Documentation & examples - SRVSOP/2017-10... · Safety assessments and compatibility studies...
Transcript of Documentation & examples - SRVSOP/2017-10... · Safety assessments and compatibility studies...
Safety assessments and compatibility studies Documentation & examples
Sebastien Lavina – Airport Operations
October 2017
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 2
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 3
ICAO Annex 14 introductory note
• Introductory Note.— This Annex contains Standards and Recommended Practices (specifications) that prescribe the physical
characteristics and obstacle limitation surfaces to be provided for at aerodromes, and certain facilities and technical services
normally provided at an aerodrome. It also contains specifications dealing with obstacles outside those limitation surfaces. It is not
intended that these specifications limit or regulate the operation of an aircraft.
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 4
EASA
• ADR.OPS.B.090 Use of the aerodrome by higher code letter aircraft
COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 139/2014 of 12 February 2014 laying down requirements and administrative procedures
related to aerodromes pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
SUBPART B — AERODROME OPERATIONAL SERVICES, EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATIONS (ADR.OPS.B)
ADR.OPS.B.090 Use of the aerodrome by higher code letter aircraft
• (a) Except for aircraft emergency situations, an aerodrome operator may, subject to prior approval by the Competent Authority,
permit the use of the aerodrome or parts thereof by aircraft with a higher code letter than the aerodrome design characteristics
specified in the terms of the certificate.
• (b) In showing compliance with point (a), the provisions of ADR.OR.B.040 shall apply.
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 5
General methodology overview
• Baseline identification
ICAO SARPS
Justification materials
• Hazard analysis
Identification of undesirable events and hazards
Causal analysis
Consequences analysis, severity level
• Risk assessment
• Conclusion
• Publication in Aerodrome Manual
• Factors of consideration: frequency analysis, experience from other airports/authorities
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 7
Risk assessment classification
• Type A
Depends on specific aircraft performance and handling qualities
Safety level achieved by suitability between above characteristics and infrastructure
Risk assessment based on aircraft design and certification (with additional simulations as requested)
• Type B
Aircraft behaviour calculated from existing aircraft measurements
Risk assessment based on statistics and accident analyses
Development of generic quantitative risk models
• Type C
Risk assessment study not needed
Geometric argument to calculate infrastructure requirements
No need to wait for certification results of to collect statistics for existing aircraft
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 8
Airport 1
• Airfield infrastructure assessed by comparing known characteristics against requirements
• Identification of areas requiring action
• Modelisation of aircraft ground movement
Check pavement width
Object clearances
• Comparison with other airports
• Safety assessment
Operational risk assessment process
Joint panels with ANSP
• Compliance matrix
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 9
Item Annex 14
requirement
National CAA
requirement
Compliance
status Evidence
Safety
measures &
comments
Airport 2
• Risk analysis
Identification of risk
Acceptability classification
Causes
Corrective measures
Action on consequence/frequency
Acceptability classification after corrective measures
• Action plan
• Return on experience
• Update of measures as and when required
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 10
Frequency
Classification
Very frequent Frequent Occasional Rare Extremely
rare
Catastrophic
Serious
Major
Minor Event
Negligble
Frequency
Classification
Very frequent Frequent Occasional Rare Extremely
rare
Catastrophic
Serious
Major
Minor
Negligble Event
FAA MoS (Modification of Standards) methodology
• Standard being modified
• Standard/requirement
• Proposal
• Explanation: why standard cannot be met
• Discuss viable alternatives
• Statement: why modification would provide acceptable level of safety
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 11
https://www.faa.gov/airports/engineering/nla_mos/
Aerodrome code / larger aircraft accommodation
• Aerodrome Reference Code is for design and planning purpose. It is not intended to restrict aircraft operations at an airport
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 12
Aerodrome code / larger aircraft accommodation
• Many aerodromes with reference code 4E accommodating the A380 and B747-8 (code F)
Airport operator to provide justification of the safe operations (and possibly operational procedures to be put in place)
• Many aerodromes with reference code 3C accommodating A320 and B737
Airport operator does not need to file any dossier to the local CAA
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 13
Aerodrome code / larger aircraft accommodation
• Example: Florence airport, Italy
• Runway length 1,560m
• Aerodrome reference code 3C (length < 1,800m)
• The Aerodrome Manual reports all the characteristics of the runway, its proper aerodrome reference code (3C) and its
representative aircraft (Airbus A319, theoretically a code 4 aircraft (RFL = 1,800m))
• No need for any specific authorization from the Civil Aviation Authority, as the use of the first element (number) is only for airport
design purpose and not for airport operational reasons
• A319 is fully capable of taking-off and landing at Florence airport
• About 65 A319 departures per week at Florence airport
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 14
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 15
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Runway length (TORA)in meters
Average number of A320 flights per week
Airports with A320 family operating on runways shorter than 1,800m
North / South America
Europe
Asia
A320 family operations on short runways
• A320 family aircraft are classified as code 4C according to ICAO Annex 14 (reference field length > 1,800m)
• A320 can also operate on runways shorter than 1,800m, as it is the case in more than 25 airports in the world.
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 16
Code 3 limit
(*) Airports with TODA above 1,800m
A320 family operations on short runways
• On short runways: performances can be augmented with special surfaces (wet grooved or PFC (Porous Friction Course))
• Objective is to enhance the runway drainage so that the friction with the aircraft tyres is increased.
• In addition, special aircraft modifications are required to take a performance credit on those runways
• The monitoring of the runway condition is the responsibility of the aerodrome operator
• AIP should state if runway surface pavements qualify for performance credit
• Example in Europe: Florence airport (1,560m)
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 17
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 18
A320 operations on narrow runways
• The nominal runway width for operations of the aircraft is 45 m.
• Operations on runways with a width below 45 m are covered through a specific modification. Only aircraft fitted with the
modification can safely operate on narrow runways.
• The aircraft has been shown to be safely controllable and to be compliant with applicable airworthiness requirements when
operating on runways with a width of 30m or more
• Specific limitations apply:
Operations on narrow runways is not allowed in case of nose wheel steering inoperative,
Operations on narrow runways is not allowed in case of one brake or more inoperative.
Autoland is not allowed.
• The Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) contains all necessary information on procedures and limitations
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 19
A320 operations on narrow runways
• 48 airports with A320 operations on narrow runways - 22 airports with operations on 30m runways
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Number of weekly departures
A320 family Operations on narrow runways
Operations on 30m runways
Narrow runway – A330/A340 family
• ICAO Annex 14 recommendation: 45m minimum
• Allowance for some operations on lower runway width requested on a case by case basis
• Airbus guidelines
Autoland Cat3 operations on runway below 45m width not allowed
Operation on 44m wide runways is acceptable
Operation on 43m wide runways is acceptable, provided total runway + paved shoulders width is at least 44m
Operation on 40m to 42m wide runways is acceptable, provided total runway + paved shoulders width is at least 44m. Shoulders
shall be capable of supporting the aeroplane without inducing structural damage.
A340: recommended total width 45m (runway + paved shoulders) to minimize FOD risk
Does not apply on partially cleared snow runways
• Operational approval shall be given by the local authority
• Absolute minimum; any relevant safety parameters shall also be accounted for (RESA, lighting, runway profile…)
• In service: A330 operations at Port-au-Prince Airport (Haiti)
43m wide runway
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 21
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 22
Runway width
• Main hazard: lateral excursion
• Causal analysis
Human factors (crew, maintenance…)
Aircraft (powerplant, landing gear, engines, systems…)
Weather and surface conditions
• Consequence analysis
Major to catastrophic
• Risk assessment
Strongly depends on aircraft performance and handling qualities
Considerations: final approach speed, flight handling qualities, landing incidence/attitude and cockpit visibility, thrust reversers,
certification process
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 23
Runway shoulders
• A380 @ Manchester
Stabilized grass shoulder extending to the limit of the cleared and graded strip
Trials to assess the ability of the shoulder to support a fire tender
RFFS response to aircraft stopped on runway is not dependent upon using the grass areas
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 24
Existing natural soil is
strong enough to support a
rescue vehicle (30t here)
45 m runway
7.5 m shoulder
Clean grass with no loose gravels: no
risk of FOD ingestion or jet blast issue
Runway shoulders – Frankfurt airport
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 25
Frankfurt Main Airport
07L/25R; evidence regarding
- the condition, load-bearing capacity, and resistance to
erosion and ingestion proc-esses of the shoulder areas
Runway shoulders - Singapore
• Chemical-soil stabilization
• Evaluation criteria
Ability to meet airport operational restrictions
Construction speed
Shoulder pavement design
Environmental impact
Cost effectiveness
• Lessons learnt
Comprehensive project planning
Comprehensive methodology evaluation
Minimizing disruptions
Sample testing for quality assurance
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 26
Tests on the occasional load bearing of shoulders
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 27
With a Geotextile fabric between the Subgrade and the aggregate
Type 3
6 cm BBME
20 cm GRH
Subgrade (infinite)
Type 2bis
6 cm BBA
20 cm GRH
subgrade (infinite)
Full size testing: 5 Structures tested.
Type 1
6 cm BBA
20 cm GLSR
30 cm of Treated soil
subgrade (infinite)
Type 1 bis
6 cm BBA
20 cm GLSR
Subgrade
(infinite)
Type 2
6 cm BBA
20 cm GRH
30 cm of Treated soil
subgrade (infinite)
BBA : Aeronautical Bituminous Concrete (0/10 class 2)
The selected critical bogie was the A380 WLG at 26.7
and 28.6 tons/wheels (bogie towed by a truck)
Trials Conditions simulated worst operational conditions:
•Subgrade bearing strength very poor (CBR of 2 and 3)
•Taxiing very slow (3-4 km/h)
It allows us to draw conclusions for operational Conditions
and to recommend to airport construction manager validated structures.
BBME : High Modulus Bituminous Concrete (0/10)
GLSR: Special Roadway Hydraulic binder aggregate (0/14)
GRH: humidify reconstituted crushed aggregate (0/20)
Conclusion on the occasional load bearing of shoulders
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 28
Runway shoulders – risk assessment
• Hazard identification
Shoulder erosion, engine ingestion
Difficulties for ARFF vehicles to intervene
Aircraft damage after incursion on shoulder
• Causal analysis
Powerplant
Shoulder width and cohesion
Runway centerline deviations
• Consequences analysis
FOD: major
ARFF delay: major to catastrophic
• Risk assessment
Geometric argument
Jet blast contours
Comparison with other aircraft types
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 29
Runway shoulders – A380 matrix
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 30
R = Runway +
Shoulder Width
Soil Type between
R and 75m Potential Issue
Operational
procedure
required by the
Airline
Operational
procedure
required by the
Airport
75m ≤ R N/A None None None
58m ≤ R < 75m
Stabilized
(without loose gravel) None None None
Unstabilized
(with loose gravel) Jet blast None
Runway inspection
and sweeping
required after take off
R < 58m
Stabilized
(without loose gravel)
Foreign object
ingestion
Apply specific 58m
take-off procedure None
Unstabilized
(with loose gravel)
Foreign object
ingestion + jet
blast
Apply specific 58m
take-off procedure
Runway inspection
and sweeping
required after take-off
Shoulder
Shoulder
Soil
Runway R 45 m
minimum 75 m
Soil
Runway strip - Definition
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 31
Runway strip objectives:
• Reduce the risk of damage to aircraft running off a runway;
• Protect aircraft flying over it during take-off or landing operations
Runway strip requirements
• Width:
• 150m on each side of the RWY centreline for code 3 or 4 runways
(ICAO Annex 14, §3.4.3)
• Graded portion: 75m on each side of the RWY centreline for code 3 or
4 runways to protect runway veer-off (ICAO Annex 14, §3.4.8)
• Transverse slope on graded portion: 2.5% for code 3 or 4 runway (ICAO
Annex 14, §3.4.15)
Runway strip
• What to do if the runway strip available is not wide enough?
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 32
RWY
Obstacle
Sea
RWY
Minimum recommended width
instrument runways (150m)
Minimum recommended width
non-instrument runways (75m)
Runway strip - example
• Limitation due to geographical constraints: Special Condition required to authority
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 33
75m 75m
Rwy strip
• Airport X – Methodology
Elements/arguments on physical and topographical limitations
Need for efficient drainage (pit – culvert)
Geometrical demonstration (obstacles below runway or taxiway altitude -> wing well over obstacle in case of deviation)
Risk analysis, frequency, deviation statistics
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 34
RESA – Runway end Safety Area - Definition
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 35
Minimum
150m
RESA (Runway End Safety Area)
• RESA required as per ICAO Annex 14 or equivalent regulation (EASA CS-ADR, RBAC-154, etc)
• What to do if there is no space to build a RESA?
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 36
San Sebastian Airport (Source, Google Earth, © Europa Technologies)
No space for a RESA – Option 1: Expand over the sea:
• Steel pillars (to mitigate environmental impact / river streams modifications) or landfill
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 37
RESA
Part built on
pillars
Tokyo Haneda airport – runway 05 threshold
No space for a RESA – Option 2: implement an arrestor bed (EMAS)
• What is EMAS?
EMAS (Engineered Material Arresting System) standard developed by FAA
in the 1990s. => allows to reduce RESA length
Composed of crushable material that would stop an aircraft overrunning the
runway. Depth of the EMAS increases with distance from runway.
When the aircraft reaches the arrestor bed, the material interface with the tire
provide a resistive force, which quickly decelerates the aircraft
Aircraft entry speed usually ~70 kt
• EMAS already installed at many airports since 1996
Equipping 100+ runways (JFK, MAD, BOS, ORD, TSA…)
Length reduced down to 60 m at certain airports (Boston, runway 04L end)
Already stopped safely 10+ aircraft overrun
• Airbus working in cooperation with EMAS manufacturers to provide aircraft
characteristics to be used for design
• Provision of an arresting system should be published in the AIP
October 2017
Safety assessments and compatibility studies
38
Boston Logan airport – runway 04L end
No space for a RESA – Option 3: Reduced Declared distance
• No space to expand or implement an arrestor bed
• Chosen solution was to reduce the declared distances
• Declared distances:
Initial 1,754m
New TORA 1,590m, new LDA 1,427m
• New pavement marking: like a displaced threshold (arrows)
Prevents runway undershoot (displaced threshold)
Reduced take-off length in the direction of the take-off
• High impact on operations
A319 and equivalent: max payload 62 pax instead of 144 pax
Potential solution through PFC / improved grooving surface.
• Implemented in August 2017
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 39
04
22
New threshold 22
New threshold 04
No space for a RESA – Option 2: Example of arrestor bed creation
• Arrestor bed at a French airport (Saint-Denis-La Réunion)
• Justification dossier to be provided if necessary by the airport to the civil aviation authority (specification on design solution: aircraft
type considered, capability of the material to sustain the deceleration)
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 40
Runway End Safety Areas
• Possible solutions
extension over water
threshold displacement
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 41
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 42
Taxiway width – straight section
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 43
• Hazard identification
Lateral excursion
• Causal analysis
Mechanical failure
Surface conditions
Loss of visual guidance
Pilot precision and attention
• Consequences analysis
Theoritically major
In-service events: extremely low rate
• Risk assessment
Low dependency on aircraft type
Pilot attention and precision: aircraft behaviour deduced from measurements
Geometric argument (visibility from cockpit)
Taxiway deviation statistics
Note: cameras (when available) for assistance only
Taxiway width – curved section
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 44
• Similation tools for checks
• Mitigation measures
Oversteering
Taxiway width – Safety analysis
• Airport Z
Calculation of edge margin
Shoulders
Lighting, markings
Long-term plan for widening (during usual maintenance programme)
Experience of other airports / CAAs, experience of previous operations at the airport (same or similar aircraft)
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 45
Taxiway shoulders
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 46
• Hazard identification
Shoulder erosion, engine ingestion
Aircraft damage after incursion
• Causal analysis
Powerplant
Shoulder width and cohesion
Taxiway veer-off
• Consequences analysis
Erosion, ingestion: minor
If undetected and followed by engine failure at takeoff: potentially major
• Risk assessment
Geometric argument (visibility from cockpit)
Comparison with other aircraft
Jet blast contours
Taxiway deviations
Taxiway shoulders – A380 matrix
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 47
T = Taxiway
Width + Shoulder
Soil Type between
T and 54m Potential Issue Recommended Taxi Procedure
Airport Operations
Recommendations
54m(1) ≤ T N/A None Normal None
36m ≤
T
< 60m
Stabilized
(without loose gravel
or sand)
None Normal None
Unstabilized
(with loose gravel or
sand)
Jet blast
from outer engines
Keep outer engines at idle (or shut
down) and put additional thrust on
inner engines if necessary
Taxiway inspection and
cleaning may be needed
(especially in turns)
T < 36m
Or
T is contaminated
N/A
Foreign object ingestion
by inner engines & jet
blast from all engines
Keep inner engines at idle (or shut
down) and smoothy put additional
thrust on outer engines if
necessary
Taxiway inspection and
cleaning may be needed
(especially in turns)
Shoulder
Shoulder
Soil
T 23m
60m(1)
Soil
Taxiway Caution: Given changing conditions
at some airports, pilots shall monitor
the paved surface for the presence
of loose gravel and modify thrust
procedures accordingly
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 48
Runway to taxiway separation
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 49
• Hazard identification
Collision between an aircraft (in flight or veering off the runway) and an object (fixed or mobile)
• Causal analysis
Human factors
Weather conditions
Aircraft (wingspan, mechanical failure)
Airport layout
Obstacle density
• Consequences analysis
Aircraft in flight: catastrophic; in service: no known case
Aircraft veering off: potentially catastrophic
In-service events: extremely low rate
• Risk assessment
Aircraft performance and handling qualities
Geometric argument
Balked landing simulations
Veer-off statistics / database
Runway to taxiway separation – FAA initial operational standards (A380)
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 50
Runway Use Separation Restriction
Departure 400 ft (120 m) No
Arrival
More than ¾-statute mile approach visibility minima 400 ft (120 m) No
Cat I 400 ft (120 m)
No more than one A380 maybe on the first 3,000 ft (915 m) of the parallel taxiway from the threshold
500 ft (150 m) No
Cat II/III 400 ft (120 m)
No A380 maybe on the first 4,000 ft (1,220m) of the parallel taxiway from the threshold
500 ft (150 m) No more than one A380 maybe on the first 3,000 ft (915 m) of the parallel taxiway from the threshold
Runway to taxiway separation
• Airport A
Geometric calculation of margin
Restriction of operations on parallel taxiway
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 51
Runway to taxiway separation – weather conditions
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 52
Taxiway to taxiway separation – AACG process
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 53
• Hazard identification
Collision between two aircraft
• Causal analysis
Human factors
Weather conditions
Loss of visual guidance
Pilot precision and attention
• Consequences analysis
Potentially major
• Risk assessment
Based on statistics or accident analyses
Taxiway deviation statistics
Cockpit visibility
Proper guidance for night or LVP operations
Taxiway to taxiway separation – MoS process
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 54
• Standard being modified
Group VI taxiway centerline to taxiway centerline separation
• Standard/requirement
324ft
• Proposal
Varies between 298 and 276ft
• Explanation: why standard cannot be met
Proximity of runway
Relocation impact on parking stands or adjacent facilities
• Discuss viable alternatives
No other viable alternatives
• Statement: why modification would provide acceptable level of safety
No simultaneous A380 operations
Taxiway deviation statistics, low probably of occurence
Taxiway to taxiway separation
• FAA operational standards for A380
• Airport 1
Long-term realignment planned
Restriction of use of parallel taxiway, or wingspan size limitation
Follow-me vehicle
Sequential taxiway centerline lighting during LVP
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 55
Separation Restriction – Taxiway Use
237 ft (72.2 m)
Aircraft with wingspan up to 118 ft (34 m) on the adjacent taxiway
267 - 276 ft (81.5 - 84 m)
Aircraft with wingspan up to 171 ft (52 m) on the adjacent taxiway
280.5 ft (85.5 m)
Aircraft with wingspan up to 179 ft (55 m) on the adjacent taxiway
298 ft (91 m)
Aircraft with wingspan up to 214 ft (65 m) on the adjacent taxiway
Taxiway-taxilane to object separation – AACG process
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 56
• Hazard identification
Collision between an aircraft and an object (fixed or mobile)
• Causal analysis
Human factors
Weather conditions
Loss of visual guidance
Pilot precision and attention
• Consequences analysis
Potentially major
• Risk assessment
Taxiway deviation statistics
Cockpit visibility
Proper guidance for night or LVP operations
Possibility of reduced margins for height-limited objects
Taxiway-taxilane to object separation – MoS process (A380)
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 57
• Standard being modified
Group VI taxiway centerline to fixed or moveable object (FOMO)
• Standard/requirement
193ft
• Proposal
Varies between 146 and 170ft
• Explanation: why standard cannot be met
Impact of relocation (loss of stands, reduced separation elsewhere, infringement of boundaries…)
• Discuss viable alternatives
No other viable alternatives
• Statement: why modification would provide acceptable level of safety
• FAA operational standards Separation Restriction
146 ft (44.5 m)
No speed restriction
In presence of vehicle service road, height must be limited to 14 ft (4.3 m)
Taxiway to object separation
• Airport W
Specific marking to get sufficient clearance
• Airport Y
Reduced speed during taxi
Displaced centerline
AIP publication for pilots’ information
Cameras if available
Limitation of height of vehicles on service road
Follow-me vehicles
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 58
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 59
Holding points
• Airport 1
Infringement of protection areas
No departing aircraft rolling. No landing aircraft within 3nm from touchdown
• Airport 2
Geometric demonstration
ICAO Circular 301 (OFZ)
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 60
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 61
Visual aids
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 62
• Hazard identification
Jet blast damage
• Causal analysis
Powerplant
Elevated edge lights strength
Aircraft rotation angle at takeoff
Runway deviation factors
• Consequences analysis
Potentially major (if undetected before takeoff and followed by engine ingestion and tire bursting risks)
• Risk assessment
Geometric argument
Engine positions
Jet blast contours
Aircraft rotation angle
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 63
Taxiway bridge
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 64
• Hazard identification
Veeroff and aircraft falling from the bridge
Evacuation slides falling past the edge
Difficulties for fire fighting intervention
Blast under the bridge
• Causal analysis
Same as taxiway width causes
Bridge width
Evacuation slides configuration
Aircraft (wingspan, engine position and span)
• Consequences analysis
Major to catastrophic depending on the event
In service: no cases reported
• Risk assessment
Geometric argument
Engine positions
Jet blast contours
Firemen practices
Contents
• Context
• Short runways
• Narrow runways
• Runway characteristics
• Taxiway characteristics
• Separations
• Holding points
• Visual aids
• Bridges
• Parking stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 65
Parking stands
• Possibility of reduced distance with appropriate measures
• E.g. lighting, marshaller
• Downgrading of adjacent stands
• MARS stands
October 2017 Safety assessments and compatibility studies 66