Security K Updates

Link – WarmingWarming representations are used by the military industrial complex to further intervention and make warming- turns the affDeutsch ’16 — Judith Deutsch is a columnist for Canadian Dimension Magazine, former president of Science for Peace, and a psychoanalyst by profession. (Judith Deutsch, 5-5-2016, "The Military’s “Securitization” of Climate Change," counterpunch.org, find at: http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/05/05/the-militarys-securitization-of-climate-change/) ZV

Any effective response to the critical climate situation would need to include elimination of the military. This is often met with derision although it was the ostensible aim of the United Nations Charter. Sara Flounders’ remarkable 2009 article on the Copenhagen climate meeting tied together the military and climate change, but delinking of the two persists. She wrote that “with more than 15,000 participants from 192 countries, including more than 100 heads of state, as well as 100,000 demonstrators in the

streets – it is important to ask: How is it possible that the worst polluter of carbon dioxide and other toxic emissions on the planet is not a focus of any conference discussion or proposed restrictions? …

the Pentagon has a blanket exemption in all international climate agreements.” Overall,

environmentalists pay little attention to the military, and the anti-war movement does not address the climate. Both

squander precious time. At a slow pace, industrialized countries have been “transitioning” to clean energy since the 1960s, without any specified and enforceable time frame. Renewables remain a very

small part of the energy mix and will not remedy the carbon-intensive military or industrial agriculture. Transition fuels like natural gas and biofuels have proven to be disastrous to human communities and to the climate. By

contrast is the fast pace rapidly rising temperature, accelerating greenhouse gas concentration (due to amplifying feedbacks), increased military spending including nuclear weapons, and new weapons/surveillance/pacification technology.[1] At some point recently, the climate goal shifted from elimination of greenhouse gases to mitigation. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, mitigation means to render more gentle, milder, to appease, mollify, to lessen the stringency of an obligation . Naomi Oreskes identifies a strategy of distraction and delay. The option of enforceable regulation, of steep reduction or elimination of high-emitting economic sectors, remains off the table. Much reliable information about the direct tailpipe emissions of US/NATO wars is accessible in Barry Sanders’ The Green Zone: The Environmental

Costs of Militarism and here. A complete tally of military carbon dioxide emissions must also include the energy and material used in the manufacture of military equipment, high-emitting transport of military personnel and weapons systems, over one thousand of military bases, reconstruction of war-torn areas requiring the use of high-emitting cement and steel. Full accounting must also include externalities such as water depletion and contamination, and the military’s destruction of many carbon sinks: the defoliation of southeast Asia, the decimated boreal forest in sourcing tar sands bitumen destined for military use, the

destruction of the soil carbon sink by war and by weapons testing. Right now, the securitization of climate change merits urgent attention. NATO, the U.S. Navy, and the Pentagon have issued policy statements prioritizing climate change as a “threat multiplier.” The race for global economic and military hegemony extends to the Arctic as warming opens up competition for sea lanes and resource extraction. In 2009, the U.S. Department of the Navy released a 36 page document called Navy Arctic Roadmap. “The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. ….What the practical implementation of this policy means is the expanded penetration of the Arctic Circle by the U.S. Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) third of the American nuclear triad…” The 2010 Pentagon Quadrennial Defense Review includes climate change as a military issue. In a memo made public on January 19th, 2016, the Pentagon affirmed that “climate change will be a constant consideration in how the Department of Defense goes about its war mission, acquisition programs, readiness plans, construction projects and security judgements….” Assigning “security” to the military rests on two premises: that the military is the institution best prepared to handle disasters, and that climate instability

and chaos will breed violence in an overpopulated, destitute world. Military/police shock doctrine interventions, justified by the terms Responsibility to Protect or humanitarian intervention, are well known to bring further disaster, even death: Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, the Haiti earthquake, the current case in the Central African Republic. Certainly a First Responders Corps and a

Civilian Conservation Corps could better protect life and environment and provide much employment and training. The assumption that destitute, traumatized masses become violent is a-historical and does not distinguish between violence from above and from below. The expectation of inevitable violence “offers an excellent platform for

states to exploit authoritarian populism in the name of scarcity.”[2] It is often posited that climate-related impacts like water depletion will be the new casus belli. “However, a closer analysis of history suggests that water issues have more often than not been grounds for cooperation, rather than conflict,” and in the 20th century 145 water-related treaties were signed. [3] Drought and famine in themselves do not cause violence from below. Syria is a case in point as the war is attributed to climate change-related drought. First, the cited figures of 1.5 million internal refugees is incorrect and at most 250,000 people left rural areas. The immediate cause of migration was not drought per se. Critical for Syria’s rural population at the time was the withdrawal of state agriculture subsidies for diesel fuel and seeds. Prior to that the Syrian Ba’ath Party support for the agriculture sector and rural development had gradually given way to marketization, with changes to land ownership and agriculture subsidies. At the time of the Arab Spring, food prices had precipitously increased worldwide. A suppressed World Bank report estimated that 75% of the increase in food prices was due to biofuels, not drought. A further determinant of soaring food

pricing was the speculative financialization of food on the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. The encroachment of the military into climate securitization is furthered by changes to climate adaptation funding. Countries are now able to count overseas development aid (ODA) towards the climate fund, and there are moves to allow ODA to also include peacekeeping and

security funding. Thus is whittled down the commitment made at the Cancun COP meeting to raise $100bn/year to provide adaptation funding for the periphery countries by 2020. There remains reticence, even silence, about the human catastrophe due to the military and climate change. In 2009, the same year as Sara Flounders’ article, Oxfam and the Global Humanitarian Forum

reported that climate change was already claiming 300,000 human lives/year. It was already predictable that

sea-level rise would displace hundreds of millions of people and inundate rich agricultural land. Is there any justification at all for maintaining a military that so clearly threatens human existence?

Securitized warming strategies are counterproductive and is analogous to the war on terrorBrauch 9 — Adj. Professor. Free University of Berlin. Otto-Suhr Institute. Berlin Fellow. Institute on Environment and Human Security of the United Nations University (UNU-EHS) in Bonn: Chairman. Peace Research and European Security Studies Editor. Hexagon Series on Human. Environmental Security and Peace(Hans Günter Brauch,paper presented at the 50th ISA Annual Convention, “Securitizing Climate Change” find at: http://www.afes-press.de/html/Brauch_ISA_NY_2.2.2009.pdf) ZV

**GCC= Global Climate Change

The securitization of GCC issues occurs on the background of a third major cause for a recon- ceptualization of security that fundamentally challenges the prevailing Hobbesian security thinking in international relations and in security studies (Kolodziej 2005), and also of representatives of critical security studies (Booth 2007; Booth/Wheeler 2008) but also of peoplecentred approaches (Thakur 2006; Picciotto/ Olonisakin/Clarke 2007) that have either ignored or downgraded the

environmental dimension of international, national, and human security. The causes of GCC pose fundamentally different security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks for the international community, the state, and humankind (Brauch 2005, 2005a). The enemy is us, not 'they', it is 'us*, 'our consumptive behaviour* and 'our use of fossil fuels' (coal, oil, gas) and that of previous generations since the outset of the Industrial Revolution (ca. 1750) that has been accumulated in the atmosphere and has become the cause of a rapid anthropogenic climate change. For this new security issue traditional military strategies and power as well as armaments offer no credible policy response. As it is impossible to de- clare a 'war against climate change', in analogy to the 'war on terror' , a 'militarization' of GCC to maintain 'our way of life' and indirectly to prevent others to achieve our per capita greenhouse gas emission levels or to enforce emission reduction targets with military means will be counterproductive.

Link – Asia TerrorThe War on terror in Asia is an act of US military intervention that justifies endless conflict in the name of restoring the peaceFebrica ’10 — Senia Febrica is a Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia, and a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, U.K. (Senia Febrica,“Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, University of Glasgow Asian Survey, Vol. 50, Number 3, pp. 569–590, find at: http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_157983_en.pdf) ZV

In embarking upon the war on terrorism campaign in Southeast Asia, the U.S. exercised its military as well as non-military power. President George W. Bush warned that “no nation can be neutral in the struggle,” declaring that “either you are with us or against us.”5 One U.S. official in

Southeast Asia augmented the warning, noting that “[i]t’s not enough to be with us in the war on terrorism . . . you have to trumpet it.”6 U.S. involvement in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia has ranged from financial support to combat operations. Through assistance, the U.S. has sought to enlist Southeast Asian countries in combating terrorism on the “second front.” This notion is conceptually compelling because it implies that Southeast Asia is hospitable to terrorists.7 The first U.S. policy program in the region gave the Philippine government $100 million in training assistance, military equipment, and maintenance support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).8 In 2002,

660 U.S. Special Forces were deployed in the southern Philippines to combat the Abu Sayyaf group.9 The Philippine and U.S. governments labeled the military operation in Mindanao as a training exercise in order to circumvent the Philippine Constitution’s banning

of foreign forces on Philippine territory—this despite the fact that the U.S. forces were armed and authorized to return fire if attacked.10The U.S. also intensified its bilateral relationship with Singapore. Since Bush and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong signed the Strategic Framework Agreement in July 2005, defense relations between the two countries progressed, with new areas of cooperation across military, technology,

and policy areas. In the case of Indonesia, the U.S. quickly tried to ensure the country’s commitment to the global “war on terror.” Officials pledged a restoration of military aid and a total of US$657.4 million in financial aid, comprising $400,000 to educate Indonesian civilians on defense matters; $10 million for police training; $130 million to help finance legal and judicial reform; $10 million to assist refugees in Maluku; $5 million to rebuild destroyed schools and other infrastructure in Aceh; $2 million to assist East Timorese who have chosen to stay in Indonesia; $400 million to promote trade and investment, especially in the oil and gas sector; as well as a duty-free status worth $100 million for 11 Indonesian products under the

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).11 The U.S. securitization move has had a profound effect on Southeast Asia’s security. In November 2001, Southeast Asian states promulgated the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counterterrorism. The declaration committed the ASEAN member states to prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts, to review and strengthen

national mechanisms to combat terrorism, as well as to reinforce cooperation at bilateral, regional, and international levels.12 As a statement of intent and acknowledgement, the declaration signified the conduct of the “war on terror” in Southeast Asia; nonetheless, there was great division among the states over the role of the U.S . in counterterrorism efforts and a major disagreement on how to combat terrorism.13

Link – Terror The War on promotes an extension of US interventionism that justifies endless warfare- the impact of collateral damage outweighs their grotesque and flawed impact of terrorism Webb and Romanuik ’15 — Stewart Tristan Webb is a professor for Department of International Politics at the University of Trento and Scott Romanuik a professor Global Security Studies at the Aberystwyth University (Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Stewart Tristan Webb, Global Security Studies, Spring 2015, Trento “Extraordinary Measures: Drone Warfare, Securitization, and the “War on Terror” find at: http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Extraordinary%20Measures%20-%20AG.pdf) ZV

The Bush administration’s so-called “Global War on Terror” (WoT) was an immediate response to al-Qaeda’s deadly assault against the United States (US) in 2001. The terrorist networks attacks were the impetus for the development of the US-led military campaign that sought to eliminate al-Qaeda and its affiliate terrorist organizations and cells in all global corridors. International in scope and with the support of the United Kingdom (UK), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and nearly

half of the world’s national governments, the WoT became a security superstructure and the driving principle behind US foreign policy that continues to impact the international system to this day. Buzan (2006,

1102) noted in “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ be the New Cold War?” that with the framing of the WoT as a “long war” or another long durée, we are in the middle of a securitizing move that is of considerable magnitude that, “could structure global security for some decades, in the process helping to legitimize US primacy.” The attacks on the

World Trade Center and the Pentagon over a decade ago were set as the WoT’s point of departure, yet one of the most prevalent features was its indeterminate end point – the difficulty in establishing the indefinable act of US victory in addition to absence of any clearly explained objectives of the “war” (Zalman & Clarke 2009). With its indeterminable parameters of time, focus on an “enemy” more akin to a concept not confined to national borders, and distinct legal and ideological infrastructure, security practitioners and theorists have regarded the former-WoT as one of the strangest and most unique “wars” in history (Zalman & Clarke 2009).

For the most part, it is comparable only to the Cold War as a macrosecuritization that drew upon and tied together multiple interrelated issues to form a cluster of security concerns. One of the critiques of the WoT was that it was not a war on a specified terrorist organization, such as that of al-Qaeda. Instead, the WoT seemingly allowed the Bush administration to declare war on any organizations that it deemed fit that utilized “terror tactics.” Insurgent organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda assume a globalized identity, but are still regionally oriented. The American government has a carte blanche to involve

American security forces around the globe in counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The open-ended objective of eliminating globalized terrorism permits the WoT to go on indefinitely. The idea of the WoT and its explicit “long war” framing as a securitizing move was studied by the Copenhagen School’s Buzan (2006) directly and Buzan and Wæver (2009) indirectly during its height in 2006, when the war in Afghanistan was

experiencing considerable set-backs and shortly after the Obama administration came to power and brought with it not only a continuation of Bush’s drone campaign but also a remarkable surge in drone operations with

more drone strikes having taken place in 2009 than in the previous eight years of the WoT (New America Foundation 2013). The WoT proved to be a successful macrosecuritization measure by the US (Buzan 2006, 1103; Kelstrup 2004). This was made possible partially as a result of alQaeda and its violent ideology having been widely accepted as a threat to Western civilization from within and outside of the Islamic world. With over 60 states that actively supported the Proliferation

Security Initiative (PSI), over 30 states having sent forces in Iraq alongside American troops, and nearly 40 states having committed varying degrees of their forces to the campaign in Afghanistan, the WoT was a macrosecuritization success and structuring global security framework that securitized the issue of terrorism that threatened Western liberal democracy (Western civilization more broadly). The WoT simultaneously strengthened the primacy of the securitizing actor (in

this case the US). As a political instrument that was able to facilitate and justify US primacy, leadership, and to a lesser-extent unilateralism to both American and foreign public spheres as well as elites. Having securitized the threat of transnational

terrorism, the WoT featured numerous extraordinary measures. Chief among these were and continue to be intervention and military campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan, long-term military occupations and presence in both of those countries, human rights violations including extreme forms of interrogation and torture (i.e., the Central Intelligence Agency’s [CIA] policy of Rendition, Detention, Interrogation [RDI]), a reduction of civil liberties including phone-tapping and

excessive surveillance measures, and even the acceptability of excessive collateral damage in order to meet the vague objectives of the WoT security program (Record 2003; Council of Europe [CoE] 2011). One of the most, if not the most, controversial measures employed during the WoT (and still to this day with no sign of abating) is the use of drones in America’s targeted killing (TK) operations (Roth, 2012).

Link – SCSSCS and Taiwan won’t escalate but threat inflation forces US intervention causing miscalcTier 14 – (David Tier is a Major in the U.S. Army and serves as a strategic plans and policy officer. He is an Airborne Ranger-qualified graduate of Harvard, a three-time combat veteran of Iraq and commanded a cavalry troop in combat for 12 months; Spring 2014, Published in The Quarterly Journal, “The Waning Grand Strategy of Democratization: Why a Pivot to the Asia-Pacific Places the United States at Greater Risk of Terrorist Attack,” http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/180011/ichaptersection_singledocument/c2e3ea94-2e66-463f-96f1-2557d3d48b2d/en/03.pdf)

Unlike the fundamentally opposed interests between the former Cold War blocs, China's potential conflicts with the U.S. do not threaten each other's existence. They do not have the world teetering at the brink of nuclear war between superpowers holding competing ideologies. Most of China's potential conflicts are localized territorial disputes with its neighbors. Disputes with Taiwan may have existential implications for the two regimes directly concerned, but this dispute does not threaten vital U.S. national interests. Chinese developments such as the "carrier-killing" DF-21, anti-satellite technologies, and cyber capabilities are intended to support operations in these types of conflicts, not

blue-water warfare on the high seas. Accordingly, future Chinese military efforts will focus on readiness for potential regional conflicts close to their borders as well as protecting commercial lines of communication . China's efforts to protect regional sea lanes will actually complement U.S. security efforts since the U.S. and China share trade routes. One example of these shared maritime security interests between the two nations is in the troubled waters near the Horn of Africa, where both countries could co-operate for mutual benefit to reduce the threat of piracy. Some have suggested that China has purchased significant amounts of U.S. debt to hold as a potential weapon against the U.S. As an investor, it is actually in China's interest to protect U.S. credit- worthiness rather than engage in activity that could destabilize the

U.S. economy. China has little to gain in seeking a major conflict with the U.S . far from their homeland , nor do they have much prospect of increasing their potential reward if they were to win such a conflict . With little hope of breaking U.S. dominance of the sea, the primary consequence of a Chinese victory in some far-flung engagement would be to subject itself to the will of Washington's desires in the maritime domain. Granted, the possibility for Chinese military aggression is stronger in regional territorial disputes, as is evidenced by their aggressive behavior toward their near neighbors. However, China's regional aggression can

be foiled by strengthening regional alliances and encouraging the military modernization of threatened countries. The most worrisome aspect of the focus on China is that exaggerating the potential threat could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Incre ased U.S. military deployments in the Asia-Pacific could heighten tensions and trigger escalation leading to accidental conflict, even when peaceful resolutions of these territorial disputes are within reach. Developments between China and Taiwan show greater prospects for a diplomatic resolution than in the past. China is a regional power whose military interests are regional. The threat of Islamist terrorists, however, remains a very real global threat to U.S. interests.

SCS expansion is motivated by a colonial and economic drive U.S. intervention makes it worse and only opening communication solvesDaksueva and Yilmaz 15---Olga Daksueva and Serafettin Yilmaz, Serafettin Yilmaz received his PhD from the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University and worked as a researcher at Academia Sinica., (“Critical International Relations Theory and the South China Sea”, Perspectives, http://scstt.org/perspectives/2015/324, Accessed 7/5/16, Schloss)

SY: Critical IR seeks to find ways to liberate international relations from the conditions of inequality and hegemony. In the case of the South China Sea, it looks at the root causes of the conflict that keeps related parties in a state of contestation and examine the conditions that prevent them from communicating with each other meaningfully and rationally. For example, Habermas proposes ‘communicative action’, which means that rationality should not be

seen as an autonomous subject but in the subjects that interact with each other. Therefore, for a meaningful solution in the South China Sea, a good step would be to set up a negotiation framework to allow parties to communicate with each other to arrive at rational solutions. Presently, the contenting parties mostly refuse to talk to each other on a bilateral basis and seek multilateral settings and multi-party involvement to negotiate. It would be

more constructive if the sides were involved in face-to-face bilateral communication to sort out differences—

but only with the parties directly involved in the dispute. Other critical IR perspectives look into the question of how colonial legacy has shaped and continuously influenced contemporary inter-state relations . From the post-colonial

perspective, we need to consider the colonial legacy that is in play in current regional conflicts across the world. Certain disagreements in the SCS are a legacy of colonialism , be it French, Japanese or British. We also need to

consider previous colonial interests and look at how they are translated into the actions of those states today. This may shed some light on some questions like , for example, why Japan is interested and wants to get involved in the SCS theater. Now, the situation in the SCS brings into question whether or not external interference creates the proposed positive externalities

for the region. Given the extent of the US military footprint that already exists in East Asia, it is hard to understand how additional deployment of forces would provide greater regional security. It appears to me that the South China Sea has become a theater for great power struggle. Because of this, smaller actors almost instinctively invite outside

intervention to reinforce their position vis-à-vis China. This invokes a colonial legacy in a subtle way at the least. If we looked from the Marxist perspective, we would probably investigate underlying economic interests that move international politics , such as natural resource extraction and other geo-economic interests like the security of trade routes and freedom of navigation. The South China Sea is known to hold significant amounts of mineral and hydrocarbon resources as well as provide livelihood for fishing communities in countries involved in the dispute and beyond. The

conflict for that reason cannot be taken in isolation from the existing geoeconomic realities. From the Gramscian perspective, we can take the United States as a hegemon and then look at how it offers both consent-inducing and coercive methods to regulate regional politics in the SCS domain . On the consent side, it provides certain economic benefits, while on the

coercive side, it deploys military instruments and initiates punitive policies. Then we can employ some specific Gramscian concepts, such as ‘war of position’ and ‘war of maneuver.’ War of position means that conflict between classes or, as with this case, conflict between states, is decided by direct clashes between actors, whereas war of maneuver means the conflict is much slower and hidden and the actors may seek to gain influence and power through indirect ways. We see that the SCS conflict is shifting from war of maneuver to war of

position. That’s why I argue that the SCS crisis will probably be a long one but will not lead to armed conflict between any of the related parties. The window for conflict might have already passed as the last serious armed clash in this region was

between China and Vietnam in 1974. What we see now is that parties are building capabilities, maneuvering, reinforcing their position, and even bringing the conflict to the arbitration to seek greater legitimacy but not necessarily to fight. SCSTT: So, for countries involved, the purpose of this buildup is to reinforce their own capabilities, and despite ongoing tensions, it won’t lead to armed

conflict, is that right? SY: Yes, I believe that armed conflict over the contested territories in the South China Sea would be highly unlikely. This is mainly because of the ongoing shift in regional discourse from one of geopolitical contest to development, which is also present in this latest debate over China’s island genesis program. For one thing,

unlike the previous island reclamation activities of Vietnam, the Philippines or Malaysia, which appear to be largely defense-oriented, Beijing has underlined the scientific and economic nature of its own program. This does not mean there is no defensive intent, but it is accompanied by other less contentious intent . This is a positive thing and, in fact, falls in line with the argument of critical methodology which stresses the growing developmentalist discourse in the region

Energy Security must be understood as more than cooperation vs competition--- the aff causes resource conflictNyman, IR Prof, 14 – (Teaching Fellow in International Relations at the University of Leicester, September 2014, Published in the Journal of International Studies, vol. 43, Limits of the Current Energy Security Literature and the Relevance of Securitisation no. 1, pgs 43-65)

There are two dominant approaches in the current energy security literature; one analyses the causes of and solutions to energy (in)security issues from a strategic/realist perspective, while the other adopts a liberal, market-based approach. Both discourses can be seen in academic

and political circles in the US and China.8 Overall, the conventional literature on energy security is ‘state-centric’ and ‘supply-side biased … [equating] security with self-sufficiency’,9 making it limited in some important respects. The

competition, or strategic, approach to energy security views the ‘international struggle for energy security as a zero-sum game’,10 emphasising competition, national security, state survival and conflict.11 This school sees energy security as ‘inherently geopolitical’,13 and competition is seen as the natural result of scarce resources and increasing

demand.12 Possibilities for energy cooperation are often explicitly dismissed as ‘rather remote’, as in Lee’s observation that ‘it is likely that oil wars … are in the pipeline’.14 The cooperation, or market, approach emphasises integration,

interdependence and liberalisation of the global energy market.15 Here energy security is ‘not a zero-sum effort’.16 In China ‘cooperation’ is emphasised in academic discourse17 and frequently cited as a key foreign policy goal.18 Liberal views within the United States are neatly summarised in the statement of the Center for American Progress that: ‘Collaboration – not confrontation – on energy … would not only benefit both countries, but also the rest of the world.’19 Some authors have sought to synthesise the realist and liberal discourses in an attempt to provide a more nuanced analysis, and, like realist and liberal authors, they provide some

interesting and valuable empirical insights.20 Nevertheless, the language used by these scholars continues to fall back on a binary understanding of energy security as defined by either national cooperation or competition, retaining a state-centric understanding of security and taking scant interest in the role discourse itself plays in making

particular policy possible. This debate over national competition versus cooperation, which dominates the literature, provides too narrow an analytical basis for understanding this important issue fully. The critique presented here is twofold, ontological and

normative. Firstly, I posit that energy security is constituted and contingent, rather than an objectively identifiable goal.21 In the existing literature, ‘threats’ to energy security are defined in a way that implies objectivity in the designation,

with negligible analysis given over to the process by which threats are socially constructed,22 and particular policy courses are made possible by means of the legitimacy created through the use of securititised discourse. Both competition and cooperation, whether economic or strategic, are presented as ‘natural’,23 thus excluding from the outset any genuine possibility of change.

This article argues that, on the contrary, such a static conception of our social environment is problematic, and to the extent that it provides an accurate account of behaviour, this is less the result of its accurate representation of natural order than it is the triumph of self-fulfilling prophecy .24 This leads onto the normative critique. Both sides of the debate implicitly present a conventional view of security whereby something is a security issue because it threatens

the economic or political survival of the state. However, while energy ‘security’ may be a threat to the well-being of the state, actions which flow from the state’s pursuit of energy security can themselves present serious threats both to human security and to the survival of the ecosystem. The presently prevailing definition of energy security is fundamentally incompatible with climate security,25 and thus the argument presented here is that that definition needs to be re-

examined. Moreover, limiting the conception of security to national security perpetuates an ‘us’/’them’ understanding of security, in practice encouraging competition over energy in strategic and/or economic terms. This article broadly follows a critical geopolitical approach, problematising ‘invocations of dangers in political discourse’,26 on the basis of the conviction that (in)security and threats are ‘discursive constructions rather than natural facts’.27 Analysing energy security using securitisation theory helps highlight this, and allows this article to address the ontological and normative critiques presented in the previous section. Securitisation is the discursive process by which ‘an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus … an agent claims a

need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means’.28 It requires ‘a process of articulations’, known as security ‘speech-acts’.29 It is

distinguished by a particular rhetorical structure, emphasising survival, urgency and ‘priority of action’.30 The reverse

process is desecuritisation. Because of the connotations and history of ‘security’, securitising an issue inevitably ‘evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it’ .31 Securitisation theory has been applied to a wide range of topics, though there has been a lack of empirical securitisation analyses of energy.32 This may be partly because of the

difficulty in applying securitisation theory to a field which has gradually become considered an accepted part of the security agenda in both the US and China,33 with rising importance to state survival. For example, the US has had an international energy adviser on the National Security Council since 2003. This is why the Unocal affair makes a particularly good case study, as it allows a clear empirical analysis of a successful securitisation, with policy implications in both the US and China. While there has been much conceptual revisionism of securitisation theory, this cannot be dealt with in detail here.34 However, it is worth noting the importance of the external context and the role of the audience as key factors for securitisation to be successful,35 which is of particular relevance to the case of energy because of the looming reality of ‘peak oil’ and the gradual inclusion of energy in the security agenda. While securitisation theory allows this article to address the ontological critique of the existing literature to show that energy security is constituted and contingent, the normative silence in securitisation is often criticised. This is partly due to the underdeveloped nature of desecuritisation36 by the original authors, who left the normative choice between securitisation and desecuritisation to the researcher to determine according to context, allowing this article to address the normative critique of the existing energy security literature by suggesting desecuritisation as a possibility for change. Viewing security as discourse, a state

labelling something a threat to security ‘enables certain political processes and policies’.37 Policy (in)security discourses are closely tied to conventional understandings of security ; ‘ these links serve to prescribe certain policy responses and proscribe others’.38 In US–China relations, the securitisation of energy reinforces state- centric understandings of security in problematic ways. It reproduces the dominant discourse, focused on rival logics of state competition and state cooperation, and reinforces the present tendency towards national security-focused behaviour. If discourse could be shifted in such a way as to return the issue to ‘the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’,39 it could be dealt with much more constructively, and space could be opened for reflection upon the impact of the current ‘national security’ discourse on environmental and individual security. Problematically, there is a lack of research on desecuritisation in practice, and while advocating desecuritisation of energy, the substantive focus here is on demonstrating the problems of securitising energy; a

thorough examination of how desecuritisation of energy might occur in practice is left for future research. However, using the lens of desecuritisation, this article can put forward a possible solution to the normative critique identified with the energy security literature, presenting a possibility for change by desecuritising the policy discourse surrounding energy, in order to better deal with energy concerns beyond the state, and their impact on individuals and the environment.40 It is important to briefly clarify the differences between desecuritisation and the traditional liberal approach. While the goals of the traditional liberal approach and desecuritisation as used in this article are similar, as they both aim for improved cooperation on energy, they differ both in their positions on how to achieve those goals and in their underlying conception of threat and security. The liberal energy security discourse present in policy circles derives from a particular branch of liberal discourse which encourages cooperation, but retains a state-centric understanding of security, focusing on cooperation as a means to national economic gain, encouraging economic competition between states over energy resources while ignoring the impact this has on individuals and the environment. This discourse is clearly visible in China’s response to US securitisation. Meanwhile, as stated in the ontological critique presented earlier, like the realist approach the liberal discourse on energy security fails to recognise the constituted nature of energy

security, and the role of discourse and action in both making particular policy possible and as an avenue for change. Thus while both approaches advocate cooperation, the liberal literature does not provide any real suggestions for getting there in practice, beyond proposing the US and China cooperate on energy security. Desecuritisation would involve moving energy out of the security sphere,41 away from a state-centric national security us/them paradigm, to make cooperation more likely. It is in this way that desecuritisation allows this approach to move beyond traditional energy security discourses.42

Their South China Sea scenario is a justification for international military dominance – turns the case and endorses interventionism Nilsson 12 – (Fredrik, Political Science Scholar, Lund University; 2012, “Securitizing China's 'Peaceful Rise' : An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/2740544, HWilson)

Some analysts claim that developments in recent years do not reflect the acclaimed ‘peaceful rise’ but have

rather created an image of China as a bully in the South China Sea

(Christensen 2011; 65). This recent history has placed China within a regional security discourse , increasing the performative force of any speech acts addressing the issue of Chinese assertiveness and stability in the South China Sea .

This belief has enabled the U.S. to reaffirm its alliances and maintain or increase military presence at bases in e.g. the Philippines, South Korea and Australia. In November 2011, the Obama administration went on a 7-day trip in the Asia Pacific making sure its presence was felt and noticed while reaffirming the important relationships with regional states and

announcing the American ‘pivot’ to the Asia Pacific. These visits constitute the chief occasions where American discourse surrounding China changed, and where the Chinese rise was incorporated in a wider security discourse of the Asia Pacific. The Obama administration deemed the trip a necessary step to remain competitive in the 21st century and to maintain its position as a regional guarantor of stability and peace (Medcalf 2011). The contexts in which securitizing speech acts took place, and the way that the discourse was shaped around points of stability, freedom of navigation, human rights, economic growth and the rule of law, made it appealing to virtually every actor with a disconcerting relation to China. The performative force of this discourse, as mentioned above, is mainly founded in the ILEO and the U.S. discourse merges with claimants’ worries about China’s assertiveness. This naturally includes all five actors besides China with claims in the South China Sea, i.e. Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, but also other states such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia whose national security is depending on

regional stability. In relation to the rapid ‘refocus’ of U.S. foreign policy to the Asia Pacific, Chinese scholars have argued that: “The US changed its Asia strategy in a hurry to return to Asia, complicating China's relations with its neighbors

further and weakening their political mutual trust” (Jie and Feiteng 2010). Furthermore, the Chinese has a different view

on developments in the Asia Pacific, arguing that: “the U.S. has disturbed the military balance in the Western Pacific region ” (Han Xudong quoted in Chase 2011; 140). It is important to acknowledge the Chinese position, as it is not

necessarily considered in U.S. securitizations . The next section deals with a range of significant speeches and texts that

have shaped the U.S. approach towards China based on the above circumstances and conditions. 4.2 Political sector: Securitizing Chinese assertiveness in territorial claims Although the nature of territorial disputes might seem to fall into the military sector, the issues are largely related to established international law in the form of freedom of navigation in international waters and the UNCLOS which outlines boundaries, territorial rights, and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, issues pertaining to international law fall under the political sector (1998; 141). They further argue that by identifying “threats to international society, order, and law” states, such as the United States, can securitize a threat to the international order and thus legitimize interventions in sovereign issues (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; 159). This is visible in the following case where the U.S. has decided to get involved in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea on precisely these grounds. Established international law (UNCLOS) provides a framework to deal with disputes such as the ones between China-Philippines and China-Vietnam. However, with increasing assertiveness and an unwillingness to agree on a path to solution, any territorial dispute that might result in armed conflict is threatening to destabilize the region. The threat in this instance is thus mainly identified as one where international law is being breeched and vital international commercial shipping lanes in one of the world’s busiest waters are compromised. This has been deemed unacceptable by the United States China’s 9-dash line claim (see figure 1) is at the

center of the issue as China claims virtually the entire South China Sea and thus puts it in dispute with all other claimants. Since 2010, a number of incidents involving Chinese patrol boats have caused some anxiety in the region. In one incident, a Chinese patrol boat cut the cables of a Vietnamese survey vessel operating in Vietnam’s acclaimed continental shelf (Glaser 2012a; 2). Chinese boats have also intruded in disputed waters that the Philippines claim (rightfully according to UNCLOS) as a part of its EEZ (Valencia 2011). Moreover, China also warned that any exploration in the Spratly area is a violation of its sovereignty and it has labeled the SCS a ‘core interest’ (Thayer 2010; 69). The Philippines has resorted to diplomatic protests due to its inferior military power, and president Benigno Aquino III has said the government is ready to take the issue to the UN (Reyes 2011). The Chinese permanent representation at the UN sent a note verbale to the Secretary Gerneral expressing its outrage over the Philippine claims to islands that China argues belongs to its Nansha Islands (PRC 2011). Furthermore, in a move

towards internal balancing of power, Vietnam reportedly signed a contract to buy six submarines from Russia (Pham 2009). According to statements made by top officials in the Obama administration, America has a range of national interests in the disputes. A

report published by the Council on Foreign Relations outlines four major reasons why the U.S. has national interests in the South China Sea, namely: (1) Upholding global rules and norms such as freedom of navigation; (2) Alliance security and regional stability that the U.S. is expected to uphold to ensure stability ; (3) Economic interests pertaining to shipping lanes where $1,2 trillion of U.S. goods pass through each year; (4) Cooperative relationship with China from

which both states benefit (Glaser 2012a; 4-6). These national interests are substantial and guide U.S. policy in the region. July 2010 officially marked the beginning of U.S. involvement in the South China Sea disputes to further

protect its interests by securitizing the Chinese threat to international maritime laws and norms. At the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, Hillary Clinton received a lot of critical remarks from Chinese officials after she brought up the South China Sea issue, something that Beijing had kept off the agenda for 15 years (Graham-Harrison 2010). Clinton (2010) said, among other things: ”The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea”. She further stated that the U.S. urges a peaceful resolution and that it supports the 2002 Declaration on the Conducts of Parties in the South China Sea, and that “The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration” (Clinton 2010). The fact that 12 of the 27 countries at the meeting favored a multilateral approach provoked the Chinese Foreign minister Yang to believe that the U.S. effort was staged and planned to put pressure on China (Landler 2010). As one Australian reporter observed: “The US has helped Asia find its voice to speak up against China” (Hartcher 2011) and this did not sit well with the Chinese. National Defense University professor Han Xudong stated, in relation to the U.S. decision to involve itself in the South China Sea, that: “the Obama administration must clearly understand: are they prepared to fully open up an era of friction with China? If they are not then they are certainly giving the impression that they are” (Xudong quoted in Graham-Harrison 2010). The reaction indicated that despite the somewhat benign approach taken by Clinton, it was perceived as malignant. Subsequently, on her visit to Manila in November 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose to use the name ”West Philippine Sea” for what is usually referred to as the South China Sea (Clinton 2011a). This discursive practice could have unintended destabilizing consequences that might lead Manila to be less open to a peaceful resolution to its disputes with China (Glaser 2012a; 6). It can be understood as a risky rhetorical tool employed for the specific context to enforce Manila’s perception that the U.S. is sympathizing with the Philippines. Whether intentional or not, the rhetoric shaped the wider order of discourse. Clinton was more than once asked questions pertaining to the U.S. position on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which clearly indicated Philippine worries and its pursuit to externally balance Chinese power. When asked about U.S. support for the Philippines in the dispute with China over the Spratly’s, Clinton said the following: The United States does not take a position on any territorial claim, because any nation with a claim has the right to assert it, but they do not have the right to pursue it through intimidation or coercion. They should be following international law, the rule of law, the UN Convention on Law of the Seas, UNCLOS… And we stand for the rule of law and we stand for international norms and standards, which is why we support the peaceful resolution (Clinton 2011a). Clinton thus indicated a stance of non-involvement in this particular instance, and marked a path where the U.S. indorses the legal framework of UNCLOS. This statement is not a securitizing move but rather an attempt to limit expectations on U.S. involvement and keep U.S. reaction to conflict

ambiguous. However, the U.S. is no longer a bystander on the issue but rather a n active participant and a

central actor in shaping regional relations. Following turbulence over its involvement in the South China Sea dispute, the United States, through Hillary Clinton, continued to emphasize U.S. interest in the dispute as the leaders and upholders of the liberal international order . In her widely cited article in Foreign Policy, Clinton made the following remarks: Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea,

or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players (Clinton 2011b) Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is identified as crucial to global progress and to ensuring security in the greater Asia-Pacific region. By incorporating the word crucial, Clinton dramatizes the issue and presents it as a top priority, something that, according to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998; 26), places an issue in the security realm. The order of discourse is changing with this statement because of the speech’s clear reflection of security discourse through words like defending, security, and peace. Nevertheless, there is an element of what Faircoulgh calls ‘modality’ by not explicitly naming China but instead saying “the region’s key players”. Modality is used in order for the speaker to hedge against confrontation in which it can say: ‘I/we did not refer explicitly to this or that actor’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002; 84). Nevertheless, transparency in military activities is arguably directed towards China. This makes it clear that the political and military issues exist in the same order of discourse. Clinton further argued that the bilateral U.S. alliances in the region ensure the future facilitation of economic development in a time of security challenges (Clinton 2011b). In a response to Chinese officials’ assertions that the United States is not a part of the South China Sea dispute and should thus stay out, Clinton responded as follows: “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea” (Clinton 2011c). Not only does the United States have a national interest in the order it has established, but it also has a range of regional alliances that involve certain responsibilities. National interest also takes a place within the security discourse as a way of enforcing the importance of an issue and making it a top priority. Regarding the Philippines, Clinton tried to reassure Manila by saying: We are determined and committed to supporting the defense of the Philippines, and that means trying to find ways of providing affordable material and equipment that will assist the Philippine military to take the steps necessary to defend itself (Clinton 2011d). This statement does not necessarily guarantee U.S. involvement in case of conflict, but it does state that it will help the Philippines with necessary means to fight off any enemy. The U.S. decided to take a stance that does not fully commit it to the defense of the Philippines, but that still involves a clear element of security practice through alliance and a commitment of support. U.S. officials consistently state that the U.S. does not take sides in the South China Sea dispute and they decline to answer how the United States would react in case of Chinese coercion arose over disputed territory and waters (Glaser 2012a; 2). This is likely so for strategic reasons; to keep China guessing. Clinton’s positional power as a securitizing actor seems to be limited to a practice where she reflects and reinforces the discourse produced mainly by Barack Obama’s administration apparatus. This is likely due to the nature of her job. However, it is clear that she is constantly reproducing the existing U.S. discourse on China’s assertiveness, the U.S. national interest in freedom of navigation, and the possible security implications of China’s behavior. On the Asian ‘tour’

in 2011, Clinton and Obama both made essential, coherent, statements. As the Commander in Chief of a democratic nation, the president has an institutionally tied authority and legitimacy in speaking security. The Copenhagen school argues that: “security is very much a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power to define security” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; 31). During his visit to Australia in November 2011, president Obama gave a keynote speech to the Australian Parliament in which a clear path for the future was painted. He made the following remarks, quoted at length, reflecting the same order of discourse and its embeddedness in a larger strategy of the United States’ Asia ‘pivot’: First, we seek security, which is the foundation of peace and prosperity. We stand for an international order in which the rights and responsibilities of all nations and all people are upheld. Where international law and norms are enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to regional security, and where disagreements are resolved peacefully. Now, I know that some in this region have wondered about America’s commitment to upholding these principles. So let me address this directly. As the United States puts our fiscal house in order, we are reducing our spending. And yes, after a decade of extraordinary growth in our military budgets – and as we definitively end the war in Iraq, and begin to wind down the war in Afghanistan – we will make some reductions in defense spending. As we consider the future of our armed forces, we've begun a review that will identify our most important strategic interests and guide our defense priorities and spending over the coming decade. So here is what this region must know. As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not -- I repeat, will not -- come at the expense of the Asia Pacific (Obama 2011a). The promises and statements of these parts of the speech are unambiguous and firm. Its textual structure further develops the discourse that the Asia Pacific region is a top priority in U.S. foreign policy and that security is placed as a prerequisite. He is enforcing the weight of freedom of navigation as a core value of the United States and the international order. Any threat to this international order is a security issue. He is also attempting to settle any growing uncertainty and doubt about U.S. commitments in the region to its allies, as a balancer and a guarantor of security, by strongly emphasizing that no budget cuts will come at the expense of the Asia Pacific. Obama further went on to state his intention with the coming Bali summit: “I believe we can address shared challenges, such as proliferation and maritime security, including cooperation in the South China Sea” (Obama 2011a). There is little or no hedging (in the sense of Fairclough) in his speech except for not being explicit about whom he is referring to. The understanding is tacit, and this was illustrated through the response of the Chinese media and in the regional media coverage the days following the visit. Now, not only did the U.S. reaffirm several alliances during the tour in 2011, but it has also raised a warning finger to China in an increasingly stern manner. In a similar vein, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated the following: In 2011, China continued a pattern of provocation in disputed areas of the South China Sea. China’s policy in the region appears driven by a desire to intimidate rather than cooperate. Many of China’s activities in the region may constitute violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. While China sometimes demonstrates a willingness to cooperate with other claimants to disputed waters in the South China Sea, it is unlikely that China will concede any of its claims

(2011; 180). This text, produced to guide decisions in congress, explicitly identifies China’s intentions as malignant. Regardless of whether the intention is to contain China (as some argue) or not, the result is that the U.S. decided to employ a discourse that it is aiming to justify its increased presence, influence, assertion and balance of power against China.

The extraordinary measures that have been taken to back up these statements are visible in a range of ways from increased military exercises with the Philippines, cooperation with Vietnam, presence in Singapore and the stationing of troops in Darwin, Australia. However, the measures taken to enforce the security in the South China Sea are closely knit to the securitization of China’s maritime capabilities and the military sector . The measures will thus be discussed together after the next section.

Link – CyberCyber threats are hyper securitized by the military which cause us to ignore important attacks that threaten our safetyLobato and Kenkel 15--- LUÍSA CRUZ LOBATO and KAI MICHAEL KENKEL, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Rio de Janeiro, ** Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, Brasil, 2015, (“Discourses of cyberspace securitization in Brazil and in the United States”, SCIELO Brazil, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292015000200023&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en#aff1, Accessed 7/5/16, Schloss)

The Copenhagen School argues that a security threat is social construct-not subject to structuralist ontology (Wæver

2012). The militarist and statist bias of Strategic Studies is here opened up for new and diverse referent objects and critical, constructivist/post-structuralist outlook (Krause and Williams 1997). This research emphasizes the ideas of speech-act securitization and sectors, shedding light on the process of construction and definition of threats (Krause 1998:306)-an increasingly relevant perspective in the case of cybersecurity. Utilizing theory of securitization implies recognizing its theoretical limitations (Balzacq 2011:19; Cavelty 2008:24) and risks (Bigo 2007:21). It cannot postulate a specific notion of security; rather, in highlighting the role of discourse, a fine-grained application of such a theory seeks to grasp how a securitizing actor operates, as well as how a certain topic ascends to the security agenda. The approach embraces the societal variables of security, besides the process of constructing threats (Elbe 2007:36; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009:1160). Notwithstanding, the unintended consequences of its inappropriate use contribute to increased insecurity, as well as to catastrophic policies regarding human security (Bigo 2007:3). Securitization theory characterizes security itself as an objective and self-referential concept and practice (Buzan et. al. 1998:25), acquiring different meanings in different societies, according to actors' perceptions (Krause 1998:306). Threats are socially and discursively constructed, products of a semantic competition over the persuasion of an audience regarding the labeling of a given topic as a matter of security (Buzan et al. 1998:32). This broadens the notion of the referent objects beyond the state, and one of the theory's virtues is precisely its focus on society as a specific sector of security analysis (Buzan and Hansen 2009:36). Securitization is intersubjective, discursive, intentional and performative, as well as non-discursive, non-intentional and removed from the locus of the action (Balzacq 2011). Certain problems become security issues when presented as threatening in an efficient manner (Balzaq 2011; Cavelty 2008). Buzan et al. (1998) underline that the analysis of security entails the distinction between referent objects, securitizing actors and functional actors. Referent objects like the state, the individual or a computer network are those who suffer the existential threat (Deibert 2002); securitizing actors are responsible to declare an existential threat to the object of reference. Several entities can fit this role, such as bureaucrats, political leaders, governments, groups of pressure, as long as they are imbued with authority to deliver the act of speech (Buzan et al. 1998; Cavelty 2008); finally, the functional actors affect the sectorial dynamic, while they influence decisions, but are

not involved in the act of speech per se. To securitize a given topic is to transfer it to the sphere of security, labeling it as an existential threat to a certain human collectivity (Buzan et al. 1998:24; Cavelty 2008:25). This move is based on hypotheses of the future: of what shall happen if a given policy is or is not adopted (Buzan et al. 1998). The process involves securitizing actors who speak in the name of referent objects and gain authority by directing their rhetoric to an audience that must accept the speech-act through which a topic is granted the "security" label (Balzacq 2011). There is competition around what should constitute both threat and security, the latter being considered an essentially contested concept whose meaning is not objectively framed, but inherently disputed (Buzan et al. 1998). The content of security is constituted through a speech act, a discourse that securitizes and constructs referent objects as well as real or perceived threats which require that adoption of enhanced policy measures that escape the usual decision-making process, allowing the policy to go beyond established rules and regulations (Buzan et al. 1998:201). Speech-act theory is the basis for understanding the securitization process, since rhetoric lends strength, while constituting a threat in itself (Wæver 2012:53). Speech acts wed action and speech, in that saying becomes doing: speech acts can involve saying something, as well as acting while saying something, besides deriving an action from the act of speech itself (Austin 1962:12; Onuf 1989:83; Balzacq 2011:5). As such, the process of securitization requires

the audience's acceptance of the threat (Buzan et al. 1998:25). This analysis presents a discursive analysis of the securitization of cyberspace, based on specific texts such as, inter alia, official documents, speeches, and press articles. Governments whose infrastructure and daily lives are highly dependent upon digital networks, as well as think tanks, tend to figure as securitizing actors, for they perceive the destabilization of the networks in which their operations strongly confide as threats. Thus, the loss of information or of operational capacity ranks as an important threat to their stability. Likewise, in the economic sector, networks also tend to be securitized in their own terms or in reference to structures that depend upon them and to social groups (Buzan et al. 1998:100). In this case, the audience is both part of the process that constitutes the threat, as well as is varies according the logic applied for persuasion

(Léonard and Kaunert 2011). The Copenhagen School distinguishes five security sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental (Buzan et al. 1998). Each sector comprises particular referent objects, as well as securitizing and functional actors. Balzacq (2011) highlights the relational feature within the sectors, as well as their relevance to the constitution of the involved objects and actors. Practices thus involve intersubjective interpretations of a certain historical and cultural inheritance, and also of the structure that constrains

them. Discourses of cyber securitization cannot be removed from the practices that constitute cyberattacks, software and hardware breaches, and their use to conceal or reveal identities, just as "the discursive side of nuclear deterrence and arms control practices cannot be entirely understood without the missiles, bombs and organizational resources, which over time sustained its existence and importance" (Adler and

Pouliot 2011:23). The discursive elements are influenced by daily-life activities that produce diversified perceptions in the actors. These perceptions are re-dimensioned to the virtual reality and projected in terms of potential disruptive events. Therefore, "it is relevant to conceive of discourse as practice and to understand practice as discourse" (Adler and Pouliot 2011:16). Discourses on the security of cyberspace require the broadening of the traditional concept of security that focuses only on military power and states' ability to tackle threats (Walt 1991). The incorporation of information technologies into contemporary war fighting, hacker operations, threats to users' data and privacy, and the civil and the military interest in the area all justify the growing space cybersecurity has come to occupy in the field of international security. Since cyberspace goes beyond the logic of national borders (Cavelty 2012a), the constructed threat encompasses multiple referent objects (Deibert 2002), and requires the theorization of a peculiar sector in order to precisely contextualize processes that are typical to the phenomenon of securitization. In the 1990s, securitization theorists did not perceive cybersecurity as an existential threat to states (Buzan et al. 1998). However, as consequence of the growing dependence of human societies upon networks, Hansen and Nissenbaum

(2009) argue that cybernetic issues are already securitized, suggesting that the materialization of this process is highlighted through policy, institutional and strategic responses. The Estonian and the US examples are paradigmatic, given the launch of Estonia's Center for Cyber Defense and the establishment in the US, in 1996, of the Presidents' Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection. It is paramount to mention that different cases call for different securitization processes, all assuming the central importance of audience acceptance. In dealing with cyberspace issues, this process is directed toward didtinct audiences: decision-makers, IT experts, the military and public opinion (Léonard and

Kaunert 2011). Beyond these multiple audiences, in the context of cybersecurity, it is possible to recognize how some states, acting as securitizing actors before domestic and international audiences, alert to the risks of cyberattacks and to the need to establish a specific agenda to deal with those matters, while other states' bureaucracies, for example in the military sector, participate in the construction of the threat. Most concerns over cyberwar stemmed from this universe (Cavelty 2012c). It is also plausible that private agents should seek to securitize cyberspace, although their presence usually takes the form of functional actors. In this sense, the press stands out for its coverage of cyberattacks, as does academia, which has made an extensive contribution to the debate over cyber threats, alongside technology companies and their clients. This multiple constellation creates the necessity of a theoretical framework that comprehends the connection between discourses and the political and normative consequences of constructing virtual issues as security problems. The idea of a cyber-sector is relatively novel. It has been theorized as an attempt to revamp the Copenhagen approach given the importance cybersecurity has acquired, reinforcing the idea that it has been successfully securitized (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Hart 2011; Garcia and Palhares, 2014). Politically, this translates into institutional and discursive developments that, for instance, under the Clinton administration in the US have engendered the creation of the aforementioned Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, as well as the formulation of national strategies oriented towards cyberspace (USA 1999; 2003; 2011; Brazil 2012). Different discourses entail different threats, referent objects and securitizing actors.

For Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009), there are three patterns of security within the cyber-sector: first, hypersecuritization, which represents the extension of securitization beyond regular levels of risk and threat, typically characterized by chain effects that have the capacity to reach other sectors. This pattern comprises catastrophic scenarios that usually contain projections of cascading disasters. The leverage of this discourse results from the hypothesis that damage to networks would yield radical effects in the societal, military and financial arenas, through scenarios that resemble

environmental catastrophes. Secondly, daily practices of security refer to the impact of virtual threats in the everyday life. The hypersecuritization landscapes gain even more plausibility, for catastrophe is usually associated with the disturbance of daily habits, such as the risks of virus-infected computers. This demands responsible behavior from Internet users, turning this group of interconnected people into audiences for both the potential enhancement and reduction of insecurity in the system, since these third parties

can be instrumentalized for DDoS attacks (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009:1166). Finally, the pattern of technification creates discursive space for experts given the need for people with specific knowledge about systems operation. Technification legitimizes cyber securitization, supporting hypersecuritization discourses and aiming to influence public opinion in favor of those who master certain machines and the architecture of certain systems: "the mobilization of technification within a logic of securitization is thus one that allows for a particular constitution of epistemic authority and political legitimacy" (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009:1167). The constitution of the expert's authority also leads to a separation between the "good science" of data processors and the "bad knowledge" of

hackers. Cyber securitization involves a two-fold movement: from the political to the securitized; and from the political to the technical (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). While Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) consider interconnectivity an idiosyncrasy that unites an entire constellation of referent objects, one can infer that the networks that underpin systems and services constitute a referent object common to scenarios of hypersecuritization, of everyday practices and of technification. This is not to say that there are no referent objects interrelated through the network, but rather that securitization frequently happens to foster its integrity. Even different possible referent objects, are generally thought of in relation to the network itself: interconnected states and collectivities, networks of business and computers, governmental (confidential information), military and critical infrastructure networks (dependent upon hardware systems). Moreover, although the authors emphasize the link between cyber and military securities (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009:1162-1164), they do not elaborate on their differences. This distinction is of the utmost importance since it allows differentiation between security logic and military logic-which will be discussed below. According to Buzan et al. (1998:70), the military sector is pervaded by the logic of friend versus foe,

and by the centrality of states and political organizations similar in their insistence upon territorial integrity. While phenomena such as Stuxnet in Iran may bring the logics of the cyber-sector and military sector closer together, accentuating the perceptions of friend versus foe, and of the protection of a territorial integrity, they nevertheless differ perceptibly, since the former sees networks as major referent objects or as links to identify other objects.. There are no clear-cut divisions, due precisely to the organization of the networks themselves (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009:1161). Cyberspace is an open space in terms of concurring risks and solutions. The Hansen and Nissenbaum discursive construction of threats and of referent objects does not necessarily imply the adoption of a military logic of security. In securitization, a successful speech-act stems from the combination of language and inter-subjectivity (Buzan et al. 1998:32) with conditions that facilitate their interaction. These can be internal (the speech-act must follow a security grammar) or external (the social conditions of the securitizing actor and the likelihood of the acceptance of their speech, as well as the features of the threats that hinder or facilitate securitization). This is essential for the analysis of the content of specific securitizing actions, such as official documents, as well as for grasping how the utilization of the cyber-sector and the three patterns above contribute to understanding the construction of threats and vulnerability in cyberspace. The analysis of American and Brazilian securitization discourses This section addresses American and Brazilian discourses of securitization, based on national policy documents and on media accounts, with the intent of identifying to which audience these speech-acts were aimed, their referent objects, the presumed existential threat and the proposed responses. The discursive analysis identifies patterns of hypersecuritization, of securitization of everyday practices, and of technification, and the level of securitization of each of the cases is compared. The United States In the case of the US, the discourse of securitization is no novelty, having already gone through several phases. In the early 1990s, the country migrated from a process of cybersecurity politicization, or its introduction into the political agenda and debates, to securitization itself (Cavelty 2012a). Nonetheless, both the Clinton (USA 1999) and George W. Bush (2003) Administrations, in their official discourses, witnessed - or practiced - pervasive securitization moves. The criteria for the prevention and reduction of risks from cyberattacks were institutionalized via the International Strategy for Cyberspace (2011) during the Obama Administration. The most recent strategy adopts a view in which cyberspace is the source of both opportunities and threats, derived from the interdependency and interconnectivity of networks. Thus, damage to cables, servers and networks caused by natural disasters, accidents or even sabotage, the spillover of material conflicts to cyberspace, as well as several types of cybercrimes are examples of threats that transcend national borders from virtual platforms: (...) low costs of entry to cyberspace and the ability to establish an anonymous virtual presence can also lead to "safe havens" for criminals, with or without a state's knowledge. Cybersecurity threats can even endanger international peace and security more broadly, as traditional forms of conflict are extended into cyberspace (USA 2011:5). The document shows an effort to publicize

the securitization of cyberspace, an intention derived from the focus on government officials and industry. Cybersecurity as a matter of national security seems to have been internalized in the media, while cyberattacks, including DDoS, and the development of sophisticated viruses are frequently portrayed as 'weapons' and 'acts of war' threatening the security of US and allies' networks (Deibert 2013). Patterns of hypersecuritization, of everyday practices and technification thrive in light of the proliferation of cybercrimes; viruses and worms that are capable of suspending the operation of industrial and commercial facilities; of attacks that affect the privacy of industry and individuals; and, at the national or international level, raise the risk of virtualization of material conflicts. The document explicits to the public the implications of this threat to national security and to the private sector, as well as to everyday life. Network stability is central to the strategy, "... a cornerstone of our global prosperity, and securing those networks is more than strictly a technical matter" (USA 2011:9). Their instability and vulnerability threaten individuals, the private sector, governments and international society (USA 2011; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Deibert 2002); threats may originate from terrorists, cybercriminals or even other states (USA 2011:12). However, while the sources of threats are attacks on networks and systems, many of these actors may operate as functional actors. The logic would be similar to what Buzan et al. (1998) sketch out using a company that pollutes the environment: these actors directly influence the dynamic of the cyber-sector, but they are neither referent objects nor securitizing actors,

though they may contribute to actions that impact the perception of the threat. The threat to networks that support critical infrastructures is portrayed in relation to the country's sovereignty and to the security of the population. This discourse is also legitimized for the particular features of the cyberspace, or appealing to traditional threats, such as terrorism and aggression. The reference is indeed relevant, since both securitization and the cyber threats interact in threat scenarios (Buzan et al. 1998), adopting the assumption of an acquiescent audience not entirely aware of the

dangers (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). The document resorts to deterrence, as well as to the use of force, as possible responses to cyber

threats (EUA 2011:14). It is important to highlight that the military sector has a significant role in the way cyber threats are perceived and managed-a trend that has increased in the debate on cybersecurity since the

1990s (Cavelty 2012c). Beyond the above document, President Barack Obama's official discourses stressed the importance of placing cybersecurity among matters of national security, defining cyberspace as a strategic asset (EUA

2009), hence demonstrating its institutionalization in policy programs and an attempt to gain audiences in other security sectors. In 2010, the "Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act" (PCNAA) was brought before the US Senate, seeking the assignment to the Federal Government of extensive responsibility in emergencies involving cybersecurity, including the power to intervene

in the private sector (PCNAA 2010). Although the bill has not yet been voted upon, in the intelligence field, similar interventions led by the National Security Agency have already taken place without formal provisions.

Securitization of cyberspace causes small attacks to trigger large scale retaliationKlingova 13 [Katarina, Central European University Department of Political Science, Master of Arts in Political Science, 2013, Securitization of Cyber Space in the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Estonia, www.etd.ceu.hu/2013/klingova_katarina.pdf] Schloss

Just like economic or environmental issues, threats of cyber space have global implications and tore down the concepts of nations boarders. Indeed, securitization theory of Copenhagen School of security studies balanced out rigidity of realist security concepts with the fluidity of international relations of the 21*' century, between the state and the individual as well as between consistency and flexibility. Therefore, it has great applicability and provides an excellent framework for cyber space's security. Indeed,

cyber attacks and especially cyber war are extensively modifying the traditional concept of conflicts and the process of providing security. Myriam Dunn Cavelty points out "cyber-security and national security differ most decisively in

scope, in terms of the actors involved and in their 'referent object', [which protection they seek]"(20l2a). Furthermore, it is possible to observe that nations round the world have securitized or penalized particular actions in cyber space. However, it is questionable whether militarization of this 'commonly shared' network is efficient. Therefore, the Copenhagen School 's theory or securitization is exceptionally suitable for 'securitization' of cyber space because of "its understanding of security as a discursive modality with a

particular rhetorical structure and political effects" (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009, p. I156). In addition, the securitization theory is appropriate of cyber space because it points out that security discourse comprises of other referent objects than just the state or nation. And consequently, it understands that if the existential threat is sufficiently explicit and gained the attention of the relevant audience, then armed forces would be just one of the sectors of society that would be involved in handling the situation (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). Undeniably, for proper securitization of cyber space a comprehensive action plan with all societal and global actors involved is necessary.

Therefore, the theory of securitization is an appropriate approach for cyber security discourse, because it enables fluent transition between the referent objects as well as securitizing actors, both from private to political-military sphere. Indeed, the cyber domain does not exist as a totally insulated plane. It is occupied by states, individuals, private companies and many other organizations. The multitude of security discourses that relate to these groups and individuals in the physical world are often mirrored in discourses of cyber security. Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum therefore view the discourse of cyber security as "arising from competing articulations of constellations of referent objects rather than separate referent objects", exemplified by the "linkage between 'networks' and 'individuals' and human collective referent objects" present in this discourse (2009, p. 1163). Therefore, within securitization theory, Hansen and Nissenbaum

identified three discourses with different objects of reference and specific forms of securitization grammar, specific speech act of securitization. Accordingly, cyber security has three different security modalities: hypersecuritization, everyday security practices and

technifications (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). vastness of upcoming threats, predicting their immense cascading effects, and thus calls for extreme and most of the time unnecessary countermeasures. While the authors point out that securitization in general

is connected with hypothetical scenarios of existential threat, it is the instantaneity of its impact, the urge for immediate

action, and interconnectedness resulting into cascading effects throughout the whole range of reference objects of security. The hypersecuritization discourse of cyber space "hinges on multi-dimensional cyber disaster scenarios" that are

going to severely damage the computer network system. The unprecedented disaster is going to have implications for the whole of human society. Hyper-securitized cyber discourse compares the attack in cyber space to the dangers of the Cold War and utilizes the analogies to the logic and language of nuclear war . This discourse utilizes the language of fear based on the power of the ripple effect in the whole network. The absence of prior large-scale attack of a nuclear explosion's magnitude leads to vagueness in the cyber-security discourse, since no one knows what measures would be appropriate. "The extreme reliance on the future and the anonymity of the threats... 3 make the discourse susceptible to charges of 'exaggeration," while the rising probability of such attack in the world highly dependent on the technology increases the vulnerabilities and dangers if all warnings are ignored and no safety precautious measures are applied (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009, p. I I64). The retaliation would be enormous- The object of referent in hyper-securitization is mainly the state or nation whose security is being threatened by a massive electronic attack. The second discourse of securitization of cyber space is of every day security practices implying the effect on the daily lives of ordinary people. The referent point of

securitization is an individual. Threats are more plausible to be experienced, because this discourse links elements of disaster scenarios with ordinary actions and every day needs (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). With accessible and easily downloadable hacking tools, any breach into critical networks could escalate into severe national threat and implication of the highest security measures (Dunn Cavelty 2010). The referent subject is familiarized with the threat, not only because individuals will experience the disruptive effects first hand, but also because they themselves can

be responsible for an attack in cyber space. The individual is the necessary element in the light against insecurity as well as the liability to the system as a whole, whether through deliberative actions or not (Hansen and

Nissenbaum, 2009; Following the referent subject of everyday securitization of cyber space, a responsible action of each individual connected to the network via World Wide Web is necessary. Proper educative measures of "computer hygiene" need to be applied, otherwise the innocent might be misused as zombie computers providing perfect cover for the intruders and criminal networks. Indeed, the development of personal computers and other smart devices have led to exponential growth of the internet, which made cyber networks denser and much more vulnerable. The daily lives of ordinary people are vulnerable to the computerization and programming of the administration system. The vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure is high, but establishment of individual responsibility and ownership of data as well as proper education, as applied in Estonia, should reduce direct correlation of individuals with adjectives such as careless and helpless. Nobody, neither government officials, private sector nor individuals want the total collapse of the internet or the critical infrastructure networks. The last securitization discourse applicable to cyber space is of technification deriving from computer experts' know-how. In order to properly understand and implement efficient measures an extensive knowledge of the computer network is necessary, not just the large-scale disruptive consequences of the cyber attack (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). Therefore, computer experts have to closely

cooperate with security experts and other representatives of administrations. Techno-utopian solutions of the privileged experts have to be subject of open discussion of wider expertise. One of the critiques of technical securitization of cyber space is the privileged role of computer experts who might defy the blind uneducated masses (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). However, despite the fact that certain differences in opinion between computer experts exist, most of them argue against hypersecuritization and exaggeration of threats and fear (Cavelty 2010b, Rid 2013).

Neg FWTheory informs practice—their indicts of critical analysis produce a vicious cycle in which we are unable to uncover discursive foundations of powerPan, IR Prof, 12 – (Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, PhD, Political Science and IR from Peking University, November 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise,” Edward Elgar Publishing, 84-94, HWilson)

If containment continues to be part and parcel of US China policy, what does it have to do with the China threat' paradigm? It is one thing to say

that there is a link between theory and ideas on the one hand and practice and foreign policy on the other, but it is quite a challenge to empirically demon- strate such a link Gordon Craig once

observed that 'To establish the relation- ship between ideas and foreign policy is always a difficult task,

and it is no accident that it has attracted so few historians' 10 T he result , of course, has been a vicious cycle—

with little scholarly interest in this matter, we end up knowing still less about the connection Furthermore,

for various reasons, both scholars and practitioners tend to play down the existence of such a connection . In

the case of scholars, they often lament that their ideas are underappreciated by practitioners, whereas the latter tend to brush aside ideas coming from the ivory tower as nothing more than arm-chair commentaries. Either way, the

common perception is that there has been a yawning gap between the ivory tower and the corridor of power 11 While such a gap may well exist in certain individual circumstanccs or in relation to particular policy or theoretical issues, overall this does not overturn the proposition that policy necessarily operates through ideas or theories . As will be demon- strated below, without the knowledge support of the China threat" paradigm, containment will not be able to function as an effective policy.

First, the threat paradigm helps define (or at least renew) the purpose of containment as a policy Bernard Schaffer tells us that policy has three dimensions of meaning: purposes: the review of information and the determi- nation of appropriate action: and the securing and commitment of resources in its implementation.12 We are familiar with the second and third dimensions of policy, but no policy can exist without the first, namely, a certain purpose (or purposes) In fact, functioning like a fulcrum, the articulation of a relevant purpose is often the very first—

sometimes also the most difficult—step in a policy-making process. For instance, as far as US strategic planners are

concerned, the main challenge lies not in implementing a policy of military build-up. but in justifying or identifying a legitimate public purpose for that policy Likewise, for weapons manufacturers, promoting arms sales is not an overly complicated task: but in order to translate it into official policy, they require a rationale, or more specifically, a legitimate target against which their arms should be deployed In both cases, identifying a purpose or target is crucial to policy-making.

Thanks to a China threat 'out there', a new purpose can be injected into US foreign policy. It provides a rationale for a policy that would otherwise struggle to justify its contemporary relevance This constitutive effect on US China policy can be likened to the way in which the discourse of terrorism justified and legitimised the US-led 'War on Terror" For a start, the terrorist threat immediately gave George W Bush a hitherto elusive sense of certainty about his mission and policy direction. As reported in the New York Times, not until the September 11" tragedy did the President begin to feel sure about what he should be doing' 13 While the rise of terrorism has enabled the US to preoccupy itself with the War on Terror' for more than a decade, at least for a particular section of the US foreign policy establishment, a more lasting purpose for US foreign and security policy requires the China threat.

Second, the threat paradigm contributes to policy-making by spelling out some specific policy options. From the beginning, the

representation of China as a danger is not merely an intellectual question about 'what is China?*, it is always concerned with the practical question of what to do about it ?' For example,

in their book The Coming Conflict with China, Bernstein and Munro devote a whole chapter to the issue of how to manage China's rise

Among their policy recommendations are maintaining a strong US military presence in Asia , strengthening Japan, continuing arms sales to Taiwan, and restricting China's nuclear weapons

arsenal" Similarly, in the last pages of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer believes that an appropriate China policy is not what he calls the misguided' engagement strategy, but containment to 'slow the

rise of China' 15 Charles Krauthammer, a prominent neoconservative proponent of the China threat argument, not only advocated explicitly for containing China in his 1996 Time magazine article, but also detailed how this can best be done. Taking "a rising and threatening China' as a pregiven fact, he insisted that any rational policy' towards the country should be predicated on various containment strategies such as strengthening regional alliances (with Japan. Vietnam, India, and Russia) to box in China, standing by Chinese dissidents, denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics, and keeping China from joining the WTO on its own terms Speaking with a sense of urgency, he urged that this containment policy 'begin early in its career' 16

AFF – Reps D – ChinaAssessing China war scenarios are good – key to sound policymaking even if it’s not the most realisticGoldstein 13 – (Avery, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations and Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, Published in International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89, HWilson)

Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post–Cold War era. The first is the potentially deadly mix of nuclear proliferation, rogue states, and international terrorists, a worry that became dominant after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.1 The second concern, one whose prominence has waxed and waned since the mid-1990s, is the potentially disruptive impact that China will have if it emerges as a peer competitor of the United States, challenging an international order established during the era of U.S. preponderance.2 Rejecting this second concern, some analysts have expressed reservations about the dominant post–September 11 security agenda, arguing that China could challenge U.S. global interests in ways that terrorists and rogue states cannot. In this article, I raise a more pressing issue, one to which not enough attention has been paid. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak, the gravest danger in Sino-American relations is the possibility the two countries will find themselves in a crisis that could escalate to open military conflict . In contrast to the long-term prospect of a new great power rivalry between the United States and China, which ultimately rests on debatable claims about the intentions of the two countries and uncertain forecasts about big shifts in their national capabilities, the danger of instability in a crisis involving these two nuclear-armed states is a tangible, near-term concern.3 Even if the probability of such a war-threatening crisis and its escalation to the use of significant military force is low, the potentially catastrophic consequences of this scenario provide good reason for analysts to better understand its dynamics and for policymakers to fully consider its implications. Moreover, events since 2010—especially those relevant to disputes in the East and South China Seas—suggest that the danger of a military confrontation in the Western Pacific that could lead to a U.S.-China standoff may be on the rise.

Pan concedes our reps aren’t the cause of warPan, IR Prof, 12 – (Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, PhD, Political Science and IR from Peking University, November 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise,” Edward Elgar Publishing, 84-94, HWilson)

Despite the powerful effect of the 'China threat' paradigm on policy-making, we must acknowledge that the 'threat' representation is not the only contributing

factor . To the extent that international relations are interactively constructed, the hardline China policy in the US is in part constituted by China's strategic behaviour . For example, the concept of AirSea Battle' (developed by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and now seriously entertained by the Pentagon as a part of a broader strategy of dealing with China) might be seen as a necessary response to Beijing's growing A2/AD capabilities ,61 rather than a pure brainchild of the 'China threat" discourse. Yet, equally, even as we turn attention to Chinese capabilities and behaviour in global politics, we must not lose sight of the constitutive role of the 'China threat* paradigm in the development of Chinese worldviews and strategic behaviour in the first instance. For example, the growth of China s A2/AD capabilities cannot possibly take place in an international vacuum, rather, they can themselves be seen as responses to still earlier Western policies on China, policies which are inevitably shaped by the 'China threat' perception In this section, I will examine how some key- indicators of the China threat, such as jingoistic Chinese nationalism, realpolitik thinking, and assertive foreign policy, can be understood not as inherent Chinese traits, but as social constructs courtesy of the China threat' theory as practice.