Document of The Independent Evaluation Group -...

Document of

The Independent Evaluation Group

Report No.: 66056

PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

INDIA

THIRD TECHNICIAN EDUCATION PROJECT (CR. 3413-IN)

AND

TECHNICAL/ENGINEERING EDUCATION QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

(CR. 3718-IN)

December 19, 2011

IEG Public Sector Evaluation Independent Evaluation Group

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Indian Rupee

2003 US$1.00 INR 46.58 2004 US$1.00 INR 45.31 2005 US$1.00 INR 44.10 2006 US$1.00 INR 45.30 2007 US$1.00 INR 41.34 2008 US$1.00 INR 43.50 2009 US$1.00 INR 48.40 2010 US$1.00 INR 45.72

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A&N Andaman and Nicobar islands APR Arunachal Pradesh CAS Country Assistance Strategy DCA Development Credit Agreement DSHE Department of Secondary and Higher

Education ICR Implementation Completion and Results

Report IEG Independent Evaluation Group IEGPS IEG Public Sector Evaluation INR Indian Rupees J&K Jammu and Kashmir KPI Key Performance Indicator M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MGL Meghalaya MHRD Ministry of Human Resources

Development MZR Mizoram NGL Nagaland

NPIU National Project Implementation Unit OED Operations Evaluation Department

(now IEG) PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PPAR Project Performance Assessment Report R&D Research and Development SC Scheduled Caste SDR Special Drawing Right SKM Sikkim SPIU State Project Implementation Unit ST Scheduled Tribe TDB Tribal Development Plan TEQIP I Technical /Engineering Education

Quality Improvement Project I TPR Tripura Technician Education III

Third Technician Education Project UT Union Territory

Fiscal Year

Government: April 1 – March 31

Director-General, Independent Evaluation : Ms. Caroline Heider Director, IEG Public Sector Evaluation : Ms. Martha Ainsworth (Acting) Manager, IEG Public Sector Evaluation : Ms. Monika Huppi Task Manager : Ms. Tara Béteille

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Contents

Principal Ratings ................................................................................................................. v

Key Staff Responsible......................................................................................................... v

Preface............................................................................................................................... vii

Summary ............................................................................................................................ ix

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

2. Third Technician Education Project ............................................................................. 11

Project Objectives and Design ...................................................................................... 11

Financing................................................................................................................... 13

Project Institutional Framework ............................................................................... 13

Implementation ............................................................................................................. 14

Relevance of Project Objectives and Design ................................................................ 16

Relevance of Objectives ........................................................................................... 16

Relevance of Design ................................................................................................. 18

Achievement of the Objectives ..................................................................................... 18

Expanding the Capacity of Technician (Polytechnic) Education ............................. 18

Improving the Quality of Technician (Polytechnic) Education ................................ 22

Improving the Efficiency of Technician (Polytechnic) Education ........................... 27

Meeting the Specific Economic Needs of Each State and UT.................................. 31

Increasing Access of Women, Scheduled Tribes and Rural Youth to Technician Education and Training ............................................................................................. 32

Efficiency ...................................................................................................................... 33

Project Outcome............................................................................................................ 34

Risk to Development Outcome ..................................................................................... 34

Bank Performance ......................................................................................................... 35

Borrower Performance .................................................................................................. 36

Monitoring and Evaluation ........................................................................................... 36

3. Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I ............................... 37

Project Objectives and Design ...................................................................................... 37

Financing................................................................................................................... 39

Project Institutional Framework ............................................................................... 39

Implementation ............................................................................................................. 41

This report was prepared by Tara Béteille, who assessed the Project in May 2011. The PPAR was peer reviewed by Peter Darvas and panel reviewed by Kristin Hallberg. Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye and Viktoriya Yevsyeyeva provided administrative support.

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Relevance of Project Objectives and Design ................................................................ 44

Relevance of Objectives ........................................................................................... 44

Relevance of Design ................................................................................................. 45

Achievement of the Project Objective .......................................................................... 46

From Inputs to Outputs ............................................................................................. 47

From Outputs to Intermediate Outcomes .................................................................. 50

Efficiency ...................................................................................................................... 56

Project Outcome............................................................................................................ 57

Risk to Development Outcome ..................................................................................... 57

Bank Performance ......................................................................................................... 57

Borrower Performance .................................................................................................. 59

Monitoring and Evaluation ........................................................................................... 60

4. Themes and Lessons ..................................................................................................... 61

Lessons of Experience .................................................................................................. 61

Follow-on Projects ........................................................................................................ 66

References ......................................................................................................................... 69

Annex A. Basic Data Sheet for the Third Technician Education Project (Cr. 3413-IN) .. 73

Annex B. Basic Data Sheet for the Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project (Cr. 3718-IN) ................................................................................. 77

Annex C. List of Persons Met ........................................................................................... 81

Annex D. Borrower Comments ........................................................................................ 87

Boxes

Box 1. Linking Technical Education Investments with Improved Economic Productivity and Competitiveness ........................................................................................................... 3

Tables

Table 1. Selected Macro-Economic Indicators ................................................................... 2

Table 2. Student Enrollment in Higher Education Institutes in India (public and private) 6

Table 3. Number of Institutes and Enrollment in Technical Education (2011) .................. 7

Table 4. Third Technician Education Project ................................................................... 13

Table 5. Appraisal and Actual Costs of Project Components in Technician Education III........................................................................................................................................... 15

Table 6. Expanding the Capacity of Technician Education in Project states/UT ............. 19

Table 7. New Programs Offered in Project States/UT ...................................................... 20

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Table 8. Results Chain for Improving the Quality of Technician Education and Meeting Specific Economic Needs of Project States/UT ................................................................ 23

Table 9. Improving the Quality of Technician Education in Project States/UT .............. 24

Table 10. Average Pass-Out/Self-Employment Rate within One Year (Percent) ............ 26

Table 11. Student Employment Data: Ambedkar Polytechnic, Port Blair ....................... 26

Table 12. Student Employment Data: Jowai and Tura Polytechnics (since 2008) .......... 27

Table 13. Results Chain for Improving the Efficiency of Technician Education ............. 28

Table 14. Improvement in Efficiency ............................................................................... 30

Table 15. Revenue from Consultancy and Other Services in Project Polytechnics (Rs thousand) ........................................................................................................................... 32

Table 16. Increase in Women Students (%)...................................................................... 33

Table 17. Increase in Rural Students (% of students from rural areas) ............................ 33

Table 18. Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I ................... 41

Table 19. Appraisal and Actual Cost of Project Components TEQIP I............................ 42

Table 20. Results Chain for Increasing the Productivity and Competitiveness of the Indian Economy ................................................................................................................ 46

Table 21. Status of Autonomy of Project Institutes at Project Closing ............................ 47

Table 22. Achievement of Institutional Reforms in Project Institutes.............................. 48

Table 23. Administrative/Management Efficiency Indicators in Project Institutes .......... 50

Table 24. Improvement in Intermediate Outcomes ......................................................... 53

Table 25. Services to Community and Economy in Project Institutes ............................. 56

Table 26. The Two Operations and Subsequent Bank Support ........................................ 67

Figures

Figure 1. Grant-in-aid received by All India Council of Technical Education .................. 5

Figure 2. All-India Unemployment Rate for Persons aged 15 years and Above (2007-08)7

Figure 3. All-India Average Daily Wage Rate for Persons aged 15 years and Above (2007-08)............................................................................................................................. 8

Figure 4. Increase in Enrollment in Project States/UT ..................................................... 22

Figure 5. Increase in Enrollment in Project States/UT Relative to all-India and non-Project Northeast States .................................................................................................... 22

Figure 6. Student Performance in Project Institutes ......................................................... 51

Figure 7. Average Income of Graduates in Project Institutes ........................................... 53

Figure 8. Increase in Number of Publications in Science and Technology ...................... 54

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Principal Ratings


ICR* ICR Review* PPAR

Outcome Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome

Moderate Moderate Significant

Bank Performance Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance

Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory

TECHNICAL/ENGINEERING EDUCATION QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (CR. 3718-IN)

ICR* ICR Review* PPAR

Outcome Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory


Moderate Moderate Moderate

Bank Performance Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory


Satisfactory Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory

* *The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible


Stage Task Manager/Leader Sector Manager Country Director

Appraisal Shashi K. Shrivastava Emmanuel Y. Jimenez Edwin R. Lim

Completion Shashi K. Shrivastava Michelle Riboud Isabel M. Guerrero

TECHNICAL/ENGINEERING EDUCATION QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (CR. 3718-IN)

Stage Task Manager/Leader Sector Manager Country Director

Appraisal Shashi K. Shrivastava Michelle Riboud Michael F. Carter

Completion Andreas Blom Amit Dar N. Roberto Zagha

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IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank’s self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank’s work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the Bank’s lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEG peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations

IEG’s use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: http://worldbank.org/ieg).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. Relevance includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent with the country’s current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project’s design is consistent with the stated objectives. Efficacy is the extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Efficiency is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. Possible ratings for Outcome: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome: High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. Possible ratings for Bank Performance: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. Possible ratings for Borrower Performance: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

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Preface

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses two education operations in India that supported reforms in technical and engineering education: the Third Technician Education Project (Loan Number 3413-IN), approved on September 7, 2000 and closed on June 30, 2007, and the Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I (Loan Number 3718-IN), approved on November 14, 2002 and closed on March 31, 2009.

The total cost of the Third Technician Education Project at completion was USD 83.4 million, with IDA contributing USD 71 million. The Project was extended by one year from the planned closing date of June 30, 2006, and closed on June 30, 2007. The total cost of Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I at completion was USD 315.11 million, with IDA contributing USD 250.92 million. The Project was extended by nine months from the planned closing date of June 30, 2008.

The report also contributes to IEG’s ongoing evaluation of the World Bank Group’s support for youth employment and skills development, which focuses on contributions of education and other policies to the employability and earnings of the young. The report was prepared by Tara Béteille, Evaluator, IEG. The findings are largely based on a three-week mission to India from May 9-27, 2011 undertaken by Tara Béteille and Pia Schneider, Lead Evaluation Officer, IEG. The mission visited New Delhi, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Meghalaya, West Bengal, and Maharashtra. The mission met with key-informants including Central and State Government officials, Bank staff, beneficiaries (students, employers and faculty), and representatives from supported education institutes. It also conducted site visits to seven Project institutes and examined Project appraisal and completion reports, the Loan Agreements, Bank files, and the published literature.

The cooperation and assistance of all stakeholders as well as the support of the World Bank country office in India are gratefully acknowledged. Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR will be sent to Government officials for review and comment. These comments will be added as Annex D.

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Summary

This report assesses the performance of two education operations in India, the Third Technician Education Project (Technician Education III) and the Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I (TEQIP I). Both operations took the form of Specific Investment Loans. The overarching theme of the two projects was to expand and improve the technical manpower of project states in India in order to meet economic needs of the country and states. Both projects were prepared in the early 2000s, when India had emerged successfully from nearly a decade of economic liberalization reforms. India had one of the largest and fastest expanding systems of post-secondary technical and engineering education in the world at the time, suggesting it had the technical manpower to design productivity-enhancing technologies and build India’s emerging economy. In the Indian context, the term technical education covers a range of fields: engineering, technology, management, architecture, town planning, pharmacy, applied arts and crafts, hotel management and catering technology. Technical education is offered at the tertiary level by both universities and colleges affiliated to universities as well as by polytechnics. Universities and their affiliates issue degrees, while polytechnics offer diplomas. The average quality of the technical and engineering education system in the early 2000s was low, putting in doubt India’s ability to improve its growth, productivity, or competitiveness, leave aside its ability to become a knowledge superpower. In response to the low average quality of the technical/engineering education system, and in recognition of its key role in future economic development, the Government of India embarked on a mission to improve the quality of technical manpower over the next several decades. It articulated its intention in key policy documents, including the 9th Five Year Plan (1997-2002) and a 2001 Task Force Report, “India as Knowledge Superpower: Strategy for Transformation.” During this time, the World Bank supported the Government of India through Technician Education III, designed to expand and improve vocational education in geographically remote regions, and TEQIP I, designed to improve the technical education system through systemic reform. Technician Education III was the final phase of a three-part Technician Education program, and was designed to support vocational education in seven states and one union territory of India. This third and last project of the Technician Education series was targeted at the most difficult regions in India, regions characterized by geographical isolation and conflict history. TEQIP I was the first part of a three-part program designed to improve the technical/engineering education system in India. It covered thirteen of India’s largest states. There was no overlap in regions between the two projects. Project objectives and design

The Project Development Objectives for Technician Education III was “to assist the industrially and economically underdeveloped and geographically remote states of the northeastern region (Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura), Jammu & Kashmir, and the Union Territory (UT) of Andaman & Nicobar

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Islands) to expand capacity and improve the quality and efficiency of technician (polytechnic) education to meet the specific economic needs of each state. The Project also aimed at increasing access of some disadvantaged sections of society (women, scheduled tribes and rural youth) to technician education and training.” Technician Education III focused on polytechnics, with programs introduced during the project being at the undergraduate diploma level, which is a below-degree qualification in India.

The Project Development Objective for TEQIP was “to support the production of high quality technical professionals through reforms in the technical/engineering education system in order to raise productivity and competitiveness of the Indian economy.” TEQIP I focused primarily on universities and colleges offering degree-level programs, but also supported a few polytechnics. Polytechnics comprised 12.5 percent of all supported institutes. The objectives of both operations were closely aligned with the Country Assistance Strategies in India, which in the early 2000s gave priority to reforms improving the efficiency and responsiveness of technical training institutes to the changing labor market, while also reaching disadvantaged groups. These concerns were, and continue to be, articulated in several key policy documents of the Government of India, including India’s Five Year Plans (1997-2002, 2002-2007 and 2007-2012) and the World Bank’s more recent Country Assistance Strategies (2005 and 2009). The relevance of objectives of Technician Education III is rated as High and TEQIP I as substantial.

The two projects emphasized, albeit to different degrees, decentralized decision-making, cost recovery, networking of institutions, labor-market relevant programs and cutting-edge equipment, faculty training, and employment of students. Technician Education III focused on polytechnic education. Its primary focus was on providing access to technical/vocational education in remote parts of the country as well as improving their quality and making technical education responsive to the economic needs of Project regions. TEQIP I addressed the core systemic goal of reducing over-centralization at the central and state levels, which had led to a lack of autonomy and accountability in institutions of technical education in India and resulted in institutions having limited authority in the areas of faculty appointments; student admissions; structure and content of programs; financial management; and student evaluation methodology. This compromised institutions’ ability to respond to the changing needs of the economy, undertake innovation, and be at the cutting edge of their field. Both Projects undertook the following broad categories of expenditures: (1) new/updated equipment and laboratories; (2) training of faculty in cutting-edge fields; (3) seminars; (4) designing labor market relevant curricula; and (5) building management capacity among staff. Additionally, Technician Education III financed new polytechnics, hostel facilities, and faculty residences. Both projects were ambitious, but for different reasons. Technician Education III was challenging because it targeted remote and neglected parts of the country and sought to build their technical manpower. In so doing, it entered previously unchartered territory for international donors in education. TEQIP I’s ambitiousness lay in undertaking systemic reform in the technical/engineering education space in India. Systemic reform is

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challenging, not only because of the technical component of such reform, but also because of underlying administrative and political challenges and tensions. With the benefit of hindsight, certain aspects of design could have been different in both projects. These include factors enhancing the labor-market relevance of programs in Technician Education III, and greater participation of private institutes in TEQIP I. On balance, however, the relevance of design is rated as substantial for both projects. The achievement of Technician Education III’s objectives

Technician Education III increased access to vocational education in multiple ways. It strengthened the infrastructure in all twelve existing polytechnics and built nine new ones. It did this by increasing the number of programs in old polytechnics, the number of hostel places for students and faculty residences, building skill development centers in remote regions (of remote states), and improving available learning equipment in existing polytechnics. As a result, enrollment increased 350 percent. The objective of expanding capacity of technical education was thus substantially achieved.

The Project aimed to improve the quality of vocational education by providing better quality equipment and laboratories, improved curricula and programs, and improved teaching. It was able to improve the range of programs on offer by updating the curricula in all institutes and instituting sixty new programs. At project closing, an average of 67 percent of graduates were employed within a year of graduation, a substantial increase over the less than 40 percent at the outset. In the case of some of the new programs, such as Food Processing Technology, the skills conferred on students were, however, not accompanied by adequate complementary skills. As a result, students in these programs were not able to use their technical training effectively. On balance, the achievement of this objective was substantial.

The Project aimed to improve the efficiency of polytechnics by reducing student drop-out rates and the average number of years taken to complete the diploma program. On average, the drop-out rate had decreased to 4.6 percent at Project closing, cost per student reduced by 35 percent and the utilization rate of seats increased from 54 percent to 84 percent. This objective, therefore, was substantially achieved.

Technician Education III aimed to meet the specific economic needs of each state/UT by generating graduates with labor-market relevant skills, and enabling faculty with skills and equipment that allowed them to advise the government and industry through consultancies. While it succeeded in the latter, with revenue from consultancy work and other non-fee sources increasing by 159 percent during the project, it was less successful with the employment record of students. A number of the new programs it introduced were directed towards informal sector employment, but these programs were not accompanied with sufficient complementary support. The project substantially achieved its objective of increasing access of women to polytechnic education through a number of programs such as garment technology, cosmetology, interior design, and computer science. Additionally, because of the location of the polytechnics and the skill development centers, it was highly successful in

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providing access to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as well as rural youth. For instance, the enrollment rate of rural students increased from 39.5 percent to 66.6 percent. The Project’s efficiency was modest due to poor fiduciary management, especially in the first five years of the Project. Taking into account the high relevance of the objectives, the substantial relevance of design, substantial achievements in expanding the capacity of technician education, improving the quality and efficiency of technician education, and expanding coverage and access to women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and rural youth, modest achievement in meeting the economic needs of each state and UT, and modest Project efficiency, the Project Outcome for Technician Education III is rated as moderately satisfactory. The achievement of TEQIP I’s objectives

TEQIP I led to an unambiguous increase in the supply of high-quality technical professionals by increasing the supply of high-quality graduate students and the academic productivity of faculty. Not only did the proportion of students graduating with distinction increase, campus placement rates within one year of graduation nearly doubled for undergraduate students, from 41 percent to 76 percent, and more than doubled, from 25 percent to 56 percent, for post-graduate students. The Project also helped increase the strength of scientific manpower in India by helping project institutes update and improve the performance of faculty. Professional publications increased by more than two-thirds per year (67 percent of target), patents applied for increased seven-fold, and patents obtained increased by more than half.

Many factors outside the project affected productivity and competitiveness, but the project likely contributed by increasing the supply of technical professionals and improving their quality. It also improved the technical ability of project institutions to undertake cutting-edge industry collaborations, consultancies and research, and services to the community and economy. As an example, the Project-supported institute, University Institute of Chemical Technology, undertook a range of consultancies with industry in the realm of chemical technology. Approximately 7 percent of India’s GDP comes from chemical industries, with this Institute’s faculty among the most sought-after advisors/consultants. Similarly, research endeavors of other universities also played an important role in generating better technologies, thereby improving productivity. On average, TEQIP I supported institutes to produce higher-quality technical manpower, improve their technology-readiness, and innovate. Each of these is likely to have contributed to building India’s competitive advantage in a range of industries and services. Thus, TEQIP I substantially achieved its objective of supporting the production of high- quality technical professionals in order to raise productivity and competitiveness of the Indian economy. Efficiency was substantial. The Project was able to double its coverage without an increase in funds. There is no evidence of dilution in quality, but the Project encountered challenges in fiduciary management in its initial years. On the basis of relevance of objectives and design being substantial, efficacy substantial, and efficiency substantial, the Outcome for TEQIP I is rated as satisfactory.

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Risk to development outcome

The risk to development outcome is rated as significant for Technician Education III. The sustainability of reforms in polytechnics, especially those that were newly created, is low. In the absence of support mechanisms, and an overall paucity of technical expertise in project regions, the only way in which reforms in polytechnics would be sustained is through proactive government involvement. Without World Bank presence, it is unlikely that such involvement will be forthcoming. Risk to development outcome is rated as moderate for TEQIP I. It has been succeeded by TEQIP II, which includes many institutes from its predecessor. In the latter institutes, it is likely that reforms will be sustained and built upon. This is less likely in institutes not supported under TEQIP II, especially private institutes, since these institutes will no longer have access to the technical assistance that comes with involvement in World Bank projects. Bank performance

Bank performance was moderately satisfactory in Technician Education III. Quality at entry was moderately satisfactory. Given that project states/UT had no experience with externally-funded projects, the Bank did not have access to adequate experience or research from prior projects undertaken by it, other donors or the government. Nevertheless, it did a commendable job in terms of background work and building access to vocational education. However, it did a less satisfactory job in understanding the local labor market of project states/UT which compromised its ability to design programs that would ensure employment of graduates. Additionally, supervision of fiduciary aspects, in particular procurement was weak, resulting in considerable procurement lapses. Quality of supervision is rated moderately unsatisfactory. Bank performance was moderately satisfactory in TEQIP I. Quality at entry was moderately satisfactory, while quality of supervision was satisfactory. The quality at entry was compromised by the Bank not having adequately gauged the complexity of implementing reforms such as academic and financial autonomy. Further, it had not adequately accounted for the political and bureaucratic hurdles that derailed reforms in the initial period of the project. In terms of supervision, well-documented supervision missions were conducted on a regular basis. Additionally, the Bank was frequently available for informal need-based consultations with the NPIU and project institutes. When procurement issues were detected in the initial phase of the project, the Bank took action to ensure that they were promptly addressed. Borrower performance

Borrower performance is rated as moderately satisfactory for Technician Education III. State governments took considerable initiative and played a very supportive role, but the implementing agency was not able to provide timely advice. Borrower performance is rated moderately satisfactory for TEQIP I, given the political and bureaucratic hurdles that nearly derailed the project in its initial years. Post 2005, Borrower performance improved considerably with the change in leadership. In the initial period, the implementation agency was unable to function effectively and was characterized by high staff turnover.

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Lessons

IEG draws the following lessons:

• It is important to align courses with economic needs, as well as students’ employment aspirations. TEQIP I performed better than Technician Education III in its student employment record because it supported programs geared towards formal sector employment, which is where students sought jobs. In Technician Education III, many of the new programs were in the informal sector, such as garment technology and food processing, while the employer of choice was the government (formal sector).

• Accreditation processes are difficult in remote regions and are vulnerable to manipulation. When carried out as envisioned, the National Board of Accreditation’s certification is comprehensive and rigorous. However, it is frequently difficult to arrange for experts to visit institutes in remote regions, and there is potential for manipulation of the accreditation process.

• Leveraging alumni connections can be an important mechanism for raising funds. A number of TEQIP I institutes benefited from strong alumni connections. These led to donations, consultancy, research work, and teaching inputs from alumni.

• Autonomy is important, but institutes must be ready for it in terms of accountability and initiative. A number of institutes receiving autonomy under both projects benefitted in terms of being able to pursue cutting-edge fields of research and cost recovery. However, many were not equipped to make effective use of autonomy, due to low confidence, responsibility and initiative.

• Systemic reform in Indian technical education is incomplete without the inclusion of private institutes. Given that private institutes enroll approximately 85 percent of all students studying engineering in India, improving the technical education system requires their participation on a much larger scale than occurred in either project.

• Networking of institutes is likely to be effective only when institutes recognize mutual gains. TEQIP I designated some institutes as Lead and others as Network. This created a hierarchy between the two types of institutes, defeating the purpose of mutual exchange, with the former choosing to give expertise rather than receive any.

Caroline Heider Director-General

Evaluation

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1. Introduction

Background

1.1 This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) reviews the experience and achievements of World Bank support for tertiary-level engineering, technical, and vocational education reforms in India between 2000 and 2009. Bank support in India occurred through two operations, the Third Technician Education Project (Technician Education III) and the Technical/ Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project (TEQIP I). Both Projects were supported by Specific Investment Loans.

1.2 These two projects were selected for this PPAR because they address core challenges in higher technical and vocational education reforms. These include improving the quality of education and making it more labor market relevant; cost recovery; governance; and private sector participation. At the same time, the projects differed in approach, with Technician Education III targeting remote, difficult-to-access and conflict-ridden regions, and TEQIP I targeting better performing institutes in more easily accessible regions. Spread over 21 states (out of a total of 29 states in the country), together the Projects provide insights on providing tertiary technical/vocational education across several important contexts: low-income, middle-income, stagnating economic growth, high economic growth, varying employment rates, and conflict. This PPAR, therefore, provides a unique opportunity to examine the challenges and successes of providing labor market-relevant technical education across such contexts.

Socio-economic context of India

1.3 In 2000, India had emerged successfully from nearly a decade-long process of economic liberalization. GDP grew at an annual average rate of 5.5 percent between 1988-1998, dipping briefly in 1999, but continuing its upward trend thereafter, doubling from 4.0 percent in 2000 to 9.1 percent in 2009 (Table 1). The dip in 2008 occurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-08. Importantly, GDP grew at 4.9 percent that year, unlike most other economies which experienced negative rates of growth at the time, though it recovered post crisis to 9.1 percent in 2009. The overall trend in other macroeconomic variables such as trade in services, productivity growth, and patent applications per year is also one of general improvement.

1.4 Based upon the 1990 and 2000 population censuses, India was expected to experience a demographic dividend over the next 40-50 years. In other words, over the next several decades, it was projected to see a rise in its working age population, and a fall in its dependency ratio. In 2020, the average age of an Indian is expected to be 29 years. A young population is an asset because an educated and skilled population is essential for productive employment and higher growth. At the same time, if this young population is not suitably skilled or made ready for productive employment, then the demographic dividend can very easily turn into a demographic burden.

1.5 In 2000, unemployment in India stood at 4.3 percent, but this figure does not include underemployment. Youth unemployment at the time was more than double, at 10.12 percent.

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These figures indicate an urgent need for the economy to create more high-productivity jobs so that youth could be gainfully employed.

1.6 The creation of high productivity jobs in India is constrained by the structure of enterprises and employment, characterized by a large informal sector and widespread informal employment. The informal sector in India consists of all unincorporated private enterprises owned by individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and services operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with fewer than ten total workers. Informal employment refers to employment characterized by the absence of employment security, worker security, and social security benefits, and may occur in the formal or informal sector.1

Table 1. Selected Macro-Economic Indicators

Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

GDP growth ( percent) 7.38 4.03 5.22 3.77 8.37 8.28 9.32 9.27 9.82 4.93 9.10

Productivity Growth* (percent)

4.9 2.1 3.25 1.33 5.89 4.85 6.75 6.97 6.10 4.51 -

Unemployment rate (percent)

-

4.29 - - - 4.40 - - - -

Patent applications by residents, number per year

- 2179 2371 2693 3425 4014 4521 5314 - - -

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Note: *Based on GDP per person engaged (constant 1990 US$ at PPP).

1.7 In 1999-00, out of a total workforce of 396.4 million, approximately 362.8 million (91.5 percent) were in informal employment. Out of those in informal employment, approximately 93.6 percent were employed in the informal sector and 6.4 percent in the formal sector (NCEUS, 2009).2 Despite the dominance of the informal sector in employment, only half India’s GDP was generated in this sector in 2004-05. Relative to the formal sector, the informal sector is characterized by low sectoral product per worker, low wage rates, and low education levels (NCEUS, 2009).

1.8 This being said, there has been an upward trend in overall labor productivity growth since 2002, except for a brief dip in 2004 and in 2008 due to the financial crisis (see Table 1). Ultimately improvements in labor productivity depend upon factors covered under the umbrella term of competitiveness (Box 1). Estimates for the pre-project period are not available, but recent estimates suggest that even now India fares poorly in its ranking of

1 Employment security in the Indian context refers to protection against acts such as arbitrary dismissal; wage security refers to protection against instances such as workplace accidents or illnesses; and social security refers to benefits such as maternal, healthcare and pension benefits (NCEUS, 2009).

2 Not much has changed since. In 2007-08, out of a total workforce of 450 million, approximately 415 million (92 percent) were in informal employment. Out of those in informal employment, approximately 94 percent were employed in the informal sector and 6 percent in the formal sector (National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector, 2010).

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competitiveness. Its overall ranking is 51 (out of 139 countries surveyed) in the 2010 Global Competitiveness Report. It ranks 39 in innovation, 85 in higher education and training and 86 in technological readiness.

Box 1. Linking Technical Education Investments with Improved Economic Productivity and Competitiveness

Productivity is the relationship between resource inputs and the output of goods and services. Technology is the method of transforming inputs into outputs. Improvements in technology can result in production of more outputs per unit of input. Productivity can be measured in many ways. These include GDP per capita (or income per capita); GDP per hour worked; hours worked per capita; and the ratio between output and capital input. The choice of measure depends largely upon the issue being examined and the data that are available.

Better access to quality technical education can be expected to contribute to higher productivity by increasing the number of good technical professionals who are better prepared to innovate and create new technologies. From this perspective, investing in strengthening technical/engineering schools to better equip them with physical and intellectual resources is likely to increase the supply of high quality technical professionals. Such professionals are better prepared to innovate and create superior technologies, thereby contributed directly to the productivity of the economy.

According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, competitiveness can be defined as: "the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a

country". The Report includes information from over a hundred variables covering the following broad categories: institutions; infrastructure; macro economy; health and primary education; higher education and training; market efficiency; technological readiness; business sophistication; and innovation. Together, these variables affect how competitive a country is in the global economy.

Investments in technical/engineering education can strengthen competitiveness by affecting a number of these indicators: the number of scientists, engineers and patents; the local availability of specialized research and training services; the quality of scientific research institutions; university and industry research collaboration; staff training; and the capacity for innovation. Improved competitiveness in turn contributes to building an economic environment conducive to growth and productivity.

Source: OECD (2008), Schwab (2010)

Higher education in India

1.9 Higher education in India refers to tertiary-level education, and includes diploma courses offered to students upon completion of Grade 10 as well as diploma and degree courses offered to students upon completion of Grade 12. In India, technical education is offered as part of higher education, and comes under the overview of the Ministry of Human Resources Development.3

1.10 In the Indian context, the term technical education covers a range of fields: engineering, technology, management, architecture, town planning, pharmacy, applied arts and crafts, hotel management, and catering technology (MHRD, 2011). Individual technical

3 In contrast, apprenticeship training is referred to as technical/vocational training and the primary responsibility for this lies with the Ministry of Labor.

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education institutions typically offer only a selection of the fields mentioned above, with many specializing in the provision of just one field, such as the Indian Institutes of Management across the country.

Regulation, provision and financing

1.11 Education at all levels belongs to the Concurrent List of the Constitution of India, which means that both the central government and state governments can undertake legislation in education. Additionally, the central government determines standards for higher educational institutions, while states can incorporate, regulate and close down such institutions. The Central Advisory Board of Education coordinates between the Center and the States. Higher education in India is regulated by multiple authorities. The University Grants Commission regulates universities and colleges teaching general subjects, such as physics and history. It has the power to determine and maintain standards and disburse grants. Technical education is regulated by the All India Council for Technical Education.

1.12 The technical education system in the country can be broadly classified into three categories: Central Government funded institutions, State Government/State Government-funded institutions and self-financed (or private) institutions.4 In 2004-05, there were 38 centrally funded institutes in the country, and by 2010-11, there were 79 (MHRD, 2005; MHRD, 2011). Based upon the certification they provide, the providers of technical education in India are sub-classified into universities, colleges/institutes affiliated to universities, and polytechnics.

1.13 Universities or colleges/institutes affiliated to a university offer degree programs, while polytechnics (not affiliated with a university) offer diplomas. Degrees and diplomas can be offered at the undergraduate or postgraduate level. For instance, a student who has completed a four-year Bachelors course in Electrical Engineering at the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, will receive a Bachelors Degree in Electrical Engineering. A student who has completed a two or three year program in Electrical Engineering at the Shillong Polytechnic will receive a Diploma in Electrical Engineering. A diploma after a two or three-year course from a polytechnic is a below-degree level qualification for technicians (MHRD, 2011).

1.14 There is a clear status distinction between the diploma and degree in undergraduate institutions, a distinction recognized in the labor market and institutes of higher study. The distinction arises because of the easier entrance conditions for diploma programs. This creates a two-track system, with better-performing students enrolling in degree programs and worse-performing students and Class 12 drop-outs in diploma programs. The status distinction between degree and diploma is blurred at the post-graduate level, with some of the top institutes such as the Indian Institutes of Management providing diplomas and not degrees.

4 State government institutes are those that are both financed and managed by the state. State government financed institutes are those that are financed by the state, but managed by the private sector.

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1.15 Technical education is provided both by the public sector and the private sector. Until the mid-1990s, the public sector was the main provider, partly due to the dominance of the sector in the economy prior to the structural reforms of 1990-91, and partly for equity reasons. At present, private sector provision outstrips the government, with over 85 percent of institutions being private. In 2002, 78 percent of all engineering and technology colleges were private (Tilak, 2003). In 2006, the percentage had increased to 85 percent, and in 2007, to nearly 95 per cent (Carnoy and all, 2010).

1.16 Private participation, however, is heavily regulated and allowed only on a not-for-profit basis in order to ensure access and affordability. Specifically, there are restrictions on the number of (student) seats in an institute that are “payment” seats, or seats from which the institution can recover costs through fees, with the remaining seats required to be free.5 Even fees for “payment” seats are regulated by state-level committees or the University Grants Commission, depending on the type of institution.6

Figure 1. Grant-in-aid received by All India Council of Technical Education

Source: PPAR data from All India Council of Technical Education

5 This has not prevented many private institutions from charging students high fees. Legislation to counter the exploitative practices of certain private providers, the Prohibition of Unfair Practices in Technical Educational Institutions, Medical Educational Institutions and Universities Bill, 2010, seeks to penalize unfair practices of private educational institutions. These include charging capitation fees, not giving receipts for payments made, and publishing false or misleading advertisements. (Capitation fees are general fees charged by educational institutes that are in addition to tuition fees).

6 In the case of institutions imparting technical education and in affiliated colleges (operating on a no-grant-in-aid basis), the fees are regulated by state-level committees (MHRD, 1997). In the case of deemed and deemed-to-be universities, they are regulated by the government or the University Grants Commission (UGC, 2010).

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1.17 Approximately 0.03 percent of India’s GDP is spent on technical education (NKC, 2009).7 Most of this amount is spent on salaries and pensions, rents, electricity, telephones and examinations. This leaves very little for improvement in learning resources. Figure 1 graphs the pattern of funds received by the All India Council for Technical Education, the apex body meant for regulating technical education in India. The funding received by the Council has doubled since the early 2000s, with the spikes coinciding with periods of expansion of National Institutes of Technology.

Enrollment and quality of graduates

1.18 Enrollment in higher education institutions in India has increased over the past decade, but most of this increase comes from enrollment in general education courses, where enrollment increased from 7.1 million persons in 2001-02 to 9.2 million persons in 2007-08 (Table 2). Enrollment in professional education courses has also increased over the period, but relative to general education, its magnitude is low. Within professional education courses, enrollment in engineering/technical education and polytechnics has been the highest throughout the period, increasing by nearly 60 percent between 2001-02 and 2007-08.8 In relation to the total, the share of enrollment in professional and technical education has increased, while the relative share of general education has decreased over this period.

Table 2. Student Enrollment in Higher Education Institutes in India (public and private)

General Education (million)

Professional Education (million)

Technical Education (million)

2001-02 7.1 1.5 0.9

2007-08 9.2 2.9 1.5

Source: GOI (2010a) . Note: General education refers to subjects in the sciences, social sciences and humanities. Technical education is a part of professional education, the latter including other areas such as medical sciences and law.

1.19 Table 3 shows the number of institutions offering degrees and diplomas in the different branches of technical education, and student intake in each branch as of 2011. Engineering and technology are offered by the largest number of institutes and enroll the largest number of students. Technical institutes offering engineering and technology typically offer programs in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and civil engineering. In addition, there are a range of other types of engineering, such as chemical engineering, marine engineering, information technology, computer engineering and so forth, and individual institutions can determine which programs to offer.

7 Higher education institutions in India are, on the whole, poorly financed. Only 0.7 percent of India’s GDP is spent on higher education, which is lower than countries such as the United States (2.9 percent), United Kingdom (1.3 percent) and China (1.5 percent). The National Knowledge Commission, an advisory body to GOI, recommends that government funding should be 1.5 percent of GDP by 2012 (NKC, 2009).

8 These figures do not include enrollment in open and distance education.

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Table 3. Number of Institutes and Enrollment in Technical Education (2011)

Degree (number of institutes)

Degree (Enrollment of

students)

Diploma (number of institutes)

Diploma (Enrollment of

students)

Engineering and technology

2,686 1,050,604 1,860 550,654

Architecture 94 3,201 not available not available

Masters in Chartered Accounting

1,032 70,512 not available not available

Hotel management 69 3,585 60 3,500

Pharmacy 944 60,718 292 18,365

Applied arts and crafts 10 575 2 380

Masters in Business Administration

1,418

132,190 not available not available

Source: 2011 Annual Report, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India

1.20 Engineering/technical education institutions and polytechnics cover institutions across the quality spectrum, not all of which produce graduates who are absorbed promptly by the labor market. The most recent National Sample Survey, conducted in 2007-08, shows that among youth (15-29 years) in India, those with a below-graduate level diploma or certificate and a graduate-level diploma or certificate had the highest rate of unemployment in both rural and urban areas (Figure 2). Individuals with a post-graduate diploma or degree had a relatively lower level of unemployment.

Figure 2. All-India Unemployment Rate for Persons aged 15 years and Above (2007-08)

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1.21 Such unemployment likely results from a combination of supply-side and demand-side factors. Among the former, some part of the unemployment is likely explained by the fact that individuals who acquire post-secondary education in India typically come from

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socio-economic backgrounds that can absorb the unemployment of a recent graduate without financial hardship, allowing the graduate greater (job) search time. For such individuals, it makes sense to wait, since more education, on average, is rewarded with higher wages (Figure 3).

1.22 Yet, at least some part of the unemployment (and the long job search process) is likely explained by the lack of employability of many of the students graduating from technical education institutes in India. A recent study, based on an employer survey, found that skill shortages remain one of the major constraints to continued growth of the Indian economy (Blom and Saeki, 2011). Only 36 percent of employers hiring fresh engineering graduates are satisfied with the quality of the new hires. Of the skills gaps identified, employers perceived soft skills (core employability and communication skills) to be the most important.

Figure 3. All-India Average Daily Wage Rate for Persons aged 15 years and Above (2007-08)

Source: National Sample Survey Organization, 2010.

1.23 Low employability of graduates remains an important concern articulated in several policy documents in the early 2000s as well as recent ones, including the most recent 11th Five Year Plan. In order to address this, Government of India’s National Skills Development Mission established the National Skills Development Corporation, a Public Private Partnership, in 2008.9 The Corporation’s mandate is to meet the growing need for skilled manpower across sectors, ranging from the highly organized Infotech sector to the unorganized sector.

9 NSDC came into existence towards the end of TEQIP I and after Technician Education III. Hence, it was not associated with either project.

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Challenges in the technical education system in India

1.24 The technical education system in India is characterized by the following core challenges: (1) overcentralization and lack of autonomy and accountability of institutions; (2) resource constraints and wastage; (3) poor quality and relevance with weak quality assurance mechanisms; (4) faculty shortages and low quality; (5) poor technology and infrastructure support; and (6) limited access and regional disparity (World Bank, 2000b).

1.25 In the Indian tertiary education system, autonomy is granted in each of the following areas: academic, administrative, financial and managerial autonomy, with full academic autonomy typically being the most difficult to achieve since it allows institutes to hire and fire teachers, and conduct admissions and examinations based on their own judgment within broad guidelines.

1.26 The themes of autonomy and accountability, which feed into many of the other challenges, form the cornerstone of several key policy documents of the Government of India as well. These include the National Policy on Education (1986 and 1992), and Government of India’s Central Advisory Board of Education report on Autonomy of Higher Education

Institutions (2005).10

1.27 The lack of autonomy in decision-making on academic, managerial, financial and administrative matters means that institutions have limited authority in determining the goals and priorities of their institutes, selecting leaders, faculty appointments, student admissions, the structure and content of programs, financial management and student evaluation methodology. This seriously compromises their ability to respond to the changing needs of the economy, undertake innovation, or be at the cutting edge of their field.

1.28 Providing institutions autonomy has, however, proved challenging for a number of reasons. At the core is the problem of accountability.11 Autonomous institutions, in theory, can decide on faculty appointments, curriculum and evaluation on their own. However, absent mechanisms within the institution, as well as governmental or third-party mechanisms to ensure accountability, the risk of quality dilution in the institute’s core functions is high. The proliferation of “diploma mills” in India, which issue certificates with little value in the job market, is testimony to the problem of accountability (Kapur and Mehta, 2004).

10 The Central Advisory Board of Education report notes, “Autonomy of Higher Education Institutions is a pre-requisite for enabling them to achieve their goals and objectives. An honest exercise of autonomy — academic, administrative and financial — will lead to making these Institutions as centers of innovation, excellence and development. With this in view the Universities need to be insulated from internal and external pressures of all kinds, may be bureaucratic, political and other groups.”

11 Recently, two legislative bills have been floated in the Indian Parliament to address issues related to quality and accountability in higher education institutions. The National Accreditation Regulatory Authority for Higher Educational Institutions Bill, 2010, seeks to set up a mechanism to accredit all higher educational institutions. This would ensure that students have access to information about the quality of an educational institution and each course offered by them. The Educational Tribunals Bill, 2010 seeks to set up national and state level tribunals. Disputes related to higher educational institutions and students or the faculty of institutions and statutory authorities shall be adjudicated by these tribunals.

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1.29 A related set of issues arises from bureaucratic and political interference. Universities and other tertiary institutes provide (illicit) financial gains to government officials and politicians, including those arising from the sale of faculty and staff posts, accreditation, permissions, construction work, and the purchase of equipment.12 The promise of easy financial gains from controlling universities has led to a situation where being granted autonomy, in practice, does not exempt the institution from overt and latent controls outside the institution. These infringe upon its autonomy (Kapur and Mehta, 2004; Saint and others, 2009). An example is the presence of government officials or politicians on the Board of Governors of autonomous institutes. To the extent government officials or politicians have the power to appoint faculty deans, heads of department and other people in positions of power and influence, the autonomy of the institute and its ability to undertake quality-enhancing changes is likely compromised. 1.30 Since the 1990s, the World Bank has been supporting technical education projects in India. The first of these was the Electronics Industry Development Project, jointly financed with the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation during 1990-1996, supporting 14 engineering colleges and 12 polytechnics. Concurrently, the Bank co-financed with the Government of India two technical education projects from 1990 to 1999, Technician Education Project I and II. The two projects involved upgrading and strengthening over 530 polytechnics in 19 states and union territories using IDA credits totaling approximately USD 500 million. Technician Education III was the final part of the Technician Education Project. TEQIP I became effective two years after Technician Education III. 1.31 The remainder of this report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 assesses Technician Education III, while Chapter 3 assesses TEQIP I. Chapter 4 concludes, drawing lessons from experience and summarizing follow-on projects. 1.32 It should be noted that the assessment contained in this PPAR cannot rule out the influence of other factors that may have influenced project performance, education, and labor force outcomes. Of these, two factors are worth considering. First, the general trend in economic growth over the period may have encouraged many of the improvements, regardless of the project. The absence of a suitable counterfactual prevents us from ruling this out.13 Second, the association of the Projects with the World Bank may have enhanced the reputation of institutes, independently of qualitative improvements, thereby allowing them to attract better performing students than previously. The ability of project institutes to attract better students was mentioned repeatedly in interviews with faculty at the institutions. The achievement on indicators such as reduced dropout rates and superior employment rates may well reflect superior selection of students and not project performance.

12 As an example, a senior official of the All India Council of Technical Education was arrested in 2009 under the Prevention of Corruption Act for allegedly demanding money for an accreditation-related case involving processing the case of increase in intake of seats of an engineering college.

13 Given high variation on several socio-economic indicators across states, no state in India provides a meaningful comparison group for another.

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2. Third Technician Education Project

Project Objectives and Design

2.1 The Project Development Objective of the Third Technician Education Project is to “assist the industrially and economically underdeveloped and geographically remote states of the northeastern region (Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura), Jammu & Kashmir, and the Union Territory (UT) of Andaman & Nicobar Islands to expand capacity and improve the quality and efficiency of technician (polytechnic) education to meet the specific economic needs of each state. The Project will also aim at increasing access of some disadvantaged sections of society (women, STs and rural youth) to technician education and training” (Project Appraisal Document (PAD), p. 2). The wording in the Development Credit Agreement is identical. All twelve existing polytechnics in these regions were supported, and nine new ones were built.

2.2 Technician Education III was approved in September 2000 and became effective in January 2001. It closed on June 30, 2007. Technician Education III had similar overall goals to the previous two Technician Education Projects in terms of upgrading and strengthening technical/vocational education in India, and drew key lessons from them on addressing implementation challenges.14 While Technician Education III resembled its predecessors in its emphasis on technical/vocational education, unlike them, it focused on states characterized by either geographic remoteness or conflict/insurgency history or both: Jammu & Kashmir; Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Sikkim and five northeastern states; Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh. This made Technician Education III unique relative to other externally-funded education Projects in India.

2.3 Technician Education III regions face the contradiction of being blessed with plentiful natural resources and a labor force with high average literacy levels, yet blighted by low rates of economic productivity, inadequate technical skills, high youth unemployment and poverty. The combination of difficult terrain, low population densities, border problems, and conflict/insurgency history has discouraged industry from setting base in these regions. As a result, the economy in these regions is primarily government driven, with the government being the most extensive and sought-after employer.

2.4 The rationale for Technician Education III lies in the identification of the lack of competent technical manpower — and the opportunity to become competent in technical skills — as a key impediment in improving the economic productivity of the Project states/UT. The lack of such manpower limits the potential to create profitable and productive economic undertakings locally and also discourages industry from entering these regions.

14 The lessons included the following: (1) building early consensus on project scope and components through micro-planning at the polytechnic level. This helped build stakeholder participation and accelerated project progress; (2) effective central coordination, recognition of good performance of states through allocation of additional funds, and sharing the problems and possible solutions through workshops with all states encouraged superior performance; and (3) over-centralization of procurement in the earlier two technician education projects had cause major delays. In Technician Education III, consultation with the project states led to a decentralized mechanism for procurement being incorporated into the project design.

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The absence of opportunities to acquire skills relevant to the local economy has created a situation where youth are literally “on the streets,” frequently engaged in economically unproductive situations, including insurgency/separatist movements. While the Government of India has supported several schemes for the economic and industrial development of the Northeast states, with a special Ministry devoted exclusively to the development of the Northeast region, the success of these investments will depend greatly on the availability of quality technical manpower in adequate numbers.

2.5 Table 4 describes the Project’s components and activities. The first component, capacity development/expansion involved building infrastructure to provide increased access to technician education. By strengthening existing polytechnics, building new ones in underserved areas, providing short term courses to the local community, and building hostel facilities to ensure students from geographically remote areas could benefit, the component was comprehensive.

2.6 The second component, quality enhancement, aimed at improving quality primarily by providing students with modern equipment, better teaching and updated curricula reflecting labor market needs. The updated curricula were supposed to reflect labor market needs, and develop technical skills accordingly. The third component, efficiency improvement, aimed at improving efficiency by training administrative units dealing with technician education; upgrading computer-based Project and financial management systems; providing substantial autonomy (with accountability) to Project polytechnics; and networking of polytechnics with other institutions and organizations. This was expected to allow the technician education system in Project regions to develop an administrative structure conducive to achieving the project goals in a sustainable manner.

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Table 4. Third Technician Education Project

Components (IDA amount at appraisal in parenthesis)

1. Capacity development/expansion (USD 48.18 million)

2. Quality improvement (USD 22.85 million)

3. Efficiency improvement (USD 9.05 million)

Activities Establishing six new co-educational polytechnics and a skill development center Strengthening 12 existing polytechnics and introducing new programs Introducing continuing education and non-formal training programs for industry and community Providing student and faculty housing facilities

Modernizing existing laboratories and workshops Developing/revising curricula to meet labor market needs as well as imparting entrepreneurial skills Improving staffing and imparting training Increasing utilization of learning resources and media Promoting interaction with industry and community

Establishing/strengthening state boards and other support units dealing with technician education Conducting research studies for systemic reforms Instituting computer-based project and financial management systems Providing substantial autonomy with accountability Networking of polytechnics and other institutions Enhancing state-level policy support for technician education

Source: ICR, PAD

2.7 None of the components were revised during the Project period. However, at the mid-term review, the Government of India and the Bank assessed that cost savings allowed the financing of three new polytechnics, thereby increasing enrollment capacity.

FINANCING

2.8 The Project’s cost at appraisal was USD 80.1 million. Of this, USD 64.9 million was expected to be financed through a credit from the International Development Association (IDA) as a Specific Investment Loan and the Government of India was expected to finance USD 15.2 million.

PROJECT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

2.9 The Government of India implemented the Project along with seven states and one union territory. Technician Education III was a multi-state Project in the state sector with coordination and guidance provided by the Department of Higher Education in the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) of the Government of India. The existing National Project Directorate, established by MHRD for the implementation of the completed Technician Education Projects had overall responsibility for coordinating the implementation

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of the Project through the Project states. The National Project Directorate was assisted by the National Project Implementation Unit (NPIU) established in the Educational Consultants India Ltd. The NPIU worked closely with the State Project Implementation Units (SPIUs) established in each of the Project states. It provided them with guidance on implementation and with technical advice on academic matters.

2.10 At the state level, the state secretaries of education, assisted by the State Directors of Technical and Higher Education, were responsible for facilitating Project implementation. The polytechnic principals were responsible for Project implementation at the institutional level. The primary responsibility for monitoring the Project rested with the SPIUs, NPIU and on a broader basis, with the Government of India and the World Bank. To enable effective monitoring, each of the institutions was expected to prepare progress reports on a Project Management Information System developed by the NPIU.

Implementation

2.11 Project Cost: At closing, the total Project Cost amounted to USD 83.4 million. The Bank had financed USD 71 million through IDA and the Government of India had financed USD 12.4 million. The credit disbursed fully. Table 5 presents the expected and actual costs of the Project, the appraisal and actual financing from IDA and the expected and actual financing from the Government of India. There was no real increase in the cost of the Project, and the increase in their nominal amount reflects the depreciation of the Indian Rupee (INR) relative to the Special Drawing Right (SDR).

2.12 Implementation Experience: The PAD expected the Project to open six new polytechnics. At project closing, nine new polytechnics had been opened. The Project had to be extended by a year from its original date of June 30, 2006 to June 30, 2007 for four main reasons. First, many of the states had never implemented an externally funded Project before, and possessed limited institutional capacity to undertake many of the procurement and financial management related tasks straight away. Second, many of the sites were remote and connected poorly by road, rail and air. This made it difficult not only to identify qualified contractors, but also transport equipment and supplies to the sites. Third, natural calamities in three of the Project sites – the 2004 tsunami in Andaman & Nicobar islands, heavy snowfall and the earthquake in Jammu and Kashmir, and severe landslides in Nagaland – delayed the Project. Finally, the decision to design, contract, construct and equip three new polytechnics required additional time.

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Table 5. Appraisal and Actual Costs of Project Components in Technician Education III

Components Appraisal Cost (US$ millions)

Actual Cost (US$ millions)

Implementation Ratio (B)/(A)

1. Capacity Development/Expansion

48.18 48.49 1.01

2. Quality Enhancement 22.85 21.55 0.94

3. Efficiency Improvement 9.05 13.37 1.48

IDA 64.9 71.0 1.09

Government of India 15.2 12.4 0.81

Total 80.1 83.4 1.04

Source: PAD and ICR.

2.13 Procurement: SPIUs were assigned the responsibility of procurement in order to increase coordination with approving state authorities and speed up the release of funds. Overall, adherence to procurement guidelines for local procurement was weak, as was oversight of the local procurement process. The Project was not subject to regular post-procurement reviews, with the first being conducted only in 2006, over five years after the Project became effective, and shortly before it closed. The findings from this review (discussed below) were available too late in the Project cycle for recommendations to be incorporated for future procurement within the Project.

2.14 The detailed post-review of procurement contracts signed between April 1, 2005 and March 31, 2006 for all states found deviations from guidelines in every state/UT. The post-review examined 99 contracts out of 407 for the year, and found deviations from guidelines in 53 of them. Of these approximately a third had significant deviations. The deviations included: the use of state procedures instead of Bank procedures; splitting up of single contracts into multiple contracts to avoid using national competitive bidding; insufficient documentation of quotes under shopping; inappropriate quality of the quotation (incomplete information on the address, telephone number and sales tax registration numbers of the bidders); and insufficient adherence to bidding dates and bid opening procedures. For instance, in Sikkim, procurement of furniture had taken place under direct contract instead of national competitive bidding. In some cases, no bids were invited for procurement and contracts were awarded on the basis of an earlier contract being awarded to the same vendor. The review also notes lack of transparency. In Tripura, quotations were compared without adjusting for sales tax, as a result of which the contract was not awarded to the lowest bidder. Further contracts were awarded without receipt of a minimum of three quotations. In Meghalaya, the building for the State Bureau of Technical Education was not being used for its appropriate purpose until the Project had nearly closed. In Mizoram and Nagaland, equipment was lying unused. A review of deviations identified by the ex-post review by the Bank’s TTL suggested that a number of contracts noted as having significant deviations involved deviations due to confusion over differences in Government of India guidelines and World Bank guidelines. There was no case of misprocurement.

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2.15 Although staff from both the NPIU and SPIU had taken the procurement courses provided by the Bank, and the Bank team visited SPIUs and Project institutions, reviewing procurement processes and the usage of procured items, oversight could have been greater, given the decentralized nature of procurement and the lack of prior experience in the states/UT on working with the Bank. The audit team conducting the post review of contracts for 2005-06 emphasized the need for Project officials, especially at the state level, being conversant with World Bank procurement guidelines by reviewing the standard bidding documents to be used and threshold limits for performing various types of procurements. The audit report also suggests that the NPIU’s training of the SPIU on procurement guidelines was insufficient. Further, it was important that other agencies involved in the procurement process, such as the Public Works Department, also be aware of the Bank specified procurement guidelines.

2.16 Financial Management: Financial management was a challenging task, given that Project states and institutions had very little experience with externally-financed Projects. Despite this, oversight was primarily done through desk reviews of documents, and typically did not include field visits or interactions with Project states or institutions. As a result, financial management relating to internal controls, staffing, and effective and timely utilization of funds was inadequate. Moreover, while audits were carried out regularly, many states frequently submitted audit reports late. Government of India was also not prompt in its response on audit disallowances.

2.17 At the time of the PPAR mission in May 2011, the NPIU was working with institutions and states to help them clear objections raised by the Comptroller Auditor General’s office. Audit objections noted for Andaman & Nicobar Islands had been resolved, while those for Sikkim, Tripura and Jammu & Kashmir were being resolved. In August 2011, the Government of India refunded the International Development Association USD 748,796 for ineligible expenditures.

2.18 Safeguards: The Project was classified as category C for environmental purposes and safeguards for indigenous people, OD 4.20 (current OP 4.10), was triggered for the Project. It should also be noted that in the case of the Northeastern states, the majority population is tribal. Although the ICR notes that the Project undertook an extensive social assessment, including interviews with several NGOs, local people in the communities and opinion leaders, some faculty from non-Project institutes and political leaders in Meghalaya, suggested to IEG that the assessment may not have been sufficiently comprehensive.

Relevance of Project Objectives and Design

RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVES

2.19 The relevance of the development objective is rated High. It is worded clearly and concisely, was relevant at the time of Project conception and continues to be relevant today.

2.20 Over the past 20 years, there has been a steady rise in the number of students completing Class 10 and Class 12 in the Project states and UT (and all over India) due to an increasing number of students completing primary and secondary education. Many of these

17

students perform well in exit exams in Class 10 and Class 12. Those who clear the Class 10 exam with marks above a cut-off are able to enter senior secondary school, and those who clear the Class 12 exam with marks above a cut-off are eligible to enter degree colleges. Many students, however, do not make the cut-off, and having acquired a Class 10 or 12 degree, status considerations make them reluctant from taking available low-skill jobs requiring less education. Employing such youth productively is important both from an economic perspective as well as a social perspective given the high rates of youth unemployment and insurgency activities in many of the Project states. This calls for a mechanism to transfers skills to youth who may not be academically inclined, but nevertheless capable of undertaking skilled work.

2.21 A related problem in the Project states/UT is the lack of industry. As discussed previously, industry from other parts of the country have not been able to make successful inroads into these regions for a variety of reasons, including the fact that this is border territory; there are land ownership problems for outsiders; and a dearth of technically skilled manpower. Against this backdrop, the Project aimed to introduce technical education programs in areas where employment was likely to grow, assuming states/UT created the environment to promote overall economic growth in these industrially underdeveloped states/UT.

2.22 The demand for high quality technical manpower and for vocational education has been articulated in the 9th Five Year Plan (1997-2002), 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) and 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012). The need for technical and vocational education is also emphasized in the National Policy on Education 1986 and 1992; the National Policy Initiative for Technician Education 1998; and the Information Technology Policy 2000. Prior to Technician Education III, Project states/UT had a poor infrastructure for providing technical/vocational education to such youth. Further, many of the programs on offer were standardized packages expected of technical education, such as electrical engineering and not specific to the economic needs of the Project states/UT. By aiming to upgrade existing polytechnics, update the programs on offer, and build new polytechnics in underserved regions, the PDO catered directly to key needs for developing these regions and spoke to several important policy documents at the time of Project conception as well as today.

2.23 More recently, the Northeast Commission’s strategy document, Northeast Vision 2020, highlights the need to expand opportunities in technical education in an equitable manner. This is also being emphasized by the newly-formed National Skills Development Corporation, a public-private partnership, which has already undertaken a program in the Northeast. Finally, recent initiatives in industry, such as those undertaken by the Confederation of Indian Industry, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the National Association of Software and Services Companies emphasize an overall all-India need for workers who are better skilled for practical tasks. The availability of high quality technical/vocational institutes is increasingly being seen as the need of the hour.

2.24 The India Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 2001 and 2005 also emphasized that the bottlenecks constraining growth in India included a shortage of appropriately skilled and trained personnel. Given this, its emphasis was on promoting policy and institutional reforms in the area of technical education that included both public and private institutions in

18

order to improve the quality of India’s pool of technical manpower. This is consistent with the Education Strategy of 1999 as well. The most recent CAS (2009-2012) also lays emphasis on supporting India’s technical and vocational education system.

RELEVANCE OF DESIGN

2.25 The relevance of the Project design is rated as Substantial. The Project objective was ambitious and the Project design comprehensive. Overall, it laid out a convincing causal framework between project activities and intended outcomes. Project components were designed to address the problem of low technical manpower and poor economic development in Project states/UT. The problem had magnified because of limited opportunities for students to acquire labor-market relevant skills. It also considered external factors that could impact Project outcomes, such as the law and order problem in Project sites/UT. There is, however, ambiguity in the design on how the needs of industry would be met. While the PAD (p. 7) states that Project polytechnics will serve the needs of small and medium-scale industries and various government departments, it is not clear whether Project components were meant to increase the supply of technically skilled workers in order to attract industry that would employ the graduates, or provide skills that graduates would use to start their own micro-enterprises, or both.

Achievement of the Objectives

EXPANDING THE CAPACITY OF TECHNICIAN (POLYTECHNIC) EDUCATION

2.26 The achievement of this objective is rated as Substantial. The Project increased access to technical education in multiple ways and exceeded targets as discussed below. Table 6 shows the improvement in these metrics between baseline and endline. One of the major contributions of the Project was to strengthen the infrastructure in all the 12 existing polytechnics and to build new ones. Initially, 6 new polytechnics (one each in Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland and 2 each in Meghalaya and Sikkim) had been planned and approved. Subsequently, at the mid-term review 3 more polytechnics (2 in Jammu & Kashmir and 1 in Tripura) were added upon request. The 9 new polytechnics made access to technician education easier for the local population, especially those located in the more backward parts of the targeted states/UT.

19

Table 6. Expanding the Capacity of Technician Education in Project states/UT

Baseline Level

Target Actual Level

% change over baseline

% of target achieved

Number of new polytechnics n.a 3 6 n.a 200

Number of new programs n.a. 52 60 n.a 115

Student enrollment 1,623 7,728 8,233 407 107

Additional enrollment capacity created n.a. 4,505 5,503 n.a. 122

Percentage of student seats filled (utilization rate)

58 95 84 45 89

Number of hostel places for male students

- 1,273 1,065 - 83.7

Number of hostel places for female students

n.a. 1,257 1,252 n.a. 99.6

Source: Project data

2.27 In addition, the Project increased capacity in four other ways: it increased the number of new programs; it increased the number of hostel places for students and faculty residences; it built skill development centers; and it increased/improved available learning equipment in existing polytechnics.

2.28 The new programs (Table 7) are in areas where demand is expected to grow over the next decade as identified by the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector’s report on employment in India, and the Northeast Commission’s vision document for the coming decade (NCEUS, 2009; NEC, 2010). The new programs included both regular three year diploma programs, as well as short duration certificate programs of less than a year. The diploma programs offered were not just more of the same; they included many potentially labor market-relevant programs such as automobile engineering, costume design and garment technology. The short duration courses included certificate courses in electric wiring (3 months at Shillong Polytechnic) and computer typing (1 month at Shillong Polytechnic). Ambedkar Polytechnic also provides apprenticeship training to students who have dropped out from school in areas such as electrical wiring and automobile repair. From the perspective of the polytechnic, they got free manpower. From the perspective of students, they were trained with skills that increase their employability free of cost.

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Table 7. New Programs Offered in Project States/UT

Arunchal Pradesh

Electrical and Electronic Engineering; Automobile Engineering; Information Technology; Costume Design and Garment Technology; Travel, Tourism and Hotel Management; Herbal Remedies and Cosmetology

Meghalaya Computer Appliances; Food Processing Technology and Preservation; Medical Electronics; Information Technology; Computer Science and Engineering; Architecture Assistantship; Costume Design and Garment Technology; Automobile Engineering

Nagaland Information Technology; Electronics and Computer Maintenance Engineering; Telecommunications Engineering; Automobile Engineering; Computer Applications; Fashion Technology

Sikkim Electronics and Hardware Maintenance; Computer Science and Technology; Telecommunications Technology; Electrical and Electronics Engineering; Computer Applications; Mechanical Engineering; Manufacturing Technology; Tool and Die-making; Mechatronics

Tripura Modern Office Management and Practice; Computer Science; Food Processing Technology; Automobile Engineering; Interior Decoration, Handicrafts and Furniture Design; Information Technology; Fashion Technology; Medical Laboratories Technology

Mizoram Computer Science and Engineering; Garment Technology; Beauty Culture and Cosmetology

Jammu & Kashmir

Textile Design; Medical Laboratories Technology; Food Technology; Travel and Tourism; Instrumentation and Controls; Wood Technology; Leather Technology; Computer Engineering; Electrical Engineering; Information Technology; Computer Engineering; Civil Engineering; Travel and Tourism

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

Hotel Management and Catering Technology; Information Technology; Marine Engineering; Deck Cadet

Source: PAD and ICR

2.29 The availability of hostel places meant that students from the more remote parts of each state could attend the polytechnics. Audit reports suggest that the hostels were being used, and had played an important role in attracting students.

2.30 Skill development centers also played an important role in expanding the capacity of technician education, especially to lesser-educated members of the community, including school dropouts. These centers are typically located in rural areas and provide short term courses. For instance, Ambedkar Polytechnic operates skill development centers in remote parts of the islands: Car Nicobar, Ferrargunj, Mayabunder, Campbell Bay, Hutbay and Katchal. The centers offer programs such as certificate courses in tailoring and computer applications.

21

2.31 The sum total of these factors resulted in more students having access to technical education. Importantly, access translated into enrollment. This was made possible by media communications undertaken by the polytechnics, including regular advertisements in newspapers. Since all construction and procurement work came from the Project, any change between baseline and endline is likely attributable to the Project.

2.32 Finally, as Figure 4 shows, enrollment in the polytechnics increased over the Project period. The increase is particularly noteworthy when compared to the increase in enrollment in non-project states are shown in Figure 5. Interviews suggest the increase in enrollment was driven by the Project, which not only expanded the number of programs and seats available to students, but improved the reputation of existing polytechnics and attracted higher performing students to them. In the case of both Ambedkar Polytechnic in Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Shillong Polytechnic in Meghalaya, more students apply than can be admitted. For instance, for approximately 180 places, Shillong Polytechnic receives approximately 1,500-1,600 applications per year.

2.33 Yet, the achievement on the indicators discussed in Table 6 and Figures 4-5 are not sufficient to ensure Project success and sustainability of outcomes. Building a polytechnic and creating an institution is not the same thing, and in the case of the new polytechnics, the Project faced difficulties in addressing core factors associated with creating an institution. These include hiring well-qualified faculty, versus contract staff with inadequate qualifications, and ensuring the diplomas issued by the polytechnic are recognized. The problem with hiring well-qualified faculty for Project polytechnics, especially the new polytechnics, is that many were situated in highly underserved parts of the state. This is important from an equity perspective, but it does not diminish the problem of attracting and retaining high-quality faculty, since they are more likely to seek work in urban areas. In general, there are no financial or professional incentives for working in rural educational institutes in India. This is important to note, even though it was beyond the scope of the project to suggest revisions in pay scales to favor rural postings, since such decisions need to be taken at the state-level for all government employees and not just those working in the polytechnics.

2.34 At the time of the PPAR mission, the two new polytechnics in Meghalaya, Jowai and Tura, were at risk of closure. The exact reason is not clear. Newspaper reports cite widespread discontent among students in the two polytechnics at the state government’s apathy toward them. Interviews with the state government suggest that the two polytechnics had been performing poorly in terms of student placement records, and that teachers had been striking and asking for regularization of their contracts. Although the two polytechnics are continuing to operate at the present time, the strikes held in the previous academic year reflect discontent among students and teachers, and problems in the manner in which the polytechnics are operating.

22

Figure 4. Increase in Enrollment in Project States/UT


Figure 5. Increase in Enrollment in Project States/UT Relative to all-India and non-Project Northeast States

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF TECHNICIAN (POLYTECHNIC) EDUCATION

2.35 The achievement of this objective is rated as Substantial. The results chain is depicted in Table 8. The Project aimed to improve the quality of technician education

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2003 2004 2005 2007

Stu

den

ts e

nro

lled

(In

dex 2

002/0

3=

100)

Assam

Manipur

Andaman and Nicobar

Arunachal Pradesh

Jammu & Kashmir

Meghalaya

Mizoram

Nagaland

Sikkim

Tripura

182

Project states/UT

355

Other NE states 102100

All India 91

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

2003 2004 2005 2007

Stu

dents

enro

lled

(Index

2002/0

3=

100)

23

through three types of activities: (1) improved resources, including hard equipment and laboratories, and soft equipment such as softwares and books; (2) improved curricula and programs, designed to reflect labor market needs; and (3) improved teaching.

Table 8. Results Chain for Improving the Quality of Technician Education and Meeting Specific Economic Needs of Project States/UT

Outcomes

Graduates with stable employment in jobs meeting economic needs of region

Employers satisfied with quality of graduates

Intermediate outcomes

Students opt to take courses in labor market relevant fields of study Training and placement offices operating effectively

Outputs New programs offered in labor market relevant areas of study

Number of faculty trained in new programs meeting economic needs

Training and placement offices created

Updated hardware and software

Inputs Spending on equipment, laboratories, faculty training, and curriculum redesign (government, private and World Bank)

Public policy and regulatory environment: polytechnics granted autonomy by state

Source: PAD

2.36 Technician Education III provided polytechnics the opportunity to upgrade laboratories and equipment, which in turn allowed them to pursue more labor market-relevant programs for students as well as consultancy Projects for faculty. Table 9 shows the achievement in terms of the number of laboratories upgraded, and the number of new laboratories established. For instance, Ambedkar Polytechnic had modernized its navigation laboratory and added a new seamanship laboratory and maritime laboratory. This allowed it to offer a cutting-edge Post Diploma course in Marine Engineering and Deck Cadet, both popular and highly remunerative courses. The laboratories have also allowed faculty to undertake consultancy projects, which in turn have helped with internal revenue generation.

24

Table 9. Improving the Quality of Technician Education in Project States/UT

Baseline Target Actual % change from

baseline % of target achieved

Number of labs and workshops modernized

122 127 143 17 113

Percent of existing and new teaching posts filled

- 90 89 - 99

Number of teachers trained - 549 560 - 102

Number of technical support staff trained

- 523 500 - 96


2.37 The data also suggest targets were met or almost met in staffing, and the training opportunities provided to teachers. The absence of baseline data makes it difficult to assess the extent of improvement during the Project cycle. In terms of staffing, most of the additional positions were filled by contract staff, which creates its own set of problems as such staff seek to be regularized. At the time of the PPAR mission, this was the problem facing the two new polytechnics in Meghalaya, Jowai, and Tura. A combination of student and teacher strikes was threatening to shut down both the polytechnics.

2.38 With regard to teacher training, the majority were conducted by the four National Institutes of Technical Teacher Training and Research and Nettur Technical Training Foundation. While training from these entities was satisfactory from an academic point of view, approximately three-quarters of over forty faculty interviewed during the PPAR mission felt the practical component in such training was low. Every teacher who had experienced industry-led/private sector training, as in Shillong Polytechnic and Ambedkar Polytechnic, spoke highly of it and found that it imparted many practical skills relative to that by the National Institutes of Technical Teacher Training and Research.

2.39 The Project also sought to introduce programs in the polytechnics with curriculum that was labor market relevant, ranging from programs in traditional technical education areas such as Computer Science and Engineering to less traditional ones such as garment technology (Table 6 and Table 7). Labor market relevance was sought to be achieved by aligning the course with findings from a needs assessment of skills prior to Project effectiveness, and by involving employers in course design, instruction and teacher training. The involvement of industry was constrained by the fact that none of the states is blessed with thriving industry driven by the private sector. The involvement of private sector employers in curriculum design, instruction and teacher training on a regular basis was, therefore, limited. Where possible, staff from government-run enterprises, such as the Chief Electrical Engineer in Port Blair, were regularly invited to give lectures and advise on curriculum. While some institutions, such as Ambedkar Polytechnic, had a compulsory industrial attachment training program for students as part of its diploma syllabus, the logistics of this proved difficult, since such training had to happen outside the island, in peninsular India. Subsequently the polytechnic started inviting locally-based employers, primarily from the government, to interact with students.

25

2.40 Project data suggest that in terms of offering labor market-relevant curricula, all the Project institutions achieved the quantitative target of the number of programs designed. For new curricula developed, once again, targets were achieved everywhere except in Sikkim, which achieved 83.3 percent of the target. While all the programs were in areas identified as important for economic growth in the northeastern region by the Northeast Commission, the ability of graduates from programs geared toward informal sector or private sector work, such as garment technology, food processing and preservation, to utilize their technical skills effectively, was limited by the lack of complementary skills. PPAR interviews suggest skills such as accounting, marketing and distribution were needed for graduates to make effective use of technical skills in these more informal sectors. For instance, programs such as food processing technology and preservation addressed economic needs of the project regions since there was a need to minimize wastage of fruit and vegetables that grow aplenty there. However, graduates did not possess complementary practical skills, such as accounting, customer service and marketing, important for being effective in private sector micro-enterprises, which dominate the food preservation sector in the Project states/UT. Even where students were readily absorbed, as from Ambedkar Polytechnic, employers felt they needed more training in behavioral skills to make them effective at work.

2.41 Project polytechnics were also encouraged to set up Training and Placement Offices to provide an organizational structure to help students get internships with employers, as well as employment after completing the program. While data were not available on how many polytechnics had set up placement cells over the course of the Project, both the institutes visited during the mission, Shillong Polytechnic and Ambedkar Polytechnic in Port Blair, had placement offices, which helped students prepare for interviews and build links with employers. In the case of the former, the placement office had only recently hired a full-time placement coordinator, whereas in the latter, the placement office had been operating effectively for several years. All the students interviewed in Ambedkar Polytechnic were confident of finding a job upon graduation with the help of the placement office. In Shillong Polytechnic, the majority of students wanted to go on for higher studies, suggesting they perceived their employment prospects as being bleak with only a diploma.

2.42 The ultimate test of the improved quality of programs comes from the employment record and history of students. Quantitative indicators at the time of Project closing indicate substantial success in employment of students, with 67 percent of graduates employed within one year of graduation, exceeding the target of 65 percent employment of graduates within one year of graduation. These numbers match those collected during supervision missions, as shown in Table 10. As the table shows, there was a consistent improvement in student employment rates over the course of the Project.

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Table 10. Average Pass-Out/Self-Employment Rate within One Year (Percent)

2001 2004 2006 2007

ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS 11 63 68 78

ARUNACHAL PRADESH - - - 46

JAMMU & KASHMIR 12 55 55 70

MEGHALAYA 60 63 64 64

MIZORAM 45 63 70 78

NAGALAND 46.5 50 50 70

SIKKIM - 89 87 88

TRIPURA 50 60 60 70

Average 37 63 65 70

Source: Project data.

2.43 Data gathered during the mission suggest variation in the extent to which the success has been sustained, with Ambedkar Polytechnic performing much better than Shillong Polytechnic, Jowai Polytechnic and Tura Polytechnic. Table 11 presents the employment history of graduates from Ambedkar Polytechnic over the past six years.

2.44 Discussions with the placement officer at Shillong Polytechnic revealed that only 5 percent of students from Shillong polytechnic, the most sought after polytechnic of the three in Meghalaya, were employed within the first 6 months, 37 percent within a year, and 74 percent thereafter15. Table 12 presents data for Jowai and Tura polytechnics collected from the government during the mission, which highlights a poor employment record.

Table 11. Student Employment Data: Ambedkar Polytechnic, Port Blair

Students graduated

Students employed

Students self

employed

Students in apprenticeship

Students in higher studies

Students Un-

employed

Placement percent

2005 114 66 - 7 40 8 89

2006 90 70 1 13 18 1 99

2007 132 104 2 24 15 12 91

2008 100 70 - 28 18 12 86

2009 126 70 3 16 38 15 83

2010 134 72 2 1 44 15 83

Source: PPAR Mission Data from Ambedkar Polytechnic

15 The time taken for employment post one year , that is, whether employment happened within 1.5 years or 5 years, was not available.

27

Table 12. Student Employment Data: Jowai and Tura Polytechnics (since 2008)

Jowai Polytechnic Total number of

graduates Number of graduates

employed Number of graduates in

higher studies

Computers 35 24 3

Food Processing and preservation

41 10 1

Medical electronics 41 14 2

Total 117 48 6

Tura Polytechnic

Architecture Assistantship

40 23 3

Automobile engineering

52 20 5

Costume design and garment technology

17 13 4

Total 109 56 12

Source: PPAR Mission Data from Department of Education, Government of Meghalaya

2.45 With no quantitative data on the duration of employment available, it is difficult to know whether the jobs were short-term temporary jobs or whether they were in relevant fields. Over 90 percent of faculty interviewed at the Polytechnic, as well as government officers and representatives from industry associations, said that if the job was not a government job, then it was likely short-term/temporary.

IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF TECHNICIAN (POLYTECHNIC) EDUCATION

2.46 The achievement of this objective is rated as Substantial. The results chain is depicted in Table 13. An improvement in efficiency is ultimately reflected by improved completion rates of students and reduced vacancies in programs. The Project expected this to be achieved by states giving polytechnics greater autonomy to carry out decisions for their institutions; a modern Management Information System and Financial Management System; networking of institutions; and better staffing and better equipment use.

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Table 13. Results Chain for Improving the Efficiency of Technician Education

Outcomes

Increase in completion rates of students and time taken to complete degree

Decrease in faculty vacancies in new polytechnics


Better staffing, with faculty teaching only in areas of expertise

Faculty and administrators in Polytechnics motivate students to perform well

Outputs Number of faculty trained in new programs and old ones

New programs offered in labor market relevant areas of study with engaging curricula

Well-functioning and utilized Management Information System and Financial Management System

Networking of institutions to share best practices

Updated hardware and software

Inputs Spending on equipment, laboratories, faculty training, and curriculum redesign (government, private and World Bank)

Public policy and regulatory environment: polytechnics granted autonomy by state

Source: PAD

2.47 The Project encouraged states to give project polytechnics greater autonomy, so that they could take decisions without requiring the approval of a hierarchically superior unit, thereby reducing delays. Over the Project period, the Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh and Port Blair polytechnics received full autonomy, while the remaining six received full academic and managerial autonomy.16

2.48 As mentioned previously, the project surpassed its target in terms of the number of faculty trained and new programs offered. It did less well in achievement of other outputs. With the exception of Ambedkar Polytechnic, no state achieved the target set for operationalizing its management information system and financial management system. Even though all states achieved 75 percent of the target, key institution, department, faculty and student-level data are not available in an accessible format. This diminishes the value of such systems, since it is difficult to track the performance of individual departments, the training needs of faculty or the study-employment trajectory of students.

16 Full academic autonomy, however, does not mean that polytechnics can hire directly from a potential pool of applicants. They can only consider candidates from those who have cleared their respective state’s Public Services Commission Exam. For instance, although Shillong polytechnic has full academic autonomy, it can only hire faculty from applicants who have cleared the Meghalaya Public Services Commission exam, thereby excluding candidates who may not have taken this exam. Even in Ambedkar Polytechnic, one of the two fully autonomous polytechnics, faculty can only be hired from the pool of Union Public Services Commission exam graduates. Getting suitable candidates, with specializations in areas of interest to a polytechnic, frequently means that positions go unfilled because such candidates may not have taken the Union Public Services Commission.

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2.49 Networking was envisioned to help institutes share and learn best practices in teaching and administration. There were two main types: networking of polytechnics with other Project polytechnics, and networking of Project polytechnics with well performing non-Project institutes. The former mainly happened during Joint Review Missions when polytechnics met at one of the Project locations and discussed Project progress. The latter involved twinning polytechnics with other institutes. For instance, the two polytechnics in Mizoram were twinned with SBM Polytechnic in Mumbai. Similarly, Ambedkar Polytechnic tied up with the Indian Maritime University in Chennai. PPAR interviews suggest that networking with well performing non-Project institutes was much more useful and well organized relative to the former. Teacher hiring and releasing was not in the hands of individual institutions.

2.50 Project data do not allow us to gauge the achievement on the intermediate outcomes in the results chain. Data from the PPAR mission suggests that teachers in the polytechnics are qualified to teach their programs. However, the ability to motivate students was perceived as being higher in Ambedkar Polytechnic.

2.51 In terms of the outcome, the Project missed its target of reducing student drop-out rates overall, although it met or surpassed the target in half the states/UT (Table 14). In cases where the target was achieved, or exceeded, such as Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Nagaland and Sikkim, it is not clear whether the reduction was due to an improvement in programs or because of the selection of better students into these institutes. As was mentioned repeatedly in interviews, institutions’ reputations had been enhanced because of their association with the World Bank, as a result of which they were able to attract much better performing students. In terms of the average time taken to complete the diploma, the project surpassed its target of 3.4 years (Table 14).17

17 Some of the programs, such as those in Sikkim, had been introduced shortly prior to project closing, and there may not have been sufficient time to ensure that a cohort of students would have graduated. This is likely to have biased the figure for average time taken to complete the diploma.

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Table 14. Improvement in Efficiency

Reduction in Student Drop-outs: Dropout Rate (%)

Avg Years Taken to Complete Diploma Program

BASELINE ACTUAL TARGET

% OF

TARGET

ACHIEVED BASELINE ACTUAL TARGET

% OF

TARGET

ACHIEVED

ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS

6 2.5 3.0 120 3.6 3.2 3.4 106

ARUNACHAL PRADESH

NA 6.0 5.0 83 NA 3.4 3.4 100

JAMMU & KASHMIR

10 10.0 5.0 50 3.2 3.2 3.4 106

MEGHALAYA 10 4.0 3.0 75 NA 3.4 3.4 100

MIZORAM 5 3.0 1.0 33 NA 3.5 3.4 97

NAGALAND 5 5.0 5.0 100 3.2 3.5 3.4 97

SIKKIM NA 5.0 5.0 100 NA 3.3 3.4 103

TRIPURA 2 1.0 2.0 200 NA 3.14 3.4 108

Total Project - 4.6 3.6 79 - 3.33 3.40 102

Source: Project data *Note: In the case of drop-out rates, a lower rate is more desirable. Hence, if the actual is lower than the target, the target would have been over-achieved.

2.52 Likewise, the percentage of student seats filled also improved from baseline, even though there had been an expansion in enrollment capacity in all the institutes. The main improvements came from Jammu & Kashmir and Mizoram, where the utilization rate increased from 25 percent at baseline to 102 percent at endline, and 27 percent at baseline to 84 percent at endline respectively.18 With the exception of Jammu & Kashmir and Tripura, all the states fell short of target. Sikkim’s record was the worst in this regard. It had set a target of filling 95 percent of students seats, but by Project closing, was able to fill only 53 percent of seats. A potential explanation for the low rate comes from the fact that two new programs were introduced shortly prior to Project closing. Students also finished the diploma in less time than previously.

2.53 The Project also brought about a decrease in per student cost by 35 percent. This happened because of an increase both in the number of seats available as well as an increase in their utilization rate from 54 percent to 84 percent. With the exception of Mizoram, in all states/UTs, there were cost savings in real terms, with the average training costs per student reducing from Rs 32,100 to Rs 20,900. Additionally, given that the drop-out rate and the time to graduation decreased, it is likely the cost per graduate fell.

18 Utilization rate is a measure of excess capacity, and is defined as the number of seats occupied by students as a percent of total seats available. A utilization rate of 102 percent suggests excess demand.

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Finally, toward the close of the Project, nine polytechnics received ISO 9001: 2000 certification.19 Of these only one had ISO 9001:2000 certification prior to the Project. At the time of the PPAR mission, Ambedkar Polytechnic had also received ISO 9001: 2008 and ISO 14000 certification. MEETING THE SPECIFIC ECONOMIC NEEDS OF EACH STATE AND UT

2.54 The achievement of this objective is rated as Modest. The Project design envisioned helping polytechnics meet the economic needs of their state/UT in two ways: by providing graduates with labor market relevant skills and by equipping faculty to undertake consultancy Projects. Table 10 (above) provides details on overall employment at the state level during the project, and Tables 11 and 12 present data from the PPAR mission on the employment records of students from the two polytechnics visited. Students at Ambedkar Polytechnic provided important services in Port Blair, such as management of traffic lights and computerization of the state library. Graduates from this institute work in many public sector departments, such as electricity and shipping. Such active involvement in the economy, however, is less evident among graduates from polytechnics in the Northeast where the majority of project polytechnics were located. While the real economic need in this part of the country is to increase industry, for a variety of political and local reasons, such as restrictions on the ownership and transfer of land between different tribal groups, the progress on this front has been slow. This means that graduates either find work in the government or through work in micro-enterprises/informal sector. Project data do not provide details on the extent to which graduate employment was in the field of study. Most of the PPAR interviews suggest that graduates from non-traditional programs, such as food processing and processing, were limited in their ability to find related work, suggesting the corresponding economic needs were not being met adequately.

2.55 To the extent that most states were able to generate internal revenue from faculty consultancy fees, this suggests economic needs were being met to a certain extent (Table 15). Faculty are allowed to keep 70 percent of the fees generated from consultancies, serving as an incentive to undertake such work. There was a 159 percent increase in the amount of internal revenue generated from consultancy and other services over the course of the Project.20 Five states started generating some internal revenue from consultancy during the Project period, one generated no revenue, and data are not available for two. Consultancy services happened through a large number of activities such as consultancy to industry, testing of materials, production-cum-training centers, LAN work, vehicle maintenance, and testing and calibration services. In Ambedkar Polytechnic, students are frequently engaged in helping faculty with their consultancy projects, providing them useful practical training. At the time of the mission, Ambedkar Polytechnic had generated Rs 6.5 million through consultancies in the previous year. However, in other cases, such as Shillong polytechnic, there is limited internal revenue generation.

19 ISO 9001:2000 and 2008 certification focus on quality management systems, emphasizing process management systems. ISO 14000 certification relates to environmental management.

20 No targets were set for this indicator.

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2.56 The category of “Other Services” primarily involves lending institute equipment and learning/research resources. While the PPAR mission suggests that lending of institute resources rarely occurred, project data do not allow us to separate consultancy services of faculty from other services. Additionally, it would have been useful to know what percent of faculty had undertaken any consultancy work, since that would provide a clearer picture of how successfully the Project had changed both faculty attitudes towards undertaking consultancy work and the demand for such work.

Table 15. Revenue from Consultancy and Other Services in Project Polytechnics (Rs thousand)

2001 2006

ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS 716 1,226

ARUNACHAL PRADESH 0 17

JAMMU & KASHMIR 0 463

MEGHALAYA - -

MIZORAM - -

NAGALAND 0 0

SIKKIM 73 319

TRIPURA 0 2

Total Project 789 2,045


INCREASING ACCESS OF WOMEN, SCHEDULED TRIBES AND RURAL YOUTH TO TECHNICIAN

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

2.57 The achievement of this objective is rated as Substantial. The primary challenge in achieving this objective was not so much access to SC/ST populations, since the majority population in the Northeast is SC/ST — the expansion in enrollments is itself evidence that the SC/ST population was reached. The challenge was in providing access to women and rural youth. Here the project did well, although it did not meet its target for women, which may have been unrealistically high. The increase in enrollment for women, as shown in Table 16 is due to the establishment of one women’s polytechnic in Mizoram; expansion and improvements of three women polytechnics; construction of hostel facilities for women (1,252 new seats); and the introduction of programs attractive to women such as garment technology, cosmetology, interior design, and medical lab technology.

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Table 16. Increase in Women Students (%)

Baseline % Actual % Target % % of target achieved

ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS 38.5 45.5 45 101

ARUNACHAL PRADESH n.a. 37 45 82



MIZORAM 50 60 68 88

NAGALAND 40 37 47 79

SIKKIM n.a. 14.3 40 36

TRIPURA 25 47 40 118

Total Project 30 38.4 47.6 81


2.58 Hostel facilities, in general, contributed to greater enrollment of rural youth in polytechnics located in urban areas (Table 17). Further, many of the new polytechnics were located in primarily rural areas. In addition, all polytechnics operated extension centers/ community programs that provided short-term courses to rural youth.

Table 17. Increase in Rural Students (% of students from rural areas)

Baseline % Actual % Target % % of target achieved

ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS 13 60 25 240

ARUNACHAL PRADESH NA 100 70 143



MIZORAM 55 70 75 93

NAGALAND 53 100 80 125

SIKKIM NA 60 40 150

TRIPURA 50 48 60 80

Total Project 39.5 66.6 58.1 115


Efficiency

2.59 Efficiency is rated as Modest.

2.60 A reverse cost benefit analysis was conducted by the PAD to identify the earnings differential required to yield a 10 percent rate of return on Project investments.21 The ICR

21 A routine cost benefit analysis could not be conducted due to the absence of adequate data on the length of employment, employment rate, age earning profiles over time, graduation rates and capital costs

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uses a different methodology, using data from the three states for which tracer studies had collected salary information. It assumes the employment rate to range from 85 percent on the lower side to 95 percent on the higher side and arrives at IRRs ranging from 22 percent to 26 percent. Project data indicate an average employment rate of 67-70 percent at project closing, suggesting the IRR is likely lower than that calculated by the ICR. It should be noted that a drawback of the IRR is that it does not quantify efficiency gains accruing to future cohorts or the impact on the local community and economy. The Project was also able to open nine additional polytechnics, instead of the six originally planned, without additional financing. These polytechnics contributed to the overall objectives of the Project.

2.61 The Project, however, suffered from low institutional capacity initially, and was unable to undertake a number of procurement and financial management related tasks in an efficient manner, leading to procurement-related concerns and delays. It was also unable to identify qualified contractors, and transport equipment and supplies to a number of Project sites in a timely manner. At the behest of the Project team, the National Institute of Technical Teachers’ Training and Research, Bhopal, undertook a study in June 2007 to assess the utilization of space, equipment, learning resources, furniture and vehicles, training of staff and vocational courses. The study found overall utilization to be satisfactory. While the Project should be commended for its initiative in undertaking the utilization study, the absence of data on utilization in previous years of the Project makes it difficult to know whether utilization was efficient or satisfactory during years when other cohorts of students studied at the institute. Finally, high staff turnover in the implementing agency meant that advice was not always available in a prompt manner, leading to delays in implementation.

Project Outcome

2.62 This PPAR rates the project outcome as Moderately Satisfactory. This is based upon rating the Relevance of Objectives as High; the Relevance of Design as Substantial; the Efficacy of four objectives as Substantial and one as Modest; and Modest Efficiency.


2.63 This PPAR rates the Risk to Development Outcome as Significant.

2.64 The overall environment in India at the time of the evaluation was supportive of reform in technical education, but relative to the rest of India (including Andaman & Nicobar Islands), the momentum for such reform is comparatively low in the Northeastern states and Jammu & Kashmir. As a result, the polytechnics supported under Technician Education III, especially those created under Technician Education III, are unlikely to feel motivated to continue on a path of improvement. With the exception of two polytechnics in Sikkim, all are government-funded, which means that faculty will continue to be paid their regular salaries regardless of outcomes such as student achievement and employment. The absence of incentives (and disincentives) to motivate superior performance by faculty is a threat to the sustainability of reforms in these polytechnics. Absent financial aid and support mechanisms in the form of technical assistance and networking, the polytechnics are likely to deteriorate from the level at which they were at the time of project closing. Such was the case of the polytechnics in Jowai and Tura that were threatening to close. In interviews with

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government officials in New Delhi, most did not know about Technician Education III, and those who did, candidly admitted that Technician Education III had been forgotten by the government. The only way in which reforms in these polytechnics can be revived is through proactive government involvement and funding.

Bank Performance

2.65 Bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

Quality at Entry

2.66 Quality at entry is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. The strategic relevance of the Project was high, and given recent experience with the other two Technician Education Projects, the Bank was well prepared to work in the technical education space in India. It chose to work in areas that are difficult by any standard, but of strategic importance. It understood most of the risks associated with working in these areas and undertook effective risk mitigation strategies.

2.67 This being said, PPAR interviews suggest that the Bank did not fully understand the labor market aspirations of youth in the Northeast. Limited industry means that jobs were limited. Further, the job of choice in most of these regions is a government job. A number of the new programs introduced under the Project had trained students in skills suitable for the informal sector, but had not provided them training on how to enter or engage with this sector. As a result, the impetus for students to utilize skills developed through the Project was, on average, short-lived. Additionally, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) design was weak, with key performance indicators poorly linked to objectives such as meeting the economic needs of project regions.

2.68 Although the Project attempted to design a more decentralized procurement and financial management structure given that the centralized structure of the previous two Technician Education Projects had caused delays, it did not invest in adequate capacity building and supervision of procurement and financial management. This led to several procurement and financial management lapses. Finally, an analysis was conducted to examine the unique features of the Project states/UT political economy, such as land ownership rights and politics in the Northeast and J&K. There was, however, no clear analysis of how such factors could become binding constraints for Project effectiveness. For instance, land ownership problems limits the incentives for industry from outside these regions to set up base here.

Quality of Supervision

2.69 Quality of supervision is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. The review and supervision team comprised recognized experts in technical and engineering education that provided the team with credibility, especially in interactions with the state governments. Additionally, Bank staff in the India office regularly supervised the Projects and team members visited problem states to address implementation problems. Construction inputs

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from a professional architect ensured that the buildings were high quality. The Project also experienced no change in Task Team leader, providing it considerable continuity.

2.70 Financial management, however, was weak, and more financial management supervision was needed given that the polytechnics and states did not have much experience with Bank or externally funded Projects. Similarly, the Project was not subject to regular post-procurement reviews, with the first being conducted only in 2006, nearly five years after the Project became effective and shortly before it closed. This review found significant deviations from procurement guidelines in a substantial share of contracts. The Bank should have been more proactive through regular procurement reviews throughout project implementation and with helping states address deviations early on.

2.71 Further, although a fair amount of aggregated state-level data exists that helps us understand the performance of the Project, the inaccessibility of institution-level data questions the extent to which such data were used systematically for supervision.


2.72 Borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

2.73 Government Performance is rated Satisfactory. The Project interacted with three different sets of governments: a central government until 2004; another central government at since May 2004; and individual state governments, many of which also changed during the Project cycle. The change in political party in power was accompanied by a change in the government officials in MHRD and state offices. This meant the Project had to interact with different sets of people in the government on a regular basis. Nevertheless, all governments were supportive throughout the course of the project.

2.74 Implementing agency performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The Department of Higher Education in MHRD was responsible for Project implementation through a National Project Director, who was assisted by the NPIU. The NPIU coordinated project implementation at the national level and guided states in their implementation. There was, however, relatively high turnover of Central Project Advisors and staff at NPIU, as a result of which the pace and continuity of project implementation were hampered. NPIU was frequently not able to provide advice on a timely basis. As noted earlier, oversight of the local procurement process was weak, with serious deviations.

Monitoring and Evaluation

2.75 This PPAR rates monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as Modest.

2.76 M&E Design: The M&E design proposed a range of indicators, such as dropout rate of students and time to completion of degree, internal revenue generation, equipment modernization and curriculum redesign. They do not, however, help us understand the achievement of some of the intermediate and final outcomes, such as the number of graduates with stable employment in economically relevant jobs, average salary levels of graduates, employer satisfaction with graduates, and the number of faculty undertaking

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research that is economically relevant. To understand how effectively the project had performed in providing labor market relevant skills to students, it would have been useful to have detailed data on the employment of graduates, including whether the employment was temporary or permanent, self employment, in the field of study, how long it took the graduate to find the job, and whether the graduate was able to hold onto the job.

2.77 M&E implementation: In addition to collecting data on indicators, polytechnics commissioned tracer studies to understand the labor market performance of graduates. The studies, however, only tell us about how many students got jobs immediately upon graduating, not what happened to graduates who did not get a job immediately or those who lost their jobs shortly after getting them. PPAR interviews, for instance, suggest that many of the graduates of Shillong Polytechnic were not able to hold onto their jobs for an extended period of time. Additionally, the data that were collected were not systematically stored or computerized, as a result of which they are not easily accessible.

2.78 M&E utilization: The Project generated a vast amount of data which was used to track progress, discuss problems, and improve performance when the polytechnics met at the Joint Review Missions. A survey of state officials and principals carried out by the Project team noted they found the sharing of such data and best practices to be extremely useful. However, much of the data are aggregated at the state level and not the institute or department level. The absence of disaggregated data, for instance, makes it difficult to know whether disadvantaged students performed poorly in their studies and in the job market or not. This complicates the task of making corrections mid-course.

3. Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I

Project Objectives and Design

3.1 The Project Development Objective for the Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I is “to support the production of high quality technical professionals through reforms in the technical/engineering education system in order to raise productivity and competitiveness of the Indian economy” (PAD, p. 2).22 The Project agreement was eventually signed with 13 states in two phases: six in March 2003 (Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh) and seven in July 2004 (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand and West Bengal). A total of 127 institutions were funded by the Project, including 18 centrally-funded institutes, 89 state government/state government-funded institutes, and 20 privately-funded institutes. Approximately 12.5 percent of these institutes were polytechnics.

3.2 TEQIP I is the first part of a three phase program of 10-12 years duration. The entire program is meant to be implemented as a centrally coordinated, multi-state, long-term

22 The Project Development Objective is worded identically in the PAD and the Development Credit Agreement.

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program in 2-3 overlapping phases, each of about 5 years’ duration. TEQIP I became effective in March 2003 and closed in March 2009 at a total Project cost of USD 315 million.

3.3 TEQIP I was prepared over a period of 22 months. It was informed by the Economic and Sector Work, Scientific and Technical Manpower Development in India; previous Bank Projects in technical education in India and Argentina, Chile, China, Indonesia, Jordan, Romania, and Vietnam; and key policy documents. The latter include the 2001 CAS and a number of policy initiatives undertaken by the Government of India, including the National Policy on Education 1986 and 1992; the National Policy Initiative for Technician Education 1998; and the Information Technology Policy 2000.

3.4 Relative to previous education Projects in India, TEQIP I is unique in four ways. First, its primary focus is on mainstream engineering institutions. Previous projects focused on technical/vocational education institutions, institutions that remain peripheral to tertiary education in India. Second, among mainstream institutions, TEQIP I chose to support Tier 2 institutes, instead of the higher-quality Tier 1 institutes, such as the Indian Institutes of Technology, or the lower-quality Tier 3 institutes.23 The PAD argues that investments in Tier 1 institutes would not contribute to the systemic reforms needed in the engineering education system in India, since these institutions were few in number, catered to top-performing students, and were anyway performing quite well. Supporting them would likely increase the gap between Tier 1 institutes and the rest. The decision to focus on Tier 2 institutions, instead of Tier 3, was motivated by the need to enable promising institutes to develop into centers of excellence, while enabling the benefits to spread through the system by networking of institutions.

3.5 Third, TEQIP I focused on fundamental reforms in the functioning of engineering institutions. Specifically, it emphasized decentralization of decision-making in academic matters, administration, and financing, and encouraged greater accountability in the teaching and research performance of such institutions. In order to undertake these reforms, institutions needed to be autonomous. As a result, states were selected into the Project on the understanding that they would provide autonomy to non-autonomous institutes, should such institutions be selected into the Project. It should be noted, however, that autonomy per se was not a policy reform supported through Project components. Finally, TEQIP I’s PAD emphasizes the importance of including private technical/engineering institutions in the overall reform process of technical/engineering education quality improvement.

3.6 Table 18 describes the components, sub-components and activities in TEQIP I. The first sub-component for the first component of institutional development, academic excellence, comprised activities core to improving the quality of teaching, research and learning in technical/engineering institutes. This sub-component also emphasized accreditation of institutes, thereby building a mechanism for ensuring they were accountable

23 The PAD distinguishes between three tiers of the engineering education system. It notes that at the apex are the Indian Institutes of Technology and a few other reputed institutes. In the second tier are 17 Regional Engineering Colleges and approximately 30 well-established government and private-aided colleges. In the third tier are the majority of private unaided colleges. It should, however, also be noted that there is currently no sector-wide formal definition of which institutes belong to which tier or how many tiers exist.

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for performance. Together, these factors are likely to lead to better-trained graduates, higher quality of industry-relevant research and innovation. Research suggests that these factors are associated with improvements in the productivity and competitiveness of the economy (OECD, 2008; Schwab, 2010).

3.7 The second sub-component, networking of institutions, envisioned a mechanism for institutes to learn from each other. The design designated forty institutes (31.5 percent) as Lead institutions based upon their initial proposals, and the remaining as Network institutions. Lead institutions would assist in the development of Network institutions through seminars, joint publication and training sessions. They would also share their equipment, library and other learning resources. In this way, the investments made in, and by, lead institutions would have a multiplicative effect.

3.8 The third sub-component, services to community and economy, envisioned engaging institutions with the community both to realize the public good aspects of the investment, as well as gauge the needs of the economy first-hand. This sub-component provided an innovative way of ensuring technical innovations contributed to the economy and society.

3.9 The second component involved building system management capacity by providing broad-based training to policymakers and administrators. It was geared to all institutes, and was meant to inculcate a modern style of management in technical education institutions by training policy makers and institutional administrative staff. In this way, the Project design foresaw a broader culture of professionalism and knowledge being built in administration that would benefit the entire technical/engineering education system.

FINANCING

3.10 The project was appraised at USD 314 million, of which IDA was expected to finance USD 250 million as a Specific Investment Loan, and the Borrower, the Government of India, was expected to finance USD 64 million.

PROJECT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

3.11 GOI implemented TEQIP I along with 13 major states. All states were invited to participate in 2002 and 2003 by the Government of India. States were selected on the basis of their willingness to grant non-autonomous Project institutes autonomy, thereby allowing them (legally) to undertake key governance and finance-related reforms. Selection of states in phases gave states interested in TEQIP I, but not ready to implement at Project inception, time to improve their proposals and apply in the next phase of selection. Once states were selected, institutions were selected.24

24 Public and private institutions within qualifying states and centrally-funded institutes were chosen through a two-step process. It was decided that 20 percent of the institutions funded should be private. In the first step, institutions were shortlisted, and assigned potential lead and network status. In the second step, clusters of institutions (lead and network) were selected through national-level competition on the basis of Institutional Development Plans articulating the institutions’ self-delineated plans for academic excellence, networking of

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Overall policy directives, coordination and directions for all Project activities were provided by the Bureau of Technical Education in the Department of Secondary and Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) of the Government of India. The overall responsibility for coordination, implementation and monitoring of the Program at the central level and the states was vested in the National Project Director, who was a senior official of the rank of a Joint Secretary in the Department of Secondary and Higher Education.25 The National Project Director was assisted by the NPIU, which provided information and best practice examples, guidance, and support to the central government, state governments and institutions on various aspects of Project implementation, including the selection process, procurement and financial issues; facilitating training programs, and periodically monitoring progress of program implementation at the central and state levels. Specifically, it supported the National Screening Committee in eligibility determination of institutions, the Evaluation Committee in evaluation of Institutional Development Sub Project proposals, and the National Selection Committee in the selection of Institutional Development Plans from institutions.

3.12 At the state level, the State Secretaries of Education assisted by the State Project Director, typically the Director of Technical/Higher Education at the State level, was responsible for facilitating Project implementation. A State Project Facilitation Unit (SPFU) in each of the participating states provided support in the state-level screening process, and became the link between individual institutions and the state government for all policy and financial matters. The SPFU also provided guidance and support to the individual institutions in Project implementation, and was responsible for overall coordination and monitoring of Project implementation at the state level. At the institutional level, Project implementation was the responsibility of the respective Head of the institution through an Institutional Project Management Unit. The Institutional Project Management Unit assisted the head of the institution in fulfilling all Project-related obligations (physical, qualitative, financial, legal, etc.) and providing necessary periodic progress reports to the institute management, SPFU, NPIU, and the National Project Director. The Institutional Project Management Units also facilitated the necessary reviews and audits as required. The primary responsibility for monitoring the individual institutional Projects lay with the SPFUs.

institutions, and enhanced services to community and economy. Public institutions were provided grants, and private institutions were provided loans.

25 At present, secondary education comes within the Department of School Education and Literacy. Higher Education is a separate department.

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Table 18. Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project I

Components (IDA amount at appraisal in parenthesis)

1. Institutional development through competitive funding (USD 304.5 million)

2. System management capacity improvement (USD 9.5 million)

Sub-components

Promotion of academic excellence Networking of institutions Services to community and economy

Establishment/strengthening of program management structures Research and training in education planning and management

Activities Faculty and staff training; recruiting and retaining competent faculty; investing in cutting-edge hardware and software; increasing capacity for postgraduate education; establishing teaching and research programs in cutting-edge technology areas; increasing interaction with industry, sponsored research, consultancy and other revenue generating activities; instituting academic reforms including program flexibility Establishing formal networks between lead institutions and 3-4 neighboring academic institutions (network institutions). The network activities would included sharing of teaching, learning, physical and human resources; faculty and staff competence enhancement; improvement of academic processes; and joint publications, researches and consultancies. Technical and advisory services provided to the local community and economy (especially informal sectors).

Activities in this sub-component were intended to benefit all technical institutions; not just those supported under the first component. This included support for: (a) development of a modern management style through training of policy planners, managers and administrators from the central and participating state governments, and their agencies concerned with the management of technical/engineering education, (b) policy and system research studies at the state and national levels, (c) management of performance, reforms, quality and efficiency audits of institutions, and (d) establishment of structures and facilities for Program management at the central and state levels.

Source: ICR, PAD

Implementation

3.13 The Project’s objectives and components were not changed and the Project was not formally restructured.

3.14 Project Cost: At project closing, the total project cost amounted to USD 315.11 million, of which the Bank had financed $250.92 million through IDA and the GOI financed $64.19 million (Table 19). Nearly USD 40 million (approximately 14.3 percent) of the Project cost was reallocated in 2004 to aid the disaster victims of the Tsunami that hit the Southern coast of India in December 2004. However, the depreciation of the INR relative to

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Table 19. Appraisal and Actual Cost of Project Components TEQIP I

Components Expected Cost A (US$ millions)

Actual Cost B (US$ millions)

Implementation Ratio (B)/(A)

Institutional Development through Competitive Funding

304.50 308.20 1.01

System Management Capacity Improvement

9.50 6.91 0.73

IDA 250 250.92 1.003

Government of India 64.00 64.19 1.003

Total Project Costs 314.00 315.11 1.003

Source: PAD and ICR.

the SDR, combined with the fact that the first round of Institution Development Proposals had over-budgeted and lowered their budgets to be more realistic, kept the INR Project amount approximately

the same. The exact manner in which the loss of 14.3 percent of the project allocation was balanced by currency depreciation and re-budgeting of institutes, without compromising the quality of activities, is unclear. In hindsight, the reallocation led to a lost opportunity for the Project to use additional resources from the depreciation of the INR. The credit disbursed fully.

3.15 Implementation Experience: The PAD expected to include 6 to 8 states in TEQIP I, but at the time of Project closing, 13 states were participating. Additionally, the number of institutions finally covered under the Project was almost twice the number that was initially proposed. Throughout, the goals of selectivity were maintained, with 127 institutions being chosen through proposal-based competition from 300 applicants in two cycles in 2003 and 2004.

3.16 The Project was extended by nine months. Four main factors explain the delay in closing. First, the Project had a slow start with significant implementation problems in the first two years. In the initial period, implementation problems arose largely due to weak leadership in the government, and the Project was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory in March 2005. Thereafter, the Project showed considerable improvement. Part of this is likely explained by the change in government in 2004, and the consequent changes in leadership. Second, nearly double the number of states and institutions participated than originally planned. Moreover, the institutional proposals of many Project institutions required considerable revisions before they could be finalized. Third, inadequate staffing of the NPIU and SPFUs remained a problem through the Project. Finally, states did not make adequate budget provisions on time in the initial period, and many were reluctant to grant non-autonomous institutes autonomy upon implementation, slowing the pace of reform in these institutes.

3.17 Procurement: Procurement was a challenge in the initial years of the Project. In 2005-06, post-procurement reviews of a sample of contracts in all Project states and of a select sample of Centrally Funded Institutes and state institutions recorded serious deviations from procurement guidelines including unjustified splitting of contracts by some institutions;

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inadequate recording of reasons for rejection of lower bids; long delays in settlement of payments; the Bank’s approval not sought for rejecting all bids and rebidding; and possible use of fraudulent practice by some contractors in local shopping. Based on a post-review of civil-works, claims submitted by one institution in Karnataka were withdrawn due to unacceptable deficiencies. These issues were discussed with all the SPFUs and NPIU, and a fiduciary workshop conducted in 2008 addressed the causes for deviation. A self-audit system for procurement by SPFUs and NPIU was introduced. As a result, a post-procurement review of 2007-08 conducted in 4 states and 3 Centrally Funded Institutes showed significant improvement in overall management with deviations reported in less than 15 percent of sampled contracts. A post-review conducted in 2008-09 in 6 states and 8 Centrally Funded Institutes covering 350 contracts showed even fewer deviations and no case of misappropriation.

3.18 IEG interviews with institution Project managers repeatedly brought out the problems and delays caused by differences between the procurement rules of Government of India and the World Bank. This suggests that the ability of SPFUs to provide adequate and timely technical support and supervision across the board to all institutions was deficient.

3.19 Financial Management was a challenging task, as expenditure under the Project took place largely in a decentralized manner in 127 institutions in 13 states, including 18 Centrally Funded Institutions. The Project was guided by a comprehensive Financial Management manual, which was revised during 2006-07. It performed satisfactorily on financial management, given that expenditure under the Project took place primarily at the institute- level, with individual institutes undertaking procurement, instead of the state (which had traditionally undertaken procurement in the majority of institutes). The Project had to ensure 127 institutes, with limited prior training in procurement, were following correct procedures. States and the NPIU submitted consolidated audit reports every year in a regular and timely manner, with a few exceptions. Discrepancies found in the early years diminished over time. It should be noted that NPIU capacity was constrained in the last year of the Project as the position of Consultant Finance fell open.

3.20 Safeguards: The Project was classified as category C for environmental purposes and OP 4.01 was not triggered. However, the Project triggered OD 4.20 (current OP 4.10) on indigenous people, and the Tribal Development Plan was designed by NPIU to address the needs of faculty and students belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Project. Activities included establishment of book banks for students belonging to the these groups, special remedial classes, guidance for taking entrance exams, counseling, communication and soft skills, preparation for job interviews and language labs. Project data suggest that more than 1,700 such activities were carried out during the life of the Project and these benefitted a sizable number of students (a total of 200,000 participations took place in these activities with students attending multiple activities).

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Relevance of Project Objectives and Design

RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVES

3.21 The relevance of the Project Development Objective is rated Substantial. It was relevant to the Indian economy at the time of project conception as well as closing as discussed in subsequent paragraphs.26 While ambitious and concisely worded, neither the PAD nor the DCA defines productivity or competitiveness. As a result, the objective falls short on clarity of purpose.

3.22 Research suggests that a vibrant technical/engineering education system, capable of generating high quality technical manpower, is key to improving the productivity and the competitiveness of any economy (Box 1 above). As noted in Chapter 1, India’s GDP growth rate and productivity growth were low in the early 2000s. Its trade in services as a percent of GDP was also low, and Information Communication Technology service exports as a percent of service exports had the potential to do much better.27 At the same time, India had one of the largest systems of post-secondary technical and engineering education systems in the world by 2001. It comprised over 1,000 degree level and over 1,200 diploma level institutions with a total enrollment capacity of about 1.5 million. These impressive numbers held the potential for building India’s emerging economy by generating growth, improving productivity and enhancing competitiveness.

3.23 A series of policy pronouncements by the Government of India in the late 1990s and early 2000s articulated the urgency of increasing the quantity of technical manpower further, but also addressed the problem of deteriorating average quality of graduates from these institutions. In 2001, the Prime Minister released a task force report entitled “India as Knowledge Superpower: Strategy for Transformation”. This report projected a requirement of over 3 million trained knowledge workers. Concurrently, the demand for high quality technical manpower was articulated in the 9th Five Year Plan (1997-2002) and other policy documents in India.28 Subsequent Five-Year plans in India have also articulated the importance of continuing to strengthen India’s growing technical manpower. These include the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) and the 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012).

3.24 The project’s objective was also consistent with the World Bank’s 2001 India CAS which underscored that the bottlenecks constraining growth in India included a shortage of appropriately skilled and trained personnel. Given this, the emphasis was on promoting policy and institutional reforms in the area of technical education that included both public and private institutions in order to improve the quality of India’s pool of technical manpower. The most recent CAS (2009-2012) also lays emphasis on supporting India’s technical and vocational education system.

26 This PPAR uses standard definitions of these concepts from the literature (see Box 1).

27 Other measures for competitiveness are not available for this time. For instance, the GCR started collecting data only in 2005.

28 These include: the National Policy on Education 1986 and 1992; the National Policy Initiative for Technician Education 1998; and the Information Technology Policy 2000.

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3.25 The decision to support technical education instead of other areas in tertiary education was driven by two factors. First, political support from the Government of India to reform the technical education system was more forthcoming than support for other areas. In 2001-02, the period during which the Project was being prepared, Government of India saw technical/engineering education as playing a key role in building a knowledge economy, and was therefore very encouraging of reform in this realm. In contrast, other fields, especially those in the social sciences and humanities would have been politically less welcoming since curricular issues in these fields tend to be politically sensitive. Secondly, technical/engineering education also served as an effective entry point for understanding systemic reform aspects of tertiary education in general. This understanding could potentially provide the backdrop for other Bank projects supporting larger reforms in the tertiary education space in India.

RELEVANCE OF DESIGN

3.26 The relevance of the Project design is rated as Substantial. Overall, it laid out a convincing causal framework between project activities and intended outcomes. Project components were designed to achieve project objectives by addressing the problems in the technical education system in India. The problems centered on over-centralization of the system, low accountability of institutions, poor infrastructure and skewed geographical presence.

3.27 Although not a sub-component, the PAD lays special emphasis on including private institutions in the sample of Project institutions. This was done because much of the growth in engineering education since the late 1990s has come from the private sector. Further, a number of quality concerns in engineering education in India emanate from the private sector. In recent years, these quality concerns have translated into shrinking (student) demand and declining revenues for a number of private sector colleges, leading to the possibility of closure.29 Nevertheless, the majority of students continue to attend private colleges, and any attempt at systemic reforms cannot ignore the private sector.

3.28 The Project was only partially successful in including the private sector, with only 20 out of the 127 institutes funded being private. Some part of the explanation lies in the traditional reluctance by the government to invest in private higher education institutes (Kapur and Mehta, 2004). At the same time, there were few incentives in the Project design to guarantee or encourage private sector participation. Private sector institutions were provided loans at essentially the same rate at which the state received the loan from the center, albeit with a small subsidy. Being regulated by the state in the fee they could charge students, and having limited prior experience generating revenue (and a clientele) through consultancy, private institutes operated under considerably more pressure and strain than

29 Trusts owning engineering colleges in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have begun putting up their colleges for sale due to shrinking demand. See: http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/demand-for-degree-shrinks-engineering-colleges-seek-buyers/445795/; http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/tamil-nadu/article2337603.ece; http://www.deccanherald.com/content/100555/500-engineering-colleges-ap-should.html.

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government institutes in the Project.30 PPAR interviews suggest the strain dampened the morale of these institutes.

Achievement of the Project Objective

3.29 The achievement of the objective is rated as Substantial based on the extent to which project inputs led to intended outputs, intended outputs to intermediate outcomes, and intermediate outcomes to final objectives. The relevant inputs, outputs, intermediate outcomes and final outcomes are depicted in Table 20.

Table 20. Results Chain for Increasing the Productivity and Competitiveness of the Indian Economy

Outcomes

Increase in the productivity and competitiveness of the Indian economy


Graduate performing better in examinations. Greater demand for graduates in labor market

Greater demand for faculty consultations from industry

Greater motivation to innovate: apply for patents and obtain patents

Emphasis on publishing research in professional journals

R&D products commercialized

Services to community and economy

Outputs Institutional reforms including flexibility in academic programs, student performance evaluation, faculty incentives, attracting and retaining faculty, utilization of block grants, establishing Board of Governors

New programs in relevant and cutting-edge fields. Accreditation of existing and new programs in these fields.

Increased number of students studying in relevant and cutting-edge fields. Increased number of post-graduates and doctoral scholars doing research in relevant and cutting-edge fields

Training and Placement Offices operating in all institutes

Number of faculty trained in relevant and cutting-edge fields

Opportunities for professional networking and collaboration

Inputs Spending on equipment, laboratories, faculty training, and curriculum redesign (Government, private and World Bank)

Public policy and regulatory environment: institutions granted autonomy by states/center

Source: PAD, ICR

3.30 An important precondition for the selection of states into the Project was that they grant non-autonomous Project institutes academic, administrative, managerial, and financial autonomy. This was considered important from the perspective of institutes being able to

30 The PAD notes that all seats in publicly-funded colleges have low fees, while 50 percent of the seats in private colleges are also offered at low fees, called “free seats”. Of the remaining “payment seats,” 40-45 percent are charged much higher fees and 5-10 percent is reserved for nonresident Indians who pay dollar-denominated fees.

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undertake Project reforms without bureaucratic hurdles and delays.31 Project data do not provide details on the status of autonomy in institutes pre-project, but provide the status of autonomy at project closing (Table 21). The achievement of objectives was likely reduced because the intended targeting mechanism, based upon selecting institutes that were autonomous, was not fully implemented with states not providing autonomy to institutes as initially agreed.

Table 21. Status of Autonomy of Project Institutes at Project Closing

% of institutes

Full academic autonomy 60

Full managerial autonomy 80

Full financial autonomy 84

Full administrative autonomy 88


FROM INPUTS TO OUTPUTS

3.31 The fact that states did not grant all Project institutes full autonomy limited the achievement of some of the institutional reforms proposed by the Project, especially those related to the utilization of block grants and flexibility in academic programs. In order to facilitate financial autonomy, the Project encouraged two financial reforms: block grants and the establishment of four funds. Block grants allow institutions to align expenditure with self-determined goals for institutional development. Previously, funding was centrally allocated to institutions and did not account for differences across institutions in terms of their ability to use funds productively. Only eight of the 13 states granted partial discretion to state-funded Project institutions, and none of the CFIs received block grants. As a result, only 54 percent of institutes received block grants (Table 22). IEG interviews suggest that many project institutes were not ready for block grants, which assume not only autonomy, but also the initiative and accountability that are demanded of autonomous institutes. The Project was, however, quite successful in establishing four institutional funds, meant for continuous improvement and sustaining gains once the Project closed. The Project achieved over 90 percent of the target under this activity.

3.32 Nevertheless, the fact that all institutes were granted at least partial autonomy in most matters allowed them to achieve some of the other institutional reforms, such as multilevel and multi-background entry; student performance evaluation; faculty incentives; and attracting and retaining faculty (Table 22). Additionally, by Project closing, 96 percent of project institutes had functioning Boards of Governors.

31 Some Project institutes, such as Jadavpur University and Osmania University, already had autonomy prior to the Project, but many did not.

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Table 22. Achievement of Institutional Reforms in Project Institutes

% of institutes (n=127)

Multilevel and multi background entry 93

Wide choice of electives 91

Credit exemptions 52

Credit transfers 50

Credit accumulation 40

Student performance evaluation 99

Faculty incentives 98

Attracting and retaining faculty 83

Mechanisms for regular audit 97

Block grants 54

Four funds 81

Source: Project data . Note: The data for Four Funds is based on 109 institutes.

3.33 Approximately 93 percent of all programs in Project institutes underwent revision or restructuring as a result of TEQIP I. Over two-thirds of the planned new programs were introduced. The project also fast-tracked the accreditation status of programs within institutes. Over the project period, 91 percent of programs had either received or applied for accreditation (by the National Board of Accreditation). It should be noted that there are two problems that limit the soundness of National Board of Accreditation certification. First, while it is easy to arrange for experts to visit institutes that are well or centrally located, there are logistic difficulties in getting experts to go to faraway places, where travel time could exceed a few days. As a result, evaluations and accreditations get delayed in such places, or conducted by people without relevant expertise. Second, PPAR interviews revealed instances of manipulation of the accreditation process, albeit in non-Project institutes. These instances, nevertheless, devalue the overall credibility of such accreditation as an instrument of accountability.

3.34 Graduates enrolled in cutting-edge technology programs in Project institutes increased from 35 percent at baseline to 51 percent at project closing, missing the target by 1 percent.32 The number of post-graduates enrolled in cutting-edge technology programs increased by 86 percent over the project cycle, exceeding the target of a 50 percent increase. The number of PhDs awarded by Project institutes increased from 250 to 587, again exceeding the target of a 50 percent increase.

32 Relevant and cutting-edge technologies are not defined in the PAD. It was felt that a top-down approach to specifying relevant technologies would limit individual institutions, and that the choice of programs was best made by institutions in their Institution Development Plan. Since the institutions that had been chosen were already performing reasonably well, it was realistic to expect them to make reasonable choices based on their understanding of how technologies were evolving and what were the most important needs in the economy at a given time.

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3.35 In addition to making students more employable, TEQIP I also required institutes to have placement cells, and thereby an organizational structure within institutions to ensure the placement (employment) of students in suitable jobs upon graduation. Placement cells brought employers to the institution for recruiting graduates, and also helped graduates prepare for interviews. All students interviewed in the institutes visited during the IEG mission believed the placement cells played a key role in getting them jobs. Approximately a third felt that placement cells facilitated industry internships for students where such internships had been built into the curriculum. The rest said they had to get such internships through personal contacts.33

3.36 While all Project institutions were required to have a placement cell under TEQIP I, it is difficult to know with certainty whether active placement programs were driven by the Project versus a general trend in campuses, since several comparable non-Project institutes also have placement cells.

3.37 TEQIP I created 19,342 new faculty positions, of which 76 percent were filled by Project closing. The vacancy rate for TEQIP I institutes is much lower than in many of India’s top central universities, reported to be 34 percent (ToI, 2010). TEQIP I also increased the opportunities for professional development and networking available to faculty and staff. Data from the last three years of the project show that 33,158 faculty members were trained and 13,708 staff members, such as laboratory staff, were trained. Training programs took various forms. For instance, the College of Engineering Pune sent faculty members to undergo courses in Indian Institute of Technology Bombay for an entire semester from across all departments. Faculty members were also sent for short-term courses and training in reputed institutes abroad. Faculty members were also encouraged to undertake further studies and improve their professional qualifications. The number of faculty in College of Engineering Pune with PhDs rose from 12 in 2003 to 54 in 2009. The number of faculty in the College of Engineering with post-graduate qualifications increased from 80 in 2003 to 115 in 2009. Finally, the number of faculty in the College of Engineering registered for a PhD increased from 6 in 2003 to 71 in 2009.

3.38 TEQIP I also contributed to an increased availability of well-trained system/institution managers. In terms of trainings in modern management, there was an increase from 40 in 2003-04 to 244 in 2007-08. The number of persons trained in planning and management increased from 209 to 1082 over the same period. The trainings were

33 As an example of the role of placement cells, the placement cell at UICT, managed by a placement facilitator, faculty and student representatives from each department, has an efficient system to secure jobs for its students. As per the placement rules for students, all students in the final year of classes are required to inform the placements cell whether they intend to go on the job market or not by July 1 of the academic year. Thereafter, pre-placement information obtained from interested companies is posted on the web site of the institute, specifying eligibility criteria for applying to jobs in those institutes. Subsequently, companies that provide all requested information including submission deadlines, written test requirements, date of interviews and salary details, are invited to interview students. After all interviews are completed, companies are required to send a letter with the names of selected candidates within seven days of completion of the final round.

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conducted primarily by the NPIU and the National Institutes for Technical Teachers Training and Research.

3.39 The trainings helped TEQIP I helped institutes become more efficient, with improvement in a number of indicators, notwithstanding increasing enrollments. Indicators such as average graduation rates and greater control over the destiny of one’s own institution showed improvement over the project period. For instance, at baseline only 27 percent of institutions controlled their admission process. By 2007-08, 71 percent of institutions reported controlling the admission process. Other measures of administrative/management efficiency are noted in Table 23.

Table 23. Administrative/Management Efficiency Indicators in Project Institutes

2003-04 2007-08

% gain over baseline

% of target

Number of institutions with academic calendar under institutions control

66 80 21 63

Number of institutions with admission process under institutions control

27 71 238 56

Number of days taken to complete admission by institution

41 33 20 -

Number of institutions with conduct of examinations under institutions control

51 79 55 62

Number of days taken to complete semester or annual exam

28 22 21 -

Number of institutions with declaration of results under institutions control

46 68 48 54


FROM OUTPUTS TO INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

3.40 As Figure 6 shows, the Project performed well in terms of the number of students graduating with distinction. The percent of students graduating with distinction at the undergraduate level increased from 35 percent in 2003-04 to 50 percent in 2007-08, and those at the post-graduate level from 36 percent to 51 percent. The target in both cases was 50 percent.34

34 The numbers for undergraduates and post-graduates with distinction are virtually identical over the project period. Institution-level data were not available to verify this, but the closeness in trend appears unrealistic.

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Figure 6. Student Performance in Project Institutes

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08

Pe

rce

nt

Students graduating

with distinction UG (%)

Students graduating

with distinction PG (%)

Campus placement rate

UG (%)

Campus placement rate

PG (%)

Source: Project data. UG = Undergraduate; PG = Postgraduate

3.41 Evidence of improvement in the quality of graduate students is inferred from their performance in the labor market, greater participation in research activities as well as practical applications of their curriculum during their student years. On average, labor market outcomes of graduates improved in terms of a number of metrics over the project period, including higher employment rates, reduced time to find employment, and increased salary. Campus placement rates within one year of graduation, used as a lower bound indicator for overall employment rate, nearly doubled for undergraduate students, from 41 percent to 76 percent (89 percent of the target) and more than doubled from 25 percent to 56 percent (66 percent of the target) for post-graduate students. The average annual salary for those employed through campus placement increased by 74 percent (41 percent in real terms) for undergraduate students and 88 percent for post-graduate students (51 percent in real terms). Figure 6 shows the trend in student performance and placement rates from the time the project started to project completion, and Figure 7, the trend in salaries.

3.42 While these achievements are impressive, they fall short of target. Part of the explanation lies in initial implementation problems that reduced the Project’s actual life in many institutions from their planned life. For instance, Netaji Subhash Engineering College in Calcutta had only two years of effective Project implementation. In this context, the targets may have been too ambitious.

3.43 Twenty-one employer interviews were conducted during the PPAR mission to understand the labor market perception of the quality of graduates from Project institutions, whether there had been an improvement in their quality over the Project period, and in what areas students need to improve.35 Overall, three points emerged. First, the number and

35 Of these, the PPAR mission independently identified and met with a third. The remaining employers were identified by Project institutes since the IEG wanted to meet regular recruiters at these institutes.

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quality of student-industry interactions had increased noticeably between the period before and during/after TEQIP I. This was made possible partly through increased internships of students in industry, and partly through industry being invited to conduct a range of classes and courses in institutions. However, such student-industry interactions were limited when institutions were situated in areas with little industry.

3.44 Second, all the employers interviewed mentioned regularly interviewing and hiring candidates from Project institutions, and taking greater numbers when needed. This indicates a certain level of satisfaction with the training and caliber of these students. For instance, a leading provider of information technology, consulting and business process outsourcing services, hired a couple of students from Vishwakarma Institute of Technology, Pune, when it started recruiting from that institute in 2003. In 2011, it had just concluded making offers to 30 students from the institute.

3.45 Finally, companies felt that students in general needed to be trained more in soft skills, including time management and communication skills. It should also be noted that students from these institutions are offered jobs by India’s leading companies, but the jobs themselves are not comparable to those offered to graduates of Tier 1 schools in these companies. The latter are offered jobs that are both higher paying and more analytical.

3.46 As noted in Chapter 1, the Project period overlapped with a time of economic growth in India, which suggests that income and employment rates in Project institutions may have increased regardless of the Project. While available data make this hard to prove or disprove with certainty, the PPAR evidence suggests that curricular changes initiated as part of the Project improved the skill set of students, potentially making them more employable. Interviews with students, faculty, and employers suggest that there were at least three types of changes associated with the Project that made students more employable. First, TEQIP I provided students access to relevant laboratory and learning tools, including cutting-edge software, and these were used to give students much greater practical training than before. Second, interaction with industry was stepped up through curricular requirements of internship with industry, as well as invitations to industry to conduct lectures/seminars/and classes for students. Third, students were provided training on building their soft skills as well as interviewing skills through classes, and in some cases by inviting industry members to conduct such training.

3.47 TEQIP I also helped put institutes in a much better position to undertake industrial projects as a result of a number of modern facilities and equipment funded under the Project.

3.48 As Table 24 shows, over the project period, externally funded R&D Projects, joint consultancies; joint publications; joint training and continuing education programs; joint research guidance for Masters’ and Ph.D. programs; and Joint Seminars increased considerably over the baseline. All faculty interviewed gave concrete examples of how the provision of cutting-edge technologies and equipment under TEQIP I had allowed them to undertake high-end research on their own or in collaboration with other universities/ institutes and industry. Instances of collaboration increased over the Project period, with joint research, design and development projects, consultancy, and training programs undertaken by institutes.

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Figure 7. Average Income of Graduates in Project Institutes

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08

Sa

lary

in

Rs

mil

lio

n Income per UG

graduate (Rs million)

Income per PG

graduate (Rs million)

Source: Project data. UG = Undergraduate; PG = Postgraduate

Table 24. Improvement in Intermediate Outcomes

Scientific personnel, output and innovations Baseline End line

Achievement Over Baseline

Number of publications 3800 6328 67

Patents obtained 22 34 55

Patents applied 12 86 617

R&D products commercialized 29 65 124

Other academic products 404 1144 183

Collaborations

Externally-funded joint R.&D. projects 70 236 237

Joint consultancies 183 290* 36.89

Joint publications 284 1106 289

Source: Project data. Note: * refers to 2006-07 data

3.49 The University Institute of Chemical Technology, Mumbai, for instance, undertook several collaborations with major national and international industries, including collaborations for refinery processes, fibers and pigments; and biofuels and bulk chemicals. International collaborations included designing chromatographic media and chromatographic processes; and extraction and purification of natural active compounds. Equipment made available through TEQIP I also helped the University Institute of Chemical Technology partner with industry to solve third party problems such as membrane separations, bioseparations and biotransformations. Since approximately 7 percent of India’s GDP is due to chemical and allied industries, with the University Institute of Chemical Technology frequently providing consultancy services to these industries, the link between investing in

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the University Institute of Chemical Technology and increasing the productivity of the economy is direct. Less direct, but also important for productivity, was the work undertaken by other institutions using equipment financed under TEQIP I. For instance, Jadavpur University, Kolkata worked with key industry players to help improve the lubricating properties of nano-particles, and fault detection and identification for nonlinear hybrid plants.

Available project data do not allow comparisons on the indicators in Table 24 with pre-project years or with a credible control group. However, a recent independent study conducted by the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore, one of India’s premier science institutes, found that TEQIP I-funded institutions had achieved a 945 percent increase in the volume of published peer-reviewed research from 2000 to 2009. As Figure 8 shows, this growth far exceeds the increase in the number of publications of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and IISc. The growth created a broader base for science and technology knowledge production across the country. In 2000, the IITs/IISc produced 78 percent of the total number of publications, but by 2009, these institutions produced 63 percent (7,418 articles). The share of state institutions had increased to 26 percent (3,013 articles), while the NITs contributed 11 percent (1,260 articles). As a result, India’s production of engineering and technology research is substantially larger and more diversified post-TEQIP I than pre-TEQIP I.

Figure 8. Increase in Number of Publications in Science and Technology

Source: http://www.npiu.nic.in

3.50 TEQIP I institutions also set up units to promote innovation and entrepreneurship during the Project cycle. For instance Jadavpur University instituted a Patent Promotion and Archival Cell, and University Institute of Chemical Technology’s proposed Technology Incubation Center.

3.51 While TEQIP I, on average, performed well in terms of its scientific output, there is likely variation in the performance of lead and network institutes. Interviews conducted

100

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500

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900

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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Nu

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ub

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In

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ase

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r =

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)

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NITs in TEQIP

State Inst. In TEQIP

IITs & IISc

2002 - start of TEQIP

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during the PPAR mission with government officials, lead and network institutes suggested that the networking model of learning and sharing had not worked well. First, designating some institutions as lead and others as network, instead of all as network, created a hierarchy between them that was unattractive to network institutions (the majority of institutions) and not conducive to partnership. PPAR interviews revealed that many network institutions, with good reason, believed they had sufficient expertise to offer, but lead institutions preferred to provide rather than receive any expertise. From this perspective, the model resembled a situation where the lead institute provided technical assistance to network institutions, and not a networking model, which is a reciprocal activity, and is likely to be successful only when mutual gains are recognized. With the benefit of hindsight, the absence of financial, performance or reputation incentives in the networking model constrained its effectiveness. Next, many of the institutions in a given cluster did not receive autonomy. This automatically constrained their ability to make changes in curriculum or teaching methods. Finally, institutions were geographically constrained in the choice of their partners as per the guidelines of the Project. Since partnership requires building relationships, greater choice on whom to partner with would likely have facilitated superior partnerships.

3.52 TEQIP I’s sub-component, services to community and economy, included activities that likely led to their target groups experiencing gains in productivity. Programs were not defined in the Project, and were left to the discretion of the institute. Examples of programs include Jadavpur University’s work in deploying bicycle powered cost-effective rural lighting systems in a non electrified village in the Sundarbans area of West Bengal; constructing a rainwater harvesting reservoir in a drought prone village in Midnapore which enhanced the community’s economic productivity through pisciculture and more intensive crop cultivation during dry seasons; and cost-effective food preparation for up to 10,000 people using solar energy. Such services took the form of faculty-community interactions; staff-community interactions; student community interactions and visit of community members to the institutions. Table 25 shows the trend in programs undertaken by project institution with the community. Person hours ranged from 660,620 for faculty-community interactions to 1,720,150 for visits by community members.

3.53 In summary, TEQIP I was able to make substantial progress on the achievement of its intermediate outcomes. In the absence of the project clearly defining metrics for productivity and competitiveness, it is difficult to determine with certainty the extent to which intermediate outcomes led to the final outcomes that were the objective of the project. However, the discussion in Box 1 suggests it is substantially plausible that project outputs and intermediate outcomes would contribute to the project objective being achieved.

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Table 25. Services to Community and Economy in Project Institutes

Indicator 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 Total % increase

over baseline

Programs conducted

Community (beneficiary)

294

821

1,385

1,133

819

4,891

278

Informal labor force

84 179 439 733 660 2,447 785

Industry personnel

82 204 387 427 401 1,694 489

TOTAL 460 1,204 2,211 2,293 1,880 9,032 409

Number of technologies transferred to the community

48 91 240 331 316 1,157 658

Number of beneficiaries from skill oriented programs (excl industry personnel)

3,050 10,254 31,002 47,481 177,652 329,393 582


Efficiency

3.54 Efficiency is rated as Substantial, based upon an assessment of the Project’s internal rate of return and other efficiency indicators.

3.55 Cost Benefit Analysis: A comprehensive internal rate of return analysis was undertaken in the PAD under different (low, base-case and high) scenarios measured by graduation rates, employment rates and starting salaries. Internal rate of return estimates from the analysis ranged from 3 percent to 23 percent, with 3 percent being the return if the Project underperformed significantly, and 23 percent if the Project did much better than expected. The analysis was redone at the close of the Project with actual retrospective data as reported in the ICR, and showed that the rate of return was 15 percent.

3.56 The analysis above only includes the labor market outcomes of students who passed through the Project institutions during the Project, and not the beneficial impacts of the Project on future cohorts. The discussion on efficacy in the previous section suggests TEQIP I had put Project institutions on an upward trend of improvement, in turn suggesting that gains accrued during the Project were likely, on average, to benefit future cohorts as well. The impact of the Project on the competitiveness and productivity of the economy through improved skills of the engineering labor force and superior R&D is not included, nor is the impact on the local community and economy.

3.57 Project efficiency was likely jeopardized in the initial years of the project because of lack of consensus between MHRD, NPIU and the World Bank on project-related issues. This slowed implementation in the first 1.5 years of the project, leading to the project being

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considered a problem project in 2005. Subsequently, the project picked pace, and was able to reverse many of the shortcomings in implementation as well as fiduciary compliance of the earlier period.

Project Outcome

3.58 This PPAR rates the outcome as Satisfactory. The Relevance of the Objective, the Relevance of Design, Efficacy, and Efficiency were all Substantial.


3.59 The Risk to Development Outcome is rated as Moderate.

3.60 The general environment in India at the time of the evaluation was highly supportive of reforms in technical education. Such reforms are a key focus of the 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012), and a number of recent legislative bills, including the National Accreditation Regulatory Authority for Higher Educational Institutions Bill, 2010; the Educational Tribunals Bill, 2010 and the Prohibition of Unfair Practices in Technical Educational Institutions, Medical Educational Institutions and Universities Bill, 2010. This bodes well for the reforms initiated under TEQIP I. Importantly, TEQIP II is currently in operation, with many institutions from TEQIP I included. In these institutions, the risk of project reforms being reversed is low; the institutions are on an upward performance trajectory.

3.61 Among those institutions not participating in TEQIP II, but at the upper end of the performance distribution, the risk is Moderate. These institutions have been invigorated by TEQIP I and are keen to maintain their reputation as high-performing institutes. Two of the private institutes visited during the mission, Vishwakarma Institute of Technology, Pune and Netaji Subhash Engineering College, Kolkata, were disappointed at not having been chosen for TEQIP II. This, however, had not dampened their enthusiasm to continue with reforms, albeit more in the realm of teaching and student employment than in the realm of research. For the rest, the risk of deterioration is Substantial. Such deterioration will happen to the extent that staff and faculty are not motivated to undertake serious research and teaching, equipment is not maintained as annual maintenance contracts lapse, and software is not updated. In these institutes, maintaining links with industry is also likely to be difficult, especially in non-metropolitan areas, since industry is unlikely to see much worth in them. Project activities such as services to community and networking between institutes are unlikely to continue in the absence of funding. This brings the overall rating to Moderate.

Bank Performance

3.62 Bank Performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory

3.63 Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory. The Project design was based on extensive consultations with a range of stakeholders, had strong linkages with the country’s own priorities and policy framework for the sector, and included good practice from similar Projects in other developing countries. In designing TEQIP I, the Bank took into account the Economic and Sector Work, Scientific and Technical Manpower Development in India;

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IEG’s report, Investment in Technical Education and Vocational Training in India,36 as well as a number of other documents and policy notes. It also drew upon the Bank’s experience in other countries including Indonesia, Jordan, Romania, and Vietnam. While the Economic and Sector Work helped to identify the main problem areas in technical education in India, other Bank Projects provided important lessons in the following areas: the importance of borrower ownership; the need to consider political economy factors; the necessity of system-wide approaches; reliance on incentives; and the importance of a strong monitoring and evaluation system. Of these lessons, those most comprehensively included in the Project design include borrower ownership and the need for system-wide approaches. TEQIP I took a sector-wide perspective to include private institutes within the Project. It achieved this in an environment which has traditionally been unsupportive of private educational institutes being funded through government schemes. Additionally, the Tribal Development Plan had an elaborate program for equity assurance.

3.64 The Bank, however, did not adequately account for some of the political problems and bureaucratic hurdles that derailed reforms in the first 1.5 years. Political endorsement does not necessarily imply bureaucratic support (and vice versa), and the Project did not adequately account for the cogs that lower level bureaucrats can insert into a Project, even if there is bureaucratic support and political support at a higher level. As a result, the Project found itself inert in its initial years.

3.65 The Bank also had overly high expectations of the readiness of the network institutions for reforms. The Project design conceived of innovative approaches for achieving the Project goal, but these approaches depended on institutions being autonomous. Yet, nearly 40 percent of Project institutes did not receive academic autonomy, limiting their ability to achieve quality-oriented academic outcomes. An independent study of TEQIP I conducted by Spectrum Planning India (limited) in 2010 suggests that the grant of academic autonomy should have been made a pre-requisite for the states and institutions participating in TEQIP I. At the same time, the Project may have been over-ambitious in some of its governance-related reforms, especially autonomy and block grants, selecting institutes into the Project that were not ready to undertake the reforms. The Bank’s M&E Design could also have included clear definitions of productivity and competitiveness, and measurable indicators to gauge progress on these objectives.

3.66 Although a separate analysis of political economy constraints was not done, the PAD considered the threat from internal and external sources that could derail the Project in its section on sustainability and risks. The risk analysis recognizes the need for political support for the Project to be successful. Some of the risks identified include the possibility of changes in government derailing reform efforts; the possibility that the criteria of selection of institutions is not conducted openly but subject to external influence; and the possibility that state governments may not be able to provide public funds to Project institutions on a regular basis. Finally, the design of the Project provides the promise of sustainability for those institutions entering TEQIP II, but is silent on those institutions not included in TEQIP II.

36 Prior to 2006, the department of IEG responsible for evaluating the World Bank was called the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).

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While it encouraged institutions to have four funds, the Project did not last long enough in many of the institutions for them to understand and experience the worth of the four funds.

3.67 Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory. The overall quality of supervision was strong, with two credible and effective Task Team Leaders conducting well-documented supervision missions on a regular basis. There was continuity in the Bank team through most of Project period, and there was a smooth transition to the new task team leader in the last two years of the Project.

3.68 Equally important, strong support from the country office ensured timely, regular and technically sound supervision. This included frequent informal need-based consultation with and feedback to the NPIU. The NPIU commended the Task Team Leaders and the country office for their ready availability to answer questions and resolve issues. Nevertheless, there were lapses in following procurement guidelines in the beginning, with massive deviations from procurement guidelines reported in a post procurement review conducted in 2005-06. These were addressed through discussions with the NPIU and the SPFUs. A fiduciary workshop was conducted in 2008. As a result of these efforts, procurement-related deviations reduced significantly by the time of project closing.


3.69 Borrower Performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory

3.70 Government Performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The Project interacted with three different sets of governments: one at the Center until 2004; another at the Center since May 2004; and individual state governments, many of which also changed during the Project cycle. As discussed, government support at the start of the Project was unsatisfactory. MHRD’s technical team had weaknesses that influenced Project progress, including limited ability to undertake training. The Central Government’s ownership and commitment to the Project improved in 2005, when it took strict measures to revitalize the Project. The period also marked a change in political leadership and a new bureaucratic leadership. Since 2005, there were close links between the MHRD and the NPIU, as well as close contact with the Bank team. The performance of individual state governments varied, with some very supportive, but others less so.

3.71 The performance of the implementing agency is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The Department of Higher Education in MHRD was responsible for Project implementation through a National Project Director. The implementation unit, the NPIU, had limited technical capacity, was characterized by poor interpersonal dynamics among staff, and suffered from high staff turnover in the initial phase of the Project. In this initial period, there were few provisions for regularly training NPIU and SPFU staff, or incentives for superior performance. This affected the implementing agency’s overall performance. Additionally, there were a number of procurement-related issues as mentioned previously. NPIU performance improved following a change in government. The NPIU then facilitated implementation and assisted the states in speeding up progress. The unit arranged for orientation workshops in Project concepts for mentors/auditors; procurement and financial

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management training workshops for the states and institutions; and dissemination of information through its website.

Monitoring and Evaluation

3.72 M&E is rated Substantial.

3.73 M & E Design: The M&E design proposed a range of indicators, such as graduation rate of students, number of publications and patents filed, providing important insight on how the project performed on these dimensions. These data tell us about the improved performance of students in terms of their educational and employment outcomes, and the number and type of cross-links between Project institutions, industry and the community.

3.74 The Project had three KPIs: (1) The percentage of high-quality graduates/post-graduates in relevant and cutting edge technologies; (2) Increased involvement of institutions with economy and community; and (3) The percentage of graduates employed within one year of graduation. Relevant and cutting-edge technologies are not defined in the PAD. It was felt that a top-down approach to specifying relevant technologies would limit individual institutions, and that the choice of programs was best made by institutions in their Institution Development Plan. Since the institutions that had been chosen were already performing reasonably well, it was realistic to expect them to make reasonable choices based on their understanding of how technologies were evolving and what were the most important needs in the economy at a given time.

3.75 The project had two indicators for intermediate outcomes: (1) Increased professional output (publications, patents, R&D and so forth) and (2) Joint programs and activities in networked institutions. Component 1, Institutional Development through Competitive Funding, was designed to improve all the KPIs and intermediate outcome indicators. Component 2, System Management Capacity Improvement, designed to facilitate Component 1, indirectly addressed the indicators.

3.76 The design, however, suffered from three shortcomings that limited the utility of the M&E system. First, the defined indicators were insufficient for measuring the achievement of intermediate outcomes of the project as well as its objectives of improving productivity and competitiveness. Second, even when indicators for the outcome were defined, such as in the case of the objective of increasing the supply of high quality technical professionals, they were inadequate. For instance, the employment rate of graduates does not tell us whether employment was in a field in which the graduate had studied in the TEQIP I institutes, whether employment was temporary or permanent, how long it took the graduate to find the job, and whether the graduate was able to hold onto the job.

3.77 Finally, M&E design led to data being collected in an aggregate fashion at the institution level, and not the level at which TEQIP I was targeting its activities: programs, departments within institutes, students and faculty. This makes it difficult, for instance, to gauge whether there were systematic differences in quality improvements/ teaching methods across departments within institutions or whether better-performing students were opting to go in for higher education after graduating or joining the workforce.

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3.78 M&E implementation: The Project generated a vast amount of data. It undertook some innovative tasks that provide lessons in building an overall culture of evaluation in the technical education system in India. It carried out large-scale semi-annual student and faculty satisfaction surveys through the lifetime of the Project, an employer survey and a utilization study. It introduced the innovative use of over 70 experts in the country (former Directors/Deans/Professors of IITs/IISc and universities) who visited each institution under their purview to mentor or conduct performance audits once every 4-6 months. Institutes also collected their own data, but these were not collected in a format that was uniform across institutes, limiting their utilization for comparison purposes. Monitoring of salaries and employment rates proved a challenge, as was the measurement of student and faculty competencies. The possibility of grade inflation was mentioned in interviews with the All India Council of Technical Education, MHRD and employers. The nature and effects of the 1,288 sub-projects for community involvement were also not monitored. Finally, with the exception of satisfaction surveys, TEQIP I’s M&E system was not computerized, with most of the data residing in paper files in the institute, making them difficult to access.

3.79 M&E utilization: Data generated by the M&E system was used to monitor project progress on a routine basis. At the same time, the limited nature of the indicators on which data were collected, and the fact that such data are not easily accessible in the post-Project period, limits the utilization and utility of the M&E system.

4. Themes and Lessons

4.1 The two Projects, with their overarching objective of building the technical manpower of project states (and UT) in India, share a number of similarities in their components. These include improved quality and labor-market relevance of education, cost-recovery mechanisms, and decentralized decision-making. At the same time, they operated within different contexts and focused on different parts of the technical education spectrum, with Technician Education III focusing on vocational education, TEQIP I on engineering education.

Lessons of Experience

4.2 Both Projects were ambitious, focusing on key challenges in tertiary education, and operating under considerable constraints. Together, the two offer important insights into addressing the challenges of providing high-quality technical/vocational education..

The quality of education and labor market relevance: Courses need to be aligned with economic needs, as well as students’ employment aspirations

4.3 The two Projects focused on improving the quality of education primarily by initiating programs of study that were better aligned with the market and economy; providing superior equipment and trained teachers. These inputs were expected to translate into improved employability of graduates (and higher quality of technical/vocational work in the economy).

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4.4 Overall, TEQIP I performed better in terms of the employment record of its graduates. It had two natural advantages over Technician Education III in this regard: (1) on average, TEQIP I students had higher prior test scores in public examinations than Technician Education III students; and (2) TEQIP I institutes were typically located in areas with multiple sources of employment, both in the informal sector and the formal sector. This allowed their placement offices to be more effective.

4.5 From a project perspective, PPAR data suggest that TEQIP I performed better than Technician Education III in its student employment record because the programs of study were better aligned with students’ employment aspirations. It supported programs that were geared towards formal sector employment, and students who were interested in formal sector employment. The match increased the likelihood of students seeking long-term employment in the area in which they are trained versus going in for more education or employment in a sector unrelated to their training.

4.6 Courses and students’ long-term employment aspirations were not as well matched in Technician Education III. In the Project’s institutes, a number of the new programs were in areas in the informal sector, such as garment technology and food processing, while the employer of choice was the government (formal sector). In order to counter the attraction of government jobs, the project needed to do more than merely provide technical skills to students in new programs. It needed to train students in skills that would make participation in the informal sector profitable and sustainable. In this sense, Technician Education III did not adequately understand or address the needs and constraints of the local economy and the local labor market in Project regions. The skills many of the new programs helped develop in students ended up being stand alone. The data in Tables 11 and 12 combined with PPAR interviews suggest most students using the diploma either as steppingstones to a degree-granting institution or as an eligibility mechanism for taking the public services commission exam of their respective state (the path to a government officer’s job).

4.7 The importance of aligning courses with economic needs, as well as students’ employment aspirations is crucial. This is, however, not an easy task. The difficulty in matching courses in vocational education with students’ long-term aspirations is magnified when such courses are introduced into a system with a well-defined mainstream, and a clear ranking of status between the mainstream and the periphery. Further, although most people interviewed were supportive of education that built real world problem-solving skills in students, many questioned the merit of focusing too narrowly on labor market relevant education and whether such education should emphasize specific skills or general skills. Faculty and administrators worried that investing too heavily in building specific skills, in the face of uncertainty on the durability of the skills, would create problems for both institutions and students. From the institution’s point of view, a labor market relevant course of study requires investing in specific equipment and teacher training, both of which take time and money. In terms of student concerns, vocational programs are unlikely to attract the best students, and are more likely to have students from lower social economic backgrounds than regular tertiary institutes. From this perspective, they are more vulnerable should their skill set become obsolete.

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4.8 The structure of institute-industry collaboration envisioned under both projects to enhance the labor market relevance of education also provides important insights. This structure was better defined for TEQIP I institutes, where industry representation in the Board of Governors ensured a minimal amount of industry involvement in matters such as curriculum revisions, which require Board approval. In Technician Education III, the structure was relatively loose, with industry involvement occurring on the initiative of individual institutes. All the same, both Projects implicitly assumed that for education to be labor-market relevant, curriculum design/redesign needed white-collar industry involvement. This automatically put institutes in regions without industry at a disadvantage. Instead of emphasizing only industry collaboration, if the projects had also focused on improving students’ problem-solving skills by encouraging them to “get their hands dirty,” the choices available for such education would open up. For instance, every habitation, no matter how rural, has some form of micro-enterprise in its vicinity, whether a small general store or a bicycle repair shop. These micro-enterprises can provide lessons in a number of fields ranging from accounting to mechanical engineering.

Accreditation processes are difficult in remote regions, and are vulnerable to manipulation

4.9 Both projects encouraged the accreditation of programs within supported institutions as one way of ensuring basic quality standards had been met. In the tertiary education system in India, accreditation can be undertaken by two government entities: All India Council of Technical Education’s National Board of Accreditation and the University Grants Commission’s National Assessment and Accreditation Council. The National Board of Accreditation was set up specifically to set standards in the technical education sector, while National Assessment and Accreditation Council covers all types of educational institutions. The two forms of accreditation rely upon government-appointed experts to visit institutions.

4.10 Both Projects expected —TEQIP I more than Technician Education III — that project institutions would be accredited (by the National Board of Accreditation). When carried out as expected, the National Board of Accreditation’s certification is comprehensive and rigorous. However, in reality there are two problems that limit the soundness of certification. First, while it is easy to arrange for experts to visit institutes that are well or centrally located, there are logistic difficulties in getting experts to go to faraway places, where travel time could exceed a few days. As a result, evaluations and accreditations get delayed in such places, or conducted by people without relevant expertise. Second, there is potential for manipulation of the accreditation process, thereby devaluing its credibility as an instrument for accountability.

4.11 PPAR interviews highlighted the importance of a credible rating agency, potentially one operating outside the government. For instance, Crisil India, a Standard & Poor’s company with an established reputation for providing unbiased credit ratings of companies in India, has recently started rating MBA institutes in India to ensure these institutes meet the needs of the market.

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Leveraging alumni connections is an important mechanism for raising funds. Cost recovery through increased faculty consultancies risks devaluing teaching and fundamental research.

4.12 There were two main mechanisms for cost recovery employed by the Projects: student fees and consultancy services offered by faculty. As discussed in Chapter 1, student tuition fees are highly regulated in both public and private institutes, making excessive reliance on such fees inadvisable. In both projects, internal revenue generation was undertaken through consultancy services offered by faculty. In interviews, faculty mentioned feeling incentivized to undertake such consultancy services, emphasizing how it helped build/enhance their professional credibility. Since they were required to pay only 30 percent of their consultancy income to the institute, such work provided financial incentives as well.

4.13 While encouraging faculty to undertake consultancy services to generate revenue is important, both from the perspective of enhancing their professional standing and providing financial incentives, there are at least two trade-offs with such work. This suggests the need for caution and balance in promoting internal revenue generation among faculty. First is the tradeoff between consultancy/research work and teaching. Relentless pursuit of industry-relevant consultancies means less time to prepare for lectures, potentially reducing the effectiveness of teaching and investments made in the training of teachers. One way in which institutes reported keeping faculty on track with their teaching responsibilities was through regular feedback from students and other faculty members. College of Engineering, Pune, for instance, collects feedback regularly from students on faculty, and conducts spot visits to various classes to ensure student learning does not suffer. Where faculty have not been performing well, they are mentored and provided feedback. Second is the tradeoff between industry-related practical research and fundamental research, which has limited immediate applicability. While TEQIP I institutes are not yet at the stage where such trade-offs are apparent, it is important to invest in mechanisms to ensure the balance between practical research and fundamental research is maintained.

4.14 Alumni donations can provide an important source of funding. Technician Education III institutes do not appear to have benefited from alumni involvement in the way in which many TEQIP I institutes have. TEQIP I institutes such as University Institute of Chemical Technology and College of Enginnering, Pune provide examples of how alumni relations have been cultivated over decades, as a result of which both institutes benefit from donations received from alumni, consultancy and research work, and teaching inputs. For instance, College of Enginnering, Pune’s Bhau Innovation Lab has been funded by alumni. University Institute of Chemical Technology has a number of named professorships, again funded by alumni. An additional advantage of alumni involvement is that it keeps processes within institutes in check, since alumni are more likely to monitor the effective use of their funds than the government may be able to.

Autonomy is important, but institutes must be ready for it in terms of accountability and initiative

4.15 Technician Education III and TEQIP I emphasized institutional autonomy as a precondition for reforms, which would allow education decision-making to be decentralized

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to the institution level and reducing bureaucratic interference and delays. Both projects provide examples of institutes which received full autonomy, and benefitted in multiple ways. The benefits include programs in cutting-edge fields, improved employment of students, and improved research and better internal revenue generation. Autonomy, for instance, put institutes such as University Institute of Chemical Technology, Mumbai and Ambedkar Polytechnic, Port Blair on the path to self-sustained excellence. Autonomy allowed Ambedkar Polytechnic to adopt effective management principles. The Principal of the polytechnic was also made the Director of Technical Education, and reported directly to the Chief Secretary of the UT. Consolidating the office of the Principal and the Director in one person eliminated an intermediate layer of bureaucracy, thereby facilitating the ability of the polytechnic to undertake high-quality programs and cutting-edge research work without worrying about bureaucratic interference or delays.

4.16 Block grants — the core element behind TEQIP I’s financial autonomy reforms — were adopted in the manner envisaged in the PAD in only one state, Haryana. In other states, they were adopted only partially. TEQIP I’s experience highlights the challenges associated with states granting institutions autonomy. First is the political economy constraint discussed in Chapter 1, which potentially reduces the incentive of officials at the state level to grant autonomy. At the same time, the thrust on autonomy, specifically academic and financial autonomy, may have been premature, since many project institutions did not have proper oversight or accountability mechanisms. Equally important, a large number of institutions were not equipped to make effective use of autonomy, in terms of confidence, responsibility, and initiative. This questions the merit of expanding TEQIP I to nearly twice the number of states and institutes. Focusing on fewer institutions — those truly worthy of autonomy — may have allowed the Project to realize its reform goals more effectively.

Systemic reform in Indian technical education should include private institutes

4.17 Private institutes enroll approximately 85 percent of all students studying engineering in India. Technician Education III and TEQIP I were open to private sector participation, but TEQIP I had a vision for including private providers. This was motivated precisely by the fact that much of the growth in engineering education has come from the private sector. Further, most of the quality concerns in engineering education in India emanate from the private sector. Nevertheless, TEQIP I’s vision was not supported adequately by the Government of India. As a result, it failed to translate into a systematic plan for the improvement of private engineering colleges and institutes. As argued in Chapter 3, TEQIP I’s design was biased in favor of state or centrally-funded institutes and against private sector participation. Private sector institutions were provided loans at the same rate at which states received the loan from the center. However, the fee structure of private institutes is highly regulated by the respective state, which means they cannot recover their costs solely through fees. This leaves research and consultancy services provided by faculty as the primary (flexible) source of income. This would have been alright if private engineering colleges in India had a history of research, but they do not, putting them at a disadvantage relative to government institutions in getting contracts for consultancies. While TEQIP I could have addressed this by helping private institutes build a strong research agenda, the terms of the loan reduced the likelihood of private institutes making long-term shifts in their research culture versus undertaking short-term assignments to repay the loan.

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Networking of institutes is likely to be effective only when institutes recognize mutual gains

4.18 Technician Education III and TEQIP I were both mindful of the gains from sharing intellectual resources and equipment, but TEQIP I had an elaborate and formal structure for the networking of institutions. Some institutions were designated as Lead institutions based upon their initial proposals, and the remaining as Network institutions. Lead institutions would assist in the development of network institutions through seminars, joint publication and training sessions. In this way, the investments made in and by Lead institutions would have positive externalities on Network institutions.

4.19 There were, however, specific aspects of the networking model that limited its effectiveness. First, designating some institutions as Lead and others as Network, instead of all as Network, created a hierarchy that was not attractive to many Network institutions (the majority of institutions) or conducive to partnership. PPAR interviews revealed that many Network institutions, with good reason, believed they had sufficient expertise to offer, but Lead institutions preferred to provide rather than receive any expertise. This defeated the spirit of networking, which is a reciprocal activity, and is likely to be successful only when mutual gains are recognized. One way of addressing this could be to have a “revolving” Lead-Network system where each institute gets a chance to be the Lead, and the performance of the entire cluster of institutions is jointly evaluated. Institutions with stronger institutional development proposals could be Leads in the first few years, and be evaluated or provided incentives for their ability to mentor weaker institutes to become Leads. This would require that all institutes be equally free to make changes in curriculum or teaching methods, and that institutions not be constrained in the choice of their partners.

Follow-on Projects

4.20 Bank support in technical/engineering education in India continues through TEQIP II, which was prepared to carry forward the reforms initiated under TEQIP I (Table 26). TEQIP II seeks to strengthen selected institutions to produce more employable and higher quality engineers and prepare more post-graduate students to reduce faculty shortage. The Bank is not currently supporting diploma-level technical/vocational education in India, but is supporting certificate-level vocational training through the India Vocational Training Improvement Project.37 This project works with the Ministry of Labor (and not the Ministry of Human Resources Development as with Technician Education III). It seeks to improve the employment outcomes of graduates from the vocational training system by making the design and demand of training more demand responsive.

37 The Vocational Training Improvement Project is being supported through IDA for USD 280 million.

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Table 26. The Two Operations and Subsequent Bank Support

Project Name Approval

Date Closing

Date Subsequent Bank Research/Operation

TEQIP I 11/14/2002 03/31/2009 TEQIP II (IDA: $300 million)

Technician Education III

09/07/2000 06/30/2007 None (Technician Education III was the final

project in series)

Source: PAD

4.21 TEQIP II has attempted to address the problem TEQIP I faced with states implementing autonomy incompletely, by monitoring and enforcing a timely implementation of each state’s commitment to policy reforms. It has also increased the participation of private engineering institutes, doubling it to 40 institutes. Further, the nature of financial support has been modified from a loan scheme to a grant scheme. TEQIP II is currently rolling out training sessions for Members of institutional Governing bodies to strengthen the accountability mechanisms. The Government of India has also increased the capacity of NPIU both in terms of staffing and in terms of training, and increased the range of NPIU’s decision-making powers. Additionally, TEQIP II has improved its M&E system by designing a centralized online system of data management. At present, the Bank and the Government of India are in dialogue for TEQIP III, which includes discussion on ways to strengthen the quality of private institutes.

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http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-06/india/28320938_1_vacant-posts-central-universities-total-vacancy

http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/tamil-nadu/article2337603.ece

http://www.deccanherald.com/content/100555/500-engineering-colleges-ap-should.html

http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/demand-for-degree-shrinks-engineering-colleges-seek-buyers/445795/

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/497-andhra-engg-colleges-to-be-served-closur/690337/

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-05/news/29739088_1_engineering-colleges-mba-seats-engineering-seats

http://www.education.nic.in/circulars/fee_policy.asp

73 ANNEX A

Annex A. Basic Data Sheet for the Third Technician Education Project (Cr. 3413-IN)

Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)

Appraisal estimate

Actual or current estimate

Actual as % of appraisal estimate

Total project costs 80.10 83.40 104.11

Loan amount 64.90 71.28 109.83

Cofinancing - - -

Cancellation - 0.02 -

Note: Total project costs by component are converted from INR to USD using the average of the quarterly exchange rate from Q2 2000 to Q2 2007 IMF International Financial Statistics, 45.92. IDA financing are reported using the exchange rate at the date of disbursing. Hence, the estimate financing of the Borrower could differ from the actual due to exchange rate fluctuations. The counterpart financing is not divided by Government of India and State governments, since the Borrower, Government of India, on-lent the IDA funds to the State Governments on soft terms.

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11

Appraisal estimate (US$M)

3.4 13.1 28.7 44.6 56.94 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9

Actual (US$M)

3.1 4.5 13.1 22.8 47.1 56.8 68.6 71.3 71.3 71.3 71.2

Actual as % of appraisal

27 34 46 51 83 88 106 110 110 110 109

Date of final disbursement: 09/16/2009

Project Dates

Original Actual

Initiating memorandum 10/29/1999 12/13/1999

Negotiations 06/26/2000 07/17/2000

Board approval 08/08/2000 09/07/2000

Signing 10/18/2000 10/18/200

Effectiveness 01/17/2001 01/17/2001

Closing date 06/30/2006 06/30/2007

ANNEX A 74

Task Team Members

Names Titles Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Shashi K. Shrivastava Sr. Education Specialist SASHD Task Team Leader

Sajitha Bashir Sr. Economist SASHD HD Economist

Vandana Sipahimalani Economist SASHD Economist

C. S. Jha Consultant SASHD Technical Education Specialist

S. A. A. Alvi Consultant SASHD Implementation Specialist

Rajiv Aggarwal Consultant SASHD Architect

R. K. Dixit Consultant SASHD Technical Education

Santhanam Krishnan Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement Engineer

Rajat Narula Sr. FM Specialist SARFM FM

Edward Heneveld Education Team Leader SASHD Team Leader

Lauritz Holm-Nielsen Principal Education Specialist HDNED Peer Reviewer

Richard Cambridge Lead Specialist AFTQK Peer Reviewer

Y. Saran Consultant – Technical Education SASHD Technical Education

Sara Gonzalez Flavell Senior Counsel LEGSA Legal issues

Supervision

Shashi K. Shrivastava Sr. Education Specialist SASHD Task Team Leader

Sajitha Bashir Sr. Economist SASHD HD Economist

Santhanam Krishnan Sr. Procurement Engineer SARPS Procurement Engineer

Rajiv Aggarwal Consultant SASHD Architect

S. A. A. Alvi Consultant SASHD Implementation Specialist

Sushil Kumar Bahl Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement

Andreas Blom Sr. Education Economist SASHD Economist

Debabrata Chakraborti Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement

Mam Chand Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement

Meera Chatterjee Sr. Social Development Specialist SASES Social Development

Renu Gupta Program Assistant SASHD

Nalin Jena Operations Officer SASHD Co-TTL

Chandra Shekhar Jha Consultant SASHD Technical Education

Tanuj Mathur Sr. FM Specialist SARFM FM

75 ANNEX A

Names Titles Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Sangeeta Goyal Education Economist SASHD Economic analysis and M&E (ICR)

Rajat Narula Sr. FM Specialist SARFM FM

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultants costs)

Lending

FY98 0.03

FY99 0.13

FY00 40 103.85

FY01 13 29.73

FY02 0.00

FY03 0.00

FY04 0.00

FY05 0.00

FY06 0.00

FY07 0.00

Total: 53 133.74

Supervision/ICR

FY98 0.00

FY99 0.00

FY00 0.00

FY01 23 53.73

FY02 26 60.54

FY03 16 49.5

FY04 20 90.65

FY05 18 92.57

FY06 21 99.28

FY07 19 105.50

Total: 143 551.62

77 ANNEX B

Annex B. Basic Data Sheet for the Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project (Cr. 3718-IN)

Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)

Appraisal estimate

Actual or current estimate

Actual as % of appraisal estimate

Total project costs 314.00 315.11 100.35

Loan amount 250.00 243.33 97.33

Cofinancing - - -

Cancellation - 35.01 -

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10

Appraisal estimate (US$M) 6.7 30.6 74.5 130.3 186.2 239.4 251.3 251.3

Actual (US$M) 6.0 6.2 12.5 72.9 168.9 233.9 242.9 243.3

Actual as % of appraisal 89 20 17 56 91 98 97 97

Date of final disbursement: 09/16/2007

Project Dates

Original Actual

Initiating memorandum 10/31/2001 11/16/2001

Negotiations 11/26/2011 09/16/2002

Board approval 01/29/2002 11/14/2002

Signing 12/12/2002 02/04/2003

Effectiveness 03/12/2003 03/12/2003

Closing date 06/30/2008 03/31/2009

Task Team Members

Names Titles Unit

Shashi K. Shrivastava Task Team Leader SASHD

Sajitha Bashir Senior Education Economist SASHD

Ralph W. Harbison (late) Consultant – Policy Planning SASHD

C. S. Jha (late) Consultant – Technical Education SASHD

S. A. A. Alvi Consultant – Project Implementation SASHD

Vandana Sipahimalani Rao Education Economist SASHD

Meera Chatterjee Senior Social Development Specialist SASDI

ANNEX B 78

Names Titles Unit

S. Krishnan Senior Procurement Engineer SARPS

Rajat Narula Senior Financial Management Specialist SARFM

Erik W. Thulstrup Consultant – Science and Technology Management SASHD

Sanjay Rastogi Consultant - Financial Management SARFM

D. K. Srivastava Consultant - Economist SASHD

M.H.Dhananjaya Consultant – Institutional Management SASHD

Ravinder Kaur Consultant – Social Development SASDI

Jamil Salmi Manager (Education), Peer Reviewer HDNED

Lauritz Holm-Neilsen Lead Education Specialist, Peer Reviewer

Amit Dar Senior Economist - Peer Reviewer SASHD

Grant Sinclair Lead Education Specialist - Advisor

Sara Gonzalez Flavell Senior Counsel LEGMS

Gertrude Cooper Program Assistant SASHD


Supervision

Andreas Blom Task Team Leader (since Feb 2008) and Sr.Education Economist

SASHD

Rajiv Aggarwal Consultant EASHD

S. A. A. Alvi Consultant SASHD

Kiran R. Baral Sr. Procurement Off. SARPS

Philip Beauregard Sr. Counsel LEGES

Asha Bhagat E T Consultant SARFM

Hyacinth D. Brown Senior Finance Officer LOAFC

Debabrata Chakraborti Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS

Mam Chand Consultant SARPS

Meera Chatterjee Senior Social Development Specialist SASDI

Isak Froumin Senior Education Specialist ECSHD

Sangeeta Goyal Education Economist SASHD


Nalin Jena Senior Education Specialist SASHD

Chandra Shekhar Jha (late) Consultant SASHD

A.K.Kalesh Kumar Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS

Tanuj Mathur Senior Financial Management Specialist SARFM

Hena G. Mukherjee Consultant ECSHD

Michelle Riboud Consultant HDNED

Hiroshi Saeki Operations Analyst SASHD

Shashi K. Shrivastava Task Team Leader (till Feb 2008) and Consultant SASHD

79 ANNEX B

Names Titles Unit

Elfreda Vincent Program Assistant SASHD

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultants costs)

Lending

FY01 19 67.29

FY02 35 116.98

FY03 14 57.58

FY04 - 0.00

FY05 - 0.00

FY06 - 0.00

FY07 - 0.00

FY08 - 0.00

Total: 68 241.85

Supervision/ICR

FY01 - 0.00

FY02 - 0.00

FY03 7 30.68

FY04 18 92.88

FY05 16 99.45

FY06 21 126.66

FY07 15 116.57

FY08 38 241.38

FY09 46 188.78

FY10 3 3.25

Total: 164 899.65

81 ANNEX C

Annex C. List of Persons Met

Amit Adhikari, Deputy General Manager (Operations)

Techno India Group, Kolkata

Pravin L. Agrawal, Director

Ministry of Human Resource Development,

Department of Higher Education

Government of India

Pandit Aniruddha B.,

UGC Research Scientist, Department of Chemical Engineering

Institute of Chemical Technology, Mumbai

Kushal Banerjee, Senior Consultant

Tata Consultancy Services, Kolkata

Rajni Bhatnagar, Vice President Effective Quality Upgradation Assistance for Technical Education

Siddharth Bhattacharya

Officer of Placement and Training

Jadavpur University, Kolkata

Andreas Blom, Senior Education Economist

World Bank

Shivaji Chakravorti, Professor,

Electrical Engineering Department


Satish Chandra Tewary, Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department

Government of West Bengal

Meera Chatterjee, Lead Social Development Specialist

The World Bank

Dilip Chenoy

Managing Director and Chief Executive

National Skill Development Corporation

Sandhya Chintala, Senior Director, Education Initiatives National Association of Software & Service Companies (NASSCOM)

Amit Dar, Manager

The World Bank

ANNEX C 82

Gurcharan Das, (formerly) CEO

Procter & Gamble, India

Sajal Dasgupta,

Director of Technical Education

Government of West Bengal

Head of SPFU, Project Advisor for World Bank Assisted Technical Education Quality Important Program

Amitava Datta

Professor

Department of Power Engineering


Pradyot Bikram Manikya DebBarma

Editor, Northeast Today

Sandeep Deshmukh, Head

Fiber Business, Asia

A. U. Digraskar, Central Project Advisor National Project Implementation Unit (A Government of India Unit for World Bank Assisted Project for Technical Education)

V.G. Gaikar, Head,

Department of Chemical Engineering


Nilangshu Ghosal, Human Resources

Cognizant, Kolkata

Shobha Mishra Ghosh Director Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

Sangeeta Goyal, Senior Economist

The World Bank

Gouri Gupta

Lead – Strategy and Program Development

National Skill Development Corporation

Mohamed H. Jadwet Member of Administrator’s Advisory Council, Andaman & Nicobar Islands

Member of Board of Governors, IIT Madras

Director, Jadwet Trading Company, Port Blair

Director, Inland Marine Works Private Limited, Port Blair

83 ANNEX C

Rajesh Jalnekar, Director

Vishwakarma Institute of Technology

Nalin Jena, Senior Education Specialist The World Bank

Madhuri A. Joshi, Professor of Electronics

& Dean Research and Development

College of Engineering, Pune

S. G. Joshi, Group Technical Advisor

Skylark Precitech Pvt. Ltd.

Surinder Kapur, Chairman,

Sona BLW Prazisionsschmiede GmbH

Sri P. Karmakar, Additional Director of Higher and Technical Education,

Mehgalaya, Shillong

W. Khyllep, Director of Higher & Technical Education

Meghalaya, Shillong

Prakash Kulkarni, Associate Professor and Head of Department of Engineering, Science & Humanities

Vishwakarma Institute of Technology, Pune

Ampareen Lyngdoh, Minister of Education Government of Meghalaya

S.K. Mahajan

Director of Technical Education

Government of Maharashtra

Ankur Malik, Manager,

Resource Management Group & IT Services

Wipro, Kolkata

H. K. Mandal, Director

Netaji Subash Engineering College, Kolkata

Teli Mangesh. D., Dean,

Student Affairs & Human Resource Development


Ashutosh Marathe

Dean, Quality Assurance

Viskwakarma Institute of Technology, Pune

ANNEX C 84

R.N. Mathur, Founder President Effective Quality Upgradation Assistance for Technical Education

Sandeep Meshram

Asst. Professor and Placement Officer

Government College of Engineering, Pune

Vinod M. Mohitkar, Deputy Director, Directorate of Technical Education


Huber Nove-Josserand, Operations Adviser for India The World Bank

Virendra D. Pawar

Manager, Human Resources

Vishwakarma Institute of Technology

Haribhau Phakatkar Mechanical Engineering, Dean, Administration & Registration

Viskwakarma Institute of Technology, Pune

Sharda Prasad, Director General,

Employment and Training Joint Secretary, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Government of India

Professor Samir Kumar Saha

Mechanical Engineering


Subho Samanta, Vice President

Cognizant, Kolkata

Swapnil Shailendra Shukla

Location Campus Manager

Wipro, Kolkata

Utpal Sharma, Special Secretary (IT)

Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Port Blair

KK Shrivastava, Consultant, The World Bank

Sanjeev R. Shukla Registrar and Professor of Fibers & Textile Processing Technology


Shakti Sinha, Chief Secretary

Andaman and Nicobar Administration

85 ANNEX C

Yogesh Srivastava, Consultant National Project Implementation Unit (A Government of India Unit for World Bank Assisted Project for Technical Education)

P.S. Thangkhiew, Principal Secretary, Education

Government of Meghalaya

S.T. Vagge, Professor & Dean

College of Engineering, Pune

S.S. Vengsarkar, Training and Placement Cell Facilitator


Abhay E. Wagh, Deputy Secretary

Higher & Technical Education Department


G. D. Yadav, Vice Chancellor


87 ANNEX D

Annex D. Borrower Comments

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