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Pollock, CynthiaDecommissioning: Nuclear rower's Missing Link.Worldwatch Paper 69.Worldwatch Inst., Washington, D.C.ISBN-0-916468-70-4Apr 8657p.Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue,N.W., Washington, DC 20036 ($4.00).Report General (140)

Mf01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.Alternati'e Energy Sources; *Energy Management;*Environmental Education; *Environmental Standards;Fuels; *Hazardous Materials; *Nuclear Power Plants;Radiation; Technology; *Waste Disposal; Wastes*Nuclear Wastes

ABSTRACTThe processes and associated dilemmas of nuclear

power plant decommissioning are reviewed in this publication.Decommissioning involves the clearing pr and disposal of a retirednuclear plant and its equipment of stJi a way as to safeguard thepublic from the dangers of radioactivity. Related problem areas areidentified and include: (1) closure methods (discussing the optionsof de=ontaminat:Ion and dismantlement, storage, and reaction cf apermenent tonb); (2) high-level waste management (identifying spentfuel removal and disposal problems); (3) retired reactor disposal(citing examples of waste management systems employed in the UnitedStates and in Europe); (4) economics (providing cost estimates formajor expense items); (5) savings mechanisms (proposing efforts tooffset future decommissioning costs); and (6) lung-term strategies(urging the need for safe disposal and eecommissioning research anddevelopment programs). (MI-)

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Table of Contents

Introduction .. . 5

Deccntamination and Dismantlement 7

High-Level Waste Management 13

Disposal of a Retired Reactor 20

Eshmahng the Costs 25

Saving for the Burial . 33

A Long-Term Strategy ,-,

Notes . 45

0

introduction

npreced2nted construction cost overruns for nuclear powerT plants have halted growth in the nuclear industry in many

countries. Even while staging under these bloated costs,the industry is now faced with the expense of dismantling

and disposing of worn out reactors. Decommissioningthe processof cleaning up and burying a retired nuclear plant in order to protectthe public from radioactivityis an essential step in the use of nuclearpower.

In most industries, the disposal of reared plant and equipment is astraightforward and relatively low-cost Dperation. But the high levelsof radiation present in shutdown re, _toms will make the procedureuniquely complex and costly. Decommissioning will require remotelycontrolled technologies and large work crews to limit the exposure ofindividuals to radiation Comprehensive strategies for transportingand disposing of radioactive wastes, and large amounts of readilyavailable money will also be needed. The economic competitivenessof electric-generating technologies is traditionally jugged by com-paring construction and operating costs. But cost estimates for nu-clear power will be meaningful only if a third variable,decommissioning costs, is incorporated into the equation.

Nearly four decades and 400 power plants into the nuclear age, thequestion of how to safely and economically dispose of nuclear reac-

I would like to thank Ken I3ossong, Frank Cardile, Luther Carter, Duane Chapman,Peter Erickson, Carl Feldma.), Bob Pollard, and Ted Taylor for reviewing early drafts ofthe manuscript I am also grateful to Jodi Johnson and Susan Noms for their produc-tion assistance

tors and their wastes is still largely unanswered. Nue lea' plants can-not simply be abandoned at the end of their operating lives ordemolished with a wrecking ball. Radioactivity builds up each yearthe plant operates, and all of the contaminated parts and equipmentmust be securely isolated from people and the environment. Someradioactive elements ,n plant components will decay quickly, butothers will remain hazardous for millennia.

No one know:- how much it will to decommission the hundredsof units in service and under construction around the world. Esti-mates range from $50 million to $3 billion per reactor.' The reactorconstruction binge prior to 1980 means that much of the de-commissioning bill may fall due shortly after the turn of the centuryfrom 2000 to 2020. Although engineers are attempting to lengthen thelife expectancy of reactors, econom:zal operation may no be feasiblefor longer than 30 year. Numerous technical difficulties, includingthe constraints radiation buildup places on routine maintenance andthe inevitable embnttlement of the reatAor press:1-e essel, are likely

limit opportunities to extend plant life.

At the turn of the century, demand for new large-scale generatingplants of all types is expected to be weak, prticularly in the UnitedStates 2 Thus nuclear decommissioning could ID? the largest expensefacing the utility industry, outstripping plant construction. Givencurrent policies, most of this bill will be paid by a generation thatneither took part :n the decision t--) build the first round of nuclearplants nor used much of the power generated.

Although nuclear power supplied 13 percent of the world's electricityin 1984, not a single large commercial unit has ever been dismantled.3Nuclear engineers have been attracted to the exciting challenge ofdeveloping and improving a new technolog), , not to figuring out howto manage its rubbish. But the problem will demand attention as agrowing number of plants approach retirement age. Not one of the 26countries currently relying on nuclear power is adequately preparedfor this undertaking.

"Nuclear plants cannot simply be abandonedat the end of their operating lives or

demolished with a wrv-king ball."

The oldest commercial nuclear reactors are already neari7g the end oftheir useful lives, and some plants have closed prematurely becauseof accidents or faulty designs. In the United States, dozens of tinyresearch and military reactors are no longer used and four smallretired commercial units are awaiting decommissioning. The U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) estimates that another 67large commercial units will cense operations before the year 2010.Worldwide, more than a dozen power reactors are already shutdown, 66 more are likely to retire by the year 2000, and another 162will reach their thirtieth year of operation in the following decade.4(See Table 1.) Countries with advanced nuclear programs will soonstart to feel the pi essure associated with managing the "back end" ofnuclear power production.

The formidable issue of decommissioning is getting less attentionthan it deserves. Utility companies and ratepayers balk at yet anotherlarge expense associated with using nuclear power. And politiciansare reluctant to tackle an issue that will not come to the forefront untilafter their political cereers have ended. In many parts of the world,the nuclear power industr- is strapped for cash and no longer com-mands the attention of scientists, business leaders, or policymakers.

Developing new technologies and formuiatirg ccmplicated regula-tory guidelines for safety handling, trap ,00rting, and disposing ofradioactive vastes will be ditficuli to accomplish in such a mil:9.u. Butthere can be little argument that public health and safety and thefinancial solvency of utilities demand accelerated research on andfinancial planning for decommissioning.

Decontaminatior, and Dismantlement

Following a nuclear plant's closure, the reactor owner must decidewhich of three courses to follow: decontaminate and dismantle thefacility immediately after shutdown, put it in storage for several de-cades to undergo radioactive decay pnor to dismantlement or simplyerect a "permanent" tomb. Each option involves removing the spentfuel, draining all liquids, and flushing the pipes.'

7

Table 1: Nuclear Power Reactors in Operation and UnderConstruction Worldwide, 1956-95, and

Year of Expected RetirementPlanned Retirement

After 30 YearsEntered Service Reactors Capacity of Operation

(r 'tuber) (megawatts)

1956-60 13 780 1986-19901961-65 22 3,920 1991-19951966-70 31 10,831 1996-20001971-75 84 54,351 2001-20051976 -80 78 61,476 2006-20101981-85 133 117,546 2011-2015

Cumulative inOpel a non 361 248 904 1986-2015

1986-90* 122 114,061 2016-20201991-95* 22 18,099 2021-2025

Total 505 381,064

'1 nder ,on-arLutton or ,n order

Source World I. e-a of \ui leaf- Powe- Nu, !ea, News, February 1986

Under the immediate -21;smantlernent scenario, tubing and structuralsurfaces would be mechanically and chemically cleaned, a processcalled decontamination, irradiated steel and concrete would be dis-assembled using advanced sconng and cutting techniques; and allradioactive debris would be shipped t'i a burial ground. The sitewould then theoretically be available for unrestricted use.

Plants to be mothballed, on the other hand, would only undergoprelnninarN cleanup before being placed under surveillance. After 50years in storage, most of the short-lived radioisotopes would havedecayed, further safety gains would be negligible, and the facility

9

would be dismantled Entombment, the third option, entails coveringthe reactor with reinforced concrete and erecting barriers to keep outintruders. Although once viewed as the cheap and easy way cut,entombment is no longer considered a realistic option because of thelongevity of several radioisotopes. The protective structure woulddecay long before the radioactivity within.6

A sury ,y of 30 electric utilities in the United States revealed that 22planned to promptly dismantle and remove their reactors followingshutdown. In Japan, utilities are advised to wait no longer than 10years after closuee to dismantle their vlants. Utilities in Canada andFrance, on the other hand, plan to mothball most of their reactors forseveral decades before dismantling them.7

Regardless of the method chosen, decommissioning a large nuclearpower plant is a complex task. the high levels of radiation present atrecently closed reactors place numerous constraints on the de-commissioning crew. Workers must take etaborate precautions, in-cluding wearing protective clothing and breathing apparatus, andlimiting their time in contaminated environments. Radiation expo-sure must be carefully monitored, and according to industry standardskept "as low as reasonably achievable." Productivity will unavoid-ably be low, less than half of what it would be in a nonradioactiveenvironment 8

Two sources of radiation will confront decommissioning workerscontaminated and activated matenals Contaminated parts includenearly all of the piping and equipment in the reactor containment-essel and the fuel, auxiliary, and control buildings. Many of theconcrete surfaces in these buildings also become contaminated. Thedegree of contamination depends on the number of fuel leaks experi-enced during opera'aon, the type of matenal exposed, and its exteriorfinish. Although high-pressure water Jets and chemical decontami-nants can wash otf some surface contamination, only a fraction of thematenal becomes clean enough to recycle or dispose of in commerciallandfills."

9

10

11 volume of solvents used must be carefully reF,ulated because theytoo become contaminated. Spills during either operation or cleanupcan result in contamination of the surrounding soil. Keeping wastevolumes to a minimum is an elusive goal: Each piece of machineryand every tool that comes into direct contact with a contaminatedsurface must be &contaminated or added to the radioactive wrstepile

The other source of radiation that will confront decommissioningcrews is "activation" products. When nuclear fuel undergoesfissionthe splittmg of uranium atoms----stray neutrons escape.These neutrons bonibard the nuclei of surrounding atoms, and theresulting change in composition causes some trace elements in thesteel and concrete that encircle the reactor core to become radioactive.Neutron-activated parts include the reactor pressure vessel, thevessel's internal components and struf_tures, and the surroundingconcret. shield. Neutron-activated components are more than 1,000times as radioactive as contaminated components, and because theyare composed of radioisotopes they cannot simply be washed clean.w

Fstimating the volume and radiortctivity of activation products thatwill be encountered at a retired reactor is difficult. The complex ar-rangement of the components in and around the reactor core makes ithard to predict the movement of neutrons. Accurate assessments ofthe quantity of activation products also require a detailed knowledgeof the amounts of various elements that are present in the constnic-lion materials, sometimes at the parts per million or even parts perbillion level. Studies conducted in France showed only a small vari-ation in the composition of concrete ti,ed in the European Com-munity's reactors, but studies of reactor construction materials in theUnited States showed greater variability. Cobalt and niobium con-centrations in stainless steel were found to vary more than tenfold."

Po. the first several decades following plant shutdown, the mostpi oblematic elements arc those that decay the fastest. Cobalt andcesium are the dominant short-iived radioisotopes, with half-lives(the time it takes radioisotopes to lose half their radioactivity) of fiveand 30 yea--s respectively. Other elements with longer half-lives are

"Practical decommissioning experience islimited to very small reactors."

present in smaller quantities and will dominate radiation levels in thefuture. Neutron-activated materials contain significant amounts oflong-lived nickel and niobium radioisotopes. Nickel 59, for example,has a half-life of 80,000 years.'

Following preliminary decontamination, the structures surroundingthe reactor must be cut into smaller pieces for transportat4on andburial. A steel pressure vessel containing a 1,000-megawatt reactor istypically over 12 meters high and 4 meters in diameter. The concretevessel surrounding an advanced gas reactor, the type used in theUnited Kingdom, is several meters thick. Dismantling the vessels isboth complicated and hazardous. Each cut causes more airborne con-tamination, so remote-controlled equipment will probably be used tokeep worker exposure to a minimum. Although testing of severaldismantling techniques is underway, more research is required toprepare the industry for dismantling today's large reactors. Accord-mg to Dr. Paul Woollam, a member of the Commission of the Euro-pein Communities team that in 1984 conducted a comprehensiveanalysis of decommissioning capabilities, "The design of equipmentfor dismantling, e pecially remote equipment, is in its infancy."13

Practical decommissioning experience is limited to very small reac-tors. The tiny 22-megawatt Elk River plant is the largest that has beenFully decontaminated and dismantled. The U.S. Department of En-erg,y (DOE) completed this three-year project in 1974 at a cost of $6.15million. The plant had only been in operation for four years. Plasmaarc torches were used to cut apart the reactor, and 3,630 cubic metersof contaminated materials were buried. Many modern reactors canproduce 50 times more power and will have operated some seventimes as long as Elk River. Since radiation builds up in proportion toplant size and operating lite, a 1,000-megawatt reactor used for 30years would pose corsiderably more problems."

Twenty-five miles outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, DOE is cur-rently decommissioning the United States' first comme reactorThe 72-megawatt Shippingport plant began producing electricity in1957, and after 25 years of operation, it was closed in 1982. In accord-ance with the original contract, the U S. government is responsible

14

11

12

for decommissioning the plant Shippingport wit: be the largest unitdecommissioned to date anywhere in the world and it could be usedas a valuable and badly needed prototype.15

Instead of seizing this learning opportunity, DOE plans to encase the10-meter-high steel reactor vessel in concrete, transfer the 770-tonbehemoth intact to a 4,000-ton barge, and send it down the Ohio andMississippi rivers, through the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal,and up the Pacific Coast and Columbia River. It is to be buried in anearthen trench on the government-run Hanford nuclear reservation.Keeping the Shippingport reactor pressure vessel in one piece insteadof chopping it up and sending it by truck is estimated to lop at least $7million, or 7 percent, off the total price tag.1°

This action is shortsighted. 3y employing cost-cutting measures now,DOE is depnvinb tl,e international nuclear industrythe same one ithelped fosterof invaluable lessons. Larger reactors may be too bigto ship in one piece, and the most difficult task decommissioningcrews of the future will face is dismantling the pressure vessel and itscontents. '7

In Europe, efforts to decommission sev2ral commercial reactors arejust getting underway. The first three projects will be the 100-mega-watt Niederaichbach unit in West Germany, the 33-megawatt Wind-scale advanced gas reactor in the United Kingdom, and the45-megawatt French G-2 gas reactor at Marcoute. Although theFrench and U.K, plants are small, each operated for about 20 yearslong enough to become well contaminated. The larger, German reac-tor was in service for only two years before technical difficultiesresulted in ita closure Each unit has a different design, and .,is-mantling efforts are likely to uncover problems unique to specifictechnologies. lb

However, orpfrience gained at the damaged reactor at Three Mileisland will av future aeconeinissioning work. The industry's knowl-echw of robotics, chemical clecontammants, and remote cutting tech-niques has greatly expanded as a result of -leanup effort.

13

"By employing cost-cutting measures now,DOE is depriving the international nuclearindustrythe same one it helped iosterof

invaluable lessons."

International information sharing and on -sit observations by foreignexperts mean that these lessons may be widely applied.19

The overriding consideration in selecting a decommissioning sched-ule and the appropriate decoiaamination and dismantlement meth-ods must be worker and public safety. Although radioactivitydeclines more than twentyfold during the first 30 years of atorage,governments and the public may not be willing to tolerate the pres-ence of these highly radioactive structures, or be willing to face thecharge of "passing the buck" tc, future generations. The HumboldtBay reactor on the northern California coast has been the center ofcontroversy since its retirement in 1976. The unit lies in a seismicallyactive zone and is not structurally engineered to withstandearthquakeswhich is why it was permanently taken out of oper-ation Immediate dismantlement would make the site availat le forother uses, and would safeguard the public against potential ex-posure to radiation. Yet efforts to dismantle the plant are not ex-pected until after the year 200'1.20

High-Level Waste Management

Discussions about decommissioning typically exclude the topic ofhigh-level nuclear waste disposal. But high-level wastesspent fueland the byproducts of fuel reprove sing must be removed from theplant before decommissioning can proceed. At present, not a singlecountry has a permanent disposal facility for high-level wastes and nosuch facilities are likely to be in operation before the turn of thecentury

The fuel for most nuclear p v : plants consists of small pellets ofoxide--the size of pencil erasers that are sealed in 12-foot-

long metal tubes and bundled into fuel assemblies. Fission productsthat result from the splitting of uranium atoms gradually build up to apoint that inhibits the chain reaction. One fourth to one third of thekel in a typical reactor roust be replaced each year. The spent fuel ishighly radioactive and consequently very warm. Spent fuei remains

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more radioactive than the original uranium ore for about 3 millionyears. Remote handling conducted behind heavy shielding is essen-tial 21

Until the mid-seventies the international nuclear industry assumedthat reprocessing of spent fuel would become a universal practice,providing fuel for the next generation of breeder reactors and a meansof quickly removing the spent fuel from utility holding ponds. Butalong with uranium, fuel reprocessing recovers plutonium, whichcan be readily made into nuclear bombs. Concerns about nuclearproliferation, coupled with new discoveries of u.anium, a slowdownin reactor construction, and the demise of merit breeder programs,undercut the rationale for reprocessing in many countries. The U.S.program was abandoned and today only France, the Soviet Union,and the United Kingdom have sizeable reprocessing industries.

Seven European nations and Japan have contraci:ed to send at least a-tion of their spent fuel to the British Sellafield reprocessing planthe French Marcoule and La Hague facilities. The recovered ura-

nium and plutonium, and the high-level wastes that are typicallystabilized in glass cylinders, are to be returned to the countries oforigin. Therefore, although sending spent fuel abroad for repro-cessing temporarily eases the waste management problem, it doesnot permanently eliminate the need for sound handling and disposalpolicies Indeed, reprocessing compounds the handling problem be-cause it increases the number of times the fuel is manipulated andtransported. Because reprocessing is more expensive than direct dis-posal, customers are essentially buying time to decide on a per-manent disposal strategy.22

In the United States, virtually all of the 12,000 metric tons of spentfuel produced to date is now stored temporarily in water-filled utilityholding ponds The volume of waste is expected to quadruple within15 years. Utilities do not have adequate space for storing this spentfuel, lior is there anyplace they can send it.23 For years, the nuclearindustry ignored the issue of permanent high-level waste disposal,thinking reprocessing would relieve it of the burden. Today the dis-posal problem, though managed by national energy agencies, is back

"The toxicity of high-level wastes requiresthat they be kept out of the biosphere for

tens of thousands of yearslonger thanrecorded history."

in their laps It is impossible to fully dismantle a nuclear plant if thereis nowhere to put the spen;, fuel cooling in utility storage ponds.

People exposed to large doses of radiation may become ill or diewithin several weeks. Exposure to lower doses results in long-termeffects, including several types of cancer. And children whose par-ents were exposed are prone to genetic mutations and birth defects.Some radioisotopes are especially dangerous if they are ingested orinhaled because they mimic essential nutrients, concentrate in vul-nerable organs, and then decay inside the body. Radioactive stron-tium and cesium, for example, behave like calcium and accumulate inbones. And unlike many fthernicals, radioactive waste cannot readilybe detoxified or dest:oyed. Health risks can only be avoided by keep-ink, wastes out of the biosphere until they have dPcayed to harmlessleve: .24

Where to dispose of high-level wastes has become a contentiouspolitical issue in each of the 26 countries that produce nuclear power.Few national governments have been in power for more than severaldecades, and the lifespan of numi, cnerzy agencies is even shorter. Butthe toxicity of high-level wastes requires that they be kept out of thebiosphere for tens of thousands of yearslonger tlian recorded hs-tory

Since reliarce on human institutions for such a long period of time isimpossible, m..st countries have decided to bury their wastes in geo-logic repositories 300 to 1,200 meters below the earth's surface.Searching for stable sites is the current focus of most disposal pro-grams. The characteristics of a good site elclude unfractured geologyso groundwater will not migrate through the area and contaminatewater supplies, low seismic activity, and the absence of mineralwealth so future generations will not find the area attractive for drill-ing.

Political opposition to high-level waste disposal will be at least asdifficult an obstacle as finding a geologically approprilte site. Win-ning public acceptor( is likely to be particularly tough where popu-lation densities are high, such as in Japan and Europe. Some

1b

countriesthe Netherlands, for example, where there is strong pub-lic opposition to all forms of waste disposalare hoping that interna-tional sites will become available, perhaps operated by reactorsuppliers. Yet no n ,tion would likely want to accept large volumes ofimported waste. China offered to store a small portion of West Ger-many's spent fuel, but the contract was linked to China's obtaining abargain price on two reactor orders. Now that the Chinese have cutback their nuclear program, the offer may no longer be good. TheSov 2i Union is the only country that takes back the high-level wastesgenerated by the reactors it sells, most of them to Eastern Europeannations.25

The geologic medium chosen for a permanent repository is likely tobe limited by the options available domestically. Sweden plans todispose of its high-level wastes in granite, West Germany is exam-ining the use of salt mines, and Belgium hopes to place its waste inclay (See Table 2 ) Japan is considering several rock types, but thecountry is so earthquake-prone that none may offer adequate stabil-ity. At this time, no single geological formation is considered sub-stantially superior. Problems have been found with each.

Most European nations are just beginning to seriously explore andevaluate permanent disposal sites. West Germany hopes to disposeof its high-level wastes in the Gorleben salt dome and has begunconstruction of exploratory shafts. The Stripa mine in Sweden hasbeen the focus of international research for almost a decade, butSweden plans to develop a new granite repository 500 meters belowthe earth's surface. Construction is not scheduled until the year 2010,when all of the nation's 12 reactors will be taken out of service. TheUnited Kingdom has explicitly deferred the decision to proceed withrepository siting and France appears content to rely indefinitely on"temporary" storage at its reprocessing facilities.2

Several experimental high-level waste repositories have already beenItested in the United States, but none has proved acceptable. In 1982

the U.S Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),requiting the federal government to develop two permanent minedgeologic repositories and have the first ready for business by 1998.

Table 2: Geologic Media Selected for Further Study as High-LevelWaste or Spent Fuel Repository in Various Countries

Country Granite Clay Salt Basalt Tuff Shale DiabaseBelgium X

Canada XFrance X X X

Japan X X X X

Spain X X

Sweden X

Switzerland XUn;ted Kingdom XUnited States X X X XWest Germany X

Source: K M Harmon. "survey of Foreign Terminal Radioactive Waste Stoiage Pro-warns," in Proceedings of the ;983 Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Infor-mation Meeting, Wasmngton, D C , December 12-15, 1983 (Spnngfield, VaNational Technical Information Service, 1984)

The Environmental Protection Agency issued standards prohThitingradiation releases from the 300- to 1,200-meter-deep burial sites for10,000 years The location of the first repository has been tentativelynarrowed to one of three sites: Hanford, Washington; Yucca Moun-tain, Nevada; or Deaf Smith County, Texas.27

Final site selection has already become a political hot potato. Potentialhost states and environmental groups have filed lawsuits challengingthe adequacy of the siting guidelines. According to James Martin, astaff attorney with the Environmental Defense Fund: "First, there areconcerns that, in its haste to site a repository, [the Department ofEnergy] has relied on pre-NWPA studies of dubious quality and isdelaying analysis of waste transportation risks that cannot be de-ferred. Second, there is evidence that politics are creeping into andtainting the decision-making process. These factors pose gravethreats to the integrity and public acceptance of the siting process."28

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Each of the proposed sites has drawbacks. There is much concern, forexample, that disposal at Hanford could lead to contamination of thenearby Columbia River. And farmers in Texas fear contamination ofthe aquifer they use to irrigate their crops. Choosing the best site willunquestionably be difficult, but the only way to inspire confidence inthe final choice is to conduct extensive testing at each proposedlocation and make the results available for scientific review.

Several nations are examining intermediate storage of spent fuel atcentralized locations away from reactor sites. Sweden has the mostadvanced program: Its CLAB facility, adjacent to the Oskarshamnpower station, will hold spent fuel from all Swedish reactors in arti-ficial underground ponds for several decades prior to geologic dis-posal. A half-dozen countries are experimenting with dry spent fuelstorage as an interim step between utility holding ponds and per-manent disposal. Aboveground concrete silos and reinforced con-crete vaults are already available in Canada, the United Kingdom,and West Germany.29

In the United States, three sites in Tennessee, including the abandoned Clinch River breeder reactor, are being considered as hosts foia retrievable storage program. Though

DOEblocked by the

courts, the storage plan would allow DOE to fulfill its obligation tctake possession of commercial spent fuel in 1998 even if a permanentgeologic repository is not yet available. Storing the fuel allows furtherradioactive decay which would result in a cooler and therefor(saferwaste package. But a centralized storage system would alsosignificantly increase the number of times fuel must be handled anctransported. Critics fear the strategy is being promoted because DOEwill not meet its deadline for establishing permanent repositories.3"

In 1976, the California legislature was the first to enact a bill forbidding further nuclear power pant construction until "the federagm,rnment has approved, and there exists, a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear wastes." Without such assurance, it is impossible to fully assess the costs of nuclearpower Cor ,roversial at the time, the measure was only one of the

1,y

"The present inability to dispose of hiFh-level wastes is causing many developing

countries to shy away from building nuclearpower plants."

many factors that put an end to reactor orders in the United States.The deteriorating economics of nuclear power, low electricity-demand growth, and tightened regulation after the accident at ThreeMile Island are considered the principal reasons that no new reactorshave been ordered since 1978.31

"Stipulation" laws making continued use or construction of nuclearpower facilities contingent upon the development of satisfactoryplans for managing the spent fuel and reactor wastes have also beenenacted in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,and West Germany. Though Japan has similar regulations in place,one commentator likens its lack of high-level waste disposal facilitiesto "living in a house without a toilet." According to the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency in Geneva, the present inability to dispose ofhigh-level wastes is causing many developing countries to shy awayfrom building nuclear power plants.32

The Nuuear Energy Agency in Paris projects that nearly 160,000metric tons of spent fuel will have accumulated in countries belong-ing to the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) by the year 2000. Existing utility holding ponds are notlarge enough to accommodate this increase, nascent away-from-reactor storage techniques are unlikely to be sufficiently developed,and permanent repositories will probably be stalled by political andtechnical obstacles.

If there is no place to which the spent fuel can be shipped, moth-balling will, by default, become the only feasible decommissioningstrategy. Choosing the safest and least expensive decommissioningschedule is only possible if high-level waste disposal facilities exist. Incountnes where fuel is not reprocessed or shipped to central storagefacilities (and thus removed from the reactor site), the lack of per-manent iepositones could severely limit opportunities for timely de-commissioning.

20Disposal of a Retired Reactor

Removing the spent fuel is only the beginning of the decommission-ing process. Few nations have independent commercial disposal fa-cilities for low-level radioactive wastes, a much larger category thatencompasses everything from work gloves and used equipment tocontaminated water and soil Although this waste is considerably lesstoxic than spent fuel and reprocessing wastes, it is produced m fargreater volumes. The largest contributor of low-level waste is nuclearpower generation, but hospitals, medical laboratories, and a varietyof industries also produce substantial quantities. Most low-levelwastes decay to safe Ir 'els in several decades, but some remaindangerous for hundreds of years.

An average pressurized water reactor, the most commoaly used nu-clear technology, sends about 400 cubic meters of l9w-level wastes to1.7,urial sites each year. When the reactors are dismantled, they willeach produce an estimated 18,000 cubic meters of low-level waste,half again as much as will have been generated throughout the unit'soperating life. (See lable 3.) This is enough to bury a football fieldunder four meters of radioactive debris. Decommissioning just onelarge reactor would yield a volume of contaminated concrete and steelequal to one fourth of the low-level radioactive wastes now shippedto all U.S. commercial dumpsites in a year.34

Until 1970, the United States and many other nations discarded low-level wastes by dumping them at sea. Belgium, Japan, the Nether-lands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom were still dumpingmuch of their low-level waste until 1983, when the London DumpingConvention declared a moratonum pending a scientific study of theeffect on the manne environment. The reprocessing operation atSellafield, however, still pumps 1.2 million gallons of slightly radio-active wastewater into the ocean daily.35

On-land disposal typically involves packing the debris in ii,zrels andstoring them either at the reactor site or in specially designated ware-houses Canada and Japan, each operating large nuclear programs,

21

Table 3: Estimated Low-Level Radioactive Wastes fromDismantlement of a Typical 1,100-Megawatt

Pressurized Water Reactor

Material Burial Volt Truckloads(cubic meters, (number)

Activated 216

Metal 484

Concrete 7(17

Contaminated 967

Metal 5,465Concrete 10,613

Radioactive 618 180

Total 17,687 1,363

Source. R I Smith C, J Kon ,ek, and W E Kennedy, Jr Technology, Safety and Costs

iit Decornmicstoning a hefrrc'ice Pre,,sitrized Water Reactor Power Station (Washing-

ton, D C S Nimicar Regulatory Commission, 1978)

practice this apr roach. In only some half-dozen countries are the

drums transported to commcial low-level waste depositories andburied in earthen, or more recently concrete-lined, trenches.36

Experience with traditional shallow land burial has been mixed

Three low-level waste sites in the United States, each opened during

the sixties, have subsequently been closed because poor bunal p.ac-bees resulted in surface water infiltration and contam:nation. Ken-

tucky, Illinois, and New York, the states in which the contaminatedtrenches are located, each spend millions of dollars annually to cleanand monitor the sites. By the late seventies only half of the country'slow-level waste sites were still operatingone each in Nevada, SouthCarolina, and Washington. Objecting to their role as the nation'sdumping ground, the three state governments closed or restrictedaccess to their facilities for a short time in 1979.17

24

21

22This prompted the U.S. Congress to pass the Low-Level RadioactiveWaste Policy Act in 1980. The law made each state responsible formanaging the commercial low-level waste generated within its bor-ders, and encouraged states to form regional agreements to establishand operate disposal facilities cooperatively. The new waste siteswere supposed to be operational by New Year's Day 1986. When itbecame obvious that the deadline would not be met and that half thelow-level waste produced in the United States, accounting for nearlythree quarters of the radioactivity, would be barred from the nation'swaste sites, an eleventh-hour compromise was reached. Slow-actingstates were given a seven-year extension and the first seven "regionalcompacts," involving 38 states were approved.38

But the governors of Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington drovea hard bargain. They set limits on the volume of waste their sites willaccept each year and developed quotas for individual reactors invarious regions. Total volume reduction required per reactor rangesfrom 18 to 45 percent. In the future all wastes accepted from outsidethese three regions will be assessed a surcharge rising from $10 percubic foot in 1986 (a 30 percent increase over present rates) to $40 percubic foot in 1990. If interim deadlines are met, one quarter of thesurcharge fees will be returned to the state of origin to help offset thecosts of establishing new waste facilities.39

Selecting new burial sites promises to be difficult. Maine, Massachu-setts, and South Dakota already require voter approval of either com-pact or siting decisions. And both Nevada and South Carolina havestipulated that their disposal sites will soon close and other states intheir respective regions will have to accept wastes in the future.Political opposition to nuclear waste sites is strong and past operatingexperience has done little to dispel public concerns.40

Because several of the first site- developed leak, at least five statesIllinois, Kentucky, Massachuseti.,, Pennsv3,.ania, and Texashaveprohibited the future use of 'radihona, :.*allow land burial. They maystill allow underground waste dispo,A, but they will require engi-neered barriers such as conch 1 :ined trenches, and strict en-

2J

"Political opposition to nuclear waste sites isstrong and past operating experience has

done little to dispel public concerns."

forcement of packaging regulations. Other disposal techniquesseriously being studied include aboveground vaults, earth-moundedconcrete bunkers, mined cavities, and augured holes. To date thesetechnologies have been used primarily for waste storage, not dis-posal, and there is concern about their long-term ability to isolatewastes. Aboveground structures, for example, will be subject to natu-ral catastrophes, possible intrusion, and years of weathering.'"

Many states are examining new disposal methods, but for the mostpart they are inexperienced in dealing with low-level wastes and havelimited budgets. Congress has made the states responsible for thewastes generated within their borders, but no federal funds havebeen allocated for assistance, and the two organizations with themost expertise, the NRC and DOE, do not plan to conduct additionalresearch and development activities. Their role will be purely advi-sory. Despite the desire to build safer disposal sites, most states areill-equipped to meet the challenge and fear that proposals to usealternative methods will result in regulatory delays.42

Since systems with elaborate safeguards are expensive to build andoperate, states have been encouraged to join forces to designate re-gional sites at which high management standards can be enforced.Such regional facilities would certainly be safer than periodically ro-tating sites among member states, a dangerous alternative that never-theless is sometimes endorsed for political reasons. New waste sitesare only expected to operate for 20 to 30 years before they are closedand a new regional site is required. Disposal responsibility is thuslikely to rotate among a regional compact's membei states eventuallyand there is no need to accelerate the process.43

In Europe, several different approaches to low-level waste disposalare being examined Sweden plans to dispose of its waste in numer-ous galleries and chambers sunk into granite rock 50 meters below theBaltic Sea. An abandoned iron mine has been designated as a futuredisposal site in West Germany, but in the meantime, wastes aretemporanly stored in aboveground warehouses. Japanese nuclearplants store low-level wastes on-site. Incinerators and compactors

24

keep waste volumes manageable while research is conducted on bad'land and sea disposal.44

In France, low-level wastes have been disposed of in earth-moundecconcrete bunkers at the La Manche center since 196c. The success athe facility has prompted the Westinghouse Electric Corporation tcdevelop a disposal system, called "SAVEPAK," patterned after thefrench method. Incoming wastes would first be X-rayed to make sumthey are liquid-free and to measure their level of radioactivity. Crimpactars would then squash many of the drums to one-seventh theboriginal size. All the wastes would be placed in concrete monolith!and then buned in huge graves. Several regional compacts in theUnited States, along with utilities in Japan, Spain, South Korea, andthe United Kingdom, have expressed interest in adopting the tech.nology.45

All the contaminated and activated components of a reactor requirespecial handling and disposal, but a small percentage of the waste!are considered too radioactive to be classified as low-level. Trans.uranic wastes, those containing elements heavi,-r than uranium, areall formed as activation products. They have long half-lives and requite isolation fromn the biological environment for many thousand!of years. Until recently, transuranics were disposed of the same wayas low-level wastes. rney are now stored at reactor and reprocessingsites and co amonly referred to as "orphan wastes." Their long halflives make then, too dangerous for shallow land burial, but governments have been reluctant to assume responsibility for them as pailof national high-level waste programs. Eventually, they will probablybe disposed of in geologic repositoi.-s.46

Plans for developing new low-level waste sites do not address theneed to provide adequate capacity for decommissioning wastes. Reg-ulations do not specify a minimum size and it appears that the secondgeneration of disposal sites may only be large enough to accept an-nual operating wastes If this occurs, decommissioning activities maybe hindered by the lack of both high- and low-level waste disposalfacilities

"Decommissioning policy is held hostage tothe lack of disposal sites."

Most r. bons that have d 2cided to use nuclear power have shirkedthe responsibility of safely managing radioactive wastes. In 1981, theAtomic Industrial Forum, an industry trade group, observed that"Because of the present waste disposal problem, it may not be pos-sible to conduct a total decommissioning today. Therefore, the op-tions a utility can choose at the present time are mothballing orentombment with onsite storage of all active material."47 That state-ment is still true today. Decommissioning policy is held hostage tothe lack of disposal sites

Estimating the Costs

The cost of decommissioning nuclear power reactors is highly specu-lative. Cost estimates have been derived from genenc studies, fromscaling up the costs of decommissioning smaller research facilities,from calculations based on a fixed percentage of construction costsand more recently from site - specific engineering studies. The detailand sophistication employed in developing these estimates variesgreatly and their lack of standardization makes comparisoi s difficult.Moreover, limited decommissioning experiencenone with largereactorsmakes it impossible to know if the estimates a-e on target.In effect, all the figures put forward are guesses based on numerousuncertain assumptions and varying degrees of wishful thinking.

In 1978 the U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission asked the BattellePacific Northwest Laboratory to estimate the cost of decommissioninga genenc 1,175- meg:watt pressurized water reactor (PWR). A Battellestudy conducted two years later estimated the cost of decommission-ing a toiling water reactor (BWR). These are the two most commonlyused nuclear technologies in the world, accounting for 72 percent ofall operating reactors-165 PWRs and 77 BWRs. Battelle concludedthat costs would depend pnmarily on the reactor design and thenumber of years atter shutdown that dismantlement would be de-ferred In general, more plant components become contaminated inboiling water reactors so they require a larger labor force, produce agreater volume of low-level wastes, and consequently are more ex-pensive to decommission For both designs, immediate dis-

26

2

26

mantlement was considered slightly less expensive than storage, inspite of higher initial costs.48

The Battelle figures were wit,:zly adopted within the utility industryand used as a proxy by many companies that had not developed theirown estimates. But the studies were never intended to be used in thisway. They were meant to be used as guidelines, and to give utilitiesand their regulators a ballpark estimate of the decommissioning coststhey were likely to encounter. Differences in plant size and design,operating history, future availability of and distance from waste dis-posal facilities, regional variations in labor rates, and urnotte sitecharacteristics such as space limitations were largely ignoied. Asindividual utilo4es began to conduct their own site-specific cost esti-mates, and as various component costs such as waste disposal rosemuch faster than anticipated, it became obvious that the initial esti-mates were too low.

In 1984, Battelle updated its studies, this time for the Electric Power1'4 search Institute, and costs had indeed risen much faster than in-flation over the preceding six years. Vaste disposal costs rose thefastest. Assumptions were also modified to reflect current regulationsand market conditions. For example, when the original PWR analysiswas performed, it was assumed that decommissioning workers couldbe exposed to four times as much radiation during a one-year periodas was subsequently deemed safe.'

The projected price tag for immediate dismantlement of a 1,175-me-gawatt PWR, using outside contractors, rose to $104 million and for a1,155-megawatt I3WR to $133 million. Comparative site-specific,rather than generic, estimates for two 1,100-megawatt reactors pro-duced estimates of $140 million for a PWR (35 percent higher than theupdated Battelle estimate) and $134 million for a BWR, excluding thecosts of removing nonradioactive structures.5°

Estimates derived from scaling up costs based on the experience atsmaller, less contaminated facilities, and from assuming a fixed per-centage of construction expenditures are even higher. California reg-ulators have assumed in some studies that decommissioning

2/

expenses would be 10 percent of capital investment. A detailed three-year study of decommissioning costs in Swit7?rland concluded thatretiring a nuclear plant would cost one fifth as much as the facilityoriginally cost to build. After evaluating decommissioning expen-ences at Elk River and a smaller research reactor, Peter Skinner, astate-hired engineer, advised the New York Public Service Commis-sion that decommissioning could potentially cost 24 ipercent of orig-inal construction costs. This translates to more than $500 million formost recently completed U.S. reactors.51

Andre Cregut of the French Atomic Energy Commission believes thatutilities will rot begin to decommission their reactors until costs canbe brought down to 15 percent of the original investment. He esti-mates that using currently available techniques, the cost of de-commissioning world be at least 40 percent of cost to build.52

All of these projections assume normal reactor operating conditions.Economist Duane Chapman at Cornell University has observed thatthe Three Mile Island plant is so heavily contaminated that dis-mantlement may exceed the original cost. Although the level of con-tamination at Three Mile Island is many times higher than will beencountered at most power reactors, cleanup costs there are pro-jected to pass q billion before decommissioning itself is con-templated. Chapman has also predicted that dismantlement mightcost as much as reactor construction, in constant dollars, at plantswhere accidents have not occurred. In the United States, thisamounts to an average of about $3 billion foi a new 1,000-megawattunit. Chapman expects that as decommissioning cost estimates rise,utilities will forgo immediate dismantlement and instead favor stor-age or entombment.53

Research done at the Rand Corporation reinforces Chapman'a skep-ticism. Analysts there have conclu -led that large-scale engineeringprojects based on newly developed technologies cost on average fourtimes more than initial estimates. Recent U.S. nuclear power plantconstruction costs total 5 to 10 times original projections, even afteraccounting for inflation.54

26

28

Because of gross cost overruns, approximately $20 billion worth ofpartially constructed nuclear plants have been abandoned in theUnited States. In the early seventies, reactors were expected to comeinto service at well under $1 million per megawatt. Costs for just-completed units now average closer to $3 million per megawatt, andat the not-yet-operating Shoreham plant on Long Island, the figurehas already surpassed $5 million per megawatt.55 Decommissiorangestimates put forward by the nudear industry presume that as expe-rience is gained, costs will fall over time. But U.S. nuclear construc-tion experience appears to defy the Liming curvecosts rose overthe years.

Members of the Atomic Industrial Forum have recently completed"Guidelines for Producing Commercial Nuclear Power Plant De-commissioning Cost Estimates." The guidelines attempt to standard-ize cost estimates and eliminate past deficiencies so estimates can bereadily compared and understood by analysts and members of reg-ulatory commissions. According to the authors, Williams and La-Guardia, "It is of equal importance to identify all assumptions used inthe estimate. One of the major problems associated with attemptingto compare the costs to decommission units estimated by differentparties is to account for the different assumptions made. Unless theyare clearly identified, no rational comparison can be made." In thepast, some estimates included the expense of removing spent fuel,others the cost of demolishing nonradioactive structures, and stillothers the cost of long-term surveillance and security at a mothballedplant. Some utilities included costs attributable to complying withstncter regulations governing waste disposal and worker exposurelimits while others did not. Rarely were the costs, expense categories,or assumptions comparable from one study to another.56

Several site-specific cost estimates that rely on the recently developedguidelines are now complete. For BWRs in the 1,100- to 1,200-mega-watt range, these studies estimate the cost to remove and dispose ofradioactive structures and waste at between $120 and $170 million.57

hi Japan, a policy advisory group for the Agency of Natural Resourcesand Ene,gy studied the costs of and optimal schedule for de-

"Financial compensation m..y be required toentice commuaities to accept radioactive

waste."

commissioning. It concluded that dismantling a 1,100-megawatt plantafter five years of storage will 'ost $160 million.58

The major expenses associated with decornm Ining are the pack-aging, transportation, and burial of wastes; labor; energy; demolition;and equipment. In several site-specific cost estimates, waste disposalaccounted for 40 percent of the total. In the last decade, the cast ofshallow land burial of a 55-gallon drum of low-level wastes has in-creased more than tenfold in the United States. knd, as discussed inthe previous section, new low-level burial grounds will tech-nologically superior to and more strictly regulated than past saes. Theunique problems inherent in establishing new facilitiesfor bothhigh- and low-level wasteswill further raise disposal costs."

Financial compensation may be required to entice communities toaccept radioactive wastes. The United Kingdom is seriously re-evaluating its disposal-facility siting policies following vehement localoppu,i,ion to a plan for using an abandoned salt mine at Billinghamin nc .teast England. Lewis Roberts, director of the Atomic EnergyRest arch Establishment at Harwell, recently acknowledged that theaget, cy may have to adopt the French and Japanese practice of com-pensating communities for hosting repositories t`'

Reactor dismantlement is a labor-intensive process. A survey of 21rust estimates, for both pressurized and boiling water reactors, foundthat labor expenses were forecast to contribute fror between 25 and50 percent of total costs. Following two years of planning and prepa-ration prior to shutdown, disassembling a large PWR is expected torequire more than 300 workey-years. Additional workers will be re-quired to decontaminate and dismantle the cooling systems in boilingwater reactors. Permissible radiation exposure levels have becomeprogressively stricter over the years and may continue to tighten inthe future because the health effects of long-term exposure to lowlevels of radiation are still debated by medical professionals. Re-placement of steam generators at the Surry reactor in Virginia re-quired more than three times as rremy worker-hours as anticipated inorder to keep down exposure levels.6'

30

Decommissioning cost estimates for two of the reactors that will bamong the first to be decommissioned amount to more than $1 milion per r: 2gawatt. (See Table 4.) The Shippingport facility, despite ilunique transportation arrangement and federally subsidized wagdisposal, is expected to cost $98 million to decommission$1.36 milion per megawatt. This figure excludes the cost of dismantling norcontaminated buildings. Shippingport is also considerably lescontaminated than larger reactors will be, not only because it is small

Tab li. 4: Estimated Decommissioning Costs for Nuclear PowerPlants No Longer in Operation

Owner/Site Capacity

EstimatedDecommissioning

Costs

CostPer

MegawattYears

Operated(megawatts) (millions of 1985 dollars)

U.S Atomic Energy 22 14' 0.58 1964-61Commission, Elk River

U.K. Atomic Energy 33 64 1.94 1962-81Authority, Windscale

Pacific Gas and Electnc, 65 55 0.85 1963-7iHumboldt Bay-Ur:t 3

U.S. Department ofenergy, Shippingport

72 98 1.36 1957-8;

Commonwealth Edison 210 95 0.45 1960-7fCo., Dresden-1

'Decommissioning of Elk River was completed in 1974

Sources. R Mark Pocta, "Report on the Decommissioning Costs of Pacific, Gas andElectnc Company for Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit No. 3," CaliforniPublic Utilities Commission, June 1985, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency"Compendium on Decommissioning Activities in NEA Member Countries,'Pans, January 1985, "DOE Says Decommissioning Costs on Target DespiteShippingport Increase," Nucleonics Week, April 25, 1985, Public CitizenEnvironmental Action, "Dismantling the Myths About Nuclear Decommissioning," Washington, D C , April 1985

"Because of the variety of reactor types inoperation, decommissioning costs and

expenence may not be transferable amongutilities."

but because it has already been thoroughly decontaminated onceduring its operating life and has had several reactor cores.62

Although members of the nuclear industry expect that economies ofscale will make decommissioning larger reactors proportionallycheaper, the amount of radiation that builds up in a plant, especiallythat contributed by long-lived radioisotopes, depends on the poweroutput of the reactor multiplied by the number of years it operates.The larger the plant, the greater the cleanup and disposal effort it willrequire.

Because reactor designs have changed so much over the years, veryfew countries will be able to develop specific decommissionin plansapplicable to more than several reactors. Not only have differentcountries adopted different reactor technologies, but within somenations the nuclear industry has dabbled in most of the systemsavailable. France, Canada, and perhaps the Soviet Union are the onlymajor nuclear countries that have achieved a high degree of uni-formity in their construction programs. These nations also commonlybuild four to eight reactors at each plant, a strategy that should helpto hold down decommissioning costs. The United States and Japantypically build only two to three reactors at one site. The 17 shutdownpower reactors listed in Table 5 represent eight different designs.Nucleai constn: ',ion costs steadily rose in the United States in partbecause each utility built a custom-designed plant. Because of thevariety of reactor types in operation, decommissioning costs andexperience may not be transferable among utilities.63

There are vast uncertainties associated with trying to estimate costs 30to 100 years in the future. Assumptions must be made about theevolution of technologies and the likely increase in decommissioningcosts, inflation, and real interest rates. Estimates must also includeprovisions for stricter government regulations and other un-foreseeable events. The staff most familiar with the plant will haveleft the company and excellent recordkeeping will be required toinform the future crew of the reactor's intricacies and its operatinghistory. The longer dismantlement is deferred, the greater the margin

32

Table 5: Nuclear Power Reactors Awaiting or UndergoingDecommissioning, 1985

Reactor Location

YearPlant

EnteredService

Number ofYearsPlant

Operated CapacityReactorType'

(megawatts)

Shippingport Pennsylvania 1957 25 72 PWRG-2, Marcoule France 1958 22 45 GCRG-3, Marcoule France 1959 24 45 GCRDresden-1 Illinois 1960 18 210 BWRIndian Point-1 New York 1962 12 257 PWRWindscale United Kingdom 1962 19 33 AGRChinon-A1 France 1963 10 7(1 GCRHumboldt Bay California 1963 13 65 BWRGangliano Italy 1964 14 160 BWRKarlsruhe Wet Germany 1965 19 58 PWRGundremmingen West Germany 1966 11 250 BWRPeach Bottom Pennsylvania 1967 7 40 HTGRDouglas PointLingen

CanadaWest Germany

19681968

169

206256

CANDUBWit

Gen filly -1 Canada 1970 9 250 HWBWRNPP-Al Czechoslovakia 1972 7 110 HWGCRNiederaichbach West Germany 1972 2 100 IivvGCR

'Reactor types listed in order they appear in table Pressunzed Water, Gas Cooled;Boiling Water, Advanced Gas, High Temperature Gas Cooled, Graphite Moderated;Heavy Water Moderated PWR (CANDID 1:eavy Water Moderated BWR; and HeavyWater Moderated GCR

Sources: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, "Compendium on Decommissioning Activi-ties in NEA Member Countnes," Pans, January 1985, International AtomicEnergy Agency, "The Methodology and Technology of DecommissioningNuclear Facilities" (draft), Annex 2, Vienna, May 1985; "Decommissioning:Survey of Power Reactor Projects," Nuclear Engineering International, August1989

of error and the higher the total costs are likely to he. Only seven 01the reactors listed in Table 5 are scheduled to be dismantled prior to1995 64

3d

"Although hundreds of nuclear powerreactors have been erected around the world,projecting the cost of decommissioning them

is still fraught with uncertainties?'

Andre Cregut of the French Atomic Energy Conunission asserts thatutilities will not proceed with decommissioning until they are morecertain of the costs. He thinks present estimates are still so rough thatactual costs could easily be at least 40 percent greater than expected. 65

New regulatory requirements increased reactor construction costs,and it is logical to assume that actual decommissioning costs will alsoexceed estimates. As experience is &ained in decontamination, dis-mantlement, waste handling, and disposal, inadequacies in existingregulations will emerge. Rules would then become more strinvnt.The biggest regulatory gaps at present as-c- the lack of criteria forclassifying wastes as either radioactive or nonradioactive, the uncer-tainties regarding the method of transuranic waste disposal, and theabsence of "residual radioactivity" standards. Without these guide-lines, utilities do not know exactly how much of their wastes willrequire special disposal and how clean they will have to leave theplant site. If the final rules are stricter than utilities ar cipate, costestirnaes could rise substantially bb

Although hundreds of nuclear power reactors have been erectedaround the world, projecting the cost of decommissioning them isstill fraught with uncertainties. The bill for all the plants now in

service could total several tens or several hundreds of billion dollars.

No one can row say with confidence which estimate is correct. Only

by using state-of-the-art technology to immediately dismantle someof the reactors being taken out of service will the industry be able to

ascertain what future decommissioning costs might be

Saving for the Burial

To ensure that adequ _ funds will be available, utilities should startsetting aside money early in a reactor's life. If money is not collectedfrom ratepayers during the years the plant produces power, the billwill be charge,: to future customers or taxpayers who did not use theelectricity In the event that regulators forbid the collection of de-

34

3,

commissioning funds from customers who did not use the nuclearpower, the expense might bankrupt utilities or result in de-commissioning shortcuts that could endanger future generations.

A variety of savings mechanisms have been proposed and, like aninsurance policy, the plans providing the greatest assurance tend tobe the most expensive. One way it, -iarantee that funds will beavailable in the future is to deposit all

:b

of the needed money in aninterest-bearing savings account before the reactor enters service.Interest income will increase the yearly balance of the account and ifthe initial cost estimate is correct, or if additional deposits are madewhen estimates are revised, sufficient funds will be available. Thisstrategy is the most expensive and requires utility customers to payup front for an expense the company will not incur for several de-cades 67

ivlaking periodic deposits into a decommissioning fund is anotherway to accrue the money. Customers can be charged a fee, based onthe amount of electricity they use, that is collected monthly andcredited to a decommissioning account. Utilities prefer to place theaccount on the books but fold the money into the general revenuesused to pay all of the company's expenses, including the constructioncosts of new nuclear plants. This strategy allows the utility to forgoborrowing and keep debt payments low, but the method has beentermed "phantom funding' by some observers because the moneywill be tied up in assets nstead of being readily available to the utilitywhen a reactor is retired 68

When the time comes to decontaminate and dismantle the plant, autility with an unsegregated account will probably need to raise cashby selling "decommissioning bonds." Borrowing capital for de-commi 3sioning promises to be expensive because investors will re-quire a high return to cover the perceived risks. If large cost overrunsare anticipated or if the utility is small with few income-generatingassets, investors may shy away from funding plant dismantlement.The market value of the stocks and bonds of several U.S. utilities withheavy nuclear commitments is already less than 50 percent of bookvalue, reflecting lack of investor confidence.69

35

If even high rates of return are not attractive to potential bond pur-chasers, the federal government or pools of electric utilities ultimatelymay have to assume the risk. The $2.25-billion bond default by theWashington Public Power Supply System in 1983 has made investorsespecially wary of publicly owned nuclear projects. Without govern-ment commitments to insure the bonds, municipal and cooperativeutilities will be particularly vulnerable because they are whollyfinanced by tax-exempt bonds: There is no equity cushion providedby private shareholders.7°

If, on the other hand, money is provided by deposits begun when theplant enters service, if the account is managed by professional inves-tors, and if the fund is allowed to grow until it is needed. the utility'sfinancial situation will not be so precarious at plant retirement.Periodic evaluations of reliable decommissioning cost estimates andcorresponding adjustments to customer rates will diminish futurerisks. Sweiish utilities revise their decommissioning surcharges an-nually!'

In a study conducted for the NRC, University of Pennsylvania econ-omist J.J. Siegel concluded that if an outside professionally managedfund were established, " . . . it would be virtually impossible for theutility to divert these assets for other uses and funds would be as-sured no matter what events, legal or financial, occur. He rankedinternal funding with no segregated account last in terms of as-surance.72

Even dedicated decommissioning accounts would be inadequate,however, if a plant closes earlier than expected. If this were to occur,particularly as the result of a costly accident, the utility would finditself with insufficient funds. An insurance policy to protect againstpremature closure is a frequently proposed remedy, and a soundstrategy, if there are companies willing to provide such coverage.

Premature closure policies are not yet available, and insurance com-panies are unlikely to offer them at affordable rates unless the nuclearindustry's operational record improves. Of the reactor' that are cur-rently retired and awaiting decommissioning, none operated for a full

36

30 years, the lower bound used in utility calculations. Nuclear plantare more complex than other electric-generating technologies, arsubject to more design regulations, and have up to ten times as man'pipes, valves, and pumps.''` More parts and a harsher operatinjenvironment enhance the potential for breakdowns. Ten of the 1shutdown reactors listed in Table 5 produced power for less than 1years.

The least secure funding method postpones collection until decommissioning has begun. Under this strategy, utilities put off untithe laEt possible moment the acquisition of debt that could totabillions of dollars. There is no assurance that the money will blavailable. Such last-ditch efforts are also unfair to utility customers ithey are charged for decommissioning a reactor from which they di(not receive power.

In countries where the electric-genera_ system is governmentowned, such as France, the "when- needed" principle of funding hafrequently been adopted. Utility managers assume that the nationor provincial treasury will dole out enough money at the right time tcover the expense of decommissioning. The burden is placed squall1y on the shoulders of future taxpayers. The French utility debt is not$30 billion because of the accelerated nuclear construction programand decommissioning costs may significantly increase already larggovernment budget deficits. Third World governments, many on thedge of insolvency, will be particularly hard-pressed to pay the d(commissioning bill for their 23 operating reactors.74

Of the four retired commercial reactors in the United Sates, only onunit had begun to build a decommissioning fund before it shut dowrThe Pacific Gas and Electric Company, owner of the Humboldt Bareactor, collected $500,000 during the four years prior to plant shutdown In 1984, the Critical Mass 'Energy Project asserted that at lea:11 reactors had gone through one third of their operating lives witlout collecting any funds for decommissioning from ratepayers, anthat nationwide only $600 million had been collected. This lack cfinancial planning prompted nine states to require mandatorperiodic deposits into external accounts: California, Colorado, Main(

3/

"01 a four retired commercial reactors inthe United States, only one unit had begun tobuild a decommissioning fund before it shut

down."

Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Ver-mont, and Wisconsin. Only one state, Michigan, does not allow therecovery of decommissioning costs in current rates.75

Swedish utilities pay an annual decommissioning fee to the federalgovernment. A separate account has been established for each reactorand utilities may borrow from it when their plants are retired. Lessformal funding arrangements exist in West Germany and Switzer-land.76

Decisions about which decommissioning funding strategy to adopthave been postponed for too long. By the end of 1984, the UnitedStates had 84 operable power reactors, more than one quarter of theworld total. The Soviet Union with 44 was a distant second. (SeeTable 6.) Yet despite the large number of plants in operation, mostutilities are financially unprepared for decommissioning. A 1985 sur-vey of 30 U.S. nuclear utilities revealed that 12 had not conductedsite-specific studies of decommissioning costs, 20 were using thefunds they had collected for other purposes, and 8 did not expecttheir current funding method to adequately cover decommissioningexpenses.77

If instead of the haphazard funding approach now in place, all of autility's customers made monthly contributions over a 30-year period,decommissioning might be affordable. The average residential elec-tricity consumer in the United States, if served by an all-nuclearelectnc utility that assumed decommissioning costs of from $200 mil-lion to $1 billion for each 1,000-megawatt reactor, would have paidsome 5 to 25 percent more for electricity last year. Customers withinefficient electric-heating and air-conditioning systems would havepaid more, but those using electricity efficiently would have paid farless. Actual increases would have been considerably lower becauseno U S. electric utility relies exclusively on nuclear power.78

Commonwealth Fdison, an Illinois utility, owns the most nuclearplants in the United States. Its nine k.i.lerating reactors provide 55percent of the company's generating capacity, and three more unitsare under construction. Thus an average residential customer of the

38

Table 6: Nuclear Power Reactors in Operation, Ten LeadingCountries, 1984

CountryNumber of

Reactors

TotalNuclearCapacity

Share Shareof Total of World

Domestic NuclearCapacity Capacity

(megawatts) (percent)

United States 84 68,536 13 33Soviet Union' 44 22,706 8 11France 36 28,015 39 14United Kingdom 32 6,569 10 3Japan 28 19,025 12 9

West Germany 19 16, i 27 18 8Canada 15 8,617 9 4Sweden 10 7,355 24 4Spain 7 4,865 12 2Belgium 6 3,467 28 2

Total 281 185,282 89

Data are for 1983

Sources: Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF), "International Survey," Bethesda, Md., Apri17, 1985, AIF, "Midyear Report," Bethesda, Md , July 10, 1985, Eric SorensonInternational Energy Agency. Pans, private c wrimunication, November 81985

utility would have paid from $20 to $100 in decommissioning chargein 1985. Again, this assumes a decommissioning cost of from $201million to $1 billion per 1,000-megawatt reactor. This charge, fromto 14 percent of the average annual household electric bill, may biacceptable in affluent if fee collection is started when tillplant enters service and if the reactor operates for a full 30 years. Itpractice, actual payments will undoubtedly be higher because feyplants now in service will have collected money throughout theioperating lives.79

39

"Regardless of a nation's future energy plans,existing plants must eventually be scrapped."

Although many nations have not set aside money explicitly for de-commissioning, funds for high-level waste disposal are collected in adozen North American and European countries. In all cases, themoney is paid to the government agency responsible for establishinggeologic waste repositories. The fee typically ranges from $1 to $6 per1,000 kilowatt-hours of nuclear electricity produced. The average res-idential electricity customer in the United States uses some 9,000kilo att-hours annually, and only a fraction is produced by nuclearplants.8°

Setting aside funds for decommissioning is essential in every countrythat uses nuclear power. Regardless of a nation's future energy plans,existing plants must eventually be scrapped. Decommissioning billswill first fall due in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and theUnited Statesthose countries that pioneered the development ofnuclear power. Neither nations nor utilities are financially preparedto absorb the projected costs, much less overruns, and their skill atmanaging the expense will be closely watched. Nations with newerreactors may learn sobering lessons, and countries that have not yetbuilt such plants may have misgivings about doing so when they arebetter able to assess the true lifetime costs of nuclear energy.

A Long-Term Strategy

Just as today's cities would not be habitable without large fleets ofgarbage trucks and extensive landfills, the international nuclear in-dustry is not viable without a sound decommissioning strategy. Morethan 30 years after the first nuclear plant started producing electricity,such a strategy has yet to be formulated. Even if reactor orderingground to a halt tomorrow, more than 500 reactors, including thosecurrently under construction, will have to be decommissioned. Safelyretiring these plants will require new technologies and a plan fordisposing of the mountains of radioactive waste that are being cre-ated. Aggressive, well-funded research and development programscould pave the way.

40

Unfortunately, decommissioning planning has lagged far behind mactor development. The International Atomic Energy Agency (United Nations wi.,:hdog and research arm) did not hold its firemeeting on decommissioning until 1973, some 19 years after the finpower reactor was built. The initial technical meeting sponsored bthe agency was not convened until two years later. Yet by that timehundreds of nuclear power plants were being planned by dozens cgovernments and utility companies.

Both national and international atomic energy agencies continue tineglect decommissioning. In the past, research and developmenmoney was lavished on fuel reprocessing and breeder n actors. ThyUnited States has now abandoned theff, projects and is redirectingthe funds to military and space applicatiais. Since 1978, more nudeareactors have been cancelled worldwide than have been orderedIndustry emphasis is on creating new business, not debolishing ohreactors. Research and development for decommissioning is not everincluded as a category in detailed DOE and NRC budgets.81

The Nuclec.r Energy Agency, a body of the OECD, encourages thiexchange of information, materials, and personnel among membecountries, but offers no financial assistanc:-. And the much touterdecommissioning research program of the European Communitiesauthorized to spf.nd only $11 million during the five-year period *labegan in January 1984. In constant dollars, the total five-year budgeis less than it cost build one small demonstration reactor 20 yearago.82

The biggest stumbling block for all nations with nuclear plants is dulack of permanent disposal facilities for radioactive wastes. Althougtmany reactor operators agree that plants should be dismantled a:quickly as possible after shutdown, that option has been foreclose(until at least the turn of the century. In countries like Japan, whenland for any type of power plant is scarce, unproductive use of reaestate is expulsive.

No country currently has the capability to permanently dispose of thehigh-level wastes now stored at a situ'_.' reactor. And the already

41

daunting task of managing low-level operating wastes is only the tipof the iceberg. As reporters Donald Barlett and James Steele haveobserved, "If the politicians and scientists in charge of nuclear wastehad been running the spare .program, John Glenn [the first U.S. 4astronaut] would still be orbiting the earth today." And, if nudearplant co- - ruction estimates made in the seventies had come to pass,lack of adequate waste sites might have crippled the industry. In1970, the OECD projected that its member nations in WesternEurope, North America, and Japan would have 563,000 megawatts ofnuclear capacity by 1985, more than double the amount now in opera-tion.- Slower-than-anticipated ordering and rapidly increasing con-struction and operating costs thwarted many nations' nuclear pro-grams even before the complicated issues of decommissioning andwaste disposal came to the fore.

But in some areas, including France, Japan, and northeastern NorthAmerica, the use of nuclear power may have already expanded toorapidly. Each area has a relatively dense concentration of nuclearplants, but no detailed plan to decommission them. Given the limi-tations of current knowledge, those nations still committed to build-ing more reactorsnamely France, Japan, and the ovietUnionmight be wise to reconsider their construction programs. Thefull economic and social costs of using n.iclear power will not beknown until the im.ny uncertainties associated with c.:,,commission-ing are eliminated. Multibillion-dollar construction decisions madetoday will be based on incomplete information.

Without detailed replations and technical guidelines, and the avail-ability of disposal sites, utilities cannot plan intelligently for the fu-ture. Some utilities started reactor construction with designs only 20percent complete and discovered that because of regulatory changesthey were not even that far along. The consequences of inadequateplanning for decommissioning would be not only costly but danger-ous. If rules defining which wastes require special treatment or whatconstitutes a clean site are not issued until decommissioning is underway, utilities may find their se:ves short of funds. Financially trou-bled utilities might even declare bankruptcy and abandon plant.

42

42

Many orphaned hazardous waste sites were previously ownednow defunct companies.

Early knowledge of decommissioning requirements would also allengineers to incorporate design changes that would facilitatedecontamination and dismantlement efforts. A simple concept twas not considered by the manufacturers of the first nuclear plawas the value of putting a protective coatini on all surfaces twould be exposed to radiation. Even a thick layt._ of removable p2reduces the surface contamination of structural components and tlthe volume of low-level wastes. Limited experience with neutractivated wastes indicates that their quantities can also be diminislby regulating the amount of neutron-absorbing impurities usedreactor steel and concrete. Several countries now require utilitiessubmit decommissioning proposals at the design stage. But hindslwill on:y benefit the trickle of reactor orders yet to come, nothundreds of units in operation."

A look at the decommissioning funding mechanisms in place in vous countries indicates that we expect our children to pay our electity bills. Without savings programs mat equitably share decomnsioning costs and assure that funds will be available when needtoday's electricity customers are getting a free ride. The longer furcollection is deferred, the greater annual payments will have to btorder to accumulate enough money. Only by periodically updatsite-specific cost estimates, instead of relying on generic studieshypothetical power plants, can utilities hope to build sufficient sings. Waiving tax liabilities on the money deposited in trust furand the interest earned on that money could also hasten the grovof decommissioning accounts.85

Because many plants operated for years without collecting moneydecommissioning, electrkity customers and taxpayers will suffer"aftershock" of paying for retired reactors. The less money set aswhile the plant produces power, and the more actual decommissiing costs diverge from estimates, the greater the aftershock will

experience would shed Ugnt on me redSORdVICLIC LPI LI= tatcvarcand assumptions now used for planning purposes. The plant ownerscould cover half the costs with governments and research institutesfrom around the world contributing the rest. Logical coordinatingbodies would be the International Atomic Energy Agency in Genevaor the Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris. A similar, ad hoc arrangementis in effect at the damaged Three Mile Island unit, with U.S. utilities,the U.S. Department of Energy, and various international par-ticipants contributing money in order to learn firsthand about themost advanced decontamination and dismantlement techniques.

Taking full advantage of the learning experience offered by the reac-tors now coming out of service is sometimes viewed as a needlessexpense. But saving millions of dollars today could result in spendingbillions of extra dollars tomorrow .

"Because many plants operated for yearswithout collecting money for

decommissioning, electricity customers andtaxpayers will suffer the 'aftershock' of

paying for retired reactors."

During the next three decades, more than 350 power reactors will betaken out of service. ImmPdiately dismantling some of the largest ormost problematic reactors as part of an international test case would

I I tore decommissionin ro'ects. Firsthand

1. Public Citizen/Environmental Action, "Dismantling the Myths About Nu-clear Decommissioning," Washington, D.C., April 1985.

2. Christopher Flavin, "Reforming the Electric Power Industry," in Lester R.Brown et al., State of the World 1986, (New Yorl : W.W. Norton & Company,1986).

3. Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF), "International Survey," Bethesda, Md.,April 17, 1985.

4. Steve Olson, "Nuclear Undertakers," Science 84, September 1984. Reactorinventory numbers from AIF, "International Survey' ; from AIF, "MidyearReport,'/ Bethesda, Md , July 10, 1985; from International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), "The Methodology and Technology of DecommissioningNuclear Facilities" (draft), Annex 2, Vienna, May from Nuclear EnergyAgency (NEA), "Compendium on Decommissioning Activities in NEAMember Countries," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-ment (OECD), Paris, January 1985; and from "World List of Nuclear PowerPlants," Nuclear News, February 1986. Retirement date obtained by adding 30years to the date the reactor went into commercial operation.

5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Decommissioning Criteria for Nu-clear Facilities," Federal Register, February 11, 1985.

6. Taylor Moore, "Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," EPR1 Journal,July/August 1985; Colin Norman, "A Long-Term Problem for the NuclearIndustry," Science January 22, 1982, J.C. Evans et al., "Long-Lived ActivationProducts in Reactor Materials," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wash-ington, D C., August 1984.

7. "Survey on Nuclear Decommissioning Methods/Costs," presented atAmerican Gas Association (AGA) Depreciation Committee and Edison Elec-tric Institute Depreciation Accounting Ccmmittee Conference, Dallas, Tex.,February 11-13, 1985, "Cool-down Followed by Dismantling Urged for De-commissioning in Japan," Nucleonics Vveek, July 25, 1985; NEA, Storage withSurveillance Versus Immediate Decommissioning for Nuclear Reactors (Paris:OECD, 1985), NEA, "Compendium on Decommissioning."

8. World Health Organization (WHO), Health Implications of Nuclear PowerProduction (Copenhagen WHO Regional Office for Europe, 1978); Daniel H.Williams and iliomas S. LaGuardia, "Guidelines for Producing CommercialNuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Cost Estimates," prepared for AIF,

45

46

National Environmental Studies Project, and presented to the InternatioiNuclear Re ictor Decommissioning Planrung Conference, Bethesda, Md., Jt16-18, 1983.

9. M. Lasch et al., "Estimation of Radioactive Waste Quantities Arising Diing Decommissioning," in K.H. ScI laller and B. Huber, DecommissioningNuclear Power Plants, proceedings of a European Communities ConferentLuxembourg, May 22-24, 1984 (London: Graham & Trotman, for Commissilof the European Communities, 1984); E.S. Murphy, Technology, Safety aCosts of Decommissioning a Reference Pressurized Water Reactor Power Stela(Classification of Decommissioning Wastes (Addendum 3) (Washington, D.(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1984).

10. For a general discussion of nuclear power production and various reacttechnologies, see Walter C. Patterson, Nuclear Power (Middlesex, U.K.: Peguin Books, 1983). For a technical discussion, see R.I. Smith, G.J. Konzeand W.E. Kennedy, Jr., Technology, Safety and Costs of DecommissioningReference Pressurized Water Reactor Power Station (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Ishlear Regulatory Commission, 1978). Neutron-activated materials discussedMurphy, Classification of Decommissioning Wastes.

11. Paul Woollam, "Five Years of European Research into Decommissicing," Nuclear Engineering International, August 1984; Evans et al., "Long-LivActivation Products."

12. Murphy Classification of Decommissioning Wastes; Evans et al., "LonLived A Products."

13. Smit.., onzek, and Kennedy, Decommissioning a Reference Pressuri2Water &Actor, Commission of the European Communities, "The Coimunity's Research and Development Programme on DecommissioningNuclear Power Plants, Third Annual Progress Report," Luxembourg, 19iTokai Research Establishment, "Development of Reactor DecommissionTechnology," Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Tokyo, 1985; MIlam, "Five Years of European Research into Decommissioning."

14. Smith, Konzek, and Kennedy, Decommissioning a Reference PressurizWater Reactor; E J. Delaney and J.R. Mickelson, "United States DepartmentEnergy Decommissioning ExperienceSelected Projects," in NEA, Storawith Surveillance Versus Immediate Decommissioning; D.E. Robertson et a"Characterization of Residual Radionuclide Contamination Within alAround Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," presented to the Intematior

4t9

Nuclear Reactor Decommissioning Planning Conference. Long-lived activa-tion products build up in almost direct proportion to plant size and operatinglife, but short-lived products, for example, Cobalt 60 with a half-life of 5.3years, reach an equilibnum beyond which further buildup does not occur.

15. Bill Rankin, "Long Odyssey For a Little Reactor," Energy Daily, May 23,1985.

16. Ibid., Moore, "Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants."

17. J.T.A. Roberts, R. Shaw, and K. Stahlkopf, "Decommissioning of Com-mercial Nuclear Power Plants," in Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 10 (Palo Al*Calif : Annual Reviews Inc., 1985).

18. NEA, "Compendium on Decommissioning."

19. John J Taylor, "Remote Systems for TMI-2 Surveillance and Char-acterization," EPRI Journal, March 1985, 'Utility Starts Extracting WreckedCore From TMI," Energy Daily, October 29, 1985; Franklin R. Standerfer,

How the Cleanup is Coming," in Proceedings of the American PowerConference, Chicago, April 22-24, 1985 (Chicago: Illinois Institute of Tech-nology, 1985)

20. Annie Stine, "The Short, Sad Life and Long, Slow Death of HumboldtBay," Sierra, September/October 1984

21. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), U.S. Congress, Managing theNation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste (Washington, D.C.: U.SGovernment Printing Office, 1985)

22. E Detilleux, "The Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel," Nuclear EnergyAgency Newsletter, Apnl 1985 For a detailed discussion of international fuelreprocessing plans and activities, see Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Management,proceedingc of the Amencan Nuclear Society International Topical Meeting,Jackson, Wyo., August 26-29, 1984 (La Grange Park, Ill.: American NuclearSociety, 1984)

23. OTA, Managing Commercial High-Level Waste.

24. WHO, Health Implications of Nuclear Power Production, NEA, Interface Ques-tions in Nuclear Health and Safety (Pans: OECD, 1985).

4?

48

25. Judith Perera, "China and Sudan Want Germany's Nuclear Waste," NeuScientist, September 5, 1985; Stephanie Cooke and Ann MacLachan, "ChinaGerman Memo on Spent Fuel Shipments May be Signed in October," NueIeonics Week, September 12. 1985; the Chinese offer may no longer be goocaccording to "Chinese Decision Seen Shift in Nuclear Policy, ' Journal 0,Commerce, March 6, 1986; Karol Szyndzieloiz, chief political commentatorZycie Warszawy (Warsaw), private communication, September 18, 1985.

26. A.V. Josh', "Suitability of Salt Formations in Europe for HLW Disposal,'Nuclear Europe, February 1985; Sten Bjurstrom and Erik Svenke, "The Swellish Program for Snt Fuel and Waste," Nuclear Europe, October 1984; SpeFareeduddin and J. Hirling, "The Radioactive Waste Management Conference," IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 4.; J.M. Lavie and M.N. Moscazdo, "Radioachve Waste Management in France," Radioactive Waste Management anthe Nuclear Fuel Cycle, February 1984.

27. OTA, Managing Commercial High-Level Waste; "EPA Issues 10,000-YeaStandard," Energy Daily, August 16, 1985; Mark Crawford, "DOE StateReheat Nuclear Waste Debate," Science, October 11, 1985.

28. Barry D. Solomon and Diane M. Cameron, "N..clear Waste RepositorSiting," Energy Policy, December 1985; James B. Martin, Review of Managin the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste," EnvironmentJuly/August 1985.

29. "SKBSwedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company," information brochure, Stockholm, 1985, Bjurstrom and Svenke, "The SwedislProgram for Spent Fuel and Waste'"; IAEA, Guidebook on Spent Fuel Storag(Vienna IAEA, 1984)

30. Benjamin S Cooper, "Monitored, Retrievable Storage. Priority Needed,'Nuclear News, November 1984, Thomas O'Toole, "Clinch River Site Urged Fo:Stonng Atomic Waste," Washington Post, April 26, 1985; Arlen J. Large, "Opposition to Permanent Sites for Nuclear Wastes Stirs Fears in Tennessee OveTemporary Depot," Wal; street Journal, December 27, 1985.

31. California legislature quote from Fred C. Shapiro, Radwaste (New YorkRandom House, Inc , 1981), Chnstopher Flavin, Nuclear Power The MarkeTest (Washington, D C . Worldwatch Institute, December 1983).

4d

32. K.M. Harmon, 'Survey of Foreign Terminal Radioactive Waste StorageProgra.ns," in Proceedings of the 1983 Civilian Radioactive Waste ManagementInformation Meeting, Washington, D.C., December 12-15, 1983 (Springfield,Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1984); Bob Johnstone, "A Comi-ty Without a 'Nuclear Toilet'," New Scientist, October 3, 1985; "No One isEmptying the Nuclear Dustbins," New Scientist, October 3, 1985.

33. Dehlleux, "The Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel."

34. Teresa A. Nichols, "State Low-Level Agreements Augur Changes forUtilities; Disposal Options Unsettled," Nuclear Industry, June 1985; Smith,Konzek, and Kennedy, Decommissioning a Reference Pressurized Water Reactor;U.S. Department of Energy, Low-Level Waste Management Program, "Na-tional Status Report December 20, 1985," Washington, D.C.

35. Luther Carter, nuclear waste analyst, Washington, D.C., pnvate com-munication, October 15, 1985, Richard L. Hudson, "Atomic-Age Dump: ABntish Nuclear Plant Recycles Much Waste, Stirs a Growing Outcry," WallStreet Journal, Apnl 11, 1984

36. Bill Rankin, "Profits Beckon in Low-Level Nuclear Waste Management,"Energy Daily, June 11, 1985, "Radioactive Waste Management Policies," IAEABulletin, Vol. 25, No. 4

37. Julie M. Jordan, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management. An Update (Den-ver: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1984); for a general discussionof nuclear waste problems in Amenca, see Donald L Barlett and James B.Steele, Forevermore (New Y9rk: W.W. Norton & Co., 1985).

38. Taylor Moore, "The Great State of Uncertainty in Low-Level Waste Dis-posal," EPRI Journal, March 1985, U.S. House of Representatives, Committeeon Interior and Insular Affairs, "Low-Level Radioactive Waste PolicyAmendments Act of 1985," Washington, D.C., October 22, 1985 containsmost of the provisions of the final amendments passed on December 19,1985

39. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "Low-I,evel RadioactiveWaste Policy"; Jeff Smiley, Low- Le .'el Waste Program Manager, U S De-partment of Energy, private communication, February 7, 1986.

40. Jeffrey Johnson, "Nowhere To Go," Environments: Action, January/February 1986, Jordan, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management

49

50

41. Johnson, 'Nowhere to Go"; R.D. Bennett et al., Alternative Methods fiDisposal of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Rejulatory Commission, 1984).

42. State Workshop on Shallow Land Burial and Alternative Disposal Conceptproceedings of a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmi lien, Bethesda, Md., May 2-3, 1984.

43. Smiley, private communication, February 7, 1986.

44. David Fish lock, "The Swedish Lesson in Nuclear," Energy Daily, Felruary 6, 1985; IAEA Bulletin, "Radioactive Waste Management Po licies."

45. Rankr- Fiunts Beckon in Low-Level r.uclear Waste Management."

46. Murphy; Classification of D,:commissioning Wastes; William J. Dircks, "Diposal Capability for Decommissioning Wastes," U.S. Nuclear RegulatorCommission, Washington, D.0 , memorandum, Maich 8, 1985.

47. David F Greenwood et al., Analysts of Nuclear Power Reactor Decommissionmg Costs (Washington, D.0 Atomic Industrial Forum/National Envirormental Studies Project, 1981)

48. Share of reactors that are PWRs and BWRs from AIF, "InternationSurvey", Smith, Konzek, and Kennedy, Decommissioning a Reference Presurized Water Reactor; H.D. Oak et al., Technology, Safety and Costs of DIcornmissionin a Reference Boiling Water Reactor Power Station (WashingtonD C U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1980)

49. R I Smith et al , "Updated Costs for Decommissioning Nuclear Pow(Facilities," Electnc Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, Calif , May 198!Roberts, Shaw, and Stahlkopf, "Decommissioning of Commercial NucleiPower Plants

50. Roberts, cnaw, and Stahlkopf, "Decommissioning of Commercial NIclear Power Plants "

51. Duane Chapman, "Nuclear Economics Taxatic,n, Fuel Cost, and Dicommissioning," prepared for the California Energy Commission, Sairainento, California, November 1980; "Swiss Estimate Price c

50

Decommissioning as 20% Cost of Building Plant," Nucleonics Week, February26, 1981, Peter Skinner, "Comparative Economics," testimony before theNew York Public Service Commission, Albany, New York, December 2, 1977.

52. Andre Cregut, comments made at the international Nuclear ReactorDecommissioning Planning Conference.

53. Chapman, "Nuclear Economics"; Public Citizen, "Dismantling theMyths."

54. Edward Merrow, Stephen W. Chapel, and Christopher Worthing, AReview of Cost Estimation in New Technologies: Implications for Energy ProcessPlants (Santa M,,nica, Calif : Rand Corporation, 1970); U.S. Department ofEnergy, "Nuclear Power Plant Construction Activity 1984," Washington,D.C., July 1985; Richard K. Lester, "Rethinking Nuclear Power," ScientificAmerican, March 1986.

55. Investment in canceled nuclear plants is a Worldwatch Institute estimatebased on numerous reports and news articles; U.S. Department of Energy,"Nuclear Power Plant Construction Activity."

56. Williams and LaGuardia, "Guidelines for Decommissioning Cost Esti-mates."

57. Nicholas S. Reynolds, Scott M. DuBoff, and Daniel F. Stenger, "Regula-tion of Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Funding by the U.S NuclearRegulatory CommissionAn Industry Perspective on the NRC's ProposedRegulations," presented to the International Nuclear Reactor Decommission-ing i iuiining Conference.

58. Nucleonics Week, "Cool-down Followed by Dismantling Urged for De-commissioning in Japan."

59. Roberts, Shaw, and Stahlkopf, "Decommissioning of Commercial Nu-clear Power Plants "

60. "U.K Considers Compensation for Those Near Waste Dumps," EnergyDaily, September 4, 1985.

61. National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI), "Funding Nuclear PowerPLInt Decommissioning," prepared for U.S. Department of Energy, Colum-bus, Ohio, October 1982; Public Citizen, "Dismantling the Myths"; Roberts,

1

5

52

Shaw, and Stahlkopf, "Decommissioning of Commercial Nuclear PoPlants."

62. "DOE Says Decommissioning, Costs on Target Despite Shippingrecrease," Nucleonics Week, April 25, 1983; Delaney and Mickelson, UnStates Department of Energy Decommissioning ExperienceSelected I

ects."

63. Nuclear News, "World List of Nuclear Power Plants"; Lester, "Rethin1Nuclear Power."

64. NRRI, "Funding Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning"; NEA, "Cpendium on Decommissioning Activities."

65. Cregut, comments made at the International Nuclear Reactorcommissio -ig Planning Conference.

66. Uncertainties discussed in several of the papers in NEA, StorageSurveillance Versus Immediate Decommissioning for Nuclear Reactors; in PiCitizen, "Dismantling the Myths"; in NRRI, " unding Nuclear Power IDecommissioning", and in Murphy, Classification of Decommissioning Wa

67. R S. Wood, "Ass'inng the Availability of Funds Kir DecommissioNut.,,ar Facilities,' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WashinfD.C., 1983; John S. Ferguson, "Influence of Accounting Concepts andulatory Rules on the Funding of Power Reactor Decommissioning Copresented to the International Nuclear Reactor Decommissioning TianConference.

68. Public Citizen, "Dismantling the Myths."

69. J.J. Siegel, "Utility Financial Stability and the Availability of FundDecommissioning," U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WashingD C , September 1984.

70. Chip Brown, "An Ambitious Nuclea- Empire Goes Awry," WashiiPont, December 2, 1984, Siegel, "Utility Financial Stability."

71. Bjurstrom and Svenke, "The Swedish Program for Spent FuelWaste."

72. Siegel, "Utility Financial Stability."

52

73. John Douglas, "Nuclear Power: The Next Generation," EPRI journal,March 1985; "Electricity," Financial Tones Energy Economist, August 1985.

74. Jim Harding, energy analyst, Friends of the Earth, private communica- 5,Lion, October 8, 1985; Nuclear News, "World List of Nuclear Power Plants."

75. Public Citizen, "Dismantling the Myths"; Peter Anderson, president,Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, private communication, February 15,1986; Reynolds, DuBoff, and Stenger, "Regulation of Nuclear Power PlantDecommissioning Funding."

76. Bjurstrom and Svenke, "The Swedish Program for Spent Fuel andWaste"; Fareeduddm and Hirling, "The Radioactive Waste ManagementConference."

77. AGA Depreciation Committee, "Survey of Decommissioning Methods/Costs."

78. The average residential electricity customer in the United States used8,965 kilowatt-hours of electricity in 1984, according to unpublished statisticscompiled by the Edison Electric Institute. Each kilowatt-hour cost an averageof $0.08 ( "International Energy Prices 1980-84," U.S. Departmer.t of Energy,Washington, D.C. August 1985) for an average annual bill of $717. Applyingan annual capital

D.C.,rate of 0.107 [Marc H. Ross and Robert H. Williams,

Our Energy Regaining Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981)]to decommissioning costs of from $200 million to $1 billion for each 1,000-me-gawatt reactor and assuming a 65 percent capacity factor, the decommission-mg charge would ratIge between $0.004 to $0.02 per kilowatt-hour, or 5 to 25percent of the average kilowatt-hour charge.

79. Roland Krantz, Commonwealth Edison, private communication, October17, 1985

80. Harmon, "Sul oy of Radioactive Waste Programs", Fareeduddin and"Radioacti Waste Management Conference "

81. Christopher Flavin, Nuclear Power. The Market Test, U.S. Governmentbudget documents

82. Jacques de In Ferte, public affairs director, NEA, private communication,March 5, 1986; Official Journal of the European Communities, August 2, 1984.

53

54

83. Barlett and Steele, Forevermore; International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD, 1982); Nuclear News, "World List of Nuclear PowePlants."

84. E.B. Moore, Jr , "Facilitation of Decommissioning Light Water Reactors,U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., December 1979; ABittner et al , 'Concepts Aimed at Minimizing the Activation and Con

illation of Concrete," in Schaller and Huber, Decommissioning of IslucleaPower Plants.

85. A recent court ruling would allow utilities to put funds into a decommissioning trust fund vilthvut paying taxes on them. See "Not TaxabiIncome," Insight, February 17, 1986

CYNTHIA POLLOCK is a Researcher with the Worldwatch Institute,and coauthor of State of the World 1986. She is a graduate of theUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison where she studied economics, en-vironmental studies, and international relations.

54

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Energy Crisis: Firewood by Erik Eckho lin.; and Responsibility of the North American Breadbasio.:r R. Brown.1Politics: A Global Review by Kathleen Newlar dto Cu. for Conservation by Denis Hayes.p Dimensions of the Population Pro .meinR. Brown, Patricia L. McGrath, and Bruce Stokes.

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by Bruce Stokes.47 Infant Mortar'- Ind the Health of Societies by tr x.n Newland.48. Six Steps to oustainable Society by Lester r in and Palmate

Shaw.49. Productivity: The New Economic Context by Kathleen Newland.50 Space: The High Frontier in Perspecive by Daniel Deudney.51. U.S. and Soviet Agriculture: The Shifting Balance of Power

by Lester R. Brown.52. Electricity from Sunlight: The Future of Photovoltaic*

by Christopher Flavin.53 Population Policies for a New Economic El N by Lester R. Brown.54 Promoting Population Stabilization: Incentives for Small Families

by Judith Jacobsen55 Whole Earth Security: A Geopolitics of Peace by Daniel Det-iney56. Materials RecyclI'g: The VIKA) of Necessity by William U. Chandler57 Nucbar Power: The Market Test by Christopher Flavin58 Air Pollution, Acid Rain, and the Future of Forests by Sandra Postel59 Improving World Health: A Least Cost Strategy by William U.

Chandler60. Soil Erosion: Quiet Crisis in the Weld Economy by Lester Brown and

Edward Wolf.

61 Electricity's Future: The to Efficiency and Small-ScalePower by Chnstopher Ftav,n

62 Water: Rethinkir Managemnrsi In an Ago of Scarcity bySandra Postel

63 Energy Productivity: Key to Environmental PTotection andEconomic Progress by William U. Chandiur

64 Investing in Children by William U Chandler65 Reversing Africa's Decline by Lester Brown and Edw,..74 Wolf66 World Oil: Coping With tne Dangers of Success by

Christopher Flavin67 conserving Water: The Untapped Alternative by Sandra Pos'elA Banishing Tobacco by Wham U. Chandler69 Decommissioning: Nuclear Power's Missing Link by Cynthia Pollock

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