64years)–stoodataround30percentin2015.Thiswillincreaserapidlytoreach45percentin2050(Fargues,2015).Theextensionoflifeexpectancyimplies latermortalityandan increase in thenumberof years a person is in good health; thus, the super-dependency ratio2 – which is the ratio between thepopulation of over 75-year-olds and the populationof20-to74-year-olds–probablyismoreappropriateto measure the growing demand of the health-caresector. In 2015, the “super old aged” in Europe held 12 per cent of the population of 20- to 74-year-olds,and in 2050 the sharewill grow to 25 per cent. Thisgrowthincreasesthedemandforworkersinthehealth-care sector. Ageing of the population shows that thelife expectancy of the elderly increases; however, italso indicates a reduction in the fertility rate, around 1.8 per cent in Europe, considered to be belowreplacement.3 This implies thatwithoutmigration thestockofthepopulationdeclines.However,theinflowsof immigrants have been insufficient until now tocompensateforthereductioninthenativepopulation.According to Fargues (2015), given the ageing of thepopulation, inflows into Italy, Spain and Germanyshouldatleastdoubletocompensateforthedeclineofthenativepopulation.

2 This definition was first presented by Alessandra Venturiniat her keynote speech during the International Migration,Integration and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE) Conference inMadrid, August 2014. The definition was expanded in thepresentation“Thedemandofcaregivers”,byA.DiBartolomeo,S. Kalataryan, A. Venturini, delivered at the Conference onDemography,MPC,EUI,Florence,Italy,4–5February2016.

3 Thefertilityrateof2birthsperwomanisconsideredsufficienttoreproduceasociety.

Migrants and migration policies for innovation in EuropeAlessandra Venturini1

Ontheotherhand, the fear thatmigrants take jobsawayfromnatives(Brücker,2012),andtheformer’slarger use of welfare compared with the latter’s,evenifnotsupportedbyconcretescientificevidence(Barrett, 2012), create a negative sentiment amongthepublicandpushforamorerestrictiveandselectivemigrationpolicy.

The Eurobarometer survey on public opinion(2015) has pointed out that the negative sentimenttowards third-countrymigration increaseswith age:52percentamongthe15-to24-year-oldsexpressedthissentiment;58percentamongthe25-to39-year-olds;63percentamongthe40-to54-year-olds;and68percentamongthe55-year-oldsandolder,whoseproportiontendstoincrease.

Ageingofthepopulationalsoleadstoageingofskills(FarguesandMcCormick,2013).Withtheextensionofworkinglife,workers’knowledgebecomeobsoleteastimegoesby,andthetotalamountofhumancapitaldeclinesanddemandforyounghighlyskilledworkersarises. In the European debate, the role played bytertiary-educated migrants in advancing Europeaninnovationcapacityseemstheonlywaytounderlinethepositivecontributionofmigration,becausehighlyskilled migrants are also less contrasted by localpopulation. These migrants have the reputation ofnotusingthenationalwelfaresystemandofnotbeingcompetitivewith low-skilled nativeworkers. Europeneeds toenhance its innovationcapacitybecause itislaggingbehindtheUnitedStatesaswellasthenewemerging countries such as the Republic of Korea,Chinaand India,whichhaveboomed in thepast10years.

Innovation and human capital Innovation

All countries search for the perfect recipe to spurinnovationthatassuresthelargestbenefitatamorelimited cost. The policy mix that spurs innovationis less clear. A little bit of investment in researchand development is fundamental, but sometimesinnovation blows without any public intervention(e.g. Google), so the role of government policies islessclear.

1 Alessandra Venturini is Chair Professor at the University ofTurin and Deputy Director of the Migration Policy Centre(MPC),EuropeanUniversityInstitute(EUI),Florence,Italy.

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Governmentshouldformulateregulationsthatdonotrestrict innovativeprocessesandshouldprovidethehumancapitalneededforinnovationwithinvestmentineducation,favouringtheentranceofhighlyskilledforeign workers with solid education background(PhD and master’s degree holders) in science,technology,engineeringandmathematics(STEM),orevenencourageapplicationsfromforeignstudentstopursuefurtherstudies.

As defined in the Oslo Manual, which providesguidelines on collecting and interpreting innovationdata, “…[i]nnovation is the implementation of anew or significantly improved product (good orservice), or process, a newmarketingmethod, or anew organisational method in business practices,workplace organisation or external relations.”4

4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)andEurostat,Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data – The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities, third edition (Paris,OECD,2005).

As innovation is an activity that involves constantchange,measuringitisdifficult.Andifaninnovationwouldbemeasured,whatdowewanttoknow?Dowe want to understand if the potential innovationis more important than the ability of a country, aregion,asectororafirmtoproducesomethingneworintroducemoreefficientwaysofdoingthings?Oris there something that canbepatentedasnovelty,whichprovidesroyaltiestotheinventor?Inthiscase,patents registered at patent offices are the bestoptionformeasuringinnovation,sinceahighnumberofpatentsregisteredindicateincreasedinnovations.5

Amongthetopfivepatentofficesintheworld,patentapplicationtrendsinEuropearenotencouraging(seeFigure1).

5 Notallpatentsdepositedwillbeused.Someof themcouldbedepositedonlytostopapossiblesimilarinnovationortoprotectanoldone,which,however,after30or50years,willbeofpublicdomain.Forthisreason,tomeasuresomethingcloser to the implementation of an innovative process, thecitationofpatentsismoreused.

Figure 1: Trends in patent applications in top five patent offices, 1983–2014

Source: World Intellectual Property Organization Statistics Database, 2011.

19Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Ontheotherhand,dowewanttoknowtheincreaseinemploymentandwagesandthusinproductionatthenational, regional or sectoral level? This seconddimension is probably closer to what interests thepolicymakers and the citizens, that is, the positiveeffect of innovation on well-being redistributionto the population. If this is the case, probably thebestmeasure is total factor productivity (TFP). In aproductionprocess,whatevergrowth inoutputthatisnotcontributedbycapitalandlabourisattributable

to TFP. In termsof TFPas ameasureof innovation,the trends inEuropearenotbetter thanthepatentregistrationtrends.AsshowninFigure2,TFPgrowthintheEuropeanUnionhasnotseenanincreasefrom1989.

It can be concluded that the two measures areinterconnected.Patent isan indicatorof innovation,andinnovationincreasesTFP.AcountrythatproducesalotofpatentsalsoholdshighTFPgrowth.

Figure 2: Total factor productivity growth in the largest economies, 1989–2011

Source: Conference Board Total Economy Database and EU KLEMS Database.Note: 1989 arbitrarily set to 1. The time series is constructed using this equation: A(t+1) = A(t) (1 + ΔA(t)/A(t)).

Foreign workers

In an effort to understandwhat spurs innovation, alot of studies focus on the contribution of foreignworkers. There are three different cases in whichforeign nationals drive innovation: foreigners asproducers of patents; foreigners as collaboratorsin patent production; and foreigners boosting TFPgrowth.

IntheUnitedStatesofAmerica,researchhasshownthatalargercapfortheH1-Bvisa6intheSTEMfieldshas stimulated foreign patent producers (Hunt andGauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Kerr and Lincoln, 2010;Gosh,MaydaandOrtega,2016),andthatforeignersoutperformthenativesinpatentproduction.ShouldthemigrationpolicyjustfocusontheaccessofSTEMworkersandtertiary-educatedmigrantworkersto all the modern fields of studies? The evidenceseems to stress that the former are important for

6 The H1-B visa is the most preferred visa type for foreignnationalswhowouldliketoworkandliveintheUnitedStates.

20 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

designinginnovationwhilethelatterarefundamentalfordiffusinginnovationalsoinsectorsdifferentfromtheoneinwhichtheinnovationwasproduced.Thus,migration policy should also favour the entrance ofhighlyskilledforeignworkers.

The empirical research that analyses the impactof highly skilled migrants is done at the regional,country, sectororfirm level.Even if researchat thefirmlevelshouldbethemostrelevant,theresultsarevery heterogeneous and very country specific. See,for instance, the study on the correlation betweenthediversityofmigrantsandinnovationinDutchandGermanfirmsinOzgenetal.(2014),whichshowsthatwhilediversityfavoursinnovationinGermany,thisisnotthecaseintheNetherlands.Inaddition,althoughanalyses at the firm level measure the benefits ofmigration for the firms, they disregard inter-firmmobility among migrant workers and knowledgeexchanges from innovative firms, both of whichmightalsobenefitotherfirmsinthesamesectororregion.Forthatreason,evenif it isvery interesting,firm-levelresearchisnotrelevantforaggregatepolicyconsideration.

Researchattheregionalorsectoralleveliscarriedoutaccording to three factors: the quantity ofmigrants(shareofmigrants); thequalityofmigrants (tertiaryeducated or not); and the diversity of countries oforiginofmigrants.

Theshare–quantity–ofmigrants7has,ingeneral,apositiveeffecton theproductionof patents andonTFPgrowthofdestinationcountries(OrtegaandPeri,2014;Fassio,KalantaryanandVenturini,2015).

Theshare–quality–of tertiary-educatedmigrants8

has a positive effect on the innovations in someEuropean countries in general (Gagliardi, 2015;Bosettietal.,2015;Fassio,MontobbioandVenturini,2015; Fassio, Kalantaryan and Venturini, 2015), butitdoesnothavethesameeffectinallsectors.Whilethe quantity of migrants has a positive effect oninnovation inall sectors, thequalityofmigrantshasastrongpositiveeffectinthehightechsectorbutnotinlowtechandservicessectors.Inthemanufacturingsector,themedium-andlow-skilledworkersarestill

7 Shareofmigrantsreferstothequantityofmigrantworkersbysector,regionorcountry.

8 Shareoftertiary-educatedmigrantsisthenumberoftertiary-educatedmigrantsoutofthetotalmigrants.

important for innovation (Fassio, Montobbio andVenturini, 2015; Fassio, Kalantaryan and Venturini,2015).

As well, the diversity of countries of origin9 ofmigrants presents frequently a positive effect onthe innovative performances of firms, regions andcountries (Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2013;Ozgen,NijkampandPoot,2012),butithasnopositiveimpact at the sector level (Fassio, Kalantaryan andVenturini,2015).Thediversityof countriesoforigindoesnotseemavalueaddedforinnovation,whilethepositiveeffectatthecountrylevelislikelytheresultof the concentration of different ethnic groups indifferentsectorswhichcomplementeachother.Manyexamplescanbeproposed,buttherearemorestudiesabouttheroleofhealth-careandhouseholdworkers(CortésandTessada,2011;BaroneandMocetti,2011;Farré,GonzálezandOrtega,2011)whocomplementthehighly skilled femalenative-bornworkers in thehightechsector.

Migration policy for innovation and growth

The research results are very important for policydesign.

•The United States recipe seems simple – bymandatingalargecapfortheH1-BvisaforSTEMstudents, production and registration of patentsincrease. It is,however,verydifficulttoreplicatethis experience because other factors should beconsidered.Forinstance,theUnitedStateshasanimportantlanguageadvantage–Englishiswidelyspoken worldwide, and it is thus less costly tomovethereandtheworkersaremoreproductive.Inaddition,intheUnitedStates,thereisalargersupplyofhighlyskilledjobs,whichfavoursthejobmatch, and the wages offered are much higherthan in Europe because in the United Statestaxes are lower andwage dispersion is higher.10

9 Thediversityofcountriesoforiginis,ingeneral,measuredbythediversityindexbasedontheSimpsondiversityindex,whichisequal to theprobability that twoentities taken randomlyfrom the dataset of interest (with replacement) representthesametype.Itstransformation(1–SimpsonIndex)istheprobabilitythatthetwoentitiesrepresentdifferenttypesandiscalledtheGini–Simpsonindex.Inthecontextofourstudy,itimpliestheprobabilitythattwopersonsrandomlytakeninthesectorhavedifferentorigins(countryofbirthorcitizenship).

.

10 In the United States, wage dispersion is twice that inSwitzerland,SwedenandBelgium(ILOstatistics,2000).

21Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

The United States, in general, is the preferreddestinationforallmigrantworkers.

Takingthesedifferencesintoaccount,itwouldbeimportant toorganize in Europeamore friendlyaccess for foreign STEMworkerswith dedicatedBlue Cards or national cards. At the same time,theoutflowsofSTEMstudentscouldbereducedbyprovidingmorejobsandhigherremunerationso that they will not have to look for betteropportunitieselsewhere.

•Notonlyisthedesignofinnovationimportantbutalsoitsdiffusion,andtertiary-educatedindividualsare fundamental particularly in the high techsector.

Thus, any policy that favours the entrance ofhighly skilled workers should be pursued. TheBlueCardorsimilarnationalcardsthatfavourtheentranceofthehighlyskilled,orapointssystemthat values the education of immigrants more

thananyothercharacteristics,shouldbeadopted.EvenifthisissueisalreadyintheEuropeanagendaonmigration,moreattentionshouldbedevotedto the practical implementation of the policy.Frequently,infact,smalloperationaldetailsreducetheeffectivenessofthepolicy,which,inprinciple,respondstothedemandoftheemployersandofthepotentialworkers.

•Thepossibility tohire foreign studentseducatedin the destination countries should also beconsidered and the possibility of a transitionfrom school to work should be from the initialstages of negotiation with the sending country.Thissolutionwouldalsoreducethephenomenoncalled “brain waste” or “overqualification”11of migrants, in which the levels of educationalattainmentofmigrantsarehigherthanthelevelsofjobsavailableforthemortheyhavebeenhiredfor. As shown in Figure 3, this phenomenon isprevalentinalldestinationcountries.

11 OECD,Settling in: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012 (Paris,OECD,2012).

Figure 3: Overqualification rates among foreign and native-born workers aged 15–64 by country of birth, 2012 and 2013

Source: OECD, OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In (Paris, OECD, 2015).

22 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Thismismatchbetweenthejobsofforeignworkersandtheireducationalattainmentisnotalwaysduetodiscrimination.Frequently,mismatchhappensbecause the studies undertaken by migrants intheir countries of origin are not in demand inthedestinationcountries, sometimesthequalityof education is difficult to measure withouta skills assessment, or migrant workers havelimitedknowledgeofthelanguagespokeninthedestinationcountry.Reductionofoverqualificationisanimportantobjectiveofthemigrationpolicy,but apart from recognizing the educationalattainmentofforeigners,somethingcanbedonebefore they leave their home countries, such asby investing in careerorientation in schools andtakinguplanguagecourses.However,theonlywaytoeliminatebrainwasteistohireforeignstudentswith skills, knowledge and experience that aremoremarketableinthedestinationcountries.

•Thediversityof inflowsdoesnot seem tobeaningredient of a successful recipe for enhancingproduction in all sectors. The national quotasystemforimmigrants,forinstance,whichaimstoassurethediversityofinflows,doesnotenhanceproduction in the high tech sector. Migrantsof different ethnic groups are concentratedin different sectors (Fassio, Kalantaryan andVenturini,2015).Whenmigrantsfromaparticularsendingcountryarriveatthedestinationcountry,they are usually employed in a certain sector,helping that particular sector boom. Thesemigrants usually stay in that sector for the longterm. When fellow workers from the samecountryjointhefirstmovers,themigratorychainbegins;thissubsequentbatchofforeignworkersareintroducedinthesamesector,thusasector-ethnicclusteringtakesplacewithoutamigrationpolicyinterventionbythedestinationcountry.Thediversityofcountriesoforigincorrespondtothediversityofethnicconcentrationinsectors,whichcan result in a positive complementarity at thenationalorregionallevelbutwhichdoesnotneedtobepushedatleastforinnovationreasons.

•Low- and medium-skilled migrants play animportant role in spurring innovation in themanufacturing sector. Even if themanufacturingsector is declining in all European countries andmanufacturing production has been shiftedto developing countries, the manufacturingsector enhances its productivity by employinglow- and medium-skilled workers. Productivitygrowth should therefore be taken into accountinformulatingmigrationpolicies,thuscombining

high-,medium-andlow-skilledinflowsaccordingtothevariationofdemand.

•Thekeyroleofeducationandtraininginspurringinnovationhasbeenemphasized.Tohelp labourmigrationgetgoodresults,pre-departuretrainingorganized in the sending countries and bilateralagreementsorpartnership agreementsbetweenthesendinganddestinationcountriescouldbeanextensionof strictmigrationpolicies suchas theBlueCardorthenationalcardsysteminEurope.Intherecentasylum-seekerandrefugeeemergencysituation,many traditional instruments availablefor labour migrants are not applicable, butinvestmentinlanguagestudies,skillsassessmentand specific training remain available and canbe key priorities not only to favour the asylumintegrationindestinationcountriesbutalsotousethepotentialhumancapitalinthemostprofitableway. The research carried out by Jacobs (1969)aboutwhathappenedinNewYorkCityafterWorldWarIIisencouraging.Afterthewar,manyrefugeesfromallovertheworldcametothecity.NewYorkthenbecamealaboratoryforinnovationbecauseforeigncitizensbroughtwith themdiverse skills,knowledgeandeducation,makingNewYorkoneof the greatest cities in the world. This successstorymaybereplicatedatpresenttime,butifhighhumancapitaldoesnotexistcurrentlyinvestmentineducationandtrainingisencouraged.

References

Alesina,A.,J.HarnossandH.Rapoport2013 Birthplace diversity and economic

prosperity. National Bureau of EconomicResearch(NBER)workingpaperno.18699,NBER,Cambridge,Massachusetts.

Barone,G.andS.Mocetti2011 Withalittlehelpfromabroad:Theeffectof

low-skilledimmigrationonthefemalelaborsupply.Labour Economics,18(5):664–675.

Barrett,A.2012 Welfare and Immigration. Migration

Policy Centre (MPC) Research ReportNo. 2012/07, MPC, European UniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy.

Bosetti,V.,C.CattaneoandE.Verdolini2015 Migrationofskilledworkersandinnovation:

A European perspective. Journal of International Economics,96(2):311–322.

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Brücker,H.2012 TheLaborMarketImpactofImmigrationand

Its Policy Consequences. Migration PolicyCentre(MPC)AnalyticalandSyntheticNoteNo. 2012/04, MPC, European UniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy.

Cortés,P.andJ.Tessada2011 Low-skilled immigration and the labor

supply of highly skilled women.American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,3(3):88–123.

DiBartolomeo,A.,S.KalataryanandA.Venturini2016 The demand of caregivers. Presentation

delivered at the Conference onDemography, Migration Policy Centre,European University Institute, Florence,Italy,4–5February.

Fargues,P.andA.McCormick2013 Ageing of skills and complementary

immigration in the EU, 2010–2025.Robert Schuman Centre for AdvancedStudies (RSCAS) working paper 2013/81,RSCAS,Migration Policy Centre, EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy.Availablefrom http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28643/RSCAS_2013_81.pdf?sequence=1

Fassio,C.,F.MontobbioandA.Venturini2015 How do native and migrant workers

contributetoinnovation?AstudyonFrance,GermanyandtheUK.Discussionpaperno.9062, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft derArbeit(IZA,InstitutefortheStudyofLabor),Bonn,Germany.

Fassio,C.,S.KalantaryanandA.Venturini2015 Human resources and innovation: Total

factor productivity and foreign humancapital. discussion paper 2015/9422,Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit(IZA,InstitutefortheStudyofLabor),Bonn,Germany.Availablefromhttp://ftp.iza.org/dp9422.pdf

Farré,L.,L.GonzálezandF.Ortega2011 Immigrants, family responsibilities and

labor supplyof skillednativewomen.B.E. Journal of Economic Analyses and Policies, 11:1–48.

Gagliardi,L.2015 Does skilled migration foster innovative

performance? Evidence from Britishlocal areas. Papers in Regional Science,94(4):773–794.

Gosh,A.,A.M.MaydaandF.Ortega2016 The impact of skilled foreign workers on

firms: An investigation of publicly tradedU.S. firms. Discussion paper no. 8684,Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit(IZA,InstitutefortheStudyofLabor),Bonn,Germany.

Hunt,J.andM.Gauthier-Loiselle2010 How much does immigration boost

innovation? American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,2(2):31–56.

Jacobs,J.1969 The Economy of Cities.Vintage,NewYork.

Kerr,W.andW.F.Lincoln2010 The supply side of innovation: H-1B Visa

reformsandU.S. ethnic invention. Journal of Labour Economics,28(3):473–508.

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2012 Settling in: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012.OECD,Paris.

2015 OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In.OECD,Paris.

Ortega,F.andG.Peri2014 Openness and income: The roles of trade

and migration. Journal of International Economics,92(2):231–251.

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affect innovation? A comparative analysisofimmigrationandfirmproductivityintheNetherlands and Germany. International Migration Review,48:377–416.

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regions. In:Migration Impact Assessment: New Horizons (P. Nijkamp, J. Poot andM.Sahin,eds.).EdwardElgar,London.

Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE24

Conventionallabourmarketorientationstowardsmigration and development do not addresssome important aspects of development.

AmartyaSen’sviewofdevelopmentastheexpansionoffreedomsorcapabilities,anditsfocusonthelivespeople live and have reason to value, needs to becontrastedwith thisperspective.Senconceptualizesdevelopmentas aprocessof expanding the choicesand freedoms people have reason to value. Thesefreedoms depend on the timewhen and the placewhere they are made as well as on the individual.The sameperson, in different contexts,might valuedifferent choices or freedoms.2 Sen understandspoverty as a constraint on substantial freedoms,such as poor economic opportunities, includingunemployment, low salaries, social deprivation,neglectofpublicfacilitiesandintolerance.

For example, unemployment and non-employabilityresult from the confines of the limited absorptivecapacity of the labour market. To achieve higherlevels of development and reduce poverty, variousrestrictions (unfreedoms) and barriers to freedomthatpeoplesufferhavetoberemoved.3Thisfreedom-based context advances the concept of humandevelopment,allowingadeeperunderstandingofthemigration and development nexus. The applicationof the capability approach also allows for a betterassessment of international migration’s inherentdevelopmental features and the consequences forpeople’s freedoms. Since it is “the combination offoundationalanalysisandpragmaticusethatgivesthecapabilityapproachitsextensivereach,”4itcontrastseconomicperspectivesofdevelopment.

2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development(NewYork,UNDP,2009).

3 A.Sen,Development as Freedom(NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,1999).

4 A. Sen, Freedom, Rationality, and Social Choice: The Arrow Lectures and Other Essays (Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press,2000),p.86.

1 Sabrina Juran is a technical specialist at thePopulationandDevelopmentBranchoftheUnitedNationsPopulationFund(UNFPA).Theviewsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthoranddonotreflectthoseofheremployer.

Voluntary migration itself can be understood as anexerciseofthefreedomtomove.Thefunctioningsandconsequencesthatmigrantsandtheirhouseholdscanachievebyexercisingtheirfreedomtomovedependonthecontextinwhichmigrationoccursaswellasontheagencyoftheindividual.

Thecapabilityapproachischaracterizedbyelasticityand internal pluralism that allows for its furtherelaborationandapplicationintodifferentspheresofresearch5,6andthusprovidestheidealframeworktomeasure the contributionof internationalmigrationtohumandevelopment.

Notlimitedtoeconomicachievements,thecapabilityapproach is interested in various outcomes andconsiders all factors that lead to the life a personhas reason to value. Sen points out that the“glorification of human beings as instruments ofeconomicdevelopmentcannotreallybeadequate.”7

Migrationscholarssuggestthat“afullunderstandingof contemporary migratory processes will not beachieved by relying on the tools of one disciplinealone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis.”8The capability approach allows for the integrationof different academic disciplines that address theissue of international migration from demographic,sociological,geographic,andeconomicperspectives.By recognizing the linkages between human well-being and economic, cultural, social, political, andenvironmental factors, the capability approachremainsopentotheinclusionofunlimitedindicators.Sendoesnot imposerigidorthodoxywithadefinedsetofprescriptivemethods.9

5 A. Alkire,Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2002).

6 I. Robeyns, “The capability approach: A theoretical survey”,Journal of Human Development,6(1):93–114(2005).

7 A. Sen, “Development thinkingat thebeginningof the21stcentury”,paperpresentedattheconferenceondevelopmentthinkingandpractice,organizedbytheInter-AmericanBank,Washington,D.C.,3–5September1996.

8 D.S. Massey et al., “Theories of international migration: Areviewandappraisal”,Population and Development Review,19(3):432(1993).

9 S. Fukuda-Parr, “The human development paradigm:Operationalizing Sen’s ideas on capabilities”, Feminist Economics,9(2–3):301–317(2003).

International migration seen through the lens of Amartya Sen’s capability approachSabrina Juran1

25Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Another strength of the capability approach is itspossible division into various analytical layers.10Despite its person-centred perspective on humandevelopment, it also considers the surroundingsystems that prevail in the countries of origin anddestination–includingeconomicgrowth,investmentin education and a flourishing social infrastructure– that shape developmental outcomes. Therefore,the capability approach allows for the explanationof internationalmigration as a by-product ofmacroconditions, without ignoring the perspective of theindividual.Themigrationprocess,includingtrajectoryandsettlement,isunderstoodasameanstoexpandpeople’sfreedoms.

One assumption is that the migratory experienceexpands the real freedoms a person enjoys. Themigrant and the family that he or she either takesalong or leaves behind expand their economic,political and social freedoms. However, sincemigration is a very selective process, mobility canprovide ways to access and accumulate financial,human and social resources for somemigrants. Forothers, themigratory experiencemight lead to thedepletionoftheirassets.Anotherassumptionisthatthemigrationprocessissociallyembeddedandthat,inpart,outmigrationrisksthedisruptionofsocialtiesinthecountryoforigin,thusleavingthiscommunitywithadefectivesocialinfrastructure.

The link between social capital and migrationbecomesclearwhenconsideringemigrationasalossof highly valuable social capital. The developmentof a productive social infrastructure is very labour-intensive, and the condition of national socialcapitalisoftenobscuredbyhighratesofemigration.However, the migration process itself relies onexistingsocialtiesalongthemigrationcorridor.Whileintransitoruponarrival,migrantsdevelopnewsocialrelationshipsthatcanfacilitatethemigratoryprocess.Longstandingmigratoryflowsalongacertaincorridorprovide the basis for social cohesion; transnationalnetworksoperateandbecomeestablished.Throughthesenetworks,contactbetweenmigrantsandtheirfamilies and friends left behind can bemaintained.Researchonsocialnetworksinthemigrationprocess

10 M. Biggeri, T. Jean-Francois and P. Bakhshi, “Le Teorie dellaDisabilità: Una Reinterpretazione Attraverso l’Approcciodelle Capability di Amartya Sen”, inDalla Relazione di Cura alla Relazione di Prossimità: L’approccio delle Capability alle Persone con Disabilità (editedbyM.BiggeriandN.Bellanca),CollanaBiòtopi(Naples,Liguori,2010).

shows that they also influence who moves andwhere to.11 Transnational communities demonstrate“theimportanceofdifferent localities inamigrationprocess and how families and migrants conserveexisting links and create new links between eachother.”12 By participating in established networksthat span themigratory space or channel, the costofmigrationisdrasticallyreducedwhenthemigrantgains access to facilitated sources of information,housing, employment or loans. Social networksmitigate the risks of crossing national borders, inparticular in undocumented situations.13Reductionsinmigratorycostsprovidepoorerpeoplewithbetteropportunities and encourage their participation.14

Overtime the proportion of people with migrationexperience increaseswithinacommunity.Migratoryexperiences accumulate among the community’spopulation, open attitudes and spread knowledge;social ties tomigrantsor returneesmultiply. This inturnexpandsthepoolofpotentialmigrants.

Sen states that “development requires the removalof major sources of unfreedoms, poverty as wellas tyranny, poor economic opportunities as wellas systematic social deprivation, neglect of publicfacilities as well as intolerance or over-activity ofrepressive states.”15 He postulates that “economicunfreedom, in the form of extreme poverty, canmakeapersonhelplesspreyintheviolationofotherkindsoffreedom...and...canbreedsocialunfreedom,just as social or political unfreedom can also fostereconomic unfreedom.”16 Migration provides astrategy to free oneself from these unfreedoms ofeconomic, political and social development, and toaugmentanddiversifytheactualfreedomsapersoncan possess. The possibility to choosemigration asa freedom-enhancing strategy depends, however,

11 S.Thieme,Social Networks and Migration: Far West Nepalese Labour Migrants in Delhi,NationalCentreforCompetenceinResearch(NCCR)North-SouthDialogue(Berne,NCCRNorth-South,2006).

12 Ibid.,11.

13 K.EspinosaandD.Massey,“Undocumentedmigrationandthequantityandqualityofsocialcapital”,Soziale Welt,12:141–162.

14 D. Massey, L. Goldring and J. Durand, “Continuities intransnational migration: An analysis of nineteen Mexicancommunities”, American Journal of Sociology, 99(6):1492–1533(1994).

15 A.Sen,DevelopmentasFreedom(NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,1999),p.3.

16 Ibid.,8.

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on people’s access to various forms of resources.Theseincludeeconomic,human,social,culturalandpolitical capital, as well as the institutional contextand geographic conditions within which it takesplace. Such accessibility and ownership of assetsplayessentialrolesinthedecision-makingprocessofmigration.On the one hand, they define the actualneed for an individual or a household to pursuemigrationasalivelihoodstrategy.Ontheotherhand,theydetermineifthepotentialmigrantcanaffordthecostsassociatedwithemigration.17Whilepoorpeopleingeneralaremoredisposedtoemigratewithhopesof expanding opportunities, the poorest people donotmigratethemost,becausetheylackthenecessaryfinancial and social resources. Households that areeconomically better off aremore able to afford thecostsassociatedwithmigration.18,19,20,21

Whilethecapabilityapproachistheoreticallyverywellsuitedtodescribedevelopmentandpoverty,itsmajorchallenge lies in itsmethodological application. Theoperability of Sen’s approach has been questionedbecause of the difficulty to assess and measurevaluable capabilities22 from the perspective of theactor.

However, Sen claims that while the freedom ofwell-being is reflected by a person’s capability set,achievements of well-being should bemeasured atthe levelof functionings.23“Thecentralclaimof the

17 F.M.Antman,“Theimpactofmigrationonfamilyleftbehind”,discussion paper no. 6374 (Bonn, Forschungsinstitut zurZukunftderArbeit,2012).

18 S.Acharya,“LabourmigrationinthetransitionaleconomiesofSouth-EastAsia“,workingpaperonmigrationandurbanization(Bangkok, United Nations Economic and Social CommissionforAsiaandthePacific,2003).

19 G. Gonzalez-König, “Migration, remittances and incomedistribution”, paper presented at II Simposio InternacionaldeMigración,MigraciónyDesarrollo,LasRemesas,segundasesión,Tijuana,México,2008.

20 R.Black,C.NataliandJ.Skinner,“Migrationandinequality”,background paper, Equity and Development: World Development Report 2006 (Sussex, Development ResearchCentreonMigration,GlobalisationandPoverty,UniversityofSussex,2005).

21 F.M.Antman,“Theimpactofmigrationonfamilyleftbehind”,discussion paper no. 6374 (Bonn, Forschungsinstitut zurZukunftderArbeit,2012).

22 D.A. Clark, “Capability approach”, The Elgar Companion to Development Studies (edited by D.A. Clark) (Cheltenham,EdwardElgar,2006).

23 I. Robeyns, “The capability approach: A theoretical survey”,Journal of Human Development,6(1):93–117(2005).

[c]apability [a]pproach is that whatever concept...onewantstoconsider,theinformationalbaseofthisjudgment must relate to the space of functioningsand/orcapabilities,dependingontheissueathand.”24Alongtheselines,itispossibletoconducttheanalysisat the level of functionings including goods andmaterialwell-being,orat the levelof achievementssuch as schooling, literacy and mortality rates.25Understanding capabilities and functionings asthe evaluative space for human development andassigninganagencycharactertotheindividualimpliesthe inclusion of diversity as one of the underlyingcharacteristicsofhumanbeings. 26,27

Given this evaluative aspect of the capabilityapproach,key indicatorswillbedefinedat the levelof functionings to measure improvement of well-being.28Onlytheproperidentificationoffunctioningsformeasurementwillmake the capability approachoperational in linking migration and development.Povertyorthelackofdevelopmentwillbelookedatintermsofdeprivationofmeasurableachievements.“Deprivationhastobejudgedincomparisonwiththeexperience of others in the society.”29 Functioningsarenumerousandunderliesubjectiveevaluation.Asstated before, they vary among cultures and socialgroups, are gender- and age-sensitive, and maychangeduringthecourseoftimeandmigratorystage.Forexample,thecapabilityoflivingahealthyhumanlife of normal length – not dying prematurely orbeforeone’slifeissoreducedastobenotworthliving–reflectstheactualsocialopportunitiesonehas.30

24 S. Deneulin and L. Shahani, An Introduction to the Human Development and Capability Approach: Freedom and Agency(London, Human Development and Capability Association,2009),p.38.

25 J. Schischka, P. Dalziel and C. Saunders, “Applying Sen’scapabilityapproachtopovertyalleviationprograms:Twgmocasestudies”,Journal of Human Development,9(2):229–246(2008).

26 I. Robeyns, “The capability approach: A theoretical survey“,Journal of Human Development,6(1):93–117(2005).

27 A. Sen, Inequality Reexamined (New York, Russell SageFoundation;Cambridge,HarvardUniversity,1992).

28 S. Fukuda-Parr, “The human development paradigm:Operationalizing Sen’s ideas on capabilities”, Feminist Economics,9(2–3):301–317(2003).

29 A. Sen, “Poverty: An ordinal approach to measurement”,Econometrica,44(2):219–231(1976).

30 M.Nussbaum,“Capabilitiesasfundamentalentitlements:Senandsocialjustice”,Feminist Economics,9(2–3):41(2003).

27Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Sen’s theoretical framework stipulates importantfeatures that can be used to conceptualize andevaluatesocialanddevelopmentalarrangementsandchange, such as the phenomenon of internationalmigration.Includingdifferentrationalesandobjectivesthat people have created given their environmentalconditions create complexities, which require theapplicationofaculturalperspectivewhenlookingatdevelopment.31,32n

Migration provides a strategy to free oneself from these unfreedoms of economic,

political and social development, and to augment and diversify the actual freedoms a person

can possess.

31 Theapplicationoftheculturelensisaimedatstrengtheningcultural diversity and analysing and evaluating whethervisions,practices,policiesandprogrammes incorporateandpromote the principles enshrined in the declarations andconventionswithrespecttoculture.

32 United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO), UNESCO Universal Declaration onCulturalDiversity(Paris,UNESCO,2001).

Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE28

The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than everJulia Black, Ann Singleton and Arezo Malakooti1

1 in 23 die in the Mediterranean in the first five months of 2016

Duringthefirstfivemonthsof2016,1inevery23migrantshasdiedattempting the journeyacross the CentralMediterranean to Europe.

This represents a drastic worsening of the deathtoll. Since the beginning of 2014, the overall ratioof deaths to the number of migrant crossings hasbeen1 in50. For2015, itwas1 in53. This ratioofdeaths to attempted crossings worsened further inAprilandMay2016when1migrantdiedforevery17attemptedcrossings.Thiswas5percentofthetotalnumberofpeoplewhoattemptedthejourneyacrosstheCentralMediterraneanduringthesetwomonths.Theseestimatedfigures,usingthesamemethodologyandsourcessincethebeginningof2014,indicateanincreasingly deadly route, despite the widespreadmediaattentionandpublicandpolicyawarenessofthiscontinuinghumanitariandisaster.

Thisbriefingaimstoachievethefollowing:(a)examinethe available data on rising numbers of deaths and

arrivals;(b)analysethechangingroutestowardsthedeparturepointsforthisdangerousseajourneyintoEurope;and (c) investigatehowpatternsandtrendshave changed during the period between January2014andtheendofMay2016.

How many migrants have died?

Monthly totals of deaths in the Central Mediterranean, January 2014–May 2016

Figure 1 indicates the deaths and disappearancesbymonth on eachMediterranean route. Comparedtootherroutes,deathwhileattemptingtocrosstheCentral Mediterranean occurs at disproportionatelyhigh levels to thenumberofpeopleattempting thecrossing. Since2014,17ofevery20migrantdeathsin theMediterranean have occurred on the CentralMediterraneanroute,whichaccountsforjustoveraquarterofarrivalsduringthesameperiod.Forevery50migrantswhohaveattemptedthedangerouscrossingsince2014,1hasdied.Recentmonthshavebecomemoredeadly,however;morepeoplehavediedinthe

Figure 1: Migrant deaths and disappearances in the Mediterranean by route, January 2014–May 2016

Source: Missing Migrants Project.

1 Julia Black, Consultant for the Missing Migrants Project,GMDAC;AnnSingleton,SeniorAdviserofGMDACandArezoMalakooti,SeniorResearchandDataAnalystofGMDAC.

29Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

CentralMediterraneaninthefirstfivemonthsof2016thantheequivalentperiodinanyotheryear.Similarly,theratioofdeathsperattemptedcrossinghasmorethan doubled from2015 to the first fivemonths of2016,from0.18percentofcrossingsto0.43percent.Thisrepresentsashiftfrom1deathin53attemptedcrossingsto1in23onthisroute.

Largest incidents in the Central Mediterranean, 1 January 2014–31 May 2016

In theMediterranean from2014 to theendofMay2016, 9,492 people are estimated to have diedor are thought to be missing. Within these totalnumbers, more than 20 incidents since 2014 haveeachresultedinover100deaths,totaling6,406deadandmissing.AlltheseincidentstookplacealongtheCentralMediterranean route (Figure 2). These largeshipwrecksmakeupmorethanhalfofalldeathsintheMediterranean,withoverloadingoftheboats,ratherthanbadweather,being thought tobea significantcausalfactor.

When hundreds of migrants die during shipwrecks,manybodiesareneverrecovered.Itisestimatedthatmore than 6,000 bodies remain unrecovered in the

Mediterranean from incidents between 2014 andMay2016.ReportsoflargenumbersofbodiesbeingwashedupontheshoresofNorthAfricaindicatethatshipwrecksoccurwithout leavingany traces. In July2015,more than100bodieswere found inTajoura,Libya,withnomajorshipwreckhavingbeenrecordedfor three months previously. Smaller numbers ofbodieshavebeen foundon the shoresof LibyaandTunisia,withnoreportsofashipwreck,onmorethanhalf a dozen occasions. It is likely that the CentralMediterranean route is even more deadly thanalreadyreported.

Arrivals

The increased numbers and ratio of deaths toattemptedcrossingsofthecentralrouteaccompanywhatappearstobeaveryrecentriseinarrivals.Sincethe end of 2013, more than 300,000 people havearrivedinEuropeviatheCentralMediterraneanroutefromNorth Africa to Italy andMalta (most arrivingin Italy). In 2014, there were 170,100 arrivals, asconflicts inEurope’s immediatevicinityescalated. In2015,numbersarrivingviathisroutefellto153,842,while847,930migrantsandrefugeesreachedGreeceacross the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the

Figure 2: Incidents with highest reported migrant fatalities by route, January 2014–May 2016

Source: Missing Migrants Project.

30 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

unprecedented spike in arrivals in 2014, numbersfellby9.5percent in2015.Thiswasmainlydue totheinstabilityinLibya,whichmadethecountrymoredangerous for migrants and led to higher numbersacrosstheEasternMediterranean.2Figure3indicatesthe monthly breakdown of arrivals in Italy fromJanuary2014toMay2016.

Itisnowknownthatinthefirstfivemonthsof2016,47,851 migrants arrived in Italy. This was in totalalmostthesamenumberasfortheequivalentperiodin 2015 (47,452). However, a significant changeoccurredinApril,when–forthefirsttimesinceMay2015–morepeoplearrived in Italy than inGreece.SinceMarch 2016, arrivals inGreece have fallen by90percentcomparedwithMay2015.AprilandMay2016saw29,474arrivalsinItaly,comparedto5,661arrivalsinGreece.Thesefiguresshowthatthenumberofmigrantsattemptingthisrouteisrisingagain.

Numbers of women arriving in Italy increased in 2015

As the total number of arrivals have risen, theproportion of women appears to be increasing. In2015,thenumberofwomenarriving in ItalyviatheMediterranean totaled 21,434, an increase from18,180 in 2014. Women made up 14 per cent ofarrivals to Italy in2015,comparedwith10percentin2014.

2 A. Malakooti, Migration Trends in the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots (Altai Consulting for IOMMiddle EastandNorthAfricaRegionalOffice,Cairo,2015).Availablefromhttp://publications.iom.int/system/files/altai_migration_trends_accross_the_mediterranean.pdf

Arrivals of children fell as the proportion of unaccompanied minors remained the same

The pattern of arrivals of children is mixed. Thenumber of minors travelling to Italy via the seabordersfellbetween2014and2015,from26,122to16,478, including (respectively) 13,026 and 12,360unaccompaniedminors.Whiletheoverallproportionof children fell from 15 per cent to 11 per centduringthesetwoyears,thereisalsoanindicationofhigher numbers of unaccompaniedminors, as theirproportionofthetotalstayedthesame,ataround8percent.

Falling numbers in the Eastern Mediterranean, rising numbers of arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route

In2015,thenumberofarrivalsinItalyviatheCentralMediterraneanfellforthefirsttimesince2012,dueinlargeparttotheriseoftheEasternMediterraneanas the predominant route used by Syrianmigrants.ThoughEritreanarrivals increasedin2015to25percentoftheoverallflows,thenumberofSyriansfellto7,448,whichis5percentofthetotalarrivalsinItalythat year. During the same period, 499,495 SyriansarrivedinGreeceviatheEasternMediterranean.

Changing suite of countries of origin

In addition to the changing situation for Syrians,arrivalsinEuropeviatheCentralMediterraneanhaveseena shift in the suiteofother countriesoforiginsince2010.Before2012,mostmigrantswhoarrivedinItalyviatheMediterraneanwerefromNorthAfrica;between2010and2012,Tunisiansmadeupatleast

Figure 3: Monthly arrivals to Italy, January 2014–May 2016

Source: IOM Italy.

31Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

15percentoftheseflows.ArrivalsinItalythenmorethandoubledin2013,inlargepartduetothearrivalof 11,307 Syrians and 9,834 Eritreans, representingrespectiveincreasesfrom582and1,612in2012.

In the following year, 2014, numbers crossing theCentral Mediterranean increased again, this timetriple the number of the previous year. Despite theoverallincreaseinnumbers,thedistributionbymajorcountriesoforiginremainedlargelythesame.In2014,42,323Syrianscomprised25percentofthenumbersarriving in Italy, compared to 26 per cent in 2013.Similarly,34,329Eritreanmigrantsrepresented20percentofarrivalsinItalyin2014,thesameproportionseen the year before. Fewer Egyptians arrived in2014 and2015 than in 2013,when they comprised6percentofarrivalsinItaly.Contrastingly,significantnumbersofSudanesearrivedinItalyin2015,makingup6percentoftheflows.Similarly,Nigerianarrivalsincreased in 2015, from less than6per cent of thetotalin2013and2014tonearly15percentofarrivalsinItalyin2016(Figure4).

Routes from North Africa to Europe

MigrantsarrivinginItalyfromLibyaarepredominantlyfrom East Africa, West Africa and the Syrian ArabRepublic, though numbers from the Syrian ArabRepublic fell in 2015 and 2016.Historically, the riseinnumberofarrivalsvia theCentralMediterraneanroutewas first associated in 2014with an increasein thenumberofNorthAfricandeparturepoints toEurope.ThemajorityofboatdeparturesfromNorthAfricaoccurredfromtheLibyancoast,withadditionaldeparture points in Tunisia and Egypt. The mainboatdeparturepoints fromLibya in 2014and2015were beachheadswithin 50 km of Tripoli, includingZwarahandZawiya.SomemigrantsalsodepartfromBenghazi.ThemajordeparturepointsfromEgyptarearound Alexandria, between El Hamam to thewestandDamiettatotheeast.Boatarrivals to Italy fromEgyptweremainly Eritreans, Palestinians, Egyptiansand Syrians, though again the number of Syrianmigrantsdecreasedin2015and2016.Thefrequencyofuseofthesedeparturepointsisthoughttodependonthelevelandintensityofbordercontroloperationsatdifferentpointsonthenortherncoast.3

3 Ibid.

Figure 4: Country of origin of migrant arrivals in Italy, 2013‒2015

32 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Historically, some Syrian migrants arrived by air toAlgeria, Egypt and Libya, which previously had novisarequirementsforSyrians.ThenumbersofSyrianstravellingbyairintoLibyadecreasedduringthe2014crisis, but has since risen again. However, Egyptand Algeria now require visas from Syrian passportholders,whichstoppedthesemovements.Generally,the number of Syrians who arrived in Italy in 2015andthefirstquarterof2016weremuchlowerthanpreceding years, due to the increasing difficultiesof travel to North Africa and the comparative ease(until recentmonths) of the EasternMediterraneancrossing.

Map 1: Main migration routes from North Africa to Europe

Source: Malakooti, 2015.

Routes to North Africa towards the Central Mediterranean

LibyaistraditionallythemaincountryofdepartureontheCentralMediterraneanroutes,althoughEgypthasbecomeamorecommontransitpointinrecentyears.There are severalmajor routes into Libya.MigrantsfromEritrea,Ethiopia,SomaliaandSudantravelfromtheeast,throughtheHornofAfrica,toKhartoumandthen toLibyavia its south-easternborders.Anothermigratoryroute isthroughChadtoSebha, inSouth-western Libya.Nigerian,Malian, andotherWesternAfricanmigrantstaketheroutesthroughNiger,whichleadnorthtoLibyaeitherdirectlyorviaAlgeria.There

33Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

isalsoaroutefromEgypttoLibyaviaSalloumthatistakenbyfewermigrantsthanontheotherroutestoLibya.ThisrouteisfrequentedbyEgyptians,Eritreans,Ethiopians,SudaneseandSyrians.

LibyaistraditionallythemaincountryofdepartureontheCentralMediterraneanroutes,althoughEgypthasbecomeamorecommontransitpointinrecentyears.There are severalmajor routes into Libya.MigrantsfromEritrea,Ethiopia,SomaliaandSudantravelfromtheeast,throughtheHornofAfrica,toKhartoumandthen toLibyavia its south-easternborders.Anothermigratoryroute isthroughChadtoSebha, inSouth-western Libya. Nigerian,Malian and otherWesternAfricanmigrantstaketheroutesthroughNiger,whichleadnorthtoLibyaeitherdirectlyorviaAlgeria.ThereisalsoaroutefromEgypttoLibyaviaSalloumthatistakenbyfewermigrantsthanontheotherroutestoLibya.ThisrouteisfrequentedbyEgyptians,Eritreans,Ethiopians,SudaneseandSyrians.

Map 2: Main migration routes to North Africa on the Central Mediterranean route

Source: Malakooti, 2015.

Conclusions

The available data on routes towards the CentralMediterranean and on deaths and arrivals indicatethat since theendofMarch2016, therehavebeenrising numbers bothof arrivals anddeaths,with anincrease in the number of large incidents and anunprecedented death toll for the last week ofMay2016.Thisbriefingseekstoinformpolicymakersandthe general public of this change, in the context ofpreviousandemergingEuropeanUnionandnationalgovernment policy interventions. Thedeadly eventstaking place in the Mediterranean are increasinglyconcentrated in the CentralMediterranean, a routethathasbecomemore significantwith theeffectiveclosureof theEasternMediterraneanrouteandtheoverlandWesternBalkansroute,theimplementationoftheEuropeanUnion–Turkeyagreement,therelativeporosity of borders in Libya and the increasinglydangerous conditions for the migrants living there.

34 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

All these factors are thought to drive and influencethe desperate choicesmade bymigrants, along thevarious routes to the Central Mediterranean andwhichresultintheincreasednumberofarrivalsonthisroute.WiththeclosureoftheEasternMediterraneanrouteandtheextremedangersposedbytheCentralMediterranean crossing, the numbers presentedhere seem to support warnings from officials andcommentatorsofamajorhumanitariancrisis.

Note on data used in this brief

Timely data on migration are often scarce, makingit difficult for decision makers to develop effectivemigrationpolicies.ThecreationoftheGlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre(GMDAC)inBerlin,Germany,isIOM’s response to growing calls for comprehensivedata on global migration trends. This series ofdata briefings is a step towards better analysis andcommunicationofavailabledata,whichisneededtopromoteabetterunderstandingofmigration.

Thedatausedinthisbriefarebasedonmethodologiesdeveloped to maximize accuracy and timeliness.Data onmigrant arrivals are collected by IOM fromnational sources on registrations – in this brief, theItalianMinistryoftheInteriorandtheHellenicCoastGuard – and take into account government sourcesand local estimates from IOM staff on the ground.Data on migrant deaths are sourced from IOM’sMissingMigrantsProject,whichcollatesinformationfrom national authorities, media reports, non-governmentalorganizationsandlocalestimatesfromIOM staff.However, it is important to keep inmindthat because of the irregular nature of migrationdiscussed in this briefing, it is not possible to havepreciselyaccuratenumbers.Allnumbersusedinthisbriefing should be seen as approximations, whichnonethelessreflectthescaleandtrendsofmigration.For further reading, see: A. Malakooti, Migration Trends in the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots (AltaiConsultingforIOMMiddleEastandNorthAfricaRegionalOffice,Cairo,2015).Available from http://publications.iom.int/books/migration-trends-across-mediterranean-connecting-dots

Crowdfunding is an increasingly popular and successful mechanism to generate funding for worthwhile projects and initiatives.

MigFunder (www.migfunder.com/), the first and only crowdfunding platform dedicated solely to migration, refugee and human rights initiatives worldwide, was launched a few months ago.

The platform caters to migrants looking to create (or grow) their businesses abroad or in their countries of origin, as well as to migrant organizations, public agencies, non-governmental organizations, and individuals looking to launch a development or humanitarian initiative in support of immigrant and refugee communities worldwide, or a research project/conference in the field of migration, asylum or human rights policy.

This is a pioneering initiative that will contribute potentially to reducing the effects of budget cuts and underfunding in major refugee, migration

and human rights programmes around the world. MigFunder was established by a group of European migration policy experts, including former senior government officials, reputable researchers and IT developers, who set out to extend the facilities and benefits of a crowdfunding platform to the specific needs of immigration, refugee and human rights affairs worldwide.

MigFunder targets, primarily but not exclusively, members of the diaspora who are willing and able to support viable business projects from their compatriots, as well as development, humanitarian and research initiatives in the countries of immigration or origin.

Current campaigns on MigFunder originate from organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Doctors of the World, the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), Business in the Community Ireland and Quist Solicitors, among others. Most are concerned with the current refugee crisis.

For any further information, or to submit a campaign, please contact Solon Ardittis (sardittis@migfunder.com) or Don Ingham (dingham@migfunder.com).

Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE36Publications

Fatal Journeys Volume 2: Identification and tracing of dead and missing migrants 2016/108pages/EnglishISBN978-92-9068-721-4•E-ISBN978-92-1-058234-6

Over 5,400 people are estimated to have lost their liveson migratory routes around the world in 2015, and thefirsthalfof2016hasonlyseenthenumbersincrease.TheMediterraneanalonewitnessedarecordnumberofatleast3,770deathsin2015,withnumbersclimbingin2016.TheInternational Organization for Migration (IOM) estimatesthatoverthelasttwodecades,morethan60,000migrantshavediedtryingtoreachtheirdestinations,andthisonlyincludes deaths for which there is some record. Oftenoccurringfarfromthepubliceye,anunknownnumberofdeathsgounrecorded.

In addition to the tragedy of loss of life, themajority ofthosewhodiearenever identified.Theirbodiesmaynoteverbe recovered, andevenamong thosewhosebodiesare found,most are buriedwith at best a number – nota name. Each unidentified migrant represents a missingpersonforafamily.Leftwithoutcertaintyastothefateoftheirlovedone,familiesmaysearchforyearsorlifetimes,neverfullyabletogrievetheirloss.

This second volume in IOM’s series of global reports onmigrant deaths, Fatal Journeys Vol. 2: Identification andTracing of Dead and Missing Migrants, has two mainobjectives.First,itprovidesanin-depthanalysisofavailabledata on migrant deaths for 2015. Data on the numberand profile of dead and missing migrants are presentedfordifferentregionsoftheworld,drawinguponthedatacollectedthroughIOM’sMissingMigrantsProject.Second,the report examines the challenges facing families andauthoritiesseekingtoidentifyandtracemissingmigrants.The study compares practices in different parts of theworld,andidentifiesanumberofinnovativemeasuresthatcouldpotentiallybereplicatedelsewhere.

Atlas des migrations environnementales2016/152pages/FrenchISBN2-7246-1655-3

Catastrophes géophysiques ou météorologiques,hausse du niveau des mers, désertification,dégradation des écosystèmes : chaque année, desmillionsdepersonnesquittent leurs terrespourdesraisons environnementales. Un phénomène que lechangementclimatiqueencoursnevaqu’amplifier.

Al’aidedeplusde100cartes,graphiquesetdiagrammesetdenombreusesétudesdecasconcrets,cetouvragepionnier, coordonné par trois desmeilleurs expertsdesmigrationsenvironnementales,dresseunétatdeslieuxinéditetproposedespistespourrépondreàcegranddéfiduXXIesiècle.

Carmieuxcomprendrecesmigrations,c’estmettreaujour la manière dont les causes environnementalesse mêlent à d’autres facteurs – politiques,socioéconomiques,psychologiques–quipoussentlesindividusàlamigrationtemporaireouàl’exode.C’estanticiperlesmouvementsdepopulationetpermettreleur accompagnement raisonné. C’est contribuerà l’indispensable adaptation aux conséquences duchangementclimatique.

37Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Migration Governance Framework 2016/8pagesEnglish/French/Spanish

There is a clear and increasingly sought relationshipbetween emergency, rehabilitation and development,andmigration is relevant and a key component of all.Theinternationalcommunityrecognizesthatemergencyassistanceshouldbeprovidedinwaysthatsupportlong-term development to ensure smooth transition fromrelief to rehabilitation. At the same time, economicgrowth and sustainable development are essentialfor prevention of, preparedness and resilience againstnaturaldisastersandotheremergencies.

Migration is a growing trend, yet there has so far notbeen an agreed document that clearly presents theelementsofgoodgovernanceofhumanmobility.IOM’sMigrationGovernanceFrameworkseekstopresent,inaconsolidated,coherentandcomprehensiveway,asetofthreeprinciplesandthreeobjectiveswhich,ifrespectedand fulfilled, would ensure that migration is humane,orderly,andbenefitsmigrantsandsociety.

Access to Microcredit Opportunities for Returned Migrants during and beyond IOM Support 2016/64pages/English

With the present study, IOM Bern wanted to explorethe availability of microcredit as an additional sourceof financing for reintegration projects that areimplementedwithintheframeworkofanIOMassistedvoluntary returnandreintegration (AVRR)programme.The accessibility of microcredits to returned migrantswas examined in five target countries: the IslamicRepublic of Iran, Mongolia, Nigeria, Senegal and SriLanka. In the first step, the situations of the nationalmicrocreditmarketswereanalysed,consideringthatthegeneralavailabilityofmicrocreditsandtheiraccessibilityinfluencereturnees’chancestobepartofamicrocreditscheme.Inthesecondstep,migration-specificchallengesfor applicants for amicrocreditwere identified. In thethirdstep,recommendationstoIOMandtheSwissStateSecretariatforMigrationwereformulated.Ononehand,these recommendations aim to serve as suggestionson how to include the concept of microcredit intofutureAVRRprogrammework.Ontheotherhand,therecommendations aim to serve as guidelines on howto include information about microcredit into pre-departurecounselling.

38 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Etude sur la Diaspora Burkinabe au Burkina Faso, en Côte d’Ivoire,en Italie et en France2016/142pages/French

Réputé être un « réservoir abondant de main-d’œuvre»durantlapériodecoloniale,une«TerredesHommes»poursacontributionauxeffortsdeguerredelaPremièreetdelaDeuxièmeGuerremondiales,le Burkina Faso (ancienneHaute-Volta) a fait l’objetde trèsnombreusesétudeset recherches sur le faitmigratoire . Néanmoins, la présente recherche, parsonobjet d’étude, par l’envergure de son terrain etpar la diversité des thèmes abordés, constitue unepremièredugenreauBurkinaFaso.

CetteprésenterechercheaétéinitiéeparleBureau-Pays de l’Organisation internationale pour lesmigrations (OIM) de Ouagadougou, avec l’appuifinancierduFondsdel’OIMpourledéveloppement,dans le cadre du projet de « recherche et derenforcement des capacités pour une gestionstratégiquedesmigrations auBurkina Faso et de ladiasporaburkinabè».

Ce projet vise à renforcer les capacités duGouvernement du Burkina Faso pour unemeilleuregestion desmigrations et de la diaspora burkinabè.Œuvre conjointe entre l’OIM et le Gouvernementburkinabè, il comporte plusieurs activités dont laréalisation d’une étude sur la diaspora burkinabèauBurkinaFasoetdans troispaysque sont laCôted’Ivoire,laFranceetl’Italie.

If we leave we are killed2016/152pages/English

Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection ofCivilian Sites 2014-2015 is a snapshot and analysisof the formulation and administrationof protectionof civilian sites gathered from interviews of IDPs,stakeholders,partnersanddecisionmakers.

ViolencebrokeoutinSouthSudaninDecember2013,forcing tens of thousands of internally displacedpersons(IDPs)toseekprotectionatUNpeacekeepingbases,leadingtoanunprecedentedsituationforboththeUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandhumanitarianagencies.Due to thescaleofviolenceof thecrisis, thedesperateand immediateneeds inthe newly termed protection of civilian (PoC) siteshavebeenoverwhelmingand requiredconsiderableflexibilitytosavelivesandmitigatetheimpactsoftheconflict.

ThePoCsiteshavebeenaconsiderableachievementforUNMISS,which isprotectingmore than200,000IDPsonadailybasis.DespitethesuccessofthePoCsites as a protectionmechanism, much debate hasarisenovertheirsustainabilityandtheresourcestheydemandfromthemission.Thisuniquesituationhasledtoconsiderabledifferencesbetweenstakeholdersthat function under very different systems andmandates.Significantchallenges in thecoordinationoftheresponse,bothbetweenhumanitarianagenciesand with UNMISS, and the need to define thediffering rolesandresponsibilitieshavenecessitatedthe establishment of guidelines and synchronizedmechanismstofacilitateeffectiveprocesses.

39Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Policy Brief Series Issue 5 | Vol. 2 | May 20162016/8pagesISSN2410-4930English

Brazilhaswitnessedanincreasedlevelofhumanmobilityduetoenvironmentalchange.AccordingtotheInternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre,between2008and2014,Brazilwasamongthecountrieswiththehighestnumbersofinternallydisplacedpersons.Furthermore, thecountry isoneof thetopdestinationsofcross-borderdisplacedpersonsbydisastersintheregion.However,thecountrylacksmigrationlawsandpoliciestocopewiththeincreasingnumberofdisplacedpersons.

ThispolicybriefaimsatidentifyingthesegapsintheBrazilianlawandrelatedpolicies concerning migration caused by disaster, climate change or otherenvironmentalchangesandprovidesacomprehensiveoverviewonexistinglawandpolicies.Somerecommendationstosolvethesegapsarepresented.

MPP Readers’ Survey

Migration Policy Practice (MPP) waslaunchedthreeyearsagoandtheeditorswouldnowliketoinvitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinashortreaders’satisfactionsurvey.

Thepurposeofthissurvey,whichcanbetakenanonymously,istohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Thesurvey’sresponseswillcontribute,inparticular,toadjustingandimproving,asappropriate,MPP’scontentandstyle,andthusthereader’sexperience.

Shouldyouwishtoparticipateinthissurvey,pleaseclick here.

Thankyou.

40 Vol. VI, Number 2, April–May 2016MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Call for authors/Submission guidelines

SinceitslaunchinOctober2011,Migration Policy Practice haspublishedover110articlesbyseniorpolicymakersanddistinguishedmigrationpolicyexpertsfromallovertheworld.

Past authors have included, inter alia:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) andSpecial Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil societyactivities intheUnitedNationsHigh-levelDialogueonInternationalMigrationandDevelopmentandtheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment;Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje,ChairoftheGFMD2013-2014;Mark Cully,ChiefEconomistattheAustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;António Guterres,UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees;Khalid Koser,ChairoftheWorldEconomicForumGlobalAgendaCouncilonMigration;Khalid Malik,DirectoroftheHumanDevelopmentReportOffice,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP);Cecilia Mamlström,EUCommissioner forHomeAffairs;Ali Mansoor,Chairof theGFMD2012;Andrew Middleton,DirectorofCulture,RecreationandMigrantStatistics,AustralianBureauofStatistics;Najat Maalla M’Jid,UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesaleofchildren,childprostitutionandchildpornography;Robert A. Mocny,DirectorofUS-VISIT,USDepartmentofHomelandSecurity;Imelda M. Nicolas,SecretaryoftheCommissiononFilipinosOverseas(CFO),OfficeofthePresidentof the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes InternationalFederation; Kelly Ryan (CoordinatoroftheIntergovernmentalConsultationsonMigration,AsylumandRefugees–IGC,Geneva);Martin Schulz,PresidentoftheEuropeanParliament;David Smith,DirectorofSurveysandReporting,AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;Sir Peter D. Sutherland,SpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretary-GeneralforMigration; Ambassador William Lacy Swing,DirectorGeneraloftheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM);Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, DeputyAssistantSecretaryofState,BureauofPopulation,RefugeesandMigration,USDepartmentofState.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

•Notexceedfivepagesandbewritteninanon-academicandreader-friendlystyle.

•Coveranyareaofmigrationpolicybutdiscuss,asfaraspossible,particularsolutions,policyoptionsorbestpracticerelatingtothethemescovered.

•Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant publicadministrations,orcivilsociety,inothercountries.

Articlesgivingaccountofevaluationsofspecificmigrationpoliciesandinterventions,includingbothevaluationfindingsandinnovativeevaluationmethodologies,areparticularlywelcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

• Solon Ardittis(sardittis@eurasylum.org);and

• Frank Laczko(flaczko@iom.int)