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Disaster-induced internal displacementin the Philippines

Philippines

The case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong


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Acknowledgements

This report was developed and written by Justin Ginnetti (Natural Disasters Advisor, Internal Displacement MonitoringCentre), Butch Dagondon and Clarisse Villanueva (Green Mindanao), Juanito Enriquez (Civil Society Organization Forumfor Peace), Francis Tom Temprosa (UNHCR), Christie Bacal (International Organization for Migration) and Fr. NorbertoL. Carcellar C.M. (Philippine Action for Community-led Shelter Initiatives, Inc.).

Maps and IDP statistics were provided by UNOCHA-Philippines and IDMC.

IDMC would like to thank the following individuals and organisations for sharing their insights and comments on draftsof this report: Jerry Velasquez (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction); Renato Redentor Constantino; AslamPerwaiz (Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre); Dave Bercasio (International Organization for Migration); Jason Christo-pher Rayos Co (Philippine Action for Community-led Shelter Initiatives, Inc.); Tessa Kelly (International Federation of Red

Cross and Red Crescent Societies), Disaster Law Programme, Asia; Laurie Wiseberg (ProCap); Jessica Dator-Bercillaand Arvin A. Jo (Ateneo School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University); BenCyrus G. Ellorin (MindaNews); ButchEnerio and Bong D. Fabe (National Union of Journalists of the Philippines); Lilian de la Peña (Capitol University); NinaM. Birkeland, Allison Fajans-Turner, Frederik Kok, Barbara McCallin, Nina Schrepfer and Frank Smith (IDMC).

Thanks to Tim Morris for editorial assistance.

Cover photo: Two men stand helpless amid the pile of debris in the aftermath of the devastating Typhoon Sendong, atthe Rizal Boulevard, Dumaguete City (in Negros Oriental, Philippines), December 2011.Photographer: Clee A. Villasor [Clee Andro]Facebook: www.facebook.com/cleeandrophotographerFlickr: www.flickr.com.com/cleevillasorTwitter: www.twitter.com/Cleeandro

Published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring CentreNorwegian Refugee CouncilChemin de Balexert 7-9CH-1219 Châtelaine (Geneva)Switzerland

Tel: +41 22 799 0700 / Fax: +41 22 799 0701www.internal-displacement.org


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January

Disaster-induced internal displacement inthe PhilippinesThe case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong


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Table of contents

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Sendong impacts and response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Legal history and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix I: September-October survey results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix II: Detailed summary of PDRRM- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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3Disaster-induced internal displacement in the Philippines | The case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong

Executive summary

Background

On December Severe Tropical Storm Washi (knownin the Philippines as Sendong) reached peak intensityas it made landfall along the east coast of Mindanao.Despite its relatively weak winds Sendong caused cata-strophic damage: it killed more than , people, dam-aged over , homes and displaced some , people. The greatest impact was felt in and around thecities of Cagayan de Oro where over half the population(,) was displaced and Iligan where approximatelyone third of the population (,) was displaced. While

the macroeconomic impact of Sendong was relativelymodest, the economic impact of the disaster fell heavilyon already poor households and small and medium-sizedenterprises.

This report, from a consortium of experienced interna-tional and Filipino actors, highlights the strengths andweaknesses of the response to the Sendong disasterand the recovery process. It describes in detail the Phil-ippines’ developing corpus of laws on disaster risk re-duction (DRR) and draws out linkages between disasterpreparedness, disaster impacts, responses, displacementand the subsequent, often prolonged, search for durablesolutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The report includes contributions from staff of the In-ternal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), GreenMindanao, Civil Society Organization Forum for Peace,the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration(IOM) and Philippine Action for Community-led ShelterInitiatives, Inc.

The report is informed by the results and insights of sur-veys of several hundred people affected and displaced

by Sendong, and interviews with key state and non-stateactors. It shows that understanding how Sendong wastransformed from a tropical storm into a major catastro-phe must be based on an analysis of the physical, environ-mental, socio-economic, institutional and political factorsthat led to the disaster and post-disaster outcomes innorthern Mindanao.

Vulnerability

Filipinos face high levels of disaster risk. Astride both

the typhoon belt and the Ring of Fire, the Philippines

is one of the world’s most at-risk nations, exposed tomultiple recurring hazards such as cyclones, floods,earthquakes and landslides. The nation’s high levels ofecological degradation and socio-economic vulnerabilityleave substantial numbers of vulnerable people at risk ofloss of life, health, home and sustainable livelihoods. Inthe World Risk Report the Philippines ranks rd outof countries in terms of disaster risk. The Philippineshas been ranked the tenth-most-vulnerable country toclimate change. Manila is ranked by the Climate ChangeVulnerability Index (CCVI) as the most vulnerable of theworld’s “high growth cities” to the effects of climate

change.

To put the Philippines’ disaster risk into perspective, thereare approximately equal numbers of people exposed totropical cyclones in Japan and the Philippines. A cycloneof the same intensity would kill times more Filipinos dueto the nation’s greater level of vulnerability, particularlythe poor standards of Philippine housing and infrastruc-ture and the numbers of vulnerable people settling inat-risk areas. Displacement risks are also dramaticallyhigher: in (while the world focused on displacementresulting from Japan’s Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami)five times as many Filipinos were internally displaced bynatural disasters.

Poor urban governance and lack of accountability in-crease the risk of displacement since they often resultin ineffective or unenforced building codes and land useplans which further expose vulnerable settlements tofloods, landslides and other hazards. Other factors con-tributing to the Philippines’ high disaster risk include thescale of poorly managed migration to already denselypopulated and low-lying urban areas, insufficient un-derstanding of the impacts of climate change and otherhazards and lack of effective early warning systems for

extreme weather events.

Philippines takes legislative lead

The report’s publication comes at an opportune time.On December , as this report was being finalised,Typhoon Bopha (known in the Philippines as Pablo) fol-lowed a broadly similar track across Mindanao. Govern-ment reports indicate that Pablo killed more than , people in total ( people are still reported missing) anddisplaced at least , people, but only one person

in Cagayan de Oro and none in Iligan due to large-scale


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4 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre | January 2013

pre-emptive evacuations.1 The latest tragedy furtherunderscores the relevance of this report’s findings andrecommendations, demonstrating that large-scale casu-alties can be prevented and that disaster-related internaldisplacement can be managed when there is political willto implement the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and

Management Act of (PDRRM-).

The Philippines has been a global leader in enactinglegislation related to disaster risk reduction. Its lynchpinis the innovative Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction andManagement Act, which was signed into law by thenPresident Macapagal-Arroyo in May . PDRRM- puts into practice the Philippines’ commitment to reform-ing its main disaster law in accordance with the HyogoFramework for Action (HFA), a ten-year plan to reducedisaster risks which has been adopted by UN Mem-ber States. The new law has been broadly welcomed as

a signal of government intent to move from a paradigmof disaster response to one of risk reduction. It com-plements the Climate Change Act of (CCA-).Refocusing disaster management involves a conceptualrepositioning in which disaster risk reduction (DRR) anddevelopment are understood to be simultaneous andfundamentally interdependent. Margareta Wahlström,the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-Generalon DRR , has noted that the country’s laws on climatechange adaptation and DRR are the “best in the world,indicative of a “shift from a react[ive] to a proactive stancein addressing disasters.”

Response to Sendong

The human impact of Sendong was devastating and thehumanitarian response reflected this. Around , fam-ilies (some , people) received assistance, somethree quarters of them in and around Cagayan de Oro.Camps and other emergency shelter projects were rea-sonably well funded but donor’s post-disaster responsehas been poor. Many relief efforts targeting livelihoodsand early recovery have not been fully funded.

Findings of the research show that:The great majority of those displaced had been livingin extremely high-risk informal settlements prior to thedisaster. They had been officially acknowledged ashigh-risk areas yet people were forced to build thereand to use techniques and lightweight materials unableto withstand floods.

Of those who lost their homes only an estimated six percent have been able to access a process whereby theycould receive compensation or reclaim lost property oroccupancy rights: very few had had proof of ownershipor formal tenancy agreements prior to Sendong.

The location of some temporary shelters and perma-

nent relocation sites in areas prone to landslides meansthat people have effectively moved from one risky hometo another, trading flood risk for landslide risk.

Some families have been unable to move on becausethey cannot access cash and insurance benefits towhich they are entitled as Sendong victims. They can-

not produce the necessary death certificate to triggertheir entitlements as the government has not yet issueddeath certificates for those still judged as “missing.”

Some internally displaced Sendong survivors have notbeen recorded as Sendong victims but rather as po-litically motivated migrants. This is often via the hakot system of patronage politics whereby politicians, oftenfrom elite families, encourage or allow people to moveonto state-owned land in exchange for their votes.

Most of those who have been officially relocated havefound themselves far from livelihood opportunities inCagayan de Oro’s and Iligan’s central business districts

and constrained by the cost of transport and the timeneeded to get to them. This is eroding their assets andincreasing their vulnerability.

Lack of available land and the high cost of buildingmaterials have delayed the ability of local governmentsto resettle displaced families in permanent relocationsites.

Legal gaps remain

There are considerable challenges concerning the imple-mentation of laws and procedures and there are signif-icant gaps in protection of those internally displaced bydisasters. For example, there has been no official codifi-cation of a binding human rights framework for disasterresponse. Thus, PDRRM- and CCA- should bothbe amended so as to clarify how they interact with otherlaws in order to build a comprehensive and coherent legalprotection framework for disaster-related IDPs.

Over a year after the disaster that struck on December, we have an opportunity to reflect on how Sendonglessons can help inform the work of national legislatorswho are engaged in a mandated review of PDRRM-

and considering new IDP and national land use bills.There is an opportunity for the latter to be linked toPDRRM- in a way that could strengthen the imple-mentation of each. This report is also addressed to na-tional and local civil servants involved in implementingthe law, the international community, the media and civilsociety organisations. Lastly, it suggests how local com-munities may hold officials to account.


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Abbreviations

ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and DevelopmentCat DDO Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown OptionCCA- Philippines Climate Change Act of CCC Climate Change CommissionCCVI Climate Change Vulnerability IndexDENR Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesDILG Department of Interior and Local GovernmentDOH Department of HealthDOST Department of Science and TechnologyDRR Disaster Risk ReductionDRRM Disaster Risk Reduction and ManagementDRRMP Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan

DSWD Department of Social Welfare and DevelopmentGPID Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement HFA Hyogo Framework for ActionHLP Housing Land and PropertyHPFPI Homeless Peoples Federation Philippines, Inc.IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring CentreIDP Internally Displaced PersonIFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesLDRRMC Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management CouncilLDRRMO Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management OfficeLGC Local Government CodeLGU Local Government UnitMGB Mines and Geosciences BureauNDCC National Disaster Coordinating CouncilNDRRMC National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management CouncilNDRRMP National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management PlanOCD Office of Civil DefenseOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsOpCen Operations CenterPACSII Philippine Action for Community-led Shelter Initiatives, Inc.PAGASA Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services AdministrationPD Presidential DecreePDNA Post Disaster Needs AssessmentPDRRM- Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of RDRRMC Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUNISDR UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction


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Introduction

The Philippines is considered one of the nations most “atrisk” of being struck by disasters due to its geographiclocation (astride both the typhoon belt and the Ring ofFire), a high degree of ecological degradation and so-cio-economic vulnerability due to the large number ofpeople and economic assets exposed to multiple recur-ring hazards such as cyclones, floods, earthquakes andlandslides).2 In the World Risk Report the Philippinesranked third out of countries in terms of disasterrisk.3 While country-by-country rankings may create afalse sense of precision and mask differences betweendifferent locations within countries, the Philippines’ high

level of disaster risk is nearly universally accepted.

To put the Philippines’ disaster risk into context, thereare approximately equal numbers of people exposed totropical cyclones in Japan as in the Philippines. However,a cyclone of the same intensity would kill times morepeople in the Philippines due to the greater level of vul-nerability.4 Philippine buildings and roads are not built tothe same standards or according to the same land useplans as in Japan, therefore the risk of damage to homesand infrastructure that could lead to displacement in thePhilippines is also much higher than in Japan. In , forexample, there were more than five times as many peopledisplaced internally following disasters in the Philippinesthan in Japan despite the fact that Japan suffered one ofits largest disasters in decades: the Tōhoku earthquakeand tsunami.5

The higher risk of displacement in the Philippines (com-pared to Japan) means that when a disaster does occura relatively larger portion of the population is likely bedisplaced, straining the ability of local communities (thosenot displaced) to absorb the shock. In the wake of tropicalstorm Sendong (internationally known as Washi),6 whichstruck Mindanao in December , per cent of the

population of Cagayan de Oro and per cent of thepopulation of Iligan were displaced, overwhelming theresponse capacity of local and regional governments.7 The impact overwhelmed the response capacity of theauthorities in Mindanao despite the fact that the latterhave been dealing with internal displacement for dec-ades owing to conflict between the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) and other groups. Between January and October, , people were displaced by armed conflict,clan feud, crime and violence, of whom all but , hadreportedly returned home by November. In November

, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (OCHA) estimated that some , people inMindanao were “at risk” due to high level of vulnera-bility caused by a combination of displacement history,exposure to natural hazards, conflict and violence. Ofthe , people considered “affected” most wereinternally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees whoremain in need of protection and assistance.8

There are four key factors underlying disaster risk inthe Philippines (and elsewhere): vulnerable livelihoods;poor urban governance and weak political accountability;ecosystem degradation and climate change.

Poor urban governance and lack of accountability in-crease the risk of displacement since they often resultin ineffective or unenforced building codes and land useplans which further expose vulnerable settlements tofloods, landslides and other hazards. Other factors con-tributing to the Philippines’ high disaster risk includethe scale of rapid and unplanned migration to alreadydensely populated and low-lying urban areas, insufficientunderstanding of the impacts of climate change and oth-er hazards and lack of effective early warning systemsrelated to extreme weather events.

The Philippines has been ranked the tenth-most-vulner-able country to climate change based on an analysis ofmore than social, economic and environmental factors,and Manila is ranked by the Climate Change VulnerabilityIndex (CCVI) as the most vulnerable of the world’s “high growth cities” to the effects of climate change.9 Thecountry is exposed both to climate-related disasters andsea level rise. Its population is vulnerable due to conflict,unregulated and precarious settlement patterns and areliance on agriculture.

In response to its high risk levels, the Philippines’ govern-

ment has enacted two linked pieces of legislation relatingto existing and projected climate change impacts: theClimate Change Act of (CCA-)10 and the Philip-pine National Disaster Risk Reduction and ManagementAct of (PDRRM-).11 The latter seeks to integratedisaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) intodevelopment and sectoral plans and to decentralise au-thority, responsibility and resources to sub-national andlocal authorities.


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1.1 Purposes of this report

The Philippine Congress passed the Disaster Risk Re-duction and Management Act of (PDRRM-)on February . Signed into law by then PresidentMacapagal-Arroyo on May, it has been welcomed as

a signal of intent to move from a paradigm of disasterresponse to one of risk reduction. It has been seen as apotential model for other national legal frameworks forDRR and DRRM.12

This report assesses PDRRM- and its implemen-tation in order to inform proposed amendments, revi-sions to its implementation plans and other measuresthat would enhance the effectiveness of DRRM and theprotection of the rights of those displaced by disasters.This report comes at an opportune moment becauselegislation aimed at protecting the rights of IDPs is being

considered by the Congress of the Philippines. Any gapsrelated to the protection of IDPs in PDRRM- mustbe addressed in new legislation. The two laws need tobe linked in the same way that the implementation ofPDRRM- CCA- are linked.

There have been relatively few analyses of PDRRM-,especially from a displacement lens. The internal dis-placement observed during and after tropical stormSendong provides an opportunity to examine the ef-fectiveness of the law while it is under review so thatin the future the government will be better positionedto prevent disaster-related displacement and to protectthose who have lost or had to flee their homes as a resultof a disaster.

It is hoped that the knowledge created by the researchproject which forms the basis of this report will facili-tate dialogue and raise issues with the public and policymakers in order to inform decision-making concerningthe implementation of PDRRM-. The conditions ob-served in this report may be relevant in the Philippinesand in other countries that are considering similar DRRM legislation or policies.

1.2 Organisation of the report

Section describes the impacts of tropical storm Sen-dong with a focus on issues related to displacement. Thereport is informed by the results of surveys of several hun-dred displaced and Sendong-affected people (conductedat different points in time following the disaster) and ithighlights the strengths and weaknesses of the disasterresponse and recovery process. It additionally includesinsights resulting from interviews with key state and non-state actors concerning implementation of PDRRM-.

Section contains an analysis of PDRRM- and therelevant, sometimes linked, laws that might potentiallyaffect its implementation. This analysis focuses on thelegal architecture and does not address the issue of howeffectively the law is being implemented. The sectionhighlights potential legal and protection gaps, tensions

or contradictions between PDRRM- and other leg-islation, as well as other problems with the way the lawis framed that could inhibit its effective implementation.

Section seeks to understand why the disaster hadsuch an impact, to explore the underlying factors thattransformed Sendong from a tropical storm into a majorcatastrophe. It considers the physical, environmental,socio-economic, institutional and political factors thatled to the observed disaster outcomes and post-disasterconditions in northern Mindanao.

The report also contains a series of recommendationsfor national legislators involved in reviewing PDRRM-,national and local civil servants involved in implementingthe law, the international community, the media, civil so-ciety organisations and communities so that they mayhold officials to account.


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Sendong impacts and response

2.1 Scale of the disaster

Tropical storm Sendong reached peak intensity as itmade landfall in northern Mindanao on December (Figure ). As measured by wind velocity it was a“weak” storm, but it deposited an extreme amount of rain-fall, causing severe flooding, particularly in the cities ofCagayan de Oro and Iligan.13 Sendong caused more than, deaths and , injuries, damaged , homesand displaced an estimated , people, with themajority of the impacts concentrated in and around thetwo cities.14 Both Cagayan de Oro and Iligan are officially

classified as “cities” but contain some remote rural areas,which may have had an impact on the effectiveness ofaid relief and assistance.

The .mm of rain recorded over a -hour period inCagayan de Oro exceeded the December monthly aver-age by per cent. The intense rainfall in the Cagayan deOro river basin was channeled into a gorge, producing astrong current that uprooted trees and eroded riverbanks.Tree-, debris- and sediment-filled water washed over thesandbar islets of Isla de Oro and Isla Verde. Unplanneddevelopment along riverbanks restricted the flow of flood-waters.15 Several dams were breached. More than half thepopulation lost their homes and were internally displaced,the majority staying with friends or relatives.16

Iligan residents were struck by a riverine tsunami of de-structive debris, sweeping away everything in its path andcausing a temporary dam behind a major bridge whichwhen it burst caused a wall of water mixed with debris tosweep away houses and people in Barangay Hinaplanon,the low-lying Bayug Island and Orchids Subdivision inBarangay Santiago near the mouth of the river. In total,one third of Iligan’s population was displaced and forcedto seek refuge in temporary shelters or with friends or

family members.17

In February , there were evacuation centres in andaround Cagayan de Oro and Iligan, providing temporaryshelter to , families (, people). An additional, families ( , people) were estimated to bedisplaced and staying with friends or relatives.18 In June, OCHA reported that the centres continued toaccommodate , people, of whom , remainedin tents or makeshift shelters. The estimated number ofdisplaced people living outside shelters had declined to, .19

In addition to damage to housing (estimated at . million), government statistics indicate that Sendong alsohad an impact on transport infrastructure (. million),education (. million), health (. million), agriculture(. million), power (. million), water (. million)and telecommunications (,): total damage wasestimated at million.20 The macroeconomic impactof Sendong was estimated to be marginal, even at theregional level. However, negative economic effects ofthe disaster were heavily felt at the household level andamong small and medium-sized enterprises.21

2.2. The response

The National Disaster Risk Reduction andManagement Council (NDRRMC) is tested

Reflecting the paradigm shift toward DRR, the Philip-pines’ National Disaster Risk Reduction and ManagementPlan (DRRMP) specifies mostly proactive measures thatshould be taken to prevent disasters or mitigate theirimpacts. The DRRMP also indicates several activitiesthat should be undertaken in the event of a disaster.These include:

activation of Incident Command Systems and the clus-ter approach at national and local levels

issuance of public advisories establishment of coordination systems for relief andresponse operations

activation of relief distribution points/centres publication of damage and needs assessments implementation of search, rescue and retrieval opera-tions

activation of evacuation systems provision of tents and other temporary shelter facilities provision of spaces in evacuation centres for children,

livestock, poultry and pets design and implementation of temporary livelihoodsand income-earning activities for IDPs

medical consultation and nutritional assessments andtraumatic and/or psychological stress debriefings

design and construction of disaster-resilient housing identification of suitable relocation sites for affectedpopulations

enforcement of building codes promotion of sustainable technology.22

Many of these activities were carried out fully, but others

were implemented partially or after a long delay. Further-


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A g u s a n

P u l a n g

i

C a g a y a n

P h i l i p p i n e

S e a

L u z o n

S t r a i t

S o u t h

C h i n a

S e a

S u l u

S e a

C e l e b e s

S e a

M o r o G u l f

Mindanao Gulf

Lake Lanao

INDONESIA

INDONESIA

MALAYSIABRUNEI

Taiwan

Manila

L U Z O N

V I S A Y A S

M I N D A N A O

Cagayande Oro

Iligan

Track of TS Sendong

International boundary

Capital

Tracking tropical storm (TS)Sendong’s hit on thePhilippines in December 2011

150 km0

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used onthis map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

Date created: December 2012Source: PAGASA

Affected cities

Locations hit by TS Sendong

Figure : Path of Tropical Storm Sendong across the southern Philippines: – December


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Dalai Lama Trust also donated more than , inhumanitarian assistance. The Islamic Development Bankdonated, worth of kits containing school supplies,shoes, uniforms and bags to elementary studentsin Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro, as well as milksupplies, clothes and vitamins to families with infants.28

Responding to displacement Within the Philippines’ Region X (northern Mindanao),some , people (, families) received assis-tance, the majority ( per cent) in and around Cagayande Oro.29 Although . per cent of the humanitarian re-sponse appeal for Sendong-related camp coordinationand camp management (CCCM) and emergency shelterprojects was met, only . per cent (. million) of thetotal Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) fundinghad been released by July . Thus many relief effortstargeting livelihoods and early recovery were not fully

funded.30

According to government statistics, in October , people were still displaced in Cagayan deOro and Iligan, , of whom were living in temporaryshelters in and around Cagayan de Oro and , in shel-ters in and around Iligan (Figure ).31 Given that mostpeople had yet to be permanently resettled, this meansthat approximately per cent of the people who weredisplaced by Sendong had returned home or found shel-ter outside the camps.

Providing information

Lack of information can exacerbate the harm caused byany disaster to the affected population. For example, itcan increase peoples’ level of anxiety or lead people tomake dangerous choices in the belief that they are re-ducing their risk. It is also important for people to knowwhere they can access support before, during and aftera disaster.

In order to address this need, the Department of SocialWelfare and Development (DSWD), the Department ofInterior and Local Government (DILG), the PhilippinesCommission on Human Rights, the Philippine Informa-

tion Agency, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN

more, PDRRM- is not sufficiently clear about thespecific rights of those displaced and otherwise affectedby disasters. While the law acknowledges the constitu-tionally guaranteed socio-economic rights, it is unclearhow private citizens can claim these rights in practice.23

By December , three days before Sendong struckMindanao, the NDRRMC Operations Center (OpCen) hadraised alert levels to blue and on December to red. Thisupgraded OpCen to an emergency operations centre andobliged NDRRMC member agencies to take turns on dutymonitoring the situation. The Philippine Atmospheric,Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration(PAGASA) continuously monitored Sendong’s track andissued bulletins while OpCen issued advisories to areaslikely to be affected by the storm. The NDRRMC ExecutiveDirector issued a directive to relevant Regional DisasterRisk Reduction and Management Councils (RDRRMCs) to

undertake precautionary measures and to issue adviso-ries to Local Disaster Risk Reduction and ManagementCouncils (LDRRMCs) for which they were responsible. Fortheir part, national agencies began pre-positioning reliefsupplies and equipment, alerted emergency respondersand conducted pre-emptive evacuations for residents ofsome low-lying and landslide-prone areas (, families,or , persons). Local authorities replicated these ac-tions and implemented the directives they had received.24

On December, the morning after the storm, theNDRRMC convened in Quezon City joined by the Philip-pine president and heads of NDRRC member agencies.Joining the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) and other gov-ernment responders, the Philippine Red Cross, church-es and mosques, civil society organisations, the UnitedNations, local and international NGOs, shipping compa-nies, private individuals and others started participatingin life-saving search and rescue efforts and emergencyresponse.25 The presence of government, civil societyand humanitarian agencies in northern Mindanao priorto the disaster, and their complementary stockpiles offood and non-food items, helped jumpstart the disasterresponse and meet the immediate needs of affectedcommunities.26

At the peak of the emergency response, there were over Red Cross staff and volunteers assisting with searchand recovery, identifying remains and providing other ser-vices.27 The Red Cross, together with many other agen-cies, continues to assist, working with displaced peopleto achieve durable solutions. The Roman Catholic Churchin the Philippines was also at the forefront of aid oper-ations to help displaced people. Hundreds of volunteersfrom Caritas and other local Catholic associations workedtirelessly in the evacuation shelters set up by local author-ities in public schools in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan. In the

first two weeks after Sendong the ACT Alliance and the

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement(GPID) were developed over several years inthe 1990s by the then Representative of the

UN Secretary-General on Internally DisplacedPersons, Francis M. Deng, in collaboration with ateam of international legal experts. They identifythe rights and guarantees relevant to protectionof IDPs in all phases of their displacement andset forth guarantees for safe return, resettlementand reintegration. Although nonbinding, the GPIDare consistent with international human rights andhumanitarian laws. Several of the GPID relevant tothis case study are highlighted in text boxes.


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High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ProtectionStandby Capacity (ProCap) and the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set up an infor-mation working group in February to help Sendongsurvivors receive accurate information in a timely manner.Information needs included how to access services and

entitlements for those with and without formal title deedsor tenancy agreements, as well as relocation plans andsites, geo-hazard zones and grievance procedures.32

Rebuilding livelihoods and dealing with delayedassistance

The International Labour Organization contributed, to help rebuild livelihoods in Cagayan de Oroand Iligan, providing support for cash-for-work and otheremergency employment programmes and targeted assis-tance for female-headed households and other vulner-able groups.33 Both the Catholic Church and the Islamic

Development Bank have also established and resourcedlonger-term livelihoods programmes for people displacedby Sendong.

Restoring and strengthening livelihoods has not beenaccomplished quickly and problems remain – includingconflicts between some beneficiaries and those providingassistance. In Cagayan de Oro, for example, there havebeen at least two protests decrying the slow pace of de-livery of livelihoods support. Survey participants reported

tensions between the Catholic Archdiocese of Cagayande Oro and the mayor’s office. The latter classifies someSendong survivors as “community based beneficiaries.”Until recently they have not been able to access reliefgoods distributed monthly by the government. As a resultof this classification these families are not sure if theywill be relocated to resettlement areas designated forSendong victims.

Due to the lack of an effective, transparent process fordemarcating No Build Zones (areas national authoritiesdeem too unsafe to build on) and a lack of safe public

land on which to build, many people displaced by Sen-dong remained displaced for longer than expected. Inthe immediate aftermath of the disaster it was hoped

Figure : Temporary shelters and relocation sites in and around Cagayan de Oro and Iligan and flood and hazard profiles

(Sources: OCHA Philippines, DENR-MGB, DOST and IDMC)


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that all evacuation centres, especially schools, would bevacated within a matter of weeks. In reality, some evac-uation shelters housed families until the start of the newschool year in August . As of October , nearly, families continued to reside in tents and temporaryshelters, vulnerable structures that were intended to be

used for a period of only a few months and which werenot built to withstand the typhoon season.

Civil society and faith-based organisations have beenvocal advocates for people displaced by Sendong, oftendemanding more accountability from the government. InJanuary , the Roman Catholic Diocese of Iligan criti-cised the city ’s mayor for disbursing relief too slowly.34 InJuly, displaced Sendong survivors staged a protest toraise awareness of the slow pace of the recovery – sevenmonths after the disaster, only , out of , shelterunits had been completed.35 In mid-November, the

Sendong survivors staged a follow-up protest becausethey had still not received promised compensation for theirdestroyed homes, forcing them to borrow money to makerepairs. They reported that staff in some shelters refusedto serve them because of the type of ID card they held.36

2.3 Survey results

The following section draws on both desk research andsurveys conducted in September and October of Sendong-affected people in and around the cities ofCagayan de Oro and Iligan. The objective of these surveyswas to assess the extent to which displacement impactedpeople’s ability to enjoy their rights, as well as Sendong’simpact on their homes, property and livelihoods.

GREEN Mindanao interviewed people in locationsin and around Cagayan de Oro, and the Civil SocietyOrganization Forum for Peace, Inc. conducted surveyswith participants at locations in and around Iligan.The sample groups from both areas consisted of peoplewho were still displaced, displaced and subsequentlyrelocated as well as people who were affected but notdisplaced by Sendong.

The findings from the September-October surveys werecomplemented by two additional surveys conducted inJanuary . The first, implemented by IMPACT Initiativesand the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Develop-ment (ACTED), was commissioned for the Shelter Cluster.The second, a socio-economic survey, was initiated bythe Homeless Peoples Federation Philippines, Inc. (HP-FPI) and the Philippine Action for Community-led ShelterInitiatives, Inc. (PACSII).

Of the people who participated in our survey in Septem-

ber-October , per cent had been internally dis-

placed at least once after Sendong. Prior to the disaster,approximately per cent of the survey participants inand around Cagayan de Oro had received some form ofearly warning, whereas in Iligan only per cent of therespondents reported having received any warning.

Of those surveyed, per cent in Cagayan de Oro and per cent in Iligan reported the deaths of family membersor that relatives were still regarded as “missing.” The factthat many people are still classified as missing nearly ayear after the disaster has had negative financial impactson their already traumatised families. In April , onesurvivor had to file a petition with the Family Court ofCagayan de Oro to declare his wife dead so that he couldreceive her accrued salary. The Philippines’ Family Codethus can inhibit or delay recovery because it stipulatesthat one must wait for two years to petition for a spouse’sdeath certificate “for extraordinary absence of a person

like in war, shipwreck or storm” and provide proof thats/he exerted earnest and diligent efforts to locate thewhereabouts of the missing spouse.37

At the time the surveys were conducted OCHA – usingstatistics provided by the Philippines Department of So-cial Welfare and Development (DSWD) – reported , Sendong-related displaced people in Cagayan de Oro(approximately per cent of the total population) and

, displaced people in Iligan (approximately percent of the total population).38 The fact that more than per cent of the survey participants reported having beendisplaced by Sendong suggests that the September-Oc-tober survey may have had a selection bias, over-rep-resenting those displaced relative to the total affectedpopulation in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan.

Participants displaced by Sendong came from severalareas and cited multiple reasons for their displacement(summarised in Tables and in the Appendix). The highpercentage of people living in officially designated No

Build Zones in Cagayan de Oro shows how many people

Principle 16, Paragraphs 1-2: All internallydisplaced persons have the right to know the fateand whereabouts of missing relatives.The authorities concerned shall endeavour toestablish the fate and whereabouts of internallydisplaced persons reported missing.It has been well documented that this has not beenthe case after Sendong.

Principle 17, Paragraph 3: Families who areseparated by displacement should be reunited asquickly as possible. . . .Based on the survey results, the Philippineauthorities successfully reunited family memberswho had been separated due to Sendong.


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had been living in extremely high-risk areas prior to thedisaster.

Of those who lost their homes, only . per cent fromIligan and . per cent from Cagayan de Oro have beenable to access a process whereby they could receive

compensation for or reclaim their lost property or occu-pancy rights. This is primarily because they had no proofof ownership or tenancy agreement prior to the disaster(Table ). This underscores a general problem, not con-fined to the Philippines, of the reluctance of authoritiesto help rebuild homes for those lacking titles. Generalcomments made by the UN Secretary-General’s SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, apply toSendong:

The poor often stand to lose most in disaster contextsbecause they often have to settle on fragile and ex-

posed land that is highly susceptible to the effects ofdisasters. When a disaster strikes, their pre-existingvulnerabilities are exacerbated, with women, childrenand marginalized groups bearing the brunt of the im-pact. After the disaster, the poor often also find theirattempts to return to their homes officially denied onthe grounds that return would be unsafe, and/or notpermissible as they did not have official proof of a rightto live there in the first place.39

In Cagayan de Oro, . per cent of survey participantshad no formal ownership or tenancy agreement and in-stead lived in shared housing with family members orlived on others’ property as caretakers in order to preventthe land from being seized by other. This means thata sizable proportion of the population was not entitledto compensation for damaged or destroyed property,including personal items, because the homes they lived

in were not legally regarded as their own.

The map in Figure shows the location of some tem-porary shelters and permanent relocation sites in areasprone to landslides. It is disturbing to note how many peo-ple have moved from one risky home to another, tradingflood risk for landslide risk.

Eighty per cent of those displaced in Iligan were displacedmultiple times and per cent were displaced at leasttwice. In Cagayan de Oro, per cent were displacedmore than once and per cent were displaced two or

more times. Approximately one third of the survey par-

ticipants have been permanently relocated, the majorityof whom ( per cent in Iligan and percent in Cagayande Oro) were consulted during this process.

Age, sex, ethnicity and education levels

Of the women who participated in the Cagayan deOro-based surveys, had been displaced and of the women who participated in the Iligan-based surveyshad been displaced, suggesting that women were moresusceptible to being displaced within the survey popu-lations. Women and girls were reported to be at risk ofgender-based violence (GBV) and coercion to engage intransactional sex. The age and ethnic breakdown of thosesurveyed and displaced is summarised in Tables and .

In Cagayan de Oro, per cent of the survey participantswho had been displaced had received some education:

within this group per cent had received only primaryeducation, per cent secondary education, two per centvocational training, per cent tertiary education and oneper cent post-graduate education. In Iligan, per centof those displaced had received some education, with per cent receiving primary education, per cent second-ary education, two per cent vocational training, ten percent tertiary education and one per cent post-graduateeducation. Education levels of the displaced populationmirror those of the general populations of Cagayan deOro and Iligan.40 Education, often a proxy for social orhuman capital, has had a negligible effect on preventing

displacement. However, it may be the case that those with

Principle 21, Paragraph 1: No one shall bearbitrarily deprived of property and possessions.The application of this principle is difficult to assessin the context of those displaced by Sendong giventhe absence of documentation or formal tenancyagreements and property titles.

Principle 29, Paragraph 2: Competent authoritieshave the duty and responsibility to assist returnedand/or resettled internally displaced persons torecover, to the extent possible, their property andpossessions which they left behind. . . . Whenrecovery of such property and possessions is

not possible, competent authorities shall provideor assist these persons in obtaining appropriatecompensation in another form of just reparation.Displaced people whose property was damagedor destroyed by Sendong have had great difficultyreceiving compensation.

Principle 11, Paragraphs 1-2: Every human beinghas the right to dignity and physical, mental andmoral integrity.

Internally displaced persons . . . shall be protectedin particular against:

(a) Rape, . . . acts of gender-specific violence,forced prostitution and any form of indecentassault. . .

Although the survey did not include a specific questionabout rape, gender-based violence and prostitution,participants raised concerns that these had occurred,or were still occurring, inside the shelters.


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more education may have more readily found temporaryhousing and work and obtained replacement documents.

2.4 Ongoing protection risks and lack ofaccess to basic services

The survey suggests that a number of significant pro-tection risks remain for those displaced by Sendong.These include access to water and adequate health care,resolution of housing, land and property (HLP) issues aswell as replacement of lost documentation.

Survey participants from Cagayan de Oro raised con-cerns about political and social discrimination, as did thesurvivors there who staged protests in July and Novem-ber . Some reported that they have not been officiallyrecorded as Sendong survivors but rather as migrants,

meaning they do not qualify for assistance. These peo-ple had come to Cagayan de Oro via the hakot systemof patronage: politicians encouraged them to settle onpublic land so that they could secure their block votesfor electoral purposes. In Cagayan de Oro, residents onislets and sandbars such as Cala-Cala and Isla de Oro,and riverbanks in Acacia, Carmen and Tibasak have beenaccused by members of Local Government Units (LGUs)of being hakot migrants, as have those living in tents inVincente de Lara Park.

Water, health care and educationIn Iligan, per cent of those displaced have access todrinking water, but of these per cent indicated they had

to pay for it. In Cagayan de Oro, only percent of thosewho have been displaced have access to potable waterof whom per cent have to pay for it .

In Iligan, per cent of the displaced respondents indicat-ed that they have access to some health care. Of these, per cent indicated they can see a doctor at their shelter, per cent go to a clinic and the remaining per centthrough a hospital accident and emergency department.In Cagayan de Oro, even more respondents ( per cent)indicated that they have access to medical treatment.However, during the post-survey discussions in Cagayan

de Oro, participants said that many people who are still

experiencing trauma require – and lack – medication and

psychological counselling. Though participants had ac-cess to mental health programmes immediately afterSendong, these initiatives lasted for only a month or two,which has not been sufficient to recover from the trauma.

In Iligan, the children of per cent of survey respondentscontinued to attend the same schools as before Sendong.However, per cent reported their children have had tochange schools as a result of their displacement and fiveper cent that they have stopped attending school alto-gether. Some participants linked the drop-off in schoolattendance to ongoing trauma: they report children cryand panic whenever it rains.

LivelihoodsMany participants said there was little point in waitingfor the government to take action to rebuild livelihoodsfor this would mean “waiting forever.” In addition to theproblems in Cagayan de Oro described above, surveyparticipants from Iligan noted that the recovery has beenslowed due to the lack of materials for rebuilding andreconstruction, which has in turn had a negative impacton livelihoods. Many respondents indicated that evenwhen they could find jobs, including those connectedto Sendong relief and recovery interventions, they were

not paid for work they had done. Survey participants alsoreported that a number of people died in the temporaryevacuation sites and shelters due to poverty and illness.

The location of the evacuation sites, temporary sheltersand even relocation sites may be a contributing factor inthe ongoing livelihoods crisis. Many Sendong survivorshave been resettled in permanent relocation sites somefive to kilometres away from their established socialnetworks and livelihood opportunities in Cagayan deOro’s and Iligan’s central business districts (Figure ).Transportation between the city centres and the shelters

and relocation sites is expensive, infrequent and time

Principle 24, Paragraphs 1-2: All humanitarianassistance shall be carried out in accordance with

the principles of humanity and impartiality andwithout discrimination.Humanitarian assistance to internally displacedpersons shall not be diverted. . . .Evidence suggests that Sendong survivors inCagayan de Oro have not received equal treatmenton the basis of their political opinion or ethnic orsocial origins.

Principle 18, Paragraphs 1-2: All internallydisplaced persons have the right to an adequatestandard of living.At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances,and without discrimination, competent authoritiesshall provide internally displaced persons with and

ensure safe access to:(a) Essential food and potable water;(b) Basic shelter and housing. . . .

Eleven months after the disaster, thousands ofdisplaced Sendong survivors lack both sufficientfood and access to potable water and basic shelterand housing. While many people in northernMindanao do not enjoy easy access to food, waterand shelter, those displaced by Sendong appear tobe even worse off.


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consuming. These difficulties are borne out in the surveyresults: although . per cent of the survey participantsfrom Iligan and . per cent of the participants fromCagayan de Oro reported having access to some form oflivelihood subsequent to their displacement, the majorityreported a loss of income compared to their pre-Sendong

earnings (Table ).

Recovering lost documentationWherever they are in the world, IDPs without basic iden-tity documents face difficulties restoring lives and live-lihoods. Survey participants who had been displacedalso reported having lost such important documentationas passports, birth certificates, marriage licenses, voterregistration documents, tenancy agreements, title deedsand proof of education (Table ).

There are consequences of having lost identity docu-

ments. Those who have lost voter registration documentsmay be unable to participate in the national, provincialand local elections scheduled for May . The largenumber of people who have lost, and been unable torecover, marriage or birth certificates may face the riskof loss of such familial rights as inheritance. Becauselocal registrars’ offices were damaged during Sendong,those who want to replace birth certificates and marriagelicenses are obliged to acquire them for a fee (from na-tional authorities).

A third of those displaced in and around Cagayan de Oroand . per cent of those from Iligan reported having losttheir high school or university diplomas. This is a concernbecause more than half of the displaced population ineach city had received secondary education and at leastten per cent had been to university. Without proof ofeducation, these Sendong survivors may be at an addi-tional disadvantage when competing for jobs comparedwith those not displaced in northern Mindanao or whentrying to obtain work outside the disaster-affected region.

Principle 20, Paragraphs 1-2: Every human beinghas the right to recognition as a person before thelaw.To give effect to this right for internally displacedpersons, the authorities concerned shall issue tothem all documents necessary for the enjoyment

and exercise of their legal rights, such as passports,personal identification documents, birth certificatesand marriage certificates. In particular, the authoritiesshall facilitate the issuance of new documents orthe replacement of documents lost in the course ofdisplacement. . . .Those displaced by Sendong who lost documentshave, by and large, not been able to recover them.


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Legal history and analysis

3.1 History of disaster risk reduction policiesprior to PDRRM-2010

The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), a ten-year planto make the world safer from natural hazards which wasadopted by UN Member States at the WorldDisaster Reduction Conference, indicates that a country’slegislative and executive systems provide the basis forplans and organisation in all areas of DRR.41 Among theHFA’s five priorities for government action is the need toreform or promulgate laws on disasters.42 An assessmentof the existing legislative and administrative frameworks

is thus crucial in helping reveal a country’s current ca-pacities, strengths and shortcomings regarding DRR.43

The ability of Filipinos to respond and adjust to disasterspre-dates Spanish colonisation.44 During colonialism alaw-based disaster management system was not estab-lished but a system of recording disasters was set up andthe records of events from to have informedtoday’s early warning systems. The Spanish establishedan observatory with the first technology for early warningand set up some response systems.45 The era of Amer-ican colonial rule (–) and the period as a US commonwealth (–) saw changes in approachesto disaster management, including the promulgation ofthe first laws on disasters associated with natural andhuman-induced hazards. Laws and institutions on disas-ter management were introduced. A similar system wasin place during the Japanese occupation (–).46

Presidential Decree No. (PD ), Strengtheningthe Philippine Disaster Control, Capability, and Establish-ing the National Program on Community Disaster Prepar-edness, issued by President Ferdinand Marcos in ,was the “foundation for disaster management”47 in thePhilippines and remained its lynchpin until . It provid-

ed for a National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC)as the highest policy-making body on matters of disaster.The coordination of responses through councils was re-tained, but an innovation in the decree was the specificroles assigned to barangays (the lowest administrativeunit in the country). It became state policy for planningand operations to be undertaken at the barangay level aspart of an inter-agency, multi-sectoral system to optimisethe use of resources.48 Leadership responsibilities laywith the heads of provinces, cities/municipalities andbarangays, each with their own areas of responsibility.49 So that operational activities could become routine, ex-

ercises and periodic drills were conducted at all levels,

principally at the barangay.50 All municipalities (i.e., LGUs)were involved in disaster management.

Additionally, PD clarified the responsibilities of theNDCC and regional and local disaster coordinating coun-cils; mandated the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) to pre-pare a National Calamities and Disaster PreparednessPlan; set out plans for NDCC member agencies; requiredperiodic drills and exercises and authorised governmentunits to allocate funds for disaster preparedness activities.This was in addition to the establishment of a CalamityFund (monies set aside and pre-allocated for disaster

relief and reconstruction) whereby two per cent of eachLGU’s annual budget is allocated to pay a premium for anemergency response payout. The implementing rules andregulations of PD mandated that during an emergen-cy phase the concerned local disaster council, in coor-dination with some other agencies, should undertake animmediate survey of the disaster area. The results wouldbe reported to the operations centre for initial assess-ment until they reached the NDCC for final evaluation andappropriate action.51 For decades, this was the main lawthat regulated disaster management in the Philippines.

3.2 Analysis of PDRRM-2010

It is widely recognised that PDRRM- has contributedto several major paradigm shifts in Philippine disastermanagement. The government described it as acknowl-edging the need to adopt a DRR/DRRM approach thatis “holistic, comprehensive, integrated, and proactive inlessening the socio-economic and environmental im-pacts of disasters” and which includes the participationof multiple sectors and stakeholders.52 Some civil societyanalysts have commented that it represents a move froma military-led focus on relief and recovery to “a proactive,

preventative approach in which civil society groups fostercommunity-based participation for vulnerable populationswho historically had been most at risk from disasters.”53 Margareta Wahlström, the Special Representative of theUN Secretary-General on DRR, has noted that the coun-try’s laws on climate change adaptation and DRR are the“best in the world,” indicative of a shift from a reactionaryto a proactive stance in addressing disasters.54 The newlaw puts in practice the Philippines’ commitment to re-forming its main disaster law in accordance with the HFA.

There are additional internal drivers of DRR policy evo-

lution. In , a government report criticised PD for


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being myopic, reactive, uninvolved in DRR and not takingaccount of new developments and indicated weakness-es.55 For its part, prior to enactment of PDRRM-,the NDCC had been moving toward a more proactiveapproach to disaster management.56

PDRRM- includes just one displacement-related pro-vision: the need for evacuation centres to accommodatebreastfeeding mothers. However, it contains substantiveprovisions to shape the legal and policy orientation of thelaw and increase accountability of authorities responsiblefor DRRM. PDRRM- has a monitoring and evaluationmechanism and requires an annual report to be submittedby the National Disaster Risk Reduction and ManagementCouncil (NDRRMC) through the Office of Civil Defense(OCD) to the Office of the President, Senate and House ofRepresentatives on progress in implementing a nationalDRRM plan.57 A congressional oversight committee was

created to monitor and oversee the implementation ofthe law, comprising members from both houses of Con-gress, with the chairpersons of the Senate and HouseCommittees on National Defense and Security servingas co-chairs.58 Within five years of promulgation of thelaw, or as the need arises, the committee is mandated toconduct a “sunset review,” a systematic evaluation of thelaw’s accomplishments and impact.59 The sunset reviewclause provides scope for improving understanding of thelaw, its strengths and weakness and how it relates to therights of people displaced by disasters.

A comprehensive and detailed summary of PDRRM-’s relevant provisions is included in Appendix II.

3.3 Interaction between PDRRM-2010 andother policies and laws

DRR encompasses several facets of disaster response,from disaster preparedness to post-disaster recovery andthus involves interaction with a wide body of legislationin addition to PDDRM-.

Law on climate change

The Climate Change Act of (CCA-) affirms thatthe state shall afford full protection and the advancementof “the right of the people to a healthful ecology in accordwith the rhythm and harmony of nature.”60 What has beensaid about this right in case-law as a potent source ofstate obligations is relevant to CCA-. This right wasset out in legal judgment:

Such a right belongs to a different category of rightsaltogether for it concerns nothing less than self-pres-ervation and self-perpetuation – aptly and fittinglystressed by the petitioners – the advancement of

which may even be said to predate all governments

and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basicrights need not even be written in the Constitutionfor they are assumed to exist from the inception ofhumankind.61

CCA-’s definitions of “disaster,” “disaster risk reduc-

tion” and “climate change” match those in PDRRM-.62 CCA- similarly refers to international commitments. Itdeclares that as a party to the UN Framework Conventionon Climate Change (UNFCCC),63 the Philippines adoptsthe ultimate objective of the Convention: “to achieve . .. stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in theatmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous an-thropogenic interference with the climate system.”64 Italso adopts the strategic goals of the HFA to build na-tional and local resilience to climate change-related dis-asters.65 This is one of the first ‘ link’ references betweenCCA- and PDRRM-. Furthermore, it recognises

that climate change and DRR are closely interrelated andthat effective DRR will enhance climate change adaptivecapacity. CCA- further declares cooperation withthe global community to address climate change issues;adoption of the principle of protecting the climate systemfor the benefit of humankind, on the basis of climate justice or common but differentiated responsibilities andthe Precautionary Principle.66

While PDRRM- created the NDRRMC, CCA- led to a Climate Change Commission (CCC) to “ensurethe mainstreaming of climate change, in synergy withdisaster risk reduction, into the national, sectoral andlocal development plans and programs.”67 It is mandatedto coordinate and liaise with NDRRMC so as to reducepeople’s vulnerability to climate-related disasters.68 Thiscoordination is strengthened by the fact that the Sec-retary of the Department of National Defense (in hiscapacity as chair of the NDRRMC) sits as a member of theCCC advisory board together with others drawn fromorganisations forming the NDRRMC. At least one of thesectoral representatives is from the DRR community.69 Apanel of technical experts constituted by the CCC is madeup of those with DRR and climate change expertise.70

Law on local governance and relatedadministrative issuances

Another law consistent with the objectives of PDRRM- is the Local Government Code of (LGC).71 It man-dates LGUs to provide immediate basic relief assistancesuch as food, clothing, emotional support and temporaryshelter to those displaced due to conflict or disaster,both natural and human-made.72 This supports the roleof the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and ManagementCouncils (LDRRMCs) in preparing for, responding to andfacilitating recovery from the effects of any disaster. Inaddition, the LGC gave sangguniangs (municipal and city

government legislatures) the power to reduce property


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taxes and interest rates after a calamity, upon recom-mendation of LDRRMCs.73

The LGC provides “for a more responsive and account-able local government structure instituted through asystem of decentralization.”74 Because the principle oflocal autonomy is enshrined in the national constitution

LGU ordinances form part of the DRR landscpe in theirrespective localities.

To further strengthen DRRM policy the Department of theInterior and Local Government (DILG) launched in April a Seal of Disaster Preparedness through Memo-randum Circular No. (series of ). It seeks to “rec-ognize and incentivize local government performance ininstitutionalizing disaster preparedness,” and “to assessperformance gaps, link gaps to policy or program inter-vention and monitor improvement(s) on disaster prepar-edness.”75 DILG has issued many DRR-related directivesto LGUs.76 One specifically instructs LGUs to reorganiseand enhance the capacities of their respective LDRRMCsin compliance with PDRRM-. Another policy directivewas on activating disaster command and auxiliary com-mand centres, area-wide warning and alarm systems anddevelopment of emergency response.77 By , percent of provinces, per cent of cities and per centof municipalities had complied with these instructions.78

The Cluster ApproachThe Philippines’ cluster approach follows the global modelintroduced by the UN in . It is intended to strength-en preparedness and response to humanitarian emer-

gencies by ensuring that there is predictable leadershipand accountability in all the main sectors or areas ofhumanitarian response provided by NGOs, internationalorganisations, the International Red Cross and Red Cres-cent Movement and UN agencies.79 Members of the In-ter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) designate global“cluster leads” in nine sectors or areas of activity (nutrition;health; water and sanitation; emergency shelter; campcoordination and camp management; protection; earlyrecovery; logistics; and emergency telecommunications).

The Philippines cluster approach differs in that the cluster

leads are Philippine state institutions. It was institution-

alised by the NDCC, which designated cluster leads andlaid down their terms of reference at national, regionaland provincial levels.80 Other relevant national agenciesand the private sector became involved, thus expandingthe number and network of actors in any DRR situation. 81

The cluster approach was activated in response to trop-ical storm Sendong to facilitate proper and efficient co-ordination of humanitarian response in Cagayan de Oroand Iligan. The United Nations International Strategyfor Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) notes that the clusterapproach provides a forum for stakeholders sharing aspecific concern to be proactive in terms of all phases ofDRRM. Regular cluster meetings have increased “pros-pects for DRR integration in the disaster cycle,” includingprevention and preparedness.82

There are legal implications of the cluster approach. Since

it is based on administrative rules and regulations, it isvulnerable to political changes and differences in theimplementation of coordination mechanisms. Thus, thecluster approach may be set aside if not adopted by anincoming administration. Roll-out of the cluster approachtook place under the now defunct NDCC. There has beenno official guidance from the NDRRMC concerning thecluster system, although in principle it supports it.

It has not been determined how the principle of localautonomy relates to the cluster approach in its activationby national actors. There is currently no clarification ofwhen the national government may step-in, apart fromthe president’s discretionary right to intervene upon therecommendation of the NDRRMC.83 Though the lack ofclarity didn’t appear to hamper the Sendong response,the potential remains for post-disaster political jockeyingamong officials from different levels of government.

Human rights laws and advisories with referenceto DRR

There has been no official codification of a binding humanrights framework for disaster response in the Philippines.The Philippines has recommended a human rights-basedapproach to recent disaster response efforts. A bill that

provides for the rights of IDPs is under consideration byCongress and may be enacted before the May elec-tions. The Commission on Human Rights issued an advi-sory at the time of the Mayon volcanic eruption foractors to observe human rights standards during emer-gency evacuation.84 It also issued a Sendong advisory toconsider the human rights of IDPs, especially in relationto housing, land and property. The implementing rulesand regulations of PDRRM- mention the adoption ofprinciples in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,the GPID and some other human rights instruments inits policy statements.85

Accountability for disastersThe LGC and PDRRM-2010 indicate that anyone(including an LGU official) may be held accountable

if it is proved that s/he failed to provide immediatebasic relief assistance in the aftermath of a disaster.A local official may be administratively liable fornegligence and dereliction of duty, which leads todestruction, loss of lives, critical damage of facilitiesand misuse of funds. If found guilty, s/he may beimprisoned or disqualified from public office for life.


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The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Ex-ploitation and Discrimination Act considers disasters asa circumstance that endangers the normal survival anddevelopment of children.86 It does not specify how toprotect children following disasters. However, there areprovisions for their evacuation, preservation of family lifeand temporary shelter as well as monitoring and reportingof the situation of children during armed conflict.87

Republic Act No. , or the Magna Carta of Women,provides for women’s “right to protection and security in

times of disasters, calamities, and other crisis situationsespecially in all phases of relief, recovery, rehabilitation,and construction efforts.”88 The state should provide im-mediate humanitarian assistance, allocate resources andfacilitate early resettlement if required. The responseshould include provision of services.89

Other laws, rules and regulationsGovernment agencies such as the Department of SocialWelfare and Development, the Department of Educationand the Department of Health, have issued administrativerules and regulations in their disaster response efforts.

PD (National Building Code of the Philippines) spec-ifies minimum requirements and standards of buildingdesigns to protect buildings against fires and natural haz-ards. Rule , as amended, provides for the formationof disaster control groups and health safety committeesin every place of employment and periodic drills. UnderPD (Fire Code of the Philippines), administrators oroccupants of buildings should comply with inspectionrequirements, safety provisions for hazardous materials,fire safety regulations, protection and warning systemsand should conduct periodic fire and exit drills.90

An area near the Marcos Bridge which crosses the Cagayan River in Cagayan de Oro City, where many people lost their homes and their belongings. Someeven lost their lives as this area was flooded during the storm. (Photo: Gabriel Komarnicki, December)


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PDRRM- seeks the reduction and better manage-ment of disaster risk. It is shaped by two key assumptions: that disaster risk is something that is endemic ratherthan a concern only when a cyclone, flood, drought orearthquake occurs

that it is within the power of the state to reduce disas-ter risk even though it is unable to prevent cyclones,earthquakes or other natural hazards.

Governments have an ability to alter the configuration ofdisaster risk at local level by managing such underlyingrisk factors as poorly managed urban growth, environ-

mental degradation, lack of accountability and vulnerablelivelihoods.91 Since the enactment of PDRRM- it hasbecome the formal responsibility of the government (at na-tional, provincial and local levels) to address these factors.

Given the magnitude of the impacts of Sendong andin light of the recent passage of legislation intended toreduce disaster risks, Senators Aquilino “Koko” PimentelIII and Teofisto “TG” Guingona III convened a two-daysummit in Cagayan de Oro in February . It set out toidentify lessons learned from Sendong and to analyseshortcomings in the management of relevant risk factors.The event was attended by other national legislators,members of local government as well as representatives

from NGOs, academia, civil society organisations and theprivate sector. They collectively produced a document, theMindanao Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction Priori- ties, which stressed the need for: stronger laws; improvedenforcement of existing laws; more strategic planningand institutional arrangements for implementing lawsand policies; more effective emergency preparednessand response and better ecosystems management.92

In March , OCHA convened a two-day workshop fororganisations that had participated in the humanitarian re-sponse in order to identify what went well and how response

efforts could be improved for future humanitarian emer-gencies. One of the workshop report’s key findings is thathumanitarian actors themselves needed to support localgovernments to fully implement PDRRM-.93 Participantsfound that the response efforts left room for improvement:

Local authorities had not developed or fully implement-ed contingency and evacuation plans. Thus, loss of lifewas probably higher than it might have been.The Incident Command System (an on-site mecha-nism used to coordinate disaster response, especiallywhen there are multiple responders and/or multipleLGUs involved) was activated prior to Sendong butits implementation was inconsistent and there was acoordination gap between local and national/regional

The Global Assessment Report : A framework for understanding and addressing disaster risks

The United Nations defines risk using the equation:

Risk = Hazard x Exposure x Vulnerability

Taking flood-related displacement as an example, risk is the probability that internal displacement will occur in aparticular disaster context as a result of the other three factors. The hazard represents the magnitude and intensityof the flood, often characterised by the frequency with which it occurs (e.g., a “50-year flood” is one that occurs, on

average, once every 50 years). As has been noted elsewhere, and as observed in the case of Sendong, processessuch as urbanisation and environmental degradation can influence the configuration of a hazard by alteringdrainage and stream flows. Exposure includes the number of homes and people located within the flood plainbeing assessed. Finally, vulnerability is the susceptibility of people, homes and infrastructure to withstand damage.(Coping capacity, which appears in some forms of the disaster risk equation, is captured under vulnerability.)

Based on this understanding of disaster risk, the risk of being displaced by a disaster is determined by theoccurrence of a hazard of a particular size and intensity, the number of people and settlements exposed to thehazard and the vulnerability of those people and settlements to the hazard (i.e., the propensity of homes to bedamaged or destroyed or of people having to be evacuated as a result of the hazard). These underlying conditionsare the result of government policies, public and private investments and the choices of individuals. The HFA,whose implementation is reviewed periodically in a Global Assessment Report , offers a means for addressing thetwo factors that governments and individuals can address most easily: exposure and vulnerability.

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counterparts and among local civil society organisa-tions and private citizens.Addressing the needs of the IDPs living with host com-munities or in makeshift shelters was a major chal-lenge because IDPs were mobile and hard to locate.Furthermore, it was difficult to differentiate between

storm-affected IDPs and those non-IDPs in need ofassistance due to poor living conditions. Assistancefocused on IDPs in evacuation centres, which caused jealousy among IDPs outside them. The relief operation focused on Cagayan de Oro andIligan, leaving more remote and hard to reach areasunderserved.

Aid delivery was delayed and duplicated at the initialstages of the emergency. Some IDPs received morethan enough assistance while others none at all. As-sistance provided was not recorded and tracked in acoordinated manner.94

4.1 Linkages between environmentalvulnerability and internal displacement

Cagayan de Oro and Iligan are each located in floodplains at the mouths of rivers and thus are at risk of pe-riodic flooding. The flood hazard maps prepared by the

Department of Science and Technology (DOST) (Figure) illustrate the expected extent of flooding associatedwith floods of different magnitudes and “return periods”:floods that occur once a decade, once every yearsand once a century.

Following Sendong, authorities prevented residents fromreturning to areas considered to be especially unsafe withrespect to future floods. They previously designated as NoBuild Zones at least seven hazard-prone locations withinthree barangays whose total population was more than, according to the national census (Figure ).95 Given that these densely populated settlements had alreadybeen deemed unsafe for habitation, the question remainswhy people were allowed to settle there in the first place.

In both Cagayan de Oro and Iligan rapid and unplannedurbanisation (accompanied by the failure to implement

local zoning and conservation easement laws) also con-tributed to the severity of the flooding and the magni-tude of the impacts: concrete roads, buildings and otherstructures prevented soil infiltration. In-migration andpopulation growth has resulted in the growth of informalsettlements in hazardous locations on riverbanks andfloodplains. The government has estimated that percent of the homes affected by Sendong could be clas-

Figure : Houses in No Build Zones, by Location and Category of Damage (Source: REACH,)

Cagayan de Oro

Iligan

Elsewhere

Totally DestroyedMajor DamagePartial DamageFlood/Mud DamageNo structural damage

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Figure : Extent of damage by type of construction (Source: REACH,)

sified as informal settlements,96 built using techniquesand lightweight materials unable to withstand floods orother extreme events.97 This is supported by a survey offlood damage by type of building material used to con-struct homes (Figure ) in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan,as well as a second survey of a barangay in Cagayan de

Oro which found that per cent of the affected homeswere constructed only of wood and the remaining per cent from wood with a concrete foundation.98 At thetime of Sendong, some per cent of the population ofCagayan de Oro and Iligan lived in homes whose wallswere constructed from wood, bamboo, galvanised iron,aluminum or a combination of concrete or stone withthese materials.99 Those living in the sturdiest homesand on safer land were spared displacement.

Both Iligan City’s mayor as well as the commander of thedisaster response and rescue task force in Iligan partially

blamed the flood impacts on illegal logging, mining andquarrying, especially along the Kapai and Bayog Rivers.100 As a result of these activities, logs and mud accumulatedin the Mandulog River, creating debris that swept awayhomes and people.

At the time of Sendong, approximately families (or, people) lived in informal settlements on Isla de Oro,

a sand bar islet in the mouth of the Cagayan River formedthrough the accumulation of sand and silt.101 When theCagayan River flooded, the water, logs, trees, stones anddebris that it carried wiped the entire islet – and everyoneand everything on it – into the sea.102

The timing of the floods during the night made mattersworse as many were asleep and caught unawares. Thosewho were awake had not been forewarned. For example,one survivor from Isla de Oro recalled that she had notwoken her husband and two children until the water waswaist high, having earlier thought it would be sufficient tomerely raise their possessions off the floor.103

4.2 Socio-economic linkages with internaldisplacement

According to an October report published jointlyby the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asiaand the Pacific (UNESCAP) and UNISDR, “the urbanpoor were significantly more seriously affected” by Sen-dong than the general urban population.104 Poverty, poorhousing and displacement are linked because vulnerablehouseholds lack means to build or to rent safe accom-modation. A post-Sendong survey in February found

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Concrete multi-unit homes

Concrete individual homes

Wooden shacks w/ concrete foundation

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Totally DestroyedMajor DamagePartial DamageFlood/Mud DamageNo structural damage


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an “intricate relationship of livelihoods needs as well asshelter needs”: per cent of those surveyed claimed tobe living below the poverty line,105 a figure that is in linewith the results from the September-October surveys.

The socio-economic and physical factors that configure

disaster risk are closely correlated and mutually reinforc-ing. Informal settlements, such as those in Cagayan deOro and Iligan, are often located on marginal land or onthe periphery of cities because of the lack of alternativeand affordable locations on which to build. Areas close

to river systems or the coast are sometimes state-ownedland that can be more easily accessed than privatelyowned land.106 Concentration of income-earning pos-sibilities and livelihoods is obviously welcome but thisbrings risks if not adequately regulated by responsibleauthorities able to mitigate the risk that the urban poor

will live in areas not intended for settlement.107 In Cagayande Oro alone, some , homes were estimated to belocated within No Build Zones, a risk factor that shouldhave been addressed before Sendong.108

Summary of relevant “priority and/or flagship” activities to be implemented immediately

Activity Progress expectedbetween –:

Outcome observed in the context

DRR-report-Jan2013 Displacement and Disasters

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