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Chinese cyber nationalism and emerging virtual public sphere Fan Dong Is the Internet a virtual public sphere?

Form the beginning of the 20th century, the interplay between the Internet and

public sphere has been considered imperative in our understanding of discourse and

technology. Jones (1997) argued that the Internet engendered a ‘new public space’ made

by people and “conjoined traditional mythic narratives of progress with strong modern

impulses toward self-fulfillment and personal development” (1997: 22). Nevertheless,

McDorman (2001) saw limited scholarly works, particularly from the field of

communication, attempting to analyze concretely how the Internet is actually being used.

For him, this effort will “ explore the potential advantages of cyberspace while

investigating significant questions such as how virtual space changes the operation of the

public sphere and whether it truly offers new opportunities or merely presents the same

obstacles in new forms without any real potential for the advancement of resistance”

(2001: 192). In response to this, Papacharissi (2002) reiterates the difference between

public space and public sphere and believes that the former only requires the Internet to

be another forum for political deliberation while the latter entails facilitation of

discussion that advances a democratic exchange of ideas and opinions. First of all, she

argued that similar to the bourgeois pubic sphere, the Internet is only accessible to a

fraction of exclusive, elitist population, yet Poster (1995) suggested this may not

necessarily damage the diversity of identity online. Essentially, the internet decentralizes

communication but ultimately enhances democracy. Still, Paracharissi was right in

suggesting that the public sphere created by the Internet is doomed to be different from

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that in the real world and rely on social relations. Secondly, scholars shared a common

concern on whether the instant and anonymous nature of online discourse could generate

an environment for rational discussion (Streck, 1998; Barber, 1997; Buchstein, 1997,

Dahlgren, 2001). Based on a five year data tracking collection, Katz concluded that

digital citizens “are the most informed and participatory citizens we have ever had or are

likely to have” (1997:71). However, this finding cannot erase scruple on whether the

virtual space will be contaminated by commercialization (Papacharissi, 2002; Dahlgren,

2001). Dahlgren (2001) dealt with this problem by criticizing the depreciation of

deliberative model compared to communitarian and liberal individual camps in the study

of virtual rhetoric on democracy and practice. He prompted the deliberative camp, which

“promotes the Internet as the means for an expansion of the public sphere of rational,

critical citizen discourse-discourse autonomous from state and corporate power through

which public opinion may be formed that can hold official decision makers

accountable”(2001:616). In his initial analysis, he found out that the expansion of the

public sphere through the Internet “requires not only developing deliberative spaces but

also attracting participation from citizens who have been socialized within a

commercialized and individualized culture hostile towards public deliberation”

(2001:615). In his later work, he further suggested the importance of treating these

discussions online “not just in terms of its rational communicative qualities, but also as a

form of practice integrated within more encompassing civic culture” (2005:157).

To sum up, Papacharissi (2002) believed that whether the Internet could

transfigure into a public sphere is not determined by the technology itself. Consequently,

she suggested us to take a step further by testing the implication of political deliberations

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online in order to determine whether the Internet could transform the political and social

structure. This will be the touchstone on whether the Internet can escalate from public

space to public sphere. Dahlgren (2001) initiated this task by comparing online

deliberations with the set of requirements Habermas suggested as a measure on to what

extent the public sphere could be achieved. These requirements are summarized as

“exchange and critique of reasoned moral-practical validity claims, reflexivity, ideal role

taking, sincerity, discursive inclusion and equality, autonomy from state and economic

power”(2001:638). Moreover, as Sparks (2001) reasoned, a crucial indicator is structural

connections between communicative spaces and the processes of decision making.

Consequently, these standards will be employed together in my analysis of the Chinese

case.

Has there ever been a public sphere in China? In order to examine the virtual public sphere in China, we need to locate its

cultural and social specificity. Although Habermas’ concept of “public sphere” has been

extensively studied in the Western context, it has always been a vexing notion in the

study of Chinese society. Long before Fraser pinpointed the multitude of public sphere

and the problematic dichotomy between state and society(1992), Rankin(1986) had

already illustrated the Chinese variety of public sphere where although the bourgeois

public sphere does not fit, distinctions between official, public and private activities has

always been drawn in the text. Using the alternative civil society in Eastern Europe as a

reference, "where people could interact freely and without government interference,

where they could turn their backs on the Party-state's corruption" (Chirot, 1992:234),

scholars like Wakeman (1993) identified the incipiency of public sphere in late imperial

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China mainly in the realm of non-state economic institutions. Madsen (1993) pushed

Habermas’ socio-philosophical intention further and urged a highlight on the moral and

cultural dimensions of the public sphere. According to him, “the search for ways to

institutionalize a public sphere under modern (or postmodern) circumstances brings

China and the West together in a common quest.” (1993:185) Acknowledging the

inadequacy of the bourgeois public sphere to demonstrate the Chinese case, Huang (1993)

rejected abstract and generalized application of the multiple meanings of public sphere.

Meanwhile, he repudiated Rankin’s approach of substituting segmented rural

communities in China for integrated urban public sphere, which left little value to retain

the concept of public sphere; Furthermore, he was concerned that Madsen’s

moral/rational-centred research agenda may prevent us from spotting other important

changes and developments. Consequently, Huang proposed the concept of the “third

realm”, which “would free us of the value-laden teleology of Habermas's bourgeois

public sphere” and “define more unequivocally than Habermas's public sphere a third

space conceptually distinct from state and society” (Huang, 1993:225). However,

Huang’s highly political economy approach led to his belief that the third realm is a more

promising space than private societal autonomy in bringing about political changes in

China.

Throughout these scholars’ discussions, they commonly ignored the role of

communication technologies and its implications on the growth of public sphere.

Moreover, how boundaries between the public, private and even the “third realm” have

been problematized as a result is left unexplained. Among various communication

technologies, the Internet has been the avant-garde in catalyzing social changes in

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Chinese society. On July 25th, 2008, USA Today announced that with 253 million users,

China has replaced the United States as the No.1 nation in Internet users. By the end of

2008, the scale of Chinese netizens expanded to 298 million with a coverage rate of

22.6%, which surpassed the world average of 21.9% (CNNIC report, 2009). Yang (2003)

argued that this massive social use of the Internet fostered public debate and the

functioning of existing institutions. More importantly, he emphasized the “co-

evolutionary development of civil society and the Internet” (2003:406). These arguments

were supported by CNNIC report 2009, which suggested that 76.9% of netizens believe

that they pay more attention to social issues due to the use of Internet. Wu pointed out

that “China’s Internet fever was more a political consequence than a cultural consequence.

Although the CCP has never dreamed of Internet becoming the grave-digger for its

political destiny, cyber space may very likely end up to be the hotbed for its political

disturbance” (2007: 144).

More specifically, Zhang (2006) studied the subaltern public sphere among

undeveloped middle class online which successfully constructed their own discourse

different from the market version and the dominant state preach, yet he pointed out the

tricky effect of cooperation with mass media which may ultimately deteriorate the power

of this subaltern space. Chow (2006) extended the inquiry to transnational interaction in

the case of the anti-Japan alliance online and offline praxis. He argued that the Internet

may influence international policy, but does not necessarily promote domestic civil

society in China because users are subject to governmental control. Nevertheless, the

dynamic between the state and individuals have shifted dramatically from the Olympic

torch relay dispute in March 2008 to the G20 Summit in London which was held in April,

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2009. The Chinese government has enacted a series of new policies to improve freedom

of speech both domestically and to foreign news agencies; on June 20th, 2008 and March

3rd, 2009, president Hu jintao even and Premier Wen Jaibao initiated the unprecedented

interaction with Chinese netizens at People’s Net and demanded regular exchange with

Internet users at different levels of the government to improve decision-making process.

Hence, this time period serves as a good example to examine how public discourses in

online communities have propelled the burgeoning of public sphere in China.

Nonetheless, the issue of Internet in China has always been entangled with state

control which jeopardizes the cultivation of public sphere. In fact, as I have demonstrated

in the article “Controlling the Internet in China: the real story” (2009, forthcoming),

despite conventional wisdom that the state implement an omnipotent control over the

Internet, the actually ecology of the Internet is composed of a vigorous interaction

between individual users and control bodies at different levels. At each layer of the

control mechanism, the state is constantly struggling with various interest parties. It is

exactly through these dynamics that individuals and institutions configure their version of

the public atmosphere. Hence, Asen and Brouwe (2001) reminded us to think of the

public sphere more inclusively. By this they mean to appreciate the multiplicity of the

public sphere and permeability of borders; more importantly, we should reconsider the

public sphere and the state divide. They emphasized that this “separatist” model of the

public sphere and the state “discounts the capacity of an activist state to intervene in

society in an effort to improve conditions for citizen participation in opinion-forming and

decision-making activities” (2001:15). In particular, those pains the state undertakes to

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maintain its stability serve as a battlefield for us to see the interplay between domestic

and global public sphere.

Moreover, Palczewski (2001) argued that we should not confine our theories to the

ways cyber-activism influence political sphere, because this might inhibit us from

perceiving the possible growth into social movements which involves other spheres. His

insight reflected one of the shared opinions among various investigations on the Internet

and the public sphere: we need to adopt a new take on social movements. To begin with,

“the Internet is the technology with which real life and the offline world can be enhanced,

revitalized or even radically changed. “Things seen and learned on the Internet can be

taken back to other environments, making these other environments, ranging from

neighborhood communities to the political arena, better places to live in”(Easter and

Vinken, 2003:669). Accordingly, we must incorporate deliberations online with its

implication offline in order to measure its actual effect. Simultaneously, as Cammaerts

and Audenhove (2005) noticed, the scale of civic engagement has “largely shifted from

the formal democratic level toward a meso-level of participation in between the formal

political level and the unorganized citizen” (2005:182), thus requires more elastic

measurement on the impact of online discourses. To be more precise, Melucci (1996)

claimed that the core of this shift lies in that social movements revolve more around

personal identity and understanding of cultural formation now rather than collective

action in the interest of certain social group. Identity politics online not only internalizes

the socialization experience but also places individuals on the global stage. It is this very

process that fosters the potential of a global public sphere, which is still fragmented at the

current stage.

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The juxtaposition of Chinese cyber nationalism and global counterpublics

When it comes to dominant identity politics in China, nationalism has been

identified as the underpinning component of both online discourse in China and the

identity of Chinese netizens (Qiu, 2006; Tsui, 2002, Wu, 2007). Wu has defined Chinese

cyber nationalism as “a non-government sponsored ideology and movement that has

originated, existed, and developed in China’s online sphere over the past decade. Taking

advantages of the online communication technology, Chinese cyber nationalists have

been utilizing the Internet as a communication center, organizational platform, and

execution channel to promote the nationalistic causes among Chinese people around the

world”(2007:155). According to Ozkirimli, “nationalism is a particular way of seeing

and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps s make sense of and structure

the reality that surrounds us” (2005:30). Therefore, it provides a bedrock for identity

politics project. Castells (1997) conceived national as not just the predominant form of

collective being in contemporary world; rather, nationalism has re-invigorated the very

possibility of collective identity in an age of individualism. This is also why although

contemporary Chinese netizens exhibit enthusiasm in entertainment activities in contrast

with insouciance towards social issues and state politics in their everyday life (Guo,

2007), they “can be driven into alliances with the party-state when a frontier is drawn

between China and a foreign ’enemy’, particularly when national autonomy, unity and

identity are believed to be in danger”( Guo, 2004:20).

For Greenfield, nationalism is doomed to be intertwined with global competition, for

“ this makes competitiveness a measure of success in every sphere a nation defines as

significant for its self-image, and commits societies define themselves as a nation to race

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with a relative and therefore forever receding finish line” (2001:23). In fact, Habermas

envisioned the maturation of a global public as a result of this type of competition, he

noticed that “nations, governments have actually been increasingly forced to have t least

a propagandistic regard for the world public” (1989:133), but he held a pessimistic view

over the potential of the Internet in reifying a global public sphere and claimed that “the

publics produced by the Internet remain closed off from one another like global village”

(1998:121). Although sharing Habermas’ concern originated from several unfavorable

factors for the Internet to contribute to a global public sphere, like “limited access

because of economic, geographic or educational inequalities” and “ the dominant use of

the English language”, Mater criticized this pessimistic hypothesis as “lack of evidence,

thus open both empirical and theoretical verification of an emergent global public sphere”

(2001:212). This is where the Chinese case driven by international interactions comes in

as a case in point. As Castells (2001) heeded, although this type of nationalist movements

are “very old in their principles, but they take on a new meaning when they become

trenches of cultural identity to build social autonomy in a world dominated by

homogeneous, global information flows”(2001:140).

Although instigated by nationalism sentiment, Chinese Internet users were

inevitably pushed to the core of dispute in a global sphere dominated by Western values,

“they focused primarily on those international issues involving China and strived to retain

China’s historical status as a respectable power. The waning Communism doctrine, the

reach and power of online technology, and nationalism’s inherent grassroots appeal,

made it new a powerful factor in China’s overall policy decision-making process” (Wu,

2007:155). Nevertheless, contrary to the domestic sphere, Chinese cyber nationalist

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communities became couterpublics in the global arena according to Fraser’s definition of

counterpublics, because they are immersed in “parallel discursive arenas where members

of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate

oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (1992: 123). Fraser

further argued that counterpublics “on the one hand, function as spaces of withdrawal and

regroupement; on the other hand, it also function as bases and training grounds for

agitational activities directed toward wider publics” (1992:194). The Chinese case

contribute to the study of counterpublics and the Internet in the following three aspects.

Firstly, Fraser (1992) worried that counterpublics might shatter its own ground due to

sequestration in an enclave-breeding of intolerance for others, failure to translate

discourses into interests and reliance on unhealthy criticism. But the Chinese case shows

how these initial hazardous symptoms could be counteracted through social interaction

and practice both online and offline; secondly, it reveals how the Internet influences

counterpublic formation and public sphere activism, which Palczewski (2001) reminded

us to pay special attention to in future studies. Last but not the least, this case provides a

nexus for us to incorporate the role of the state, as Palczewski suggested, “a full analysis

of the interactions of counterpublics and the state requires that we explore the myriad and

emerging ways in which counterpublics seek to maintain contact with the state even

while they attempt to challenge it” (2001:165).

Given this tenor, international dispute and online deliberation not only cultivates

the growth of public sphere within China, but also introduce Chinese Internet users to

participate in the global public sphere. Their identity as a nationalist movement

participant encompasses two implications in parallel: in the domestic arena, they

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represent the public that promotes the establishment of public sphere, in the global realm,

they undertake the role of counterpublics that fight against dominant Western beliefs and

values. Interaction and open debate with people from China and abroad function as

socialization process for Chinese netizens to formulate a consciousness of the pubic

sphere and requirements to maintain this domain.

A framework for the analysis of the Chinese case

The timeline below delineates major events during the time period in inquiry. March

14th to the earthquake in May consists phase I, which is the budding phase for Chinese

virtual public sphere . The main focus of Chinese nationalism communities is to fight

against foreign slant and restore Chinese dignity. Sichuan earthquake in May, 2008

switched netizens attention back to domestic issues, together with President Hu jintao’s

interaction with Internet users, this phase II is a reflective and restructuring period for the

cultivation of Chinese virtual public sphere. Phase III is the experiment of tentative

virtual public sphere. It started from the global economic crisis and reached its climax

with a series of combat with France, a new target as national enemy. It is also at this last

ongoing phase that nationalism movement intertwined with supervision on domestic

issues.

Year: 2008

March 14th The Tibetan revolt started

(March 16th)

March 17th biased and fake news came out at CNN and other foreign media

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March 18th the situation in Lhasa was mostly stabilized

(March 19th)

March 26th the pioneering journalist group arrived in Lhasa

(March 29th)

April 6th / 7th the Olympic torch arrived at London, Paris and confronted Tibetan rioters

(April 8th)

April 9th the Olympic torch arrived at San Francisco, Jack Cafferty insulted Chinese in

“Situation Room”, CNN

April 24th the Olympic torch arrived at Canberra

April 26th/27th the Olympic torch arrived at Kobe and Seoul

May 6th David Vigilante, vice president of International affairs at CNN apologized

the first time to the Chinese people

(May 12th)

May 15th The Chairman of CNN apologized officially again to the Chinese people

June 20th, President Hu jintao interacted with Chinese netizens

(September)

October, 17th, Chinese government enacted new regulation on foreign press and

allows for more freedom

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December, 7th, French president Sarkozy met with Dalai Lama despite protest from

Chinese government

Year: 2009

Premier Wen jiabao visited Europe, excluding France (January)

French auctioned Chinese antiques looted from Yuanmingyuan (February)

February 28th, Premier Wen jiabao talked with netizens and release stimulus plan

on economic crisis

March 3rd, 90% netizens vote against governmental contract with Airbus, France

“Hide and find incident” and the emergence of grassroot sleuth, April

G20 Summit in London, April

Yang (2003) suggests “guerilla ethnography” on studying the kaleidoscopic Chinese

Internet, which requires explorative studies entering the space without preconceptions.

Following the event timetable shown above, I will utilize the 6 elements measurement on

the virtual public sphere proposed by Dahlgren (2001) to analyze the following materials

along the three phases: discourses online from Qiangguo Forum and MITBBS, the former

is the forum that President Hu jintao visited and coined as the “trial district for freedom

of speech”, while the latter in the largest online forum outside of China without

governmental inspection. Besides, two of the most famous Youtube videos during this

period will be examined together with offline activities to provide a multidimensional

perspective on the issue.

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Autonomy from state and economic power

Unlike previous nationalist movements launched in China, in phase I, the anti-

separatist movement was initiated by overseas students. They constantly keep track of the

reaction and rhetoric of mainstream media in their host countries and adjust their

strategies accordingly. Consequently, they found out that their nationalism activities were

depicted in three frames: first. These nationalist movements are fomented and

manipulated by the Chinese government; second, participants have been brainwashed by

the Chinese educational system, thus hold bigotry nationalism; third, this generation of

Chinese young people benefited from the Opening and Reform Policy, thus they are

bewitched by the economic well-being. In order to refute those biases, people consciously

distant themselves from governmental institutions and personnel. A typical example is

the “5 principles for demonstrations against Tibetan revolt and Western media bias” that

was published at MIT BBS in March, 2008. The first principle is “DIY your own slogans,

make national flags by hand, and raise funds on your own. Do not ask for help from the

embassy or consulate, not even any institution or individual that might be traced as

related to the government”; the second principle is “do not use antagonistic slogans or

expressions. Apart from Chinese national flag, bring national flag of the host country

too.” Apparently, people endeavor to build up an autonomous image and identity by

staying detached from the state and showing respect to host countries so as to appease the

hostile attitude towards their behaviors.

This tension between Internet users and the state has escalated when the

spokesman from the Ministry Foreign Affair stood up asking for sincere apology from

Jack Cafferty and CNN in the name of “representing Chinese people’s demand and fury”.

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Internet users at both forums were infuriated by this diplomatic move, and condemned

this as “ruining everything we’ve tried so hard to establish and champion” (April, MIT

BBS). Domestic users were even more frustrated by this incident and perceived this as

“impudently harvest our fruits of success” (April, Qiangguo Forum). Afterwards, their

reluctance to be associated with the state increased to the extent of igniting the debate on

the cause of the suspicious stance from the West. “Apparently, our government does not

have any credit in the West, thus no matter what we say, they simply don’t believe in us”

(April, MIT BBS). Nevertheless, when students participating in protests were arrested in

Australia and Korea, the majority of Internet users switched their positions and firmly

believed that the government should interfere and save those victims. This demonstrates

netizens’ ambivalent relationship with the state, they would like to enjoy the legislative

protection of the state but maintain discursive autonomy. This is even more the case

when domestic public sphere is merged into the global spectrum, netizens’ discourse

power is still vulnerable without the auspice of the state. The imbalance of power in

international relations is translated into people’s experience in the virtual sphere.

In phase II, natural disaster shortened the distance between individuals and the

government. The central government grasped this golden time to channel the nationalism

sentiment by communicating with netizens and exchange ideas on the future development

of the nation. President Hu pointed out clearly in his online conversation that Internet

users’ opinions are treated seriously by the government, thus he called for officials at

every level to esteem online public opinion as well as to adopt this form of two-way

communication in the long run. However, this honeymoon period did not last long before

global economic crisis broke out. As the biggest holder of American treasury bond, China

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was forced to observe the rules and stay in the game. This aroused deep discontentment

among Internet users, who blamed the government as comprador of the West. As a result,

they practiced the discursive ritual cultivated in the first and second phase to examine

domestic policies and issues by staying detached from the government. According to

Wu’s survey (2007), More than 80% of online users believed that online discussion

would either “definitely” (36.8%) or “fairly likely” (43.3%) affect China’s overall policy

decision making. More importantly, they believe their opinions matter when they are

autonomous from the state. 64.6% of the respondents chose either “strongly disagree” or

“slightly disagree” with the statement which regard affections to the nation and the state

as identical.

Exchange and critique of criticizable moral-practical validity claims

At the early stage, Chinese netizens’ reaction to unfriendly comments, especially

racist expressions was simply tit-for-tat strategy. Realizing that this does not help clarify

the situation, they decided to support their arguments with evidence and logical

arguments. The initial attempts were those two most famous Youtube video clips-one

called “Tibet was, is, and will always be part of China”, one called “the true face of

Western media”-both of which attained over 3 million clicking rate and 200 thousand

comments from all over the world. The first video listed five insights on Tibet revolt: 1)

maps of China from Yuan Dynasty have proved that Tibet has been part of China even

before America was discovered by Europeans; 2) China is a country composed of 56

different ethnicities, thus we will not leave Tibet unless Americans go back to Europe

and return the land to aboriginal Indians; 3) Dalai Lama used to be a slave owner, he

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resents the central government because it deprived him of all his privileges. Moreover, he

executed torture on slaves in the old days, and is unlikely to practice democracy in the

future; 4) CIA has been sponsoring Tibetan separatists and training them to fight against

Chinese government ever since the 1950’s; 5) the living standard at Tibet has been

improved dramatically after the liberation. Apparently, the producer of this video was

strategically providing historical facts and social realities to analyze the cause of this

revolt. Although he frequently used irony to pinpoint Westerners’ basic logical flaws, all

are no more than known facts. As a result, those unfriendly comments purely based on

personal attacks or racism paled by showing ignorance and blind hatred sentiment

towards China. Only reasonable arguments are taken seriously in the community with

more “support” than “against” icons in the forum.

To take this effort one step further, the second video collected fake pictures

and fabricated illustrations published in Western mainstream media including

Washington Post, New York Times, BBC, CNN and German newspapers to showcase

how these media slant China deliberately. Two typical schemes were used. First of all,

since they cannot find any picture or video to prove that Chinese army bullied local

Tibetans, they used pictures from Nepali revolt and claimed that they were taken during

the Tibetan revolt. Apparently, it will be difficult for Westerners to differentiate Nepali

and Chinese, let alone the uniform the army wears. Therefore, readers and audience are

easily fooled to believe that Chinese soldiers did torture Tibetan people. Secondly, they

refused to publish photos showing Tibetan separatists set fire on shops, local residences,

beat ordinary citizens and attack soldiers. The violent part of this so-called “peaceful

demonstration” has thus been beautified. When these plots are revealed, BBC and

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German media apologized but claimed that it was only their journalists’ personal

mistakes, and does not represent the view of the news agency (BBC China, April, 13th,

2008). Detecting initial effect of these two videos, more people joined this action and

eventually set up their own website called Anti-CNN.com to constantly that facilitate

cogent arguments. It is also through this process that netizens are trained to be less easily

offended by irrational critiques or slanders, because they understand that personal attacks

and vituperation can only aggravate misunderstandings between people with different

beliefs.

The heritage was passed down to later phases in the form of memes. Knobel and

Lankshear (2005) pointed out that successful Internet memes require the following: some

element of humor or parody, rich interxtuality, anomalous juxtapositions of images. The

popularity of the aforesaid two video clips met all these requirements and set standard for

late comers in Phase II and III. For example, later videos commenting on global financial

crisis and the earthquake utilized the same background music and story-telling structure;

and before they discuss new issues, a flashback on earlier arguments in Phase I was

included to demonstrate legitimacy. This tradition was also evident in text-based

discussions, the ability to provide tenable arguments and tolerate reasonable criticism

served as a admission ticket for Internet users to join the conversation. This online

atmosphere was finally translated into the sensational book called “China is unhappy”

(Zhongguo bu gaoxing), published in March, 2009. This work is a summary and critique

on different strands of thoughts online, and is the first publication discussing sensitive

issues with nationalism sentiment 13 years after the first of its kind: “China can say No”

(Zhongguo keyi shuobu).

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Reflexivity

The critical, rational debate consensus achieved abroad was introduced back to

China later on and led to the heated debate on “how to conduct healthy nationalism”

(April, Qianguo Forum). Essentially, people questioned the nature and implication of

Chinese nationalism after the emergence of the symbolic “hero or traitor debate”. The

Tibetan revolt did not arouse much fuss among Chinese until the Paris incidence broke

out where Jin Jing, the female torch bearer, was attacked. On the day Jin was attacked,

the number of posts in both forums increased 25 times. Jin Jing was soon entitled with

“national hero” for protecting the spirit and dignity of China and Chinese people.

However, this national hero was quickly despised as traitor when she objected national

boycott on French goods and companies by arguing that many Chinese employees also

work for those French enterprises, they will lose jobs if the business goes down.

Qiangguo Forum was permeated with malicious words towards her as a result, charging

her for “betraying people who love her so much”, or “offering foolish justification for

French exploitation on Chinese”. In contrary, MIT BBS was more rational and proffered

detailed reasoning on whether people should boycott French goods, besides they criticize

domestic patriots as too provincial and near-sighted.

Corresponding to these efforts, when the intensity of confrontation with France

escalated in 2009, netizens were less agitated at the offense and focused more on

diplomatic and legal means to appease the conflict. During the Chinese antiques auction

crisis in France, amateurish users organized their own study groups to examine similar

cases in the history and international laws on this issue. They even debated with experts

to envoy a more internationally accepted solution in their mind. The same ethic applied to

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domestic injustice. In February 2009, Li, Qiaoming was claimed dead when playing hide-

and-seek games with his fellow inmates by the local police department. This suspicious

case disturbed Internet users and led to massive cynical inquiries online. In order to

restore public faith in the justice system, local government recruited voluntary Internet

users to formulate an amateur sleuth and assisted the investigation (Jacobs, 2009). The

importance of this reflexivity mechanism lies in propelling the next two elements:

sincerity and ideal role-taking. Thus, it catalyzed a more in-depth practice of the rules in

the virtual public sphere.

Sincerity

The demand for critical, reasonable arguments resulted in the tension between

domestic and overseas Chinese netizens over the legitimacy to represent Chinese. The

prevalent argument from domestic users fell into the following three categories: “you

guys have been brainwashed by the West through their education, and should not be

counted as Chinese anymore”, “if you really love China, then why don’t you come back

to your home country? Why do you rather kiss foreigners’ ass in order to get the green

card?” “how many times have you been back to China since you guys went abroad? Do

you really understand the situation in China? Do you rich guys really care about poor

people’s lives?”( Qianguo Forum) These expressions reveal the schism between overseas

and domestic Chinese originated from social class difference. From the domestic point of

view, the authenticity of nationalism is determined by the commitment to mainstream

social values, common life style and shared living experiences. These standards are

prerequisites for any participant to claim that he is represnting Chinese. As a result, a rule

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has been set that before stating one’s opinion, they have to first disclose whether they live

in China or abroad. Moreover, participants in each group are required to disclose their

social class, intention to speak. Domestic users even asked participants to reveal whether

they are from urban or rural area, rich or poor families; while overseas users are supposed

to reveal their current status abroad: student, H1B visa holder, job hunter, green card

holder or foreign citizen.

However, this is an enforced consequence rather than voluntary effort. Moreover,

although a selective few reveal the purpose of participating in the debate before making

their statement, the majority would not take this initiative. Therefore people judge other

participants’ intentions mainly through their argument or stance on the issue in discussion.

A variety of cliques emerged as a result with their unanimously acknowledged nicknames.

E.g, those who show blind loyalty to the Party and government without solid arguments

are called “fifty cent”(wumao); those who support the Party and government with

reasonable arguments are called “junior general”(xiaojiang); those who are against the

Party and government without any solid arguments are called “Senior general”(laojiang);

those who cynically criticize the government or the Party and reside abroad are called

“wretched man”(weisuonan); while Taiwan/Tibetan/Uygur separatists, Falungong

practitioners, early social activists who were bribed by foreign intelligent bureaus are

called “five toxins”(wudu). This categorization constitutes the basic ecology of both

forums and functions as a criterion to judge the authenticity and relevance of people’s

discourses. In order to distinguish yourself from these cliques, commentators are

supposed to prove their sincerity by conform to the rules or propose convincing

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arguments without biases. As a result, this identity building and matching process

indirectly encouraged critical and rational discourses.

Ideal role-taking

The struggle between cliques and autonomous participants forced Chinese Internet

users to respect and recognize the existence of dissidents. In that sense, when it comes to

Phase II and III, although people still criticized each other’s arguments sarcastically, they

started to consciously bash those participants who intend to smother dissident voices. A

typical example was the attitude towards posts from Falungong practitioners, “I really do

not want to waste my words and life paying attention to those toxins, but you cannot

prevent them from posting, or you will stink just like them”. “Come on! They need to act

wildly to raise funds from their American Master, life is hard for everyone, don’t cut off

their lifeline.”(MIT BBS). People are using irony and humor creatively to debunk each

other’s basic logic and thought patterns so as to better advance their own arguments.

Thus, although people are consciously aware of other people’s arguments and

perspectives, the underlining motivation is to grasp their weakness and attack them rather

than appreciate the difference.

A similar pattern applies to their involvement in the global public space. In order

to successfully convey their arguments, various templates and guidelines have been

published at both forums instructing participants how to communicate with foreigners.

Fearing that foreigners would not believe in sources from China, group efforts were made

to seek for books and articles published abroad to increase the credibility of their

arguments. It is also through this process that people come to the agreement that “we

23

cannot force them to accept our arguments since they have been taught by their media

and educational system for so many years. Therefore, “all we have to do is to supply the

other side of the story and things they have not been exposed to. They could make a

decision on their own whether they should believe in us”(April 2008, Qianguo Forum).

This sentiment was even stronger at MIT BBS, “we could speak both English and Chinese,

therefore we could refer to materials published in both languages. Yet, the majority of

foreigners do not speak Chinese, they could only collect information from their own

media, no wonder their thoughts are identical with the mainstream media. We could only

count on well-articulated arguments to convince those who are open-minded. Don’t

expect every foreigner to believe in us. (April 2008, MIT BBS). As a result, people have

gradually realized why their attempts fail from time to time in the global virtual space

and chosen to concentrate on less opinionated foreign Internet users.

Discursive inclusion and equality

According to Ji (2008), Anti-CNN.com has been constantly crashed down by

international hackers. Besides, materials uploaded there were smudged deliberately.

Similarly, Jiang (2008) did an extensive ethnography on all major Western media online

and concluded that Chinese Internet users’ comments have been constantly deleted by

those webmasters. CNN even closed the comment function on Jack Cafferty’s blog when

critiques from Chinese flushed in. Consequently, Chinese Internet users’ discourse power

is subject to the supervision of mainstream Western media. Furthermore, since few

domestic users are capable of posting English comments, their appearance on virtual

venues was easily ignored. This feeling of inferiority in the global space further enforced

24

their nationalism sentiment and disappointment over Western media. This phenomenon is

even more obvious at Qianguo Forum where people have not been exposed to Western

media frequently. “Is Western media any different from ours? They are also censoring the

content and deleting our posts”, “I thought Western media are more fair and objective,

now I see they’re just another China Central Television” (April, 2008 Qiangguo Forum).

Subsequently, “don’t behave like CNN” has become the most famous slogan to describe

all irresponsible reports and media conducts ever since. This request for equality in the

virtual space also facilitates the process of exchange and critique of criticizable moral-

practical validity claims as well as ideal role-taking. After the global financial crisis

disclosed the disastrous effect of bonding to a dominant currency, Chinese Internet users

also recognized the importance of having a world-class media outlet of their own. As a

response to this, the government has decided to spend 45 billion Yuan to organize an

Asia-based 24-hour news channel to broadcast news to international audience

(Akkermans, 2009). This decision signaled the ambition of China to improve its

discourse power in the international community, but at the same time, complicate the

relation between Chinese Internet users online and the government.

Conclusion

Wu (2007) believed that Chinese cyber nationalism is doomed to have two futures: to

be incorporated into governmental decision making process or evolves into social

movements that will shatter the central government. Either way it cannot bypass proper

locale and mechanism to cultivate public discourses and execute actions . Based on

analyses above, although the emerging public sphere online among Chinese Internet users

25

was driven by nationalism sentiment, it has been adjusted to fit into the global discursive

atmosphere. Although the sincerity mechanism is still at the initial stage and is highly

circumscribed by clique struggles, people are consciously fighting against opinionated

arguments and promoting reasonable, rational discourse ecology. In their attempt to enter

the global public space, they have learnt to enter the global arena with an open mind and

appreciate Western thinking patterns. Moreover, this process of reflexivity has propelled

them to rethink about domestic problems and seek for improved discourse atmosphere

back in China. All these 6 standards of virtual public sphere are reciprocal and

interrelated in molding Chinese public sphere. At the current stage, the key function of it

is to guarantee a more responsive interplay between the government and ordinary citizens;

while at the global arena, it provides people with a critical environment to accumulate

knowledge on the rest of the world and a more reasonable judgment on the advantages

and disadvantages at both ends. However, the pending question is once the nationalism

sentiment subsides gradually, how this emerging public sphere sustains its dynamic and

consolidates its vitality.

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