DOCUMENT RESUME ED 093 580 Globe, Samuel; And Others … · together by the Battelle Columbus...

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I DOCUMENT RESUME ED 093 580 SE 016 828 AUTHOR Globe, Samuel; And Others TITLE Science, Technology, and Innovation. INSTITUTION Battelle Memorial Inst., Columbus, Ohio. Columbus Labs. SPONS AGENCY National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. REPORT NO NSF-C-667 PUB DATE Feb 73 NOTE 33p. EDRS PRICE DESCRIPTORS IDENTIFIERS MF-$0.75 HC-$1.85 PLUS POSTAGE *Case Studies; *Innovation; Science Education; SciencRs; Technical Reports; *Technology Battelle ABSTRACT This report summarizes the latest effort in a series sponsored by the National Science Foundation on the innovation process. It adds to the store of retrospective case studies by documenting historically the significant events in several technological innovations of high social impact. These cases, drawn together by the Battelle Columbus Laboratories, along with previous case studies, illustrate the diverse ways by which research and development activities support each other in the innovation process. The document is an "bridged version of a report with more technical details being provided in the complete report entitled ',The Interactions of Science and Technology in the Innovative Process: Some Case Studies," available from the National Science Foundation. (Authors/PEB)

Transcript of DOCUMENT RESUME ED 093 580 Globe, Samuel; And Others … · together by the Battelle Columbus...

I

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 093 580 SE 016 828

AUTHOR Globe, Samuel; And OthersTITLE Science, Technology, and Innovation.INSTITUTION Battelle Memorial Inst., Columbus, Ohio. Columbus

Labs.SPONS AGENCY National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.REPORT NO NSF-C-667PUB DATE Feb 73NOTE 33p.

EDRS PRICEDESCRIPTORS

IDENTIFIERS

MF-$0.75 HC-$1.85 PLUS POSTAGE*Case Studies; *Innovation; Science Education;SciencRs; Technical Reports; *TechnologyBattelle

ABSTRACTThis report summarizes the latest effort in a series

sponsored by the National Science Foundation on the innovationprocess. It adds to the store of retrospective case studies bydocumenting historically the significant events in severaltechnological innovations of high social impact. These cases, drawntogether by the Battelle Columbus Laboratories, along with previouscase studies, illustrate the diverse ways by which research anddevelopment activities support each other in the innovation process.The document is an "bridged version of a report with more technicaldetails being provided in the complete report entitled ',TheInteractions of Science and Technology in the Innovative Process:Some Case Studies," available from the National Science Foundation.(Authors/PEB)

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II

L, 5 DLPARTMENT OF HEALTHEDUCATION & OJELFARENATIONAL INSTITUT E OF

EDUCATIONTo S DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPk0OJCEO EXACTLY AS RECEP.ED FROMTHE PERSON OR ORGAN'ZATIONDRIO'NAT PC iNTSOF 4IC A OA OPIN,ONSS t a TEO DO P ^1 NECE isAS X REPRESENT CF r iC1AL N,T 104AL NyTiluTt OFEthic ATiO4 PC N 1,R Pk.a_ICY

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,t7 Science, Technology, andcD°' innovation

Prepared forNATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Contract NSFC 667

February, 1973

O BattelleCo!umbus laboratortes505 Ring; A...enueColumbus, Ohio 432+J1

This report summarizes the latest effort in aseries sponsored by the National ScienceFoundation on the innovation process. It addsto the store of retrospective case studies bydocumenting historically the significant eventsin several technological innovations of highsocial impact, These cases, drawn together bythe Battelle Columbus Laboratories, along withprevious case studies, illustrate the diverse waysby which research and development activitiessupport each other in the innovation process.

This process involves many individuals andinstitutions responding over time to numerouspressures and motivations. While science andtechnology play leading roles, the human ele-ment and the environment in which innovationtakes place are themselves of considerableimportance. The Battelle study, taking thebroad situation into account, also investigatesthe role of certain socioeconomic and mana-gerial factors in promoting each of the innova-tions; and this part of the investigation consti-tutes a unique contribution to the study of theinnovation process.

The findings of this study should prove use-ful to those interested in the stimulation oftechnological innovation. To the extent thatmodels emerge, they can provide the basis forplanning and policy. New questions aboutinnovation that arise throughout thii reportreflect the insights gained and should providepossible directions for further studies.

Throughout this study the Battelle ColumbusLaboratories team worked closely with the staffin the NSF Division of Science ResourcesStudies. Drs. Samuel Globe, Charles M.Schwartz, and Girard W. Levy acted as projectmanagers at Battelle. Dr. James J. Zwolenikprovided liaison and served as technical advisorto the Battelle teem on behalf of NSF.

H. Guyford SteverDirectorNational Science Foundation

kknowledgments

This document is an abridged version of areport on a study performed at the BattelleColumbus Laboratories under Contract NSF-C667. The reader who is interested in more tech-nical deta I than provided in this abridgmentmay consult the complete report entitled "TheInteractions of Science and Technology in theInnovative Process: Some Case Studies", avail-able from the National Science Foundation.

In addition to the below named authors ofthis abridged version, the contributors to theproject included Duane E. Bell, J. Frank Byrne,Cecil Chilton, Richard D. Falb, W. Haider Fisher,Robert E. Freund, Lemont B. Kier, Edward S.Lipinsky, Garson A. Lutz, Charles S. Peet,

William J. Sheppard, Gary S. Stacey, andRonald A. Williams, all of the Battelle-ColumbusLaboratories, and June Z. Fullmer of The OhioState University.

Acknowledgment is also made of the helpfulsupport given by various members of the staff

of the Division of Science Resources Studies atthe National Science Foundation. In particular,Dr. James J. Zwolenik took an active interestin our work and provided valuable criticismwhile performing the usual tasks associated withtechnical liaison; and Dr. Charles E. Falk en-couraged this work from its inception andshowed keen interest during its progress. Thanksare also due various referees, unknown to theauthors, who, at the request of the NationalScience Foundation, reviewed and commentedon the historical accounts of the study. How-ever, the responsibility for the accounts, forinterpretation of events, and for the results ofthe analysis, rests solely with those staff mem-bers of the Battelle Columbus Laboratories whomade up the project team.

Samuel GlobeGirard W. LevyCharles M. SchwartzBattelle-Columbus Laboratories

the of ContentsINTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1

What Is Innovation? 1

Three Periods Associated with Innovation 1

How the Study Was Conducted 2

Performing the AnalysisHow the Cases Were SelectedThe Cases Studied 4

ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS 6

The 21 Factors and the Decisive Events 6

Conclusions About the Factors 7

Generalizations from the Case Histories 8

Analysis and Classification of the Significant Events 9

Can Innovation Be Managed? 11

HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE CASES 12

The Heart Pacemaker 12

Hybrid Grains and The Green Revolution 15

Hybrid Corn 17

Hybrid Small Grains 17

Green Revolution Wheats 17

Electrophotography 18

Input-Output Economic AnalysisOrganophosphorus Insecticides 23Oral Contraceptives 26Magnetic Ferrites 29Video Tape Recorder 31

Introduction andOverview

Innovation is a term that describes certainactivities by which our society improves itsproductivity, standard of living, and economicstatus. Basic to the progress of innovation arethe tools, discoveries, and techniques of scienceand technology. In an attempt to understandbetter how innovation proceeds, and how it is

supported by science and technology, we under-took, in the project reported here, an examina-tion of several innovations of high social oreconomic impact. Our motivation was not onlyadditional knowledge, but also the hope thatsuch knowledge may offer guidelines for gen-erating socially desirable innovations.

Before proceeding tc the account of thestudy, we shall find it useful to define somebasic terms, and to consider in greater detailthe background and methods of the study. Webegin with a discussion of innovation itself.

li'jhat Is Innovation?

When inventio,is or other new scientific ortechnological ideas are conceived, they do notimmediately enter the stream of commercial orindustrial application. In fact, many never getbeyond the stage of conception, while othersare abandoned during the period of develop-ment. But some go rirough a full course ofgestation, and finally emerge as new and usefulcommercial products, processes, or techniques.Such advances are called innovations.

Innovation should be distinguished fromscientific discovery, although relevant dis-coveries may be incorporated into the innova-tion. Innovation should also be differentiated

from invention, although an invention fre-quently provides the initial concept leading tothe innovation. Nor is innovation merely amarginal improvement to an existing productor process. Rather it is a complex series ofactivities '-i-%ginning at "first conception", whenthe original idea is conceived; proceedingthrough a succession of interwoven steps ofresearch, development, engineering, design,market analysis, management decision making,etc.; and ending at "first realization", when anindustrially successful "product", which mayactually be a thing, a technique, or a process, isaccepted in the marketplace. The term "innova-tion" also describes the process itself, and, whenso used, it is synonymous with the phrase"innovative process".

Three Periods Associated With Innovation

As so defined, innovation extends over abounded interval of time (the innovative period)from first concer,ion to first realization.Implicitly, therefore, we have defined two otherperiods of time the "preconception" period,which precedes the time of first conception,and the "post-innovative" period, which followsthe time of first realization. During the precon-ception period science and technology developthe foundation for the innovation. In the post-innovative period improvements of the innova-tion are made and marketed, and the technologydiffuses into other applications. The post-inno-vative period is sometimes called the period of

*Also turned "culmination" in the histor icat ,iccounts.

"technological diffusion", although the twoterms are not synonymous, because diffusionis only one of the activities of this period.

Let's look at an example one of theinnovations studied the Heart Pacemaker. Forthis innovation, the preconception period sawadvances in electricity, especially electrochem-istry, in cardiac physiology, and in surgery andintracardiac-therapy techniques. But first con-ception did not occur until 1928 when Or.Albert S. Hyman conceived the idea of periodicelectrical stimulation of the heart by means ofan artificial device, an idea for which he filed apatent application in 1930. The innovativeprocess for the pacemaker proceeded between1928 and 1960; during this period, batterieswere upgraded, the transistor was invented,materials technology enjoyed rapid develop-ment, and surgical techniques were advanced.The year 1960 marked the first implantation ofa pacemaker in a human patient, and marketingof the device began soon thereafter; 1960 istherefore the date of first realization for thisinnovation. Since that date in the post-inno-vative period heart pacemakers have becomemore sophisticated, and work on further im-provements continues.

Our study concentrated on the innovativeperiod. But to understand the background fromwhich innovation evolves, and to appreciate theimpact of innovation on society, we consideredalso the preconception and post-innovativeperiods.

The preconception period presents problems,because it is historically open ended. At whatpoint in history should one start? Electricalstimulation of muscular activity is importantto the development of the heart pacemaker.Should one then go back to Gaivarii's experi-ments with frogs' iegs? Since some time horizonhad to be chosen, we selected 1900. Thecontinuity of history makes it difficult to closeone's eyes completely to pre-1900 events, sosome especially significant scientific and tech-nical events that occurred before 1900 areincluded in the historical record.

How the Study Was Conducted

We documented the history of five new"cases", jointly selected by the National Science

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Foundation and the project team. These wereanalyzed, along with three cases from theproject TRACES,* by the methods describedbelow. At the time the new cases were chosen,we expected to find that each case involved asingle innovation. Later it became clear thatone of the cases Hybrid Grains and the GreenRevolution -- included three distinct innova-tions, so the eight cases represent ten innova-tions. By reviewing recorded literature and,wherever feasible, by interviewing importantparticipants in the innovative developments, thecase investigators documented the history ofeach innovation.

Throughout this report the term "event" isused in a special and technical sense. The inno-vative process comprises myriad occurrences,some of which happen sequentially, and someconcurrently at different places. From theseoccurrences, one can identify some that appearto encapsulate the progress of the innovation.These special occurrences are the "events" inthe technical sense just referred to.** Theirselection reflects the best judgment of the in-vestigators, and is necessarily somewhat arbi-trary.

To clarify further how the study proceeded,other terms associated with the "events" aredefined below,

A significant event is an occurrence judgedto encapsulate an important activity in thehistory of an innovation or its further improve-ment, as reported in publications, presentations,or references to research. Generally these eventsfollow one another in historical sequence, alongchannels of developing knowledge. Significantevents include other classes of events.

A decisive event is an especially importantsignificant event that provides a major aridevential impetus to the innovation. It oftenoccurs at the convergence of several streams ofactivity. In judging an event to be decisive, oneshould be convinced that, without it, the inno-vation would not have occurred or would havebeen serousiv delayed.

Is

L.

Since science and technology lie at the focusof the investigation, the great majority of signi-ficant events are technical in nature. However,a few events that did not involve science andtechnology were important enough to be in-cluded among the significant events. Theseevents are termed nontechnical.

A nontechnical event is a social or politicaloccurrence outside the fields of science andtechnology. For example, a war or naturaldisaster would be a nontechnical event, in con-trast with a management venture decision with-in a technical organization, which would beclassed as a technical event.

The technical events were then furtherclassified as to where they lie in the spectrumof science and technology. In this spectrum,three regions are defined as follows.

Nonmission-oriented research INMOR) is

research carried on for the purpose of acquiringnew knowledge, according to the conceptualstructure of the subject or the interests of thescientist, without concern for a mission orapplication, even though the project withinwhich such research is done may be fundedwith possible applications in mind.

Mission-oriented research (MOR) is researchcarried on for the purpose of acquiring newknowledge expected to be useful in some appli-cation.

Development is the process of design, im-provement, testing, and engineering, in thecourse of bringing an innovation to fruition.

Each technical event, judged by its predomi-nant purpose or content, vas classified as

NMOR, MOR, or development.

Pet

The historical record was subjected to threeanalyses: (a) an invest.gation into how certain"factors" affected the decisive events; (b) a

search through the historical record for"characteristics" common to the innovations;and (c) a classification in various ways of allsignificant events.

Decisive Events. The concept of decisiveevents, their identification in the innovations,and an investigation of the circumstances thataffected these events, constituted one of thechief contributions of this study. Twenty-one

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factors believed to be important to decisiveevents of the innovative process were identifiedfrom the literature on innovation. These factorsare social and institutional conditions of theenvironment in which innovation takes place.A scale of 0, 1, 2, or 3 was established for thefactors, designating respectively no, slight,moderate, and high importance to the decisiveevents. Each of the factors was then rated foreach decisive event.

Analysis of the frequency of the ratings foreach of the factors provides an assessment ofthe relative importance of those factors to thedecisive events. However, this procedure judgesthe importance of the factors to the individualdecisive events, and not to the innovativeprocess as a whole. Under the circumstances, ahigh ranking suggests that the factor is impor-tant for the innovation as a whole, but a lowranking is ambiguous. In other words, a factorthat scores low with respect to the decisiveevents may yet be important for the innovationas a whole. For example, ''Social Factors" wasrated as moderately or highly important foronly 4 percent of the decisive events. This doesnot necessarily mean that Social Factors is notimportant to the process of innovation; what itdoes mean is that the case investigator, sup-ported by the actual participant in the innova-tive process whenever he was available, did notjudge that Social Factors strongly affected theindividual decisive events.

Characteristics of the Case Histories. Thesecond part of the analysis examined the casehistories in a qualitative way to determine what"characteristics" appeared frequently in the 10innovations, each considered as a whole. Thesecharacteristics were selected from a review ofother studies on innovation.

Of the eight characteristics that emergedmost prominently, some, but not all, weresimilar to certain of the 21 factors. When suchsimilarity exists, and in addition both the factorand the characteristic score high in the analysis,one is justified in ascribing more than averageimportance to the influence of that conditionon the innovative process, and in suggesting aprescriptive judgment. Such is the situation, forexample, with respect to the technical entre-preneur. His presence appears to be an impor.tant influence that needs to be encouraged if

innovation is to be promoted.

Each case history also gives an account ofthe special conditions and influences thataffected the innovation(s) of that case. Theseaccounts, under the title "Implications of theCase", show the need to allow for diversity aswell as uniformity in any attempt to provide ageneral model for innovation.

Significant Events. The last analysis focusedon the significant events. To provide furtherinsight into the interaction of science andtechnology in the innovative process, weexamined the frequency of occurrence ofNMOR, MOR, and development events; thetime of occurrence of each type of event (pre-conception, innovative, or post-innovativeperiod); and the cumulative increase in eachtype of event in the years prior to the end ofthe innovative period.

Hovv tht. Gases 1,--Vert7; Stiected

At the outset, five cases for study wereselected jointly by the project team and theNationai Science Foundation. These were newcases, in that the concept of significant eventshad never been applied to them. The criteriafor selection were first, that the innovationsshould be of high social impact, and second,that the cases should represent diverse fields oftechnology and application. Thus, one case isfrom the social sciences, one from agriculturalscience, one has impact mainly in medical tech-nology, one is highly significant to problems ofthe environment, and one has its backgroundmainly in physical science.

In addition to documenting the five newcases, we used the results of three cases studiedin the earlier project TRACES. For these caseswe identified the decisive events, and subjectedthem, and the history of the innovations, to thesame analysis and inspection applied to thefive new cases. Reliable identification of thedecisive events required some further historicalresearch. The three cases taken from theTRACES project were Oral Contraceptives,Magnetic Ferrites, and Video Tape Recorder.

The following thumbnail sketches describethe eight cases studied.

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THE HEART PACEMAKERThe heart pacemaker is a device thatperiodically supplies to the diseased

human heart an electrical impulse to starteach heart beat cycle. In its societal im-pact, the heart pacemaker epitomizes theproblem of artificial organs and organ im-plants, and foreshadows the ethical ques-tions surrounding the use of such devices.It has unquestionably demonstrated itsability to prolong life. Although the pace-maker is essentially a medical device, con-tributing technology came from the fieldsof electricity, electronics, chemistry, andphysiology.

HYBRID GRAINS AND THE GREENREVOLUTIONThe development of hybrid grains is onepart of what is sometimes termed the"green revolution", referring to thestriking increase in production of cerealgrains in many parts of the world. In thestudy of hybrid grains, hybrid corn wasemphasized because it has been a modelfor hybridization of other grains. Detailsof the hybridization of the small grains,wheat and sorghum, are included in thestudy, as is the development of the newvarieties of wheat. Improvements in riceare also a part of the green revolution,but its technology involves no noveltybeyond that of the other cereal grains, soit was not included in the account. Thesocial impact of improved grains is world-wide, particularly in the recent conversionof some developing countries from grain-deficient to grain-surplus conditions, andin the grain surpluses of the United States.Because agricultural research is itself inter-disciplinary, here one does not see theunplanned confluence of technology, asin most of the other cases.

ELECTROPHOTOGRAPHYElectrophotography is the process ofduplicating or copying visual material bythe application of electrostatics and

photoconductivity. The best known appli-cation of electrophorography is the office

copier. Electrophotography has alreadyrevolutionized businesioffice procedures,and is producing further effects on theworld of duplicating, publishing, antiinformation processing. Important contributing technology came from electro-statics, photoconductivity, and coronaemission.

INPUT- OUTPUT ECONOMIC ANALYSISInput-output economic analysis is a toolfor examining the structure of an econo-my by recording the details of interindus-try commerce within that economy. It hasfound wide application in related areassuch as studies of economic development,predictions of economic needs, and otheraspects of national and group economics.Background technology came from gen-eral economic modeling and statisticalanalysis. Contributing technology camefrom the field of machine computation,especially the electronic digital computer.

ORGANOPHOSPHORUS INSECTICIDESOrganophosphorus insecticides are an

extremely diverse group of toxic agents.Their properties range from short residualaction to long persistence, from broad-spectrum insecticidal activity to highselectivity combined with low mammaliantoxicity. Some, applied to the plant sys-tern by absorption as systemic insecticides, produce their effect as the targetpests attack the plant. Because they neednot be broadcast through large portionsof the biosphere and are more selectivein their effects, these products are lesslikely to affect life forms that are not partof the target population. They are anexample of pestcontrol schemes intendedto be more ecologically desirable thanwidely broadcast chlorinated hydrocar-bons such as DDT or chlordane. This isan interesting case because its diverse

technological roots, including organicchemistry, toxicology, and nerve physi-ology, came together through the deliber-ate formation of an interdisciplinary

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team, rather than from unplanned cir-cumstance.

ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES'Oral contraceptives provide a hormonalapproach to contraception. The hormonesin the contraceptive pill suppress ovula-tion, and thereby prevent conception.Oral contraceptives are inexpensive andhave been widely accepted. The principalsupportive technologies are steroid chem-istry, hormone research, and reproductivephysiology.

MAGNETIC FERRITESMagnetic materials are widely used incontemporary technology. Of special im-portance among such materials are themagnetic ferrites, which, because they areceramics, often have advantages overmetallic magnetic materials. They com-bine the inherently high electrical resist-ance of ceramics with the magneticproperties of certain metals. Magneticferrites are used widely in communica-tions, microwave, and computer equip-ment. The technological roots of this caseare found in magnetic theory, communications science, materials science, andcrystal chemistry.

VIDEO TAPE RECORDER'The video tape recorder is a device thatextends the technique for magneticrecording of electrical signals to thefrequency range required for televisionbroadcasting. It permits wide flexibilityin editing and scheduling of televisionbroadcasts. In fact it has revolutionizedthe television broadcast industry and hasfound applications as well in education,training, and other fields. Electromagneticand communications theory, electronics,the technology of audio recording, andservomechanism design provided thefoundations for this case.

Dos ca4 3 v,,ss Taken from the TRAUS

Analysis and Conclusions

This section presents some details of theanalyses that were explained briefly in theIntroduction and Overview, and summarizes theconclusions dra,vn from these analyses.

The 21 Factors and the Decisive Event-,

As explained earlier, 21 factors of probableimportance to the direction and rate of theinnovative process were selected from the gen-eral literature. These factors were rated as todegree of importance to each of the decisiveevents of the 10 innovations. The factors aredefined or illustrated briefly below.

The first three factors are related to variousmotivational influences:

Recognition of Scientific Opportunitymotivation for the timely acquisition of newfundamental knowledge.Recognition of Technical Opportunitymotivation for the timely improvement ofan existing product or process.Recognition of the Need motivation forso! ving the problem or meeting the needsatisfied by the eventual innovation.

The next four factors involve actions takenconsciously by management:

Management Venture Decision decision byan organization to invest in some large-scaletechnical activity. The activity need not bedirectly relatid to the innovation understudy. The decision is usually followed bythe formation of an R&D team to carry outthe activity.Availability of Funding the existence{rather than the extent) of financial support.Early in the innovative process, even limitedfunds can provide for critical experimentsthat may influence management decisions.Internal R&D Management role of super-visors and other management personnel with-in the performing organization. It includes

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those who give specific suggestions anddirections to R&C) personnel, set goals andschedules, and assign staff.Formal Market Analysis economic feasi-bility studies of an innovation, especiallyestimates of its potential market..

The next four factors may involve manage-ment in some sense, but do not necessarilyimply specific action by management:

Prior Demonstration of Technical Feasibilityearlier activities that established the

practicability of further development or theutility of further research.Technological Gatekeeper an individualwho identifies scientific or technical informa-tion of relevance to the interests andactivities of the researchers.Technical Entrepreneur an individual with-in the performing organization who cham-pions a scientific or technical activity; he issometimes also called a "product champion".PatentlLicense Considerations existenceof patent protection of inventions, or oflicensing arrangements.

The next four factors descrte peer-groupforces that impinge on tie R&D scientist:

Technology Interest Group (also knownas the "invisible college") a group of re-searchers from different institutions whoexchange ideas and findings via persona;meetings. letters, etc., as distinct from theformal (publication) channels of communi-cation.In-House Colleagues technical personnelwithin the performing institution whocollaborate on or otherwise facilitate theactivity. Often they are members of an R&Dteam.

External Direction of R&D PersonnelsuggeAion of goals and approaches by per-sons outside the performing organization.

Competitive Pressures competition amongpersons and organizations working in thesame technical area.

The next two factors are circumstances thatare usually unplanned or accidental:

Serendipity emergence, during the event,of unexpected scientific or technical resultsthat proved useful in promoting the innovation.Technology Confluence merging of majorchannels of development, often from diversescientific fields, making possible new ad-vances.

The remaining four factors refer to externalfactors that form the general environment with-in which the innovative process takes place:

General Economic Factors such as a

recession or depression.Social Factors such as group customs,beliefs, and attitudes.Political Factors such as elections or war.Health and Environmental Factors such asfamine or disease.

The last four factors permit consideration ofinfluences not included in specific externalfactors such as, for example, CompetitivePressures. These categories were purposely leftbroad, so that the appropriate factor could beapplied to a given event from among the diversepossibilities.

About F,Jclors,

No factor was judged important for everyevent, and yet each of the factors was of someimportance to more than one event. For eachfactor listed, Table 1 presents, in descending

. order, the percentage of all decisive events forwhich that factor was judged moderately orhighly important. Further statistical analyses ofthe factor ratings yielded an order only slightlydifferent from that of Table 1, and do notaffect the conclusions listed below:

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TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF DECISIVE EVENTSRATED MODERATELY OR HIGHLY

IMPORTANT FOR EACH FACTOR

Percentage ofFactors Decisive Events

Recognition of Technical Opportunity 87

Recognition of the Need 69

Internal R&D Management 66

Management Venture Decision 62

Availability of Funding 62

Technical Entrepreneur 56

In-house Colleagues 51

Prior Demonstration of Feasibility 49

Patent/License Considerations 47

Recognition of Scientific Opportunity 43

Technology Confluence 36

Technological Gatekeeper 30

Technology Interest Group 29

Competitive Pressures 25

External Direction to R&D Personnel 16

General Economic Factors 16

Hearth and Environmentol Fa,:tors 15

Serendipity 12

Formal Market Analysis' 7'Political Factors 5

Social Factors 4

'In retrospect, one might ar,ma, that Purclal MarkoAnalysis was Loud to era rated k,w, tuecimse such ananalysis usually is done only ,7,tce, and doe', notcontinue through the innavativta period. But th,:arile,irgurrent !night apply Venture Deoswo, vOkif f,tr0

a

Economic Fh...?0,,, floaiti) Envoonmen-ta .F:tctors, Pou tyCdl E.w.fors, Soci,11

Factor; t.tnL, at Ow bottom. 1-lowu-ver, thisconclusion 1..41 thr olf,:ct of Ow fdittufson the 10(liviliWil .01(1 nOt

4)plicah'.e to the w,..ovatr,.'0 procesr.,,,

Generalizations from the Case Histories

Table 2 lists eight important characteristicsfrequently observed and reported in previousstudies of the innovative process. Each of theten innovations was examined r these charac-teristics. In Table 3, which summarizes theresults, "X" indicates that the characteristicwas important, and "" that it was not im-portant to the innovation. The eight character-istics were found in most of the ten innovations,although the independent inventor was found inonly three. The following conclusions may bedrawn:

frhe teiloLcal ,,hhop,eheo:, ,n)portatice n.qhHhteki (If the

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f3;:t, the techthe far ;f

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TABLE 2, SOME PREVIOUSLY REPORTED CHAR-ACTERISTICS OF THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS

1. Early Recognition of NeedRecognition of the need for the innovation gener-ally occurs prior to the availability of the techno-logical means for satisfying the need.

2. Independent InventorThe independent inventor, working on his ownbehalf, is often important in the initiation of theprocess.

3. Technical Entrepreneurthe technical entrepreneur is often important tothe successful culmination of the innovation.

4. External InventionMany innovations arise from invention,, whichoriginate outside the organization that developedthe innovation.

5. Government FinancingGovernment financing is important in many inno-vations

6. Informal Transfer of KnowledgeInnovations are facilitated by informal transfer ofknowledge, much more than through formal chan-nels of communication.

7. Supporting InventionsInnovations generally require additional supportinginventions beyond the initiating invention,

8. Unplanned Confluence of IechnologyThe innovative process is frequently facilitated byan urolanned confluence of technology.

!tr.ofr,rh, ,alky icsiolci 1 dhle :3

;iv> that LII`Tildrro.'d confluent t! of ti-k

;-")1QqY rlIN)Itai'd to sLX of thePut i:irifiticrr i! of t-:1-1nolo)y is is

ot, fiii II:, nr-oitg)ns 351:11+ id,}"r) t 1,1-gn

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it f ,,t, r(I , rid1 try ;) I. s. I tl*!

.

TABLE 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THEIN.NOVAT1VE PROCESS

Indicated as important (X) or unimpor-tant () for each innovation

Char Rteristic

Inno,,iatiun

i- ....-

i

_i-i--

,i_,

-.-it

g-y.

.-:,-t-.

i.,

-3.....

3

v

iiF:_i.,

>iizl

ii.

a-..)

j--

,....., ,....;

c c

i;)c 0

.t.

He:,rt P.iCe:rinki' r

Hybriid Corn

i4vtirid SiTiall Grair.,

Green. Revctutioi; 4\itiii,it

Electrphi:it,:igroPhv

IT:put Output F.crii.iirinil....

Analviii.ii,

.Drtialiiiijihoiiiiphili.:.riiii,

I, iskict iode.si,

Oral Contraceptii.es

Magtietii r CI f 1 TeS

Video Tame Riicordi,ri

X

---X

X-X

X

X-X

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(a) But limited Government funds were provided 10 arelated development, giving indirect aid.

t.1) x terni3I er, [roc" occurred only because WorldWar II enabled American Cyanamid to market the.innovation in advance of I. G. Far ben.

To gain further insight into the roles ofscience and technology in the innovativeprocess, we examined the 533 significant eventsof the 10 innovations studied. These significantevents were classified as to type nonmissiorioriented research fNMOR), mission-orientedresearch (MOR), development,and nontechnicalevents. Of the events, 34 percent were classifiedas NMOR, 38 percent were MOR, 26 percentwere development, and 3 percent were non-technical.

9

Additional understanding about the innova-tive process as a whole was obtained by con-sidering its duration. Table 4 presents the datesof initial conception and first realization foreach of the ten innovations studied. For someof the innovations, the time from conceptionto realization was very short, as in the case ofthe Video Tape Recorder, which was developedwithin six years from its initial conception.Other innovations covered a much longer timespan. From the small sample of innovationsstudied, there is no evidence that the t'meperiod from conception to realization is be-

com;ng shorter. In fact, two of the more recentinnovations (Input-Output Economic Analysisand the Heart Pacemaker) involve the longesttime spans. The average for the ten innovationsstudied was 19 years.

An explanation of the striking differencebetween the longest duration and the shortestgives some insight into the variety of circum-stances surrounding innovations. The develop-ment of the Heart Pacemaker, which was 32years in the process, faced a number of in-hibiting influences, including social taboos,active opposition within the medical professionand outside it, and the occurrence of WorldWar II. Yet its most serious obstacle was proba-bly the absence of necessary technology, as in

TABLE 4. DURATION OF THE INNOVATIVEPROCESS FOR TEN INNOVATIONS

Year of Year ofFirst First Duration,

Innovation Conception Realization years

Heart Pacemaker 1928 1960 321-i,brid Corn 1908 1933 25

Hybrid Small Grains 1937 19:6 19

Green FievoiutiiT,o 1950 1966 16Wheat

Electrophrytcigr,iphy 1937 1959 22Input Output 1936 1964 28

Analysis

Ori;Jnophosphorusir,k; Ct it tries

1934 1947 13

Oral Corardceptive 195! 1960 9M.ignoic F.errites 1933 1955 22

Video Tape Recorder 1950 1956 6

Average Dir3tion 19.2

NT

NT

Preconception Period

%len.NVOit 43

lb

DE V38

Innovative Period

L.)

Post-Innovative Period

Figure 1 presents the proportion of significant events occurring during each of the threeperiods making up the historical sequence.

In the preconception period, over half ofthe events were NMOR, and an additional one-third were MOR. Thus, nearly ninety percentof the precursor events consisted of fundamentaland applied scientific research.

In the innovative period, 16 percent of theevents were NMOR, 43 percent were MOR, and38 percent were development. NMOR eventscontinue to occur in the innovative period andeven beyond; but overcoming technical barriersbecomes more and more important as innova-tion proceeds, so that a higher percentage ofMOR and development events occur in thisperiod than in the preconception period.

In the post-innovative period, when diffusionand improvement occur, 10 percent of theevents identified were NMOR, 39 percent wereMOR, and 45 percent were development.

The differences in the rates of accumulationof NMOR, MOP, and development events arefurther highlighted in Figure 2. The events foreach innovation have been related in time tothe date of first realization of the innovation,and combined and plotted in terms of the num-ber of years prior to that date. The figureindicates that half of the NMOR events occurred30 years before first realization. Thus, the innovations made use of published fundamentalresearch which had been available for some timeprior to the innovative period. Approximately

LL

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NMOR: Nonmission-Oriented Research i-z

MOR: Mission Oriented ResearchDEV: Development a

NT: Nontechnical

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electronics and materials. On the other handthe Video Tape Recorder required only existingtechnology, ar... so proceeded from first con-ception to first realization in six years.

a

2 s1.1.+-ro

YEARS PRIOR TO DATE OF FIRSTREALIZATION

F1O CUN,ltil /JIVE TYPESOF SIGNIFICANI EVE N11-.;

half of the MOR events occurred in the last16 years, and approximately half of the devel-opmental activity occurred in the last 10 years,preceding first realization.

In summary of the analysis and classificationof the significant events, we may draw thefollowing conclusions:

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Can Innovation Be Managed?

Consideration of the conclusions reachedfrom analysis of the decisive events, from thecharacteristics of the case histories, and fromthe classification of the significant events, leadsone to some conjectures about managinginnovation.

There has always been argument about theextent to which research and development canbe managed. Whatever may be the merits ofdiffering positions in thus argument, we may

11

confidently assert that, in the spectrum ofscience and technology, NMOR is the mostdifficult to manage, if it can be managed at all.Furthermore, as we have seen, significantNMOR events continue to occur up to the endof the innovative process; t -ce, we are forcedto conclude that innovation cannot be com-pletely controlled or programmed. Also, theactions of the technical entrepreneur, or therole of such motivational forces as recognitionof need and recognition of technical oppor-tunity, involve inventive or creative activitiesthat do riot lend themselves to detailed planning.Hence the high ranking of these factors in theanalysis supports further the conclusion thatinnovation cannot be fully planned. We aretherefore led to recommend that management,in trying to promote innovation, permit andencourage the opportunity to act upon idesthat fall outside the established or recognizedpattern.

But if innovation cannot be fully controlled,we nevertheless can discern ways in which man-agement can help it along. Our analysis revealstwo such ways by demonstrating the importance of funding and of the confluence oftechnology. As to funding, it need not bemunifictot, at least in the early stages. It notonly permits R&D to proceed, but probablyalso aids the innovative process by the confi-dence management generates in the R&D teamthrough financial support. As to confluence oftechnology, it seems almost essential to innova-tion. Yet it too often occurs without planning,and one suspects that here is an opportunity formanagement, by promoting interdisciplinaryR&D teams, to accelerate the innovativeprocess.

Historical Accountsof the Cases

This section contains an abbreviated accountof each of the cases studied. historicalrecords, summarized in this accour nstitutithe information base from which the analysesderived. The 89 decisive events, selected fromamong the significant events in the historicalaccounts, are described briefly, and the featuresthat appear most important to the culminationof the innovative process are highlighted, Chartsillustrate the flow of scientific and technicalinformation within the various channels ofdevelopment, for each case. On those charts,the time sc.;,; is schematic only.

The Heart Pacemaker

The totally implanted cardiac pacemaker isused for treatment of patients with heart-blockdisorders. The device is an electronic pulser,complete with pertinent electronic circuitry,battery power source, and electrode system,encapsulated in a biocompatible package. Thecommercial product represents a remarkableexample of the confluence of several sciencesand technologies upon which its success de-pends, Included are low-power miniatureelectronics, sealed longlife batteries, surgicaltechniques, biomaterials, and cardiac physi-ology.

Some precursor events occurred well beforethe 20th century. For example, in the field ofcardiac physiology, electrical stimulation ofmuscle was first observed by Galvani, in 1790.The symptoms of the primary disorder treatablewith the pacemaker (now known as the Stokes-Adams syndrome) were described in 1824.Electrical stimulation of the heart was proposedin 1862. In 1886, the term "heart block" wasintroduced to describe blockage of the syn-chronous rhythmic contraction of the chambersof the heart. The conduction tissue (the "bundleof His") that transmits the synchronizing

impulse between chambers was described in1893.

Other work, particularly on intracardiactherapy and on surgical techniques, continuedthrough the 1920's, but the first conception ofthe idea of periodic elactrical stimulation of theheart was propounded in 1928 by A. S. Hyman,director of the Witkin Foundation for the Studyand Prevention of Heart Disease. In 1930, heapplied for a patent on a pacemaker, whichincorporated a spring-driven magnetogeneratorand needle electrodes, and began to use it successfully, although the spring power limited theuseful time period. He failed to gain widespreadmedical and social acceptance, however, andwas even subjected to (unsuccessful) law suitsfor malpractice. Unable for some time to find amanufacturer to improve and miniaturize hisdevice, he finally reached an agreement withSiemens of Germany, only to have this agree-ment, and his pacemaker studies, disrupted byWorld War II. Hyman never returned to workon pacemakers, lacking confidence in his abilityto exploit the extraordinary advances inelectronics made during the war years. Theseadvances, however, directed toward miniaturi-zation and low power requirements, were toprovide the basis for future success in pace-maker technology.

The transistor, the foundation of the newelectronics technology, was invented in 1948.Advances in miniaturization and in pulsecircuitry came rapidly, utilizing efficiently thelow power needs of transistors. Another productof the war effort was a sealed primary battery,the zinc-mercuric oxide alkaline cell, with tonglife at low current drains. Meanwhile, othercontributions to the implantable pacemakerepoxy for "potting" the electronic components,and biocompatible silicone rubber encapsulationmaterial for long-term implantation came

THE HEART PACEMAKER

lemlsonduclos and tlecuumcsDevelopment of Trans.stor and Miniaturised Circwtry

Batley TechnologyDevelopment of Long-1.1e Battery

Soroca' TechniquesDevelopment of Techniques !Of Heart Surgery

Cardoc Physiology and Myocard.di ShmulatoonImproved Know/edge

Siomaterais and Electrodes

Improved embedding and bocompabbie plashcsImproved electrode materials and design.

Concept utParr at, 4 v,

from the polymer field. Further efforts includeda search for electrode materials and systemsfree from problems of increasing electrodethreshold (minimum voltage needed for con-sistent stimulation) and insulation leakage incontact with body fluids.

Progress toward the goal of the innovationalso depended upon advances in surgical tech-niques. Procedures were developed, for example,for either insertion of the electrodes through avein into contact with the inner wall or theirdirect attachment to the heart muscle, and forimplantation of the pacemaker device. Theextensive work leading to open-heart surgery,and the complications which occasionally arise(in the form of temporary heart block due tosurgical trauma) led to the development oftemporary pacing techniques. Open-heart sur-gery received considerable publicity, and thecorresponding dramatic successes had a stronginfluence on widespread acceptance of thistechnique and, therefore, on the use ofstimulating electrodes in control of temporaryheart block. Certain religious and moral ques-tions concerning the inviolability of the heartwere sufficiently resolved to permit use of thepacemaker.

Successful clinical application of an externalpacemaker for treatment of complete heartblock was announced in 1952. With furtherimprovements and external, rather than needle,electrodes, longer term use (up to one week)was reported. However, the technique required

13

First Human Implant 1960

high voltage for external pacing, with attendantpain of muscular contraction and possible burns;consequently, interest refocused on direct-stimulation techniques for long-term pacing. By1958, surgically induced heart block was beingtreated successfully with directly implantedmyocardial electrodes and an external transis-tori zed battery-powered pacemaker. Successfulclinical application of a pacing technique usinga transvenously inserted catheter electrode tocontact the inner wall of the heart wasannounced. The first fully implantable pace-maker wa$ placed in a human in 1959, but itsbattery pack required periodic recharging, byinduction, and the problem of electrodethreshold remained unsolved.

At about this time, Wilson Greatbatch, abiomedical engineer, teamed with Dr. WilliamChardack, a surgeon, to develop a totallyimplanted, permanent cardiac pacemaker.Greatbatch applied for a patent on his devicein the late 1950's, and he and Chardack testedit successfully in animal experiments. Somedifficulty was experienced with electrodethreshold, but a new stainless steel electrodesystem minimized the problem. The first humanimplant was performed in 1960, marking thesuccessful culmination of the innovation. Thedevice performed well and the patient survivedfor more than 2 years. Units of this type weremarketed in 1961 by Medtronics, whosedirectors were convinced of the potentialmarket. At that time, however, the need was

not universally recognized, and the firm suf-fered heavy financial losses during the firstyear. Nevertheless, after that critical period,sales mounted rapidly to a net of 830 millionin 1971.

The Medtronic device was of the fixed-rateor asynchronous type, with low power require-ments and an expected battery life of up to5 years. Its success has inspired efforts bynumerous investigators and manufacturers toimprove the device. For example, an improvedpacer stimulates the ventricles in response toatrial contraction. Another concer is that ofdemand pacing, where the pacer is inactive un-less triggered into action by a period of ab-normally low heart contraction. Berkovitzextended this concept and, in 1971, patentedhis Bifocal® demand pacemaker, which maystimulate the atria, or both atria and ventricles,in accord with a preset interval. Nuclear bat-teries have been used as power sources in animplanted pacemaker, and solid-state batterieswith protected lifetimes of up to 10 years havebeen suggested. The coupling of microelec-tronics to a nuclear power source has beenproposed, with the objective of eliminating leadproblems by producing a device small enoughfor total containment within the heart chambers,rather than the body cavity.

The Decisive Events. Of the 102 significantevents recorded, the following 13 were con-sidered decisive:

to 1926 the Witkin Foundation for the Studyand Prevention of Heart Disease establisheda special committee to investigate theproblem of intracardiac therapy, initiated thefirst concentrated attack on the problems ofresuscitation, and, with A. S. Hyman asFoundation Director, provided the base forevolution of his pacemaker concept.

L. Cordorelli's 1928 report, that the heartbeat could be sustained by mecharticalstimulation, i.e., thumping the chest,strengthened Hyrnan's concept of electricalstimulation.Hyrnan's patent application, in 1930,described the first electrical instrumentsuitable for clinical use in resuscitation.

Hyrnan's 1932 publication of his pacemakerexperiments caused considerable polarization

14

among advocates and opponents of its use.

The sealed marcury battery, developed byS. Ruben in 1947, marked the first powersource with properties of long life, no gasevolution, and flat discharge characteristicssuitable for powering implanted transistor-ized devices.

The invention of the transistor by J. Bardeenand W. H. Brattain, in 1948, paved the wayfor development of miniaturized electronicequipment with low power reouirements atlow voltages suitable for bat,try operation.The first Biomedical Engineering Group,established by W. Greatbatch in 1952,stimulated interaction of the medical andengineering professions, and was later thesource of the association of the two princi-pals jointly involved in developi'g andimplanting the first pacemaker unit.

The clinical demonstration of external pacingfor heart block, by P. M. Zoll, 1952, led towidespread use of electrical stimulation.

The development of medical-grade siliconesby Dow Corning in 1953 provided thenecessary biocompatible encapsulating ma-terial.

In 1955, Lillehei used external pacing tocombat heart block resulting from cardiacsurgery; he later developed a technique fordirect attachment of electrodes to the heartwall.

Weirich and his associates in 1957, treatedAV block with external pacer and electrodesdirectly inserted into the heart muscle. Atransistorized, battery powered externalpacemaker was later developed by Bakkenfor their te,e.

Hunter and Roth, in 1959, developed a;table electrode system for the implantablepacemaker, which eliminated problems ofelectrode degradation in service in the body

Chadaciik and Creatbatch, in 1960, developedthe first totally implantable heart pacemakerand implanted it successfully into a humanpatient. This unit was marketed immediately,and the innovative process was completed.

Implications of the Case. A unique featureof this case history is the long time span, 32

years, from concept to first realization, thelongest span among the cases studied. The delaycaused by World War II and the inhibitingeffects of sociomedical rejection of cardiacmanipulation do not account for the entireperiod. Although Hyman clearly recognized theneed and knew what he wanted, certain tech-nologies, such as electronics, batteries, andpolymers, had not been developed sufficiently.As the needed technologies reached a level ofmaturity adequate to support the innovativeprocess, their convergence made it possible todevelop and market the device in a relativelyshort time.

Although this innovation was need oriented,the need was not universally recognized untilthe late 1950's. The long perseverance of theinventor in the face of social resistance, legalharassment, and attack by his colleagues, is welldocumented; he gave up only because theavailable technology was inadequate. A. S.

Hyman, the inventor, was his own productchampion during his time. A second inventor-entrepreneur appeared later. Management deci-sions were crucial, in the face of adverse marketanalysis, possible legal ramifications, andinability to obtain product insurance. Theinitial invention evolved outside the innovativeorganization. Government financing was of onlyperipheral significance. Supporting inventionswere needed in the course of the innovation.Informal transfer of knowledge played a role,

Hybrid Grains zinc! The Green Revolution

This case describes the development of thetechnology of hybridization and varietal im-provement of cereal grains, a technology thatled, ultimately, to a world-wide increase in

iiEVUIMIdH)`:

tr-,or or:

wheat production, a dramatic result aptlytermed the "green revolution". In tracing thecomplex history of this case, it became apparentthat more than one innovation was involved.Thus, in order to describe the innovative processconsistently and in accord with our stateddefinition of the term, three unique, but related,major innovations hybrid corn, hybrid smallgrains, and the green revolution of wheat are

treated separately.

Hybrid Corn. For hybrid corn, the innovativeprocess begins with the recognition in 1908 ofthe extraordinary vigor, both in size and growthrate, of first-generation crosses between purelines. The promise of hybrid corn from inbredcrosses was recognized at this date; however,difficulties of seed production made commer-cialization impractical. The ears of the inbredfemale parent were small and had few seeds,pollen production was low, and the plants weresmall, weak, and less drought resistant. Althoughthe first-generation hybrids bore ears withnumerous kernels, they could not be used asseed, because the second-generation plants werenonuniform, with loss of vigor. The next majorstep forward was the development of thedouble cross in 1918. This technique providedlarge amounts of seed, but was too complex forthe individual farmer and required specializedseed companies. A period of research and devel-opment followed, both by the seed industryand by state and Federal agricultural experimentstations.

By 1933 the use of hybrid seed reached the0.1 percent level for the nation, signifying thestart of market acceptance and the culminationof this innovation. Following the drought con-ditions of 1934 and 1936, during which period

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15

Corn in Me,,co

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1,V0vcments

the superior hardiness of hybrids was dramatically evident, use of hybrid corn increasedrapidly to the level of nearly universal adoption.Research continued, however, and led to theimportant discovery of cytoplasmic (non-Mendelian) male sterility. By combining theapplication of this discovery and the associateddiscovery of means of genetic restoration,hybrid corn could now be grown for seed with-out the costly and difficult task of hand ormechanical detasseling otherwise required toprevent self-fertilization.

The yield per acre of corn in the UnitedStates has increased nearly fourfold since 1935.By 1970, about 80 percent of the hybrid cornwas produced by the single-cross system ofcytoplasmic male sterility plus genetic restora-tion, using cytoplasm derived from a singlevariety. However, in 1970, a razw strain ofsouthern leaf blight, particularly virulent in itsattack on this type of corn, appeared in theCorn Belt. This new problem, disease suscepti-bility on a broad front, emphasized an ever-present hazard associated with large-scale use ofa single genetic line. Research is continuing intomethods of solving this problem.

Hybrid Small Grains. The problem ofhybridization of the small grains, such assorghum and wheat, is much more difficultsince their flowers are hermaphroditic. That is,pollen and ovules occur in the same flower.Therefore, hand or mechanical means for con-trol of pollination iti eliminated as a practicalcommercial method. However, the commercialsuccess of hybrid corn and the available geneticknowledge inspired a search for other solutionsto this problem. For sorghum, the first con-ception of a method for hybridization wasproposed in 1937. Commercial success wasattained by 1956 with the introduction ofhybrids using genetic male sterility, thusculminating the innovation. The commercialintroduction of hybrids using cytoplasmic malesterility followed in 1957. By 1960, 95 percentof all sorghum in the United States was hybrid.

Although intensive research on wheat hasbrought forth cytoplasmic male sterile plants,commercial success has not yet been attained.The problem, apparently, is that geneticrestoration is incomplete and the hybrids areequivalent only to the best varietals available.

16

On a cost-effectiveness basis, therefore, hybridwheat is not yet competitive.

Green Revolution Wheats. The RockefellerFoundation, in 1943, initiated a program toimprove agriculture in Mexico. Inasmuch as cornis the staff of life in Mexico, initial efforts weredirected toward increasing its yield by hybridi-zation. However, since the subsisteoce farmeris outside the cash economy and cannot affordto purchase hybrid seed each year, the directionshifted toward other technical and socioeco-nomic means of improving his lot.

In 1943, wheat yields in Mexico also werelow; the soil, the seed, and the agriculturalmethods were poor; and plant disease wasrampant. The Rockefeller Foundation firstattacked the stem rust disease problem, bytesting hundreds of varieties against variouslocal strains of rust, without success. In 1944,Norman E. Borlaug began crossing to produceimproved varieties. The effort was prodigious:of the 66,000 varieties and selections grown by1951, only four had rust resistance. Even here,the resistance proved insufficient against newstrains of the disease. Further developmenteffort culminated in resistant varieties, Aparallel effort was mounted to improve the soil.Proper fertilization resulted in up to sixfoldincrease in yield per acre; however, the plantsgrew tall and, bending over with a heavy headof grain, created new difficulties with mechani-cal harvesting. To solve this problem, Borlaugcrossed a stiff-stalked dwarf variety into theMexican wheats, producing a series of semidwarfwheats that responded well to fertilizer. Thus,by 1960, this effort had resulted in a majorimprovement in Mexican wheat. Meanwhile,another event occurred, without which thedevelopment of truly international wheatswould have been impossible or seriouslydelayed. This was the discovery that, beginningin 1950, day-length insensitivity had beenaccidentally bred into the wheat. This develop-ment marked the introduction of the conceptof worldwide improvement in production ofwheat (and other cereals).

In 1963, experimentation began in India andPakistan to adapt Mexican wheats to theweather, soil, diseases, and pests of the localareas. High yield varieties were introduced on alarge scale in India in 1966, culminating the

innovative process. By 1971, nearly 14 millionacres, one-third of India's wheat acreage, wasin high-yield wheat. From 1964 to 1970, thecombination of increased yield and acreage re-sulted in a dramatic increase of about 85 per-cent in India's total wheat production. Thehigh-yield wheat varieties, p'us fertilizer andpesticides, produced the Green Revolution thatdrastically reduced problems of hunger andstarvation in the world, and converted somegrain-importing countries into grain exporters.This exhaustive program and its internationalbenefits to humanity earned Borlaug the NobelPeace Prize.

The Decisive Events. Fifty-eight significantevents were identified for the three innovationsin this case. Of these, the following 16 wereconsidered to be decisive.

HYBRID CORN

G. H. Shull, in 1908, reported hybridvigor and the development of pure linesin corn, and suggested a method of hybridcorn breeding.

Independent studies of hybrid corn fromcrosses between inbreds, by E. M. East in1908, revealed the potentialities of hybridvigor for breeding purposes. These twoevents defined the concept and pointedthe way to future breeding methods forcommercial development.

The invention of the double-cross tech-nique, by D. F. Jones in 1918, madepossible the commercial exploitation ofhybrid vigor.

The establishment, by F. D. Richey in1922, of a cooperative program betweenthe USDA and the various Corn Beltexperiment stations, provided a majorimpetus to the development of hybridssuited to local conditions.

HYBRID SMALL GRAINS

The production of hybrid onions, byH. A. Jones and A. E. Clarke in 1943,using cytoplasmic male sterility, providedthe inspiration and direction for similarwork in corn, sorghum, and wheat.

In 1946, R. D. Lewis, at the Texas Agri-cultural Experiment Station, approved an

intensive program to develop hybridsorghum, which produced commercialseed in 10 years.

Jones' work, in 1950, on cytoplasmicmale sterility with genetic restoration incorn, was important in leading to com-mercial single-cross hybrid corn and indirecting further work on sorghum,wheat, and other cereals.

Cytoplasmic male sterility in sorghumwas found in 1950, by Stephens andHolland. All effort at the Texas Experi-ment Station was shifted to this approach,culminating in the marketing of hybridsorghum in 1956.

In 1951, H. Kihara showed that cytoplas-mic male sterility could be bred intowheat. This directed attention to thepossible development of commercial hy-brid wheat.

By 1961, J. A. Wilson and W. M. Ross hadproduced cytoplasmic male sterility inwheat.

In 1962, J. W. Schmidt, V. A. Johnson.and S. S. Maan found restorer genes forwheat. This discovery, plus that of cyto-plasmic male sterility by Wilson and Ross,pointed to the technical feasibility ofcommercialization of hybrid wheat.

GREEN REVOLUTION WHEATS

The establishment of the RockefellerFoundation program in Mexico wassignificant in that a systems approach toagriculture was applied; this approachprovided a favorable environment forN. E. Borlaug's comprehensive programon wheat.

The introduction of dwarf wheat genesinto U.S. wheats, by 0. A. Vogel in 1949,led to short-stalked varieties with goodfertilizer response. Borlaug obtained thedwarf material from Vogel, for use indeveloping the high-yielding Mexicanwheats.

Borlaug's breeding of day-length insensi-tivity into the Mexican wheats, in 1950,was a decisive contribution to the devel-opment of international wheats.

The establishment of the International

Corn and Wheat Improvement Center(CIMMYT) by the Rockefeller and FordFoundations, in 1963, marked the inter-nationalization of the initially Mexicanprogram, and the beginning of the intro.duction of Mexican wheats into India andPakistan.

By 1966, large-scale importation andplanting of the international high-yieldwheats took place in India, and culmin-ated in the "green revolution" of wheat.

Implications of the Case. This case is uniquein that three major innovations were identified.The three innovations were strongly interlinked,however, through direct interplay of technicalkr.owledge. The historical record is highlightedthroughout by the interweaving of Governmentand institutional funding, and by the influenceof federal policy, effective management deci-sions, and long association of key personnel.An invisible college, need for supporting inno-vations, and even a serendipitous discoverypla ed a role.

The innovation of hybrid corn was distin-guished by the initial recogniti -in of the tech-nical feasibility of hybrid vigor, followed by anearly recognition of its value it, improving cornproduction. The initial invention originated out-side the marketing organization. There wasstrong evidence of the importance of the

product champion and of direct transfer ofknowledge between scientists. The hybrid smallgrain development was need oriented, with theinitial concept originating outside the seed-producing company. The international wheatprogram was also in response to a need, but theconcept developed within the innovative or-ganization.

ph:, r ;idly

Electrophotography is traced from its con-ception in 1937, through its extensive develop-ment period, to the production and marketingof a practical high-speed copier exactly thekind of machine envisioned by the inventor.Two genera! methods in use today account formost of the market. One employs a reuseablephotoconductor and delivers copy on plainpaper; the other uses a paper sheet coated with

18

a photoconductor (e.g., zinc oxide) in a resinbinder and delivers the coated paper as thefinal copy. Now other methods of electrophoto-graphy are reaching the marketplace, or areexpected soon. In this study the emphasis wason the plain-paper copier, since its developmentfrom concept to culmination as a marketedproduct presents the course of the innovativeprocess in accord with the stated definition ofinnovation.

In 1935, Chester F. Carlson, a patent attor-ney, recognized the need for an office copierthat would eliminate typing carbon copies orpreparing stencils or masters for the duplicatingprocesses. Concluding that a photographicprocess was indicated, since the only commonproperty of the various originals to be copiedwould be their light reflectivity, he began hissearch for technical solutions via the interactionof light with matter. In 1937, he read a reportof a un,que process of facsimile transmissionthat dispensed with chemically treated paper.In this process, a pencil of ions was used toproduce an electrostatic image in a scanningpattern on an insulating surface. The electro-static image was then developed by dusting witha fine powder. Strongly influenced by this dis-closure, Carlson conceived of using ions to pre-charge a layer of photoconductive material, theelectrical characteristics of which would bethose of an insulator in the dark, but whichwould conduct and dissipate the charge in theexposed areas of the image. Powder dustingwould be employed to develop the image.Carlson immediately filed a patent application,and then attempted to develop a workingdemonstration of the concept, but, workingalone, was unsuccessful. In the fall of 1938 hebrought in a physicist, 0. Kornei, to assist him,and they succeeded shortly in producing thefirst crude demonstration of electrophotog-raphy. Their process consisted of charging sulfuror anthracene plates by rubbing, and dustingwith dyed insulating powder to develop theimage. The image powder was transferred towaxed paper and fixed by heating.

Following several years of frustrating andunsuccessful attempts to interest a number ofcompanies in taking over the invention, Carlsonwas able to generate enthusiasm for the conceptat Battelle Memorial Institute. In 1944 Battelle

De,,eoprnent ofS/ngle- the Photoconductor

Development of OtherElectrOphoto9raph,c

Systems

oevp4opment of Reusable Photoconductor

agreed to undertake research to improve theinvention and to promote its development.Concerted effort by the team assigned to theproject resulted in several improvements andinventions that refined the concept, demon-strated its technical feasibility, and left nodoubt that it was ready for the final (and costly)product development and engineering stage ofthe innovative process. These improvementswere: (1) the discovery of the superiorproperties of amorphous selenium as the photo-conductor for this process: (2) the use ofcontrolled corona discharge to provide uniform,fast charging of the photoconductor surface ;(3) the invention of the process of electrostatictransfer of the powder image from the photo-conductor to the paper sheet; and (4) the in-vention of the two-component developer inwhich the pigment particles are carried byelectrostatic attachment to large, heavy carrierparticles. When dusted over the suitablycharged photoconductor, the pigment particlesof the two-component developer are transferredto the charged image areas, and the unchargedbackground areas are scoured and maintainedclean of stray pigment powder by the largecarrier particles.

Electrophotography reached the attenvon ofthe Haloid Company* in 1945, generating consAerable management interest in its potentialas a product addition to the company's line. In1947 a licensing agreement was negotiated bywhich Haloid supported the research at Battelle,with emphasis on cc:mercialization. In 1950,

'Later t-431oidX.E;rox, then Xerox Corpciratiori.

19

Other Commerc alCopers

First Successful

Commercial Coperlialoid.Xelo

1959

Haloid produced and marketed its first copier,a slow, manually operated device that did notgain acceptance in the marketplace. Under thedirection of J. C. Wilson, the product champion,development and engineering groups at Haloidwere charged with the task of solving the manyproblems to be faced in reaching the goal of asequentially programmed, fully automaticcopier. In 1959-1960 this difficult and complexeffort culminated in the production and marketing of the first commercial machine, theXerox 914 Copier,

Stimulated by the public announcement ofelectrophotography in 1948, many organiza-tions began studies leading to the second majormethod, which employs a one-time-use coatedpaper with a composite layer of photoconduc-tive powder in a resin binder to record theelectrostatic image. In 1954 G. J. Young andH. G. Greig at RCA announced the use of zincoxide as the photoconductive material in sucha composite layer. Considerable effort has beenexpended in basic and applied studies of theproperties of zinc oxide and other photocon-ductors and methods of improving sensitivity,spectral range, and other properties. Electro-photography hewn to follow a second com-mercial path employing the one-timeuse zincoxide coated paper; RCA called it Electrofax.A number of companies, under license to RCAand Xerox, have marketed copiers based on thecoated-paper principle, beginning with Apeco,in 1961.

The early work with anthracene, the firstorganic photoconductor to be applied to elec-trophotography, prompted a search for other

organic photoconductive materials. A numberof materials have been proposed, but therequirements are severe: for once-used plates,the material must be relatively low in cost; forreuseable plates, the problem of the softnessand low strength of most organics must be sur-mounted. Photoconductive polymers appear tooffer the most promise, particularly those withadditives to increase sensitivity. In 1970, IBMintroduced a plain-paper copier, employing areuseable organic photoconductor. The problemof wear is solved by placing the photoconductoron a web that, advanced on demand, presents anew surface as needed to presr-ve the qualityof the copy.

The past decade has seen a rapid diffusion ofthe technology. Several copiers, both plain-paper and coated-paper types, have appeared onthe market here, in Europe, and in Japan. Someinnovative modifications have already beendeveloped, and other novel processes are inprogress. A greater variety of machines may beexpected in the future.

The Decisive Events. Of the 66 significantevents identified, the following 14 were con-sidered to be decisive in the innovative process:

P. Selenyi, in 1935, described a facsimilerecorder in which the scanned pattern of theelectrical signal is stored on an electrostat-ically charged insulating surface and devel-oped by powder dusting. This precursorevent strongly influenced Carlson's thinkingand led directly to his conception of electro-photography.

C. F. Carlson's invention of electrophotog-raphy in 1937, involving the novel conceptof light-image storage on an electrostaticallycharged photoconductor, was a major break-through.

The first reduction to practice of the inven-tion, by Carlson and Kornei in 1938, demon-strated the technical feasibility and potentialof the process.

The Battelle agreement v.ith Carlson in 1944opened the way for the development effortleading to the successful completion of themajor inventions needed in support of theinnovation.

In 1945 E. N. Wise invented two componentpowder development, which resulted in a

major improvement in background cleanli-ness and print quality.

W. E. Bixby, in 1946, discoverer! the superiorphotoconductive properties of amorphousselenium for electrophotography.

In 1946 R. M. Schaffert invented the processof electrostatic transfer of the image powderfrom the reuseable photoconductor surfaceto the paper.

In 1946 J. J. Rheinfrank used a fine wirestretched across and above the photoconduc-tor surface, to replace needle-point coronacharging. The essentially uniform coronaalong the wire considerably improved theuniformity of charge on the photoconductorsurface.In 1947 L. E. Walkup improved the wirecorona discharge by using a wire grid in-serted between the high-voltage wire and thephotoconductor surface. Application ofelectrical bias to the grid permitted closecontrol of the magnitude of corona-depositedcharge on the photoconductor surface,avoiding excessive voltages and the possi-bility of electrical breakdown of the photo-conductor.

The license agreement between Ha loid andBattelle in 1947 marked the first of veryimportant management decisions that com-mitted Hatoid to large financial risks anddrastically influenced the course of theinnovation.

In 1954 Haloid introduced the first rotaryxerographic machine, that is, with the re-useable photoconductor surface on a rotatingcylinder. Although not a document copier,this machine demonstrated the rotary-drumprinciple of succeeding automatic copiers.

C. J. Young and H. G. Greig disclosed theRCA zinc oxide-resin binder coated-paperelectrophotographic process in 1954. Thecoated-paper process, with a once-used

photoconductor surface, is the basis of anentire family of copiers.

In 1959.1960 the introduction of the Xerox14 office copier marked the culmination of

the innovation and the proliferation of atype of product having a major impact onsociety and its functions.

In 1970 IBM introduced a copier with a

reuseable organic photoconductor coated ona web wrapped around a drum, and designedso that the web can be advanced to replacea worn surface. This event appears to haveinitiated a new class of machines,

Implications of the Case. Among the internaland external factors having an impact on theinnovative process, the inventor's recognitionof the need is clearly and explicitly evident.This study illustrates the difficulties of anindependent inventor in selling his idea to or-ganizations that might be expected to recognizeits potential worth. The influence of both thetechnological gatekeeper and the product cham-pion is apparent in two separate time periods.The study demonstrates the importance ofinstitutional factors such as management deci-sions in the face of adverse market analysis, theheavy investment required for the production-engineering phase of the innovative process, andthe value of a team effort in problem solvingand in producing the supplementary inventionsneeded to support the original idea. PartialGovernment support of: a special developmenteffort at a crucial period provided needed in-centives. This study also illustrates the effectsof an unplanned confluence of technology, andthe importance of informal transfer of knowl-edge.

ifput-Output Economic AnalysisInput-Output (I /O) Economic Analysis dif-

fers from the other innovations in that it is ananalytical toot to explain inter-industry eco-nomic relationships, rather than an innovationleading to a saleable product. It views the wholeeconomy of a region or country as a single

IfsiPUT 'OUTPUT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

AMILDeveloprnent of 1,'0,noutoonal Capatxtty

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system, in which the information is reduced toan I/O table a matrix of inter-industry trans-actions of raw materials, goods, and services,received and delivered among the variousproducing sectors of the economy. Thus, forexample, the effect of changes in demand forthe products of any one industry on all otherindustries may be computed.

The clearly defined concept, as formulatedby Wassily Leontief, was outlined in his trail-blazing 1936 paper. The immediate precursorevents were difficult to trace, even throughLeontief, and it must be concluded that thedevelopment originated in the broad backgroundof general economic modeling and statisticalanalysis. The major aspects of economic theoryleading to the formulation of his model include:(a) the tableau format for representing inputsand outputs of the economy, dating back toFrancois Ouesnay (1758), (b) general equilib-rium analysis of Leon Walras (1874), using fixedcoefficients of production and representationof the analysis in the form of sir iltaneouslinear equations, (c} the method of balancesused for resource allocation decisions by theSoviet government, and (d) the developmentof national policy analysis, a technique forassessing national economic priorities that pro-vided the motivational basis for I/O analysis.The 1936 paper, failed, however, to attractwidespread attention.

Leontief's research led to the 1941 publica-tion of his first book on 110 analysis. includingthe inter-industry matrices of the U.S. economyfor the years 1919 and 1929, the book providedinsight i nto cause-and -ef feet relationships amonginput, output, prices, Lind consumption patternsbetween the two years. Publication of the 1941

04vtlorenent cf 110 Analysq

NotAtool ity,orne Accounts13,ckgeoun.:1Sc once uE ttlYt QTrinC 0.1ockne4

21

UnearPro9amming

Puticaboo of I/O Toblafor 1958 by Waft ofir Bustnoss Econoosoct

1964

book led directly to Leontiers association withthe forthcoming government efforts.

In the same year, in the midst of economicexpansion due to mobilization for World WarCongress expressed concern lest postwardemobilization force a depression and requestedthe Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to studythe economic effects of demobilization. BLScontracted with Leontief at Harvard Universityto direct production of an I/O table for 1939for use in predicting the effects of demobiliza-tion in the United States. This table also servedas a pattern for estimating an I/O matrix forGermany, which, in turn, provided an overviewof the German economy that helped the U.S.Air Force select bombing targets. The 1939table, published in 1945, was also used to fore-cast steel capacity needed in the postwar year1947. The resulting prediction a significantincrease was not universally accepted butlater proved correct.

In order to obtain an I/O matrix describingthe military economy, the U.S. Air Force sup-ported BLS, from 1948 to 1954, in a majoreffort, called Project SCOOP. This projectyielded an extensive I/O table for 1947. Manynonmilitary applications resulted from the 1947table, in addition to development of theEmergency and (unfinished) MobilizationModels for the Air Force. In 1953, with achange in administration of the ExecutiveBranch of the Government, Project SCOOP wasofficially terminated, although some effortcontinued on an informal basis fr.), a few years.

Project SCOOP was one of the sponsors ofthe first UNIVAC computer and the sole spon-sor of the SEAC computer. Without large com-puters, the 1947 table (and of course all futureI/O work) could not have been constructed.Other contributions to model theory anddevelopment, as well as to matrix mathematicsand linear programming, were made underProject SCOOP.

Interest in I/0 work revived under a broadstudy (1956.1957) of the national economicaccounts, made by the National AccountsReview Committee (NARC). The NationalBureau of Economic Research (NBER) or-ganized NARC at the request of the Bureau ofthe Budget. The NARC expressed concern thatforeign governments were outstripping the U.S

22

in the use of I/O for national-incomeaccounting, and recommended resumption ofI/O analysis by the Federal Government as partof its national accounts. The new program wasplaced in the Office of Business Economics(OBE) of the Department of Commerce in orderto integrate all national-account activities in asingle system. In 1964, the OBE published adetailed I/O table, using 1958 Census data. Thiswas the first U.S. table integrated with nationalaccounts.

The 1958 table represents the culmination ofthe innovative process because it marks the endof the experimental period of I/O history,Succeeding tables are regularly prepared by theFederal Government. As this innovation dif-fused into other applications, it generatedsupplemental methods of data treatment andanalysis.

The Decisive Events. Of the 48 significantevents identified, the following 9 were cee)-sidered decisive:

Leontiof's definitive book of 1941 presentedthe concepts of I/O analysis and an inter-industry matrix model. This book wasinstrumental in developing large-scale supportof I/O research.

In response to a 1941 Congressional requestfor a study of the economic effects of de-mobilization, BLS contracted with Leontiefto produce at Harvard an I/O table for 1939.T- a objective of this contract was to estimatethe effects of demobilization on employ-ment. This was the first direct U.S. Govern-ment involvement in I/O analysis.

In 1943, BLS favorably reviewed the Harvardwork, and in spite of its deficiencies at thetime, recommended continuation at BLS.

The firer large-scale digital computer, devel-oped at Harvard in 1944 by H. Aiken, wasused by Leontief to solve the 1939 I/Omatrix. This work and later tables could nothave been processed without the aid of I-Ligecomputers.

The 1945 publication by BLS of an I/Omatrix for 1939 marked the first such matrixto be published by a U.S. Government agen-cy. Recognition of its potential applicationto military planning-programming problemsled the Air Force to organize project SCOOP.

In 1948, Project SCOOP was organized toproduce an I/O matrix for 1947. This projectrepresented the first multimillion-dollar inter-agency effort in military planning andprogramming.

The UN-sponsored First International Con-ference on Input-Output Economics, in

1952, crystallized world-wide interest in I/Oanalysis.

The NARC report to Congress in 1957 wasa broad study of national income accounts.It marked a milestone in I/O history bypublicizing its value to the economy, andled to the authorization of the 1958 table.The 1964 publication of the I/O matrix for1958 was the culmination of the innovation.

Implications of the Case. This innovation andits applications are intimately associated withGovernment policy, planning, and funding, andtherefore have been affected by these externalfactors to a degree not noted in the other casesstudied. The innovation is an analytical tool,rather than a product; however, we do find achampion; in fact, this role is played by morethan one person. The roles of the techlologicalgatekeeper and the invisible college are in strongevidence. Management decisions were impor-tant factors at various stages of the innovativeprocess. In fact, a period of "management con-servatism" resulted in a temporary shutdownof the process in the U.S. government. There istittle doubt that the innovator, Leontief,recognized the need for the innovation. Leontiefserved also as an independent inventor, outsidethe organization which completed the innova-tive process. A confluence of technologyoccurred in the timely development of large-

u i t

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scale computers, without which the extensivecomputation needed for the production of I/Omatrices could not have been handled. Informaltransfer of knowledge and the need for suppor-tive inventions were important factors in theinnovation.

Orti,itiophoTtio!tis It suciictcks

This case describes the development oforganophosphorus insecticides to control insectpredators an indispensable task if the foodneeds of the world are to be met and thedepredations of insect carriers of disease are tobe eliminated. The stable broad-spectru.n chem-icals. such as DDT and other chlorinated hydro-carbons, have performed this task efficiently,economically, and with dramatic benefits tomankind. However, unexpected problems haveaccompanied their extended use. In part, theseproblems are associated with the toxicity ofsuch chemicals to man, but of greater concernis their pers'sterre in the environment, and theresultant ecological danger of widespread toxicbuildup in higher animals. Another problem isthe ability of insects to develop resistance toinsecticides to which they ../ere initially suscep-tible a continuing challenge to technologicalprogress.

The first successful approach to the solutionof these problems derived from the discoveryof the specific properties of the organophos-phorus compounds, of which a number arecommercially important insecticides. Some aresystemic insecticides they are absorbed bythe plant, which then becomes lethal to insectsfeeding upon it. Many organophosphorus com-pounds are relatively nontoxic to mammals and

irlerdscpltna,v R&D at I. G Farben toDevelop Oroanosphoro< Insect,c,de

lary Pe-search To x,cology

4kLMa rk et ing of Parathion

American Cyanamid Co.3947

nonpersistent in the environment, and there isconsiderable potential for finding highly selec-tive variants. Analysis of the innovative processof developing these insecticides has providedinsight into the probable directions of futuregrowth and the diversity of chemical means forinsect predator control with minimal environ-mental hazard.

The discovery, by Lange and Kreuger in1932, of the toxicity of organophosphorusesters containing fluorine, and the recognitionof their potential as insecticides, marked thestarting point for the subsequent concerted re-search effort on these compounds. However,their findings did not evoke immediate responsewithin the technical community, and theseauthors did not pursue the subject. First con-ception of the technical opportunity wasformulated in 1934 by the management of I. G,Farbenindustrie, in recognition of the need foran insecticide to replace the toxic but flam-mable gases then in use as fumigants. Further-more, as an economic measure, the Germangovernment had curtailed the importation ofcrop-Protecting substances, chiefly rotenoneand nicotine, and thereby created an incentivefor the production of synthetic substitutes.Gerhard Schrader was appointed to initiate tnisresearch.

Schrader began his studies by synthesizingorganic compounds in which fluorine alone wasintroduced. The management of I. G. Farbenestablished a team consisting of the chemistSchrader, a biologist to do insecticidal testing,and a pharmacologist for toxicity studies. Theproperties of the fluorine compounds were onlymoderately attractive, and in 1936 Schraderturned to the synthesis of compounds withphosphorus as the central atom.

There followed a long sequence of synthesisand testing of organophosphorus compounds inthe I. G. Farben laboratories. More than 2000compounds were said to have been preparedbefore the end of World War II. When the warbegan in 1939, the German work was classified.Of the many compounds prepared, Dimefoxexhibited systemic characteristics on absorp-tion by the plant from the soil (sprayed with anaqueous solution of the compound), the leavesbecome poisonous to insects, A related com-pound, Schradan, prepared in 1942, proved to

be fairly stable in the presence of lime, aproperty then considered important, becausefield applications of synthetic insecticides some-times included additions of lime. The compoundBladan was prepared in 1939. Only moderatelytoxic to higher animals, it is as effective asnicotin against aphids; however, it is not stablein the presence of lime.

None of the compounds prepared wereeffective against the Colorado potato beetle. Aninfestation of this insect in Germany in 1944,and a shortage of arsenate of :ime to combat it,compounded the danger of an acute foodshortage and led to an intensified search bySchrader for a suitable material. He shoe tlyfound two compounds, Paraoxon and Parathion,effective against the potato beetle and proposedtheir application without mixture with arsenateof lime. Parathion is effective against a widevari( of insects and has a short residual action.However, it is extremely toxic to humans andmust he handled with great care.

Parathion was unknown to the Allies at theend of the war. Its existence was revealed in1945 in the British Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee (B.I.O.S.) reports of interviews withSchrader. Parathion was first marketed in theUnited States by the American Cyanamid Com-pany, in 1947. This event is taken to mark theculmination of the innovative process for thiscase the production of the first commercialinsecticide of this type.

Beginning in 1935, the German governmentrequired that new toxic compounds be reportedfor screening, and the most toxic were classified.Two compounds, initially prepared by Schraderin 1937 and submitted for testing, proved to beextremely toxic. Given the code names Tabunand Sarin, these were selected for manufactureby the German Ministry of Defense.

Interest in the toxicological properties ofthe organophosphorus compounds spreadrapidly beyond the German laboratories. TheBritish Ministry of Supply launched an investi-gation, in 1939, of the physiological propertiesof the compounds reported in Germany in1932. Later the Medical Division of the U.S.Army began intensive studies of toxicity andtherapy at Edgewoocl Arsenal.

It became clear that the toxicological effectof the organophosphorus compounds is pro-

duced by their irreversible inhibition of theactivity of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase,which occurs in nerve tissue in both insects andhigher animals. Deactivation of this enzymeresults in complete destruction of nerve im-pulse transmission and disruption of normalnerve functioning. Release of the early informa-tion on the insecticides and later the "nervegases", as they are called, has stimulated inten-sive research, basic and applied, in several

disciplines related to enzyme kinetics and nervetransmission.

In the early 1930's, Dow Chemical Companydeveloped independently a general interest inthe properties of phosphorus compounds, in-cluding their insecticid II properties. The re-search program involved synthesis and screeningfor toxicity and insect lethality. Their work wasextended to a search for animal systemicscompounds which, when ingested by animals,afford protection against insect attack. Theeffort was successful and led to the marketingof ,Ronnel and Ruelene, the first of a family ofanimal systemics available from various manu-facturers.

Other chemical companies in the UnitedStates and elsewhere became interested in syn-thetic insecticides, some before the end of thawar, but the release of the 8.1.0.S. reportscreated more intensive and widespread interest.A large number of compounds have beenpatented and marketed. Their properties extendover a wide range of specificity, persistence,lethality to insects, and toxicity to mammals.The proliferation of successful products and theneeds of mankind have serve; as impetus tosearch in new directions for methods of insectpredator control, as in the use of techniquesinvolving insect hormones or sex attractants tointerfere with the life cycle.

The Decisive Events. Of the 42 significantevents identified in this study, the following 10were considered decisive:

The management decision by I. G. Farben,in 1934, to embark on a comprehensiveprogram of development of synthetic iiisect-icides assured adequate support, funding,and direction to the new venture, in ail areapreviously unexplored.

Of parallel importance was the establishment

of the I. G. Farben team of chemist, biologist,and toxicologist. This combination of disciplines permitted direct focus on the impor-tant aspects of the problem and efficientscreening of candidate materials.

Schrader's decision, in 1935, to investigatefluorine compounds delayed initiation ofwork on the organophosphorus compoundsat least a year, In view of I. G. Farben'sknowledge of Lange's earlier work on fluor°phosphoric acid esters, it is surprising thatSchrader did not turn to these at once.

The 1937 discovery, by Gross at 1. G. Farben,of a relationship between animal toxicityand insect lethality focused attention on thisvital criterion for evaluation of all candidatematerials. This led to the discovery of themechanism of toxic action and, in turn, to arapid extension of basic research on nervetransmission and enzyme inhibition.

In 1937, ,chrader postulated a general struc-ture formula for organophosphorus insecti-cides, which served as a guide for furtherstudies.

In 1939 Schrader recognized the need forlime-stable compounds and initiated effortsto produce these.

In 1941 the discovery by Schrader of plantsystemic action marked the beginning of theestablishment of an extensive series ofproducts having this desirable characteristic.

The critical need in Germa ry, in 1944, foran insecticide to control tl.e potato beetle,was recognized by Schrader. At this timethe shortage of arsenate of lime led to anacute problem of food supply.

Schrader's rapid response was the develop-ment of Parathion, a broad-spectrum insecti-cide effective against the beetle, and thefirst synthetic compound to reach the mar-ketplace. However, because of the effects ofthe war, Parathion was marketed first byAmerican Cyanamid.

In 1951 L. Wade predicted that compoundsof the type of organophosphates might besystemically active in animals. This openedup the development of a new class ofdesirable insecticides.

Implications of the Case, perhaps the most

characteristic feature of this innovation is thatits success depended upon the full support ofmanagement over a 10-year period, the effectivework of a competent team, and the dedicationof the innovator. Without any of these factors,the project would have bogged down. The socialand political pressures upon the organizationand the scientific team must have been severein wartime. The concept was unquestionablyneed oriented, and the proliferation of productson the market today attests to the success ofthe innovation, Parathion, in satisfying the need.That the innovation was marketed by a firmnot responsible for the original concept was aresult of the effects of the war on Germanindustry. Supportive inventions, in the form ofa number of new compounds, were required.Government support was provided in Germany.The. e was an effective interchange and transferof knowledge among the members of the projectteam.

The development of the oral contraceptivepill began with the formulation of the conceptin 1951, and culminated in its commercialproduction in 1960. The present study identi-fied the decisive events and analyzed their inter-actions within the innovative process.

This innovation is the control of conceptionby regulating the release of the egg. Contracep-tion is effected by simulating conditions ofpregnancy that are hostile to fertilization. Theearliest recorded suggestion of an oral contra-ceptive was made by Haberlandt in 1921.Having induced temporary sterility by trans-planting ovaries of pregnant animals into non-pregnant animals, he speculated that extractsfrom the ovaries of pregnant animals might beadministered as an oral contraceptive. However,the idea was premature. Progress had to awaitthe identification, isolation, and production ofthe active ingredients in sufficient quantities topermit studies in reproductive physiology.

'Extension of earher study in TRACES - NSF-0535(1968/. In order to orovide a historical basis for ouranalysis of the decisive events, it was necessary, inthis and the succeeding two case studies, to make fulluse of the histotital data available from the TRACESprotect.

Then in the mid1930's, prompted by observations of the effect of sex hormones on ovula-tion, Kurzrok refined Haberlandt's suggestionby specifying an ovulation-inhibiting hormoneas the regulator. The idea was still not tech-nically feasible, for an orally active progestina hormone producing the physiological condi-tions of pregnancy was not yet available.Meanwhile, considerable effort was directed tothe synthesis of steroids the class of chemicalcompounds which include hormones with thedesired properties.

Finally, in 1945, a concept of contraception,approaching the method finally adopted, wasproposed by Albright. It involved hormonalprevention of ovulation, plus separate hormonalcontrol of the menstrual period. The availablehormones were considered either dangerous orineffective, and no immediate action was taken.

By 1940, the first of a series of highly im-portant events occurred the discovery byR. E. Marks, that diosyeitin. a botanical rawmaterial, cou'd be coneqrted to t.,;,-,!ogicauysignificant stcc,Eds. Aware of the isolation ofdiosgenin from the toot of a native yam byJapanese workers, recognizing the possi-bility that a readily available plant source wouldfree the steroid chemist from dependence onanimal organs, Marker began an intensive searchof the United States and Mexico for an abun-dant source of diosgenin. Collecting over 400species of botanicals, his search was rewardedby discovering such a source in a Mexican yam,a plant easily collected without need for explicitcultivation.

In 1944 Marker organized Syntex, S.A. inMexico to produce steroids from diosgenin.Hormone production by Syntex increasedsteadily from laboratory to tonnage levels, witha corresponding reduction of price. The large-scale market demand for steroids in the early1950's was for the production of cortisone,particularly for treatment of rheumatoidarthritis. Considerable progress was being madein steroid synthesis and in preparation of struc-tural modifications exhibiting other biologicaleffectiveness, including increased progestationalactivity. The research effort included not onlyan international academic community, but theresearch teams established at Syntex and inother pharmaceutical houses. Two steroid

Icrtased K^oveed9e of HornnonaEffacts oo Fierxoduct,c Process

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svlines4 and StrLATLoe ofImproved Stertyds

analogues, norethisterone and norethynodrel,each exhibiting high progestational activitywhen administered orally, emerged from thelaboratories of Syntex and G. D. Searle in timeto enter the innovative process.

In this case of innovation, the initial impetusfor a safe, sure, and easily administered contra-ceptive method resulted from the concern ofMargaret Sanger of the Planned ParenthoodFederation and the philanthropist Mrs. StanleyMcCormick over the potential danger of exces-sive growth of the world population. Early in1951 they requested a proposal for a researchprogram on contraceptive methods from Dr.Gregory Pincus, of the Worcester Foundationfor Experimental Biology. His response was aproposal to develop an oral contraceptive pillthat would suppress ovulation. He had a clearvision of the potential effectiveness of such anapproach to contraception, the probability ofhigh social acceptance of the method of appli-cation, and the potential benefits to mankind

With his proposal accepted by Mrs.McCormick and funding assured, Pincus becamea highly motivated product champion, gener-ating enthusiasm for the program among hiscolleagues and providing direction for a con-certed attack.

The approach was not straightforward, forthe progress of steroid chemistry had not yetreached a level that would provide the ultimatematerials. Initial animal and clinical studies ofprogesterone, an ovulation inhibitor readilyprepared from diosgenin, confirmed its limitedactivity for oral use and led to a search forbetter materials. By 1953, the search was

rewarded by the submission of norethisteroneby Syntex and the chemically similar compoundnorethynodrel by Searle. In small-scale tests onvolunteers, the products were rated superiorprogestational agents, both in safety andefficacy. A large-scale evaluation was nownecessary, and Puerto Rico was chosen as thesite of the experiment. Searle's management,overcoming the traditional position of an ethicalpharmaceutical house that drugs are only forcure of disease, and the fear of possible socialstigma attached to the term contraceptive, co-sponsored the Puerto Rican trials with thePlanned Parenthood Federation.The trials wereoutstandingly successful; they paved the wayfor FDA approval of Enovid (Searle's tradename for norethynodrel) for treatment ofmenstrual disorders in 1957, and for use as anoral contraceptive in 1959. Enovid reached themarketplace as an oral contraceptive in 1960,marking the culmination of the innovativeprocess. Syntex's analogous drug also receivedFDA approval for menstrual disorders in 1957,and was marketed by Parke-Davis under thetrade name Norlutin, but its approval for oralcor,traceptive use was delayed until 1962(because Parke-Davis would not enter theoral contraceptive market in 1957). Syntexhad to find another licensee, the Ortho divisionof Johnson and Johnson, who marketed theproduct under the trade name OrthoNovum.

Since the introduction of Enovid, extensiveefforts have been made to improve the efficacyand safety, and to reduce the cost of this andnumerous competitive products.

The Decisive Events. Of the 75 significant

events identified in this historical study, 15were considered to be decisive in the innovativeprocess, as follows:

The isolation and structure elucidation ofthe hormone progesterone, by A. Butenandtand others, in 1934, precipitated a race toobtain the pure material for studies of thephysiology of reproduction.

By 1937, the ability of steroidal hormonesto inhibit ovulation had been demonstratedby several workers. The low activity of orallyadministered progesterone was recognized,stimulating an intensive search for an orallyactive progestin.

H. H. Inhoffen synthesized ethisterone, thefirst orally active progestin, in 1938, by achemical conversion route later used success-fully by Searle and Syntex in synthesis oftheir highly active compounds.R. E. Marker's discovery (1941) of thechemical process for converting the steroidbase, diosgenin, into progesterone, stimulatedhis search for an abundant plant source.The organization of Syntex, in 1944,marking the introduction of an abundantand cheap source of steroids and startingmaterials for steroid analogues, stimulatedresearch on chemical derivatives, many ofwhich ultimately reached the marketplace.In 1944, M. Ehrenstein and W. M. Allendemonstrated the progestin activity of 19-norprogesterone, a structural modificationwhich became the prototype for future com-pounds, including the Syntex and Searleproducts of the innovation.

In 1944, A. .1. Birch developed a simplifiedsynthesis of 19-nor steroids which providedimpetus and direction ro the steroid chemistsinvolved in the innovative process.

In 1951, C. Djerassi of Syntex synthesizednorethisterone, one of the two compoundsused in most oral contraceptive products.In 1951, F. B. Colton of Searle synthesizednorethynodrel, thus sharing honors withDjerassi.

The request for a proposal on contraceptivemethods, by Mrs. Stanley McCormick andMargaret Sanger in 1951, provided theincentive to G. Pincus and the WorcesterFoundation to plan a concerted effort.

The proposal by Pincus in 1951, and itsfunding, initiated an integrated program todevelop an oral contraceptive. As productchampion, Pincus led and encouraged hiscolleagues to surmount the difficulties inthe way of success.In 1953, M. C. Chang evaluated the two19-nor steroids received from Searle andSyntex, respectively, and proved their effi-cacy and safety on animals; this was con-firmed by J. Rock, from clinical tests on asmall group of women.

In 1954, Pincus offered the concept of cycliccontrol, wherein the drug is withdrawn fora few days to permit a normal menstrualcycle. Avoidance of the physiological andpsychological symptoms associated withfailure to menstruate undoubtedly influencedthe rapid adoption of the product.The decision by Searle, in 1954, to press thedevelopmental effcrt to commercialize theoral contraceptive, was an event requiringconsiderable courage in the face of possiblesocietal rejection. Syntex was not yet in aposition to initiate commercialization at thistime, and the full-scale testing needed forFDA approval would have been delayed fora considerable time.Searle introduced Enovid as an FDA-approved oral contraceptive in 1960. Themarketing of this product marked theculmination of the innovative process.

Implications of the Case. This innovation wasneed oriented; in fact, it was in direct responseto the need expressed by the project sponsor.This account also provides dramatic examplesof untimely prior concept, when the state ofthe art was still inadequate to supply thenecessary technology. The importance of theproduct champion is again evident in thisaccount. Management decisions in the face ofpossible societal rejection were crucial here. Inthis case, the initial invention was conceivedoutside the innovative organization, and sup-portive inventions were needed. Governmentfinancing was not involved. The effects of aninvisible college and of personal transfer ofknowledge, as well as the unplanned confluenceof technology, were also important within theinnovative process.

One of the striking features of this case is

the complex, truly international interplay ofthe channels of development steroid chemis-try and physiology. The joint contributions ofthe academic community and industry, and therole of serendipity were also significant factors.

This innovation involves the production andapplication of magnetic ferrites, a broad class ofceramic materials that combine the magneticproperties of certain meta!s with the electricalproperties of insulating materials. Some com-positions are "hard" or permanent magnets and,as such, find application as replacement formore costly alloy magnets. Others are mag-netically "soft", or nonretentive, and are used,for example, to replace iron cores of inductors;here, the inherent high resistance of the materialprevents alternating current power losses in thecore due to eddy currents. With compositiontailored to fit the desired properties, softferrites find many other important applicationssuch as in communications, microwave tech-nology, and computers.

The initial concept took shape in the PhilipsResearch Laboratories, Netherlands, in theearly 1930's, in response to the need forimproved magnetic materials for use in theirtelephone communications business. By 1933,J. L. Snoek, at Philips, had recognized thepotential of magnetic materials exhibiting lowelectrical losses and the possibility of tailoring

This case was adapted from the TRACES project.

esearch m Magnetic Structure

Advances m TetecommunIcalionsLed to Need for H f Magnets

chemical compositions to application, and hadbegun a systematic study of ferrites. Progresswas undoubtedly affected during the war years,but by 1946, the importance of compositionalhomogeneity and correct oxygen content wasfirmly established, and in 1947 PhilipsLaboratories reported experimental applicationsof ferrites to radio and telephone communica-tions, in the form of transformer cores, induc-tors, and band-pass filters. By 1949, televisionapplications in horizontal-sweep and high-voltage transformers, deflection yokes, tuningslugs, and magnetic shields, as well as loopantennas for broadcast -band receivers, werereported. By 1952, the 100 tons of ferrite permonth used in the communications and televi-sion industries indicated widespread marketacceptance of this product.

An important extension of the applicationsof ferrites into the microwave region of electro-magnetic wave phenomena resulted from war-time needs associated with military communica-tions and radar technologies. Many of theseapplications were based on the theoreticalbehavior of a microwave gyrator, a circuit com-ponent whose properties had been described inprinciple several years before. Following thewar, many laboratories, including Bell Tele-

phone Laboratories (BTL), developed increasedinterest in magnetic phenomena and in appli-^ations in the microwave region. Meanwhile,ferrite compositions to meet the requirementsfor microwave applications were being devel-oped by E. Albers-Schoenberg at General

Development and improvementof a Varetv of Ferrtes

Techmques Developed forSynthests 0 Magnetic Oedes

The OretCal Sttidel

Ceramics. In 1951, C. L. Hogan of BTL recog-nized the characteristics of ferrites thatsatisfied the requirements for a microwavegyrator, and in effect, reduced the concept topractice. By 1955, the invention had been ex-tended to several microwave applications in

circuit elements, such as phase shi rters, delaylines, isolators, and circulators.

Following World War II, another class offerrites, termed square-loop ferrites in referenceto their unique response to an external magneticfield, evolved from military needs for morecomputer power. An Air Force project at

Harvard and an Office of Naval Research (ON R)contract with MIT resulted in developing theconcept of a static magnetic storage elementfor use in a digital computer memory. Thestorage principle is based on the switchingproperties of the square-loop ferrite core, themagnetic polarization of which depends uponthe previously applied magnetic force. Thuseach ferrite core is a binary-logic storage ele-ment, switchabte by the magnetic field associ-ated with suitable current pulses. In 1948,General Ceramics assigned Albers-Schoenbergthe task of developing square-loop ferrites. In1952, he filed the first patent on square-loopferrite compositions. Further work at GeneralCeramics and at MIT led to ferrite core com-positions with improved properties, includingfaster switching times. Magnetic core memoriesare key components of present-day high-speedcomputers.

Hard ferrites permanent magnet materialswere developed in the Philips laboratories in

the late 1940's to mid-1950's. Their extensiveapplications in the military and consumermarket range from the cores of permanent-magnet motors to the small magnetic plaquesfor cupboard-door and shower-curtain retention.

Therefore, by 1955, suitable formulationshad been developed and were accepted in themarketplace, for each of the major applicationsof ferrites, thus marking the culmination of theinnovation.

on the relation between composition andelectrical-magnetic properties. Clearly, thefunding of this research was indicative ofmanagement's recognition of the growingneed for such materials in the telecommuni-cations industry. Snoek served as productchampion through the early developmentperiod.

The post-World War II establishment ofresearch-funding agencies of the Federalgovernment, starting with the Office ofNaval Research in 1946, allowed significantfunding of academic and industry researchteams in pursuing programs whose resultswould serve the national interest. Thefunding of Project Whirlwind at MIT for thedevelopment of larger, faster computers isan example that markedly affected thefuture technology of ferrites.

The increased emphasis on magnetic researchat Bell Telephone Laboratories in the late1940's was a consequence of management'srecognition of the need to extend the appli-cability of ferrites into the higher frequencyregions to meet the communications prob-lems of the future.

The decision, by General Ceramics in 1948,to bring Albers-Schoenberg from Germanyto pursue a ferrite program, marked thebeginning of a rapid development of ferritetechnology in this company. Albers-Schoenberg, because of his dedication andhis ability to obtain funds from the SignalCorps and from Project Whirlwind, was ableto serve as product champion of the program,which ultimately led to the marketing ofsquare-loop and microwave ferrite devices.

Went and Van Oosterhart reported on themagnetically hard properties of barium fer-rite, in 1949. Philips' recognition of itseconomic potential led to the commercialdevelopment of this important class ofmaterials.

In the period of the late 1940's to the early1950's, realization developed widely thatsoft ferrites were generally useful in theelectronics industry, and led to the initiationof considerable applications research, somewith Government funding. The result wasthe widespread proliferation of applications

The Decisive Events. Of the 65 significantevents recorded in this case study, the following7 were identified as decisive:

In 1933, J. L. Snoek began to work atPhilips on magnetic materials, with emphasis

30

as electronic components.

The invention of the microwave gyrator byC. L. Hogan, in 1951, was a direct outcomeof microwave research funding by BTL thatpermitted the establishment of a team ofexperts, but was based on the previoustheoretical description of the gyrator and onbackground research in gyromagnetic phe-nomena.

Implications of the Case. For each class offerrite hard, soft, microwave, and square-loop discussed in this account, the need wasck,aily recognized end the potential marketcould be visualized. Management decisions werehighly important; they represented major finan-cial and technical commitments. The productchampion was evident at least twice. The inno-vation was the outcome of a confluence ofbasic science and technology along severalchannels of development. This account demon-strates the value of the team effort within theinnovating organization. Government fundingplayed a major role in some phases of thisinnovation. Supportive inventions were re-

quired. There was considerable personal inter-change of technical knowledge in the laterstages of the innovative process.

Cre,croonenr of Precd,:rn Mechanismsand Erectron c Feedback Contror

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Theo, et,ca' Studies

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veroonnent of Rada and T.V.13,0adcast

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This is an account of the development of thevideo tape recorder (VTR), an instrument thatcaused a revolutionary change in the operationand programming of the television-broadcastindustry. At first conception of the innovation,in 1950, the need for a technique to recordvideo signals for subsequent rebroadcasting wasuniversally recognized. It would not only solvethe time-zone problem in network program-ming, but also provide greater programmingflexibility for the individual station.

The technical situation, however, was farfrom satisfactory. The requirements for qualityvideo recording were unequivocal; to record theamount of information in a video signal requiresa bandwidth (frequency range) of recordingfrequencies extending over 4 million hertz(cycles per second) versus a typical bandwidth,for high-fidelity audio recording, of 15,000hertz. Simply to extend existing audio tech-niques would require unrealistic tape speeds of1500 inches per second (over a mile per minute),and correspondingly unrealistic quantities oftape and size of reel per hour of broadcast

"This case was adaptud from the TRACES project.

R&D at Anti,

MonochromeVTR 1956

R&D at RCA

time. Direct-recording techniques did notappear feasible, unless supported by someunanticipated breakthrough.

In 1950, Marvin Camras of the ArmourResearch Foundation suggested a solution tothe tape-speed problem rotating the taperecorder head relative to the moving tape. Themanagement of the Ampex Corporation, a

licensee of Armour and a recognized manufac-turer of quality broadcast audio recordingequipment, considered the VTR an obvious,andneeded extension of its product line. In 1951,the decision was made to develop a VTR fol-lowing the rotating-head concept. C. P.

Ginsburg, hired by Ampex as project managerearly in 1952, identified the four major techni-cal problems to be solved:

Rotating heads of adequate precision, withappropriate tape transport.

Servo techniques to control head-to-tapepositioning.

Servo system for reel-toreel tape positioning.

Carrier modulation with sideband widthcomparable to the video signal bandwidth.

On Ginsburg's project team was a youngtechnician, R. M. Dolby, who rapidly solvedthe problem of servo techniques for precisetape positioning. Within 10 months, the firstcrude model of a rotating head tape-transportsystem had been developed, and progressappeared to be satisfactory. However, theproject was terminated officially for a yearbecause of internal conflict; nevertheless,Ginsburg continued his work after hours untilthe project was renewed. The rotating headwas now a sophisticated precision device, withfour heads set in a high-speed rotating cylinder,against which a 2-inch wide magnetic tape wasrapidly drawn parallel to the axis of the head.Thus the magnetized track was a succession oftransverse helical segments. The problem ofsynchronizing the signal from one segment tothe next was also solved.

Certainly the most serious problem was thatof the frequency limitations of direct taperecording, which, in the period of the innova-tion, was about 100 kilohertz. For recordingcolor video signals, a bandwidth of 4.5 megahertz is required; thus direct recording is impossible. The solution is to modulate a carrier

wave with the desired signal. Amplitude modu-lation, as used in .ornmercial radio broad-casting, was tried first, without success. Then afrequency modulation (FM) technique, using acarrier frequency slightly higher than the desiredsignal bandwidth, was proposed. Although FMradio transmission was well known at the time,conventional practice would require a carrierfrequency of at least 40 megahertz. The deci-sion of the Ampex team to try their FM schemewas bold, but the results were completelysatisfactory and justified the gamble. It turnedout that theoretical support of the narrow-bandFM concept had already been published, butthis information was not known to the Ampexteam at the time. The conceptual system wasnow reduced to practice, but several engineeringand production problems had yet to be elimi-nated. The decision was made to develop mono-chrome VTR first; this reduced the bandwidthrequirements from 4.5 to 2.5 megahertz andsimplified the production problems to be met.

Meanwhile, a market study had been madefor the Ampex Board of Directors. The reportwas unfavorable, but Ginsburg persuaded man-agement to continue. In 1956, the project waspublicly demonstrated at the annual meeting ofthe National Association of Radio and Tele-vision Broadcasters (NARTB). During the firstday of the demonstration, Ampex booked salesof nearly $5 million of monochrome VTRmachines, then equivalent to nearly 30 percentof the company's annual business, thus bringingthe innovation to its culmination.

Unknown to the two contenders, the VTRdevelopment was actually a race betweenAmpex and RCA. Ruling out the rotating headas impractical, RCA took two approaches in theearly 1950's: direct recording and multiple-channel recording. The direct-recording ap-proach was soon recognized as impractical, andmajor emphasis turned to a multiplexing tech-nique in which the recorded video signal wasdivided into 10 channels, each carrying aportion of the band of frequencies. FMrecording was also ruled out as impractical, anda further constraint was imposed that colortransmission be recorded. Nevertheless, con-siderable progress had been made when Ampexannounced its monochrome VTR. RCA reorgan-ized its development approach along the lines

of Ampex, but added color capability, andentered into a cross-licensing agreement withAmpex. Thus a significant contribution wasprovided to Ampex's later development of itscotor-recording capability.

The Decisive Events. Of the 77 significantevents identified, 5 were considered to be deci-sive, as follows:

The inauguration of regular TV broadcastingby the BBC, in 1936, marked the beginningof this vast industry. Without the potentialdemand for a VTR by this industry, it is

unlikely that the innovation would have beendeveloped.

The rotating-head concept of Camras wasunique and highly innovative. Without it,the project would not have progressed far,but the concept posed difficult problems ofhead design and of track positioning andsynchroni zat ion .

The decision of a small company like Ampexto embark on an ambitious program of thistype was courageous, even though it wasbased on recognition of the potential sound-ness of Camras' concept and on the com-pany's considerable experience in therecording industry.

The successful development of servo tech-niques and tape-head synchronization byDolby was crucial to the overall innovation.

The successful incorporation of FM recordinginto the VTR system completed the develop-ment of the concept into a full reduction topractice, and provided management impetus

to proceed with engineering, production, andmarketing plans.

Implications of the Case. This account ishighlighted by recognition of the specific needby the management of Ampex and by the dedi-cation of the product champion and his researchteam. Based on the Camras concept (innovationconceived outside the company) and the com-pany's internal expertise in the recording field,the final product emerged in only 6 years. Thisdoes not imply that the ambience of scienceand technology made no contribution; thehistorical account traces the backgroundthrough several channels of development such aselectronics, radio and television broadcasting,magnetic theory, magnetic recording materials,and magnetic recording systems. In the absenceof this entire historical background, the Camrasconcept would have been meaningless. No out-side assistance of Government funding wasinvolved in this case. The innovation, causing a"revolution" within the TV industry, promotedchanges in the nature and frequency of broad-casts of mobile transmissions, such as news andsports events, and in the use of instant replay,time-zone planning, editing, and programstorage. An unfavorable market analysis failedto halt the effort; the product champion pre-vailed. Supportive inventions were needed. Asentrepreneur, Ginsburg contributed to the inno-vative process not only his personal drive andguidance, but a high order of managerial insightand direction regarding Dolby's work thatmaximized the latter's contributions to theproject.