Economic Impact of Digital Revolution_JM_073015

The Impact of Digital Revolution Bounty and Spread of Digital Transformation, 1945 -2015

DID THE VICTORS LOSE THE PEACE?

History, Politics and Economics: 1945 - 2015

Richard G. Smethurst

Oxford Berkeley Program

Merton College

University of Oxford

August 3, 2015

Jim Mukerjee

Introduction: History has witnessed three Industrial Revolutions, each associated with general purpose technical inventions. The first powered by steam, in the late 18th century (1778), and the second based on electricity, in the late 19th century (1878), led to unprecedented increase in productivity, social development, and standard of living. The third Industrial Revolution fueled by Information & Communications Technology (ICT), which began during WW II in 1940s, with the adoption of digital computers and digital record keeping and analyses, launched a Digital Revolution, which continues to the present day. Like both of the previous ones it will take decades to unfold and influence our daily lives. Prior revolutions created disruptions by eliminating jobs to Cartwright’s power looms, and later, to Edison’s electric lighting, automobiles, and wireless communication. But, those inventions created new economic opportunities on a mass scale with plenty of new job creation to replace the job destruction, immeasurably improving people’s lives, sweeping away old economic structures, and transforming society. The Digital Revolution has already brought about transformative changes to business and personal productivity, and social media. But, whether the Digital Revolution will bring mass job creation to make up for the job destruction remains to be seen. The “creative destruction” aspect generates the “bounty” and the “spread” of the digital transformation, which may prove far more divisive than previous industrial revolutions. The unprecedented economic benefits of exponential, digital, and recombinant innovations represent the “bounty”. The large and growing differences among people’s income, wealth, and well-being represent the “spread”.

Fig 1: Comparison of GDP changes during successive Industrial Revolutions

Most of us today share a sense that the digital advances of the past 50 years are transformative, perhaps even revolutionizing the way we live. Rapid advances of digital information technology have already opened up a huge amount of rich new territory and will keep doing so. Around the world, economies, societies, and people’s lives have been vastly improved by digital tools and high-tech products; these positive trends will continue, and likely accelerate.

Unlike the economics of traditional goods and services, “information” does not get used up when it is consumed. Once a book is read by one person, others can also read the same book and benefit from the information. In fact, successive readings make the book more valuable, because all readers can use the same information to collaboratively generate new ideas and products, creating the “network effect”. When the book is digitized, it can be easily copied infinitely, perfectly, and distributed around the world instantly at no additional cost. Just like Johannes Gutenberg’s moveable type press marked the beginning of the Printing Revolution in 1454, a colossal moment in the history of sharing information and learning, the digital frontier has further reduced limitations for access and sharing information with larger audiences and collapsed timelines. At a more personal level, the digital revolution is transforming our daily lives. With Internet access and a connected device, it’s free and easy to communicate with people around the world. With Social Media services like Skype, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, texting, voice and video calls, keeping friends informed of current status is much easier. These facilities help to flatten the world and promote unprecedented communication, cooperation and collaboration, generating a “sharing economy”. Many of us use these resources so often that we take these for granted, but they are all less than 10 years old. This highlights the phenomenal velocity, volume, and variety, of technical innovations and the resulting impact of the digital revolution.

The economics of digital revolution, in short, are the economics of abundance, not of scarcity! This is a fundamental shift and a beneficial one. To take just one example, the Internet is now the largest repository of information that has ever existed. It is also a fast, efficient, and cheap, worldwide distribution network for all this information. Finally, it is open and accessible so that more people can join it, access new ideas, and contribute their own.

In the books “Race against the machine” (1), and “The second machine age” (2), Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, of MIT Center of Digital Business, cite an analysis suggesting that between 1988 and 2003 the effectiveness of computers increased 43million-fold. Smaller, cheaper, and more powerful microprocessors accounted for a significant part of this improvement. But, a larger share came from

more efficient algorithms used in software. However, the promise of higher employment and better jobs of this rise in computing power have been slow to materialize. Far from pushing up wages across the board in response to higher productivity, the digital economy is keeping them flat for the mass of workers while extravagantly rewarding the most talented ones.

The reasons are often illustrated by an ancient story about chessboards and rice. Inventor and futurist Ray Kurzweil (2) retells the story from the Gupta Empire, 6th century CE, India, in his book “The age of spiritual machines: when computers exceed human intelligence”. In one version of the story, the inventor of the game of chess shows his creation to his king. The king is impressed and offers the inventor a gift of his choice. The clever inventor asks for one grain of rice for the first square, two for the second, and four for the third and so on to 64 squares. The king readily agrees thinking the request to be surprisingly modest. They start counting out the rice, and at first the amounts are tiny. But they keep doubling, resulting in very large numbers. The inventor winds up with (264 -1), or more than 18 quintillion, grains of rice – a pile bigger than Mt Everest. The inventor was lucky to retain his head. Exponential growth, in other words, looks negligible until it quickly becomes unmanageable, which is frequently referred to as “the second half of the chessboard”. This is emblematic of the progress in ICT that has brought computer prowess to the “second half of the chessboard”, allowing computers to accomplish tasks previously thought impossible. This includes advances such as Google’s autonomous cars, IBM’s Deep Blue chess grandmaster, IBM’s Watson Jeopardy champion, high quality language translation and voice recognition, among others, which encroach on areas, such as complex communication and pattern recognition, in which people are considered to be better-suited than machines. And we have only just entered the second half of the chessboard in 2006, which indicates that serious employment dislocations can result before this relentless pace of digital innovation is over.

The digital revolution is opening a great divide between a skilled and wealthy few and the rest of society. In the past, new technologies have usually raised wages by boosting productivity, with the gains being distributed between capital owners, workers, and consumers. Now, technology is empowering highly skilled, talented individuals and opening up yawning gaps between the earnings of skilled and unskilled, capital owners and labor, creating a large pool of underemployed labor that is depressing investment.

The “Bounty”: Exponential, Digital and Recombinant innovations

Almost a century after the pioneering work of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace in the 1830s, the advent of computers was heralded in England and the U.S. by the drums of war in the 1940s. Visionaries such as Alan Turing, Vannevar Bush, John Mauchly, Presper Eckert, John von Neuman, among others, spearheaded the dawn of the digital computer age. But the invention of computers did not immediately launch a revolution. They relied on large, expensive, fragile vacuum tubes that consumed a lot of power. These were expensive behemoths that only the military, large corporations and research universities could afford. The true birth of the Digital Age, in which electronic devices became embedded in every aspect of our lives, occurred in Bell Labs, NJ, in December, 1947, with the introduction of the transistor. Complex military and space applications required a large number of transistors creating a “tyranny of numbers”. Subsequent innovations that allowed millions of transistors to be etched onto tiny microchips meant that robust processing power could be nestled inside the nose cone of rockets, in smaller personal and laptop computers, in calculators, in portable music players, in mobile phones, and other consumer devices that could easily exchange information or entertainment with any other node of a networked planet.

Such powerful, ubiquitous computing facility was made possible by the development of Integrated Circuits (IC) in 1958, at Fairchild Semiconductor and Texas Instruments. In a 1965 article in Electronics Magazine, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, noted that the number of transistors in a minimum-cost IC had been doubling every 24 months, and predicted that the same rate of improvement would continue into the future (3, 4). Later modifications changed the time required for doubling to occur to 18 months. When this prediction was validated Moore’s Law was born. This meant that electronic circuits would be 500 times more powerful in 1975 as they were in 1965. Moore’s Law has proved remarkably prescient, and recently celebrated its 50th anniversary on April 19, 2015. In a video commemorating the milestone at the Computer History Museum, Silicon Valley, California, Gordon Moore quipped “if Al Gore invented the Internet, I invented the Exponential”. Variations of Moore’s Law have been applied to improvements in disk drive capacity, display resolution, and network bandwidth. This consistent cadence of improvements has made Moore’s Law the linchpin phenomenon of the computer age, and acts as a steady drumbeat in the background of the economy.

Fig 2: Moore’s Law: exponential growth in number of transistors in ICs

So, where are we in the history of business applications of computers? This is an impossible question to answer precisely, but a reasonable estimate yields an interesting result, inspired by Kurzweil’s distinction between the first and second halves of the chessboard. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) added “Information Technology” (IT) as a category of business investment in 1958. If we take that year as the starting point for when Moore’s Law entered the business world, and use 18 months as the doubling period, after 32 doublings, U.S. business entered the second half of the chessboard, related to the use of digital tools, in 2006. Changes to these assumptions will yield a different break point. One of the lessons that set the Digital Revolution apart is how quickly we have arrived at the second half -- into the phase where exponential growth yields jaw-dropping results (1) with transformative economic and social impact.

The exponential growth property of ICs has enabled embedding ever smaller, better, and cheaper ICs in electronic devices and services, creating transformative changes in the way computers are used by governments, businesses, and consumers, and in the intrinsic business of the ICT industry (3, 4). For example, the smartphones carried by consumers around the world have vastly more processing power than the supercomputers of the 1960s. The results will be felt across virtually every task, job, and industry. Such versatility is a key feature of General Purpose Technology (GPT), a term economists use to describe the pervasive influence of technological innovations that interrupt, accelerate, or dislocate the downstream sectors and the normal progression of the overall economy. ICs and computers are the GPT of the Digital Age, including similar improvements in network and storage technologies, generically referred to as “Information & Communications Technology” (ICT). GPTs don’t just benefit their “home” industries. Computers, for example, increase productivity not only in the high-tech sector but also in all industries that purchase and use digital gear. These days, that means essentially all industries; even the least IT-intensive sectors like agriculture and mining are now spending billions of dollars to digitize their functions.

Fig 3: Worldwide ICT spending forecast with continuous transformation across all industries

Digitization is not a single project providing one-time benefits. Instead, it’s an ongoing process of creative disruption; innovations use both new and established technologies to make sweeping changes at the level of the task, the job, the process, even the whole organization itself. These changes build and feed each other so the cumulative effects of “recombinant innovations” are constantly expanding at a rapid pace.

The personal computer (PC), for example, democratized computing in the 1980s putting processing power into the hands of individuals and knowledge workers. Major innovations appeared in the mid-1990s: the Internet, World Wide Web (WWW) interface, large scale commercial business software like Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Customer Relationship Management (CRM).

Fig 4: The age of the Internet, WWW, and New Media

The WWW became more useful to consumers when Google made it easier to search and conduct E-commerce transactions. New waves of Social Media and Mobile Applications have emerged that allow businesses and customers to stay connected, provide feedback, complete transactions using smartphones and tablets, which provide most of the functionalities of PCs, far more convenient and popular. Mobile phone subscriptions will exceed the world population ; some people hold multiple accounts, specially in countries with spotty connections. In an elaborate survey of telecommunications, Frances Cairncross of The Economist (5) argues that advances now underway, specially of mobile phones and mobile

applications, will effectively eliminate distance as a perceptible concept from our lives. This “death of distance”, a major determinant of the cost of communications, will become the single most important economic bounty to reshape society in the next half century.

Fig 5: Global mobile phone subscriptions outnumber world population

The innovations we are starting to see in the second half of the chessboard are encroaching into territories that used to be performed by people alone, such as advanced pattern recognition and complex communication. For now, humans still hold the high ground in each of these areas. But, as we move further into the second half, and face the torrent of data and information, from Social Media, Cloud Computing and Big Data sources, we find human cognitive skills “augmented” by artificial intelligence is a better, and more efficient, alternative. We are starting to see the evidence that deep Machine Learning is affecting the business, professional, and personal world. IBM is working with Columbia University Medical Centre and the University of Maryland School of Medicine to adapt Watson to the work of medical diagnosis, partnering with voice recognition software vendor Nuance. GeoFluent offering from Lionbridge has brought instantaneous machine translation to customer service interactions. California and Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) are developing regulations covering autonomous vehicles on the states’ roads. These are a few examples of a myriad IT-enabled innovations that have the “creative destruction” potential, and are transforming manufacturing, distribution, retailing, media, finance, law,

medicine, research, management, marketing, sales, and almost every other economic sector and business function.

Computers have become the “universal machine” that has applications in all industries and tasks, akin to the “general-purpose machines” envisaged by Ada Lovelace and Alan Turing in prior centuries, uniting creative skills at the intersection of the arts and technology, a guiding principle espoused by Steve Jobs. General purpose computers are directly relevant for not only the 60% of the labor force involved in IT processing tasks, but also an ever-increasing extent of the remaining 40% (2). As the technology moves into the second half, each successive doubling in power will increase the number of devices and applications, which act as building blocks of future “recombinant innovations”, which can affect work and employment. As a result, our skills and institutions will have to work harder to keep up lest more of the labor force faces technological unemployment.

The “spread” : Current Economic Implications

John Maynard Keynes observed in 1930: “We are being afflicted with a new disease of which readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come – namely, technological unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labor outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labor” (1, 2).

At least since the followers of Ned Ludd smashed mechanical looms in 1811, workers have worried about automation destroying jobs. Economists have reassured them that new jobs would be created even as old ones were eliminated. For over 200 years, the economists were right. Despite massive automation of millions of jobs, more Americans had jobs at the end of each decade up through the end of the 20th century, but there is no axiom that most people will automatically benefit from technological progress.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics Job Openings & Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) shows a dramatic decrease in hiring since 2000 (2). Lack of hiring, rather than the increase of layoffs, is what accounts for most of the “jobless recovery” of the early 1990s, which has worsened after each of the two recessions since then. Employers just don’t seem to have the same demand for labor that they once did. GDP rebounded, but jobs didn’t.

From the end of the Second World War to the mid-1970s productivity in America, measured by output per person, and inflation-adjusted average pay rose more or less in tandem, each roughly doubling over the period. Since then, and despite a slowdown in productivity growth, pay has lagged badly behind productivity

growth. From 2000 to 2011, according to America’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, real output per person rose by nearly 2.5% a year, whereas real pay increased by less than 1% per year.

Fig 6: Relative stagnation of median real wages

The historically strong relationship between GDP and employment appears to have weakened as digital technology has become more powerful. Even as overall wealth increases, there are winners and losers. The losers are not necessarily a small segment of the labor force; they can be a majority or even 90% or more of the population.

Similar effects are evident at the top of the income distribution. The top 10% of the wage distribution has done much better than the rest of the labor force, but even within this group there has been growing inequality. At each fractal, the top 0.1%, and top 0.01% have seen their income grow faster than the top 1%. This is not run-of-the-mill skill-based technical change, but reflects the unique rewards of “superstardom” that the exponential technical advances of Digital Revolution enables. Wages for many Americans fell well short of historical growth rates and even fell in real terms for many groups as digital technology transformed industries across the board.

Fig 7: Effect on real wages, income share, employment by skill

The stagnation in median income is not because of a lack of technological progress. On the contrary, it is because of our skills and institutions have not kept up with the rapid advancements in digital technology. In the 19th and 20th centuries, as each wave of automation eliminated jobs in several occupations, entrepreneurs identified new opportunities where labor could be redeployed and workers learned the necessary skills to succeed. Millions of people left agriculture, but an even larger number found employment in manufacturing and services.

In the 21st century, technological change is both faster and much more pervasive. While the steam engine, electric motor, and internal combustion engine were

indeed transforming technologies, they were not subject to an ongoing level of continuous improvement anywhere near the exponential pace observed in digital technologies. Already, computers are thousands of times more powerful than they were 30 years ago. Intel is confident that it will be able to maintain this pace of improvement in silicon for another 15 years. Recent breakthroughs by researchers at IBM and Hewlett Packard in molecular electronics lead many experts to believe that Moore's law will continue to apply for perhaps another 50 years (5). Similarly dramatic advances in storage and transmission technologies are also in prospect.

Productivity growth has always meant cutting down on labor. In 1900 some 40% of Americans worked in agriculture, and just over 40% of the typical household budget was spent on food. Over the next century automation reduced agricultural employment in most rich countries to below 5%, and food costs dropped steeply. But in those days excess labor was relatively easily reallocated to new sectors, thanks in large part to investment in education. That is becoming more difficult. In America the share of the population with a university degree has been more or less flat since the 1990s. In other rich economies the proportion of young people going into tertiary education has gone up, but few have managed to boost it much beyond the American level.

Fig 8: Medium-skilled workers as % of total employment

At the same time technological advances are encroaching on tasks that were previously considered too brainy to be automated, including some legal and accounting work. In those fields people at the top of their profession will in future attract many more clients and higher fees, but white-collar workers with lower qualifications will find themselves displaced and may in turn displace others with even lesser skills.

The effect of technological change on trade is also changing the basis of tried-and-true methods of economic development in poorer economies. More manufacturing work can be automated, and skilled design work accounts for a larger share of the value of trade, leading to what economist Dani Rodrik, of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, calls “premature deindustrialization” in developing countries (5). No longer can governments count on a growing industrial sector to absorb unskilled labor from rural areas. In both the rich and the emerging world, technology is creating opportunities for those previously held back by financial or geographical constraints; yet new work for those with modest skill levels is scarce compared with the bonanza created by earlier technological revolutions.

This technological revolution could still hold many surprises. It may create vast numbers of jobs nobody has yet imagined, or boost the productivity of less-skilled workers in entirely novel ways, perhaps through robotics and augmented intelligence. But for now, despite the opportunities opened up by some new tech-based ventures, a generation of workers the world over is facing underemployment and stagnant pay. The challenge for individuals, companies and policymakers is to adapt their skills, organizations and institutions more quickly to keep up with ever-accelerating digital advances.

Income and Wealth Inequality in the 21 st Century

Thomas Piketty and a handful of other economists in a book entitled “Capital in the 21st Century” (7), in more than a decade of research, have detailed historical changes in the concentration of income and wealth. The data show the evolution of inequality since the beginning of the industrial revolution (Fig 9). In the 18th and 19th centuries western European society was highly unequal. Private wealth dwarfed national income and was concentrated in the hands of the rich families who sat atop a relatively rigid class structure. This system persisted even as industrialization slowly contributed to rising wages for workers. High taxes, inflation, bankruptcies, and the growth of sprawling welfare states caused wealth to shrink dramatically, and ushered in a period in which both income and wealth were

distributed in relatively egalitarian fashion. But the shocks of the early 20th century have faded and wealth is now reasserting itself.

Fig 9: Top 10% share of Income and Wealth, 1870 to 2010 (Source: Piketty)

Central to the book’s argument is “r > g”, where r is the rate of return of capital and g is the rate of economic growth. In the 21st century, r has been significantly higher (4% – 5%) than the growth rate of the economy (~ 1.5%). Piketty also argues that the return on capital can be propped up by innovations in technology, which could lead to new products and services, substituting machines for people inspired by the Digital Revolution.

Although Piketty’s empirical observation provides macroeconomic result of Income and Wealth Inequality, it is composed of several key microeconomic factors, such as “human capital and specialized skills”, which is in short supply in relation to the demand. Especially in the ICT industry, technically trained and skilled employees are in high demand commanding very high incomes contributing to the income inequality, as evidenced in Silicon Valley, California, and in other clusters of computer companies worldwide.

The Silver Lining

Following are just a few examples of the way the Digital Revolution is creating economic opportunities in the new economy to replace at least some of the work it destroys.

E-entrepreneurship is part of a broad movement that represents one possible response to a new and different economy. This began more than a decade ago when the sort of private transactions previously conducted through classified ads, yard sales and flea markets moved online, courtesy of companies like Craigslist and eBay. That move dramatically increased the value of the market for such goods by increasing its scale and raising the odds of achieving a match between a buyer and a seller. This market has since grown dramatically, powered by the pull of new opportunities and the push of economic strain across the rest of the labor market.

E-entrepreneurship received a boost in 2008 when Apple launched its App Store, through which third-party software designers could market their own iPhone applications. The “app economy” has since grown by leaps and bounds. According to an estimate by the Progressive Policy Institute, a think-tank, in 2013 it provided work for more than 750,000 people in America alone. Many more take part in it from elsewhere in the world. Apple’s App Store and Google Play, the equivalent for the Android operating system—which runs on 82% of the world’s smartphones, as opposed to Apple’s 15%—now offer users more than 3million apps. Apple alone sold apps worth more than $14 billion in 2014 (6). Amazon and other e-tailers allow authors and artists to self-publish and market their work

around the world. YouTube offers a platform to a cast of phenomenally successful video producers, makers of comedy clips or video-game reviewers who can rack up billions of views

Mobile apps and networks are also democratizing capital ownership in some sectors of the economy, including accommodation and passenger travel. Airbnb, for instance, allows householders to earn money by renting their home while they are away. The most famous app-based company, Uber, is valued at $41 billion because of the success it has had in turning the smartphone into a remote control for taxis. The “sharing economy” is increasingly indistinguishable from the mainstream economy; things that can now be borrowed via online apps include server space, home appliances, bicycles and tools. The logistical hurdles to entrepreneurship are shrinking. Selling surplus goods or putting underused capital to work is as easy as creating an online profile.

Startups are benefiting as well. New firms can rent computing power from Amazon Web Services (AWS) through the “cloud” rather than having to buy expensive servers. Office space and support services are becoming ever easier to find, as is finance, thanks to peer-to-peer lenders and crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter. Easy and cheap access to all the off-the-shelf components needed for a startup is fueling the rise of “weightless companies”, firms that can attain extraordinary valuations with minimal staff and capital.

Informal online education is a widespread and underappreciated aspect of modern economic life. Teachers around the world have been putting academic coursework online for more than a decade, including reading material, syllabuses, video lectures and practice exams. For the price of a computer and an internet connection, motivated learners could work their way through several university degrees and save millions of dollars.

The online education market is now maturing. Massive Open Online Courses, or MOOCs, have struggled to live up to expectations, but online offerings are improving and expanding. America’s largest providers of online education—edX, a non-profit service run by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Coursera and Udacity for-profit organizations with Stanford University roots, and the Khan Academy non-profit organization—have provided courses for an estimated 12m students so far.

Online education programs have several big advantages over traditional models. These probably weigh most heavily with people living in developing economies

who have few other options. It offers flexibility that the bricks-and-mortar sort cannot match. Busy students can fit it around their job or family schedule, work at their own pace and sample courses from universities without leaving their homes. Critically, online courses are significantly cheaper than the in-person kind. Many are offered free, though providers sometimes charge to certify exam results. A new online master’s degree in computing at Georgia Tech costs just $7,000, compared with $25,000 for the on-campus alternative.

A reduced price for higher education would be a boon to many families, since a university education can take a large bite out of household budgets, or saddle students with loads of debt. Education is just one of many things that new digital technology could deliver more cheaply. Over the past couple of decades prices of many physical goods, including televisions, computers and household appliances, have tumbled, particularly allowing for improvements in quality.

Yet the cost of other items just keeps going up. In 1990 Americans on average spent 38% of their income on housing, health care and education. By 2010 that share had risen to 43%. In recent decades prices for all three of those categories have risen faster than for goods and services as a whole. Even if technology does not create many new jobs, if it brings down the cost of education and medical care as well as that of other goods and services, workers can breathe a sigh of relief.

As innovation expands outward from ICT, so too should the jobs. Success in many of the newly available niches will often remain a matter of skill, whether the product on offer is a versatile mobile phone or a fancy application. But at least technology is making it easier and cheaper than ever to obtain new skills.

Technology creates possibilities and the potential to change the world, but with it comes greater responsibility. Ultimately, the future will depend on the choices we make. We can reap unprecedented bounty and freedom, or greater disaster than humanity has ever seen by increasing the spread.

But in the long run, the real question will go beyond economic growth. As more and more work is done by intelligent machines, people can spend more time on other productive activities. Not just leisure and amusements, but also the deeper satisfactions that comes from invention and exploration, from creativity and building, and from love, friendship and community. These qualities will grow in importance as we satisfy our more basic economic needs. If the previous Industrial Revolutions helped unlock the forces of energy trapped in physical and chemical bonds to reshape the physical world, the real promise of the Digital Revolution is

to help unleash the power of human ingenuity. As we have fewer constraints on what we can do, it is then inevitable that our values will matter more than ever. Our generation has inherited more opportunities to transform the world than any other. That’s a cause for optimism, but only if we are mindful of our choices. Technology is not destiny. We shape our destiny!

References

The Impact of Digital Revolution

Reference # Title, Author, Publisher, Date

(1) Race Against the Machine, Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAffee,Digital Frontier Press, 2011

(2) The Second Machine Age, Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAffee, W.W. Norton & Co, 2014

(3) The Innovators, Walter Isaacson, Simon & Schuster, 2014

(4) Invention of Integrated Circuits, Arjun N. Saxena, World Scientific, 2009

(5) The Third Great Wave, Special Report on Technology and the World Economy, The Economist, October 4, 2014

(6) Briefing: Telecoms and Society, The Economist, February 28, 2015

(7) Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the 21st Century, Harvard University Press, 2014.

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