1

East Asia’s Transborder environmental issues: encouraging regional

cooperation or conflict1

When considering East Asia’s various cross border pollution and environment issues,

a critical point in case is to what extent they will contribute to either a more

cooperative or conflictual relationship within the region. What complicates further is

that most environmental issues are related to economic modernisation and

development. Among the specific issues identifiable are the Haze, involving various

countries within the ASEAN community; the KOSA, interlinking a number of

countries spread over a wider geographic area but originating in parts of China and

Mongolia; the question of how to share trans-border water sources like those of the

Mekong River. Drawing together from different International Relations Theories and

approaches to security studies the paper will address to what extent we could expect a

positive or negative impact in the relationship of the involved countries. After all we

are often told that cooperation in issues of lesser national security issues, like

environmental security, may contribute to a more collaborative relationship on the

critical topics of national security issues as well. Yet, the argument presented is that

we rather should be cautious in this regard, as the opposite may also happen,

especially when considering the close link between environmental degeneration and

economic developments, at least when following orthodox development strategies.

What’s more addressing transborder environmental issues and the impact of climate

change at the local and regional level occurs in the context of the regional security

dynamic and thus should not be evaluated in isolation.

Keywords: Environmental Security; East Asia; Security Studies; regional integration;

1 Presented by Dr Christian Ploberger, Draft version, no quotations to be made without the author’s permission.

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INTRODUCTION

When speaking of environmental security, an important qualification is needed as environmental

security refers to the socially, political and economic related implication of environmental

degeneration on the livelihood of people and their development prospects.

Yet, environmental security issues as well as the impact of climate change vary in their scope as

they can have local, regional or global impacts, though, environmental security issues can include

a variety of issues like: acid rain; air, water and marine pollution; deforestation and

desertification; ozone depletion and climate change, which in itself represents a comprehensive

challenges. Since the impact of climate change and environmental degeneration can undermine a

country’s development strategy and negatively impact on the living conditions of a population,

consequently carrying fundamental implications for political stability.

This stimulated a process of redefining the meaning of security and contributed to a

transformation in the awareness of security threats, where human health, social welfare, domestic

sources of instability, environmental degeneration, political and social identity are now identified

as security concerns.

Indeed, we can identify additional efforts of re-interpreting the meaning of security when taking

into account the concept of Human Security, put forward by the United Nation which is people-

centered, multi-sectoral and context-specific (Human Security in Theory and Practice 2009).

Hence, the Human Security approach highlights the complexity, variability and interdependence

of different aspects of human insecurity, consequently stressing an inter-disciplinary approach in

addressing security risks. However, when considering the traditional, hence realist interpretation

of security, climate change and environmental degeneration and the various negative impacts

they can generate are largely missing from such a traditional conception of security.

It is worth to remember that with the end of the Cold War we are witnessing an increasing

fragmentation and proliferation of the understandings of security, as the realist interpretation of

security was gradually viewed as less satisfying. Yet, the challenges to the traditional

interpretation of security were already stimulated in earlier periods, by the rise of economic and

environmental agenda during the 1970s and 1980s in specific.

Even so, the traditional interpretation of security, related to military threats and national

sovereignty did not disappear. What’s more, such a process of re-interpreting the meaning of

security is not a novel development as the interpretation of security undergoes alterations over

time, influenced by the security challenge at a specific moment in time, like times of war

(IWW/IIWW) or times of heighten international confrontation like the Cold War period. After

all, it appears we are now returning to an earlier interpretation of security, as the 19th

century

understanding of security included an economic and social dimension of political life as well

(Katzenstein 1996, p.10).

Considering, as stated above, that if the impact of climate changes signifies an actual or potential

threat to various communities and their development prospects it certainly has to be recognised as

a particular security risk and therefore assigned a specific task in analysing related threats and to

formulate a specific responses to it. Even so, climate change and environmental related risk and

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their potential impact should not be evaluated in isolation but in the context of other factors like

an ongoing demand for development. It should also be noted that traditionally aspects of security,

related to state security did not vanished, even as their dominance within the security agenda

setting became more scrutinized and challenged.

East Asia’s environmental issues and the impact of climate change within specific localities with

the region, representing critical security issues regarding the actual and potential future impact on

people’s livelihood through the region. The environmental security issues selected in this article

include the KOSA phenomena, the annual sandstorms which have a strong impact on parts of

norther China, Mongolia, South Korea and Japan; the issues of water sharing of transborder river

systems like the Mekong River; and the recurrent haze event originating in parts of Indonesia

which occasionally strain the relationship within the ASEAN.

Those examples are selected for their relevance as specific trans-border environmental security

issue. First they represents very specific environmental issues which are related to the wider

aspect of development; second they are transnational in nature, even one can identify the source

of each of them at various locations within a country; third, together they are covering various

parts of the East Asian region. In all those cases specific local environment issues either

negatively impact on the wider region or having the potential of generating potential serious and

destabilizing regional effects which could negatively impact on regional political cooperation and

development. Hence, climate change related risk can carry critical implications for both stability

and instability of bilateral as well as multilateral relationships and thus can either support or

undermined regional stability and integration.

Even as identifying environmental degeneration and the impact of climate change as a critical

and particular security issue, their impact should not be evaluated isolation, since the existing

security dynamic and security challenges to traditional understanding of security within a region

will have an impact on how to address such challenges. East Asia is no exception to it and its

experience a number of traditional security challenges, related to the exploitation of resources,

national power competition at the regional level, the presence of an external power as well as

various development challenges to national developments.

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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AS A SECURITY TOPIC

Traditionally, interpreting security was and still is based extensively on a realist understanding of

international relations, characterised by the following principal aspects: the nation-state as the

key actor; international politics as a struggle for power in an anarchic world; nation-states rely on

their individual capabilities to ensure their survival; states behave like rational-actors informed by

national interests; power is the most important concept in explaining and predicting state

behaviour.

Even so, it is now widely acknowledged that what actually constitute security and security issues

underwent a critical revaluation and a number of new security subjects were added to the security

discourse. This process of re-evaluating the meaning and focus of security was facilitated by the

end of the Cold War confrontation and how it ended, without a major, system wide, conflict.

However, adding this process of re-interpreting the meaning of security represents an issue-

driven dynamic as non-traditional security issues like human development also became

increasingly recognised security topic. Alike, environmental degeneration and climate change

were also identified as new security issues, since both can generate a negative impact on the

livelihood of people and on their development prospect. Indeed, climate change has even the

potential of reversing already reached human development goals.

Alternative approaches to the traditional view of security: from a state centric view to a

broader and alternate interpretation with society, individual and development prospect at

its core

A critical and underlining rational of this re-evaluation of security is to what extent the focus of

security shall continue to be state centred, or should the reference and focus of security change

towards society or the individual?

Whereas Buzan et al. still emphasises, even with a somewhat different approach, the continuous

critical role of the state with regard to security, they argue that the security of states should be

analysed within different sectors: the military sector, focusing on forceful coercion; the political

sector, analysing the relationship of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic

sector, concern itself with the relationship of trade, production, and finance; the social sector,

with its focus on identity; and the environmental sector, concentrating on the relationship

between human activity and the planetary biosphere (Buzan et al 1998, p.7). Within this process

of re-evaluating the interpretation and focus of security modifications of how to interpret the

meaning of security occurred. Wyn and Li outline those alterations:

Deepening of security, to overcome the abstraction of military issues from their

broader contexts; Broadening of security, moving away from a narrowly military

focus; Extending security, by shifting away the state focus of it and to incorporate

other levels of analysis as society, ethnonational or religious identities, or

individuals; Security as emancipation, this mean the freeing of people - as

individuals and groups - from constraints (Wyn and Li 1999).

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When evaluating the process of re-evaluating the meaning of security, it is worth considering

assertions made within the Critical Security Studies approach, which emphasises that an

increasing complexity of security challenges can be identified, stating that the point of departure

for conceptualising security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and

collectivity (Smith 2005). Consequently, when conceptualising security, the reality of risk and

insecurity within a specific locality, should be the point of departure. This also represents a vital

consideration with regard to environmental security issues.

Yet, researcher who focused on developing countries, already argued for a considerable time for

a different understanding and interpretation of security.

Ayoob for example argues that the traditional, state centred, approach to security ‘is inadequate

to explain the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of the problem of security as faced by

the majority of members in the international system’ (1997, p.121). A position also supported by

Smith, stating that in many Third World states insecurity is related to domestic aspects, as to the

low levels of social cohesion, to relative weak governments, and low economic prosperity for a

large part of the population. Thus, we can identify a direct correlation between development and

security in these states (Smith 2005, p.82). Walker also supports these contentions, when he

argued for ‘the need to break down the artificial distinction between security and development’

(1997, p.65). Alagappa too, argues that security must be conceptualised with survival and

wellbeing of the political community (1998, p.689).

Hence, as the focus of security changed from the state to people and the society, the

connectedness of security with it the prospect of development were identified as critical security

issues. For example, Terriff et al. identifies society as a reference for security (1999, p.178) and

Shaw identify in society the missing dimension between the state and the individual as both states

and individual need to be understood within a sociological context, as neither just stand alone

(2005, p.84). Hence, societal security, as highlighted by Smith is distinct from that of state

security (2005, p.69-70).

The UN Human Security concept represents an additional effort of re-interpreting the meaning of

security by focusing on development and the implication for society and individuals. The

framework underlining the Human Security approach is people-centered, multi-sectoral and

context-specific (Human Security in Theory and Practice 2009). Hence, the Human Security

approach highlights the complexity, variability and interdependence of different aspects of

human insecurity and stress an inter-disciplinary approach in addressing security risks. After all,

societal security, or better social insecurity, manifest itself in various forms like potential

economic shocks (income, employment, improving the livelihood, environmental issues) and can

threaten individuals and groups alike, thus the link between security and development became

more pronounced and recognised. After all, the prospect of development failure represents a

serious security issues for many societies and individuals worldwide.

Accepting that security issues are related to the reality of actual challenges within a specific

locality, one cannot longer ignore that a huge variety of security issues exit, even one decide to

focus on some particular security issue as their relevance may commands increasing attention.

However, it is also worth remembering that, as stated by Booth, the conceptualization of security

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represents a political move, as different groups and political actor interpreting security challenges

differently. Consequently, there exists no politics-free definition of security (Booth 2005, p.21).

Taken together these assessments indicate an observable process of change, in which the focus of

security switched from the state to society and the people. Indeed, the protection of society and

individuals is broth into perspective and with it the multitude of threats that cut across different

aspects of human society, consequently highlighting the relationship between security and

development. After all, insecurity is context-specific and especially felt at the local and regional

level, an observation which is especially applicable with regard to environmental security or the

impact of climate change respectively.

The environmental security agenda:

As the damaging impact of excessive economic growth and economic modernisation on the

environment became more recognised, environment security rose to prominence. At first the

concern focused on environmental degradation and pollution issues (air, water, soil) consequently

highlighting the negative impact on human well-being. Landmarks reports like the Club of Rome

and Brundland Commission Report facilitated that process as did emerging green movements in

different parts of the world by further politicizing the ‘environmental question’. This

subsequently generated a wider public recognition of environmental issues. Second, over time

climate change and its actual or potential impact on human life as well as it’s potential of stalling

development process or even reversing already made progress in development, advanced the

acceptance of an environmental security agenda further.

Thus, if the impact of environmental degradation and climate changes signifies an actual or

potential threat to various communities and their development prospects it certainly has to be

identified as another non-traditionally security risk.

When evaluating environmental security issues and their impact we have to consider this impact

at different levels, like for individuals or for society; for specific segment of the economy or on

the whole development agenda since a specific exposure to a particular environmental and

climate change related challenges is related to a specific locality. It goes without question that the

urgency of an environmental security problem will inform the securitization process, as dealing

with immediate threats provide powerful political incentives to act accordingly. After all, it is the

actual and specific local/regional felt negative impact which will not only raise the awareness of

environmental degeneration but will make a successful securitization process more likely.

Even so, when evaluating the topic of environmental security another essential aspect it is

highlighted by Buzan at al. characterised by the existence of two agendas: a scientific and

political agenda. The scientific agenda relates to the authoritative assessment of threat scenarios,

thus providing the basis for securitization or de-securitization, whereas the political agenda is

related to the formation of concern in the public sphere and the allocation or non-allocation of

resources in dealing with environmental security challenges (Buzan at al 1998, pp. 71-6).

In both cases environmental degeneration, but especially with regard to climate change, science

has a fundamental impact in stimulating policy responses and to facilitate a shift in attitudes and

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perceptions and subsequently on the impact environmental security concerns will generate, even

when the local experienced impact of environmental related security issue are highly relevant as

well.

The actual report of IPCC indicates that due to human interference climate change is occurring

and that climate change pose a risk for humanity and that non-action will increase the negative

impact climate change has on humanity (Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and

Vulnerability 2014). Alike the released IPPC report on Mitigation of Climate Change sustains

such an evaluation, by portraying a rather challenging outlook, when emphasising, that without

additional efforts the growth of emissions, driven by economic and population growth, will result

in projected temperature increase to 3,7 - 4,8 degree Celsius by 2100 (Climate Change 2014:

Mitigation of Climate Change, 8). A World Bank report also indicates a very challenging

development trajectory, by stating that there exists a high possibility that we could face a global

average warming of 4 degrees, with the implications that this could trigger abrupt environmental

system change consequently carrying additional and considerable negative implications for

human development and life (Turn down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impact, and the

Case for Resilience 2013). One critical aspect with regard to climate change related threats are

representing recurrent extreme weather and climate events2 by contributing to the increasing

visibility of the environment security challenge.

What complicates the application of the environmental security agenda further is that we can

distinguish, between two types of disasters: concrete ones, with instantly felt implications, and

slowly developing ones but often with alarming consequences for future developments prospects

for a particular population. Yet, the specific impact generated on a particular locality will add an

additional dynamic on the securitization process. It is worth remembering that the impact of

climate change is local specific and neither global nor universal in nature, hence in many cases

environmental related securitization moves are local or regional in nature. It is at the local level

where the public and community pressure to address specific environmental related issues is

strongest felt. Yet, this specific local impact also led to a fluctuation in the environmental threat

perception, as some communities may be affected whereas others not.

What’s more, the impact of climate change can lead to a cascading dynamic of risks for

individuals, groups or whole societies because of potential feedback processes, in undermining

livelihood of millions of peoples.

Such a potential threat scenario exists especially in the context of a vast urban area like a

Metropolis. For example, storm surges could not only have a direct negative impact on urban

areas but can lead to a cascading dynamic of additional risks and damage by inundating fresh

water supply, damage drainage systems and disrupt the electricity supply, consequently

increasing the negative impact on human health and on social stability. Thus, urban areas are in

danger of experiencing a dynamic of risk escalation described as ‘concatenated hazards’.3 Evens

so, we still can identify additional aspects of the potential negative impact climate change can

2 Example includes: the heat waves Europe experienced in August 2003, which led to the reported death of more

than 20.000 people; Hurricane Katrina (2005); Hurricane Sandy and its impact on parts of New York and the US

East (2012); typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines with a recorded wind speed of 270 – 310km/h (2013), 3 See Cities and climate change : global report on human settlements, 2011. Chapter 4 – The impact of climate

change upon Urban Areas pp.65-90.

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have on urban areas since urban areas representing vital zones of economic activities. Hence, if

such zones were to be devastated, the impact this would generate has the potential of going

beyond a mere local effect, consequently inheriting the possibility of affecting national

development as well.

It is this interrelated process of environmental degradation and its impact on individuals and

society alike which can generate various feedback processes thereby challenging the established

political, economic, and social order. Though it should be remembered that those impacts are

specific local and environmental related threats to human welfare vary in intensity within and

between specific localities or regions.

As for the potential economic costs, the Stern Report already estimated that the negative impact

of non-acting could lead to a loss of 5 percent of global domestic product annually, with the

possibility of reaching up to 20 percent of the annual global domestic product, depending on the

extent and speed of the climate change impact. However, the report also states that to address the

worst effects generated by the climate change dynamic the value of about one percent of global

domestic product needs to be invested and a further delay of doing so would further increase the

related costs in addressing climate change related impact (Stern 2007).

Even as climate change is now rightly recognised as a top environmental security issue, it should

be remembered that there exist a great variety of environmental topics which complicate the

issue, when focusing on environmental security. After all, pollution issues are still highly relevant

when considering the environment as a security issue even in the context of the rise of climate

change challenge.

Even so, is it of importance to distinguish between securitization moves, the attempts to securities

an issue, and a successful securitization process, the acceptance of an specific issue as a security

subject. One can argue environmental concern underwent at least a partial securitization process.

Partial, since not all feasible option to address environmental degeneration and the impact of

climate change are implemented, otherwise the result of the IPCC and World Bank reports would

be more positive. Adding to this challenge is that environmental issues and climate change

related impacts are trans-national in nature, even as stated before, that their impact is specific

local. This in turn requires us to focus our attention at another geographic level, the regional one.

After all, geographical proximity is a relevant dimension with regard to security in general and

with regard to environmental security in particular. The specific threat generated towards a

particular locality may also impact on a country’s foreign policy especially in the case of cross-

border pollution.

The challenge for a successful securitization process stems from the fact that traditional security

challenges to state security continuous not only to be relevant but still receiving an

overwhelmingly recognition from national and international actors. Thus, when analysing to what

extent environmental security issues are relevant subjects to focus on, one have to keep in mind

the specific national and regional, and in extension, the global level of security interactions.

Locating environmental security in the context of regional security challenges

As stated before, environmental security issues and the impact of climate change need to be

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evaluated in the context not only of a specific national development process but also at the

regional level as proximity represents a critical aspect for potential negative implications in both

cases.

Regional security complex theory (RSCT) seems to offer a valuable approach since it focuses on

cluster of security integrations by identifying regional cluster of durable security interactions.

Buzan and Weaver describe Regional Security Complexes (RSC) as substructures of the

international system identifiable by the relative intensity of security interdependence among a

group of units. RSCs are therefore functionally defined types of region, constructed around

security interactions (2003, p.48). As emphasized through their work on RSCT, it is the regional

level which they identify as the appropriate level for practical security analysis, after all, a

substantial part of securitization and de-securitisation processes occurs at the regional level

(Buzan and Waever 2003, pp.43-44).

Although it seems quite helpful in applying RSCT when evaluating the actual and potential

impacts of environmental security issues, including the impact of climate change on specific

localities, the very nature of RSC as described by Buzan and Weaver (2003) already indicates the

limitation of doing so. As stated above, a RSC is identifiable by the intensity and durability of

security interdependence among and within a group of units over time. Accepting this definition

as the underling argument for identifying a RSC, which by the way is rightly applied to security

issue in general, will be problematic when applied to environmental security issues. After all,

environmental issues can change with regard to the impact they generate on specific localities

and with regard to their duration. Hence, it is this instable nature of environmental threats which

make it challenging to apply the RSC approach for environmental security analysis, though it

should be noted that the impact of climate change can be of longer duration.

Having made that point I still would argue in favour of integrating environmental security issues

within a regional security context analysis, as a particular risk category, but not in constructing a

RSC based on environmental security issues. As such it will highlight the relevance of a specific

environmental security issue at the regional level, without being too deterministic in identifying

an RSC. This will provide flexibility not only to assess environmental security issue in a wider

bilateral and regional context since it will allow us to provide insight into the contribution of a

specific environmental security issue constellation to the cooperation/conflict dynamic between

specific states.

When addressing environmental security we also have to keep those aspects in mind, after all

traditional understanding of security did not lost its relevance and the related interactions are part

of the overall security dynamic, at the local, regional and global level. After all, I am fully aware

of the competition over resources underlining different conceptions of security and recognise the

imbalance of the actual situation - indicated by the huge amount of money spent for military

means instead of addressing environmental security issues - and the need for shifting those

resources from the military sector towards the environmental sector will be a necessary

requirement.

Nevertheless, when linking the environment to the security field, I would argue that it should be

seen as particularly important in its own right, able to command the similar attention and

resources as traditional understanding of security does. Yet, while the rise of environmental

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problems, through its transnational character, has brought state power and sovereignty into

question, the responses to these problems may often extend and strengthen aspects of state

authority and involvement in society.

Recognising the potential and actual risks from environmental degeneration and climate change

to the development prospects of countries means adding another critical risk category to the

development framework and may requires a fundamental alteration of how to approach

development in general. We will now turn the EAs Asia’s specific trans-border environmental

issues.

EAST ASIA’S TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Environmental degeneration and the impact of climate change representing specific security

concerns for the East Asian region. Indeed within the region an intertwined link between

economic development and economic modernisation with environmental degeneration exist, not

least because of a particular development paradigm within the region, characterised by a ‘growth

first and clean up later’ approach. Hence, once again, as observable in other regions, the close

link between the level of industrial and economic development and environmental degeneration

once again manifest itself.

As emphasized by Rock, this relationship finds its expression in an inverted-U Kuznets curve as

increases in per capita lead to an initial process of environmental quality decline. However, with

the income continuing rising, industrial activities are shifting towards less pollution industries

therefore the burden on the environment declines (2002, p.9).

Japan’s own experience with pollution provides a good example. Even as Japan now belongs to

most energy-efficient countries globally, this was not always the case. During its rapid economic

development from the late 1950s to the late 1980s, pollution did become a serious political issue

with some of the most severe pollution cases dating back to the 1950s.4 Over time other cases of

water contamination occurred and Japan’s urban population, which increased considerable of this

period, faced a deteriorating urban air quality.

This generated a political dynamic resulted in protest movement to address those harmful impacts

on the people’s livelihood which also threaded to undermine public health in general. This in turn

also led to a rethinking about the economic development model and Fischer states that increasing

evidence suggest that Japan’s leader no longer perceive economic growth as being antithetical to

environmental protection (Fischer 2005, p.188). In the process of addressing its pollution issues,

Japan become a global leader in addressing private and industrial pollution issues since pollution

and gained economic profit from exporting its pollution reduction know-how to other parts of the

world.

Yet, despite its success, Japans economic environmental policy nexus still represents a case of

developing first, cleaning up later, it should not function as an economic development model

other developing countries should follow, at least from the environmental perspective. After all,

4 The most prominent pollution issue was the ‘Minamata Bay Case’, where about one thousand people died and

several thousand suffered from mercury poisoning

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an early shift towards a low carbon economy would be instrumental for developing countries to

avoid, what Zhengzhong (2011) describes as ‘development emissions’, emissions which are

generated during the process of industrialization, modernization and urbanisation. A stance also

taken up in the recent IPPC report on Climate Change, emphasising, that infrastructure

development and urbanisation has the potential to lock societies into a difficult to change

emission intensive pathway, consequently timely action are required if ambitious mitigations

goals are to reached (Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change 2014, 20)

However, it again reminds us that the level of industrial development and the future direction of

development play a critical part considering the future pollution trajectory path. It is also worth

recognising that often countries who are contributing to climate challenge and pollution issues are

also suffering themselves from both. Such an assessment also applies to many countries within

East Asia, with China representing a particular example in this regard.

China, through its extraordinary successful economic development and because of its sheer size

is now the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases globally. Yet, at the same time China and its

population has experienced massive environmental problems themselves, characterised by a

diverse range of issues. Among them are: acid rain and urban air pollution, both of representing

critical concern closely related to China’s coal based energy generation and its raising energy

demands, which in itself is based on its extraordinary economic success. Even so, pollution and

especially urban pollution became a serious topic in recent years.5

Yet, China is also one of the most affected countries by climate change, but even so not the only

one affected by it within the East Asian region. Hence, the following cases offer examples of the

diverse range of environmental issues East Asia is facing. They also remind us again on the

crucial link between environmental degeneration, economic development strategies and

economic modernisation processes.

In the following specific cases of trans-border environmental security issues affecting East Asia

at the sub-regional level will be outlined. Those cases not only represent specific local

environment issues but also have the potential of negatively impacting on the wider region by

generating potential serious and destabilizing regional effects which could negatively impact on

regional political cooperation and development. One is the haze issue in Southeast Asia the other

the Kosa phenomenon and the issue of acid rain within Northeast Asia yet another is linked to the

issue of sharing cross border water resources like those originating at the Tibetan plateau as

exemplified by the challenges in dividing the resources of the Mekong River. To begin with, a

short evaluation of the impact climate change will have within the region will be made.

Climate Change and as a regional challenge

As in the case of China, land degeneration represents, in its various forms (deforestation,

desertification, soil erosion and rural soil pollution, salinization) a serious environmental issue,

5For example, in October 2013 a red alert was issued for the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, with the

city of Harbin experiencing a pollution situation in which the density of airborne particles (PM2.5) were several

times above the level recommended by the WHO. An even more challenging pollution situation occurred in January

and February 2014 affecting northern and central China. On January 16 the pollution reached a level 20 times higher

than the recommended exposure level by the WHO in Beijing.

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exacerbated by a changing climate. China also witnessed increasing instances of drought and

flooding as were the case in 2010 and 2011, negative affecting the livelihood of millions of

people in central and southwestern China.6 Those observable changing climate patterns validating

assessments made in various climate related research projects, that droughts have become more

severe, the instances of floods has intensified, while the number of heat waves has increased.7

The 2011 UN report on cities and climate change further highlights China’s exposure to climate

change as Guangzhou and Shanghai rank within the global top ten cities in terms of exposed

population and potential infrastructure impact. Though in the latter case, Tianjin and Hong Kong

also added to the list. What’s more, China as a nation, also figures prominently within the eight

countries identified as highly-exposed to future sea-level rise and storm surges (Cities and

climate change 2011, pp.68-71). The actual climate change and environmental degeneration

related impact within China already generates considerable economic costs, with an estimated

economic loss, solely related to floods, between 1-2 % of the GDP for the 1990-2005 period. A

recent World Bank report on China estimates the combined cost of environmental degeneration at

about 10 percent of the China’s GDP (China 2030 2013, p.39).

Yet, the negative impact of climate change within the region is certainly not restricted to China

alone as metropolis like Manila, Jakarta, Ho Chi Min City, and Bangkok all facing the danger of

an expected sea-level rise of 50cm by 2060 and 100cm by 2090 (World Bank 2013). The IPPC

also highlights the specific and high risks faced by costal urban areas from the impact of climate

change, especially since climate change related risk can lead to an aggregated negative impact by

damaging the existing infrastructure, inundating fresh water supplies or interrupting the supply of

electricity (Climate Change2014: Impacts, Adaptions, and Vulnerability 2014).

Another highly climate change exposed case within East Asia represents the Philippines since as

a developing country its population is less able to cope with the impact of a quickly changing

climate and could undermine the progress of development already reached. What’s more, the

Philippines are also a hot spot of natural hazards. Take for example Typhoon Haiyan, which hit

the Philippines in November 2013 with a recorded wind speed of 270 – 310km/h, representing a

particular case, resulting in the deaths of over 5.600 peoples. It became the deadliest natural

disaster of the Philippines to date (Typhoon Haiyan death toll rises over 5000, 2013).

Considering the close link between extreme weather events and climate change, the prospect for

an increase in related risks and whit it damage to the livelihood of people and society is on the

raise.

When considering the specific impact climate change has on East Asia and on environmental

degeneration, the domestic-international nexus of environmental policy needs to be considered. It

is critical to note that environmental issues are neither bound nor constrained by national borders,

6 For example, the implication for Yunnan were so severe that Yunnan’s Provincial Party Committee attempted to

convince more local people to work as migrant workers in other parts of China, increasing the number from 500.000

to 800.000, as a measure to lessen the pressure on the shortage of drinking water (Drought-stricken China province

encourages migrants to work outside, 2010). 7 For details see: Ding Yihui et al, ‘Detection, Causes and Projection of Climate Change over China: An Overview of

Recent Progress’, in: Advances in Atmospheric Sciences, 24(6), (2007), pp. 954-971; Zhang Jianyun et al, ‘Impact of

Climate Change on Water Security in China’, in Advances in Climate Change Research, 5 (Suppl.), (2009) pp. 34-

40; Shourong Wang, Zuqiang Zhang, ‘Effects of climate change on water resources in China’, in Climate Research

47 (1-2), (2011), pp. 77–82.

13

nor are regulation costs readily understood at the national level, as they can vary in their impact

at the local, regional, national or international level for a single environmental issue. After all, a

particular climate change or environmental security related risk may not only carry local or

national implications but may also regional wide consequences as well. Proximity, which is often

quoted as a positive driver for local and to regional integration processes, became a different

quality when considering trans-national environmental issues.

The variety of cross-border issues and the international dimension of the environmental issue

itself highlighted by their complexity and that unconnected environmental issue could actually

increase their negative impacts when occurring at a similar time.

Shared Resources – Water, development and the Mekong River Basin Question

One critical East Asia’s environmental security issue is related to the water resources of river

networks which run through more than one country and how to share them.

Within Asia, the Tibetan plateau provides the source for major river systems which flows through

regions populated by half of the global population (MRC Annual Mekong Flood Report 2009, p.

5, 2010) represents a particular sensitive issue. Among the rivers which originate at the Tibetan

plateau are the Yellow River, the Chang Jiang, the Mekong, the Irrawaddy, the Salween, several

rivers which feed the Brahmaputra and the Ganges, as well as the Indus. Even as the Yellow

River and the Chang Jiang are not transboundary rivers the international dimension of these River

systems originating at the Tibetan plateau became evident, when considering that they cover huge

parts (from west to east) of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Lao, Cambodia and

Vietnam.

The issue of how to share such critical resources between upstream and downstream countries

represents a contentious issue and could lead to increasing international conflicts between the

countries involved. After all, any alteration, either through the building of hydropower plants or

through the overuse for agriculture, or during a process of economic modernisation will generate

negative effects on the hydrological flow regime of these river systems. Such changes could carry

fundamental implications for the populations living along these river systems. Adding to the

vulnerability of these river systems is the impact of climate change, which has the potential of

altering the river’s flow regime further. The political complexity of addressing such challenges is

made explicit in the case of the Mekong River.

The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) is an economic area bound together by the Mekong River

and includes various parts of a number of countries. Among them: China, especially Yunnan

province; Myanmar; Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Viet Nam. In all the GMS covers 2,6 million

square kilometres with a combined population of around 326 million people.

This significance of the Mekong for the development prospect of the people living along its

banks was always recognised and found expression in the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation

for Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin by stating that the natural resources and

environment of the Mekong Basin are natural assets of immense value to all the riparian countries

for the economic and social well-being and living standards of their peoples. It is therefore

emphasized, that cooperation and a focus on mutually benefits shall be lie at the center of in the

14

sustainable development, utilization, conservation and management of the Mekong River Basin

(Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong river basin,

Mekong River Commission, 1995, pp.1-2).

Consequently a number of different fields of cooperation identified and includes issues like

irrigation, hydro-power development, navigation, flood control and fisheries to name some

critical issues (Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong

river basin, Mekong River Commission, 1995, p. 3).

Both, the recognition of the significance of the Mekong Basins natural resources for development

and the well-being of the people as well as the challenges faced with where again emphasised in

the Ho Chi Minh City Declaration (April 2014) at the 2nd

Summit of the Mekong River

Commissions. It is stated that the utilization of the Mekong River Basin’s water sources

contributed largely to the socio‐economic development of the region, yet, it also generated

negative environmental and social impacts in the Basin which need to be fully and effectively

addressed. Itis further stated that climate change has already a negative impact on the livelihoods

of the people and the economies of the Mekong River Basin and it therefore needs to be

addressed urgently. After all, further development pressures, like population growth and

economic expansion, create additional and huge demand for water, food and energy, increasing

the pressure on the Mekong River Basin resources further (Ho Chi MinCity Declaration, 2014).

In March 2010 China was already confronted with renewed criticism regarding its dam building

on the upper Mekong River (Lancang River), with some accusations that these dams will worsen

the drought situation along the lower Mekong (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) which

experienced an enduring drought condition and falling water levels (China denies dams have

worsened drought in Mekong River Basin, 2010). However, building hydropower plants along

the upper Mekong could help to reduce China’s dependence on fossil fuels, thereby reducing

China’s growing greenhouse gas contribution and with its contribution to climate change.

Yet the concern with dam building along the Mekong and its tributaries is not only linked to the

upstream development within China, but also with dam building in its middle and lower section,

especially in Laos. The MRC Environmental Program 2011-2015 (November 2011, p.8) states

that over the next 20 years about 50 additional dam projects are planned. If these projects go

ahead, they will have a significant impact on the amount and quality of water which will be

available, on fishery and agricultural production potentially leading to crop failure, and will also

reduce the availability of fresh water for household use.

Degrading the environmental quality of the Mekong River Basin, will lead to serious concern

regarding the well-being and development prospect of millions of people. For example in the

Lower Mekong Basin alone living about 60 million people of which 80 percent live in rural areas

and with one third of depends on water related activities as their main occupation (MRC

Environmental Program 2011-2015, November 2011, p.6).

Additional serious implications are identified in the reduced transportation of sediments, with

significant implications not only for the agricultural sector, but for the Mekong Delta region as a

whole, as it would allow an increasing incursion of salt water into the delta region. The predicted

sea-level rise would further increase the damage by salt-water incursion within the whole Delta

15

region (ICM 2010, p.11, p.14). In addition to hydropower development, various extensive

irrigation projects also exist, especially Thailand has plans to use the River’s water for national

irrigation projects.

In this regard it is worth recognizing that the hydropower projects on the Lower Mekong,

especially in Laos, are built for export and to earn revenues, these hydropower projects are

predicted as challenging as the proposed Chinese projects, when it comes to the issue of the

potential negative impact on the hydrological flow regime of the Mekong, with similar impacts

predicted: water shortage, decrease in food security, negative impacts on income and in

undermining development goals as well as undermining progress of poverty eradication already

made.8 Yet, what complicates the challenges is that as stated in the MRC Environmental Program

2011-2015 many hydropower and irrigation projects are part of national development strategies

to reach the UN Millennium Development goals (November 2011, p.8).

In addition the Mekong River Basin’s vulnerability to the climate change dynamic add another

layer of fundamental concern to the well-being and the development prospects of the societies

which live in the Basin. Thus the challenge to the Mekong River Basin is a rather complex one as

climate change related concerns are fairly high and with economic development and

modernization as well as population pressure carrying the potential of seriously further degrading

the environmental along the Mekong river system and all this in the context of a transboundary

perspective.

Once again, environmental protection and addressing development challenges could became

conflicting goals which need to be aligned to provide for a positive development prospect for the

people living within this great river network. What’s more, and further complicating the issues is

as stated by Stoett, that the Mekong represents an inescapable feature in the foreign policy

planning of all Southeast Asian countries (2005, p.169).

The Haze Issue

Southeast Asia’s most prominent trans-border pollution problem, the haze, represents another

serious, persisting and recurring environmental issue impacting not only on the relationship

between Indonesia on the one side and Singapore and Malaysia on the other, but also carrying

serious health and economic implications especially for Singapore, but also for Malaysia.

The haze originates in various parts of Indonesia and normally occurs during the dry period

February-March and August-October. It sources are fires linked to the economic development in

specific parts of Indonesia, with peat fires generating most of the emissions related to a slash-

and-burn practice by local farmers as well as the illegal burning practice of big companies for

clearing land for palm oil production.

8 Laos is the country which will profit most from it and will use these revenues for infrastructure projects, its national

development and poverty reduction strategies. Overall, if neither Thailand nor Viet Nam would be prepared to

purchase the power generated from the Lower Mekong River hydropower dams, these dams would very likely not be

built at all (ICM, 2010, pp. 8-10, 2010).

16

Albeit the haze represents a recurring event, the years 1997/98 and 2013 are standing out with

regard of the negative impact they had on Singapore and Malaysia, though significant pollution

effects were also observed in 2002, 2005 and 2006.

Yet in 2013 haze impact reached a new negative level with the pollutant stand index (PSI)

reaching 400, the highest ever measured level. This indicated that pollution level reached a

serious health risk, especially when considering that a level of 300 is international defined as

hazardous. Serious health concerns were linked to vulnerable and elderly people, but also to

children’s health and everyone was asked to stay intern and to reduce outdoors, schools were

closed.

To but the pollution exposure of the 2013 haze into context, in 1997, which recorded the worst

year of haze related pollution until 2013, the PSI peaked at 226 in September 1997.9

Even as the health impact is at the top of the issue, the haze also carries potential economic

implications for Singapore by negatively impacting on tourism and retail sail, suspension of

business operations, and the potential of generating a general negative health impact on its work

force.

Yet, the negative impact of the 2013 haze also generated, albeit temporary, negative implications

for the relationship between involved countries and epically between Singapore and Malaysia on

the one hand and Indonesia at the other. A critical source for tension was the issue who is

responsible for the haze, which Singapore blaming Indonesia for the occurrence of the haze,

while Indonesia was hitting back that fires (to clear land for plantation the source of the haze) are

spotted on land owned by Singapore and Malaysian companies. This argument is not denied by

Singapore, as there are indications that Singapore and Malaysian based palm oil companies are

involved in the fires, as they control 2/3 of the total palm oil production. Even so, for Indonesia

the palm oil industry represents a strategic sector for its national economy development,

consequently Indonesia’s willingness to interfere in the operation of this sector seems to be

limited, a position taken by Singapore, stating that corruptions, misuse of local regulations and

the low capacity of local administrative capacities also play a role.

With regard to the Indonesian government’s insistence, that week administrative capacities at the

local level also played a critical role in failing to control the fires, Kassim points towards an

interesting episode during the 2013 haze situation which may weaken the argument that

Indonesia’s capacity at the local level are unable to address the fire issue, and indeed it was

political will which was missing. During the high of the 2013 crisis President Yudhoyono,

criticized the Riau provincial government for acting to slow, and consequently invoked his

presidential authority to step in and deploy fire-fighting troops. This intervention led to a

significant change on the ground as the numbers of hotspots causing haze were dramatically

reduced (Kassim, July 2013). Hence, one could argue, that there are some value in the argument

presented by Singapore that with more political will Indonesia would be able of doing more in

addressing the haze issue. Tan also states that over a period of 15 years the Indonesian

government has made little meaningful attempts in enforcing existing laws against the burning of

peat land and thus in preventing the annual occurrence of the haze pollution (2015, p.6)

9 See: BBC News Singapore haze hits record high from Indonesia fires; 21 June 2013; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-

22998592

17

Regarding the economic aspect, Tacconi at al pointing out that financial interests drive peatland

fires, as clearing land for plantation use by fire is the cheapest way of doing so which mechanical

clearing operations unable of competing with (2007, p.9). Tacconi at al also stating that local and

regional administrations within Indonesia are rather unwilling or unable to commit large

resources on containing peat fires and it is worth remembering that a high proportion of the

damage occurs not at the local level, as wind is driving away the pollution generated by the fire,

whereas the extension of plantation offers significant local development benefits (2007, p10).

Hence, the haze issue has put the focus on environmental issues as a source for generating

tensions within the region (Kassim July 2013).

Meanwhile, Singapore’s response to the Haze, lead to the enacting of the Transboundary Haze

Pollution Act 2014. Which defines haze pollution as ‘pollution of the environment in Singapore

comprising any poor air quality episode involving smoke from any land or forest fire wholly

outside Singapore’. Adding that ‘that this Act shall extent to and in relation to any conduct or

thing outside Singapore which cause or contribute to any haze pollution in Singapore (Singapore

Transboundary haze Pollution Act 2014). As such the Act creates extra-territorial liabilities for

actors being involved in the cause of contributing to the any haze pollution in Singapore.

No one denies that addressing the fires and with it the source of the transboundary pollution

issue, represent a challenging undertaking for various reasons as it needs to overcome not only

entrenched economic and political interests but also weak administrative capacities, at the local

level, a point emphasized from the Indonesian side.

The third regional environmental security issue is one which inserts a strong negative impact on

parts of Northeast Asia.

Northeast Asia’s trans-border pollution issues: Kosa and acid rain

Kosa (sandstorms) is related to desertification, with a rooted course in a combination of natural,

human induced (overgrazing, population pressure) as well as climate factors. Regarding the

sources and the spatial distribution of the Kosa phenomena there are three principal areas

identified, among them parts of western China (Taklimakan Desert and surrounding areas),

northern China as well as desert and semi-desert areas in southern Mongolia.

Kosa represent a critical domestic environmental issue for China by negatively impacting on the

living conditions of several northern and western provinces in China, but also as a prominent

transboundary pollution concern within northeast Asia, effecting especially South Korea and

Japan. The impact Kosa has on northeast Asia includes the disruption of electricity supply;

respiratory distress; the potential distribution of air pollution over a great area; the loss of fertile

top soil; damage to property, business and local and regional infrastructure; to name a few. The

impact of global warming will likely add to the intensity and longevity of the Kosa phenomenon.

A series of exceptionally strong storms within a narrow period of years (1998, 2001, 2002, and

2006) raised an increasing awareness of the challenge Kosa represents for China and northern

East Asia. In March 2010 Kosa again caused serious problems in various provinces (Xinjiang,

Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hebei) before hitting Beijing. The storm was so strong that people were urged

18

to stay indoors. A similar advice was issued for the residents of the capital of South Korea, Seoul,

as well (Sandstorm shrouds Beijing in dust, 2010).

As for acid rain, though it would be wrong to state that the only source of it can be linked to

China’s coal based energy generation, but it should not be denied that China’s extraordinary

economic success and the related steadily increasing demand for energy, provide a primary

source of acid rain within East Asia.

Hence to keep its economic development going, China still needs to generate an ever increasing

output of energy. Even as renewable energy sources are continuing increasing their share within

China’s overall energy generated and energy efficient measurements seriously implemented,

China need to continue to rely on coal for generating all the energy its needs. Even as the China’s

leadership recognizes that using coal for producing energy does generate some of the worst cases

of environmental pollution within China, it is still unlikely that it will reduce the amount of coal

for producing energy since introducing such a change of policy would seriously undermine the

government’s ability to provide adequate energy to satisfy its energy demand and consequently

will undermine its economic development strategy.

Yet, at the same time, the use of coal for energy generation not only negatively affect the

livelihood of many Chinese citizens, but also contributes considerable to an increase of

transboundary emission within East Asia.

In addition, acid rain and Kosa also provide a good example where two different phenomena

actually increase the impact of each other, as Kosa contributes to the problem of long rage

transport of pollutants, and facilitate acid precipitation over a greater geographic area and thereby

increase the negative effects on soil, vegetation, forests and lakes and consequently on the health

and livelihood of millions of people in Northeast Asia.

East Asia’s trans-border environmental issues: regional integration and security

constellation

The above examples indicating, that there exist a number or serious trans-border environmental

issues with the potential of impacting negatively on the relationships of the involved states and

thus may generate enough conflict potential of undermining processes of regional cooperation or

integration dynamic.

As emphasised throughout the paper, the potential impact of environmental security issues needs

to be assets in the context of economic development strategies and economic modernisation

policies as well as in the context of the existing web of regional security dynamics. The regional

security context, the degree of amity and cooperation between the regional actors, represents

another prominent factor when considering the impact of environmental security on bilateral and

regional cooperation.

The earlier mentioned regional security complex approach represents an effective approach in

identifying webs of regional security interactions and the intensity of regional security dynamics.

19

With regard to East Asia we can identify a number of specific trends, which shape the regional

security architecture.

Within the East Asian regional security web, the following security relationships need to be taken

into consideration when considering the potential consequences of local and regional

environmental security issues. Buzan and Waever argue that with the end of the Cold War rivalry

one can identify a dynamic which saw Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia merging into a single

RSC. This integration dynamic was based on various processes, like the emerging and

strengthening of a regional institutional setting since from 2000 onwards ASEAN encompassed

all sub-regional states, including Vietnam, which was once seen as a major threat and with the

ARF also including states from outside the Southeast Asian sub-region, like China and Japan.

The development of an East Asia security complex was also facilitated by, at least for some time,

Japanese cantered economic integration process and of course by one of the most critical regional

process of change, China’s economic and political rise10

.

Though the security situation on the North Korean peninsula shadow over the whole regional

security complex dynamic as does the issue of Taiwan even as the first case represents the more

volatile case. Yet, there also exist a number of other serious security concerns within this regional

security complex, like separatist movements in the Philippines or in three southern provinces of

Thailand, the threat of terrorist organisation like the Abu Sayyaf group, even one is compelled to

ask if this no mere a crime organisation based on kidnapping and extortion.

Yet, we can identify additional changes within the regional strategic environment, based on a

change in Japan’s own security policy as well as in the changed and adopted US-Japan defence

guidelines, which offers Japan a more active role within the alliance and consequently extent

Japan’s security related activities.

With regard to the first issue, we can identify a remarkable change in Japan’s own security policy

since the government of PM Abe decided to change some of the fundamental parameters which

guided Japan’s security policy since the end of the Second World War, namely changing parts of

the constitution to be more active in its defence. To be sure, Japan just moves closer to the

established praxis of other states with regards to its security policy, but it still highlight vital

changes in Japans security policy.

This coincides with another significant development, namely to update the US-Japan defence

guidelines with now state that they cover all situations that will have an important influence on

Japan’s security which cannot be defined geographically (The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence

Cooperation 2015, p. 7) and that the United States and Japan will take a leading role in

cooperating with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability and economic

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific Region (The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation April

27, 2015, p. 18). Hence this passage not only potential extent the range of Japanese security

activities geographically but also in its very context since there could be many different issues

which may carry security implications for Japan or the U.S.

The territorial dispute over the SCS islands also led to a remerging of stronger US-Philippine ties,

10 See Buzan and Weaver Part II – Asia (2003, pp.93-182)

20

adding another feature to the regional security complex dynamic by offering an external power to

enhance its position within the region. And it needs to be seen how the above mentioned changes

within Japan and in the US-Japan alliance system will impact on the already strained relationship

between China and Japan. Not only with regard to territorial disputes between China and Japan

over islands in the East China Sea but equally, what those changes means for the ongoing

standoff with regard to territorial issues in the SCS which in turn could further complicate the

already tense situations regarding all the involved claimants.

Independent of this regional web of security dynamics, generating a stable economic

development outlook represents a topic for all states within the region and could also lead to

some security related challenges, when states fail in their attempts of doing so.

Underdevelopment and marginalisation are serious issues within the region.

Addressing the complexity of regional environmental issues

The political complexity of addressing such challenges is made explicit in the case of the Mekong

River. Take the example of the further development plans for hydropower along the Mekong

River as various countries, like China and Lao, are planning more hydropower plants either to

address their own energy need, or to use the revenue generated from it to found national

development programs.

Realising those plans, could represent a serious challenge for all countries along the Mekong

River, as it will have an impact of the Mekong’s flow dynamic and consequently negative

impacting on the amount and quality of water, and on the amount of silt and nutrition transported

from the up river area down to the delta. This in turn could not only reduce the amount of fish

stock, a critical food supply for millions of people, but in the case of silt lead to an increasing

saltwater intrusion at the Mekong Delta region.

However, the challenge of utilizing and preserving the water of the Mekong at the same time

does not stop here as Thailand has plans to use the Mekong’s water for agricultural irrigation,

generating an additional and potential strong impact on the amount and quality of the water

available for other states along the river. Alike further economic development prospects within

the Mekong’s repatriates states and increasing population pressure, too have the potential of

altering the river’s flow regime and consequently negatively impacting on the livelihood of

millions of people along the GMS.

Indeed, this complex economic development challenge may even increase, considering that new

Strategic Framework for the GMS (2012-2022) shift its focus of economic development towards

a corridor perspective, favoring cross-sectoral and regional wide development perspective

(Greater Mekong Subregion Strategic Framework 2012-2022). Projects like the East-West

Corridor which eventually will provide a link between the Andaman Sea and Da Nang provides a

good example as does the strategy of facilitating of Cross Border Economic Zones. This in turn

could not only lead to cross-border economic activities and integration but it also could lead to a

situation where trans-border environmental issues can generate fundamental international

implications for the countries involved if they are not solved. Hence addressing trans-border

environmental issue became a critical aspect for further development within the GMS.

21

Thus the challenge to the Mekong River Basin is a rather complex one as climate change related

concerns are fairly high and with economic development prospects and modernization as well as

population pressure carrying the potential of seriously further degrading the environmental along

the Mekong river system and all this in the context of a transboundary perspective.

Acid rain provides another good example of the link between economic development and the

negative impact on the environment and on the livelihood of parts of the society. What’s more, in

combination with the Kosa phenomena its negative impact within the region increases

considerable.

However, addressing successful the challenges acid rain represents for Northeast Asia will

largely depend on China’s ability of substituting its coal based energy generation with renewable

energy sources as well as in facilitating energy saving policies to lessen its continuously

increasing energy demand. Once again, the link between domestic development goals and

generating environmental challenges, with not only domestic but regional implications, is made

clear and the question of how to share the negative impact this generates in a trans-national

context remains. It also reminds us that environmental issues are not constraint by national

borders.

Brettel argues that while there are signs of increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation

regarding trans-boundary environmental issues in Northeast Asia, there is no uniformity in the

degree of cooperation of various environmental issues (Brettel 2007). In the case of acid deposits

the cooperation developed more comprehensively, which is illustrated by the establishment of the

Acid Deposition Monitoring network in East Asia (ADMNEA) in 1992, and its subsequent

evolvement into the East Asian Acid Deposit Monitoring Network (EANET) in 2001 (Strategy

on EANET Development 2006-2010). Thus, we may identify EANET as a successful attempt of

intergovernmental regional environmental governance, with its geographical cope expanding and

its organisational development evolving. The EANET represents, as stated by Brettel (2007), the

core of an emerging regional acid rain regime covering both East and Southeast Asia.11

With regard to the haze issue, back in 2013 the outlook of a downward spiral in the political

relationship between the involved states was not a too farfetched prospect as the political

exchange reached a heated mood with Singapore continued in its protest with regard to what they

say as Indonesia’s non action and some Indonesian officials responding by describing this

behaviour as ‘childish’. This in turn led to a frantic activity to contain the situation with special

envoys sent to Singapore to address the haze problem. Malaysia also stepped in to help to reduce

the negative fallout by calling for an urgent ASEAN meeting and send a special envoy to

Indonesian President. Yudhoyono responded in a way to smudge the situation, and not only

expressed his sorry but also rebuked his minister and officials for their undiplomatic statements.

In doing so he was attacked within Indonesia for being seen as to submissive (See Kassim, July

2013).

Yet the episode indicates that even partners within a regional organisation (ASEAN) could end

up in a political conflict with regard of local environmental issues. If not addressed the Haze

11 Among the member states are: Japan, Russia, Mongolia, China, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam, Philippines,

Cambodia, Lao P.D.R., Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

22

issues may could developed into a vital challenge for ASEAN as an organisation, as it could

highlights it inability of addressing and dealing with vital regional issues.

The conflictual situation between Singapore and Indonesia also shed light on regional wide

agreements within the ASEAN as they represent agreement without power to enforce them

against the will of a participating state.

In 2002 ASEAN nations adopted a regional agreement, the ASEAN Agreement on

Transboundary Haze Pollution. The Agreement affirm the willingness of ASEAN members states

to further strengthen regional and international cooperation as well as national capacities to

develop national policies for preventing, mitigating and monitoring transboundary haze pollution

(Article 2). Even so, it is also stated that each nation has the sovereign right to exploit its own

resources and to pursue its own environmental and development policies (Article 3). However,

the Agreement does also refer to a state’s responsibility of controlling and preventing activities

within its territory which may cause environmental damage beyond its national jurisdiction

(Article 3). The agreement further emphasises that all member shall co-operate in developing and

implementing measures to monitor as well as to prevent transboundary haze pollution (Article 4)

(ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 2002).

Here again we can identify the strong state focus within ASEAN which may also reminds us on

its unwillingness in interfering in domestic issues of its members. Implementing ASEAN treaties

seems still depend on a ‘coalition of the willing’, lacking the power to enforce them. This also

applies to the agreement one Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002) consequently raising

questions about the robustness of the regional cooperation within ASEAN in addressing regional

challenges.

Yet, even one may rightly argue that there are potential shortcomings within the Agreement on

Transboundary Haze Pollution, ASEAN does recognise the challenge it represent for its

members.

At the 16th

Meeting of the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee (2014) on

Transboundary Haze Pollution, held in April 2014 in Darussalam, it was recognised that the

actual weather conditions could lead to an increase in hotspot activities and consequently to the

occurrence of a transboundary smoke haze. At the meeting the Ministers expressed their

appreciation that Indonesia expedites the process of ratification of the ASEAN Agreement on

Transboundary Haze Pollution, urging it to place highest priority on the ratification process so it

will be completed at the earliest possible time. They also noted the continued efforts undertaken

to further enhance bilateral collaboration between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Indonesia and

Singapore, to address transboundary haze issues.

The haze problem may provide a good example where a regional environmental issue increases

the pressure on a regional organisation to adapt its current mode of operation to address a serious

and recurrent environmental issue. Hence it may lead to a re-thinking of an existing regional

integration process and its underlining dynamic, though so far there are no sign that this will be

the case.

Another related aspect is as pointed out by Tacconi et al, that the Haze is also of global relevance

23

when considering its impact. With regard to the 1997/98 haze, it is estimated that they fires

generated a comparable 30% of the annual global average GHG emissions from land use change

(Taconi et al 2007, p.2) thus representing a pollution issue which should requires international

attention as well. Yet this in turn just adds another layer of discourse and potential conflicts in

addressing the underlining issues of the haze pollutions not only at the regional level.

What are the potential for regional cooperation or conflict regarding the implications of

environmental security issues?

Assessing the potential for or against cooperation with regards to environmental issues depends

on the specific focus and approach one will select, since assessing the potential of regional

environmental and climate change challenges for either cooperation or conflict is not

straightforward and the pattern of interaction could go both ways.

International relation theory also provides conflicting arguments about the possibility of

cooperation and conflict depending which theory one select as the two main streams, liberalism

and realism, offer different opinions on it.

Theoretical consideration for conflict and cooperation

For realists, nation interests and in gaining power is the overriding goal of state activities; indeed,

the competition between states is viewed as a zero-sum game. Hence, realist’s focus is on statism,

survival and self-help. Waltz argues that structure of the international system, which is anarchic

in its nature, shape the foreign policy behaviour of states (1980). Other members of the realist

camp distinguish between relative and absolute gains, pointing out that state, albeit they are

interested in increasing their power, are also concerned with how much more influence they

actual gain or lose towards an specific adversary, thus focusing on relative gains (Grieco 1888a;

Mearsheimer 2014).

When accepting such a realist interpretation of international relations, the space for cooperation is

rather limited, though rational choice realists do see opportunities for cooperation, but again

within limits. After all, they argue, the international system is still anarchic in character and

national interest continue to dominant foreign policy agenda setting, consequently, cooperation

may only can be interpreted as temporary, facilitating one owns agenda. Therefore, only limited

space exists for enduring cooperation.

Yet, from a liberalist perspective, the view is a rather different one. Cooperation is not only

viewed positively, but indeed it is emphasised that it will benefit everyone. For example, Mitrany

argued in favour of transnational cooperation, as only cooperation can address common problems

and challenges. Adding that successful cooperation in one field would over time led government

to cooperate in other cases as well (Mitrany 1966). When considering the incentives for

cooperation, it was stated that the proliferation of actors (globalisation) facilitated the options

available for interacting through different channels and thus contributed to the development of

what is described as a cobweb of interactions (Keohane and Nye 1989). This generates a dynamic

of interdependence among the actors, consequently, everyone would lose if the status quo would

be challenged.

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One may point out another difference between the realist and liberalist approach which can be

identified in their basic orientation. For realist international relations are about survival, for

liberalists, the focus is on competition. Another and related identifiable difference lies in their

core considerations as the liberal approach focus on political economy and human rights, whereas

the realist approach focus on national security.

When considering the potential of environmental security issues as a source for either conflict or

cooperation, it should be pointed out that, one came occasionally across the argument that

environmental issue may actual help to bridge a non-cooperative relationship between states as

they do not represent such a serious security concern as national security issues. Such an

argument is based on arguments from integration theorists like Haas, who among others,

described an integration process which at the beginning focus very specific and less political

sensitive issues before generating enough dynamic to address more complex and serious political

issues as well, consequently describing such a process of ‘functional spill-over’ (Haas 1964;

Deutsch 1957; Mitrany 1966).

In this regard, it is vital to identify the driver for cooperation and integration progresses, after all

regional integration process can depend on a variety of dynamics and can be different in their

character.

Breslin and Hook differentiating between regionalism and regionalisation. Whereas the first

represents a conscious and methodical attempts made by states to create formal mechanism for

dealing with common transnational issues and is ‘top-down’ in its character; refers

regionalisation to a different, rather spontaneous, integration dynamic, one which is based on the

actions of a number of different actors, mostly within the economy to take advantages of

economic gains at the local level (Breslin and Hook, 2002, p.4). In identifying the specific

process of such an integration dynamic they are speaking of Microregionalisation, which refers to

the creation of a transnational space below the national level, to promote economic, cultural,

political or security interests across national borders (Breslin and Hook 2002, p.8). Though, they

arguing that the exploitation of economic complementarities are at the heart of

microregionalisation processes, yet joint infrastructure projects represent another area of potential

for cooperation at the local and regional level. An underlining feature is, in all cases are an

expected ‘growth spill-over’ is at the centre of such a regional integration dynamic (Breslin and

Hook 2002, pp.9-10).

There seems do exist similarities with Keohane and Nye which emphasise the complexity of

international relations, by stating that there exists a cobweb of diverse actors operating across

national borders though an array of different channels (1989), though they not necessary referring

to the local level as Breslin and Hook are referring to.

Considering that such sub-regional integration process are taking place in close proximity, and

indeed proximity is highlighted as driving force for cooperation, trans-border pollution issues

could generate a quite negative impact especially in the case if there exist a dispute about the

source and responsibility of a specific environmental issue. However, it should not be denied that

the opposite can happen as well, as cooperation in addressing a specific environmental issue at

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the local level, where its impact is most directly felt, may help to overcome disagreement or

distrust in other cases as well and consequently generate a positive dynamic for cooperation.

East Asian’s regional integration dynamic and environmental security

With regard to East Asia one could argue that the region did indeed become more integrated over

the last two decades, with economic interests as the driving force behind it, even when regional

wide, formal agreement, are missing. Yet, this year launch of the ASEAN’s Economic

Community represents a vital process in this regional integration dynamic.

With this regional integration dynamic in mind, formal and informal, Pempel argues that the

region has developed an increasing dense network of cross-border cooperation, collaboration and

interdependence. Yet, he points out that geographical proximity represents a vital factor in these

processes (Pempel 2005, pp.2-3). Here we can identify similarities with Breslin’s and Hook’s

approach mentioned above. Pempel describes East Asia’s regional integration dynamic as

economic driven regionalisation process, one which is based on the perceived opportunities

generated by cross-border market incentives, consequently leading to bottom-up integration

dynamic, which however is open to changes when market incentives are changing (Pempel 2005,

p.22).

Considering that economic incentives does take such an prominent role, and at the same time,

formal integration process are lagging behind in their development, the impact of environmental

degeneration on a particular locality could lead to a re-direction of local cross-border cooperation

processes. Adding to that perspective is one of the main arguments for regional integration,

proximity. Yet, proximity can become a rather different connotation with regard to trans-border

environmental issues as the negative impact will be more often felt close to the source of a

specific environmental pollution issue, generating a local specific backlash. This in turn can

increase the challenge for both regional economic progress and integration. Hence, proximity can

not only became a powerful incentives for cooperation it may also provide a powerful dynamic

for disintegration. What’s more, if one takes Asia’s trans-border issues into consideration, like

acid rain, haze, river and marine pollution, as well as the increasing impact of climate change the

potential for a downward spiral of local integration processes are evident, even they did not

materialized so far.

Yet, the opposite can happen, that a positive cooperation on specific trans-national pollution

issue, at the local level, may generate sufficient dynamic of addressing other disputed areas of a

specific country-to-country relationship. Consequently, cross-border pollution issues can have

fundamental, but varied, implications for interstate relationships

Considering Pempel’s assessment that East Asia’s environmental regionalisation has addressed

trans-border pollution issues on a rather ad hoc basis, and cooperation on environmental issues

relies overwhelmingly on voluntary actions, instead on binding agreements (Pempel 2005, p.216)

the prospect of dispute and conflict is quite present. Hence, geographical proximity12

may be a

12 Cross border pollution and its potentially devastating impacts represent a particular prominent issue for regional

and international environmental concerns. One may take the example of the Jilin Petrochemical Corporation in

November 2005 in this existence a huge amount of a hazardous and highly toxic substance was released and led to

one of the most serious river pollution worldwide, subsequently poisoning the drinking water of millions of people in

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critical factor for local and regional economic integration processes, but it is also a relevant

criterion when it comes of experiencing the negative impact of environmental degeneration like

pollution issues.

Hence, environment degeneration, and especially in the form of trans-border pollution issues, can

carry critical implications for both stability and instability of bilateral as well as multilateral

relationships and thus can either support or undermined regional and international stability.

However, we need to recognize the challenge in addressing environmental issues, since doing so

will influence and often challenge the existing distribution of economic and political interests,

thereby generating additional political, economic, and social conflicts between various

stakeholders consequently generating frictions within the domestic and regional sphere. This also

applies to the impact of climate changes on specific localities by further accelerating a particular

negative impact, consequently undermining local and national development projects and with it

the expectations hold within a population and could consequently negatively impact on a

country’s regional relations when another country is identified as contributing to that issue.

As such, in whatever direction, local and regional environmental issues as well as the pressure

generated by climate change related impact, becoming a more relevant topic for regional

integration processes and the relations of particular states.

Hence when evaluation the potential impact of environmental degeneration and climate change

on regional development prospects, and thus on the dynamic of regional relations, regional

security dynamics and national development strategies need to be brought into context. After all

addressing local or regional environmental issues and the impact of climate change will not be

evaluated in isolation to regional development challenges and the wider regional security

dynamic. As such to what extent addressing transboundary environmental issues will contribute

to a more or less positive regional cooperation is to same extent related to the existing regional

security dynamic and thus has to be interpreted in that context.

Consequently, we may have to re-consider to what extent environmental degeneration and the

impact of climate change should no longer be identified as security agendas related to what was

once dubbed ‘low politics’ and instead be added to what is ‘high politics’.

north-east China, including Harbin (population of 3,8 million) the provincial capital of Heilongjiang province as well

as spilling across the China-Russian border on the 16 December and threatened the water quality of the Amur river

and of the Russian city of Khabarovsk with a population of 600.000 (Toxic leak reaches Russian river, 2005).

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Conclusion

When evaluating East Asia’s trans-border environmental security issues, including the impact

climate change has within the region, the regional development and security context needs to be

taken into account. Even as environmental security and climate change impact representing

distinctive security risks. Not only is environmental degeneration linked with specific economic

development strategies, like generating rapid economic growth or what is described as ‘growth

first and clean up later’ approach but in addition the existing security interaction and dynamic

within a region will also have an influence how a trans-border environmental issue will be

addressed.

The relevance of environmental security, when compared with more traditional security

challenges which focus on the security of the state and military, rose with the redefinition of

what security refers to. Since the end of the Cold War we witness an issue driven development

in which the traditional, state-centric interpretation of security, became increasingly challenged.

One of the main arguments is that instead of the state, individuals and society shall be the main

reference for security. In doing so, development, or better underdevelopment, raised to

prominence as a specific security issue and with it the concept of human security. Since

environmental degeneration and climate change do have an adverse impact on the development

prospects of societies, environmental security also became a more prominent issues. The

increasing negative impact of climate change just added to this dynamic.

Within the environmental security complex, proximity represents a critical issue since most

environmental impacts, including that of climate change, are felt at a specific locality.

Consequently, the local and regional level is of specific relevance when evaluating the potential

impact of environmental security issues. East Asia’s trans-border environmental issues are a good

example for it and they provide also a good example of the link between economic development

and environmental degeneration.

After all, the Haze, acid rain, Kosa, and the sharing of the Mekong’s water resources are to a

wide extent linked with the development prospects of various East Asian states. This in turn can

impede addressing their underlining causes and consequently negatively affecting the relations

between those states. Yet, it should not be denied that cooperation within the environmental

security agenda, traditionally seen as not being part of what is described as ‘high politics’, may

even facility a more cooperative relationship on other security issues as well.

However, it is rather questionable that, based on the link which exist between environmental

degeneration and development and increasing seriousness of climate change related risks, that

environmental security issues still be identified as belonging to the ‘low politics’ agenda.