IntroductionTechnology has made its mark in every aspect of human life, to say the least, from day to day activities to communication, arts, education, and so forth. But maybe nowhere else has technology advanced so quickly as in the military field, changing the face of war as well as its scale and impact, and most notably techniques. War has never been the same from the first gun onwards. In this context, technology with its volatility fits in quite nicely as it offers faster and more efficient solutions to threats belonging to the areas mentioned above. In particular, what military advancement has drawn attention and debate in the media, in international law, in the public sphere, are drones. Named as such because of their once disposable nature, drones have emerged as the 21st century innovation in military, providing with a very wide scope of action, a tactical solution to asymmetric warfare and even changing strategies of war, but little has been done to define them much more than Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, which is a concept in itself and not a definition. The wide variety of options which are now available on drones make them the perfect weapon but as easily targetable, so there is a double sidedness to them. Either way the way in which we use them makes for visible changes in the way in which a war is carried out, how strategies which were once specific to some conventional weaponry or military formation have a wider scope of action.Seeing as the United States has passed through quite a change of positioning in the international relations theater, the emergence and growing use of UAVs have made for a multi-faceted weapon which helped the U.S. carry out its national strategy overseas. Since the 9/11 attacks the U.S. has been involved in several wars under the War on Terror and others, and I believe that the use of new technology has facilitated its ongoing efforts.In this paper I will try to explain how drones fit in the U.S. Grand Strategy starting from 2001 and continuing until today. Its drone program has seen a major makeover and investments in the last almost 15 years due to the nature of the threats that had to be fought. Besides their functional role, I will try to see how drones fit with the ideology at the basis of U.S. Grand Strategy in the aforementioned timeframe and how such technology was to some level expected to be used seeing the conditions. For this I will first look at the history of drones in order to best identify their main traits, then look at the approach at an international level. The chapter regarding the legal framework helps define the functionality of drones and thus acts as an instrument in order to receive public support for war efforts. In a certain sense, drones, besides their military functionality, serve as a strategic instrument at policy and government level, which actually enables their usage, which in turn is another function of drones because of the way they are thought.then try to encompass them and see if they fit in the theoretical framework of the current U.S. Grand Strategy.

History of UAVsAs with the debate on any new technology, drones have had their fair share of opposition in time. Since the beginning of plane use in wars and with their tactical solutions and faults, the idea of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle wasnt far behind. As early as the end of the 19th century, it was predicted that aerial power, if indeed implemented, was going to change the face of war and the tactical advantage for whomever possesses such technology.[footnoteRef:1] At least these were the predictions. So it is common that at first any new technology be disregarded. This whoever does not impede human ingenuity and imagination, such that even as soon as that very period explosives were being sent to remote locations by balloon, which can hardly fit in the concept of UAV since its not a proper vehicle, but does demonstrate the idea very clearly.[footnoteRef:2] [1: David MacIsaac, Voices from the Central Blue-The Air Power Theorists, Makers of Modern Strategy--From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret,Princeton Univ.Press,1986,pp.624-647] [2: Thomas Ehrhard,Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed Services:A Comparative Study of Weapon System Innovation, Johns Hopkins University,USA, 2000,pp. 656-702]

Of course the abovementioned concept translated more likely into flying bomb instead of an automated vehicle carrying bombs, so the first evolution from there were the missiles. This is due to the fact that in order to decrease mortality of pilots in the First and Second World War bombs had to be delivered pilotless. Also, as with airplanes, the military usage of such a concept was not very clear so it had to be explored. At first the idea was simple, get a bomb from point A to point B without a pilot or even a plane, since those were expensive too, which also opened up the mindset more towards remote attacks. At the brink of WWI the United States were researching just that, the idea of an automatically controlled missiles, which would be sent long distances to a precise location. Of course, precision wasnt a fortitude of drones or bombings for that matter at the time. This mentality was due to the domino-effect mindset at the time, which continued and actually expanded later on in WWII, meaning there was a belief that one strategic point in a country could be hit, say a very important factory or very important human hub, which would have the consequence of, if not halting all together, crippling the attacked countrys economy, thus regressing the war effort and giving the attacker an advantage.[footnoteRef:3] However again accuracy was difficult to obtain because technology was lacking since all the war effort was redirected from research and development towards materials and resources, but also because there was actually little information on such locations, there were no eyes in enemy territory. Since research and development was lacking in tangible results, efforts were abandoned soon and retaken when the possibility of incorporating a gyroscope and an altimeter was present. Thus the predecessor of the cruise missile technology was born, and allowed the bomb to reach the target more effectively, more precisely than the previous missile, which only flew a straight line of a determined distance and when the distance was reached it would collapse from the sky onto the target. With the advancement of using a gyroscope and an altimeter, the bomb could determine its height and speed and sustain it until its destination. But again, after the war, the research was cancelled. [3: David MacIsaac, Voices from the Central Blue-The Air Power Theorists, Makers of Modern Strategy--From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret,Princeton Univ.Press,1986,pp.624-647]

By 1944, a few years after the research was rekindled, armies were able to use a remote control in order to better guide the so-called UAVs, which by now are approaching the meaning of the concept, but are not quite there yet because the carrier itself was also the bomb. Until this concept changed, UAVs were considered of disposable nature and thus of one-use only. Germany had high success in using this type of weapons, especially in the bombing of British cities, including London in repeated rounds.[footnoteRef:4] The Germans, perhaps for the very first time, demonstrated the extended use of such technology and its promise. Of course soon after the U.S. started its own use of such technology following the German model. [footnoteRef:5]Even since then it could be predicted that a shift will be made in emphasis from airplanes being controlled by humans to airplanes being controlled by scientists and engineers. More authors than one speculated the replacement of at least some parts of human control over weapons in war, by machines.[footnoteRef:6] [4: Richard K. Barnhart, Eric Shappee, Douglas M. Marshall,Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, CRS Press,USA, 2012,pp. 5-14] [5: Claus Reuter,The V2, and the Russian and American Rocket Program, S.R. Research & Publishing, USA,2002, p.163] [6: Brian Holden Reid, J.F.C. Fullers theory of mechanized warfare, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol I,is.3, 1978, p.301]

As early as the 1930s cameras could be attached to these flying bombs. Perhaps Americans used it first, in order to more precisely locate the target. However the mindset and the doctrine did not change much in military, and although this tactical solution was to be used as preparing the entering of troops, thus preparing battleground, destroying cities, economy, etc, its complete potential was reduced by the same thinking that accompanied the use of planes in war for the first time: that UAV had the role of support much rather than a role in itself, for the core army, and that in a war it only served as accompanying the main army body, meaning the infantry, cavalry, tank commands and so on. This hindered much the development of multi-use capability of drones and the expansion of their scope, therefore even if such advancements as a gyroscope, altimeter and even camera were mounted, they were pinned only to support role. Following that, strategists realizing the importance of the ability to attach cameras to UAVs, assault drones, much slower and of smaller range than the missile, were brought in first attention. They were re-delegated towards information and intelligence gathering during the Cold War because other, more effective, fast and which packed more power, types of flying weapons were in first sight at the time. The idea of separating man from weapon became more obvious with this line of technological evolution. Also, the increasing of strike capability, which always was and always will be an essential element of UAVs, was closer since information could be gathered first handedly now and intelligence was more available.Still despite this drones were associated strongly with the idea of flying bombs and since the finality of these bombs was destruction, drones were seen as disposable and it was a difficult idea to change at the time.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Jeffrey M Sullivan, Evolution or Revolution? Rise of UAVs,IEEE Technology and Science Magazine, is.25,vol3, 2006, pp.43-49]

The Vietnam War followed after that, which allowed this concept to be put in a new light and redefine the use of drones. A new role was assigned to drone usage, which was that of reconnaissance flights because of pilots being taken down during such flights, thus drones acquiring a role higher than support during combat. New functionalities were assigned to drones because of this, apart from the obvious camera feature, a drone was now jet powered and could launch missiles and bombs, and a variety of other weaponry.[footnoteRef:8]Now drones had the ability of doing damage assessment and also with this, a new role had been discovered, that of unmasking the enemys available anti-aircraft devices, their position and type, in order to develop countermeasures. This period also marked the beginning of CIA usage of drones in order to gather intelligence, a role which has stuck with drones for the most part of the late 20th century.[footnoteRef:9] [8: Thomas Mahnken,Technology and the War in Vietnam 1963-1975, Columbia University Press, USA,2008, p. 113] [9: Idem.]

With these developments the shift was starting to occur in drone role, and made a significant gap between man and weapon, as predicted earlier on, which gave rise to questions on whether man will be separated from war by technology, and drones received the appellative of remotely piloted aircrafts, or RPAs. [footnoteRef:10]With this shift there are important notes to be made, such as the shift of applicability of drones from support role to replacing roles previously held by man, and from this sole point onward, the change in strategy that was about to occur because of that. Basically it meant that the presence of drones could multiply forces which, if before could be organized by tasks, so could these, making way for new modes of operation prior and during battle. In spite of much promise, this technology was set aside as new technology usually encounters resistance within fixed military institutions and structures, but more than this, mindsets, doctrine and strategy.[footnoteRef:11] [10: Idem] [11: Idem p.114]

In the 1970s, much at the same time drone technology was being forgotten in the U.S. for example, a fine example of its strategic use re-brought the subject to the surface, namely the war between Israel and the Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria, also known as the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this case drones have been used in tandem with manned aircraft in order to provide intel beforehand and give the Israeli Defense Force an advantage over the Arab army, thus being able to stop their advancement and finally repel them. As drone technology has been resurfaced so was its fame so that Israel received requests to sell the technology. The U.S. in particular developed its own drones and used it in the same way, as well as for damage assessment and target clearance, in the 1991 Gulf War. [footnoteRef:12] But apart from this, the main focus for drone usage continued mostly for intelligence gathering and status checking by a number of institutions, such as the U.N. and the CIA. Although the role and use of drones was limited once again, this time by the need of clarity regarding its scope, the technology has made its way as a separate technology into the military strategy, although even if mostly as a tactical instrument. [12: Rodman, David, UAVs in the Service of the Israeli Air Force, Gloria Center, (September 7, 2012), http://www.gloria-center.org/2010/09/rodman-2010-09-07/ accessed 8.04.2015]

The need for more such UAVs was soon to follow so much so that after the demonstration in 1991, many militaries began to acquire and invest in research of this new technology.Following the technological boom of the 1990s and 2000s, drones began having more and more complex and independent features, mostly because of the emergence of global positioning system, or GPS, the micro-chip, and so on, which increased two main functions commonly present throughout the evolution of drones: remote control and precision.[footnoteRef:13] These features needed to be tested somehow, and the best occasion was in the Afghanistan and Pakistan wars following 9/11. It is impossible to talk about modern day drones without talking of these conflicts. [13: Christopher A. Jones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Assesment of Historical Operations and Future Possibilities,Air Command and Staff College, Research Department, 1997, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/docs/97-0230D.pdf, pp. 3-5, accessed 8.04.2015]

The emergence of a new threat, which was present throughout the years but never as present and as in reach, terrorism, urged research and development of new technologies to reassess tactical and strategic use of what was already available. Thus investment in the U.S. drone program is probably the most advanced in the world due to motivation, during the Bush mandates and even more so during the Obama administration, which saw the need to resolve the international law and public debate issues stressed by drone usage. The surveillance period, or reconnaissance role, of drones came to an end in this period, and the new more functional high target strike function was emphasized.Of course, in other parts of the world in which conflict was present, such as Rwanda with its recent genocide, Congo, even unrest in South-East Asia, prompted for more surveillance usage of this technology, so that U.N. consistently used it in order to gain insight into the situations at difficult to penetrate scenes. If this technology was to be used more, spirits had to be settled.

The legality of drones the political instrumentIn a strategic framework for drones within battle, the need to also consider the funder of wars is crucial. As we know governments fund wars in the classic case with declared war between two countries. When situations of terrorism and insurgents appear, however, which affect interests of a foreign state, the lack of clarity on who is fighting whom and with what increases because there is no functional definition of all parts of the war. Since the war effort has to be justified every step of the way a legal framework which comprises new technologies can shed light on such matters. The military can use it to argue for the continuation of a war, whilst the government, against it.Also, legal frameworks define how a state perceives a certain issue, and that framework also generally translates into public opinion, be it for or against the framework, but still it helps define it. In this scenario, by tying the three elements together, namely government, which is withheld by the people, which are influenced by the legal framework which is created by the government, we see a vicious circle being created around an issue. First positive aspect found in state law which defends the ethical use of drones is the value put on human lives, on less collateral casualties by increased strike accuracy, and the less obvious role of being the eyes and ears of the military thus leading to more informed and effective operations which translate into less loss of human lives.[footnoteRef:14] The greatest debate in this sector was again of the U.S. for its strikes in Pakistan, and Yemen, which the latter was also was a no-war zone at the time. The U.N. indeed declared this as problematic alongside other cases of which Russian seek and destroy units in Chechnya were mentioned quite largely. The main common argument here is the use of drones or UAVs in the targeting and elimination of terrorist activities or high profile terrorist members. While the document that analyzes these incidents is not a law per se, it explains how existing regulation already gives a framework for use of such weaponry. [footnoteRef:15] [14: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6 (ICCPR); UN General Assembly, Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, A/Res/51/191, 10 Mar. 2005, para. 1] [15: U.N. General Assembly 28th May 2010, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf accessed 8.04.2015]

The debate reaches also negative aspects when self-determination and intervention in domestic affairs of other states come into play, principles which are thoroughly described in the U.N. charter for example, as well as in international law generally, being also present in the sources of law. The debate arises from its counterbalance to the right to protect principle in international law, which is highly volatile as a principle, serving as the main argument in actions such as the war on terror, justifying U.S.A.s right to intervene in Afghanistan and later on Iraq and legitimizing its actions. On the other hand there is the Rwandan case where this principle, albeit highly applicable, was counterbalanced against the principle of non-intervention, resulting in the Rwandan genocide with no reaction from the international community. Many more examples of this exist, proving indeed that as in the case of conflict situations with intervention of regular military, drones find their place at the borderline between justified and legitimate actions involving such technology, and a violation of international law. One of the most outstanding cases in this regard was always regarded the drone strikes in Pakistan, which were held as illegal but then regarded as legal because the Pakistan Army recognized the strikes as approved beforehand. [footnoteRef:16] [16: Jack Serle, PODCAST Pakistan Army increasing cooperation with CIA on drone strikes after Peshawar massacre, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-pakistan/ accessed 8.04.2015]

In the legal debate of drones there is to be identified two aspects which resound, drone characteristics which make the difference between its morality/legality. This aspect is the type of drone, armed or not. Drones which do not possess the capability to strike are regarded more friendly as those which are armed, but even the ones that do not have arms raise the question of the destinations of the information that they collect. An example of this is the 2013 Congo drone surveillance carried out by the U.N. in order to gather data for risk assessment in the area, which sparked an opposition from the Congo government. It was settled in the end but the issue raised is still of debate regarding regulation. [footnoteRef:17] [17: UN Starts Drone Surveillance in DR Congo, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25197754 accessed 8.04.2015]

Another type of debate regarding drones relates to collateral damage. The U.S.A. is cited as an example here again because their drone program is the most outstanding and while other countries are only yet to acquire drones or have acquired them recently U.S.A. holds the lead in this technology. Even though the use of drones has given troops an increased tactical advantage and allowed them to act on more intelligence than before, collateral damage is inevitable, as drone strike precision is still an aim which has not yet been reached. The best example would be the case of the Yemen strikes, in which many attempts have been made to kill al-Qaeda member Salim Sinan al-Harethi, as many as around 250, with success in the end, but with little civilian casualties in comparison to the overall success rate if drone strikes in this particular case,[footnoteRef:18][24] making drones recognized as efficient but still debated. In this regard the obvious defense of drone use in conflict situations can act as a political instrument at home, providing people in general with reasons a war is to be supported, besides the initial motivation. [18: Drone Strikes Yemen:Analysis; http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis.html , accessed 8.04.2015]

In order to sum up this chapter, in the legal framework there already are general provisions which apply to UAVs and which offer a general legal framework under which they can operate, such as article 51 of the U.N. charter on the use of force within a state if the state has consented to it or if there is a threat coming from within its borders, towards the outside, or the Treaty of Open Skies. What distinguishes drones from other more conventional weapons is their very wide scope of operation, but also maybe their biggest feature in any role, be it surveillance or strikes, is that it puts military out of harms way. Again the argument of cutting down on human loss is risen, while other weapons have efficiency in battle and are measured by kill rate and, in some cases, there is even possibility of remote attack, such as with several types of arms, drones offer the unique capability to transfer some of the human components which werent possible before, onto them, such as sight, visibility, and even precision, ruling out what before was human error. This can give the army that holds this technology a great advantage. While conventional arms need troops to locate to the conflict area, drones remove this possibility.The legal framework then does not provide with a framework which regulates the risk of expansion of the conflict area because of that, nor does it cover the risk of civilians living in the area from where drones are operated, be it the case. In situations of great need on the battlefield, drones can prove to be a valuable asset, while as a political instrument in war they are regarded as dangerous because of the power they posses for a countrys goal. The ability to strike at a distance, with more precision, gives leaders and army men the possibility to follow their own set of ideas in which targets to select and when to strike, making for a whole new level of the political game. This aspect is the one that international law is trying to control, alongside collateral casualties and breaching of international law principles which, as we have seen above, have been resolved one way or another. In this sense, drones give a political strategic edge to goals pursued.

U.S. and its dronesEven though the U.S.A. had a drone program underway in their research and development sector of the Army, it has seen a very quick growth under the two presidencies covering the period from 2001 9/11 attacks until today, namely the Bush administration and the Obama administration. Under the Bush administration drones were mainly used in the War on Terror to target high-profile suspects pertaining to terrorist organizations. From 2001 to 2008 drones were used in Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan and Iraq, all with the same feature of targeting terrorists. Bush was often criticized on the intervention in Iraq since 2004 because of the high number of American troops casualties and unclear and unverified motives for doing so, but also because troops and resources were growing thin from the war in Afghanistan.[footnoteRef:19] Nevertheless drones provided a two-way solution to both problems, being a weapon to be used remotely it could salvage lives of soldiers, and being reusable and highly adaptable, they could be reused in the new conflict. A total of around 75 drone strikes[footnoteRef:20] were reported between 2001-2008, but with a significant increase in their usage towards the end of the Bush administration, 37 of the total some 75 drone strikes occurring then.[footnoteRef:21] The drone program itself in this period was controversial because of the increasing need for a legal framework for them, but also because the idea of UAVs have expanded in other sectors such as commercial, or for homeland surveillance, which raised concerns at home about privacy. [19: Leila Hudson, Matt Flannes, Colin Owens, Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War,Middle East Policy, vol 3,is.18, Fall 2011] [20: https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/testimony-drone-wars/ accessed 9.04.2015] [21: Leila Hudson, Matt Flannes, Colin Owens, Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War,Middle East Policy, vol 3,is.18, Fall 2011]

In 2008 the Obama administrations turn came to administer U.S.A.s wars and approach towards the international environment. In this period the drone program saw a significant growth and so did drone strikes.[footnoteRef:22] However this was not the only change occurring. Under the Obama administration the drone target list has been expanded to contain also other suspects, considered by the administration as potentially dangerous for its national security, and also the frequency of attacks, so much so that in total more than 370 drone strikes are known to have been approved. [footnoteRef:23] The countries in which drone strikes by the U.S.A. have occurred have expanded in number, for instance strikes have occurred in Libya and Somalia in addition to the three mentioned earlier. [22: http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/ accessed 9.04.2015] [23: New America Foundation, Year of the Drone,Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones accessed 9.04.2015]

A common trait of both administrations is that strikes have not only been approved for war declared zones but also in non-combat zones, which raised issues on an international level of legality. Somalia and Yemen both were not declared combat zones by the U.S., although Yemen did publicly say that it had approved of the strikes on its territory, and in Somalia the motivation was that of strikes against terrorist leaders.[footnoteRef:24] [24: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/?view=all accessed 9.04.2015]

USGS since 2001 to the presentSince the 9/11 attacks the U.S. has been confronted with a number of changes in its external policies and actions. During the Bush administration the most noticeable event is the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center buildings, as well as the start of the War on Terror. Characterized by an expansion from fighting only al Qaeda to fighting all terrorism, the Bush administration was able to pursue the war not only in Afghanistan, but also to Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and so on, wherever there was the threat of terrorism. But in order to start from the beginning, lets understand a bit the main approaches present in the Bush administrations foreign policy. It is well known that the biggest influence in the carrying out of the war on terrorism was that of the neo-conservatories. Far from being a very visible group before this event, the neo-cons surely have made their way up the decision-making ladder with their argument of the powerful United States in the period of the 9/11 attacks. The main theme of the neo-conservative train of thought is the placing of the U.S. into the centre of the international relations arena because of its status as the unchallenged super-power, in what is so-called the American Unipolar Moment[footnoteRef:25]. Following the neo-con discourse the United States was losing ground in terms of military and power, with reduced spending and interest, thus was beginning to see the end of its unipolarity and had to rebuild its status and image. The neo-cons reacted to the 9/11 attacks precisely as a consequence of this laissez faire attitude and demanded that the U.S. react in this situation in order to re-establish its position in world affairs and recommit to its ideals. Also, the neo-cons, much as Wilsonianism, were in favor of spreading American ideals overseas as a peace to solution. The active involvement in world affairs was required in order to keep the U.S. safe, and because it was the only state capable of sustaining such an effort overseas in any location in the world it chooses to do so. By these characteristics, it was also the U.S.s job and duty to act as an international policeman, assisted by its allies. [footnoteRef:26] [25: Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/91, pp. 23-33] [26: Maria Ryan, Neo conservatives and the American public, The US Public and American Foreign Policy, ed.Andrew Johnstone, Helen Laville, Routlege,U.S.A., 2009, pp.150-155]

This train of thought continued through most of Bushs administration, even if such elements were not visible at first, they soon became so because of this event and because there was a consensus from both the political elite and the public to pursue American interests overseas and defend its right to security at home, as they saw it at the moment.[footnoteRef:27] This concluded in another principle visible within U.S. foreign policy at the moment, namely the unilateralism with which U.S. followed its interests. By this logic any matter that threatened the U.S. national security and interests was to be treated directly an assertively by the U.S. In this regard, intellectuals were aware that the unipolarity of the international arena would not last, but were heading their arguments towards a benevolent hegemon. Concerning human rights the neo-cons have included it into their agenda as one of the values to be promoted by the U.S. [footnoteRef:28] [27: idem] [28: A.E.Campbel, Richard D.Burns, Balance of power, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy,vol I, ed.Alexander DeConde,Richard D.Burns,Fredrik Logevall,Charles Scribners Sons,U.S.A.2002,pp.137-138]

In the meantime although the main threat against which the War on Terror started was achieved, the U.S. continued to implicate itself in different war theaters and pursue its interests overseas. In 2008/2009 administrations changed and president Barack Obama was elected. A general overview of the U.S. would show that its unipolar moment has passed, with China rising as an economic power and Russia straightening its economy, the world is becoming multipolar. [footnoteRef:29] The role of the U.S. as the international policeman was coming to an end because of the ability of the world to solve its own problems. Despite this the following of its interests offshore offered the U.S. an important role in international affairs, also because regarding military it still has the most advanced one in the world. [29: Fareed Zakaria, The Post American World, Norton, Norton,2009, U.S.A.,p.215-217]

When speaking about U.S. Grand Strategy it is important to notice the above effects because it determines the way the U.S. positioned itself in the world afterwards. In this regard, the U.S. sought to act as an off-shore balancer. Having still the most expanded experience and the achievements to have credibility it can implicate itself in matters of conflict with credibility that it can solve it. Although the anti-American sentiment is strong because of the secrecy of some foreign actions by the U.S. because of which the Americans lost credibility, their capacity to intervene in certain situations and their required presence when things get out of hand makes them a first choice by other states. [footnoteRef:30] The policy followed by the Obama administration internationally makes for a number of theories related to its behavior, the main ones are the U.S. a benevolent hegemon, which is a view not so widely accepted; and off-shore balancer. As a benevolent hegemon the U.S. has again the responsibility to create collective assets which may prove detrimental to its own state, reason for which nowadays for example the people are unsatisfied with the way things are being run at home and have a negative sentiment of all of U.S.s involvement abroad.[footnoteRef:31] But as an off-shore balancer the U.S. can remain more detached and therefore concentrate on the problems at home. Off-shore balancing works by preventing the system to become unipolar again, meaning that the emergence of a new hegemon is the only interest followed. This strategy sets aside the possibility of the U.S. to act unilaterally, mainly because it favors the lack of necessity of such actions, and favors the development of multiple powers, interrelating states on levels such as economic, interdependent, cultural, political, security, and so on. The promotion of American values overseas is still pursued but the policy isnt so aggressive like in the case of the neo-cons. [30: Idem.] [31: Carl Conetta,Something in the Air: "Isolationism," Defense Spending,and the US Public Mood, Oct.2014, http://comw.org/pda/Something_in_the_Air.html accessed 9.04.2015]

Ideologically speaking there is a tendency to go towards isolationism because of internal disapproval and economic struggle, which means that safeguarding immediate local pressures have to be prioritized. With the economic crisis starting in 2008, the year the Obama administration started, there was no doubt that keeping the U.S.s interests safe by this method, of intervention, had to have serious up-sides in order to continue functioning. The liberal views which dominate American history in general are kept, meaning that the promotion of human rights and democratic values continues as it always has, but this time by using more effective measures. Although the anti-American sentiment has grown in this period because of the secrecy of objectives followed, the U.S. has always legitimized its actions. In the spirit of spreading democracy as a means to peace, the U.S. had to stay involved and maintain credibility.[footnoteRef:32] [32: Daniel Deudney,John Ikenberry, Democratic Internationalism An American Grand Strategy for a Post-exceptionalist Era, Council on foreign relations, USA, 2012,p.15]

Multi-faceted capabilities of dronesAs the debate goes on about how drones are used and what it actually implies for the territories, peoples and nations in which they are used, the practical aspects of drone capabilities are defining their role within the military and their roles on the battlefield. If we compare the capabilities of traditional military technology and assets such as cruise missiles, bombers, troops with a wide array of guns, fighter planes and so on, they all aim at fixed targets rather than individuals or scattered organizations, which is the case nowadays in asymmetrical threats, and have limited to no visibility in some geographical locations for instance, which are hard to reach.[footnoteRef:33] A concrete example of this are the NATO air strikes in Kosovo against the national army which was attacking villages and cities by foot, being able to stay scattered and very mobile, not to mention lightly armed, and making a for a very difficult target for the NATO bombers and airplanes. The success of the campaign rose only when the Kosovo Liberation Army assisted the bombings from the ground.[footnoteRef:34] [33: Sherrill Lingel, et al. Methodologies for Analyzing Remotely Piloted Aircraft in Future Roles and Missions. RAND Corporation, Project Air Force.USAF, 2012. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2012/RAND_DB637.pdf accessed 9.04.2015] [34: Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, Kosovo and the great air power debate, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4. Spring, 2000, pp. 5-38]

One of the main features, which is also a big plus for drones tactically as well as ethically, is their ability to watch and wait for the best moment to strike a target, thus to receive confirmation of the target, allowing the operator to discriminate between civilians and militants. Before, wars were indiscriminate in this regard, now having the ability to discriminate more. This impacts not only the strategy used, but also the efficiency of the operators, which constantly contribute to the effort by their experience.Another feature is their ability to give alternative solutions to operations which normally would have to be carried out by humans, ranging from surveillance to strikes, thus again eliminating human losses on both sides, the attacker and the target. In this way attacks are more efficient if such capabilities are employed, making for shorter campaigns, raids, giving the ability to use a raid strategy, or a waiting strategy, rather than setting on to a covert operation or surprise attack with troops which may lack coordination and is more error prone.[footnoteRef:35] [35: Mary Kaldor, Elaborating the New War Thesis, Rethinking the nature of war, Duyvesteyn Isabelle, ed.Frank Cass, USA, 2005, pp.211-217]

Cost-wise, a ground attack would be in the detriment of the attacker in human lives, military and as noted in the previous chapter, in political and international law terms, if drones would not be employed. Another factor to take into account here is the unreliability of the ground forces which can increase costs also, and as a final factor cost-related, from a summary analysis one can conclude that building a drone, and employing it with its advantages, not requiring hours of training and simulation for a pilot, not to mention his/her living costs at this time, means that drone technology is also in itself cheaper to use, allowing for funds to be transferred towards development.As regarding functionality, the obvious uses have already been mentioned above to be detailed here, namely surveillance (target acquisition, target confirmation, damage assessment, information gathering, here may be included discovering new enemy defense technology), and strike, but there is another functional role, that of providing relief to mostly anyone in dire need of some supplies or others. Drones are also capable of acting as messengers between posts regarding food, ammo, other necessities, but also to provide relief to civilians in war affected zones or other difficult to reach areas, where the functionality of a drone changes from suspicious to humanitarian. As a quick side note, here, oddly enough, the international community isnt vocal towards a set of regulations on humanitarian aid. From this role the multi-faceted part of drones are revealed since it has so many capabilities. [footnoteRef:36] Main improvements brought and continuously developed on drones generally are the capability of longer flight periods, of carrying heavy payloads, helicopter-like vertical take-off from ships and other platforms, thus increasing their presence in a multitude of environments and situations, and deployment to more areas of the world because of advanced remote control capabilities. [36: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/whats_not_wrong_with_drones?page=full accessed 9.04.2015]

The risks of using drones are fairly limited in the sense that the capabilities outrun any downfall. Drones, as any air-born vehicle, can be shot down, or if containing or transmitting important info, their signal could be intercepted. [footnoteRef:37] [37: Christopher Layne, The Strategy of Offshore Balancing, Cornell Univ.Press,2006,U.S.A., pp.159-170]

MethodologyBy analyzing the reasons which made the use of drones so preferable we can see the attributes that the world has attached to them in terms of war, but not only. By taking the most common uses in conflict areas an overview can be achieved. Also, their use has also defined a new strategy, mainly targeting high profiled criminals as the need has risen since 9/11, which is not only effective militarily speaking, but also politically. As the functionalities of drones have been established, it can be seen how they have been used and where in the past 13 years in conflict situations by the U.S. Even if drones were first used successfully by Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the U.S.A. has the biggest drone program and their exponential increase in use and spreading in the last 13 years (the first strike in Yemen) should give a better overview in which conditions drones were adopted, for what reason, and the end result of the situation. From this data then I can argue how drones fit in with U.S. Grand strategy.In the following section I will try to see how drone technology has been used and what implications this had, and see how this technology fits in the framework promoted by the U.S. .Criteria establishmentDrones uses: Surveillance usage: since the attachment of the first television device on a drone, it gained the capability to gather intelligence in an effective way, with people safely remotely controlling the drone. Various bodies still use this feature exclusively with drones in their operations. Strike capability: probably the most important feature in a drone, strike capability was dominated and still is by target precision, a feature which has always been prioritized for improvement, alongside other features such as travel range, carriage capacity, diversification of the weapons it can support and ways of deploying them, etc. [footnoteRef:38] [38: Note: surveillance and strike capability are characteristics often used together but for the purpose of the paper I will track them as separately and consider that strike capability will automatically entail some kind of surveillance.]

Humanitarian/aid role/carriage role: here the function of simply carrying supplies to conflict areas will be noted. Cost/efficiency ratio: drones as a technology stand high on this plane. Political instrument: although their very nature makes them a good argument in any pursuit, their unaccountability makes for great risk of abuse.This criteria will now be put in comparison to the main principles of the U.S. grand strategy present in the Bush and Obama administrations to see how they have served their purpose. Neo-conservative context: The strike capability satisfies the need of the neo-cons to be assertive The surveillance capability in the situation of being a hegemon of a unipolar world, it gives legitimacy to targets killed, distinguishing from civilians, rules out tendencies of expansion Humanitarian/aid role/carriage role the promotion of the U.S. principles to be exported as human rights, democratic values of liberating people from aggression Cost/efficiency - cost was not a pressing issue at the moment and the upside of drones was improving the war capabilities of the U.S. Political instrument - unfounded claims for entering Iraq, even though proven later, made for a difficult situation internally in terms of accountability. Also, their usage was mostly in countries which had terrorist links within its borders and being tied to U.S. interests, it gave them leverage to use them even in undeclared combat zones.Off-shore balancing context: The strike capability rapid expansion of the drone program made for better technology so more accuracy The surveillance capability suspicions of spying and an internal debate over their use at home made this feature controversial Humanitarian/aid role/carriage role a compelling argument when dealt with drone legality because of the possibility to distinguish between targets. Cost/efficiency the economic crisis beginning in 2008 made for debate at public and Congress level to opposing intervention in other countries Political instrument because of secrecy of drone program and actual casualties, accountability was diminished and drones no longer represented a good political instrument to gain support. The theme of American interests which transcend borders (terrorism affecting American security) stands.

The preliminary conclusions to be drawn from here is that drones have been used little during the Bush administration but were emerging as a democratic weapon because of their capability to distinguish between targets and because of the nature of the attack (targeting particular individuals). During the Obama administration their use has increased exponentially due to the multiplication of war theaters and their overall increase in usage in the world.[footnoteRef:39] Their political instrumentality has become rather ineffective after 2008 because of the management of the drone project but was still effective in terms of being easily defendable because no specific legislative framework exists to the moment, existing laws accommodating this technology for the moment. [39: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/ accessed 8.04.2015]

In terms of ideology, the drone encompasses features such as being a more human weapon because it can distinguish between targets and thus reduce civil casualties. Also it can be effectively used for carrying aid to troops or areas in which it is needed. Legally speaking, drones can also be seen as a means to intervene as a peacekeeping party, because of the case in which Yemen declared to have authorized drone strikes on its territory. Also because the main theme of drone usage was of the War on Terror, it allowed the U.S. to use it well as a political instrument internationally.An interesting comparison of characteristics is that of the drones ability to be piloted and controlled remotely, which synchronizes with the concept of off-shore balancing, which by its nature represents the safe-keeping of the home base and the pursuing of interests from a distance.ConclusionIn the overall strategy of the U.S. drones have proved a valuable multi-faceted asset in their struggle to make the transition from one unipolar political system to another, in which foreign policy goals have become increasingly difficult to pursue. By their very nature drones were never meant to be solely a weapon, as is the case for example for tanks or machine guns, but an ally in pursuing their interests and arguing their position internationally.From the political level to the legal and military one, drones give the possibility of adaptability in an array of contexts. U.S.A.s positioning towards its pursuits on an international level has benefited from the development of such a technology because it can uphold the principles that the U.S. is trying to spread in accordance to its beliefs and orientation.In the first case of the neo-cons drones were able to provide a means to express an assertive American stance and policy, unilaterally, since the targets dont get to interact with a soldier in a conflict. Furthermore the characteristic of a drone is, as shown above, to wait and strike, which does not imply a decision from both sides. This adapts to the modus operandi of the asymmetric targets U.S.A. was faced with.In the second case this technology provided with a means to appease public opinion, argue in front of international law and give the army a clear advantage in face of threats, thus withholding the American army superiority in the conflicts it has engaged in, but also set standards regarding this technology on an international level. Despite conflicts, many other countries are adopting this technology which could translate into an approval of what the U.S. is trying to stand for by acting in this manner. Drone technology is a technology that can successfully ply, more than any other, to the needs and values of the current U.S. Grand Strategy. It is a weapon with much more than tactical and strategic implications, but represents values and principles which comply with the current American foreign policy approach and U.S. general ideology. This technology can also set the pathway for other technology, a sort of ethical code in developing new military technology.

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Websiteswww.gloriacenter.orgwww.fas.orgwww.ochcr.orgwww.thebureauinvestigates.comwww.bbc.co.ukhttp://newamerica.netwww.newamerica.orgwww.comw.orgwww.foreignpolicy.com