Dubnick & Justice 2011: Barnard's Regret

8/3/2019 Dubnick & Justice 2011: Barnard's Regret

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DealingwithBarnard’sRegret:

AccountabilityandtheZoneofExpectations

DRAFT:PLEASEDONOTCITEORQUOTEWITHOUTAUTHORS’PERMISSION

MelvinJ.Dubnick

UniversityofNewHampshire

Durham,NH03824

[email protected]

JonathanJustice

UniversityofDelaware

Newark,DE19716

[email protected]

PaperpreparedforpresentationatTheSixthOrganizationStudiesSummerWorkshop“BringingPublicOrganizationandOrganizingBackIn”

25-28May2011AbbayedesVauxdeCernay,Paris,France



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Introduction:Barnard’sRegret

Byallindications,intherealmsofbusiness,publicserviceandscholarship,ChesterI.

Barnardlivedacharmedlife.Hiseffortsandachievementsinallthreearenasarenotedas

"exemplary"bymany.Nevertheless,inhisfinalyearshedidexpresssomeregretinterms

ofhisacademicwork:thathispreoccupationwithquestionsofauthorityinmodern

organizationsdivertedattentionfromanequallyimportanttopic:responsibility.

In my opinion, the great weakness of my book is that it doesn’t

deal adequately with the question of responsibility and its

delegation. The emphasis is too much on authority, which is the

subordinate subject. Now, all the teaching in business circles, and

most of them in military and academic circles, is wrong from my

standpoint. The emphasis is put on authority which, to me now, is

a secondary derivative set up.

Thereferenceto“mybook,”ofcourse,istoTheFunctionsoftheExecutive(FOTE),the

productofaseriesofeight1937lectureswhichwereconvertedtopublishableformand

releasedin1938byHarvardUniversityPress(HUP).Thequotedcommentisfrom

exchangeshehadwithWilliamWolfjusttwomonthsbeforehisdeathin1961(citedin

Wolf1995).

Between1938and1947,Barnardactivelyengagedinwritingthatextendedthevarious

themesandideasstruckinFOTE,andthesewereeventuallypublishedasacollectionof

“selectedpapers”inOrganizationandManagementbyHUPin1948,justayearafterthe

issuingofa10thanniversaryprintingofFOTE.Withoneveryrelevantandnotable

exceptiondetailedbelow,Barnardpublishedlittleafterthat,butWolfnotesthatin1949he



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didprovideanoutlineforaproposednewworkon“OrganizedBehaviorandProcessesof

Decision.”1Barnard’soriginaloutlineforthevolumeinvolved15chapters.Afterreflection,

Wolfstates,headdeda16 th–onethatfocusedon“Responsibility”.Unlikethecoverageof

thatsubjectinFOTE,thetitlewasnotqualifiedbytheterm“Executive”.Itisclearthathe

hadstartedtorethinkhisfocusonauthoritativerelationshipsinFOTE.

Theproposedvolumedidnotmaterialize,andtheoneexceptiontoBarnard’spost-1947

lackofscholarlywritingisnoteworthyforthepresenteffort.The1958articleemerged

fromarecentlectureandwasofferedastheleadarticleintheinauguralissueofthe

CaliforniaManagementReview.RarelycitedbythecriticsofBarnard,herewefindthe

explicitexpressionofwhatweareterming“Barnard’sRegret.”

In“ElementaryConditionsofBusinessMorals”(ECBM)Barnardsetsforthhisimmediate

projectas“empirical”ratherthantheoretical,theological,philosophicalorsociological.

“Whatfollows,”henotes,“istheresultofreflectionuponlongpersonalexperienceina

widevarietyoforganizations—business,governmental,andphilanthropic—withextensive

opportunityforobservation…”(ECBM,1).Hethenprovidesanintellectualautobiography

ofsortsthatexplainswhatbroughthimtothespecificsubjectofbusinessmoralsandhis

current(modified)viewsonorganizations.Hebeginsbyexpressingwhathehadattempted

toaccomplishinFOTE:“Iwasmerelytryingtodescribeorstatethenatureoftheessential

toolorapparatuswith,through,orbywhichexecutiveshavetowork,asanindispensable

1 One can only speculate as to the reasons for this, but intellectually his “project” had already been taken up by

Herbert Simon, whose Administrative Behavior was published with a Foreword by Barnard in 1947.



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creationsofthesocialsystemsofwhichtheyarepart.Moretothepoint,ratherthan

viewingbusinessmoralityasareflectionofsomemoregeneralmoralityorthepersonal

codesofindividuals,heseesthemasmanifestationsofthesocialdynamicswithinwhich

theyemergeandarenurtured.Ifthiswasthecase,thesignificanceofgeneralstandardsof

socialmoralityandpersonalethicstoorganizationwasindirectatbest,perhapseven

irrelevantordysfunctionalinanorganizationalsetting.Usingsocialorpersonal

conceptionsofrightandwrongastheanalyticmeasureofbusinessmoralitywouldnotbe

appropriate.“Rather,businessmoralityrelatesto‘goodoftheorganization,’‘interestsof

society,’‘prescriptionsoflaw’”astheyrelatetotheorganizationitself(ECBM,4).

ThisdiscussionofmoralityandresponsibilitydiffersinsignificantwaysfromBarnard’s

treatmentof“ExecutiveResponsibility”neartheendofFOTE.There,havingalreadyputso

muchstressontheroleofauthorityinmanagingorganizations,Barnardfocusedalmost

exclusivelyonthecompetingmoralcodesfacingthoseinleadershippositions.Itwastheir

moralityandspecialsenseofresponsibilitythatmatteredmost.Thiswasexplicitlyevident

inhisviewthatthe“creationofmoralcodesforothers”(FOTE,279)andthe“maintenance

ofmorale”(FOTE,231)(thatis,themoralsenseofthoseengageinorganizational

activities)weretoberegardedascorefunctionsofBarnard’sexecutives.Hedetailedthese

asa“processofinculcatingpointsofview,fundamentalattitudes,loyaltiestothe

organizationorcooperativesystem,andtothesystemofobjectiveauthority,thatwill

resultinsubordinatingindividualinterestandtheminordictatesofpersonalcodestothe

goodofthecooperativewhole…”(FOTE,279).



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TherecanbelittledoubtthatBarnardassumesandmaintainsaninstrumentalist

perspectiveonmorality(Feldman2002,ch.2),bothinFOTEandECBM.Overtheyearshe

didnotalterhisunderlyingassumptionthattheorganizationalendeavoriscriticaltoour

civilization:“thedependabilitywithwhichtheburdenofspecializedactivitiesiscarriedon,

andthedependabilitywhichweascribetothosewhodothecarryingon,isthemost

essentialaspectofmodemcivilization”(ECBM,13).Butifthatendeavoristosucceedit

mustreininand/orsubordinatethebothersomemoralityfactorsthatmightinterferewith

thoseactivities.InFOTE,Barnardleavesthistasktotheexecutives,anddoessoinaway

thathasresultedinchargesofelitismandauthoritarianpredispositions.Heregards

executivesasindividualswhopossessahigher“senseofresponsibility,”andthereforeare

inapositiontounderstandandinstillinotherswhatmoralstandardsareappropriateand

necessaryforthecooperativefunctionsthatneedtobecarriedout–andwhicharenot.

InECBM,however,hebacksawayfromtherelianceonexecutiveauthoritytodealwiththe

challengesposedbytheincreasinglycomplexmoralmilieugeneratedwithinmodern

organizations.

[The moral problem] takes on increasing importance with respect

to one of the crucial problems of our times: how to secure the

essential degree of coordination of a vast system of activities while

securing the degree of decentralization and autonomy essential to

initiative and, indeed, to responsible behavior. It is almost obvious

that those who are not capable of dependable behavior cannot be

entrusted with the making of local decisions. Yet, if this cannot be

done the burden placed upon centralized authority for securing

appropriate behavior over vast areas is in fact an impossible one.



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Modernmanagement,intheformofexecutiveauthority,hasitslimitsincontendingwith

themoralproblemsinherenttomodernorganizations.Toassertsuchauthorityinvites

failure,foritaltersthefactthatthemoralunderpinningsofcooperationmustbe“freely

accepted”inordertoassuresomedegreeofsuccess.

The span of control is so limited that despite methods of

specialized training and the inculcation of the appropriate points of

view authority could not sufficiently operate if it were not for the

development, whether inculcated or spontaneous, of the moral

sense to which we broadly give the name "sense of responsibility."

Responsibility cannot be arbitrarily delegated and, therefore, a

high degree of effective autonomous behavior cannot be secured

except as responsibility is freely accepted. When so accepted the

possibility of effective autonomous behavior is realized. (ECBM,

13; emphasis added)

Thus,fortheregretfulBarnard,itisnotexecutiveauthoritybutresponsibilitiesrelatedto

organizationalmoralitythatmustaddressthecoreproblemsofcooperativeactionamong

membersofanorganization.ThisisaradicalreconfigurationoftheFOTEargument,and

Barnardisawareofthatashedelivershis1958lecture.Organizationalmoralitytakes

shapeinconcretesituations,andshouldnotbetreatedasmerelythesameasexternally

derivedabstractionsthatcanbecontrolledandappliedtopracticalbehavior;theyinvolve

standardsthatemergefromwithinthesocialrelationshipsthatcomprisetheorganized

endeavor,andmustbetreatedassuch.Theverymoralitythatdevelopsasaresultof

cooperativework–andthe“senseofresponsibility”forthatorganizationallyconceived

moralitydevelopedamongtheworkers–isnoteasilysubjectedtothesametreatmentas



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religiousorsocialorpersonalmoralcodesbroughtto(orimposedupon)theorganization

fromoutside.Theremaystillbearoleforexecutivefunctionsthatattempttoreshapeor

precludetheinfluenceofexternalmoralfactors,butthisroleforauthorityisof“secondary”

importancetothemorechallengingandcriticaltaskofdealingwithanorganization’s

internallyderivedmorality.

Dealingwiththatchallengebeginsbyfocusingattentiononthemoralityoftheorganization,

butthisitselfhasproventobedifficult.Despitethesignificanceoftheseorganizationally

rootedmoralstandards,Barnardarguestheyhavebeenhiddenfromplainviewbythe

languageappliedinthetypicalviewoforganizationallife.Theconceptualproblemfacedby

thoseseekingtoassumeamore“practical”viewoforganizationalmoralityisthus

exacerbatedbythereluctancetoapply“moralterms”toorganizationalcontexts:

[M]oral terms are not much admitted in business or public affairs.

The terms most used are "loyalty," "responsibility," "duties," and

"obligations." Though such terms are ambiguous (e.g.,

"responsibility" is often used to mean "legal liability" where no

moral question may be involved) they are in fact loaded with moral

implications. These being the terms currently used, I shall from

here on largely use them instead of "moral" or "morality" as being

more convenient and as lending themselves perhaps to more easily

intelligible discussion. (ECBM, 5)

Here,again,weseeasignificantbreakwithFOTE,wherehehadgiven“responsibility”(and

theexecutive’s“senseofresponsibility”)specialstatusasamoralvirtueinitsownright–

asamoralstandardofahigherorderthateffectivelydistinguishesanddefinesthe

authorityofthoseinexecutivepositionsthroughouttheorganization.InECBM,however,it



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isputonequalfootingwithothercharacteristicsoftheorganizationalmoralorder,e.g.,

loyalty,duty,obligation,commitment.InECBM,responsibilitybecomesthesynonymic“key

word”thatformsanumbrellaoverallthoseaspectsoftheorganization’smoralorderthat

emergeasessentialbyproductsofconsciouslydesignedcooperativeendeavors.

Table1summarizesthevariousformstakenbyanorganizationalmoralorderasdescribed

byBarnardinECBM.Inonesense,thislist(forwhichhemakesnoclaimsof

comprehensiveness)isnodifferentfromalistof“typesorresponsibilities”thatmightarise

withinanysocialsystem,formalorinformal,focusedonsurvivaloroncooperation,

traditionalormodern,etc..Whatmakesthislistspecialisthat,withinthecontextofa

formalizedattempttocreateandsustainacooperativeendeavor(i.e.,themodern

organization),theinherentlyconflictualnatureoftheseresponsibilitiesposesacore

challengethatmustbeconfrontedtoavoidfailure.Whathehasrealizedlateinlifeisthat

hisinitial(over)relianceonexecutiveauthoritytomeetthechallengeofbridgingor

integratingtheseaspectsoftheorganization’smoralorderwasinsufficientandperhaps

mademattersevenworse.



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• judicial(“essentially…theprocessofnarrowinganddelimitingtheareasof

responsibilities,thusrestrictingtheincidenceofconflict”);

• reconciliation(“theprocessofdemonstratingthatapparentorallegedconflictsof

responsibilityarepseudo-conflictsbasedonfalseassumptionsorignoranceofthe

facts”;e.g.,reframingtheproblem);and

• the“inventionofconcretesolutions”(e.g.,“todiscoverorconstructanother

proposalwhichwilleffectivelyaccomplishtheendsinitiallydesiredwithout

involvingthedeleteriouseffectstobeavoided”).

Whatismostinterestingaboutthesealternativestoexecutiveauthorityisthat,ratherthan

replaceit,theyactuallyshiftthesolutiontotheorganization’s“moralproblems”into

arenasthatmerelytransformratherthanreducetherelianceonexecutiveauthority.Thus,

theresolutionofmoralconflictsbecomesamatterofimposingalegalorder(judicial),a

bargainingregime(reconciliation),oratechno-structuralprocess(invention)onthe

organization.Initsapplication,eachapproachsuggestedbyBarnardinvolvesthecreation

ofrolesfordifferenttypesofexecutiveswhowouldassumepositionsnolessauthoritative

andcriticalthantheexecutivemanagerstheywouldreplace.Thelegalordersolution

requiresajuridicalsystemheadedby“judges”toironouttheinevitableconflictsthatarise

fromconflictingmoralresponsibilities;thebargainingregimerequiresafacilitator-

executivewhoisengagedinhelpingtoresolve(orevenarbitrate)theconflictsamong

relevantpartieswhentheyarise;whilethetechno-structuralsolutionwouldmeana

reversionbacktotheTayloristscientificmanagementapproachinwhichacommitteeof

experts,examiningthesourcesoftheconflictsindepth,areempoweredtoengageina



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continuousredesignofaspectsofthecooperativeendeavoritself.[Onecanarguethat

Barnard’ssolutionshaveinfactbeenoperationalizedwiththeadventofcontractingout

(usuallyperformance-based),humanisticmanagement,andTQM…].

Noneofthesesolutions,itshouldbenoted,addressthepossibilitythattheresolutionof

conflictingmoralresponsibilitiescanbebuiltintothedesignoforganizationsandtheir

management.“Manyofthemoralcollapsesofindividualsinactiveaffairsresultfromtheir

beingplacedinpositionsinvolvingmoraldilemmaswhichtheyhaveinsufficientabilityto

resolvebyinventionandconstruction”(ECBM,12).Inshort,theverycapacitytodealwith

suchconflictscandeterminetheeffectivenessandsuccessoforganizedendeavors.

Itwasintheconcludingsection,however,thatBarnardhighlightedthesignificanceand

implicationsofhisreanalysisofFOTEandreassertedtheproblematicthatwas(and

remains)centraltotheexecutivefunctionwithinorganizations.Inasocietythatis

increasinglydependentoncomplexorganizations,itisnotenoughtofocusonthescientific

andtechnicalchallengesweface.Wemustalsodealwiththeissuesraisedbytheconflictual

natureofthesemoralresponsibilities.Moreover,thisisnotaproblemresolvedmerelyor

evenprimarilythroughtheexerciseofauthority,butthroughothermeansthat,Barnard

admits,requiresfurtherconsideration.

It must occur to anyone who considers this subject that we are in a

state of considerable ignorance. It simply is not known to any wide

degree what are the number and the character of the moral

problems that are faced by those who do the world's work. It is

here, I think, that the universities in the future will have a great



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opportunity, for I doubt if those within our organizations can be

sufficiently adept and objective to give appropriate study to the

nature of the moral problems which they face.... (ECBM, 13)

ItisthefailureofnothavingaddressedthatprobleminFOTEthatconstitutesBarnard’s

Regret.Intheend,however,hisreflectionsonthatregretleavesopenthequestionofhow

todealwiththemoralproblematicsofmodernorganizations.Thequestionweattemptto

addressintheremainderofthispaperishowhemighthavedonesogiventheconceptual

toolsheauthored(especiallythe“zoneofindifference”)andthethemeshehaddevelopin

thosefinalyears..

BringingExpectationsandAccountabilityintoPlay

Ourargument,inbrief,isthatBarnardwouldhavebuiltupontheworkofcomplementary

thinkerssuchasMaryParkerFollett(whosemajorworksprecedeFOTE)andHerbert

Simon(whowritingsfollowandexplicitlybuilduponFOTE)totakeanevenfurtherstep

beyondTayloristicmodelsofscientificmanagementthanhealreadyhadinFOTE.In

particular,wethinkBarnardmighthaveextendedhisconceptionoforganizationsand

motivationinwaysthatwouldexpresslyputadministrativeaccountability–understoodas

acontextuallyspecificinstanceofabroaderphenomenonofhumanmotivation–atthe

centerofthecooperativedynamicsoftheorganizationinlieuoftheprimacypreviously

giveninFOTEtoauthority.Moreover,wewillofferwhatwebelievetobea

reconceptualizationofhis“zoneofindifference”thatBarnardmightfindappropriatefor

hismore“practical”approachtomanagingcomplex,cooperativesocialsystems.



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Barnardrecognizedthatveryfewifanyorganizationaltasksandrolescouldbestructured

inwaysthateliminateeveryformofindividualdiscretion.Infact,alongwithFollettand

Simon,Barnardviewedoneofthefundamentalchallengesofleadershipandmanagement

tobehowoneshapesindividualdiscretionwithinorganizationsinwaysthatelicithigh-

qualityperformance(i.e.,cooperation)towardorganizationalgoalswithoutrequiring

excessiveinvestmentsinmanagerialsurveillanceanddirection.Thiscanincludenotjust

whatbehaviortochoosewhenmorethanonealternativeisavailable,butalsowhetherand

towhatextentindividualschoosetoinvest"ingenuityandenergy"intheirwork,overand

abovemeetingtherequirementsimposedonthembyformalauthority(Blau&Scott1962,

140).Williamson,Wachter,andHarris(1975)termedthisapplicationofinitiativeand

ingenuity"consummate"asopposedto"perfunctory"cooperation.

Inotherwords,thereisadistinctdifferencebetweenmerelydoingaswearetoldandmore

affirmativelydoingallthatwecanappropriatelydo.InFOTE,Barnardputthisproblemin

termsofthecultivationof“personalservices”--acoreexecutivefunctionthatdependson

theexerciseofauthority.

The second function [of the executive]…is to promote the securing

of the personal services that constitute the material of

organizations. The work divides into two main divisions: (I) the

bringing of persons into co-operative relationship with the

organization; (II) the eliciting of the services after such persons

have been brought into the relationship. (FOTE, 227)

Toperformthisfunction,theexecutivewouldfocuson

the maintenance of morale, the maintenance of the scheme of

inducements, the maintenance of schemes of deterrents,



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supervision and control, inspection, education and training.

(FOTE, 231)

TheseareburdensoftheBarnardianexecutiveinFOTE,andeachrequiresnotmerely

variouseffortsat“maintenance”,buttheappropriatedesignofthoserelationshipsthat

weretobemaintained.ForBarnard,insightfulandobservantmanagerthathewas,

organizationswerestructuresthatshapehumanbehaviorandchoices,andthe

authoritativetasksofthemanager/executivearenotmerelytoengageindirective

activities,butalsodesignactivitiesandtheexperiencesmembershaveofthoseactivities

andtheirorganizationalcontexts.Boththedirectiveanddesignfunctionsoftheexecutive,

however,werelimitedbythenaturalsocialspaceswithinwhichhumansinteract.

AtthispointitisworthnotingthatamongBarnard’ssignificanttalentsastheoristof

“practice”washisuseofanalogiesdrawnfromotherarenastoarticulatealternativestothe

moremechanisticanalogiesofthepopularTayloristviewsoftheday.Hisworkdraws

heavilyandextensivelyfromcontemporaryworkinsociology,socialpsychologyand

culturalanthropology,withtheuseofthe“socialsystem”analogybeingthemostobvious

example.Norishereluctanttoborrowfromlesscognatedisciplines(FOTE,75-76,note7):

An organization is a field of personal “forces,” just as an

electromagnetic field is a field of electric or magnetic forces. The

evidence of the effects, in both cases, is all that can be used to

describe or define these forces; and the dimensions within which

those evidences occur are said to define the field of those forces….

...[P]ersons are the objective sources of the organization forces

which occupy the organizational field. These forces derive from

energies that are found only in persons. They become organization



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forces only when certain conditions obtain in the field and are

evidenced only be certain phenomena such as words and other

action, or are inferred by concrete results imputed to such action.

But neither the persons nor the objective results are themselves the

organization. If they are treated as if they were, inconsistencies and

inadequacies of explanation of phenomena ensue.

AmongthemostwidelycitedofBarnard’sanalogicframes(andtheoneofgreatestinterest

forthepresentpaper)wasthe“zoneofindifference,”aconceptBarnardarticulatedusing

languageborrowedfromwhatwerethenstillrelativelyrecentdevelopmentsinmicro-

economicanalysisbyFrancisEdgeworthandVilfredoPareto(seeMoscati2007,fora

historicalaccount).Thecentralrelevantnotionhereisthatanindifferencecurve

encompassesanarrayofchoices(differingbundlesorcombinationsofgoods)among

whichtheconsumerisliterallyindifferent.Alonganysingleindifferencecurve,the

consumerisequallypleasedbyanyofthequitedifferentscenariosofconsumption

presentedalongthecurve–typicallypresumedtoincludeextremeimbalancesamongthe

goodsinthevariousbundlesaswellasbundlesthathavemorebalancedproportionsofthe

goodsinthem.Inotherwords,thechoicescanbestarkly,qualitativelydifferent,andyet

theconsumercouldnotcarelesswhichofthemshetakes.

Inthissense,then,azoneofindifferencemaybeunderstoodtodefineasetofbehaviors

amongwhichanactorisliterallyindifferent.Accordingly,BarnardnotedinFOTEthat

instructionsthatfallwithinthezoneofindifferencewouldbe"unquestionablyacceptable"

(169):whicheverbehaviormanagementorcolleaguesaskanorganizationalmemberto



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choosewillbenomoreorlesspreferredbyherthananyoftheotherchoiceswithinthat

zone.Thus,shemighthappilysuspendherownwillandmoraljudgment,andenact

whateverisurgedonherbyorganizationalauthority.Choicewithinthezone,ifnot

directedbytheorganization,mightthenbehighlyunpredictable,evenarbitrary,sincethe

actorliterallywillnotcarewhichofthechoicessheadopts.

Goingbeyondtheeconomicanalyticrootsofthezoneofindifference,Barnard’suseofthe

“zone”imagery–aswellashisuseof“energyforces”–impliesafascinationwiththeroleof

spatialityinhumanrelationships.Thezoneisasocialarenawithinwhichpreferences,

choices,options,valuesandactionsinteract,anditislikelytoemergewheneverand

whereverhumansengageinacooperativeendeavorinvolvingsomeformofdirected

purposeorobjective.Ofcourse,whatinterestsBarnardistheexplicitandconsciously

pursuedcooperativeendeavor,buthisfrequentcitationoftheworkofsocial

anthropologistsandsocialpsychologistsisaclearindicationthathewellunderstoodthe

“naturalistic”natureofsocialrelationshipsunderlyingthezoneofindifference.

ThisposedsomethingofaconundrumfortheFOTEBarnard,forbyadaptingthelogicof

indifferencefromeconomics,heseemedtobeeffectivelyprecludingtheroleofmoralityin

organizations.Theeconomicnotionofpreferencesisfundamentallyanamoralone.It

emphasizespersonalsatisfactionratherthanmoralcommitmentasitscentralconcern–a

pointconsistentwiththeideaoforganizationsasconstitutingeconomiesofself-interested

responsestoincentivesinthenarrowestsense.Thatsaid,itshouldbenotedthatevenin

FOTE,Barnardcannotfairlybeportrayedasneglectingentirelytherelevancetoindividual



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andorganizationalchoiceofnormativecommitmentsotherthanselfinterest,andthefact

thathetaskedexecutiveswiththeneedtoengageinmoral“inculcating”reflectshis

understandingthatmorality(intheformof“morale”)couldhardlybeignored.

Consistentwiththeirsharedinterestinthewayinwhichorganizationsandtheirleaders

shapeindividualmembers'decisions(throughinteractionswiththosemembers'factual

knowledge,values,andabilities),Simon(1997)adaptedBarnard'sconceptandusedthe

languageofanareaofacceptancetodescribethesetofactionsanemployeewillwillingly

andcompetentlyperformwithinthezone.Thelanguageofacceptanceisactuallyprobably

truertoBarnard'soriginalFOTEconception,andunquestionablyclosertohisfinal(1958)

articulationofbusinessmorals,inthatitdoesnotimplyliteralindifferenceamong

alternativepreferences.Rather,itcanbeunderstoodasencompassingarangeofactions

whichmaywelldifferintermsofhowanactorfeelsaboutthem,eventhoughallare

sufficientlyacceptable(oratleastarenotsorepugnant)thattheactorwillundertake

whicheverofthemsheisaskedtoperform,albeitnotnecessarilyunquestioningly.

Importantly,thelanguageofacceptanceappliedbySimondoesnotimplyabandonmentof

individualpreferenceamongalternatives,onlythattheactorispreparedtoaccept

authoritativeorpeerdirectiontoactinwaysthatthatmayormaynotcoincidecompletely

withindividualpreferencesoranyofthehostofothercategoriesofbusinessmorals

articulatedbyBarnardinECBM.Furthermore,thislaterlanguageandconception,freefrom

theusagesofneoclassicaleconomics,ismoreexplicitlyamenabletoincorporatingafull

rangeofhumanvaluesandmotivations,includingthosethatarefundamentallyother-



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oriented(i.e.,accountable)aswellasthosethataregroundedinpersonalsatisfaction.This

allowsustoseethesignificancetoindividualadministrativechoiceandbehaviorof

organizationalcultures,moralleadership,andotherinfluencesbeyondjusttheexpression

ofauthorityandtheallocationofrewardsandsanctions.Indeed,themetaphorof

acceptancepointedtotheoperationofmoralresponsibilityandaccountability askey

motivatorsofactionwithinorganizationsinwaysthattheindifferencemetaphordoesnot.2

Atthisjuncture,itisnecessarytoraisetheissueofaccountability–oratleasthowwe

conceptualizethatnowiconicterm(Dubnick2002).Asweusethewordhere,

accountabilitydescribesasocialprocessbymeansofwhichindividualactorsaremotivated

toactinwholeorinpartwithreferencetothepotentialreactionsofotherstotheirconduct.

Thisprocessincludesavarietyofcomponentmechanismsincludingthecommunicationof

expectationsbyothers,throughorganizationalmandatesand/ororthroughculturalnorms

andmoralvalues;mechanismsthroughwhichothersobtainandevaluateformaland

informalaccountsofconduct(directinteraction,observation,formalreporting,etc.);and

formal(organizationalorlegalsanctionsandrewards)aswellasinformal(expressionsof

indignation,resentment,orapprobation)reactions.Accountablebehaviorthenis

individualaction,inthesensethatitischosenandsubjectivelymeaningfulbehavior,which

isselectedatleastinpartbecausetheactorisconcernedwithhowthatactionwillbe

observedandevaluatedthroughsomeoneormoreofformalizedproceduresandless

formalsocialinteractions,moralsentiments(Smith,1759/1976;Wallace,1994),and

reactiveattitudes(Strawson,1962).Thusaccountabilityshapesbothactionthatis

2 See Aaron Wildavsky’s (1987) view on “preferences” and preference formation, which he associates with the

cultural theory originating with Mary Douglas.



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primarilyself-interested,insofarastheactorisconcernedwithothers'expectationsand

anticipatedresponses,andactionthatstemsmainlyfromunderlyingmotivationsother

thancalculatedpersonalbenefit.

Viewedinthisway,accountabilitycanaddacriticaldimensiontothezoneof

indifference/areaofacceptance.Whilethecreationofindifferencereliesonindividual

preferences,andacceptanceonsharedvaluesandnorms,accountabilityisrootedinthe

interactionandinterplayofexpectations(broadlydefined)betweenandamongthose

engagedinthecooperativeendeavor .Derivedfromavarietyofsources(seeDubnickand

Romzek,1993),theseexpectationsinformindividualsastowhatwillbeperceivedtobe

acceptableand/orappropriatebehaviorwithingivensocialactioncontexts.

Applyingthelogicofaccountability,thedeterminationof“acceptability”and

“appropriateness”canberegardedastheresultofatriangulationofthreedistinct

perspectives:thatoftheself-interestedindividual;thatoftheperceivedexpectationsof

organizational“other(s)”(e.g.,management;co-workers;citizens;clients)engagedinthe

relationship;andtheextra-organizationalmoralpressuressocentraltoBarnard’sECBM

reflections.AsFeldman(2002)noted,muchoforganizationandmanagementtheory

rootedinFOTEisbasedonadichotomouslogicthatpitstheindividualagainstthe

collective,thusreducingtoproblemofmorality(usuallyregardedasanexternal

interference)tosomethingthatmustbeeliminatedor(asisthecasewithFOTE)“managed.”

InECBM,Barnardisessentiallyseekingameansforintegratingthemoralfactor(andallits

associatedproblems)intotheorganizationalcalculus.Webelievethatprovidingamore



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centralplaceforaccountabilityaccomplishesBarnard’sECBMgoal.Thezoneof

indifference/acceptancecanbere-conceptualizedasazoneofexpectationsthat

encompassesthelogicofaccountability.

ThereismuchtobegainedbyexpandingBarnard’szoneofindifferenceandSimon’sarea

ofacceptancetoencompassexpectationsandaccountability.Atminimum,itbreaks

throughthatdichotomouslogicofindividual-organizationconflictsinherentinthe

indifference/acceptanceschemesbyinjectingamoralfactorintothezone.Moreover,it

providesanopportunitytoapproachthezoneasadesign(asopposedtostrictlya

management)probleminvolvingthedevelopmentofalternative“accountabilityspaces”in

whichtheexpectationsforresponsiblecooperativebehaviorcanbesatisfiedwithminimal

risktointernalmoralitythatmakescooperationincomplexorganizationspossible.

DealingwithBarnard’sRegret

Wepauseheretoreiterateourmajorpoint:Giventheinevitabilityofdiscretionatevery

levelandinvirtuallyeveryactivityofanorganization,anditsmaterialsignificanceto

organizationalefficiencyandeffectiveness(aswellastomembers'satisfactionand

materialrewards),akeyresponsibilityofleadershipinFOTEwastofacilitatewise,

mission-appropriateexerciseofdiscretion.Theemphasisheplacedontheprimacyof

authoritywascentraltoBarnard'sRegretandreflectedhisrecognitionthathehadnot

adequatelyarticulatedthewayinwhichanorganization'sleadersbearresponsibility,in

effect,notfor"holdingpeopleaccountable"inahighlydirectiveandsanction-driven

fashionbyrelyingontheirindifferenceamongchoices,butratherforconstructingspaces



22

ofsocialinteractionwithinwhichpeoplecanactinagenuinelyaccountable(responsible)

fashion.

TwobasicpointsunderlieourspeculationastowhatBarnardmighthaveacceptedasa

credibleresolveofhisRegret.First,fromthelecturesthatledtoFOTEonward,Barnard

wasexpresslyandconsistentlyengagedingivingtheoreticalandconceptualshapetothe

worldof“practice.”Hewasneitherscientistnorphilosopher(despitethefactthathewas

oncecalledthe“philosopherking”ofmanagementtheorists)–nordidheaspiretosuch,

eventhoughhewassupportiveofSimon’s“administrativescience”agenda.Forhim,what

knowledgehecouldimpartwasbasedonexperience.Thehighregardwithwhichheheld

thewisdomgainedthroughpracticalexperiencenodoubtspilledoverintohisviewsabout

thedegreeofdiscretionanyindividualshouldbeallowedinorganizationalendeavors.

Thus,itisnotdiscretionpersethatneedstobegivenfreerreininorganizations,butrather

discretiontiedtothat“senseofresponsibility”thatcomesfromthepracticalexperienceof

engagingincooperativeactions.

Indeed,whenBarnardwritesaboutthecentralityof"thousandsofmoraldilemmas"(ECBM,

10),"moralachievement"in"concreteconditions"(4),and"responsiblebehavior"(13)to

bothself-awaremembershipinlargeandcomplexorganizationsandtheefficiencyand

effectivenessofthoseorganizations,hispointseemsstrikinglysimilartocontemporary

urgingsthatorganizationalleadersandsocialinstitutionsingeneralinculcatethecore

Aristotelianvirtueofpracticalwisdom( phronesis)(e.g.,Kane&Patapan2006;Molina&

Spicer2004).WhileBarnardconcludedbycallingforempiricalresearchtoaddressa"state



23

ofconsiderableignorance"(ECBM,13),wesuspectthathemightwellhaveagreedwiththe

assertionthatoneofthemostimportantfunctionsoftheexecutiveis"toencouragetheuse

ofpracticalwisdomratherthaninhibitingit"(Schwartz&Sharpe,2006,p.377).

Encouragingthatpracticalwisdomwhichisrelevanttothesuccessofthecooperative

endeavorshouldprovidethecentrallogicalassumptionofeffortstodesignazoneof

expectationsbasedonaccountabilityspaces.

Forourpurposes,therearetwofactorsthatdifferentiateamongalternativeexpectation

zones:(1)thespecificityofthetaskinvolved(fromlowhigh)and(2)thelevelofautonomy

(trust)requiredbytheactorinvolved(lowtohigh)(seeFigure1).

Levelofautonomyforactor

Perceivedneedfordirectedaction(control):

Low High

High

Constitutivezone

Managerialzone

Low

Regulatoryzone

Performativezone

Figure1:ZonesofExpectations

The performativeexpectationzoneismostrelevanttothosesituationsinvolvinglittleorno

roomforerrorsthatmightprovecostlyorevencatastrophicforthecooperativeendeavor.

Here,eventhoughthelikelihoodoffailuremightinfactbelow,thereisperceivedtobe

littleornoroomforexcusemakingandposthocexplanations,foriftheerroroccursit

mightbetoolate.Undernormalconditions,thetasktobecarriedoutisdeliberatelymade



24

veryspecific,andthedegreeofdiscretionallowedtheactorisextremelylow.Unlessthe

requiredactisperformedasrequired,theentireorganizedprocesscomestoahaltor

potentiallyimplodes.Inafictionalcasethatprovidesapowerfulexample,acentralsubplot

inthepopularUStelevisionseries“Lost”involvedarequirementthatacertainsequenceof

numbersbeenteredintoacomputerevery108minutes.Whilethosecarryingoutthetask

wereneverreallycertainaboutwhatconsequencesmightresultiftheydidnotfollowthe

preciselydefinedorders,thosewhoassumedtheresponsibilitytookitseriouslydespite

theireverpresentdoubts.Discretionaryactionwouldmeanfailure,andinthecaseof“Lost”

itmeantadisastrousbreakintheworld’sspace-timecontinuum.

Asfar-fetchedasthatexamplesounds,therealityofhighreliabilityorganizations(HROs)

(e.g.,operatingnuclearpowerplants)oftenrequiresmundanetasksthatmustbe

performedtoassurethatsafeandsecureoperationofthefacility.Acknowledgingthestatus

ofawarningdevicebypressingaresetbuttoneveryhourorsomightseem

inconsequentialwhendonebyawell-paid,highlyknowledgeableengineersittingatsome

controlboard,buttheperformativeexpectationcanprovecriticalfortheentireenterprise.

Therelevanceofthatindividual’spracticalwisdomoughttobeminimalundernormal

conditions.Thosemonitoringtheday-to-day,hour-to-houroperationsofthepowerplant

mayhavebeenonthejobfordecadesorevenholddoctoratesinnuclearphysics,butthe

degreeofdiscretionastowhetherornottoflipparticularswitchatadesignatedtimein

ordertoconfirmthesafestatusoftheunitislikelytobezero,absentspecialconditionsor

knowledgeontheemployee'spartthatrequirehertoconsiderdivergingfromroutine.

Herethezoneofexpectationisverystructuredandspecific,andasnotedthespacefor



25

offeringexcusesorexplanationforerror(theaccountabilityspace)isseverelylimited.Yet,

truly"consummatecooperation"inthesecaseswillalsoinvolverecognizingwhen

abnormalconditions–anapproachingtsunami,perhaps–requireviolationofstandard

procedures,eventothepointofapparentdisobedienceregardingendsaswellasmeans.

Attheotherextremeintermsofnormaltaskspecificityistheconstitutivezoneof

expectations,solabeledbecauseitinvolveslittlemorethanestablishing(constituting)the

settingwithinwhichtheactorisexpectedtoexerciseahighdegreeordiscretionin

applyingherexpertiseandpracticalwisdom.Thisinvolvesorganizationaltasksthatrelyon

substantialknowledgeandperhapsyearsofexperience–thekindoftaskswheretheactor

isrenderedineffectiveifoverlyconstrained.Theexpectationisthatsheorhewillusethe

practicalwisdomgainedovertheyears,andthereisconsiderableroominthe

accountabilityspaceforexcusesandexplanationsthatmightamounttonothingmorethan

“bettersafethansorry.”Theuseofa“ship’scaptain”metaphorisoftenusedinthe

corporateworldtojustifythedemandsofsomeCEOsthat(inordertomaximize

shareholdervalue)theybefreeofanyoftheformallimitsandchecksthatmightbe

imposedbyaboardofdirectors.Butevenwithoutexplicitlypushingtheirdemandsforan

expansivedegreeofdiscretion,corporateculturesoftenfallintothisconstitutivezone.

Thatculturalthemeandthegrowingtendencytoview“leadership”ascriticalhashadits

impactaswellinthepublicandnonprofitsectorswhere,despiteformalsystemsofchecks

andbalances,thereisatendencytodefertothedecisionsofasingleactororsetofactors

asameansforachievingorganizationalgoals.



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Perhapsmorerelevanttotypicalorganizationaloperationsandmembersarethetwo

spaceswheretheconsequencesoffailureareperceivedtobemuchlower.Inone,the

managerialzoneofexpectations,relianceonthepracticalwisdomofworkersissignificant

andtaskspecificitylow,butthelevelofdiscretionislimitedtotheareaofmeans,notends.

Hereisthezoneofexpectationswherestressisplacedonsupervisionandoversightto

assurethattheactionstakenbythosewithdiscretionareinlinewiththepurposesand

objectivesoftheorganization.Heretheaccountabilityspaceisdesignedbymanagementto

directtheenergiesandpracticalwisdomoftargetedactorstowardaspecificendorgoal.

Modestamountsofdiscretionareappropriate,andthenatureandconsequencesof

members'rolesandtasksrequireneitherhighlyprecisebehavioralprescriptionnor

empoweringmemberstoconsiderdisobedienceunderextremeconditions.

Theclearestexampletodayistherelianceonhighstakesperformancemeasurementin

Americanschoolsystemsunderthepressuresimposedbytheferalgovernment’sNoChild

LeftBehindpolicy.Inresponse,K-12teachers,longregardedasacompetent(albeitunder-

compensated)professionalclass,arebeingsubjectedtodemandsthroughamanagerial

cadre(i.e.,schooladministrators)thattheiractionsaseducatorsproducehigherstudent

scores.ItisthezonewheretheobservationsderivedfromFOTEaremostrelevant,and

whereexecutiveauthoritycanprovecritical.

Finally,thereisthezoneofwheretheneedforcontrolovertheactionsofworkersis

perceivedtobelow,buttheleveloftrustremainslowandthereissomeanxietyofgranting

toomuchautonomy.Thisistheregulativezoneinwhichmechanismsareputinplaceto



27

assureandreinforcethecompetenceoftheorganization'sworkers,butwhereinpractice

oversightisintermittentatbest,andperhapsevenritualizedtoenhancetheworker’ssense

ofresponsibility.Theaccountabilityspaceinthiszonecanhaveconsiderablebreadthand

depth,butitisultimatelylimitedbyboundariesdesignedtorendersomeactions

inexcusableor“unprofessional.”

TheclassiccasestudyhereisHerbertKaufman’sTheForestRanger,aworkthatdescribes

indetailtheestablishmentandmaintenanceofanorganizationculturethatsucceedsasa

cooperativeendeavordespitethewidespatialandtemporalseparationofagents(the

Rangers)fromthecentralofficeinWashington.Kaufmanstressesthatmuchofthesuccess

oftheUSForestServicehasdependedontheprofessionalismandlocalcompetenciesofthe

Rangers,butthattheircompetencyitselfistiedcloselytoahighlydevelopedregulative

systembasedonanelaboratesetofpoliciesandproceduresthatcovereverythingfrom

recruitmenttorecordkeepingtoinspectionsandconstantreinforcementoftheService’s

moralcode–tothepointof“brainwashing”.Inaveryrealsense,theForestServicemade

theexerciseofauthoritativemanagementunnecessarywhilenurturingapracticalwisdom

thatembodiedtheagency’scoremoralprinciples.

Preliminaryandtentativeconclusion

BeyondtheobjectiveofdealingwithBarnard’sRegret,thispaper(initscurrentform)

representsanefforttorevitalizethe“zonal”constructsofBarnardandSimonthatplayed

suchacriticalroleinthedevelopmentofbothorganizationalandmanagementtheory.We

intended,aswell,toprovideananalyticframeforincludingtheambiguous,overusedand



28

frequentlymisusedconceptofaccountabilityinthestudyoforganizations.Whetherthe

zoneofexpectationsframeworkweprovideachievesthatpurposeawaitsfurther

elaborationandapplication.

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