AFGHANISTAN ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: A 2014 POLITICAL AND SECURITY FORECAST

2PREFACE

Afghanistan is at a pivotal moment. Presidential elections scheduled for 05 April will see the entry of a new political administration, bringing to an end over twelve years of government led by Hamid Karzai. Afghanistan’s security landscape will also experience new challenges, with the final withdrawal of NATO combat troops by December 2014 leading to an additional transition of security responsibility away from international forces and into the hands of the ANSF.

However, while a Taleban resurgence is likely to bring with it some degree of territorial regression to insur-gent control, 2014 will not bring an end to Afghanistan’s post-Taleban political environment. The ANSF re-mains well funded and has increasingly proved itself capable of operating independently of ISAF oversight. Development aid funding will also remain in place, though NGOs will face far greater constraints on where they can operate. Ultimately, new political elites will face the old political challenges, with longer term security of the country post-2014 remaining dependent upon the signing of a bilateral security agreement with the United States.

AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REMAINS EXTREMELY CHALLENGING FOLLOWING A YEAR OF INCREASED INSURGENT OPERATIONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY.

Provincial Security Threat Level 2013: Source UN, MOI, EI data

Extreme

Substantial

Moderate

Low

4THE STATE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 2013-2014

KEY TRENDS OF 2013

Nationwide, southern and eastern provinces continued to see the majority of violent activity in 2013, with notable deteriorations also reported in the formerly stable provinces, Faryab, Farah and Badakhshan. Such activity was particularly high during the first six months of 2013 due to increased num-bers of insurgents crossing from neighbouring Pakistan, utilising traditional routes along the eastern border as well as ex-ploiting new routes connecting Pakistan’s North-West Frontier. Despite such challenges howev-er, a Taleban offensive planned for the spring, dubbed Khalid Ibn Walid (the foremost general of the early Islamic conquests) largely fell short of its anticipat-ed aims, with violence falling in line with seasonal trends during the autumn and winter peri-ods. Alongside a rise in militant activity, 2013 also saw a substan-

THE SITUATION IN KABUL

In the capital, a number of high-profile attacks against GI-RoA targets gave way to a largely stable security environment from August, with substantial improvement in security result-ing from increased coopera-tion between the city’s various security agencies. While militant groups such as the Haqqani network and the Taleban re-main committed to perpetrating mass-casualty raids within the city, increased ANSF capability has meant that such attacks have shifted from complex raids against international and GIRoA compounds, to moving targets such as military convoys within the city’s outlying districts.

tial increase in ANSF casualties nationwide, as responsibility for national security was transferred from international personnel to Afghanistan’s Army and Police units.

5THE BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT (BSA)

Few issues have attracted the attention or intrigue of interna-tional observers more than the anticipated signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) be-tween Kabul and Washington.

Constituting the necessary legal grounding for US forces to ex-tend their troop presence in the country post-2014, the signing of a BSA is of critical importance to the future stability of the country. Nonetheless, efforts to broker a deal by US diplomats have been repeatedly rebuffed by President Karzai, despite the approval from among the GIRoA’s political elite following consultation in a specially con-

vened Loya Jirga assembly on 27 November 2013.

PROSPECTS FOR A 2014 AGREEMENT While a “zero option” of full US withdrawal by the Obama ad-ministration remains a possibility, in practice such a result should be considered unlikely, due to strong disadvantages posed to both parties. Karzai’s decision to delay the signing of the BSA likely stems from a desire to extend the leverage he currently enjoys with the Obama administration, as well as to present himself as a leader resilient to the demands of the United States. However,

such sentiments are unlikely to be shared by a successor government which must face the challenge of renewed insurgent activity in the coming year.

Consequently, while the agree-ment of a residual training and counter-terrorism force (estimated at around 10,000 personnel) re-mains the most likely outcome, de-pendence on the election of a new President to sign the bill will mean that a final written agreement may not transpire until at least June 2014. In the short term, this delay will serve to perpetuate a sense of uncertainty among the Afghan populace, leading to additional instability in the coming months.

Afghanistan’s principal ethnic groupings by province.

Pashtun

Uzbek/ Turkoman

Tajik

Mixed

Hazara

6THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: POTENTIAL SCENARIOS

On 05 April 2014 Afghans will go the polls to elect a new Presi-dent, the sixth electoral contest since the overthrow of the Tale-ban in 2001. Unlike in previous contests, President Karzai will not be among those standing due to constitutional limitations which prohibit the President from exceeding two terms in office. Standing in his place are 11 men, almost all of whom are drawn from Afghanistan’s GIRoA and Mujahedeen-era elite and are politically close to President Karzai. The major exception to this is Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a seasoned opposition figure who remains an active critic of the Karzai government.

CHALLENGES FOR ELECTION DAYWhile last minute deals and candidate withdrawals are likely to obscure a clear assessment of the outcome until March at the earliest, several wider develop-ments are to be expected. First-ly, corruption and vote rigging, while potentially lower than previous contests following the passage of new legislation will continue to permeate through the process, with the sale of voter cards already underway within the country’s electoral black market. Secondly, security concerns will remain paramount on Election Day, as militant forces act to simultaneously disrupt voting for the Presi-dential and Provincial council elections which have historically

witnessed considerable spikes in violence. Another probable outcome of the electoral process will be a runoff vote between the top two candidates.

At present, neither candidate appears to possess the requisite 50% share of the popular vote to avoid a runoff as required by Afghan law. Consequently, the announcement of a new President is unlikely to be made prior to the conclusion of Hamid Karzai’s final term in May, adding further instability to the period of transition. The final result itself is likely to be one of three potential scenarios.

ELECTION OF PRO-ESTABLISHMENT CANDIDATEThe most probable outcome is the victory a pro-Karzai candi-date capable of bridging Afghan-istan’s disparate Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethnic voting blocs. Former Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai is at present the most credible can-didate for this position, having succeeded in appealing to both his Pashtun constituents as well as northern voters through the appointment of Uzbek strong-man General Abdul Rashid Dos-tum as his running mate.

7

While Qayyum Karzai, brother of the current President could also conceivably play this role, and is likely to win key supporters from the GIRoA administration, his candidature lacks broad support among the Afghan electorate.

The Election of Ghani or Karzai would offer the best of hope of maintaining national unity with-in the country, given the support that both candidates hold within the restive south and east of the country and their advocacy for further reconciliation efforts with the Taleban.

VICTORY FOR ABDULLAH ABDULLAH

The second most likely scenario is the victory of popular Tajik politician Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Drawing on support from among his Northern Alliance base, as well as courting the approval of Hazara, Youth and Female voters, Abdullah represents the best prospect for a move away from the political status quo. Despite enjoying a narrow lead in most nationwide polls, Ab-dullah’s candidacy has limited support among much of Afghan-istan’s majority Pashtun popula-tion and faces the risk that some pro-Karzai contenders may drop out of the race in order to unify their support behind a single candidate. Should Abdullah win, already strained divisions be-tween Afghanistan’s north and south-east would be exacerbat-ed further, with more conserva-tive Pashtun elements unlikely to accept government by a non-Pa-shtun President.

DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY

While unlikely, there also re-mains a prospect that President Karzai may declare a state of emergency, leading to an indef-inite extension of the present administration’s rule. Low voter turnout coupled with political disputes over the outcome of the election could force the President to intervene, particu-larly should the Taleban escalate violence to a point which effec-tively prevents large swathes of the country from participating in the poll. Such an outcome would also hand Karzai addition-al power to secure one of his supporters in any successor gov-ernment, likely to be a priority of the President in the upcoming elections. An intervention of this nature would prove extremely unpopular with both the inter-national community as well as domestic audiences and would serve to fundamentally weaken the already fragile structure of the GIRoA.

Abdullah Abdullah

Ashraf Karzai

Qayyum Karzai

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf

25

23.2

9.5

6.8

Presidential Election Poll Results 2013; Source: TOLO News, Democracy International, EI data

Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a seasoned figure of opposition politics.

394

1870

151

2767

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

ISAF ANSF

20122013

ISAF & ANSF casualties 2012-2013; Source: ISAF, MOI

8THE DRAWDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES

SHIFT TO ANSF CONTROL

Following a process of struc-tured troop reductions begin-ning in 2011, Afghanistan will see an increase in both the scale and speed of ISAF military drawdowns over the coming year. At present some 52,000 international military personnel remain within Afghanistan, with all front line combat troops to be removed by the end of the year in line with NATO plans. While ANSF troops are likely to encounter increased rates of attrition as they fill this security gap, secured funding and equip-ment for 2014 will prevent any major fragmentation in the face of Taleban advances.

TALEBAN RECOVERYNonetheless, in provinces where Taleban fighters already exert partial control, a regression of local government authority to insurgent fighters, mediated

with the ANSF is to be expected. Helmand, Zabul, Paktia, Nanga-har, Nuristan and Kandahar are likely to be the worst affected by this trend given the historic role ISAF has played in upholding their security.

INTERNAL CHALLENGES FOR THE ANSF:Rather than a credible threat of Taleban advances towards the capital, the major challenge to the ANSF in 2014 will be the maintenance of internal coher-ence among its tribally organised battalions, a task traditionally served by the command and control structure of ISAF. Beyond 2014, the security of Afghanistan will depend upon the signing of some form of bilateral security agreement between Kabul and United States, which will provide a template for both the funding of Afghanistan’s military institu-tions, as well as the maintenance of the ANSF’s offensive capability.

SECURITY POST 2014:With NATO’s pledge to remain in Afghanistan until 2020, the long-term survival of the ANSF, and with it the GIRoA is likely to persist beyond 2014, though crucially such stability will depend on the agreement of a residual security force under a formal BSA.

9THE POLICY OF REGIONAL STATES: 2014 AND BEYOND

PAKISTAN

Pakistan’s interests in Afghan-istan will remain a mixture of domestic security concerns

and regional strategic considerations in 2014. Seek-ing to appease a Pashtun insurgency in its western provinces, Islamabad’s primary concern is to foster a peace settlement in Afghanistan which can pro-duce a power-sharing arrangement between the Taliban and non-Pashtun populations.

However, while Pakistan does not want a return of an exclusively Taleban government, a full US withdrawal met with growing Indian military assis-tance would lead decision-makers to substantially increase their support of Islamist organisations, namely the Haqqani network and HiG, seen as the only firm allies of Pakistan available in the country.

IRAN

Iran’s policy in Afghanistan will be determined primarily

by security concerns in 2014, as the Islamic Re-public prepares to withstand even greater levels of narcotic smuggling and human migration than in previous years.

Historic opposition to any future Taleban adminis-tration has the potential to see Tehran renew sup-port to Afghanistan’s Tajik powerbrokers should insurgent violence increase substantially in the New Year.

CHINA

The People’s Republic has in-vested heavily in Afghanistan’s

mining and energy sector in recent years and will place as a priority the stabilisation of the security landscape through the resumption of direct GI-RoA-Taleban talks.

While Beijing is likely to welcome further draw-downs in western military personnel, security con-cerns for its own restive border areas, will likely compel China to broaden its own counter-terror-ism links with regional states including its historic rival India.

INDIA

India’s concerns for the securi-ty environment in Afghanistan have already seen a substan-

tial rise in development assistance and military aid to the GIRoA, expected to continue throughout 2014. Such policy derives from twin factors of longstanding enmity towards the Taleban, and concern that the collapse of the GIRoA administra-tion may result in the country becoming a Paki-stani-client state.

Nonetheless, New Delhi is prepared to tolerate a future pro-Pakistan administration provided that it is does not institute a new Islamic government.

10DEVELOPMENT AID 2014

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

2014 will pose a number of new challenges for the aid industry in Afghanistan, with violence against civilian staff likely to reach particularly high levels dur-ing the spring period as insurgent fighters target international staff associated with the upcoming elections.

Over the course of 2013 fatalities among NGO workers more than doubled from the previous year. Northern and western areas saw a particular increase in this form of violent incident, a product of both a more assertive militant presence in formerly stable ru-ral areas, as well a decline in the protection traditionally afforded by NATO Provincial Reconstruc-tion Teams. While a number of

AID FUNDING 2014

Despite such challenges howev-er, 2014 will not bring an end to international development in its current form. Donor countries have committed to providing $16 billion in aid though 2015, with annual US spending expected to remain around $2 billion until 2017. While failure by the US to agree a BSA would undoubtedly undermine support for further aid pledges in Washington, other key donors, including Germany and the Asian Development Bank are likely to continue spending over the next two years, irre-spective of the future level of di-rect US military assistance

NGOs may see the ISAF with-drawal as an opportunity to reas-sert their neutrality to local com-munities, the reality for many implementing partners is likely to be a reduction in of operations in unprotected rural areas, and a shift to indirect oversight of pro-jects conducted from key urban centres such as Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif.

CONCLUSION

Few years in Afghanistan’s re-cent history have passed without predictions of dramatic deterio-ration in the country’s security environment. Key changes in the nation’s security and political situation will undoubtedly bring significant upheaval, yet at the same time fundamental conti-nuities of both political elites, international assistance and aid funding are unlikely to disappear within the period of the next 12 months.

The risk for the country remains, that should Afghan policy mak-ers fail to agree a long term security pact with the United States, and with it future plans on the training and funding of the ANSF, present conditions of military uncertainty and chronic instability will persist into 2015 and beyond.

Author: James Borrelli

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