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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

Most problems related to land in third world countries are those associated

with planning, use and management of land. Over the years, developing

nations have tended to change their policies from those left by colonialists

to the ones best suited to their socio-economic conditions (Kambenja,

1997).

Land reform has long been at the heart of efforts to promote rural

development. It has been argued that customary Tenure in Africa is a

recipe for underdevelopment, and thus a major cause of the regions untold

levels of rural poverty (Ngombe et al, 2006).

In recent years, market reforms have been carried out in countries as

diverse as Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia (Brown,

2002). The quest for land reform involves raising the living standards of

huge proportions of the world’s population, currently estimated at 6

billion, of which many are in developing countries (UN Habitat, 2003).

The great majority live in rural areas thus it is a matter of necessity that

overall development must include rural development (Ngombe et al,

2006).

It has been argued that Africa can only develop if the traditional tenure

consisting of about 90% of African land resources is integrated into

leasehold tenure system founded on principles of individualization (Quan,

1998)).

In urban areas, land or real property that is acquired for public interest is

compensated by value. Although the owners may experience worsenment

by moving from their premises, they still get the value for their properties

and manage to settle elsewhere. But decades after the construction of the

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Kariba dam, the Gwembe valley Tonga still bear the consequences of the

mass construction. Apart from being displaced from their land, they

experienced a loss of livelihood and have never been fully able to recover

from these consequences (Colson, 1979).

1.1 Background of study

Zambia has a total landmass of approximately 752,000km². This land is

divided into two tenure systems namely customary land and state land.

Customary land covers about 94% of these areas while the remaining 6%

is state land. (GRZ, 1996). In the customary system, chiefs regulate the

allocation of land.

Figure 1.1: Land Tenure distribution

Source: Adams(2003)

With an exponentially rising population of about 11million, the country

has experienced artificial shortages of land in major towns due to poor

planning of urban land. The demand for land has increased considerably

and in its current state the land delivery system is unable to meet this

demand especially in urban areas. This calls for the conversion of

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customary land to state land to meet future land requirements (Republic of

Zambia 2000)

Further, it is believed that promoting market-based activities in customary

areas will bring about economic development in the rural areas.

In Zambia as well as in many African countries, the call for market based

land reform has been overwhelming. Urbanization, rural-urban migration,

commercialization in farming, tourism and monetary economy bring about

a demand for customary land to be converted to state land (Kambenja

1997). After the end of the second republic under the UNIP government,

the new government under the MMD found it necessary to reform land

laws in the country to make land delivery more efficient (Brown 2002). In

their manifesto it was outlined among other things that:

The MMD shall institutionalize a modern, coherent, simplified and relevant land

Law code intended to ensure the fundamental right to private ownership of land as

well as to be an integrated part of a more efficient land delivery system. To this end,

the MMD government will address itself to […] fundamental land issues […] in

order to bring a more efficient and equitable system of tenure conversion and land

allocation in customary land; land adjudication legislation will be enacted and

coordinated in such a way that confidence shall be restored in land investors […] the

MMD shall attach economic value to undeveloped land [and] promote regular

issuance of title deeds to productive land owners in both rural and urban areas

(MMD Manifesto, 1991)

One of the specific objectives of the current land policy is to address the

pressures and need for land by urban populations and foreigners. Among

other things, the Land Act provides for the alienation of land by the

president, statutory recognition and continuation of customary tenure and

also the conversion of customary tenure into leasehold (state land). The

aim was to enact legislation that would restore investor confidence in the

land market, attach economic value to undeveloped land and encourage

customary communities to engage in market activities.

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1.2 Problem statement

In recent times, tracts of customary land have been converted into state

land as private land, game reserves or district expansion. Conversion of

title has taken place throughout Zambia and these have been concentrated

in peri-urban areas and in those parts where agriculture and tourism have

the most potential (Brown, 2002).

While we appreciate this, in areas where the issuance of leasehold title is

widespread, long standing economic, social and political relations are

being transformed (Brown, 2002). The l995 Land Act (Part 11 section 4(c)

provides that land should not be alienated ‘without consulting any other

person or body whose interest might be affected by the grant’ (Republic of

Zambia, 1995). This proviso offers legal protection to sitting tenants on

customary land; however, it is seldom adhered to (Brown, 2002).

Following the implementation of the Land Act, the government failed to

pass any statutory instruments- the rules and procedures that govern the

administration of land (Adams. 2003).

It has been observed in areas converted for tourism purposes, under the

premise of market based land reform that local people have lost full access

common pool resources upon which they have depended for their

livelihood (Southern Guardian, 2005). Also, after transformation, it is

uncertain whether the leaseholds on customary land remain subject to

local customs and traditions (Mulolwa, 1998).

In the absence of equitable and democratic administrative system, market

reforms can lead to social and economic exclusion (Brown, 2002).

Majority of the investors in these areas prefer that the land they desire

should be converted from customary land to state land. Under the current

act, there is no provision for land that is converted to state land to be

reconverted to customary land (Zambia land alliance 2005).

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However, there are some customary areas which have seen the

introduction of investors as a positive contribution to their livelihood,

making the debate on tenure conversion dependant on particular areas of

implementation (Quan, 2000).

Given this background, an important question arises:

Bearing in mind that customary communities depend on land for their

livelihood, can Market based land reform in be carried out without leaving

negative consequences on customary communities in Zambia?

1.3 Research questions

The primary questions to be answered by this research are:

1.Are village communities aware of the market based approach to land

reform in their areas?

2.Have customary communities benefited from market based land

reform in their areas?

3.Is the market based approach the best method for appropriating land

in customary areas?

1.4 Research objectives

The aim of the research is to assess the inherent problems of the current

land reform as regards customary land. To achieve this aim, the objectives

are to investigate:

1.Administrative procedures followed in implementing market based

activities in customary land

2.What economic benefits have been channeled to the local people

through market reform?

3.The social effects of conversion of tenure on the livelihood of the

local people.

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1.5 Relevance of research

Land policy lies at the heart of economic development. This means that

the focus is on the landed professionals to come up with policies that will

be viable enough to sustain development.

The current land disputes in Zambia justify this research. As the focus

now turns to customary land to meet future land requirements, procedures

of this allocation need to be made clear. However this can only be done if

the real effects of this conversion are brought to light.

The research thus generates information as to whether the current

approach to customary land appropriation is the best approach for

Zambia’s economic development.

1.6 Justification of study area

The research focuses on Chief Chiwala’s area in Ndola Rural as a case

study area. The proximity of the area to the Ndola urban area has resulted

to high demand of the area by urban dwellers. The area is also endowed

with rich forests and fertile soils making it a prime area for investors.

The area also proved to be convenient as it can easily be accessed from the

University.

1.7 Research Methodology

Primary data was obtained by way of field survey through interviews with

the residents in the research area and with relevant authorities like the

ministry of lands, Masaiti District Council and non-governmental

organizations, the chief and village elders.

Secondary data was obtained by desk research through reviewing of

published and unpublished literature.

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1.7.1 Data Collection Methods

Focus Group Discussions

Focus groups are a tool for collecting qualitative data from group

discussions. This process follows a predetermined interview guide to

direct a discussion among 5 to 12 people with the purpose of collecting in-

depth qualitative information about a group's perceptions, attitudes, and

experiences on a defined topic. Participants should be typical of the

intended population.

This research will follow a “funnel structure." The beginning section is

broad and less structured. This is achieved by focusing first on a larger

group of people who will be randomly selected.

The middle section is more structured. Through Judgement Sampling a

smaller group will be selected and the goal is to lead into, or begin to

cover, the research questions.

The ending section is narrow and the most structured. The goal is to

obtain answers to the specific needs assessment questions. www.sampling

/focusgroups

Questionnaires

Structured questionnaires were given to the Masaiti District Council. This

questionnaire was intended to achieve the following:

1. Investigate the relationship between the chiefdom and local authority in

terms of land allocation

2. Investigate the extent of conversion of customary land in the chiefdom

3. To generate data on the social geography of the area

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Interview Schedules

Interviews were conducted with the investors or farmers and heads of

households in the area.

The advantage of an interview is that certain conclusions can be made

through personal observations. It is also cost-effective in terms of time.

1.7.2 Details of units of inquiry

In order to investigate the socio-economic impacts of conversion of tenure

in Chief Chiwala’s area, the following units were used in this research:

Employment

Through encouraging investors to settle in customary areas, it is hoped

that employment can be created for the local people. The research

investigated the number of people that have gained employment from the

investors in the area.

Infrastructure

This was assessed in terms of recent infrastructure built by investors such

as schools, health centers. It was assumed in the research that access to

basic infrastructure improves livelihoods of people thus a social benefit.

Productivity

In order to assess the economic impact, the research investigated the

levels of productivity of the local people and sought to establish as to

whether it has been affected by the reform process.

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Security of tenure

Tenure security is an important aspect of livelihood in customary land. An

assessment was carried out to determine how secure the villagers are with

the introduction of market reforms.

Access to common pool resources

Villagers consider certain areas of great importance to their livelihood.

This is because those areas possess vital resources such as wild fruits

which act as safety nets during non-farming seasons. In view of this

importance, the research investigated access to these resources as a

measure of livelihood.

1.7.3 Analysis of Data

Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used in the analysis of

data. For open ended questions, the analysis was physical. Data obtained

from Focus Groups was analyzed and presented using simple

descriptive/reporting method.

1.8 Scope and limitation of study

The research focuses on activities of private land owners in customary

areas, with specific interest to Chiwala chiefdom. The chiefdom covers

quite a large area thus it was necessary to further limit the area of study by

selecting a particular area within the chiefdom.

It is limited to one study area hence the information may not be a

representation of all chiefdoms.

The time given for the research is also limited, as the study requires

considerable time to familiarize with the research community.

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Being a customary area, sampling frames could not be easily accessed for

farmers in the area. This meant using snowball sampling which was quite

hectic because of the differing locations.

Finances also limited the research because hiring vans to get to the farms

was expensive. This meant that only a few farmers could be reached.

Villagers were quite skeptical in giving information for fear of being

reported to the chief. They risked losing their land if certain information

reached the headmen.

The land question in Zambia is quite a sensitive matter hence some

investors and farmers in the research area were not willing to provide the

necessary information.

1.9 Chapter Layout

Chapter one introduces the study, outlines the problem statement, scope

and limitation of the study, justification and relevance of the study

Chapter two is divided into theoretical and conceptual framework. It

reviews literature on land reforms and give experiences of land reforms

and outcomes in other countries. The conceptual framework contains the

model of the research.

Chapter three: This chapter gives the background of land reform in

Zambia. It is meant to give an insight of the reform process in Zambia

before narrowing to the selected case study in chapter four.

Chapter Four: The chapter is a presentation of research findings and

analysis with particular reference to the case study area. It presents the

findings of the research in line with the Research questions and objectives

outlined in section 1.4 and 1.5 respectively.

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Chapter Five: The final chapter summarizes the study and gives a

recommendation on the best approach to land reform in Zambia.

Recommendations for further study are also given.

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CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

Land in Africa is a subject that can be traced to as far back as the 1950s

and 1960s and yet it is still one of the topical issues and a top agenda item

at many a global forum especially those hinging on development in sub

Sahara Africa (Ngombe et al, 2006). Current concern with the land

question derives from the accumulated experience of economic

development. Land is believed to be a prerequisite to economic growth as

most people depend primarily on the land and agriculture for their

existence. Land is directly linked with both their economic and social

interests (Quan, 2000).

Most African countries have embarked on reform programs intended to

regain macro-economic balance, improve resource allocation and restore

growth. Reforms in Africa have been substantial in three important areas

namely Macro economic balance, Market forces and private initiative or

privatization (World Bank, 2004). Among the critical areas of reform, land

has stood as the focal point of reform as many African economies hinge

on Agriculture.

After decades of neglect and disinvestments in agriculture and rural

development land reform has returned to national policy agendas as a

result of increasing landlessness on the one hand, and on the other

pressure from the World Bank and donor agencies to develop land

markets. The objectives of the world’s body land reform programs have

been equity and efficient distribution of secure land tenure. Nevertheless,

Africa has emerged from reforms with a difficult legacy; the performance

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of Africa’s developing countries still falls short of the needed levels

needed to reduce poverty and offset decades of stagnation (Plateau, 1992).

2.1 Understanding market based land reform

In the last two decades, land reforms have taken place throughout the

world in one guise or another. The aims have been to promote economic

growth, encourage sustainable management and reduce poverty.

Land market reforms have been carried out in countries as diverse as

Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia (Brown, 2002). The

quest for land reform involves raising the living standards of huge

proportions of the world’s population, currently estimated at 6 billion, of

which many are in developing countries (UN Habitat, 2003). The great

majority live in rural areas thus it is a matter of necessity that overall

development must include rural development (Ngombe et al, 2006).

Land remains an asset of great importance to economies especially in

Africa where land and the biological resources it supports are principle to

livelihood.

Economic development issues concerning land tenure are often related to

the concept of land reform (Chileshe, 2005).

Adams et al in 1999 defined land reform as a planned change in terms and

conditions on which land is held, used and transacted. Further, Bruce

(1993) defined land reform, as a government measure undertaken to

redistribute land holdings. From the above definitions, it is clear that the

reformation in land is meant to change existing structures and practices

related to land.

In an effort to redress past inequalities to land and stimulate self-

sufficiency, many developing countries sought to redistribute land from

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big landowners to poorer peasants and the landless. However from the

1980s, market based approaches to land reform have been dominant

(Brown, 2002). The rationale is that this would lead to rural economic

growth through sustainable individual use of land resources, good

governance and promotion of rural land markets .Proponents of the market

approach further argue that the recognition of property rights will reduce

poverty and reduce the problems of capital accumulation in developing

countries (Pilipinas, 2000).

The hope that rural people will be able to loan, rent or even sell their land

in terms of hardship and have financial security is the basis of market-

based land reform (Plateau, 1992). Deininger (1997) has observed that in

times of economic growth through reforms, the income of the poorest

sections of society also tends to improve. Even where the growth does not

directly affect the poor, it can do so indirectly, for instance through-

improved provision of rural services, employment or safety nets

(Quan,2000).

According to Kambenja (1997) there exist many factors that bring about

the need for land reform:

i. Economic reform.

ii. Employment creation

iii. Better income distribution

iv. Social requirements

v. Education

Agrarian reform, a construct of the Cold War to counter 'communist' land

reform, embraces improvements in both land tenure and agricultural

organization. Its policy prescriptions urged governments to go beyond

redistribution: they should also support other rural development measures,

such as the improvement of farm credit, cooperatives for farm-input

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supply and marketing, and extension services to facilitate the productive

use of the land reallocated. Economic arguments favoring land

redistribution focus on the diseconomies of large-scale enterprises and on

the need to increase returns to land (Adams, 2001).

2.2 Land Tenure conversion in market based land reforms

Land tenure has been broadly defined as the set of legal rules and

procedures that govern the use of land (Dorner, 1970). Many of the

challenges arising from land reform in sub-Sahara Africa stem from the

plurality of tenure systems of authority related to land (Quan, 1996). He

further asserts that the plurality of land tenure systems in Africa has had

lots of challenges in terms of land administration, land delivery and

general economic advancement.

Tenure in Africa follows a mosaic pattern although the duality of statutory

and customary is the most dominant. The background of this mosaic

tenure is as a result of the colonization of Africa in the 19th century, which

saw the introduction of the western capitalist models of tenure

administration (Ngombe et al, 2006). This saw the birth of unjust divide of

land between the colonial masters and the natives; with the colonialists

getting the best of African fertile land. The western tenure system was

more capitalist as compared to the African perception that land is a free

gift from God.

After independence, many countries hastily sought to change this

prevailing tenure and turned to their own socialist systems founded on

principles of customary rights. Tenure under customary practices is

predominantly communally held. Natives have individual rights of use but

do not have exclusive rights to the land (Chileshe, 2005). Up to date, many

African countries hold land under customary tenure as the majority, while

private land is held in minimum. However, reforms that were undertaken

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after independence by African governments, aiming at correcting the

historical injustices in land distribution, have had their own share in the

stagnation of economic development (Brown, 2002).

Many countries of the world, especially developing countries in Africa

have experienced severe problems related land administrations under their

current tenure systems. The most prevalent ones include environmental

degradation, landlessness, squatting, inadequate public revenue and rural

poverty (Kambenja, 1997).

Many African governments and international donors have attributed the

problems of rural poverty, poor agricultural output and low levels of

economic development to the persistence of farming systems based on

customary tenure (Quan, 2000). There is widespread argument that Africa

can only develop if the traditional tenure, consisting of about 90% of

Africa’s land resources, is integrated into the leasehold tenure system,

which is founded on principles of individualization. The World Bank in

particular has made frantic efforts to encourage modernization of tenure in

many developing countries. (Ngombe et al, 2006). But why have

traditional tenure systems attracted so much global attention?

2.2.1 The World Bank view on Market based land reform

Up to the 1990s, the role of the World Bank and other international

organizations in promoting and supporting land reforms was rather

marginal and contradictory. Although they formally endorsed land reform

in conference declarations, researches and policy statements, their actual

support for it was ambivalent (FAO, 1992)

When the World Bank published its 1975 “Land Reform Policy Paper,”

basically, its major recommendations wanted to do away with customary

communal tenure systems that are deemed to be backward. Moreover,

these common lands are traditionally used for the production of food crops

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and are thus incompatible with the World Bank’s model of export-oriented

agriculture to service the needs of the industrialized countries (Pilipinas,

2000). Privatization of land ownership would provide a more favorable

environment for cash crop production. It likewise serves the objective of

debt servicing since the proceeds of public land sales are used to generate

state revenues which are channeled to the international creditors (World

Bank, 1980).

During the 1990s, the World Bank reviewed its Land Reform Policy Paper

and started pushing market-assisted land reform as a concrete alternative

to redistributive land reform (FAO, 2006).

The World Bank (2003) argues that customary tenure encumbers

commercialization; it is insecure, lacks certainty and frustrates rural land

markets. This has led to the call for land tenure reform, attempting to

replace customary tenure with a modern secure tenure. Land tenure

security is often associated with Land titling and land registration.

The next section explores land titling in relation to land tenure and also the

role it plays in market based land reform.

2.2.2 Land titling and Registration in market based land reform

Secure individual tenure, and a free land market, has been promoted in the

belief that they will lead to higher levels of agriculture investment and

productivity and thus provide a firm basis for national growth and

development (Quan, 2000). Smith (1999) defines title as the degree of

control, use and enjoyment that are recognized and protected by law. It has

been argued that lack of title in customary lands brings about insecurity

because rights are not recognized and protected by law. Olawore et al

(2006) state that, over 80% of lands in developing countries have no

documentary evidence or confirmed tenure, making insecure land in

Africa the majority.

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Acquare (1984) defines land registration as the making and keeping of

records relating to land transactions. He further states that these records

include not only the information about the transactions affecting land, but

any relevant data about its physical and abstract attributes depending on

the purpose for which it is intended to use the register. It can be seen from

the definitions that land registration and titling go together. What role do

they play in market-based land reform?

Land titling and registration make parcels of land known, definable and

identifiable (Olawore et al, 2006). This substantiation of parcels makes a

prospective purchaser ascertain the right vendors to convey the land to

them. This forms the basis of the land market. Following this line of

argument, customary tenure it is believed, hinders the development of the

land market and agricultural growth. Quan (2000) thus concludes that

growth requires the conversion of customary tenure systems in which land

is not a saleable commodity, to formal, individual land titles, which can be

traded.

But Mololwa (1998) and other scholars like Brown(2002) oppose this

conclusion in that without registration, customary rights are secure and do

not need to undergo market reforms. At a time when customary tenure is

labeled backward because of the inherent uncertainties, ambiguity in

parcels of land (and hence the justification of its reform), it is also being

argued that customary tenure does not encumber financial markets.

2.2.3 The effects of market based reforms on Common Pool Resources

The debate on registration and titling also brings an important question on

common property resources. Ostrom(1990) defined common property

resources(CPR’s) as “ public goods which are used simultaneously or

sequentially by different users because of difficulties in claiming or

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enforcing exclusive rights, or because they are so sparse that it is not

worth doing so”.

Most tenure systems are communal in character hence common property

resources form part of their livelihood. Their contribution can be viewed

in terms of water for domestic use, grazing land for mixed herds, habitats

for wildlife, providing food, cash and medicine; building materials; fuel;

edible plants; raw materials for tools, products and handicrafts for use and

sale(Cousins,1999; Quan,2000).

The significant contributions that CPRs make to rural livelihoods are

under threat with the introduction of reform policies on land. Rapid socio-

economic change partly as a result of new modes of interaction between

the local and market economy is fundamentally altering the context of

CPRs making the economic livelihood of rural people very uncertain

(Quan, 2000).

Opposing views of researchers on the commercialization of customary

rights makes the question of land reform more critical. Some countries

have, in the quest for economic growth, undertaken considerable steps in

modernization of their tenure and it would be interesting to see how and

draw lessons from them.

2.3 Market Land reforms in East Africa: Lessons from Kenya

Kenya is said to be the first African country south of the Sahara to have

adopted a clear policy on land access, management and control

(Swynnerton report, 1955). While settlers in Zambia came for mineral

exploitation, the explorers in Kenya were attracted by the beauty of the

country and decided to permanently settle there. Agriculture became the

basis of the land policy.

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The policy first introduced by the colonial administration is based on

implementation of a comprehensive program of registration and titling

throughout the country. Individualization in Kenya was implemented

following the Swynnerton report of the royal land commission on East

Africa in 1955(Ngombe et al, 2006). This process was on the basis that

individualization stimulates farm investment, agriculture growth and the

emergence of land markets (Kanji et al, 2001). Kenyan nationals were

granted individual titles to portions of former colonial settlers’ estates and

these were registered with the hope that market transactions would be

consolidated, and administrative benefits would be derived from the

creation of organized records (Quan, 2000). The arguments advanced in

the swynnerton report which were the basis of the individualization of the

tenure in Kenya are:

Security of Tenure: It was and it is still hoped that individualization of

tenure will bring about the pride of ownership thus foster individual

investment on land. The collective result would result in economic

development especially in rural areas. Communal tenure is thought to

discourage long term planning and investment in land.

Facilitation of credit: It is argued that land titles give farmers and other

rural people the opportunity to mortgage their plots and thus access loans.

Dispute reduction: It was thought that individual titles would reduce

disputes especially in densely populated areas.

Since the 1970s, individualization has taken place all over Kenya. In their

research, Ngombe et al (2006) argue that land has been privatized to

outsiders against the wishes of and without consultations with the local

community. Quan (2000) asserts that the expected free market from titling

and registration, have not materialized nor has agricultural credit been

increased. He concludes by stating that although land titling has provided

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secure tenure rights, the process of registration has been costly and the

titling has tended to generate damaging impacts on the position of the

poor. According to Bruce et al (1986) some of the impacts that Market

based approaches have had in Kenya are summarized as follows:

i. Increased concentration of land ownership, especially in the hands of

the recipients of former settler land, and those influential enough to

manipulate the registration process in their own interests;

ii. Weakening of customary rights, within households and between

different social groups, resulting in diminished security of tenure

for non-title holders especially women, children and landless

farmers who can no longer rely on secondary claims or kinship ties

to guarantee access to resources.

iii. Heightened inequalities in land ownership and agricultural incomes,

leading to increased landlessness through land sales, and growing

rural-urban migration.

iv. Rising unemployment, caused by reduced opportunities for share

cropping and tenancy opportunities

v. Diminished food security and increased vulnerability to drought

amongst groups whose access to land has been diminished by the

titling process;

vi. Increased level of disputes resulting from individual rights being

imposed on pre-existing systems of multiple rights

vii. The inability of poor farmers to acquire title since the costs is often

greater than the benefits.

Kenya, where the post-independence government somewhat unexpectedly

embraced the colonial government's Mau-Mau-era individualization

programme, has been the major test case for the individualization of

indigenous tenure. The programme was carefully studied and generated an

extensive critical literature in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, other

important studies have been carried out of both the development of

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indigenous tenure systems where there are no major interventions, and the

economic impacts of tenure individualization in several smaller pilot

tenure reform exercises (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994).

Two conclusions have emerged. First, indigenous tenure systems tend to

evolve under the influence of such factors as new market forces and

population growth. They are not static and can often be reformed without

the need of state interventions. Second, where individualization was

forced by State-sponsored reforms, it usually did not have the desired

impacts on small farmers' behaviour. New investment did not materialize,

and land was not used as collateral to secure credit (FAO, 1992). Other

important economic or technological preconditions for the anticipated

behaviour apparently did not exist, and farmers' behaviour with regard to

land still reflected their adherence to the values of family and lineage.

These findings have weakened the case for forcing individualization.

Existing tenure systems are less often described as "bottlenecks" and

discussion concentrates more on strategies for adapting such systems,

rather than replacing them(Quan,2000).

2.4.0 Market Land reforms in Central Africa: Lessons from Malawi

The colonial policy was to appropriate all land in Malawi to the British

sovereign, place the administration of such land in the sovereign’s local

representative, facilitate access by white settlers on the basis of private

title, preserve native rights strictly as occupation rights and ensure

availability of cheap labor for settler agriculture (Kandodo, 2001). The

results of such a policy were that indigenous people lost ownership and

control over their own land. By independence in 1964, land was

categorized as public land, private land and customary land.

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Malawi’s land policy after independence evolved in a different approach

from Zambia. From the onset, post-colonial policies were aimed at getting

rid of the customary approach. The countries first president Dr Kamuzu

Banda carried the colonial accusations leveled against customary tenure

and also proclaimed that customary tenure was a hindrance against

economic growth (Ngombe et al 2006). In 1965, the Government of

Malawi passed the land act (cap.57.01) but it did not change the existing

policies. The government embarked on an aggressive process of expansion

of large scale or estate agriculture through alienation of land under

customary land tenure, which up to date has seen land being concentrated

into the hands of fewer individuals (Kandodo, 2001).

The results of this process are high rates of underutilization of large estates

or absenteeism of landlords while 55% of peasant households own

smallholdings of less than a hectare each. The underutilization reflected

among other things, the ease with which land was acquired and prevalence

of low taxes. (Mkandawire, 1999; Ngombe et al, 2006).

What economic benefits have been reaped from this market-based

approach to land ownership? Kandodo answers this question by stating

that:

It is not a secret to say that not less than 80% of the Malawian

population is poor; there are black Malawian citizens, who, if they

have any property, it is the land where they have built their hut or

have their small garden. Chances of being tempted to sell that piece

of land are therefore very high. Whatever will be realized from the

sell will straight away go to the mouth. What will be seen later will

be 80% of the population being poor and landless, while 20% of the

population (foreigners and multinational companies) taking over

(Kandodo, 2001)

24

Malawi has since introduced a draft new land policy that seeks to reverse

the injustices in land ownership. This reversal in the policy is enshrined in

the Control of lands order of 1990, which has discontinued the conversion

of customary land to estate leasehold. The goal of this policy is to ensure

security of tenure and equitable access to land, and to facilitate the

attainment of broad based social and economic development through

optimum and ecologically balanced use of land and land based resources.

It is however interesting that the fundamental principle is to elevate

customary tenure to full ownership status through comprehensive

registration and titling of customary interests.

2.5.0 Market Land reforms in Southern Africa: Lessons from

Mozambique

Mozambique, a country with around 17 million people has a total

landmass of 800 000km². Like Zambia, Mozambique took up the socialist

approach to land through the enactment of the Land Act 1970 (Suca,

2003). However, unlike Zambia where all land was vested in the president,

all land in Mozambique was placed into the hands of the state and it

became state property. Socialism disappeared with the coming in of the

political and economic liberalization of the 1980’s, which resulted into

mass privatization, grounded in the usual expectation of economic growth

(Ngombe et al, 2006). White farmers from South Africa and Zimbabwe

expressed the most interest in land acquisition, resulting in a strong

concessionaire culture whereby lands were leased by the government to

foreigners for certain productive uses (Quan, 2001). During the 1980’s up

until 1992, the country suffered a lot of civil wars, which led to mass drifts

into neighboring countries like Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Malawi and South

Africa. An estimate of 1/3 of the population fled to other countries. The

civil strife led to the classification of Mozambique as the poorest country

in the world in the 1990’s (Suca, 2003). The road to recovery meant that

25

policies had to change to address socio-economic needs. Consultations on

land policy began under structural adjustment programs (SAP). Civil

society rejected the continuation of privatization of land rights, which

were among the principles of the land policy (Kandodo, 2001). As a

result, when the bill went for debate at the 1996 national land conference,

any clauses aimed at rural land reform were excluded (Ngombe et al,

2006). The new land law was passed in 1997 and among its various

aspects is that state land cannot be sold. Kloeck-Jensen (Cited in Quan,

2000) observes that the law has neither met the ambitions of most citizens

nor met the keenest of the donor community to create a clear legal

environment for the development of private property and a free market in

land.

However, the land issue in Mozambique seems not to have been fully

settled. The Minister of Agriculture is reported as having stated that:

The land law we have today in Mozambique, that protects the

peasants, was conceived by the peasants. It was thought that it was

the best way to protect the peasants, but I think time has come to

start selling land (Kanji et al, 2002).

The above case studies have shown how some countries in Africa have

performed in attempt to privatize their land. When Kenya and Malawi are

considering reversing the individualization program under the auspices of

market reform, Mozambique is thinking of introducing it.

Experiences in Kenya have shown that market approaches to land can

result in increased landlessness through land sales and weaken social

bonds in customary areas. The weakening of customary rights indicates a

change in societies, a scenario so familiar to the coming of the colonialist

in Africa.

26

Malawi too has shown the results of unclear policies in introducing market

activities. Poor people have a higher chance of becoming landless by

selling their parcels of land with the hope of getting money.

From the literature reviewed, the call of market based activities in

customary areas as a way of promoting rural development in itself is a

good idea but the approach of implementation is what has caused land

disputes. The conversion of title from customary to leasehold has

benefited the wealthy people leaving the target communities with negative

consequences such as landlessness.

Therefore, in the continuing search for tenure security and poverty

reduction in rural areas, what policy changes or synergies are required to

confer social security and equity, and permit economic efficiency?

The next section discusses some of the models in land reform that are able

to achieve economic growth.

2.6.0 Economic theory of Private Enterprise

The argument that individuality of tenure or privatization of land rights

would yield economic growth is derived from the economic theory of

private enterprise. According to Ngombe et al (2006), the economic theory

of private enterprise, two keys theoretical approaches have been used in

pursuing private enterprise and these are:

2.6.1 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP’s)

Private enterprise is achieved by making adjustments to the economy.

Creating an enabling environment for the market forces of supply and

demand to interact freely mainly achieves this. By allowing the market to

interact freely i.e. willing buyer and willing seller, an enabling

environment is created for rural land markets. An enabling environment is

27

defined by universal inducements towards individualization of land rights

and universal constraints against the form of tenure are targeted to reform.

This theory is supported by Turner (1997) in his book “an approach to

land values”. He describes three (3) criteria that must be satisfied for land

to have value for market reform.

1) Utility

Land must be capable of being utilized. This is looked at in terms of

productivity and its ability to create goods and services. Without utility,

the value of land can not be expressed as value is often determined by the

output it produces.

2) Ownership

It must be capable of being owned. Individual ownership can only be

established on a known, definable and identifiable basis. Communal

ownership in this case inhibits the value of land because parcels of land

cannot easily be identifiable and linked to an owner.

3) Limited Supply

It must be limited in supply to instill competition. From an economic

standpoint, the more limited or scarce a good is on the market, the more

likely that its value will be high. In the case of land, the total extent of an

area cannot be changed, thus land at any point is limited in supply.

However, economic land can be increased with the opening up of new

roads.

The above factors can be summarized in figure 2.2 as follows:

28

Figure 2.2: Basic elements of land value

Formulated by author

The satisfaction of land as an economic good makes it a tradable

commodity on the market. However, while customary land satisfies the

aspect of utility, individual ownership does not exist. Land is held as a

communal good and not an individual good. To understand rural land

markets it is helpful to shift the analytical focus from the physical

ownership of to the prevailing system of property rights. Hoff states that:

Little economic activity would occur in the absence of rights, or powers, to

consume, obtain income from, and transfer assets. The level of economic

development of a region will therefore depend on its system of property rights

(Hoff, 1993).

It is thus the aim of the Government to put up mechanisms that will create

a sense of ownership of customary land and also create demand for it. The

theoretical supply curve for land is vertical, meaning that there is no way

to (materially) increase the supply, as the price people are willing to pay

climbs. Since the supply of land is "inelastic" it means that limitedness of

supply will be achieved by inducing demand (Hoff, 1993). As prices for

land are increasing, there is a "tendency" for those who control land to

hold it off the market in anticipation of further increases. Thus, the supply

OWNERSHIP

UTILITY LIMITED SUPPLY

LAND VALUE

29

curve for land actually leans to the left rather than being vertical. This is

what land hoarding and speculation causes. With this artificial scarcity

created, prices for the land that is either developed or underdeveloped will

tend to increase even more (Turner, 1997).

This theory was heavily supported by the World Bank before 1975. In

1975, changing priorities in economic development meant a direct change

in land reform (FAO, 1992)

2.6.2 Direct central control

Unlike the enabling approach, which merely facilitates market interaction,

this approach directs reforms on assumptions that left alone, the market

can fail to transfer enough land to meet the demand (World Bank, 2004).

The government is able to introduce redistribute policies such as Fast track

policies in Zimbabwe aimed at distributing land equally.

2.7 The replacement theory

Customary land allocation rules provide every resident with as much land

as it needs for subsistence but not for more. In other words, households are

prevented from producing a surplus. And even when they succeed in

producing a surplus, they are subject to strong pressure to redistribute to

the village (Plateau, 1992).

The implication of this argument is that any more of land tenure ought to

be encouraged on the grounds that it would provide much stronger

incentives to hard work and investment than customary land arrangements

and traditional social organization.

The cornerstone of this theory rests on the premise that if a large number

of people are free to use the same piece of land, each for their own

purpose, each has an incentive to use the same piece of land without

putting anything back to it (FAO, 2006). However, under the replacement

30

theory, flexibility in land tenure will encourage households to adjust their

holdings and production to meet new needs, thus encouraging investments

and development of sustainable means of using land and natural

resources(Plateau,2000).

It is further argued that communal tenure worked well in Africa so long as

populations were small in relation to land; but population pressure

everywhere causes such tenure to destroy the land. Investment apart,

communal tenure is a handicap to innovation (Lewis, 1995).

Under the replacement theory, the legitimization of access to land and

natural resources by individuals is likely to reflect power structures and

may not be equitable (FAO, 2006)

2.8 Towards the theory of adaptation

From the discussions in the previous sections, it can be concluded that

land tenure reforms in most African countries are based on replacement of

customary tenure with statutory tenure. The approach supports the

replacement of customary tenure by statutory tenure provided by the state

because customary tenure is conceived as inefficient in allocation of

resources.

However, different concepts of customary tenure are emerging. One such

theory is that of Adaptation. The basic concept of this approach is that

indigenous tenure arrangements are dynamic and evolve in response to

factor price changes (Chileshe, 2005). Individualization of land rights, in

which farm households acquire full transfer rights over their land comes

about as a result of population pressure and agricultural

commercialization, proceed. The evolution of land rights is said to have a

common tendency. With increasing population density, specific land rights

develop and generally replace general land rights. Therefore customary

systems are often able to evolve to meet new needs (Brown, 2004).

31

Traditional village communities can therefore be viewed as an

organizational response to the challenges arising as a result of externalities

and are able to stipulate and enforce rules, behavioral norms and

regulations to coordinate and reduce conflicts over the use of scarce

resources. Opening up new and varied avenues for social and economic

mobility, the growth of the markets tends to encourage the overt

expression of individual propensities among the people and has the effect

of loosening the web of traditional social relations towards individual

efforts to achieve economic growth (Plateau, 1992)

The picture that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that customary

tenure systems are capable of conforming to prevailing market conditions

and should be allowed to evolve. Customary tenure systems operating in

village settings provide vital livelihood security functions for households

and are able to meet new social and economic needs of communities

(Chileshe, 2005).

Bruce (1993) has also observed that state intervention may work against

land security and economic opportunity of vulnerable groups and further

break the link between traditional social organization and land tenure.

The Adaptation approach to land tenure reform recognizes that land tenure

rights under customary tenure are embedded in socio-cultural systems that

cannot be bypassed. Instead of imposing state governed systems of reform,

local or community-based solutions to land tenure security should be

explored (Plateau, 1992). Chileshe (2005) further suggests the

strengthening of village community capacity for management, information

and dispute settlement rather than imposing a statutory land tenure system.

32

In the 1970s, the "tragedy of the commons" was almost conventional

wisdom in discourses about natural resource management. The tragedy

asserted was that, as population and pressure on resources grew, the users

of resources that were held in common would eventually, and inevitably,

overexploit and degrade those resources, because they had no individual

incentive to use them carefully (Hardin, 1968).

Today there is renewed optimism about the prospects for effective

community management of natural resources, based to a significant extent

on the growing perception that communities with the opportunity to

manage resources as common property have a reasonable chance of doing

so sustainably(Munshifwa,2003).

The arguments of economic development and land management tend to

underestimate the importance of customary land tenure systems, which are

an integral part of the social, political and economic framework. They

overlook the unintended effects of undermining land tenure systems,

which protect poor and vulnerable members. They also tend to disregard

the empirical evidence that traditional tenure systems can be flexible and

responsive to changing economic circumstances. With population pressure

and commercialization, individualization has occurred autonomously

(Migot-Adholla et al., 1994).

2.9 Conceptual Framework

This section presents the conceptual model for the research. The model

suggests the process of reform and will act as a guide in analyzing field

data.

The model has been developed on the concept that society is able to

evolve and meet required challenges without undue influence. The model

is illustrated in Figure 2.3.

33

The figure is represented by two main descriptive rectangles which

represent Land and the Community itself. Both components have their

own characteristics that may come up with a tenure system. However the

components are interlinked and therefore exert a dependency relationship.

Land is a resource base upon which the community depends for its

production and livelihood (Chileshe, 2005), but on the other hand, “a

resource is not, it becomes”(Zimmerman, undated).

The framework suggests that the tenure situation in a community should

be determined by mapping and describing the characteristics of the

community and the land which is the resource base. The identification of

these characteristics will lead to the identification of the uniqueness of that

community and the rules that govern the allocation of resources. Once this

is done, the tenure system can easily be identified.

The dependency of these components suggests that even the

characteristics will be interrelated as depicted by the inner solid lines in

diagram. The interaction of these characteristics determines the tenure

system. Any change in the any of the characteristics leads to change in the

other characteristics leading to change in the tenure system.

For example, a change in the fertility of the land could lead to a decrease

in its demand. The decrease in demand could also lead to flexibility in the

regulations governing ownership and use.

The core of this model is therefore summarized as follows.

Change in land tenure = Change in characteristics of land/change in the

characteristic of the community.

34

Figure 3: The community, land and tenure adaptation model

Source: Formulated by Author

Freudenberger(2004) in his analytical schema asks four important

questions that are of interest to the model

1.How do the characteristics of the community determine the nature of

the tenure system?

2.What incentives or disincentives does the tenure system create for

sustainable, equitable, efficient use of natural resources?

3.How do the rules affect the socio-economic life of the community?

Economic -Productivity -other non-farm activities

Administration -Land allocation -Inheritance -leadership

COMMUNITY

Social -Demographics -Culture -Equity

LAND

Legal/Political -Statutory regulations

Economic -Scarcity/abundance -Demand/supply

Quality -Fertility -Other by products

TENURE Local/Formal rules

35

4.How do the characteristics of the resource base affect the nature of

the rules that are promulgated and/or enforced?

2.9.1 Characteristics of the community

The community has several unique characteristics which will define its

social structures. These can be in form of leadership, inheritance trends

and other social norms and values. Different tribes have different cultures

which also lead to a difference in the perception of land.

2.9.2 Characteristics of the Land

Communities can be defined in terms of their land and its resources. High

qualities of land such as fertile soils could define the community as a

farming community or vise-versa.

Therefore land plays a vital role in determining land tenure for any

society.

2.9.3 Characteristics of the Tenure

Land tenure defines the relationship between people and their land and

other natural resources. It determines who has access to land and who can

be excluded from it; the terms and conditions of that access; the rights and

obligations that such access gives rise to; how land can be used and

controlled; and the means and circumstances by which the rights and the

obligations which can be transferred to others(FAO,2006)

The characteristics of the tenure will be interplay of the characteristics of

the community and the characteristics of the land. The community can

determine its own rules towards their own land and will mainly draw their

socio-economic livelihood from it.

36

Therefore, Land tenure is essentially a social phenomenon, comprising

rules invented by society to regulate behaviour (Quan, 2000))

The focus of the argument can then be outlined that change of tenure has

to be internal i.e. a communities ‘ response to change and not imposing

rules on the community. This is because the linkage between the

community and the land is a solid linkage which cannot be broken without

affecting either/ both of them.

Cousins (1999) has drawn a table to illustrate the relationship between the

resource and the community. In his table Critical livelihood questions, he

examines several questions that will critically affect livelihoods.

Box 1. Critical tenure-related livelihood questions

Given the inherent complexity of land tenure systems, the limited capacity of the

State and the costs of tenure reform, is reform necessary for reducing poverty

and securing sustainable livelihoods? What kinds of reform are appropriate?

How should tenure reform be phased?

Political: Is land ownership distinct from jurisdiction, i.e. is the tenant in a

feudal relationship with the landowner? How is tenure reform linked to land

reform in the wider sense? Do political conditions favour tenure reform? How

effective is the administration of land tenure at national, regional and local

levels?

Economic: How do tenure systems affect agrarian and other sources of

production and income? What economic use is made of common property

resources? How does the land tenure system intersect with markets for land,

capital, labour, inputs and outputs? Does lack of clarity about land rights

discourage investment?

Social and cultural: How are rights to land embedded within wider social and

37

cultural relationships? What is the impact of the structure of land rights on

gender inequality? Are tenure systems associated with class, racial ethnic and/or

other forms of inequality? Are rights to land an important source of asset-based

security for the poor? How have indigenous tenure forms been affected by

colonial and post-colonial laws? How do reform policies interact with informal

evolutionary processes?

Legal: Do constitutional and legal frameworks affect tenure? Are there

appropriate and legally secure options for rural and urban situations? What is the

legal basis of common property arrangements? When and where are titling and

registration programmes appropriate? Do group forms of ownership require

titling and registration?

(Ben Cousins,1999)

2.10 Conclusion

It is now clear that most countries in Africa will move with some sectors

under individual ownership and other sectors where indigenous tenure

systems prevail. Recent decades have seen dramatic attempts at land-

grabbing by the urban-based government and local elites and private

investors through the process of shifting land out of the indigenous tenure

category into statutory tenure systems. This has been done whether by

government-granted concessions of indigenously held land over which a

State title is asserted, or through registration of land purchased by the

elites from those who held it under indigenous tenure systems. Land

reforms will be of little significance if such processes cannot be

controlled, and this implies broad political mobilization of rural people to

put an end to land-grabbing.

38

CHAPTER 3 Market land reforms in Zambia

3.1 Introduction

The preceding sections defined and explained land reform in general and

have formed the basis of this section. This section applies all these issues

to the situation in Zambia. Zambia’s prelude to reform has been no less

different from the countries explored above. The myriad of problems

related to land all point to the development of the tenure arrangement.

3.2 Evolution of land tenure systems in Zambia

Before the coming of the white settler community, holding of land by the

indigenous community was largely through families, jointly or by a chief

or chieftainess on behalf of the community in accordance with the

community’s respective customary laws (Republic of Zambia, 2000)

Traditional rulers administered Land in pre -colonial days. With the

coming of the white settlers in Zambia in about 1890, the system of

ownership changed significantly (Mvunga, 1980).

In 1924, when Northern Rhodesia came under British rule, the settlers

wanted to know exactly what they owned thus the first imperial governor

Stanley appointed a Native reserve commission to investigate the land

extent, examine natural resources with special regard to agriculture. The

commission demarcated land reserves for exclusive habitation of Africans

and allocated the best fertile lands for the settlers. All lands with mineral

sites were put under settler land or otherwise called crown lands. This was

the beginning of the dual system of land tenure (Mvunga, 1980). The land

held by the white settlers was generally held under leasehold or freehold

title and as such enabled the title holders to use title deeds in borrowing

money from lending institutions so as to develop their land (Republic of

39

Zambia, 2000). This system of land tenure was completely alien to the

African way of life. The exclusive properties of private ownership were at

variance with and destructive of communal and family life as it existed in

the colonies. In fact, the only way in which this land grabbing could be

enforced was through the introduction of "pass" laws in various forms

(Mvunga, 1980). They prohibited the access to traditional lands by the

birthright owners and condemned the indigenous people to live in

overcrowded "squatter reserves" to which the private land tenure system

did not extend. The colonialists used private titles to benefit only

themselves; it was never intended to benefit the owners of the land for

development or any other purpose (Sichone, 1997).

With the attainment of independence in 1964, the Zambian government

took over management of crown lands and these became known as state

land. Trust and reserve lands continued under the authority of the

customary rulers. The dual type of land holding continues to

date(Republic of Zambia,2000).

3.2.1 Watershed Speech- Land Reforms 1975

The watershed speech marked a significant change in Zambia’s land

tenure. From the capitalist approach, the president Dr Kenneth Kaunda

introduced socialist practices to land ownership. In his view, land was a

free gift from God and thus did not need the market to determine

ownership of land. Thus the market approach to land was banned and

replaced by the socialist principles. All land was vested in the hands of the

president to be a custodian on behalf of the people. Thus freehold was

banned and replaced with statutory leaseholds. Large tracts of idle lands

owned by absentee landlords were confiscated by the state and these were

incorporated into state land. It became more difficult for foreigners to buy

and own land. In fact, the emphasis of the watershed speech was on the

40

point that Land had no value, thus land sales became prohibited unless by

government control. This was a big blow to the land market in Zambia.

3.2.2 The Land (Conversion of titles) Act CAP 289, 1975

The Watershed speech on land reforms was then backed by legislation.

This was through the passing of the land (conversion of title act) in 1975.

The significance of this Act was to provide for the vesting of all land in

Zambia absolutely in the hands of the president and for the conversion of

titles to land. It further imposed restrictions on the extent of Agricultural

holdings, the abolition of sale, transfer and other matters incidental to the

ownership and alienation of land (Mushinge, 2004).

The land reform brought about unforeseen constraints: significant

restriction of the publics access to land resulted in:

i. An artificial land shortage;

ii. The introduction of the requirement for state consent brought

complications in the procedures of land acquisitions, causing

administrative delays;

iii. Less land was brought to productive use as those who had no

capacity to develop were inhibited from selling off undeveloped

land. (Chinene et al, 1998)

3.2.2 Land Circular no 1 –1985

This document was drawn to lay down procedures of the administration

and alienation of land. The circular set out procedures for the conversion

of customary land to leasehold tenure. It further restricted the alienation of

land to foreigners, with the exception of certified investors and charitable

organizations (Land circular, 1985). According to the circular, approved

investors could acquire land as long as they had consent from the local

chief or council who had to physically inspect the land and ensure that no

41

persons rights or interests were affected (Republic of Zambia, 2000).A

person wishing to obtain land in a customary area must first secure the

approval of the local council and then apply to the local council enclosing

the chief’s letter of approval. It is up to the commissioner of lands to

decide whether or not to approve the application.

This goes to show that conversion of tenure is not an MMD policy but

started way back into the Kaunda era.

An important question thus arises; why has it received more attention

during the MMD regime?

3.2.3 Lands Act CAP 189-1995

Zambia’s third republic, which began in 1991, saw the ushering in of

privatization of the economy following the Structural Adjustment

Programs. There was a rapid change of the economic policy from

nationalization (from Kaunda’s socialist to a liberalized economy) to

instigate wide market reforms in order to promote mining, agriculture and

tourism. The land issue was not to be left out under this liberalized

economy. The thriving of these three sectors required an enabling land

policy that would accommodate investors (PRSP, 2002).

Like other African countries, Zambia’s resort to reform was externally

influenced by the World Bank and IMF who set it as a condition that the

government was required to meet in order to restructure its international

debt (Ngombe, 2006). The provisions of the proposed act were to re-

establish a market for land and to streamline the issuance of titles and to

promote foreign and domestic investment, to stimulate agricultural

productivity and to generate tax revenue. Value to land was restored.

The process of reform began in 1993 when the government convened a

National Conference on Land Policy and legal reform to spearhead the

42

formulation of a new land policy. As in Mozambique, the consultations

carried out sparked protests against the proposals of the bill and thus when

it was extended to parliament, the bill was withdrawn. However the bill

was reintroduced in September 1995 and passed. (Chinene et al, 1999).

The provision of the Act among other things saw the lifting of the

restriction of ownership of land by foreigners and makes it clear for

Zambia citizens to convert their customary land holdings to statutory

leasehold (Republic of Zambia, 2000).

3.2.4 The Zambian experience of market reforms

The MMD new deal government has not reversed it’s the market policy to

land. The republican president stated that:

It is my hope that traditional rulers will make land available

expeditiously….This will be an opportunity to transform these areas

into industrial and commercial cities with world class physical and

social infrastructure (www.statehouse.gov.zm/)

The impacts of the market reforms in Zambia have been felt. Brown

(2002) states that market based reforms in Zambia have been inequitable,

contentious and confused. Issuance has been skewed towards foreign

investors and prosperous well-connected locals. Few rural villagers are

dimly aware of the land act and the conversion and its technicalities.

Under the provisions of the act, Investors are able to access land in

customary lands through written consent from the chief to hold land under

leasehold system. Planning authorities are required to draw site plans for

the areas and the committee interviews the applicant. Upon success, the

council secretary recommends the allocation of the unnumbered plot to the

ministry of lands. Once the procedure is complete, the plot immediately

43

changes from customary to state land. It is worth noting at this point that

under the current land tenure system, there is no provision for land that has

been converted to state land to be reconverted to customary land. (GRZ,

Land policy document 1996).

Although the act explicitly recognizes and protects customary land rights,

an unstated but crucial assumption underlying the act is that overtime the

conversion of customary to leasehold tenure will open up more land for

investment and diminish the amount of land held under customary tenure.

At present, no land audit has been carried out to determine how much of

customary land has been converted to statutory land (Muchima, 2006).

Most Zambians are also at a disadvantage when it comes to protecting

their land rights because their territorial boundaries are in abstract form.

For example, some villagers in rural areas have found themselves

squatters overnight after their land was converted to private land by

investors.

Case 1

The Times of Zambia on 22nd August 2002 carried a story headlined

“Displaced in my own country?” It is the story of the people of Kasembele

village who woke up one morning and found themselves as squatters.

From 1920, the people of Kasembele village have lived on this land,

planted over 320 mango and guava trees, which they used as a medium of

exchange with people who cultivate their maize. This had been their

livelihood until Thomas Edward Roberts came and ordered the villagers to

vacate, claiming he had bought the farm.

46 Native families were given marching orders claiming they were illegal

squatters. Out of desperation, some families left the village after being

compensated with K 1 Million each (approximately US$340) to begin new

44

livelihood. The results were women and children sleeping at the nearest

graveyard.

Case 2

The post newspaper dated November 14, 2006 had a story of Mayana farm

in chief Mpenzeni’s area. The case involves Sara Towers who bought land

from the ministry of lands in chief Mpenzeni’s area without the consent of

the chief.

Sara Towers issued an eviction notice to the villagers who she framed as

squatting on her land and destroying her land. The chief vowed that he

would rather commit suicide than see his people evicted from the land.

The people in the area have stated that this case is a matter of life and

death and are ready to fire guns than let a white lady evict them from their

land.

Land conflicts such as those in Kasembele Village and Mayana are

occurring all over Zambia, highlighting increasing tensions between

customary and private land rights. These conflicts have been sharpened by

the process of economic reform, including the liberalization of land

markets, which has seen wealthy Zambians and foreign investors buying

up land previously held under customary tenancy by the rural poor

(Brown, 2002).

Common pool resources contribute to the livelihood of most rural

Zambians. Villagers draw their water from rivers or village wells, graze

their livestock on communal pasture, cut their firewood and building

materials from forests and catch fish on shared rivers and lakes (Brown,

2002). Besides this, certain social-cultural aspects such as marriage,

45

inheritance, power, equity and social security are also embodied (Platteau,

2000).

According to Brown (2002), Land conversions have caused a great deal of

conflicts in customary communities and are transforming social and

political relations between chiefs and villagers, between villagers and one

another and between locals and outsiders.

3.3 Legal implementation of market reforms in customary land

The disputes in customary areas pose one important question. Are

customary rights fully recognized by the law?

The following pieces of legislation give recognition of customary tenure.

Chapter 184 section 3(4) of the laws of Zambia states that:

i. The President shall not alienate any land situated in a district or

chiefdom;

ii. The person acquiring land shall consult the chief and the local

authorities in the area in which the land to be allocated

iii. The person acquiring land shall consult any other person or body

whose interest might be affected by the grant and customary rights

to the land recognized under section 7(2) of the lands Act.

Section 7 (2) states that the rights and privileges of any person to hold land

under customary tenure shall be recognized and any such holding under

the customary law applicable to the area in which a person has settled or

intends to settle shall not be construed as an infringement of any provision

of this Act or any other law except for a right or obligation which may

arise under any law.

Section 8 (1) states: Any person who holds land under customary tenure

may convert it into a leasehold tenure not exceeding ninety-nine (99) years

46

on application in the manner prescribed by way of a grant of leasehold by

the President.

Section 8 (2) states: the conversion of rights from a customary tenure shall

have effect only after the approval of the chief and the local authorities in

whose area the land to be converted is situated and in the case of a game

management area and the director of National Parks and Wildlife Services,

the land to be converted shall have been identified by a plan showing the

extent of the land to convert

.

Section 8(3) states that: Except for a right which may arise under any

other law in Zambia, no title other than a right to the use and occupation of

any land under customary tenure claimed by a person, shall be valid unless

it has been confirmed by the chief and a lease granted by the President.

Despite the above legislation to over customary land, customary land

rights have continued to be in conflict with local authorities over land

allocation (Laws of Zambia, volume 12)

3.4 The place of Chiefs in Market based land reforms

In order to successfully implement land reform, the MMD Government

called on traditional rulers to support the reform by releasing more of their

land to the investors and local people that would want to convert title

(Mushinge, 2004). In so doing, investment would be brought to their

areas.

However, many chiefs feel betrayed by outsiders who acquire titles

because they often promise to bring schools, clinics and other benefits to

the local people but seldom fulfill these promises once in possession of

title(Brown,2002;Chileshe,2005).

47

Concerning authorization of title, chiefs have differed over the issuance of

title deeds on customary land. In a Times of Zambia article “Chiefs differ

over land authority”, the house of chiefs disagreed with the motion raised

by the president on who should issue title deeds. One faction suggested

that the chiefs should take over the issuance of title deeds so that they

could be respected as custodians of such land. The other faction however

opposed this suggestion, stating that the chiefs did not have capacity and

could end up giving all their land to investors (Times of Zambia, 2006).

It can be seen from the above argument that the future of customary land

is quite uncertain. The chiefs who are custodians of the land cannot agree

on how reform should be carried out their areas and this has led to disputes

in customary areas.

3.5 The basis for market based land reforms in customary land in Zambia

The major argument on customary tenure has been security in land

holding. The World Bank (2003) argues that customary tenure encumbers

commercialization; it is insecure, lacks certainty and frustrates rural land

markets. This has led to the call for land tenure reform, attempting to

replace customary tenure with a modern secure tenure. Land tenure

security is often associated with Land titling and land registration.

Secure individual tenure, and a free land market, has been promoted in the

belief that they will lead to higher levels of agriculture investment and

productivity and thus provide a firm basis for national growth and

development (Quan, 2000).

Smith (1999) defines title as the degree of control, use and enjoyment that

are recognized and protected by law. It has been argued that lack of title in

customary lands brings about insecurity because rights are not recognized

and protected by law. It is such arguments that led to the implementation

48

of the 1995 Land Act in Zambia. The chiefs and the local people however

object to this notion because for them, communal resources act as an

important social safety net and people have equal access to the resources

that nature has provided (Chinene et al, 1998).

3.6 Conclusion

The debate on security of tenure in customary land has continued to date

without conclusive evidence that customary areas hinder the development

of markets and lessen the ability of rural development to take place

(Brown, 2002). Despite this uncertainty, conversion of customary land

tenure has continued to take place.

The experiences of the reform process have been felt differently in the

various chiefdoms. While others have appreciated the market approach as

the best reform measure, other chiefdoms have had bitter experiences.

The next chapter will now investigate the effects of the reform process in

Chief Chiwala’s area.

49

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the data analysis and findings. It is divided into the

following sections

Section 4.1 is a profile of the case study area.

Section 4.2 presents a restatement of objectives

Section 4.3 presents the survey method including computation of sample

size.

Section 4.5 gives the analytical tools to be used in the data analysis.

Section 4.6 discusses the analysis of processed data.

Section 4.7 is an overview or summary of major findings of the research.

4.1 CASE STUDY PROFILE

4.1.1 Demographic characteristics

Chief Chiwala’s area lies in the peri-urban areas of the Copperbelt Province. The

chiefdom falls under Kafulafuta constituency, in Masaiti District, Ndola rural

(Masaiti District Situational Analysis, 2005).

50

Figure 4.1: Map of study Area

Table 4.1: Population distribution in the survey area

Source: CSO, 2000

4.1.2 Economic Activities

The economic situation of Chief Chiwala’s area depends solely on

subsistence farming and charcoal burning. Major livelihood sources are

farming and gardening as an off-farm activity. Other livelihood sources

include forest activities like beekeeping, pit sawing, furniture making, fruit

collection, caterpillar collecting and mushroom collection. These activities

are done either in the forest reserve areas or in the open land. It is an

Ward Number of

males

Number of

females

Total Total

Households

Chondwe 1,682 1,642 3,324 632

Majaliwa 3,780 3,471 7,251 1,629

Mutaba 6,119 5,740 11,859 2,492

TOTAL 11 581 10,853 22 434 3,753

Source: CSO 2000

51

underdeveloped rural area where people live in small mud, grass-thatched

houses and form homesteads that are scattered near the forest reserve or

along the main road.

The people in these villages rarely carry out economic activities as a

community. Although they get together to discuss their problems and

possible solutions, they are not organized to improve their economic

situation for themselves (Masaiti District situational Analysis, 2005)

4.1.3 Social Organization

The people of chiwala chiefdom are a Lamba speaking ethnic group under

the leadership of senior Chief Chiwala.

Families are usually grouped in homesteads of between 3 to 10

households. These villages are further grouped into villages and are

headed by village headmen.

Plate 4.1: His Royal highness, Senior Chief Chiwala with the Author

Source: Field survey, October 2006

The chiefdom has approximately 600 villages under the guidance of

headmen or ba salutani in lamba. These report to the 25 traditional

counselors located in different areas.They are mainly matrilineal and rules

52

of inheritance favour men as against women. Thus many homesteads are

headed by men coming from the woman’s side of the family.

Figure 4.5: Hierarchy of leadership in the chiefdom

Source: Field survey, 2006

4.2 Objectives restated

The purpose of this research was to carry out a socio-economic assessment

of the Market based land reform process in Zambia.

The primary objective was to determine whether using the market based

approach was the best method of appropriating land in customary areas

with the aid of Chief Chiwala’s area as a case study.

The secondary objectives were therefore to investigate:

1) Administrative procedures followed in implementing market based

activities in customary land and whether they are followed

2) What economic benefits have trickled to the local people as a

result of allowing outsiders to buy land in chiefdoms?

3) The social effects of conversion of tenure on the livelihood of the

local people.

Senior Chief Chiwala

25 Traditional councilors

Headmen

Villagers

53

4.3 Survey method

The sample size that was used was 100. To arrive at 100, a series of

calculations were done using the formula as follows:

Source: scheaffer, 1979

Therefore with a total population of 3753 households:

N=3753 B=0.098 π=0.5

Sample n= 3753 (0.5) (1-0.5)

(3753-1) (0.098)²/4 + (0.5) (0.5)

Sample n=938.25/9.25 =101.43≈100

Because the area in question is a village area with scattered homesteads, it

was resolved instead that a village consisting of about 100 households be

adopted to make the collection of data easier. Therefore a village zone

with an estimate of 102 households and 3 main villages was selected.

These households are grouped into 30 homesteads. It was further

resolved that heads of homesteads be used, thus 30 heads of homesteads

were a representative of the 100 households.

Sample size required to estimate p with a bound on the error estimation, B: n= Npq (N-1)D + pq Where q=1-p and D=B²/4 n=sample size p=π N=Population B=Error bound

54

4.4 Problems encountered during the research

4.4.1 Households

Households were quite suspicious about the study because of the ongoing

disputes over land in the area

The research was carried out at the onset of the farming season thus some

house owners could not be interviewed as they had left for their fields.

Permission from the chief to carry out the survey could not easily be

obtained because the chief does not reside at the palace.

4.4.2 Farm owners

Farms are located far away from the transport points making it very

difficult to access them.

Some farm owners are absentee landlords thus it was difficult to obtain the

information needed.

4.4.3 Local Authority

Masaiti District Council is a rural council that faces lots of challenges

including information management. It was difficult to obtain sampling

frames and maps for the research.

4.5 Methodology of Analysis

The statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for the

analysis. SPSS was able to offer the analysis required in terms of each

variable being investigated and cross-tabulations showing relationships of

certain variables. The package was mainly used for the village or

household questionnaire.

55

The other data sets were analyzed and presented using simple description

and report method.

4.6 Research findings

The following were the analysis and findings following the collection of

data. The three respondent types i.e. Villagers, Farmers and the local

Authority are dealt with differently.

4.6.1 Local Authority findings

4.6.1.1 Procedure of land allocation in customary areas for outsiders

The Local Authority clearly stated that the Legislation concerning land

allocation (Land Act 1995) did not discriminate land ownership. Every

citizen has the right to settle wherever they wished provided that all

requirements were met.

The procedure that is used when a non villager seeks land is as follows:

Figure 4.6: Land Allocation procedure

Source: Field Survey, 2006

The land seeker obtains written consent from the chief

Ministry of Agriculture maps out the boundaries and submits to local Authority

Local Authority approves plans and recommends for title to lands commissioner

Settles in the area without title

56

In the procedure of land allocation whether with title or without title, the

chief has no authority to sell land but merely receives tokens of

appreciation from the applicants.

4.6.1.2 Benefits to the chiefdom

Once title has been granted by the Local Authority, the new farm owner

has no obligations to the chiefdom except out of courtesy to the chief.

However, the benefit is supposed to be derived from the Land

Development fund which provides for consideration fee to be paid to the

chiefdom and to the local authority. Currently, there is no procedure to

determine this fee thus a standard fee of only K10, 000.00(Ten thousand

Kwacha) is paid to the local authority.

Furthermore, the local authority does not have direct implementation of

the land development fund for customary areas. This means that there’s no

economic consideration for customary areas in the land conversion

process.

4.6.1.2 Has the market reform achieved its aim?

Final conclusions from the local authority are that the market land reform

has not achieved its intended purpose of fair redistribution of land while

developing customary areas.

4.6.2 Findings from Focus Group discussions

Two major focus group discussions were conducted during the research.

The aim was to identify potential respondents and also to draw out certain

aspects that would be necessary to include in the interview schedule. It

was noted that the villagers were freer to discuss in groups than as

individuals.

57

Group one

The first group consisted of 10 members i.e. 8 women and 2 men. This

particular group comprised villagers bordering Zambezi Portland Cement

PLC. The following were the issues raised:

Shortage of farming land

The villagers complained that the new company bought large tracts of land

including land which they had been cultivating on for years. This meant

that they had little land to cultivate more food for their families and also

for sale.

Plate 4.2: Prohibitions by Private land owners

Source: Field survey, 2006

Besides Zambezi Portland Cement, they were also aware that their chief

was allocating land to abamapension( urban dwellers), causing more

insecurity about their land.

Title to land

Because of the current influx of urban dwellers seeking land in the area,

the villagers were no longer comfortable with their kind of tenure.

58

However majority of them could not afford to acquire statutory land title

as they lacked finances to do so.

Relationship with the chief

The group unanimously agreed that their relationship with the chief and

headmen was getting bad because of the increase in land grabbing. The

group disclosed that the chief rarely consulted them about giving land to

outsiders and thus they felt betrayed. The law provides that chiefs consult

their subjects who are likely to be affected by the allocation of land to

outsiders.

Relationship with new farmers

It was expressed that the new farmers worsened the situation by not

fulfilling their promises of accelerating development in the area.

When seeking for land, the seekers promise to employ people with good

pay, improve roads, and help the community to access fertilizers, build

clinics and schools for the children. When land is given to them, they do

not fulfill their promises but end up fencing their farms so that no one can

reach them.

It was highlighted for example that farmers made the villagers walk long

distances because they no longer allow them to use their usual paths

through the farms.

Views on the market based reform in the area

The villagers expressed concern about the current urban land deficit but

stated that they should not suffer the consequences of urban land

shortages.

59

It was also stated that the market approach to land distribution was unfair

on the poor who could not afford to buy land. The approach could lead to

the poor being landless, while the rich accumulated more land. The people

wondered where their grand children would live if more people bought

land in their area

The final remarks were that money transactions on land were not

acceptable in customary land and were against the traditions of villagers.

This is because it is making the people lose trust and respect for their chief

and increasing tension in the village.

Focus group 2

The group comprised 6 women from saidimujala area near the new farms

The aim of the discussion was to get views of women on the land reform

process.

The major issues raised were similar to focus group 1. However an

important aspect of enclosure of common pool resources was raised.

Focus group 2 named their major shared resources as forests with mango

trees, mushrooms and other wild fruits.

It was observed in the group that since people started buying land; these

important resources can not be easily accessed because the land no longer

belongs to the community.

Their opinion on the market reform was similar to group one. The market

reform was increasing insecurity of tenure and failed to fulfill the aim of

developing customary area. However, the group suggested that if it was

the only way of distributing land, then the villagers should have the power

to demand for certain things from the urban seekers before they occupy

their area.

60

It was also suggested that farmers should not apply for areas where

villagers obtained common resources but should settle in areas outside the

reach of villagers.

4.6.3 Findings from the homesteads

4.6.3.1 Sex of homestead owner

From the total of 30 homesteads, the respondents were distributed as

follows:

Table 4.2: Sex of respondent

Sex Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Male 16 53.3 53.3 53.3

Female 14 46.7 46.7 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2006

There was an almost equal balance in the gender of respondents giving a

balanced view of the response from both sexes. However, in terms of the

ownership of the land, the results showed biasness to men.

Upon cross tabulation of marital status and head of homestead, the survey

showed the following results.

Table 4.3: Marital status of heads of homesteads

Status Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent

Married 19 63.3 63.3

Widowed 8 26.7 90.0

Single 3 10.0 100.0

Total 30 100.0

Source: Field survey, 2006

61

4.6.3.2 Method of land acquisition

The type of land acquisition is one of the key aspects of any tenure

system. Therefore, it was important to investigate how people acquire land

in the chiefdom. Survey results showed that only two methods exist in the

chiefdom i.e. directly through the chief or through inheritance. The table

below summarizes the mode of acquisition from the 30 respondents.

Table 4.4: Methods of land acquisition

Source: Field survey, 2006

From the survey results, it can be noted that although the villagers perform

their economic activities as individual families or homesteads, none of

them have individualized ownership of land. The common method of land

acquisition is through inheritance while others obtain it directly from the

chief.

The most probable reason could have been that the villagers are not aware

that they can convert the customary title of their land with the permission

of the chief. It was therefore necessary to also investigate the level of

awareness of tenure conversion among the villagers. From the survey, the

following results were obtained:

Table 4.5: Tenure conversion awareness

Source: Field survey,2006

Method Frequency Percent

Valid

Percent

Cumulative

Percent

Inherited from parents 17 53.3 56.7 56.7

Given by chief 13 46.7 43.3 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Awareness Frequency Percent Valid Percent

Cumulative

Percent

Aware 26 86.7 86.7 86.7

Not aware 4 13.3 13.3 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

62

From Table 4.5 above, it can be deduced that 86.7% of the villagers are

aware that land can be converted to individualized parcels. About 13.3%

still maintained that at were not aware that land can be converted to

statutory land in the chiefdom.

The 26 who showed awareness of the conversion process has varying

reasons for not converting their land. The reasons were summarized as:

i. Lack of finances to convert their land.

ii. Land was a gift from the chief thus it would be impolite to

convert it.

iii. It would be against the social norms of the village.

iv. Converting the land would require paying of ground rent to the

Government and they were not willing and able to do so.

4.6.3.3 Productivity of villagers

It is essentially the objective of Market based land reform to increase

productivity among rural farmers, thereby boosting the economic

livelihood of the village. Farm productivity was therefore a priority in

assessing the economic impact of reform in the chiefdom.

From the survey conducted, most homesteads engage in maize cultivation

as a source of food. Other homesteads also have gardens for vegetables

and tomatoes.

However, although labour and farm inputs are an issue in the chiefdom;

the size of the land determines how much food will be cultivated.

A survey of the size of land parcels per homestead was carried out.

The sizes of land parcels varied as follow Table 4.6.

63

Table 4.6: Sizes of land parcels among village households

Size Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Large 3 10.0 10.0 10.0

Medium 6 20.0 20.0 30.0

Small 13 43.3 43.3 73.3

very

small 8 26.7 26.7 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Land in the chiefdom is often measured in lima, a local terminology.

1 lima=50m × 50m Categories of size of land

Size Category

Below 3 lima Very small

Between 3 lima to 5 lima Small

Between 5 lima to 8 lima Medium

Above 8 lima Large

Source: Data Compiled from field survey,2006

From Table 4.6 above, it was found that about 43% of the homesteads

have small-sized parcels representing the majority. 20% of the homesteads

were considered to have medium tracts of land. 26.7% of homesteads are

considered to have very small parcels of land and only 10% have large

tracts of land.

Having determined the sizes of land, it was imperative to also determine

how many of the village homesteads have surplus food for sell. The

following results were obtained:

64

Table 4.7: Sell of produce among homesteads

Sell of produce Frequency Percent Valid Percent

Cumulative

Percent

Sell 8 26.7 26.7 26.7

Don’t sell 17 56.7 56.7 83.3

Sell occasionally 5 16.7 16.7 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Source: Field survey,2006

The market reform process is supposed to improve the productivity among

the village communities. However, the results of this particular village,

indicate that about half of the homesteads have do not have surplus food

for sell while only 26.7% confidently agree that they have surplus to sell.

Other homesteads sell their produce occasionally when their harvest allow.

The reasons for low productivity are varied.

A cross tabulation of size of land and the selling of produce gave the

following results:

Table 4.8: Size of land and selling of produce Cross tabulation

sell of produce Total

sell don’t sell occasionally

Large 2 1 0 3

Medium 2 2 2 6

Small 4 7 2 13

Very small 0 7 1 8

Total 8 17 5 30

Source; Field survey, 2006

It can be noted that size of land is a reason for not selling of produce by

majority of homesteads. Land allocation in the chiefdom has been affected

by the reform process. The villagers complained that since buying of land

began, priority is usually given to those with money. Those without

65

money are given smaller parcels of land. This allegation was also

investigated upon and the results obtained were as follows:

Table 4.9: Size of land and Method of acquisition Cross tabulation

method of acquisition Total

Size of land inherited given by the chief

Large 1 2 3

Medium 5 1 6

Small 10 3 13

very small 1 7 8

Total 17 13 30

Source: Field data, 2006

The other reason given by respondents was the lack of Agriculture inputs

such as fertilizers and seeds. Not all the farmers can afford to buy fertilizer

for their crops; therefore, their yields are too low to sell their produce.

4.6.3.4 Renting of land

The hope that villagers will be able to rent their land is yet another

objective of land reform. Renting of land can become an important source

of income for village communities. It was therefore paramount to establish

this important aspect of the village community. The following were the

findings:

Table 4.10: Number of people renting out land

Rent Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Yes 11 36.7 36.7 36.7

No 16 53.3 53.3 90.0

Sometimes 3 10.0 10.0 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Souce: Data compiled from field survey, 2006

66

It was observed again that size of land was the determining factor in

renting of land. This was proved by correlation of variables i.e size of land

and renting of land.

Table 4.11: size of land and renting of land Cross tabulation

renting of land

yes no occasionally Total

Large 4 0 0 4

Medium 5 5 0 10

Small 2 5 2 9

size of

land

very small 0 7 0 7

Total 11 17 2 30

Source: Compiled by author from field work

It was found in the survey that the villagers rent out land to people from

the nearby townships such as Ndeke and Kabushi. These urban dwellers

come to villagers during farming seasons to solicit for land to rent.

Villagers with larger parcels usually rent out their land. However, it was

also observed that those without agriculture inputs tend to rent out their

land to gain some form of income.

4.6.3.5 Employment

Employment was also considered to be an important aspect of not only the

economic aspect but also the social relations with new farmers in the

chiefdom. It is also the hope of market reform that villagers would be able

to have extra income from employment.

Table 4.12 shows the employment status of homesteads.

67

Table 4.12: Level of employment

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Full time 4 13.3 13.3 13.3

Piece work 8 26.7 26.7 40.0

None 18 60.0 60.0 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Source: Data compiled from field survey, 2006

Results indicate that only 4 heads of homesteads have villagers with full

time employment. 18 out of the 30 heads of homesteads reported to have

had no form of employment. However, it was also found that other

homesteads have people who are not fully employed but work on part time

basis.

Some of the reasons for not being employed were given as follows:

i. Not enough manpower for their own fields. Some respondent stated

that it would not make sense to work at the farms when their own

fields needed more manpower.

ii. Farmers usually employ only one person and the rest are hired

during farming seasons.

iii. Conditions of service are not conducive. The villagers complained

that some farmers do not pay them agreed amounts. Some farmers

just pay form of pamelas (small packets of mealie meal. Therefore,

there was no motivation to work on the farms.

However, some respondents commented that not all farmers were bad.

Others offer good salaries and help the villagers when they have no food

i.e. in form of food for work. Thus from the survey a few indicated that

they had fairly good relations with farmers.

68

Table 4.13: Relationship with farmers

Relationship Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Fair 5 16.7 16.7 16.7

Bad 18 60.0 60.0 76.7

don’t know 7 23.3 23.3 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Source: Field survey, 2006

Some respondents did not have a say over their relationship because they

rarely had contact with farmers.

4.6.3.5 Market reform: a gender perspective

Women are often the most affected by land reform processes. This is

because even their own traditions favour men against women in the

distribution of land (Nsemiwe, 2006).

In the research, a few variables were used to determine the livelihoods of

women during the reform process in the chiefdom.

Gender and size of land: It was observed that women headed homesteads

had smaller parcels of land compared to men headed homesteads

.

Table 4.14: Head of homestead and size of land Cross tabulation

Source: Field survey, 2006

It can be observed from the results that women headed households have

generally smaller parcels of land compared to their male counterparts.

Given this scenario, it can also be concluded that women will most likely

Sex size of land Total

Large medium Small very small

Male 3 5 9 3 20

Female 0 1 4 5 10

Total 3 6 13 8 30

69

not be able to rent out their land or sell their produce because of the size of

their land.

The survey also observed that men had better chances of getting

employment as compared to women.

Table 4.15: Head of homestead versus employment status employment status Total

Sex of head of home full time piece work None

Male 4 5 11 20

Female 0 3 7 10

Total 4 8 18 30

Data compiled from field survey, 2006

This was consolidated by the fact that, most respondents were women

although the heads of the homesteads were male. The women remain to

look after the homestead while the men look for work. However, the

women headed homesteads indicated that it was difficult for them to

compete with men in looking for full time employment. However, women

can engage in piecework occasionally.

4.6.3.6 Views on the market land reform process

From the results given in figure , most of the villagers are aware of

market land reform in their area. The views concerning the land reform are

varied. The results below show the mixed feelings of land reform in the

chiefdom.

Table 4.16: Views on market land reforms

Views Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent

Happy 5 16.7 16.7 16.7

Not happy 23 76.7 76.7 93.3

Indifferent 2 6.7 6.7 100.0

Total 30 100.0 100.0

Source: Field survey, 2006

70

The survey results indicate that 76% of the villagers are not happy with

the conversion of tenure process. The reasons for this unhappiness were

given as follows:

i. The process was making villagers lose their land to urban dwellers.

The villagers worry that their children who are neither at school

nor have hope for employment will suffer more because they will

not have enough land to cultivate food.

ii. Although they are aware about the conversion of title, it still remains

a fact that conversion will only benefit the rich since villagers

cannot afford to convert.

iii. They are not consulted about giving part of their land to others; land

is simply grabbed from them.

iv. Farmers were being allocated land in areas that have communal

resources such as wild fruits and streams for gardening.

v. The new farmers have done nothing to improve the state of roads,

schools, clinics or even help village farmers in the acquisition of

fertilizers.

vi. Although some farmers allow villagers to draw water from their

hand pumps, villagers can only draw water before 07:00hrs in the

morning and after 17:00hrs in the evening.

While others were quite indifferent about the process, others were happy

that urban people were coming in their areas. The reasons were given as

follows:

The farmers will help set up cooperatives where even the rural people can

benefit.

There was no hope for the villagers to develop on their own areas. Urban

dwellers can help them to develop.

71

Piecework from farmers helps them in difficult times. When villagers have

no more food in their homes, piecework helps them to acquire some

money to buy food.

4.6.4 Findings from the Chief

An interview with the chief brought out the following findings:

4.6.4.1 General land administration

The chief is guided by the village act of 1971 which provides for the

establishment of villages within the chiefdom. In order to effectively

manage his area, the chiefdom has been divided into 25 catchment areas.

4.6.4.2 Land allocation to subjects

The procedure of land allocation to villagers follows the same pattern as

other chiefdoms in Zambia.

A villager seeking land approaches the headman and presents his request.

The headman will look for an area which is vacant within his area and if

available, the person is granted land. Once the procedure is completed, the

villager granted land will present a gift to the, chief who is the owner of

the land .There are no money transactions when allocating land to

subjects.

However, many villagers still access land without the chiefs’ consent

through inheritance from family members.

4.6.4.3 Land allocation to outsiders

According to the chief, the rate of outsiders seeking land in his area is

about 50 to 100 requests per year.

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An outsider will approach either a headman or visit the chief directly.

Usually, outsiders have particular areas in mind as they approach the

chief.

It is the duty of the headman to verify if that parcel of land is occupied by

the villagers or not. Once the headman verifies, the request is submitted to

the chief for approval.

The process of approval is basically a short interview with the applicant.

The chief seeks to determine the personal details for the applicant thereby

establishing the quality of the applicant. Depending on the size sought for,

the chief may personally give a demarcation of the parcel of land. If the

area is relatively small, the chief may approve the headmen’s proposal.

When the approval process is complete, the chief signs a written letter or

document of application prepared by the applicant.

As is the case with villagers, the chief does not sell the land but may

receive money as a token of appreciation for the land given.

4.6.4.4 Benefits from allocating land to outsiders

The chief stated that the initial intention of improving customary areas by

allowing outsiders to settle in customary areas was not wrong in itself.

However, the process has raised a number of disputes in his area.

Some outsiders have been faithful and have benefited the chiefdom, but

others simply get land and resale it at a higher price.

It was also alluded to that others come with a lot of promises to improve

roads, build schools and clinics and generally help the villagers. But so far

none of the promises have been fulfilled.

73

Commenting on the level of infrastructure, it was stated that infrastructure

was very poor in his chiefdom.

4.6.4.5 Comment on market based approach to land reform

The chief fears that his people will remain landless and will not be able to

access important resources in the chiefdom. This is because of the high

level of corruption in the process of obtaining land.

The chief noted that other applicants bribe his headmen to extend the

chief’s demarcations. Unfortunately, others extend into villagers land and

thus a source of dispute.

Final remarks from the chief were that customary land should remain

customary land and the people seeking for land should not obtain title for

it. This would offer more security of tenure for village communities.

74

4.6.5 Findings from the farmers

The Market based approach to land reform is an approach that seeks to

make land available for those in need of land, while improving the

livelihoods of the local people.

The following were the findings from some of the farmers that have

settled in chief chiwala’s area.

4.6.5.1 Land acquisition and size of land

The survey established the following results from the farms surveyed.

Table 4.17: Farm size and method of Acquisition

Name of farm Method of acquisition Size of land

Farm 42 Applied through Ministry of

Agriculture

10 hactares

Bweupe Applied through Ministry of

Agriculture

10 hactares

Farm 33 Bought from the chief 20 hactares

Polido Applied through the chief 20 hactares

Mpombo Bought from the chief 10 hactares

Musa Bought from another farmer 8 hactares

Source: compiled from field survey, 2004

From the results given, it can be noted, that directly seeking consent from

the chief is not the only method of acquiring land in the chiefdom.

From the sizes of land, it can also be noted that titled farm plots in

comparison with villagers farming plots are relatively large.

75

4.6.5.2 Productivity

The major economic activity was found to be maize cultivation and

represented 100% of the sample. 2 out of the 6 respondents engage in

gardening vegetables and other plants like cassava and sweet potatoes.

Only one respondent had an extra activity of chicken rearing.

Table 4.18: Activities of Farmers in the Chiefdom

Name of farm Commercial activity Other activities

Farm 42 Maize cultivation Vegetable gardening

Bweupe Maize cultivation, Chicken

rearing

sweetpotatoes,cassava,

vegetables

Farm 33 Maize cultivation None

Polido Maize cultivation None

Mpombo Maize cultivation None

Muma Maize cultivation None

Source: compiled from field survey, 2006

4.6.5.3 Market for farm products

From the results obtained, all the farmers have sufficient market for their

produce. 4 out of the 7 farmers sell their maize to the Food Reserve

Agency (FRA), while the other 3 respondents make their own private

arrangements. The farmer who rears chickens supplies the chickens to

restaurants in Ndola town.

All the farmers indicated a high market for their produce.

4.6.5.4 Benefits to the villagers

Employment

All farmers alluded to a positive benefit of their presence to the villagers.

This positive benefit was seen in view of employment opportunities for

76

the villagers. During farming season, farmers usually employ villagers to

work on part time basis, giving them some form of income.

Provision of basic infrastructure

4 out of 6 farmers submitted that they have also helped the villagers in

providing water through their boreholes. Water is a major challenge in the

chiefdom.

It was however noted that besides provision of water, the farmers have not

improved the level of infrastructure in the chiefdom. The farmers also

complained of the bad state of roads in the chiefdom but had no capacity

to improve the roads.

Farming inputs

Farm 33 submitted that the village community surrounding his farm has

learnt new farming techniques. This has enabled them to produce more

food. The villagers who work on his farm learn better farm techniques and

teach others in the village.

In terms of farming inputs, the farmers stated that it was difficult and

expensive to help the villagers because of inadequate finances. It was

emphasized that the Government should help the villagers in provision of

farming inputs.

4.6.5.5 Comments on market reform process

The farmers all responded that the process is good because it will help to

reduce urban landlessness. It was also stated that rural land is too vast

hence needed to be explored for development. However, the process of

land acquisition should be revised to ensure transparency and avoid

disputes with villagers.

77

4.7 Summary of major finding

Market land reforms in Zambia have been received with mixed feelings. In

the research area, the views on the land reform indicate a conflict of

interests. From the analysis of data, the following were the major findings

of the socio economic impact of market based land reform in chief

chiwala’s chiefdom:

Land allocation procedures are inconsistent

Procedures in land allocation are unclear leading to loopholes in the

system. The results from the farmers indicate that outsiders can acquire

land even without consulting the chief. It is no wonder then that disputes

have arisen in several chiefdoms.

There is no strategy to develop rural areas through reforms

The process of market land reform was embarked on without setting out

strategies of developing customary areas. It therefore follows that

customary areas are not likely to improve their status even when land is

being appropriated to others. While it is being appreciated that customary

areas are a prime source of land for development, it would not be fair that

these areas do not benefit from the apparent loss of their land.

Reforms have increased insecurity of tenure among villagers

Survey results indicate that almost 80% of villagers are not happy with the

reforms. This stems from the fact that land belonging to villagers is at a

high risk of being grabbed and converted to private use. The debate on

security tenure in customary areas has always been concluded that

customary tenure is insecure and discourages investment. This research

established that insecurity of tenure has been as a result of external factors

78

such as the apparent loss of land to outside applicants. Before this,

villagers were happy and secure with their customary arrangements.

Conflicts have resulted to loss of respect for leaders

The fact that the villagers are not consulted in the conversion process has

increased disrespect for leaders. Villagers feel betrayed by their leaders

because they would rather serve outsiders instead of their people. A lot of

respondents felt that their leaders were corrupt and the buying of land by

outsiders has increased desire for more money on the side of tradition

leaders. It was commented that the leaders will end up selling all the land

in the villages.

Influence of reforms has led to desire to rent out land

Money transactions on land have led to villagers developing initiatives of

renting underused land to gain some income. Villagers now realize that

since land has value, idle land can be used to gain income through renting

it out to people from nearby townships.

No meaningful benefit to villagers in terms of employment

While the aspect labour on their own farms is paramount, it was also

observed that not much of employment opportunities have been created by

the farmers and investors in the area.

In particular, Zambezi Portland Cement in their Environmental Impact

Assessment stated that they would employ 300 villagers on part time and

247 on full time basis as a way of giving back to the rural community

(Zambezi Portland Cement, 2005).

During the survey, it noted that priority was not given to the villagers.

Instead people from the nearby townships had benefited.

79

From the farmers, it was observed that at most 2 villagers were employed

at full time basis.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed field data and presented field data in line with

research questions in chapter one. The next chapter will now revisit the

objectives and compare with the findings in chapter 4. The chapter will

further make final conclusions and give recommendations for areas of

further study.

80

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions and Recommendation

This study assessed the socio-economic impact of the market based

reform to land in Zambia. From the findings in chapter four, it is now

imperative to look at the main findings and draw conclusions, before

making recommendations.

The following were the major findings in chapter four:

i. Unclear procedure of land allocation in customary land

ii. No strategy for development planning in customary land

iii. Increased insecurity of tenure

iv. Villagers have not been able to convert their land even

when they are aware of the reform

v. Social disputes between traditional leaders and subjects.

vi. renting of land has become common among households

Having outlined the major findings of the research, it is necessary to

evaluate the research questions and objectives with regard to the major

findings.

5.1 Research questions and answers

Are village communities aware of the market based approach to land

reform in their areas?

The study brought to the fore the fact that majority of the villagers are

actually aware about the conversion of title from customary land to

statutory land. It was found that villagers were also aware that land has

value and it can be bought or sold at market prices.

81

Have customary communities benefited from market based land

reform in their areas?

It was established that the market based approach has achieved varied

results but generally, it has not benefited the chiefdom.

Socially it has led to an increase in disputes between traditional leaders

and their subjects, a factor that could lead to disintegration of village

societies. When a community loses respect for its leaders, the rules laid

down to govern the community cannot easily be followed.

The loss of land could mean a reduction in large homesteads which is a

principle feature of village communities. Furthermore, women headed

households feel more disadvantaged since their livelihood depends mainly

on farming and collection of forest products.

Economically, some villagers no longer have access to certain resources

that act as social safety nets in hunger periods. Loss of cultivable land to

urban dwellers or outsiders has led to reduction in productivity of village

homesteads as not enough land is available to cultivate food for their

consumption and for sale.

The level of infrastructure in the chiefdom has also not improved since the

implementation of the Land Act, 1995. Farmers and investors have

acquired land in the chiefdom but have not helped to raise the level of

infrastructure. The area is still characterized by poor roads, inadequate

water facilities, limited clinics and schools. To the villagers, this is a

betrayal and hence it is feel that no good thing can come from the

investors.

However, the renting of land has been seen as a positive benefit. The fact

that people can utilize dormant land by renting it out and gaining income

is an indication that to a small extent, the reform has contributed to the

village economy.

82

Is the market based approach the best method for appropriating and in

customary areas?

What has been noted in the study is that the principles of market based

land reform are not bad in themselves. However, the method of

implementation has marred the objectives of the reform.

The fact that administrative procedures are not clear has led to disparities

in land acquisition, thus a source of disputes. It was observed for instance

that some farmer were able to acquire land without seeking permission

from the chief, while another submitted that they bought they land from

the chief.

Lack of clarity in the procedures has also led to evictions of villagers from

their land. As in other customary areas, the rate of squatting on farms has

increased because indigenous people are not considered when allocating

land.

Another factor to consider is the inability of villagers to convert their

customary titles to statutory title. Since the cost of conversion cannot be

borne by the villagers, it therefore follows that the approach will

marginalize poor people from accessing the so called secure tenure.

It can thus be concluded that the market based land reform in the chiefdom

is not the best way as it lacks strategy of ensuring that indigenous people

are not negatively affected by the reform. A tenure system ought to

increase social welfare, equity and justice by protecting the poor who

cannot protect their own interest.

5.2 Evaluation of the Research model in relation to survey results

In chapter 2, an adaptation model for the evolving of customary land to

meet current socio-economic needs was proposed. This section is

83

dedicated to the assessing the potential of the model in relation to the

results that were obtained from the field.

The main characteristics of the model were:

1. Characteristics of the land

2. Characteristics of the community

5.2.1 Characteristics of the land

Physical

It was established in the survey that the area is characterized by fertile

soils suitable for maize cultivation and other crops and vegetables.

Economic

Demand for land in the chiefdom is very high. Although actual statistics

were not given, it was approximated that 50-100 outsiders seek for land in

the chiefdom. The demand for land by villagers within the chiefdom is

also very high due to expansion of households. It is this high demand from

both the villagers and outsiders that has led to land disputes within the

chiefdom.

Chief Chiwala’s area extends from Minsundu to Mkushi and also borders

the Democratic Republic of Congo. Supply of readily cultivable land is

limited within the chiefdom. Although the actual area is unlimited, it is

difficult to settle in the remote areas because the land is not cleared and

covered with thick forests. Thus at present, the economic supply of land is

limited. Applying this to the model, tenure is thus likely to change

automatically because of changes in the supply and demand of land.

Legal characteristics

The chiefdom is mainly governed by local rules and customs of the

people. However, the chiefdom has a forest gazetted under protected

areas. This forest is known as Kansanfwe forest reserve.

84

In the above discussion, the main characteristic of the land that can cause

an evolution of tenure is the demand and supply of land.

5.2.2 Characteristics of the community

Land Administration

The Chief is the custodian of the land and governs it on behalf of the

president. According to the chief, land allocation procedures are typical to

any chiefdom. It is not a merit based system of allocation because anyone

is entitled to land in the chiefdom.

From the findings it was observed that land parcels allocated by the chief

to his villagers are smaller compared to those acquired by inheritance.

Also, families on land acquired from the chief are smaller in size

compared to homesteads on inherited land. This could indicate a gradual

change of family grouping from larger homesteads to smaller ones; a

change in tenure from very communal to individual family land

ownership.

Economic characteristic

The villagers are peasant farmers growing mainly maize and vegetables.

Produce is often sold to the Food Reserve Agency. Another form of

activity observed is the brewing of illicit beer.

Because of insufficient farming inputs, other homesteads have idle lands

during farming seasons. The resolution has been to rent out part of their

land to urban dwellers. This also marks a change in the economic

characteristic of the community. This desire to rent can lead to a desire for

a more secure tenure system whether individual or grouped.

85

Demographic characteristics

The annual growth rate in the area is 1.2 %( CSO, 2000) and the total

population of households is 3753 households. However, the influx of

urban dwellers has led to fluctuations in the population size. This change

has implications in the tenure system in that, rising populations have led to

rising demand.

It can be noted that both variables i.e. Land and the community, have

undergone changes that may cause an evolution of tenure system in the

chiefdom.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be noted that much of the change in

characteristics has been induced by external factors i.e. demand for land

from outsiders which has a direct effect on the supply of land.

It is no wonder that the reform process has been characterized by disputes

in the area. When policies have been imposed on local people instead of

allowing policy to change internally, the resulting effects are social

disintegration of communities marked by loss of respect for leaders.

The introduction of market reforms on the people without consultations

and patience has indeed not benefited Chief Chiwala’s area.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations were

made in order to effectively achieve fair distribution of land.

The concept of rural land management boards should be implemented in

chiefdoms to allow chiefs to effectively manage their areas .Rural

management board should be compose of the chief, village

representatives and representatives from district councils. This would

86

achieve transparency as land seekers would have to be approved by the

board and not the chief alone.

The question of securing land tenure, particularly for the most economic

and socially vulnerable groups should be taken seriously

Insecurity of tenure among villagers has been accelerated by the land

reform process. There is need to reduce this insecurity by finding

affordable title to villagers whose areas have already been affected by the

reform.

Customary areas should be allowed to evolve with minimal government

intervention. However, it is the role of the Government to provide basic

infrastructure. The land development fund should be implemented at

district level to allow districts councils to plan for their areas.

5.3 Areas of further research

The subject of land is an ever evolving matter and calls for further study in

various dimensions. This study has brought out the effects of land reform

on customary communities. Based on the findings, the following have

been recommended for further research:

Pro-poor land titling as a concept should be thoroughly studied to see how

it can be implemented within chiefdoms.

Research should also be done to explore various ways of using the land

development fund to benefit customary areas.

As a matter of priority, land data systems in customary land should be

studied. Any successful land policy should be based on reliable data, on

access to and distribution of land. Currently, no data systems exist to

monitor distribution of land in customary areas.

87

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APPENDIX 1

Homestead Interview Schedule Name of respondent……….. …………………. Age…………………. Sex………………………….. Marital status…… Number of family……………. 1. Do you own land?................................. 2. How did you acquire it?

……………………………………………………………………………

3. Are there any other means of acquiring land besides the one mentioned? ………………………………………………………………………………………

4. What is the size of your plot?....................................... 5. How do you determine your boundary?.................................................

6. What do you use the land for?

……………………………………………………………………………… 7. Do you sell your produce?

……………………………………………………………………………… 8. Do you have sufficient market for your produce? 9. What is your average income?...........................................................

10. Are you able to sell your land?

Yes No

Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.

93

11. What is your understanding of the rules regarding transfer of land in your area?

12. Can you buy or sell land? .............................................................................................................................. 13. Can you rent out your land? ………………………………………………………………………………… 14. Can you use your land to get a loan? ………………………………………………………………………………… 15. Are you aware that outsiders can buy land in your area? ………………………………………………………………………………… 16. Are you happy with this arrangement?

……………………………………………………………………………… 17. Are you consulted when people from outside want to settle or invest in

your area? Yes No

18. How would you rate your relationship with the investors in your area? ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

19. What in your opinion have the investors done to improve your area? 1…………………………………………………………………………. 2…………………………………………………………………………. 3………………………………………………………………………….

20. In nothing in 15, what are your expectations? 1…………………………………………………………………………. 2………………………………………………………………………

21. Do investors offer employment to the local people? 22. Are the conditions of service favorable?

23. What resources do you share as a community?

1……………………. 2……………………. 3…………………….

24. Are there any rules that you follow in accessing or using these resources? Explain…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

25. Are there cases of enclosure of community resources by investors? Yes No

26. If yes in 24, how has it affected your livelihood?......................................... ………………………………………………………………………………… 27. Is the market land reform the best way of sharing land?

94

Appendix 2

Interview schedule with the Local Authority

1. What is the area extent of chief Chiwala,s area.

………………………………………………………………………………

2. What are the legal boundaries?

…………………………………………………………………………………

3. What is the estimated population of the chiefdom?

..............................................................................................................................

4. What are the major economic activities of the chiefdom?

.............................................................................................................................

5. What is the current demand of land in the area?

………………………………………………………………………………

6. What is the procedure of land allocation in chiefdom?

……………………………………………………………………………

7. How many investors have acquired land in chief chiwala’s chiefdom?

8. What is the current state of infrastructure in the area? Number of schools,

clinics?

9. How many if any, have been built by investors?

Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.

95

10. Would you say the investors or farmers have contributed to the economy

of the chiefdom?

..............................................................................................................................

............................................................................................................................

11. What is your role as a Local Authority in the reform process?

12. Is the market approach the best way of appropriation of land in customary

areas?

96

Appendix 3

1. What is the population estimate in your

area?..............................................................

2. How many Villages are in your area?.........................................

3. What are the livelihood sources of the chiefdom?

…………………………………………………………………………

4. What economic challenges does your area face?

…………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………

5. Are there any social challenges in the chiefdom?

…………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………..

6. How do you value land in this area?

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

7. What are the rules governing land allocation?

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

8. Who formulates these rules?........................................................

9. Can land be sold in your area?.........................................................

10. Do people use land as collateral to access finances?........................

Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.

97

11. What is the estimated demand for land in the chiefdom from

outsiders?

…………………………………………………

12. Are there any investors or outsiders in the area?..............................

13. What is the criterion of allocating land to outsiders?

…………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………

14. Do they convert the interest from customary to private?..............

15. Are there any specific areas that are of interest to both outsiders

and local people?.............................................................................

16. How are these areas treated?...........................................................

17. Who determines the land extent and boundaries for outsiders?

………………………………………………………………

18. Has this process affected your people in any way?..........................

19. Are you happy with the conversion of land from customary to

statutory?

20. What are the benefits of having investors or outsiders in your area?

..................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................

21. Are there any demerits?..............................................................

22. What is the relationship between investors and the local people?

………………………………………………………………………

23. What is the level of infrastructure in your area?.............................

24. Do you think the outsiders have helped to improve livelihoods in

your area?......................................................................................

25. Is the market based land reform the best way of appropriating

land?

…………………………………………………………………………

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Appendix 4

The Copperbelt University School of the Built Environment

Department of Real Estate Studies Name of Respondent……………………..

1. When did you settle in Chief Chiwala’s area?......................................... 2. What attracted you to the area?......................................................................

……………………………………………………………………………… 3. What was the method did you use to acquire the land?.................................

……………………………………………………………………………… 4. What is the size of your land?........................................................................ 5. Can you access credit using your land as collateral?....................................

…………………………………………………………………………….. 6. What activities do you carry out on your land?.............................................

....................................................................................................................... 7. Have you faced any challenges as a farmer in the chiefdom?.......................

…………………………………………………………………………….. 8. How is your relationship with the villagers?.................................................

…………………………………………………………………………….. 9. How many villagers have you employed on your farm?.......................... 10. Apart from employment, what other things have people benefited from

your farm investment?....................................................................................................

11. What would you say have been the negative impacts on the village community? ………………………………………………………………………………

12. Why did you opt for titled land?.................................................................... ………………………………………………………………………………

13. What is your opinion of the market reform in customary areas?.................. ………………………………………………………………………………

Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.

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APPENDIX 5 SPSS DATA SHEET

Variable Variable label Variable Name Coding System V1 sex Sex of respondent 1=male; 2=female V2 head Sex of head of

homestead 1=male;2=female

V3 marista Marital status 1=married; 2=widowed;3=single

V4 landown Land ownership 1=yes; 2=no V5 mthofacq Method of land

acquisition 1=From chief;2=Inherited;3=bought

V6 landext Land extent 1=large;2=medium;3=small; 4=very small

V7 Prodsell Sell of produce 1=yes; 2=no;3= Occasionally V8 rent Renting of land 1=Yes; 2=no;3=Occasionally V9 awmktrf Market reform

awareness 1=aware;2=not aware

V10 views Views on reform 1=happy;2=not happy;3=indifferent

V11 employmt Employment status

1=fulltime;2=partime;3=none

V12 relation Relationship with farmers

1=good;2=fair;3=bad