Ecomog - Nigeria
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ECOMOG Non-standing, ad-hoc multinational military force, created in 1990 by the Anglophone members of ECOWAS in response to the Liberian civil war. Nigeria provides most of the troops, material and financial backing (in 2001 the country had spent around $ 13 billion in peacekeeping operations. • Nigeria is suspected, mainly by the Francophone members of ECOWAS (mainly Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso) to advance its own agenda. It can be argued that the country has tied its security to that of the region and intervenes in other countries to address the potential spill-over of internal civil wars. The conflict in Sierra Leone can be seen in part as a consequence of the Liberian civil war. Moreover Nigeria tried to impose itself as the regional policeman in the security vacuum of the early 1990s. • The heavy costs in blood and treasure supported by the country suggests that ECOMOG was a vehicle for imposing Nigerian hegemony in the region. The multilateral nature of the force gives some additional legitimacy. However, it is unthinkable to mount a large scale operation without Nigeria providing the bulk of troops, material and financial resources (huge oils revenues have permitted an interventionist foreign policy in the post-Cold War decade). • The intervention to restore a democratic elected governement in Sierra Leone by Nigeria can be seen as an attempt to regain international prestige the country's military dictatorship. (Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth in november 1995, for executing nine environmentalists including Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken Saro-Wiwa) ECOMOG IN SIERRA LEONE: “SUCCESS” • ECOMOG deploys before others international actors, following the may 1997 coup. (UN peacekeepers won't be deployed until 2000) • Has enough resources and political will to commit troops and material resources. • Is different from “1 st generation peacekeeping” in the sense that is able and willing to fight his way into complicated civil war situations. • Actually fights the RUF, is the external actor that suffers higher casualties. • Reinstates Kabbah's democratically elected government after the may 1997 coup. • Notwithstanding hundreds of casualties following a surprise attack in Jan. 1997, remains in the capital to fight RUF troops, even when the government goes into exile. • Is involved in a broader regional scenario, can engage multiple actors: threatens to bomb Liberia and Burkina Faso for supplying weapons to the RUF, parallel engagement in Liberia. • First attempt of African peacekeeping. “FAILURES” • Ad-hoc force: no previous common training, no planning. Improvised character negatively influences capacity. • No unified command: national battalions respond to their heads of state/government. Can withdraw troops without noticing the field commander. • Over-reliance on Nigerian troops/finances suggests the advancing of a Nigerian agenda: ▪ Balancing Francophone regional takeover? (Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso supported and sponsored both Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars)
description
The role of Nigera in war in Sierra Leone
Transcript of Ecomog - Nigeria
ECOMOG
Non-standing, ad-hoc multinational military force, created in 1990 by the Anglophone members of ECOWAS in response to the Liberian civil war.
Nigeria provides most of the troops, material and financial backing (in 2001 the country had spent around $ 13 billion in peacekeeping operations.
• Nigeria is suspected, mainly by the Francophone members of ECOWAS (mainly Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso) to advance its own agenda. It can be argued that the country has tied its security to that of the region and intervenes in other countries to address the potential spill-over of internal civil wars. The conflict in Sierra Leone can be seen in part as a consequence of the Liberian civil war. Moreover Nigeria tried to impose itself as the regional policeman in the security vacuum of the early 1990s.
• The heavy costs in blood and treasure supported by the country suggests that ECOMOG was a vehicle for imposing Nigerian hegemony in the region. The multilateral nature of the force gives some additional legitimacy. However, it is unthinkable to mount a large scale operation without Nigeria providing the bulk of troops, material and financial resources (huge oils revenues have permitted an interventionist foreign policy in the post-Cold War decade).
• The intervention to restore a democratic elected governement in Sierra Leone by Nigeria can be seen as an attempt to regain international prestige the country's military dictatorship. (Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth in november 1995, for executing nine environmentalists including Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken Saro-Wiwa)
ECOMOG IN SIERRA LEONE: “SUCCESS”
• ECOMOG deploys before others international actors, following the may 1997 coup. (UN peacekeepers won't be deployed until 2000)
• Has enough resources and political will to commit troops and material resources.• Is different from “1st generation peacekeeping” in the sense that is able and willing to fight
his way into complicated civil war situations. • Actually fights the RUF, is the external actor that suffers higher casualties.• Reinstates Kabbah's democratically elected government after the may 1997 coup.• Notwithstanding hundreds of casualties following a surprise attack in Jan. 1997, remains in
the capital to fight RUF troops, even when the government goes into exile. • Is involved in a broader regional scenario, can engage multiple actors: threatens to bomb
Liberia and Burkina Faso for supplying weapons to the RUF, parallel engagement in Liberia.
• First attempt of African peacekeeping.
“FAILURES”
• Ad-hoc force: no previous common training, no planning. Improvised character negatively influences capacity.
• No unified command: national battalions respond to their heads of state/government. Can withdraw troops without noticing the field commander.
• Over-reliance on Nigerian troops/finances suggests the advancing of a Nigerian agenda:▪ Balancing Francophone regional takeover? (Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso
supported and sponsored both Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars)
▪ A reactionary force? Taylor's rebellion was aimed at overthrowing a bloody military dictatorship and the war in Sierra Leone was seen both by him and Sankoh as a continuation of the former. Nigeria may have intervened to stop the spred of the revolution.
▪ When transition to democracy (1999) the elected government is under pressure to end the commitment and focus on domestic issues.
Conclusion: can't do much, situation is very complex, has to play on different tables. The main contribution to the conflict is the actual fighting against the rebels and the protection of the capital, Freetown.
