Do Individuals Make a Difference? The Individual Level of...

Chapter 3

The Individual Level of Analysis, Part II

Psychological Explanations for War

The common folk do not go to war of their own accord, but are driven to it by the madness

of kings.�+,��(�J�

Wars begin in the minds of men.�+��-,�E�� #�

Thus far we have been operating under the assumption that humans are aggressive due to things that they have

more or less in common: predispositions for aggression that �� &��# ��(@�#��)�� ) ��

common cultural responses to our �'�� +��)��<�� .?�/��(�D�� (��

important are the differences between people rather than their similarities. It should be apparent that not all

people have the same nature: Some are clearly more prone to violent behaviors than others. There are great

differences in the psychological makeup of individuals, differences that are important to the understanding of

conflict. In sum, human nature is a variable, not a constant.[1]

Consider for a moment the war between India and Pakistan in 1971. The forces of West Pakistan had invaded

East Pakistan to overturn the results of an election that would have placed an East Pakistani political leader at

the head of the state. India was burdened by over ten million refugees from East Pakistan and harbored

longstanding grudges against Pakistan. Finally, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered Indian forces to penetrate

five miles into Pakistani territory and issued an ultimatum ordering the Pakistani ruler, Yahya Khan, to withdraw

from East Pakistan. Yahya Khan chose war instead, a fatal mistake since his army was quickly and decisively

defeated, with East Pakistan gaining independence as Bangladesh. Why did this occur? Consider John

,� ((�� @(��(( ((� ��&��@(�� )�� /��L�� (� that the ultimatum

��(��#�� )��)�(��) (��#��&��@(�&�� ()�� ego,

such an ultimatum from a woman was psychologically unacceptable. Thus, even though he knew

that the Indian forces outnumbered his own by a ratio of five to one, the president of Pakistan

ordered a massive air strike.[2]

�� & �( �&��@(�� &��#��& �� '��( � �� have been a decisive

&�)�� )�(��Q�,� ((�� @(�K�� or may not be valid, but it opens the door to the

link between individual attributes and war.

This chapter investigates the ways in which the individual leader influences the decision about whether to go to

war. We will first discuss the circumstances in which individual leadership most affects decision making and then

the various ways that individuals are influenced themselves: through personality, cognitive biases, emotion, and

more.

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Do Individuals Make a Difference?

It is quite appropriate that we should seek the causes of war in the individual makeup of national leaders who

are in a position to choose between war and peace. The basic assumption at this level of analysis is that

individuals do make a difference. It matters that Vladimir Putin (or Mikhail Gorbachev or Boris Yeltsin) sits in

the Kremlin instead of Josef Stalin; it makes a difference whether Barack Obama sits in the Oval Office instead

of George W. Bush. It matters, presumably, because in most cases wars are precipitated by the decisions of

individual leaders and their advisers. One would be hard-pressed to find examples of war that occurred without

a command decision from the highest level of government authority. Thus, if we want to know what caused the

outbreak of war, we need to understand the individuals who were responsible for those decisions.

On the other hand, we must be careful not to completely reduce the causes of every war to the psychological

makeup of individual leaders. It is clear that the ability of any individual leader alone to determine war or peace

is constrained by a great number of important factors: by the international and domestic environments, by the

role of governmental bureaucracies in policy formulation and implementation, by formal and informal decision-

making processes, and so on. It is also clear that there are some situations in which these constraints are less

powerful and in which individual leaders will be able to make a significant impact on national policy. In such

situations individual level characteristics may be decisive.

Under what circumstances might we expect individual leaders to be able to rise above the normal organizational

constraints? The obvious answer is when only the top executives and their advisers make the decision. The

higher one is in the bureaucratic hierarchy, the fewer organizational and role constraints there are to restrict the

influence &�� @(�� (�� )�(��.�� (�� )�(��# �� )�� highest decision

maker has sole responsibility. The fewer the number of individuals involved, the more we will be able to focus

on individual and personality factors instead of larger institutional factors. But when do we see decision making

at the highest levels?[3] Decisions are made by a small number of top level executives under a number of

circumstances:

1. When formal, constitutional procedures (or informal, situational factors) demand it, owing to the type of

decision involved or the structure of the situation.

2. When the top leader is constitutionally permitted great personal latitude and discretion to make decisions

or where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single leader (as in a dictatorship).

3. When the leader has a high degree of interest in the decision.

4. When there is only one institution responsible for the decision, permitting a few officials in that one

institution to make policy unencumbered by opposition from other organized bureaucratic forces.

Furthermore, the personal characteristics of these top leaders should have greater impact on policy:

1. 9� �� )�(��(�� &��)�� (��+� �&��)��no standard operating

routines have been developed that would restrict the latitude &�� )�(�� (+�(��)��(�(.

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2. When the information concerning the situation is either extremely low or when top leaders are inundated

��&��<' ��?L�� ( �)��(�� (��is likely to be highly ambiguous,

allowing individuals to define the situation themselves and to make decisions in accord with their own

predispositions.

3. When the top decision maker has little experience or training in foreign affairs, thus forcing the leader to

rely more on his or her natural problem-solving predispositions.

4. When the situation is accompanied by great stress.

Assuming that many of these conditions are met, we may begin to examine some personal characteristics that

may be crucial determinants of whether leaders will choose to take their countries to war.

The Role of Reason: The Rational Model

In the best of all possible worlds governments would pursue peaceful policies rather than aggressive ones, their

leaders would be enlightened and humane rather than incompetent or venal, and reason and good intentions

would prevail over stupidity and evil. In this world of philosopher-kings and well-intentioned governments, we

would expect policy to be made in a reasoned, calculated manner. Political scientists generally define rationality

as a process in which certain steps are taken to ensure that the conclusion arrived at is the one that has the best

chance of accomplishing the goals � (�� .�, ' ��)��()� �) �� (+ *� )� ��

choice �� )�� +��)�� (�� &��) ��.�Procedural

rationality would include the following steps:

1. Identify and define the problem .

2. Identify and rank goals. Often, policy makers will have more than one goal. If so, they will have to be

ranked in order of importance, since it is quite likely that no policy option can achieve all goals and that

the choice of any particular policy might mean that some goals will have to be sacrificed in order to attain

certain other goals. Rationality requires that decision makers make conscious trade-offs of the things they

value.

3. Search for information. (This process is more or less continuous and may in fact start at step 1. It is

included arbitrarily as step 3.)

4. Identify many alternative means/options for achieving the goal(s).

5. Analyze each possible alternative. At this stage, decision makers must estimate and weigh the probable

costs and benefits of each alternative, examine the possible consequences of using each option, calculate

the effect of each option on other goals, determine the relative effectiveness of each option for achieving

the goals, and estimate the probability of each potential outcome.

6. Choose the option that is best able to achieve your goals. In other words, select the optimal�(�� +

the one most likely to maximize your interests.

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7. Implement the decision; that is, put it into action.

8. Monitor and evaluate the policy decision. Is it a success or a failure? Does it have defects? Is it

achieving the desired results?

9. Terminate/alter/continue the policy as determined by your evaluation of it in step 8. This last step

recognizes that decisions are not normally one-and-done deals; they are more often part of a chain of

iterated decisions over time.

��) ��# �� &� �) ��'��(@�� )�(��regarding war, and sometimes

this rationality does work as intended. But these are rather stringent standards, and as we will see in this chapter

and the next, the real world of decision making departs from the ideal model considerably.

The Role of Personality: Psychological Theories

Psychological Needs or Motives

Psychologists have identified a variety of psychological needs that motivate the actions of individuals, some of

which are relevant to politics. The need for self-affection or love, the need for self-esteem or dignity, and the

need for self-actualization or fulfillment are often identified, for instance, as well as the needs for security, power,

and dominance. All individuals have similar needs; however, the relative importance of these needs varies. While

some individuals seem to be dominated by the need for self-esteem, others might be dominated by the need for

power. Abraham Maslow hypothesizes a hierarchy of needs.[4] Listed in their order of assumed priority they

are as follows:

1. ��(�)��6#��)��8+&�� ( *

2. ,�& ��+�� ((��) �&�(�'�'��( )��

3. =&& )��# �� ((+�'

4. -(� �+&��( �&3 (� �� (� )��&�� (

5. Self-actualization or self-development

According to Maslow, these needs are both universal and innate; all humans have these needs. Each set of goals

��H (�� '��@(�)�()�(� ((.�9� ��the first set of needs is fairly well satisfied, the next

<�� ?�� (��dominate the conscious life and serve as a central motivator of human behavior. The

<�� ?�� (��# )� ��)��'�� <�� ?�� (�� (��#��(��(&� �.�For instance, if both

psychological and security needs are fairly well satisfied, affection needs will become important for the

individual. Thus, which needs are important to the particular individual depends on his or her prior pattern of

need gratification.[5]

��)��(�J�(��@(�� )��&�self-actualizing��'��(+��( ��' ��)�� ' �

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satisfaction of their physical needs and their psychological needs for security, belongingness, and self-esteem.

This physical and psychological security makes it possible for these individuals to have trust in their

environments. Presumably, individuals with high self-esteem are not only more trusting of others but also more

opposed to the use of force. However, their confidence in their own abilities would probably lead them to

accept greater risks than others. On the other hand, individuals with low self-esteem have been depicted as

being anxious, hostile, uncooperative, tough bargainers, paranoid, and nationalistic and as having a propensity

toward the use of military force. (Many would put Wilhelm II and Stalin in this category.)

The basic presumption, at least for some scholars, has been that aggressive behavior is the result of the need to

compensate (and indeed to overcompensate) for anxiety caused by low self-esteem. A corresponding

assumption is that people with high self-esteem no longer have an overwhelming urge to see themselves

&�'��#��L�� @' �(��(&� ��this need. Presumably, then, high self-esteem confers immunity from ego threats and

greatly reduces a major reason for aggressive behavior. This does seem to be the case for many such people,

but reality (as usual) is somewhat more complex.

,�� (�&�'��(��(�&�� & (�� ' �(�&�� ((��+��)��narcissists (people with

grandiose views of themselves), psychopaths (who tend to have truly astonishing egocentricity and a sense of

entitlement to go along with their )�� )� (8�� () ��#�� (+��)�� &�� ( ��

suffer from low self-esteem. Some psychologists now argue that violence is associated with a small subset of

� �� ( �&3 (� �+��( ��( ��( �&3 (� ��(��) ��and unstable. When these people are

confronted with threats to their egos inflicted by others, they tend to react aggressively.[6] On the other hand,

those whose high self-esteem is stable tend to be the least '�� ((�' .��-�� @(�&��(

study in political psychology shows that people with high self-esteem differ in their attitudes toward the use of

force. Etheredge studied male U.S. foreign service officers, military officers, and domestic affairs specialists and

their responses to international crisis scenarios. He found that those measuring high on self-esteem generally

tended to oppose the use of force, but those with high scores on self-esteem coupled with high ambition were

the most dangerous, showing a strong tendency to advocate military solutions.[7]

9� �� # �� ' ��J�(��@(�� (�)�� )��(��political psychologists argue

that three fundamental sets of motives are readily recognizable among political actors: (1) People whose primary

motivation is power desire to influence or to make an impact on other individuals or countries or on the world at

large. (2) Individuals whose primary motive is achievement are driven to accomplish major deeds and attain

high standards of excellence. They want to make a mark on the historical record. (3) Individuals whose primary

motive is affiliation are concerned about establishing and maintaining positive personal relationships. They wish

to occupy a seat of power that places them in the limelight.[8]

Students of politics are probably all familiar with leaders who seem to have a tremendous need for power.

According to Winter, power orientation��(��(�� (+� �� #��.[9] Power orientation, coupled

with self-control and a sense of responsibility, may have positive effects. However, if power orientation is not

restrained by a sense of responsibility or self-control, the results can be rather nasty. These power-oriented

people tend to dominate others, to be argumentative, to be paranoid, and to have very little humanitarian or

moral concern, and they may be impulsive and prone to taking extreme risks in the pursuit of prestige. Studies

also find that high need for power �(��(()�� @(�(�� ((��&�� )�(��) ((.[10] The

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��'��@(�� &�� (��(�� )�� *��' ��conflictual, and aggressive behavior

and a disposition toward the advocacy of war or the use of force in foreign policy decisions.[11] Power-oriented

persons are frequently believed to be compensating for deprivations experienced during childhood, where their

needs for security, love, achievement, and self-worth were not met.[12] Unfortunately, such individuals also tend

to desire positions of leadership that permit them to exert control over others; indeed, this may be the defining

characteristic of professional politicians! Harold Lasswell suggested many years ago that the primary motivation

for political activity is emotional insecurity or low self-esteem, conditions that are compensated for by a drive for

power.[13]

�� (� ' ��(� � '�� ) �� @(�� &�� more aggressive his

�' �� @(�&� ��)� (.[14] 9�� @(��(�(�&�� # �� '��&� ��)�

actions by U.S. presidents shows that although the causal linkage is complex, presidents with power motivation

were associated with involvement in wars.[15] J�� M ��@(��(�(�&�&��3&�' �� (��(

indicates that power motivation is related to high levels of hostility expressed toward other countries.[16]

On the other hand, those individuals who are dominated more by need for affiliation and need for

achievement�� )� ��' �� )��(�� (.�9�� ,� ��@(� study of

American presidents indicates that presidents with higher affiliation and achievement needs (as opposed to

power needs) were less likely to engage in war and more likely to support arms control.[17] =�� @(

international relations simulations suggest that individuals who are achievement oriented pursue cooperative

strategies at first, hoping their opponents will also be cooperative.[18]

9�� @(��(�(�&�,��M(( ��@(��'��(��#�( ��)�� (�(�&��(� interviews with reporters

between 1974 and 1991, indicate a profile characterized by high power motivation, above average affiliation

motives, and low achievement motivations. As we will see shortly, the dominance of power motivation

corresponds with assessments of Saddam Hussein by others who describe him as having an unbounded drive

for power and prestige, the use of aggression as an instrument of power, and a paranoid fear of enemies. Each

of these traits is statistically linked to power motivation, especially when the subject lacks a sense of

responsibility.[19]

Personality Traits

While human beings exhibit a wide variety of personality traits, some have special relevance for the topic of war.

Dogmatism: One personality type that students of international conflict might wish to watch out for is what

Milton Rokeach has dubbed the dogmatic personality.[20] Individuals with dogmatic personalities are rather

closed-minded; they find it difficult to accept and use new information that contradicts their beliefs. They do not

tolerate ambiguous information very well; they are unlikely to examine the full range of alternatives available; and

they have a tendency to rely on stereotypes. They are generally suspicious, have high levels of anxiety, and are

likely to perceive conspiracies. They are also predisposed to condone the use of force.[21]

Authoritarianism: One of the most frequently discussed set of traits belongs to individuals who may be

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described as authoritarian personalities. A famous study of T. W. Adorno and his associates identified a

complex of characteristics that typified such a personality and then developed a scale through which they could

ascertain (by the use of questionnaires) whether a particular individual possessed these traits.[22] Although

Adorno named his scale the F-scale for fascism, those who score high on this scale tend to have beliefs that

could categorize them as members of either the extreme right (fascists) or the extreme left.

The traits involved include a preoccupation with virility and strength, a tendency to dominate subordinates,

deference to superiors, the need to perceive the world in a highly structured way, discomfort with disorder, a

preference for clear-cut choices, rigidity, and the use of stereotypes. The effect that such a personality would

have on the ability of an individual to make rational decisions is obvious. In addition, authoritarians also tend to

# ��(��)�� ) ��)+)��)� ��(��)(�that are both highly associated with support for war and

aggression.[23]

Dominance: Students of politics are also familiar with individuals who possess domineering personalities:

Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Henry Kissinger come immediately to mind. Individuals with such

personality characteristics are probably plentiful on the political scene; political recruitment patterns and self-

selection combine to elevate those with high dominance characteristics to high positions. Winter generally

concludes that the dominance trait is associated with a disposition toward war and the use of force.[24] Two

separate studies of American presidents and their foreign policy advisers indicate that individuals who possessed

the personality trait of dominance were usually much more likely to advocate the use of threats and military force

and oppose conciliatory moves than those who scored lower on dominance. Indeed, based on knowledge of

the ��'��@(�� (�� (��#��(�� (�� #� ��))�� )��77 percent of the time

whether that person would advocate the use of force or not.[25] In other words, the personality trait of

dominance seemed to have been generalized &�� '��@(� ' ��& �� &��)�.

Domineering leaders tend to relate to other countries in much the same way as they relate to other individuals.

This is an important finding. It suggests that decisions on the use of force at the national level are determined at

least in part by the subconscious personality traits.

Extroversion/Introversion : One analyst has discovered that in disagreements concerning U.S. policy toward

the Soviet bloc, the more extroverted personalities were much more likely to advocate cooperative policies

than those who were more introverted. Since personality factors interact, predictions of behavior based on a

combination of traits are preferable. The evidence indicates that the combination of high dominance and

introversion factors would seem to create a particularly undesirable mix. Here �(��-�� @(��(�(�&

()��'��(�� # �(�<��)��6-*)��8�� (�?��( ��(�� &��C��N(� �

Dulles, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Charles Evans Hughes, Henry Stimson, Dean Acheson, and

Cordell Hull:

The Bloc Leaders tend to divide the world, in their thought, between the moral values they think it

ought to exhibit and the forces opposed to this vision. They tend to have a strong, almost

Manichaean, moral component to their views. They tend to be described as stubborn and

tenacious. They seek to reshape the world in accordance with their personal vision, and their

foreign policies are often characterized by the tenaciousness with which they advance one central

idea.[26]

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Risk Orientation7��(�� (��(�� ( �' (�� .�� '��@(�� (��&��risks would

seem to be a trait that may be of cardinal importance regarding decisions for war or peace. In such situations

some decision makers are relatively more risk acceptant, while others are more risk averse. Given the same

evaluation of the costs and benefits to be derived from war, some decision makers may be willing to take the

risk for war given a particular probability of success (say, 50 percent), while other decision makers may require

a greater probability of success (say, 75 percent). This individual difference may play an important role in the

decision to go to war.[27] Byman and Pollack hypothesize that risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause

wars, and they offer Hitler, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Saddam Hussein as historical examples.[28] 9 @��'

more to say about this later.

Combinations: From her psychological study of foreign leaders, Margaret Hermann has constructed six

personality orientations each of which is made up of different combinations of various motives, traits, and

cognitions. Each orientation is associated with certain foreign policy behaviors. Probably the one that should

cause us to stand up and take ��) ��(�� (� �� & �(��(�< *��(��(�.?��(�� &�� is

interested in gaining control over more territory, resources, and people. The psychological components that

make up this complex are power motivation, nationalism, a belief in � @(��#��)�� ' ��(��( �&3

confidence, distrust of others, and task motivation.[29] A separate study by Hermann places Saddam Hussein in

the expansionist orientation category.[30]

,� �� F�(��(��H ��(�� J��(� ��@(�� (��#�( ��on a content analysis of his

responses to Parliamentary Questions on foreign policy. M �� (��@(�(��&��(��( �&�&�)

against Iraq in 2003 can be accounted for by the combination of his high need for power and his high belief in

his ability to control events. These attributes led him to tightly control the decision-making process in the hands

of a small group and to permit very little open debate on the issue. Meanwhile, his low conceptual complexity

led him to see the Iraq issue in a fairly simplistic black-and-white way.[31]

Personality Complexes

We can now advance from looking at mere personality characteristics or traits to actually personality

complexes. The term personality refers to more than just an accumulation of discrete individual traits; it

indicates �� )�� *�� .�N��)��(�)��(�(�� (��<�� (�a patterned

relationship that links belief systems, value systems, attitudes, leadership styles and other personality

& �� (.?[32] �� (�&�� (��)�� @(�� L�� @(��&& )��& ��(� (including

anxiety, aggression, hostility, shame, and guilt); drives for power, achievement, ��&&��L�� @(� '��

of reality; interpersonal relationships (including )��)��&�� 8L�� @(�� 6��#�'�� ) ��#�

�� 8L�� @(�)��)� ��(��)�ego defenses; and cognitive/intellectual style. Particular personality types tend to

be linked with particular belief systems and leadership styles.[33]

Political psychologist Jerrold Post identifies three personalities that are of particular interest to political

psychologists: narcissists, obsessive-compulsives, and paranoid personalities. He argues that the first two are

<��(�� ( �� )�� (.?�� ( �� (�� (��

uncommon, but �� ( ��)��)� �� <)��(��)�)�( D �) (�&�� (.?[34] During

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times of stress, individuals with each of these patterns of personality organization can essentially cross the line

into personality disorders��)��# )� �<�(�)��)��(�#��.?��(�� (�� ( �) �&��&��3

blown personality disorder is not consistent with sustained office-holding; such individuals )��(��+

(� )�� )��)�+#�� # �&��)�( ��()� �� (.[35] � �@(�� D�)��&

�� ( �� (��)�� * (+�� (�� (�and narcissism. As we look at these personality

complexes, it is important to note that political leaders (like all of us) possess a considerable array of

psychological characteristics that are unlikely to fit one pure type. Instead, what is important is the

predominance of one style over another.[36]

Paranoid Personality: Political leaders with a paranoid personality complex are identified by a host of

interrelated characteristics.[37] They are incredibly suspicious and mistrustful of others; they are hypervigilant of

threats to themselves and see themselves as surrounded by enemies. The world they perceive is one of complex

��(��<�� ' (��(� )�� (.?�� also hostile, stubborn, unwilling to compromise, and

defensive. Great effort is expended to create a near-perfect self-image as a compensation for feelings of

inferiority, and paranoids are therefore hypersensitive and easily slighted. Perceived threats to their self-images

trigger a projection mechanism that is likely to bring about an aggressive counterattack. They also have a need

for self-reliance as a way of defending against the dangerous world they perceive. (And since self-reliance is

related to power, there is a strong drive for dominance that is part of the paranoid personality.)

Leaders with paranoid personalities have a cognitive style that is highly rigid. They believe that they know what

the world looks like, and it is full of external dangers and threats. They are internally driven to search for

information that confirms this view, and they tend to systematically exclude information to the contrary.

Paranoids are prone to internally motivated biases and to disregard information at variance with their belief

system. The paranoid creates an elaborate system of beliefs and theories to justify the projection of threat onto

others. This process biases them in favor of worst case analyses. (The result, of course, is a highly distorted

view &�� .8�� ( ��&�� )�(�(� ��# �� &(+��&�which are centered around

an image of an enemy. The enemy is viewed as totally evil and threatening without any shades of gray. When

confronted with new situations, paranoids tend to rely on the use of historical analogies as a heuristic shortcut to

understanding. They compare current situations to things that have happened to them before. Their diabolical

view of the enemy means that they prefer the use of force over negotiation and they lean toward preemptive

strategies in a crisis.

Since paranoids tend to see threats where they do not exist, tend to have delusions of complex plots against

them, and tend to be extremely vigilant in scanning the environment for threats emanating from diabolical

opponents, one would think that the primary risk of war with such leaders is that they engage in preventive or

preemptive wars against presumed enemies who are not really a threat to their countries. This is logical and it

may actually have occurred.

E� ��)��(�)��(��$��(�� C( &�,��+�� (��(�� ' �� @(

��(��(�� )��((�)��(� ��)��&�� (+��(�actually under-prepared �&��M�� @(��'�(��&��

Soviet Union in June 1941 because of his paranoia.[38] This sounds quite counterintuitive, but it makes sense.

Germany posed a real threat to Russia, not a delusional one, and at one level Stalin certainly understood this.

But there were still delusional elements in his analysis of German behavior. It is well known that in the days

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before the German attack, Stalin and other Soviet leaders had abundant information that the attack was about to

))�+��&��)��(��(��(( ��by Stalin as being fabrications or part of a calculated German plot to

provoke the Russians into a preemptive attack; thus, he gave orders for Soviet forces to avoid provocation.

Even after the German attack began, he was hesitant to permit counterattacks by Soviet forces. Stalin is

reported to have gone into a state of near catatonia, retreating to his dacha, drinking heavily, not communicating

to his staff or issuing orders, seemingly engulfed by debilitating depression. In other words, he had a

psychological #� ��.�M�� @(��)��(�� )�� (��(��(��)�((�(��)� ��this resulted in

the collapse of his self-esteem. He assumed that his days as leader were numbered and the other members of

his Politburo would arrest him.

/��(�)�( ��,��@(��)�� '��) �� (��(�' �)� �#�� beliefs and attitudes that he had

constructed regarding Hitler. According to Birt, Stalin believed he understood Hitler and even identified with him

and admired him. �� &� ��M�� )��.�E�� )�(��)��(�&�,��@(��are possible.

,��' �# �� ' �� &�� M�� @(��(�� 7�he always issued warnings or ultimatums

before he invaded other countries (and no ultimatum had been issued to Russia), and he tried to provoke others

to use force in order to justify his actions as self-defense. Or Stalin might have believed that Hitler was a

realpolitik statesman like former Chancellor Bismarck who knew better than to put Germany into a two-front

war.[39] Regardless of what Stalin thought, the problem is that paranoids have rigid belief systems and adhere to

these beliefs very stubbornly to protect their infallible self-image, even in the face of clear and unambiguous

information to the contrary.

=�� (� )��&�,��@(��(�� (��&�*�� +�� (��( ��

&��(�� (�� (+)�� &��rather than from abroad. While these threats

��,��@(�� #�(�(��reality, the result was that he ruthlessly and relentlessly purged the party

organization, �� ) �� )� (�� &&�) ��)��(+��(�'�(�� (�� @(��#��

protect itself against the real threat from Germany.

Narcissism: Narcissism is a highly complex personality construct made up of several factors.[40] These factors

��)�� 6!8� *�� (�� *�� ( �&3�#(��+��)��a sense of self-entitlement and superiority

that verge on grandiosity, a preoccupation with fantasies of unrealistic goals, the need for continual attention and

admiration, and physical vanity; (2) a disposition to exploit and manipulate others, coupled with an inability to

empathize with others; (3) an absence of conscience in the pursuit &�� @(��(L�6"8�� ' �� (��

and authority roles; and (5) a hypersensitivity to the criticism of others. This external grandiosity constitutes a

massive compensation for feelings of inferiority and/or uncertainty about identity: The massive hunger for acclaim

�(�� )�� ( �&3 (� �.��)�((�(�(�� '�� #� +( �(��' ��(��(��)��)�(�+��

suffer psychological injury easily. This inhibits their ability to do reality testing. When placed in leadership

positions, they are prone to surround themselves with toadies who will tell them what they want to hear.

Moreover, their grandiosity leads to an overestimation of their skills and ability to control events, impairing their

judgment. Strong relationships have been found between narcissism and hostility, aggression, and the need for

power.

, ' ��(�)��(�(��' �)�)�� /��D@(�,��M(( ��)�((�(��)�personality.[41] In fact,

Jerrold Post, who has constructed personality profiles of world leaders for the CIA, has concluded that

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M(( ��@(�� (��(��&�malignant narcissism , a particularly dangerous personality disorder. Saddam

saw himself as a great historical &�� +�� &�� (��(�&��(( ��J��(��.��(��

was linked to dreams of glory and a messianic vision to rid the Arab world of Western influence and to unite it

�� (�� +��( �&.�M ��(�� ()��# ��(��'��outlook on the world, prone to seeing the

United States, Iran, and Israel behind plots against his leadership and justifying his aggression as required by

threats from his enemies. (This is not to say that Hussein lacked enemies, just that he tended to ignore his own

role in creating these enemies and that he generally exaggerated the threats.) He was consumed by a drive for

�� +��' ��(��)�(�� #��)�()� �) �or by a concern for the suffering of others. But

these dreams of glory, feelings of specialness, and messianic ambition (as well as his acts of aggression) hid

underlying feelings of self-doubt and insecurity. The combination of messianic ambition for unlimited power,

absence of conscience, unconstrained aggression, and a paranoid outlook constitute the central constellation of

his personality.

While these traits do not describe someone with a pleasant personality, Saddam Hussein did not suffer from a

psychotic disorder. He was capable of seeing the difference between fantasy and reality; he was rational rather

than impulsive, and he was capable of deliberation and even patience. He was even capable of reversing course

and backing down, but was likely to back down only if he could keep his honor and prestige intact. However, in

�(�@(��(�(��<9�� (��(�)��)��)�� is often politically out of touch with reality.

,��@(��'� ��(��(�� and he has scant experience out of the Arab world . . .

Moreover, he is surrounded #��(�)��(�� )� ��#��,��@(�� 3&�� &��#��

and �� &��)��)��.?[42] Thus, he is a calculating political leader who was constantly subject to

miscalculations. While he was indeed a ruthless political calculator, he did not see himself as a martyr; his chief

��(��(��)��(�'�'��.�9�� <� �)��# �extremely dangerous and will stop at

nothing if he is backed into a corner. If he believes his survival as a world-class political actor is threatened,

Saddam can respond with unrestrained aggression, using whatever weapons and resources are at his

��(�(��.?[43]

�� (�� #��M(( ��@(�� (�� (�/��D�was engaged in during his time

�(�� +�� !02 A22�/��3/��D�9�� !00 A0!�G�&�War, and the 2003 Iraq War. In each he made

grave miscalculations. In the first two he engaged in aggression against neighbor states, Iran and Kuwait, which

eventually led to retaliation that left Iraq prostrate. In the third war his unwillingness to provide complete

��(�� )��#��/��D@(��)��&�9JF�� Bush administration officials to perceive that

Iraq constituted a threat to U.S. interests that required a military solution.[44]

Psychohistory

Anyone who has taken three final examinations on the same day is aware that there is a rather fine line between

sanity and mental illness. The stresses and strains of high political office would seem to place government

officials quite near the line more often than either they or we would desire. Jerome Frank maintains that as many

as seventy-five chiefs of state in the last four centuries have suffered from severe mental distress while in

power.[45] Hitler, Wilson, and Stalin have all been described by their biographers as having had severe

psychological problems. Since these biographies combine history and psychology, they are frequently given the

�� <�(�)��(��.?�� (�� K(�� *�� &�how social scientists have applied psychological insights

-71-

�� *�� @(�� )�(��&��.�, ' ��()��(��' �� ( ��9�� //@(�� )�(�' ��

starting World War I, especially historians John Rohl and Robert Waite and political scientist Richard Ned

Lebow.[46]

�� ( �@(��#� ��)�� (��(�� (�)�� (.��(��Foreign Minister Grey

� )�� (�# �� &�� ( ��(�<��D�� (�� ?�� (� �� <��#�� (��(� ��

up and screws going, but with no �� ?��(� �� K(��<)�( ��)��(�� .?[47] Those who

knew him described him as childlike, impulsive, mercurial, and unstable. He vastly overestimated his own

abilities, had grandiose visions of himself, was unable to take criticism, and appeared incapable of learning from

advice or experience. It is also speculated that he suffered from sexual confusion.

These debilitating traits were most likely formed deep in childhood. The Kaiser was marked by conspicuous

birth deformities, lacked a nurturing family life, and was saddled with the burden of living up to high

expectations. As a result, he depended heavily on subconscious ego-defense mechanisms that protected his

insecure self-image. Grandiose ( �&3)�) ��(��(( ��(�&�� <)�� (��# �� )�?��

psychological defenses against feelings of inadequacy and perhaps also fears of homosexuality. He was clearly

��(��#� .�N� ��&�)��( ��(��#� ��(�<� ��(�� ?�a neurosis that was a

manifestation of his inability to cope with emotional conflicts and feelings of inferiority. (Wilson had the same

diagnosis.)[48] Medical authorities had informed his family that while he was not clinically insane, neither would

he be entirely normal. He would be subject to sudden outbursts of anger and would not always be capable of

making rational decisions.[49]

In the lead-up to World War I, the Kaiser had initiated several diplomatic confrontations over Morocco, where

he had been forced to back down by the French and the British. Henceforth, the Kaiser was committed to a

��)��&�<)�� (��# �� )�?��(�a way of demonstrating his masculinity, toughness, and decisiveness.

The July Crisis of 1914 would become a test of his manhood; he declared to the German industrialist Krupp,

<��(�� /��@��)�' ��.?[50] He encouraged his Austrian allies to take a tough stance against Serbia (and its

supporter Russia) in response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. By the end

&�C�� )��(�(��(�(��&�)��.�� ( �@(�illusion that Germany could fight a small, localized

war in the Balkans and that the British would be neutral in this affair was shattered by telegrams received on the

��&�C��0A: .�� (�� (�� #��9�� .�� &��Russia announcing that

Russia had begun mobilization against Austria five days earlier was interpreted as meaning the Russians had

mobilized against Germany as well. The � � ��&��G ��@(� �'��

remain neutral if France was attacked created a paranoid reaction: the Kaiser now believed that Britain, France,

and Russia were engaged in a conspiracy to keep Germany negotiating while the Entente powers mobilized to

��)�.�� #�� (�� ( ��(&& � ��)� �<��*� �� )��?��(�� (.�=))�� #��

9�� @(�� (��( ��(�� (��)��' �&��(�� (�� *�� defense

mechanisms to cope with the free-floating anxiety triggered by the breakdown of his former

defenses. No longer able to deny the probability of Russian, French, and British intervention, yet

unable to admit just how grievously he had miscalculated, Wilhelm chose instead to escape from

his own aggressiveness and its consequences by portraying Germany and himself as hapless

victims of the aggressiveness of other powers. Paranoid delusions of persecution are typically

-72-

triggered by environmental or inter-personal stress, although they tend to occur only in persons

who have formerly maintained an unstable psychological balance by resorting to denial or other

defense mechanisms. The Kaiser was such a person.[51]

Confronted by reports of Russian mobilizations, the Kaiser convinced himself that his choices had now been

outpaced by events and that there were no options other than to mobilize German forces for war. He bore no

responsibility for what would happen next.

Although psychobiographies play an important role in alerting us to the importance of individual personalities in

domestic and international politics, one must be careful in assessing their value. The main thing that separates

psychohistory from the work of clinical psychologists and therapists is that the latter have the advantage of

actually working with and interviewing their subjects; historians work one or two steps removed from this.

Politicians are notoriously secretive about their personal lives, and none of the psychohistorians mentioned was

able to actually interview his or her subject. Instead, they had to rely on already published biographical material,

speeches, letters, diaries, and interviews with relatives and associates. Second, one often wonders about the

objectivity of these studies. Biographers are usually not drawn to their subjects because they are neutral toward

them; they are usually attracted to them as heroes or repulsed by them as villains. Finally, psychohistorians may

be guilty of the sin of reductionism, reducing (in the most extreme form) the ��@(�&� ��)��

training of the president. One must be careful not to focus entirely on early childhood conflicts and related

pathologies as a cause of later behavior without concern for the social and political environments of the time.

The Role of Emotion: The Cognitive Revolution

Dramatic recent advances in cognitive psychology, biological anthropology, evolutionary psychology, and

neuroscience (especially through the use of brain imaging techniques) have converged to fundamentally change

the way we look at how humans process and evaluate information and make decisions.[52] Political scientists

have traditionally believed that emotions were separate from and detrimental to the process of rational decision-

making. Neither appears to be entirely true.

Before we start, we need to define our terminology. This is not easy since (can you believe it?) scholars have

found it difficult to agree on definitions. At any rate let us define emotions as being subjective human

experiences that have physiological components; they are <�� (�� (��'��(�� ()��# �� (��(

feelings, and those feelings ��# ��(()�� #��)��)��' ��# ��'��(�� (��)�� (.?[53]

Emotions thus involve thoughts (cognition), biological sensations, motivations, and an internal sense of

experience.[54] A short list of emotions that political leaders might have to deal with would include fear, anxiety,

awe, admiration, love, hate, anger, regret, panic, desperation, pride, and shame.

Stimuli from the environment bring about physiological changes in humans, including the production of emotions

()��(�& ��.�� #�)�(�(� �+��)��(�)��(+�(�� &�� #�� (�#�(�)

biological mechanisms. It includes the thalamus (which receives information from the outside world through

sensory organs) and the amygdala. The latter is a walnut-sized organ on either side of the brain that constitutes

��@(� ��) �� (�� )��H �� & ��anxiety are produced; it also serves

as a filter for memory. Political psychologist Rose McDermott describes how the amygdala works:

-73-

The amygdala . . . constantly scans incoming information for signs of an emotional emergency. If

there is none, the amygdala recognizes that there is time for more advanced processing through the

prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for more abstract, rational thought. But if the brain decides

that the information indicates a threat, it shuts down the higher mental processes through the

release of catecholamine neurotransmitters, which also turn on the action of the emotional brain to

react quickly and efficiently to threats. This processing hierarchy evolved to help humans survive

fight-or-flight kinds of challenges.[55]

From an evolutionary perspective, emotions are adaptive and functional. The system is designed to give priority

to potential threats, which produce the emotion of fear. Fear is linked to physiological changes such as increased

adrenaline and a more rapid heartbeat, which prepare animals for fight or flight. Additionally, the emotional

processing of information is an integral part of rational thought; indeed, it precedes higher-level cognitive

processing and is much quicker. That is why it is given preference in situations of threat. Speed matters. Emotion

and cognitive rationality are not processes that are independent of each other; they are intertwined.

Social scientists point to the findings of prominent neuroscientist Antonio Damasio ��(�)�� (+

��)�� &��(�� <-��.?�=(�� (��&�(�� for a brain tumor Elliot suffered neurological

damage to his ventromedial prefrontal )�� *+��&�� #��)��(� ��.�-��(�)� ��

intelligent and � �� (�� )��' �(��(L�� ' �� (�< �� &��?��(�

��(��#��<& �.?�M�(��)��)�� (��#��(�( ' � ��impaired, and he seemed unable to make socially

appropriate decisions. The inability of people with similar brain damage to make good social decisions probably

results from their inability to tap into emotions and to envision future consequences.[56] People lacking such

)��)�� (�<��)�� #�� ( �' (��#��others, and they neither try to avoid making

mistakes nor are they capable of learning &�� (�� (.�� O��@�#��)��O& �@��)�( D ��

�� (�� (.?[57]

Damasio has theorized that information received through our senses creates emotions ��'�� )� (+

��I#�� (��#� I��&�+��)�� ((�(��(��&�� decisions in an efficient manner.[58]

Emotion and rationality are not distinct systems in which rationality leads to good decisions and emotions lead to

bad decisions; the relationship is much more complex. =(�� (��<��#��# �� #��

O� ��& ��@�&�#��)�( D �) (��(��(�(��(�&��.?[59] /�� (��&�C��J �) ��<-��(

necessary to rationality and ��(�)��)��) .?�=��<� �� )��#� �&�(��& ��(��

��( �� & ��(��#�( �)� ��#( �'�#� �&�)�(�)��(�.?[60] Trust is important in

facilitating cooperation, as we will see when we discuss game theory in chapter 9.

One way to think of this is that the brain has two interconnected operating systems for decision making, one

based on emotion and one based on reason. The emotion-based (�(� �+��)��F�� & �(��(

(�(� ��!+)��# �� ()��# ��(��' ��preconscious, automatic, fast, effortless, unreflective, and slow to

change. It is ��)� ��)��&�� '��(��(.�� (�3#�( ��)��' �(�(� �+��)�

�� & �(��(�(�(� ��+�(�� 3�' �� )�()�(��(�� &&��&�� &� )��' ��and flexible. It is

(� �� (��&��(�� <� ' �� ?��&��#��.�Kahneman suggests that most human decisions

are made through the first system and in comparative terms, the first system always trumps the second one,

though system ��)��<��' �� ?�(�(� ��!��&��.[61] However, a word of caution is in order

-74-

about these terms: Kahneman notes that systems !�� (� ��<&�)��(�?�� ( �( ��<�� (��

one part of the #�� &�� (�(� �(��)�� .?[62] No bright line divides cognition from

emotion.

� �@(��&�� ) (�&� '�� ) .�N��(�� (�� &�3D� ��&�)��while the brain can absorb

approximately eleven million pieces of information a second, it can only process about forty pieces consciously;

the unconscious brain handles the rest. Second, there is the frequently repeated experiment that indicates that

#��(��(��(()�� ' � ��&�� (�@(��#(��)��))��#��a half second before one is

conscious of deciding to move.[63] E� �� (�(�� (� ��&��(�(�� (�(�<�� )�()�(��

is like a monkey riding a tiger of subconscious decisions and actions in progress, frantically making up stories

about being in control . . . the conscious brain is only playing catch-up to what the unconscious brain is already

��.?[64] Most mental operations are, in reality, not conscious and deeply thoughtful, they are instead largely

��)��(#)�()�(�6�� @� ��&�(�(� ��!8.�=(�$# ��Jervis notes, much of the cognitive process is

<# �� )��&�)�()�(��.?[65]

=�� &�) ��&� ��@(�� )�(��(�(��#�� &��(�<�� ?�&��(�

developed by economists. In this game there are two players, A and B. A controls a certain set of resources

and has exclusive power to decide how these resources will be divided between himself and B. In the game, A

makes a one-time offer to B to divide the resources: he may give B anywhere from 1 percent of the resources to

! �� ) ��.��@(��)��) ��(��)) �� && �� K )��.�/&��)) ��(��the resource is split according to the

deal; if B chooses not to accept, neither player gets any of the resource. At this point the game is over. It is a

one-and-done game that will not be repeated. Logically, B should accept any split offered by A, since

(� ��+ ' ��!T+�(�# �� .�=��K(��(��)��=�(�� offer as little as possible,

knowing that B will likely accept any deal A offers. In practice, however, results repeatedly show that B is likely

to reject offers of less than 20%. Why? B players are apparently insulted and humiliated by low offers and deem

them to be unfair. Their response to low-ball offers is normally quick and <��' ?��)� �� (��# ��

emotional response to the situation.[66]

All of this should push us toward the understanding that if one wants to understand �� +��)��

�' �� (+�� )�(��(�� (��the role that emotion plays. (Paul Slovic calls

this the affect heuristic.) People make decisions by consulting their emotions; we tend to let our likes and

dislikes determine our beliefs.[67]

Here is a short list of other ways in which emotions may influence decision makers. First, emotions are crucial to

�� ) ��&�� +��)�(��&�)��in war. As we have already seen, the limbic system plays a

role in detecting threats. Threat perception happens at a much faster rate than the cognitive processing of

potential threats. Given the high cost of failure to detect threats, evolutionary forces have ( ��<� &��

�(��?�� (��.��(�� &�� (��human emotions are not the only consideration:

threats are both cognitively (consciously) processed by the human brain and socially constructed. That is, what

constitutes a threat is determined partly by our relationships with others in the environment.[68]

, )��<#�)�� ?�� &��&�� @(�� )��' �� && )��on memory, attention,

perceptions, and beliefs.[69] According to Kahneman, when we are in a good mood, we are more intuitive,

-75-

more creative, but also less vigilant and more gullible and prone to error. We are more reliant on the automatic

functioning of system 1; a good mood biologically signals �� ' ��@(�� @� �(�& .[70] When we

are in a bad mood, we lose touch with our intuitions; we become more vigilant, more suspicious, and more

analytical; we have activated system 2.[71]

Third, while emotions may aid decision making at some levels, extreme emotions can interfere with rational

choice. Emotions unrelated to the outcome of the decision may be present as individuals make decisions. During

the choice process individuals may experience anxiety, compassion, shame, pride, awe, admiration, anger,

regret, ��)�� (� ��' �� +��&��)��&� �) �)��) .[72] Specific emotions are

problematic and may be directly related to the outcome of the decision-making process; chief among these are

fear and anger, which are closely related at the biological level. Fear and anger might overwhelm cognitive

processes and bias the judgment of decision makers. This has interesting implications in international relations for

�� ( �&�� (+�(�(�� (�&� D ��( �� (�� actions by others. Here is what Neta

Crawford has to say about the use of threats:

Threats that produce fear instigate perverse cognitive effects . . . fearful actors tend to make less

careful decisions that rely on cognitive heuristics rather than integrative complexity. In addition, the

already fearful tend to gather information that is threat focused, thereby intensifying their fear in a

feedback loop. Fearful actors also tend to emphasize the short term rather than the long term, even

if this short-term bias is counterproductive. The careful weighing of costs, risks, and benefits . . .

will become much more difficult if decisionmakers are fearful. Further, when threatened,

decisionmakers may reasonably consider the threatener an enemy, slipping into cognitive schemas

and scripts that attribute malevolent intentions to the other, rather than carefully evaluating the

)��)�(��) (��' ��'�� @(�behavior.[73]

Moreover, prior experience of fear affects later emotional and cognitive reactions to stimuli from the

environment, as the brain learns to be fearful. Thinking about a prior experience of fear may cause decision

makers to feel more fearful in the present.[74] Under these circumstances, it is quite likely that the response of

national leaders to threats is an emotional response of resistance and bellicosity. The direct implication is that the

use of deterrent threats to induce caution and restraint by the target is likely to backfire.

Emotional states of high anxiety generally lead to counterproductive decision processes: reduced information

gathering and processing, and the avoidance of information that might make one feel worse. In extreme cases,

anxiety may lead to a complete shutdown &�� @(�� )�(��) (( (.��(��(�� )�( �&��,��

in the immediate �&� ��&�M�� @(��)�� ,'� ��C� �!0"!.[75] (Although, certainly, the

emotional state of anxiety was not the sole reason for ,��@(��(�)��)��)��( L�� (��(( (��

clearly involved as well.) On the other hand, moderate fear and anxiety might actually stimulate people to work

��(�' ��&&�)��#� �(L�� &�(�� ((��<)�) �� (�� .?

Fourth, emotion can affect the perception and calculation of risks. People in negative moods tend to

overestimate the chance that a negative event will occur and underestimate the chance of a positive event.

Conversely, people in positive moods tend to overestimate the chances of good things happening and

underestimate the chances of bad things.[76] A positive mood state actually increases aversion to risk, especially

-76-

in situations in which a significant loss is highly likely. (Happy people have more to lose, including the positive

mood itself.)[77] As Vertzberger explains, although moods are rarely decisive, they may indirectly ��)�� @(

�(( ((� ��&��(��#��&� �)��K�� .�<9� �� (��(��#��(�or low and known, people in a positive

mood are more likely to take the risk because their mood produces optimism about the outcome. But when the

risk is high, they are �� # �)�( �'��' ��(��' �( �� )�� .?[78]

Fifth, previous emotional relationships between groups or countries may influence how we assess the intentions

of others. In a relationship between countries A and B that has been characterized by fear, hatred, and

antipathy, leaders of both states are more likely to negatively evaluate the intentions and motives of others than if

�� (��# ��&HH�+ (� )��&�� )��(�� #��(.[79] The negative evaluation

is not entirely cognitive and rational; it is partly emotional. (This is one of the reasons why relations between

pairs of states called enduring rivals are so prone to conflict and violence, as we will see in chapter 7.)

Let us now explore some other aspects of the cognitive revolution in political psychology and return to

�� @(�� (��#��(�(� ��!��(�(� ��.

The Role of Bias: Heuristic Theories

Cognitive psychology is the subdiscipline of psychology that deals with how our minds are hardwired to

function: how mental processes allow us to think, to perceive, to remember, to process information, and to solve

problems. It is especially important to our understanding, therefore, of how political leaders make decisions for

war and peace. In the last forty years we have witnessed a cognitive revolution, as research has led to a

fundamental reassessment of how our minds work. The results have critical implications for assumptions that

national decision makers (like people in general) �)��<��.?[80] Indeed, Janice Gross Stein has argued that

the deviations from rationality uncovered #��)��' ��(�)��(�(�� ()� ��(�(�<�� (�� '�(�' ��(

systematic that it is a mistake to consider rational models of choice as empirically valid in foreign policy

��(�(.?[81]

Policy makers live in a difficult cognitive environment. They are constantly confronted with complex problems

derived from an equally complex global environment. Luckily (perhaps), the brain operates to simplify this

complexity for policy makers, and these complexity-reducing methods are not random; they operate in

patterned and predictable ��(.�=(�C��,� ��#�� )�� (�� <)�(��(�� (��(

)� ��)� � �� ' ��(.?[82] In order to enhance the efficient processing of information, many of the

mental operations performed by humans are actually automatic and subconscious.[83]

-77-

In sum, here are some things that cognitive psychology tells us:

1. Our brains have a preference for simplicity.

2. 9 ��' �� )��( �� (��)�(��)�(+()��(�� (��#��+�� us solve difficult

problems.

3. Humans are inherently poor estimators of probabilities.

4. Our attitudes toward risk are not necessarily balanced or neutral; they are biased toward risk aversion.

5. We have a tendency toward cognitive consistency and cognitive stability; we resist inconsistent images

and try to maintain our current beliefs and images against significant change.

6. We are predisposed to make causal inferences to explain what has happened and why, and these

inferences tend to be biased in predictable ways.

7. The images and beliefs that we hold in our minds tend to be organized and internally structured around

certain strong central beliefs.

8. Images and beliefs do not necessarily correspond to reality; our perceptions of the world are subject to

bias. The question is simply the degree to which our images are accurate reflections of the real world. We

will explore most of these in more detail in the following sections.

We should note at the outset that many of the tendencies and systematic biases identified above are derived

&�� & �(��(��#��@(�(�(� ��!�)�� (.�� @(�)�) ��&�(�(� ��!��

system 2 are summarized in table 3.1.

-78-

Biases in Information Processing

How are political leaders to cope with the complexity of making decisions in the international arena? Cognitive

psychologists have identified several heuristics��<�� (�&��#?��)�� (�( ��(�)�' ��

shortcuts in processing information, in assessing probabilities, and in forming conclusions. These shortcuts

represent systematic biases (i.e., they are not random) that help explain why people deviate from standards of

rationality. Importantly, these biases are not consciously )�( �L�� ( �� (��# )�( ��#��@(�(�(� �

1 components are wired to work this way.

For example, people tend to interpret new information in terms of what is most easily available to them from

their own mental repertoire. Thus, we tend to predict the chances of something happening based on the ease

with which we can think of examples of it. Instances of things that are unusual, dramatic, salient, or based on our

own personal experiences are more readily available to us, and we tend to think therefore that these types of

events are more frequent than they really are. This is called the availability heuristic.[84] Not only are potential

events judged on the basis of how available they are to our thinking, they are also judged on the basis of the

emotional charge they generate. (Consider the emotional impact of the vivid events of the September 11 attacks

on the United States and the subsequent anthrax letter attacks.) As a result, we tend to distort the frequency of

these or similar events and the probability that they will happen in the future. For instance, frightening thoughts

and images of potential threats like a terrorist-induced smallpox epidemic or an Iraqi attack on the United States

��)� �� (+#��#�#� � ' ��(�� K�� #K )��' ��+)��precipitate intense

reactions because images of these two events are both easily available to us and are highly charged emotionally.

=(�� (��(��<� ��(��(� ��(�� )��(�(� ��!.?[85]

A related bias is referred to as imaginability7�9 �� <)��?��&��(��(�#� ��

for real-world probabilities. For instance, whether we deem a particular event to be likely depends on the ease

with which we can think of examples of it in our own recollection. The upshot of this is that the real risks

involved in a particular scenario may be drastically underestimated if potential pitfalls are simply difficult to

)�) �' �&+�(�(��commercial airliners as guided missiles was before September 2001. Conversely, the

risks of a particular event may be vastly overrated simply because it is easy for us to imagine.[86] In general, we

are intuitively very poor estimators of probability. The limited things that we know and remember have a

<��(�� )��&� )�(�(.?[87]

Several biases concern how we explain to ourselves the behavior of others. The first is called the egocentric

bias: We tend to exaggerate the chances that the actions of others are due to our own previous actions and

behaviors. And we also tend to overestimate the extent to which we are the targets of the actions of others. For

example, officials in the Bush administration tended to think that to the extent Iraq had WMDs, they were

intended for use against the United States. In reality, while Saddam Hussein did not possess WMDs in 2003, he

attempted to maintained the fiction that these weapons still existed, not to deter the U.S. but to deter potential

�� ((��#��/��+��' ��.,.�� (�&�� to consider as a possibility.

We also tend to vastly overestimate the degree to which the behavior of others is planned, coordinated,

orchestrated, and centralized because we consider our own behavior to be planned. In reality, the behavior of

others is frequently the result of coincidence, �))�� )��(��3&3�� 3�� )��(+��(� �

-79-

stupidity.[88] As a result, we tend to see conspiracies where they do not exist.

Another bias is called the fundamental attribution bias, which determines whether we attribute the actions of

others to their inner dispositions (their desires, goals, ideology, psychological traits, personalities) or to

situational factors (constraints produced by the domestic or international environments).[89] Political leaders are

likely to interpret the negative behavior of rival states as due to the malevolent or aggressive intentions of its

� �� (L�#�� (�� (�� @(��(��' ��)�(�� # ��#� ��<)��)�(��) (�# �� )��.?�As

F@=�� (��(�� (��&��(�#��(��(��<�)��(�� (�� a peaceful state for an aggressive

� ��'�) �' �(�.?[90]

The fundamental attribution bias is reinforced by what is known as the halo effect. The halo effect refers to the

tendency to either like or dislike everything about an individual, group, or country. If we know a positive or

negative fact about the person or country, we tend to view other attributes of that entity in a similar ��+ ' �

though we lack any information about these other attributes. This simplifies our images of others and exaggerates

the consistency of the image. As Daniel Kahneman (��(��<G�� (��#��

�� #��.?[91] Friends are seen in a positive light and get the benefit of the doubt when we evaluate their

intentions; we attribute their positive behaviors to dispositional factors and we attribute their negative behaviors

to the situation. The opposite applies to those we dislike: their bad behavior is attributed to dispositional factors

and their good behavior merely to the situation.[92]

Another source of bias comes from the fact that system 1 is predisposed to search for causal explanations for

things. Our mind automatically attempts to construct and impose causal explanations for phenomena in our

environment. This is largely due to our need for coherence, and system 1 is pretty good at finding a coherent

causal explanation to explain various fragments of knowledge we possess. This is done quickly, intuitively, and

without conscious direction. Kahneman asks us to look at this sentence:

After spending a day exploring beautiful sights in the crowded streets of New York, Jane

discovered that her wallet was missing.[93]

9�� ' ��(��( �' (�� D (��<9�� C�� @(�� >?��(��of us will automatically

conclude that her wallet was liberated by a pickpocket. Our mind has causal intuitions that kick in, even without

any real evidence, that allow (�� &�)�(�� *��.�=(�� (��(��<,�(� ��!��(��

to K��)�)�(��(.?[94] System 1 may get these causal relationships correct most of the time, but the notion

��(�)�(�� ( ��)�(��)�� )��(+ ' ��)��(�(�(��(�of high complexity,

��&�� (�)��# �)��(��)+(�� (�(�� need to closely monitor our own reactions

and to consciously engage in more rigorous analytical thinking.

�� @(�( ��)��&��)�(�� *��(��(�� (�desire for coherence , which is another form of bias.

As system 1 constantly monitors our environment, forming impressions as it goes, it links together in our mind

things that appear connected. This aspect of our cognitive processes is called associative memory.�,�(� ��!@(

intuitive response to external stimuli sets off a cascade of associated ideas in a process called associative

activation. This happens instantaneously, and very little of it is conscious; the mind simply imposes coherence

on events. Coherence is important. We are strongly predisposed to believe that something is true if it is linked

-80-

by logic or by association to other beliefs we hold (or from a source we trust).

�� (�� (�(��&�� )��&��(��) ((7�<=�� (��easier for the associative

machine to run smoothly will also bias beliefs. A reliable way to make people believe falsehoods is frequent

repetition, because familiarity �(�� (��(��(� ��&��.?[95] Repetition of ideas (whether true or

false) pushes us toward belief simply because repetition fosters cognitive ease and a sense of familiarity. This is

called the mere exposure effect . A related problem exists. Consistency of information matters much more than

completeness: Knowing relatively little about something actually makes it easier to organize everything we know

into a coherent pattern.[96]

All of these tendencies and biases are exacerbated by several other characteristics of system 1. First, since

system 1 operates automatically and cannot really be turned off, it is difficult to prevent errors associated with its

intuitive analysis of the environment. Second, system 1 is pretty sure that its intuitive judgments are right. The

result is that people tend to be overconfident and place too much faith in their intuitions (see George W. Bush

�#��(8.�=(�� (��(��<,�(� ��!��(�� to doubt. It suppresses ambiguity and spontaneously

constructs stories that are as coherent as possible. Unless the message is immediately negated, the associations

�� '� (��(�� (��&�� ((�� .?[97] ,�(� ��(��)�� &��#�+#��&��(

activated.

=�� (( ��&�(�(� ��!��(��(�<��#� ��#��( ��# �� ' .?[98] This happens in a number of

ways. We tend to look for (and uncritically accept) information that supports our existing beliefs. This leads to a

kind of confirmation bias.�/�� (��<(�(� ��!�� (��(�( �� ) (�#��

make them true, and the selective activation of compatible thoughts produces a family of systematic errors that

make us gullible and prone to believe too strongly whatever � �# �� ' .?[99] Without the active intervention of

(�(� ��) ((��H ��#�(��<� �will automatically process the information available to us as if it

� � �� .?[100]

All of the above suggests that when political leaders meet in their oval offices or �� <��(?��

be well-served by understanding that, as they evaluate their environments for threats and risks, their assessments

are unlikely to be free from error and bias.

��

As we have seen, one of the principles of cognitive dynamics is that the human brain attempts to impose

simplicity on the complexity of the world as a way of helping us cope with our environments. One way to

simplify situations is for policy makers to match them to previous situations from which they can apply the

<� ((�(?��' �been learned. Thus, we tend not to see current events as unique but as just new versions of

well-known and well-understood past events. This is just another shortcut that our brain is hardwired to

perform.

Leaders frequently use past events as cues or guides to aid thinking about present problems. Jervis notes that

some events, like wars and revolutions, make such an impression on individuals that it takes equally dramatic

developments to nudge them aside. The � (��(�� (�&��(�� ' ��(��' �� D@(��(��' ��

-81-

attempts to understand the present.[101] Historical analogies and simple images (such as seeing the countries of

Southeast =(��(�<&�� (?��/��D��(��<�� (�� ?8��'�� )��around which

ambiguous information can be structured and given meaning. They provide the individual with an elegant method

for reducing the uncertainty inherent in complex situations.[102]

Reasoning by analogy may provide a shortcut to understanding, but it is also fraught with danger. As Janice

G�((�,� �� (��)�� (�<�)�()�(��(�� nuances, context and subtleties out of the problems

they face in order to build simple frames. When they look to the past to learn about the future, political leaders

tend ��(�� 3�3� �� (��D��&��)��(.?[103] Political scientists have been pretty

)��)��&��( �(.�-�� (��J��@(�Lessons of the Past finds that the misuse of historical analogies is

practically endemic in the making &��.,.�&� ��)��,�� F� (��@(� *��&��

crises from 1898 to 1973 actually finds no examples in which analogies were able to produce <��)�� )�

�� &�� ((�� ?�&��(�� (� ��'�' ��)��(�(.[104]

Historical lessons are most important for those who experienced them firsthand in their formative years and for

those whose adult lives and careers were significantly affected by the original events. Jervis mentions that three

of the British foreign ( )� �� (��'�' �� )��&�� (��M�� !0: (+M�� ,��and

M��&�*+�� )�� (�#�� (��/�� (�&�� self-government. The

lessons learned in one environment were then inappropriately transferred to another.[105] Lessons also tend to

have generational effects. American leaders who came of age in the 1930s and 1940s were generally guided by

the Munich analogy; those who came &�� !05 (�� &��&�� <� ((�(�&�B� ��?�6�� ' �

they came to interpret them); those who will come of age in the early years of the twenty-first century are likely

��# ��&� �) ��#��<�� ((�(�&�/��D?�� <� ((�(�&�, �� # ��!!.?[106]

� ((�(�� @(��)��)�� (� )�� ((�(�� &��)�)��early successes or failures,

�� (� )�(�&�� @(�' �� .�� (�� $ ��@(�&��(��)��K#��(�&��(��)��

success came as president &�� ,)� ��=)��(@�G�� (��'�' ��&�� ' ��(

aligned with the Communist Party from taking over the union. His image of communists as devious and

expansionistic was formed from this early experience.[107] Stalin spent the formative years of his life as an

underground, conspiratorial political operator in the Caucasus, organizing bank robberies and other activities for

the Bolsheviks. It was certainly in this cauldron of revolution and banditry that he learned the art of political

intrigue, the importance of ruthlessness in pursuit of political survival and advancement, but also the importance

of hiding his intentions, reducing the power of his rivals, organizing for action, and the necessity of a very fined-

tuned antenna for the detection of potential enemies.[108]

An additional consideration is that these historical lessons are not only important at the individual level; they can

become institutionalized within government bureaucracies. Once this has occurred, they may form the basis of

future planning, becoming permanent features of standard operating procedures, creating preferred frameworks

for viewing events or preferred options for dealing with contingencies.[109]

�� J��)��+&�M�� @(� *��(��-�� +�(�� )��((�)� *�� &��3��( �historical

analogy, used as a guide by American leaders in virtually every crisis from Korea to Vietnam to the Persian

-82-

Gulf. The general axiom that appeasement of aggressors should always be rejected (and that the proper

response to aggression should be immediate and forceful resistance) came to be applied indiscriminately, in a

way that ruled ��)��( ��)�.�� &�M�� @(�#��&�-�� (� �)� ��in the

memory of those on both sides of the Atlantic who lived through the 1930s and 1940s. Truman and his advisers

saw communist activities in Greece, Turkey, and Iran �� &� ��9��9��//��(��(��M�� @(

step-by-step aggression in Europe in the 1930s. American diplomacy in the 1940s and early 1950s was aimed

at preventing the recurrence of World War II. Moreover, Truman saw the North Korean attack on South

Korea in 1950 in the light of analogies from the 1930s. Truman wrote in his memoirs of his thoughts on the

plane from Missouri to Washington prior to his meeting with his advisers on the Korean crisis:

I had time to think aboard the plane. In my generation this was not the first occasion when the

strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I

remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to

keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese

had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. . . . If this were allowed to go unchallenged it

would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on a second world war.[110]

President George H. W. Bush was a veteran of World War II for whom the memories of Nazi aggression were

part of the living past. (He was the last U.S. president of this generation.) It is not surprising that he saw Iraqi

�� (�� ,��M(( ��@(�#��!00 A0!�� *��&��(��H�3�� ((��M(( ��( �&

as Hitler. In fact, Bush was quick to make these connections and to argue that Iraqi aggression <(��

(��.?�/��D@(�� ((��(��# �� &�) &��#��&�� ) ((�� (��,��M(( ��@(�()) ((��

to attack Saudi Arabia or other Persian Gulf (�� (��(�)�� @(��(�� (�) .��)(

were quick to point out that Saddam Hussein was not Hitler, that Iraq was not Germany, and that the threat to

American interests was nowhere as great as they had been in 1941. Nevertheless, what mattered was the

�(()�� # �� (��(�� (�� @(�mind and the strategies that these associations

triggered.

� ((�(�&�� (��(�� K�� (��@(�!05!�decision to make a major

)�� ' �� &��&�,��B� ��)��(�+��#��the most important U.S. decision

regarding that war.[111] -�� (��J�� )��(�� (�� K )� �� ( ��&�� ((�(+

those &�� 9��+��)) �� ( ��&�� (��J��(��.�� lessons of

Korea, as seen less than a decade later, were twofold: the United States should never again fight a land war in

Asia, and the American people were unlikely to support a prolonged, limited war. In retrospect, this should

have been a powerful ��&�)��(+&�� .,.��.�� (�)�'��'�( �(�

Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk, and Robert McNamara, preferred, however, to apply the lessons learned in

$��J��(��(��@(�&��(�� )��(��M�#�� # �(�� Philippines and by the British in their

&��(��(�� (��J��+#�� *�� (�of the successful use of specialized, small-scale

counterinsurgency operations.[112]

J��@(��(�� (�&� �� (�(� �&�)��()�� and inappropriately. In fact, Gen.

Lyman Lemnitzer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, listed five rather impressive reasons why the

Vietnamese and Malayan situations � � ��)��#� +� �(�(��)�� (� )�� (�� ' �

-83-

though they were thoroughly ignored at the time:

1. Malayan borders were far more controllable.

2. The racial characteristics of the Chinese insurgents in Malaya made identification and segregation a simple

matter compared with the situation in Vietnam.

3. The scarcity of food in Malaya versus the relative plenty in South Vietnam made the denial of food to the

guerrillas a far more important and readily usable weapon in Malaya.

4. Most important, in Malaya the British were in actual command.

5. Finally, it took the British nearly twelve years to defeat an insurgency that was less strong than the one in

South Vietnam.[113]

The Malayan counterinsurgency analogy continues to crop up in American foreign policy circles, most recently

as a frame through which to view U.S. strategy for nation-building attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since the lessons of the last war play such an important role in creating images of international relations, leaders

frequently believe that the next war will have the same causes as the last one and they prepare accordingly.

Appeasement in France and Britain in the 1930s was at least in part based on the notion that the previous war

(World War I) could have been avoided by conciliatory diplomacy.

The Soviet demands on Finland in 1939 for territory near Leningrad in the Baltic were based in part on lessons

from the past, both general and specific. One of the most powerful lessons of history for Russian leaders has

been that security depends on �� )� ��&�#&& ��(�� (.��(��(�� ((�� &�� (�&��'�(��+#�

G ��(��@(�=(�� (��#�� ,� � (��(�� )��(�� (�� the French, the

Germans, and others. Each invasion taught that security depended on the ability to create friendly buffer zones

�� (�� #�(��@(�� to create a set of more defensible borders than the Russian plains

allowed, and, most important, to ensure that when war did break out, it could be fought outside the Russian

homeland rather than on its soil. More specifically, incidents in the Russian civil ��6!0!2A�!8�� )��

given the Soviets an inflated perception of the importance of that region. The White leader, Yudenich, and the

British had both been active in the Gulf of Finland area, an area the tsars had been able to protect with their

naval base at Porkkala, in what was in 1939 independent Finland.

The Finns, not having had the same historical experiences as the Russians, failed to understand the defensive

motivation of the Soviets and believed instead that their demands were aimed at destroying the Finnish

state.[114] Needless to say, the matter failed to be settled through negotiation. In the ensuing Russo-Finnish War

the Russians were taught certain military lessons about fighting winter wars by the Finns, and the Finns were

taught certain political lessons about accommodating the security interests of Great Power neighbors.

�� )�(��&�G �� 9.��(��(��'�( �(+ (� )��B�) �� (�� F�)�� Secretary of

F & �( �F��$�(& ��, )��=�'�( �� HH��$�) +�� on lessons presumed to

have been learned from both the earlier Gulf War and the events of September 11.[115] The combined lessons

-84-

of September 11 were that rogue states with weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups were an

extreme threat, that if even a small chance existed that a rogue state like Iraq might furnish terrorists with a

WMD, the chance ought to be treated as a virtual certainty, and that time was not on our side. One of the

presumed lessons of the first Gulf War (and the postwar inspections) was that fairly advanced nuclear weapons

programs could be successfully hidden from the world community. The application of these lessons to Iraq in

� �A:�� (�( ��(��administration officials toward the preventive use of force to prevent a second

catastrophic attack on the United States.

� ��N��@(� *��&�� C��(��(��@(�B� �� )�(��(� in 1965 is probably the

gold standard for studies of the use of historical analogies. He asserts that analogies help decision makers

perform six crucial tasks when faced with a policy problem (like whether to use force or not). Analogies (1)

help define the situation, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provide potential policy prescriptions. These first

three tasks are strongly connected, with the answer to number one largely controlling the content of the second

and the third. The last three tasks help leaders to assess the potential options by (4) predicting the chances of

success, (5) evaluating their morality, and (6) warning about potential dangers associated with the options.[116]

In this way, Khong argues, analogies actually play a causal role in policy making, making a major impact on the

selection and rejection of possible policy options.[117]

9��( �(��@(�(��&&�&�� *��(�&�� ( �&��(��)�� (�is that he explicitly

)�� )�(�� (��)��' ��(�)��@(�()� �� .�Schema theory starts from the basic assumption

that human beings have limited computational capacities; we are therefore frequently referred to as having

<#�� ?��# ��<)��' ��( �(.?��)� �� ((�' ��&��&��)�&��(�(

on a daily basis we rely on simplifying mechanisms to help us code, interpret, explain, simplify, store, and recall

this information and to generally make sense out of our environment. Schemas help us do this.

=�()� ��(��<�)� �?�&��&��#��)��)�) ��(��(��#�( ��our previous experiences.

We may, for instance, have pockets into which we deposit our beliefs about nuclear weapons and nuclear

deterrence, about dictators and rogue states, about Iran, about WWII and the Munich crisis, and about

terrorism. These pockets contain interrelated and interdependent bits of knowledge, ideas, and beliefs that are

structured somewhat hierarchically, with some general core beliefs connected to more peripheral specific beliefs.

While each pocket of information contains information that is hierarchically arranged (top to bottom), a

particular schema may or may not be linked to any other specific schema horizontally. So, an individual may

have numerous ()� ��(�� &� ��&&��(��#�� ( �()� ��(��# �<��H �?�� L�thus, the

individual may not have a coherent belief system about foreign affairs.[118] Indeed, inconsistent beliefs and

pieces of information may be stored in different schemas.

Analogies are functionally and structurally very similar to schemas.[119] When confronted with new and

ambiguous information, decision makers code it in terms of a schema found in their memory banks. Analogies,

like schemas, allow individuals to make inferences about missing information. We interpret ambiguous

information in ��(�)�(�(� �� 3��.�9 �� <�� data fit the

()� ��(� ��&�� .?[120]

For instance, we may have a schema devoted to the concept of dictators in rogue states. In this schema are

-85-

'��(��#� (�&��)��(7�� @� �� (�� ((�� populations, they hold phony elections, they erect

statues and portraits of themselves throughout their countries, and they are aggressive toward their neighbors.

When we � �� # ��&��(�(� )� (�<��)��?�� # ��#� �� all the

attributes are present except for the last one: we do not yet know if he is aggressive toward his neighbors.

However, the presence of the schema or analogy permits us to fill in the blanks. This is what cognitive

psychologists refer to as the default value of schemas. For missing or unambiguous information, we simply fill in

the rest of the picture from our more general understanding of the phenomenon (much like the halo effect).

For example, neither Truman nor anyone else in June 1950 knew what the result would be if the United States

chose not to intervene to resist North Korean aggression. To fill in this hole in their knowledge, the Munich

analogy provided Truman and his advisers with the default value: Appeasement would not work; successful

aggression would increase the appetite of the aggressors for further gains, and we would soon have to fight a

larger war to counter the next act of aggression.[121]

It should be emphasized that policy makers will possess a repertoire of analogies (or schemas) that may be

called up when they face novel situations that require explanation and analysis. Several dueling analogies were at

play in the discussions in the Johnson administration in 1965 concerning Vietnam. The old standby Munich

analogy (and other analogies related to fascist aggression in the 1930s) was much in play and widely accepted;

��(�� ' ��)�� (��@(� ��()((��(.�� J��analogy, suggesting the possibility

that Western states could defeat guerrilla insurgents in a nonconventional war, was also present. But the

dominant analogy had to do with the lessons of Korea.

The Korean War analogy was especially important to President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Its

dominance in part was due to the fact that it was able to perform all six of the tasks singled out by Khong. First,

it defined the situation ��B� ��(�� &� *� ��6��B� �� ( 8�� ((��(�� ,��+K(��as

the Korean conflict was defined as North Korean aggression against South Korea. Second, it assessed the

stakes as vital to the U.S., since permitting North Korea to succeed would erode U.S. credibility and lead to

communist aggression against other states in the region, raising the potential of even more serious wars in the

future. Third, the analogy suggested that the preferred policy response should be the use of military force to stop

the aggression. More specifically the analogy led to the decision in February 1965 to use a graduated aerial

bombing campaign (Operation Rolling Thunder) and then in July to send 100,000 U.S. ground combat forces.

Fourth, the chances &�()) ((�� ( ��(��+�� +��(#(��)(�(.�N�&��

the use of force in response to aggression was seen as morally correct. Sixth, the primary danger of the

proposed American use of force might be that if the U.S. pushed ��)�� ' � +�(��

the Korean War. Thus, any acceptable policy had to avoid the more provocatively aggressive options on the

table.[122]

The primary skeptic in the administration, Undersecretary of State George Ball, asserted that the Korean

analogy was inappropriate for Vietnam, and he offered the earlier French experience in Vietnam and its defeat

at Dien Bien Phu as a more appropriate analogy. Looking at the situation in Vietnam through this lens would

define the situation as an internal conflict and a war of independence rather than a war of aggression by one

sovereign state against another. It would define the stakes as medium rather than high. It would categorize the

morality of military intervention as dubious, and it would rate the chance of success as poor. (The French had

-86-

�(��M��J��@(�Vietminh after a five-year effort, even though they had 250,000 forces still in the field.)

Although it would rate the danger of Chinese intervention as low, it would place the danger of domestic U.S.

opposition to the policy as high. (The French pullout was largely in response to lack of public support for the

war.) Most important, it would imply that the best course of action for the U.S. would be to cut its losses by

withdrawal. Ultimately, Johnson and his advisers were not interested in the lessons of Dien Bien Phu; those

� ((�(�� (()�� &�� <��)�� (�� (� �� &��( �(.?[123]

Khong uncovers some interesting findings concerning the use of analogies by American presidents and their

��'�( �(.�J(�� (��+�� J�� F� �� +� �

disputed during the policy discussions as being inappropriate and flawed. In spite of rather vivid dissection of the

analogies, no one changed his mind. Policy makers remained attached to their favorite analogies. Schema

theorists refer to this as the perseverance effect, and it has been thoroughly confirmed by cognitive

psychologists as an effect of schemas.[124]

Given that several potential analogies might be available to explain a particular situation, what determines which

analogy is chosen? Cognitive psychologists have noticed a number of principles at work, which have been

' ��&� ��#��@(�(��&�� B� ��decisions. First, individuals use those analogies that are most easily

recalled; this is the availability heuristic. Recent events are examples of phenomena that are readily available.

Second, surface commonalities are important; people tend to use analogies that are superficially similar to (or

� �� ( ��' �&8�� ' ��D (��+�� representativeness heuristic . The Korean analogy was both

easily available (the attack on Korea in 1950 was only a decade and a half distant and clearly remembered by

all), and it certainly had surface )�� (�� (��B� ��+��(�� (�� )��

it was a Cold War struggle between ideologies, it involved a country divided north and south, with an aggressive

communist north attempting to unify the south by force, with the backing of the two major states in the

communist bloc, China and the USSR.[125]

Virtually all of this research on historical analogies leads to the inescapable conclusion that senior government

leaders make poor use of historical analogies. However, this is not because they are ignorant of history; after all,

��C@(��'�( �(�� *�� bright men steeped in world history and experienced at making tough foreign

policy � )�(��(.�� @��#�# (�� (.�,� �� (�(� ��)��(�� having to do

with the very nature by which the human mind works.

The Role of Risk Bias: Prospect Theory

The evidence from a vast amount of research in cognitive psychology indicates that people systematically violate

almost all of the basic principles found in rational decision-making models. This research has resulted in an

alternative model of decision making, called prospect theory, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos

Tversky.[126] At the base of this theory is the fact that certain identifiable biases exist in how we treat risk.

Prospect theory is based on several principles that we will outline here.[127] These should be treated as

operating characteristics of system 1.[128]

1. Evaluation of choices is relative to a neutral reference point. People tend to think in terms of gains and

-87-

losses rather than in terms of their net assets, and therefore they evaluate their choices in terms of deviations

from a reference point. The reference point is usually the current status quo, but it might be an aspirational goal

or an expectation level. The selection of this reference point is highly subjective and will vary from individual to

individual. At any rate, when decision makers think about potential outcomes, they tend to rate them in terms of

relative gains or relative losses from the reference point. Jack Levy states that this reference dependence is the

central analytic assumption of prospect theory.[129]

2. Losses loom larger than gains. People tend to value what they have more than comparable things they do

not yet have. In other words, the perceived harm of relinquishing what one has is seen as greater than the benefit

&��)D��.�=(�� (��(��<�(��ten dollars hurts more than finding ten dollars

��&� (.?[130] This overvaluation of current possessions is called the endowment effect.[131] Furthermore, the

perceived value of a good is proportional to the length of time it has been possessed and the effort and

resources used to acquire it.

Since losses loom larger than gains, a general tendency of choice is toward loss aversion. The endowment

effect and the tendency toward loss aversion combine to produce a bias toward status quo choices.[132]

According to Kahneman, loss aversion is clearly due to the emotional impact produced in system 1, and it

�� (��#��(�� '��(��7�<E��(�(�� threats as more urgent than opportunities have a

# �� )��) ��(�'�' �� ) .?[133]

3. Losses and gains are asymmetrical in terms of risk orientation. Individuals treat gains differently than

losses: We tend to be risk-averse in our selection of options if we believe ourselves to be facing gains, and we

tend to be ��(�3�)) ��(��&�� # �� ' �� &�)��(( (+ ' ��&�standard rational

choice models would indicate a preference for caution. As Levy puts ��<=�(�� # ��&�� *��

to fight to defend the same territory ��' �# ��&��)D�� .?[134]

Because of the role of reference points in defining gains and losses, and because a change in identifying the

reference point can result in a change of preference, �� &�� & � �) ��+�� framing of a choice

��#� �+�(�&�)��)��) .�/�� (�)�(�� #�� frames an issue in terms of gains or

�(( (��(�)��# ��&��(#K )��' �K�� + (� )�� <�� (��'�' (��()) ((��&

choices and where there is ambiguity � �� (��(�D.?[135] Since framing is subjective, it is also prone

to manipulation.[136] Advisers to presidents and prime ministers are adept at getting their bosses to frame issues

��)��.��(��(��# )�( ��(�C �'�(�(��(��<� �� will choose the risky alternative when the

choice is framed in terms of avoiding losses when, in the exact same case, they would take the less risky course

of action if the &�� &�� & � �) ��(�� ((�#��&��'�� (��.?[137]

4. An important consideration in prospect theory is how individuals accommodate gains ��(( (+��(�

how quickly and completely they come to accept gains or losses. 6=))��'�' (�� 3( ��<� 3

��H��?�� & � �) ��.8�=(�� might expect, people accommodate to gains more rapidly than to

�(( (+��(��(�)�� the instant endowment effect.[138] On the other hand, decision makers are unlikely to

accept losses and are likely �� (�(�� )' �� .�/�(� ��&�<)�� (( (?�� (�� )�(��

tempted to regain sunken costs. The French and American ventures in Vietnam and the Soviet and American

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ventures in Afghanistan are cases in point.[139]

One implication of the biases associated with accommodation is that after a change in the status quo, both sides

are likely to engage in more risk-taking than one might expect based purely on rational calculation, due to the

way they frame the situation. Both sides perceive the status quo is on their side and are willing to take risks to

preserve it. If A makes a gain at the expense of B, A quickly readjusts its reference point to accept the gain

(remember the instant endowment effect). Meanwhile, B is unlikely to accommodate to the change and sees the

old situation (pre-loss) as the � �� (��(�D.�6�� && )�� (�@��(( (.8��(�#��

find themselves protecting their version of the status quo. Both will frame the situation as one in which they are

faced with possible losses and will be inclined toward more risk-seeking.

As Jervis points out, a central implication of prospect theory is that war is more likely when decision makers on

each side believe that they are defending the status quo and therefore believe that they will suffer significant

losses if they do not fight to defend it. Wars are presumed to be more commonly motivated by the desire to

prevent perceived losses than to attain future gains. Fear, not desire for expansion, is the most significant

motivator. Presumably, the tendency toward loss aversion is a force for international stability since states will not

take risks to increase their positions relative to the status quo, but stability only exists if all relevant states identify

with the same status quo. If leaders have references points above the status quo, then maintaining the status quo

will be rated as a loss.[140]

Prospect theory tells us that people are not very good in dealing with probabilities. Several tendencies appear.

At the extremes, we tend to treat highly probable events as being completely certain, and things deemed to be

highly unlikely are treated as being impossible and are thus ignored. We tend to overweigh outcomes that

appear to be certain compared with those that are merely probable. This is the certainty effect.[141] This is

important because when leaders perceive certain losses, prospect theory predicts they are likely to engage in

high-risk behavior to avoid these losses. Faced with a choice between a certain loss and a gamble that could

reduce the loss (or make it worse), we tend to choose the riskier alternative. As Levy and Thompson explain,

<� �� (� �� '��) ��(( (��O� ��(( (@�� (�risks that often result in

even greater losses, even though the expected value of the gamble may be considered worse than the value of

�� ) ��((.?[142]

Leaders who accept even limited defeats internationally are likely to be punished politically at home. Risking an

even greater loss in order to prevent or overturn an initial loss might be irrational from the standpoint of national

interests, but it might be rational for the individual politician to whom even a small loss might mean personal

��(�(� �.�C �'�(�(�� (�(��<�� (��)��#��)�� (��))��to prospect theory in finding even

small losses so painful that it prefers high risks to accepting them and will punish any leader who permits them to

))�.?[143]

A related implication of prospect theory has to do with diversionary wars.�� (��@��(�� &�� (

��(( (�� (�&�� (�� @(�� influence or security; they also define them in terms of the

domestic political situation. As Levy notes, the temptation to undertake diversionary actions abroad might be

< ��) ��by risk-acceptant attitudes in the domain of losses created by a deteriorating domestic (��.?[144]

Levy suggests that a combination of internal political insecurity and a relative � )�� (�� @(� *� ��

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relations can be conducive to extreme risk-taking. This was apparently the situation facing Jimmy Carter when

he made the decision to attempt to rescue American diplomats held hostage in Iran.[145]

Another tendency is that low-probability/low-risk events are either ignored altogether or they are overweighted

compared with events with high or medium probabilities.[146] That is, events that are not deemed to be very

likely are paradoxically given more importance than they deserve, especially if coupled with vivid images of

impending doom. This is called the pseudocertainty effect: An event that is uncertain is weighted as if it were

certain. It is easy to see how the pseudocertainty effect can lead to analysis based on worst-case-scenario

thinking.[147] ��(��(�� & )�� ()��# (�� (�A, �� # ��!!� �'�� (��(��.

Vice President Dick Cheney had convinced many members of the administration that if very low probability

events (such as a rogue state like Iraq developing nuclear weapons or other WMDs and then transferring them

to terrorist groups like al Qaeda, which would then use them against the United States) could have a highly

negative impact (destruction of a major American city), then the probability ought to be treated as a

certainty.[148]

In sum, prospect theory provides a probabilistic explanation of decision choice: leaders will show a bias toward

��(��(�� ) ��)��)�(��) (+�� ) ��they are facing losses. The theory does not mean

that unprovoked aggression never occurs, nor does it deny that sometimes leaders take actions to change the

status quo. As Jervis notes,

Actors will take some risks to improve their situations even if they are risk-averse for gains. But,

the theory argues, actors should be much more willing to run risk when they believe that failing to

do so will result in certain losses. Wars will then frequently be triggered by fear of loss; fighting in

order to act on opportunity will be relatively rare.[149]

Applications of Prospect Theory

There have been numerous applications of prospect theory, mostly in the form of case studies or comparative

case studies. We will mention a few so that you get the flavor of the argument.

Audrey McInerney uses prospect theory to explain Soviet policy in the Middle East in the months preceding the

Six Day War in 1967.[150] While Soviet policy in the area was generally risk-averse, by 1966 a major change

had taken place. The neo-Baathist coup had brought a radically left-wing government to power in Syria that

was much more aligned with Soviet ideological interests than �� ' �� +��&��

Soviets that they quickly incorporated into the new status quo. However, that government was threatened on

two fronts: it had serious internal political unrest, and the continued cross-border raids against Israel threatened

the possibility of a war with Israel that would almost certainly mean an Israeli victory and the demise of the neo-

Baathist regime. The risk of doing nothing was that the Soviet client regime in Syria would fall. This would

certainly be framed as a loss. In order to prevent this loss, the Soviets undertook extremely risky behavior. They

�� <��()�� ?�#��(��&��( �� ) ��&��to Egypt and Syria that Israel was planning

an invasion of Syria. The intent was to get Egypt to take strong action to back Syria and thereby deter any

possible Israeli attack. The Soviets did not desire war, but they did desire to shore up the shaky government in

F��()(+ ' ��&�� (��&��.�� ,'� ��(�3��backfired: it brought about the very

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war they had hoped to prevent. The result was ��,'� ��)�� (+-��,��+� � �#�� & ��

although they escaped with their regimes intact.

McInerney notes that Soviet leadership was divided on these risky actions toward Syria. There was one faction

+� ��#�� J��(� ��(��F & �( �J��(� ��G��+��was more cautious. This faction

accepted an older status quo in which the Soviet Union was happy with a less radical Syrian regime that was

less close to Russia; they therefore saw no need to undertake risks to achieve further gains. However, the

Kremlin majority framed the situation within the realm of losses, not gains. and were therefore willing to accept

significant risks.[151]

Charles Sullivan examines the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 to protect the local communist

government there from Islamic mujahideen rebels. The Soviet leadership was clearly unwilling to send military

forces in the spring of 1979 in response to requests from the recently installed communist government.

However, before the year was out they had changed their minds. What accounts for the policy shift? Sullivan

argues that it was not that the situation on the ground in Afghanistan had changed; the Soviets were still

convinced that the communist government could prevail over the insurgent mujahideen forces. What had

changed was the internal political situation. The communist movement in Afghanistan (the PDPA) had always

been split between the moderate Parcham faction (headed by Babrak Karmal) and the more radical Khalq

faction. The Khalq had come to dominate the regime in Kabul, and its most radical leader, Prime Minister

Hafizullah Amin, had precedence over the more moderate President Nur Mohammad Taraki. The Soviet

leadership apparently pushed Taraki to overthrow Amin, but the process backfired, and in October 1979

Taraki was killed by Amin. Soviet leaders saw =��(��)�� )��#� �� #� ��)��#� +

sort of like an Afghan version of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Many Soviets believed that Amin, like Sadat,

was attempting to reorient Afghan policy toward the West, moving out of the Soviet sphere of influence.

This change in the situation brought about a change in frames. In the spring, Soviet leaders had looked on the

Afghan situation as a gain (a recently installed, pro-Soviet communist party regime) and were thus reluctant to

support a clearly risky policy of military intervention. With the unpredictable Amin now in control, a small group

of important policy makers (a troika of KGB Chief Yuri Andropov, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, and

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko) now saw the USSR in the domain &�� (( (+�� (��# ��

that the top leadership was now much more risk-acceptant. The troika was able to convince Party Secretary

Brezhnev to go along, and the decision to intervene was essentially made over the heads of the other Politburo

members.[152]

C��) �G�((�,� ��@(��(�(�&�� !01:��9�� J�� -�(��&)( (� on the framing of the

situation by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Even though Israel won the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza strip

from Egypt in the 1967 Six Day War, Sadat never accommodated himself to this changed territorial situation;

the loss was never accepted or normalized. Thus he was highly motivated to engage in a risky war with Israel to

return the Sinai to Egypt. A war for the Sinai would not be a war to acquire something new but to ensure that

Egypt would not lose something it already possessed. /(�� (+�� &�� &�� && )�(�&

&��&��(( (+��(&&�)� ��understand the intense motivation on the part of Egyptian leaders and of

the risks �� .�� ((� ��-�� (��# �<��?�and refrain from war

against a state that had clearly shown its military superiority and its willingness to defend itself in the past.[153]

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� �@(�� &��)��.�C &&� ��& �� (��(� )�� defensive realism (which we will

address in a later chapter) to create what he calls a balance of risks theory. He is concerned with explaining the

behavior of great powers in geopolitically � �� (+ (� )�� (�� (��

behaviors and then to maintain these behaviors even in the face of evidence that they are not working. He is also

aware that there are examples of leaders deciding not to engage in risky behavior or to disengage from risky

policies. He derives several hypotheses from prospect theory and defensive realism and then examines them in

several historical cases.

��& ��(�� (�(��<��3(��)�� )�� *�( ��(?�� ( ��)��found in international affairs,

� �� (�6#��'��(��(��(8�� <�� likely to assess outcomes and contingencies in terms of

deviations from an expectation � ' �� & � �) ��.?[154] , �� (@�� ) ��(�&��

relative power trends between their country and that of rivals have an impact on these expectation levels. He

hypothesizes as follows:

1. If officials foresee a decline in relative power or status over time, they are more likely to adopt a more

favorable international environment as their expectation level. Conversely, if they anticipate a relative

increase in power and status, they are more likely to adopt the status quo as the expectation level.

2. E&&�)��(@��#�� '�( �� *� )�� ' �� (��( ��' �( ��)� (�will be directly

proportional to the length of time they adhere to a particular level.

3. Officials are more likely to initiate or persevere in risk-acceptant strategies in the periphery to avoid

perceived losses.

4. Officials will likely continue and even escalate their commitment to risk-acceptant but failing intervention

strategies in the periphery.[155]

Taliaferro examines several pairs of decisions made by three great powers. For each country a decision

accepting risk is compared with a situation in which risky options were rejected: Germany in the 1905 Morocco

Crisis (and the 1911 Agadir Crisis); Japanese � �� (@�� )�(��(�&�!0" A"!�6�� )�(��(��

Changkufeng and Nomohan incidents in 1938 and 1939), and United States in the Korean War in 1950 (and

again ��!04!8.�/�� )��( ��&�)�( (�� ( �� (@�&��&� ' ��(�)�� ' ��time and their policies

� &� )� �� ( �)�� (.�� @(�� K(�� *�� .

The North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 challenged both the global status quo and the Truman

��(��@(��(�399//��)�� )�� area as strategically nonessential. Faced

with a temporary window of vulnerability at the global level and losses to U.S. power and reputation in Asia,

Truman and his ��'�( �(�( �� *� )�� ' �� (��(�D�� @(�outbreak (two

Korean states divided at the 38th parallel) and chose a high-risk strategy of military intervention to prevent

losses to that expectation level.

Once the North Korean army had been thrust backward, the possibility of a successful rollback of communism

occurred, tempting Truman and his advisers to approve of U.S.-UN operations north of the 38th parallel to oust

the communist government and establish a unified Korea controlled by the south. In other words, they were

-92-

tempted to secure gains over and above the original expectation level. Senior American leaders adopted a new

*� )�� ' �+��&� �� +�� (��)��(��)�� ' ��(�new goal, sending troops north

of the 38th parallel, in spite of Chinese warnings that it would intervene. This is viewed as an anomaly by

Taliaferro; prospect theory predicts leaders are less likely to take risky actions when they believe they are facing

potential gains, as American leaders clearly did. Once U.S.-UN forces neared the Yalu River (the border

separating North Korea from China), things became dicey. In spite of increased warning signals, U.S. troops

continued to advance northward. They escalated their commitment to a high-risk strategy. Anything short of a

complete conquest and unification of Korea under a pro-Western government would be seen as a loss.

And then disaster struck. A strong Chinese-North Korean counterattack pushed U.S.-UN forces rapidly back.

At this point Truman and his advisers abandoned any thought of total conquest and once again recalibrated the

expectation level, setting it back to the prewar status quo, and pursued a much more limited war whose goal

was to restore South Korean sovereignty within its old borders. In this case it was relatively easy to reset

expectations downward since rollback had only been the expectation level for a few months. In the heady days

of September through November, officials would have seen the failure to create a unified Korea as a loss; by

January 1951, after the communist counterattack, they saw it simply as forgoing a possible gain. Once again,

consistent with prospect theory, risky actions (continuing the war) were taken to prevent or reverse losses to an

expectation level.

Taliaferro finds that most of the decisions in his set of cases were consistent with prospect theory. The decision

�� (��&��+�� =� ��)�� (�# �� :2�� +�(��#��)��#

explained.[156] It must be remembered that prospect theory only points out probabilistic tendencies; it will not

apply all the time. Decisions to attempt risky actions in pursuit of gains are not expected to disappear; they are

only expected to occur less frequently than risky actions to prevent losses.

Taliaferro is able to conclude that when great powers declined to intervene or decided to deescalate policies, it

��(�� <�� ((�&�� (��( �risky strategies to secure gains over and above their

*� )�� ' �(.?[157]

Personality and Risk Taking

Prospect theory argues that propensity for risk taking is the result of a bias in the way humans deal cognitively

with particular situations: when we frame situations to involve the prospect of losses, we are more inclined

toward taking risks to prevent these losses or to reverse them. The situational context is not the only determinant

of risk, however.

Kowert and Hermann argue that individual leaders are likely to differ significantly in their tolerance for risks.

They note that roughly a third of the subjects in prospect �� *� �� (��@��)��# ��' ��

predicted by the framing effect.[158] Research indicates that personality, age, race, gender, education, income,

and ��& ((��' ��)�� @(�� (��(�.[159] The profession of politics would

appear to be one profession that attracts risk-acceptant personalities. Political psychologists would emphasize

personality as an important determinant of attitudes toward risk taking.

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Yaacov Vertzberger, who has studied risk taking in international relations, says there are three motives for risk

taking: (1) deliberative/reasoned judgment that that the risky choice is better than the alternatives, (2) socially

driven risks due to peer pressure, and (3) dispositional risk taking caused by personality attributes or core

beliefs. He concludes that dispositional forces are the most powerful motivating forces &�� @(

propensity to take risks will be strongest when all three motives push individual choice in the same direction.

B ��H# �� @(��(�(�&�� )�(��(� for military interventions finds that the psychological disposition of leaders is

�� (��&�� (7��'�� (��<)�(�(� �� & ��risk-prone behavior over risk-

averse behavior (or vice-versa), irrespective of situational )�� *�(.?[160] While research on this is still in its

infancy, it is probably correct to say that some kinds of people (and some political leaders) are simply risk-

averse and others �� (�3�)) ��L��@(��&�� (�)��)�� .

N�� '��#� �� ( ��)��B ��H# �� )�)�� (��<�� (�3�� (�are persistent, confidant,

outgoing, aggressive, domineering, manipulative, opportunistic in dealing with others, and needful of

�)�� ' � ��.?[161] As you have probably noticed, quite a few of these characteristics match the narcissist

� �(��.�� &��&��)�((�(�@(�� (��&��(��(��(�( �( �of omnipotence and feeling of

invulnerability, but it can also be triggered by psychic need to compensate for injuries to his self-esteem.

Kowert and Hermann use two separate instruments to assess personality differences and two other tests to

measure risk propensity. They find a number of strong relationships between personality and risk taking. First,

while conscientious and deliberate people are likely to be cautious and risk-averse, those with low scores on

conscientiousness, deliberation, and judging tend to ignore risks. (In other studies, these types of people are

shown to be hasty, impulsive, careless, and impatient.) Second, the trait of openness is positively associated

��(�(.�� <� ��?��# ��' ��()�� '(.��( �� <� �

�� ?��# ��' ��(�and open to new experiences, consciously seeking out risky behaviors. Third,

people who score high on the anxiety subscale (fear and tendency to worry) and the self-consciousness

subscale (measuring shyness and inhibition) are risk-averse. Finally, as we would all expect, risk is related to

gender. Males were much more likely to indicate a preference for risk than females. In sum, several types of

people show a disposition for risk taking: some seek out excitement and risky experiences; others are simply

impulsive and careless and tend to ignore risks.

�� M ��@(� *� �� (�(�&�� (��# �� (��and prospect theory

indicates that both personality and context are important and that individuals respond in quite different ways to

situations of risk. Some of the subjects in their study behaved just as prospect theory would predict. The

behavior of others was constant, regardless of the risk or how it was framed; personality was the main

determinant. A third group did respond to risks differently, depending on how the problems were framed, but

not��(��(� )�� )�7�<E� ��' �( �(��( � �(�� to take risks primarily

when they have something to gain (in another setting, such individuals might be considered gamblers). More

agreeable, altruistic, feeling individuals prefer to avoid risks, but especially when facing a loss (and presumably

when even �� )��)� ��(� � �# )�( �&�� (�8.?[162]

Personality may help explain how different leaders frame similar situations in different ways. Sensation seekers

may frame situations differently than agreeable altruists or those who are anxious.[163] Emotion is also important.

Emotions such as fear, anger, regret, panic, desperation, �� &� �) �� @(�(#K )��'

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feelings about gains or losses �� &� ��&& )��'��@(�&��&�� (��.[164]

Thus, while prospect theory is clearly helpful in explaining some situations in which leaders choose extremely

risky actions (including war), in other situations prospect theory is trumped by personality attributes.[165] Risk

taking due to personality may interact with cultural factors as well. Levy and Thompson suggest that the types of

leaders who rise to the top of the political food chain in highly centralized or authoritarian regimes tend to be risk

takers, otherwise they would not have been able to rise to the top and stay there. On the other hand, risk-

averse leaders may be more likely in democratic systems where an important ingredient of success is

compromise and the art of not alienating various constituencies. Likewise, leaders who have attained top-level

office after long careers in government bureaucracies, like George H. W. Bush, are likely to have been

socialized into adopting a cautious decision-making style.[166]

The Role of Images and Beliefs

Not only do individuals have different psychological makeups, they also have different images and perceptions

of the world. Images�� <��)�� (?��'��@(��#��#K )�(�� ' ��(�� (�� (��policies.

They are organized representations of the social and political environment in which we live. Images contain not

only our knowledge about these things but also �� '��(�&�� +��#�� +�� (

toward them. An image is, of necessity, a simplification of reality. We keep in our mind only certain images of

the events, politics, or people we think about. A great deal of information is lost.[167]

�� ( �( �� (�� H �� ((�)� � �� +�a belief system or

worldview. E� �M�(�� *��(��<��# �� &(��'�� (�� ((�)� � ��)� �by which we

organize and make sense out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals picked up from the

�'�� #��( �( (.?[168] A significant part of this general belief system has to do with politics.

9 �� (� �� (�� ) ��(�&�� +��(� ' ��(��(�(�� (��(�� (+�))��

correspond to reality. Unfortunately, this is infrequently the case. Prior beliefs function as an anchor around

which we organize incoming information. =�� @(�)�� (��# �� &(��)��(��&�� )��(�

assesses the nature of the opponent, the perception of threats, the utility of force, and so on. This is another one

of the cognitive shortcuts that is part of how the brain operates. However, these prior beliefs and images are

also a source of bias that may seriously hamper our ability to create a realistic picture of our surroundings. As

two scholars ��<� �) ��.�.�.��(��((�' ��) ((�&�� ) �'��&��#��active process of

)�(��)�� .?[169]

For a variety of reasons, which we will explore in this section, our images of the world around us may be

seriously distorted. This is important because political leaders act on their individual images and perceptions of

the world rather than on objective reality. For all practical purposes, the image is the reality. Two pioneers of

international relations, Harold and Margaret Sprout, long ago made the important distinction between the

psychological milieu (the world as perceived by the decision maker) and the operational milieu (the world as

it really is, and the world in which politics must be carried out). They argued that decision makers act on their

knowledge of the former rather than the latter.[170] We can only hope that the images and perceptions used by

-95-

national policy makers are more accurate than not, but we know that this is not always the case.

Image Content: Operational Codes

E� �&�� (�� (�&��' (�� (�� )�� &�� (�@(�image of the world or

belief system. Although several concepts have been used to describe the content of the belief system, the one

most widely used is the operational code.�=� *�� G �� &�� (�� )� ��(��<��)��

significant portion &�� )��@(� �� ( ��&�# �� &(��#��)��& .?[171] In other words, it is that subset of a

� �(�@(�# �� &(��' �� politics. (Although there are certainly subtle differences in

definition involved, # �� &�(�(� �(�� )� (�' ��# �)�� +�

coherent set of political beliefs.) Following an earlier work by Nathan Leites on the belief system of the early

Bolshevik leaders in the USSR,[172] George developed a framework for the operational code that consisted of

ten questions about politics. The answers to these questions would delineate the crucial aspects &�� (�@(

political belief system. Five questions were philosophical and five were instrumental, dealing with political tactics.

Philosophical Questions

�3!.�9��(�� < (( ��?�� &��)��& >�/(�� )��' �( � (( ��one of harmony or

)�&��)�>�9��(�� &�� )��)� ��&�� @(��)�� (>

�3�.�9�� (� )�(�&�� ' �� H��&�� @(�&�� )��values and

aspirations? Can one be optimistic or pessimistic on this matter?

P-3. Is the future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

�3".�M��)��<)��?��<��(� ��?�)�� ' �' ��(��)�� ' �� >�9��is the role of the

��'��<�'��?��<(��?��(�� (�� )��>

�34.�9��(�� &�<)��) ?��&&��(��(��)�� ' �� (>

Instrumental Questions

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? (For instance, on the

basis of purely unilateral national interest or on the basis of multilateral considerations involving self-

restraint?)

I-2. How are goals pursued most effectively? (For instance, through force or diplomacy? Unilaterally or

multilaterally? Through threats or promises of reward?)

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? (Under what conditions

(�� )) ��(�(>8�/(�(�� ()��&�� @(��)��(��fait accompli the best way to control

risks?

/3".�9��(�� # (��<��?�&��)��'��) �� @(�� (�>�69��&��(��) ��is the utility of

-96-

preemption or surprise? Should force be used simultaneously with negotiation? Should one wait until

military parity has been achieved before one pushes demands upon a rival?)

/34.�9�� &��&& � �� (�&��'��)�� @(�� (�(>

G �� @(�'� ��&�� )� ��(�� ( �(�&�# �� &(�� in a hierarchical way. Beliefs

in P-1 concerning the nature of the political universe �� (�) �&�)�&��)�� # �<��(� �

# �� &(?L�� # �� &(�� dependent on the answers to these primary philosophical questions.

, ' ��)��()� ��(�(��' �( ��G �� @(�&�� ( ��)�� &&��(�to investigate the operational

codes of important national leaders or foreign policy advisers. Speeches, autobiographical material, transcripts

of meetings and interviews, books, and articles by the subject are studied, using a method called content

analysis to identify the political beliefs of the subject. Once this has been done, attempts are often made to

� � �� (�� @(��)��)� (��' �� &� )� �� operational code of the individual policy maker.

/��(�� )�� @(�� )� �)��# �� )��)�� to the situation so that we

��# ��#� �� #�� )��(�� @(��)��&��(�)�� &��)�� @(�# �� &�(�(� �.�$��

codes are seen as just one of many factors that play a role in determining policy. Sometimes they are extremely

important, sometimes not.[173] What we do know is that decision makers may have a tendency to fall back on

their belief systems and that the existence of belief systems may narrow the range of alternatives that decision

makers may consider during the decision process.[174]

International relations specialists have produced operational codes for many world � �� (+��)��C��

Foster Dulles, the Soviet leaders (from the Old Bolsheviks to Khrushchev to Mikhail Gorbachev), Mao

Zedong, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and

George W. Bush. Many of the recent studies have used computer programs, such as the Verbs in Context

System (VICS) to perform content analysis of public speeches or other documents.[175]

It is worth contemplating the possibility that certain kinds of operational codes may be dysfunctional. For sake

of argument, let us suppose that the operational code of a government leader consists of the following set of

beliefs:

P-1. The world is an inherently dangerous and conflict-ridden place. Our enemies are numerous, evil, and

fundamentally opposed to our values. The only thing they understand is force.

P-1. Peace is ephemeral and is created only by strength.

�3�.�� #�� '��' �� @(�� (��(�� # )�( ��opponents are internally

weak, their political and economic systems are deficient, and they understand the superiority of our

system.

I-2. Reliance on treaties, international law, international organizations, and international courts is unlikely

to be productive.

I-2. When bargaining takes place it should always be from strength, and one should always put forward

-97-

� @(��*�� (��&�� &��(��concession.

I-2. Military force is an effective tool of foreign policy, and threats, ultimatums, and brinkmanship tactics

�� && )��' �� @(�� (��#�)��to change their policies.

I-3. Risky policies are part of the territory and must be accepted if one is to achieve � @(��

interests.

I-3. First use (preemptive and preventive use of force) is a good way to eliminate risks posed by

opponents.

This set of views approximates what might be referred to as a hawkish or hardline operational code. One can

imagine the relative ease with which leaders with this operational code might become involved in an endless

series of conflicts. Indeed, as we will see in chapter 8, states whose leaders follow these prescriptions tend to

be involved in numerous wars and militarized conflicts. Let us now move from the hypothetical to the real world.

Henry Kissinger has provided a fertile field for analysts. Having been a respected professor of international

relations with numerous publications prior to his service as national security adviser and secretary of state in the

Nixon and Ford administrations, there were plentiful paper trails from which to map out his operational code; in

fact, there was a veritable gold mine of writings waiting to be subjected to content analysis. Here was a man

who developed an extremely coherent approach to international politics (based on the realist perspective)

before he entered public service. Would this coherent worldview, or operational code, have a significant impact

on U.S. policy once Kissinger attained a position of authority?

E� �(��&��((�� @(�#��# ��'�� (�� )�&��)��in Vietnam indicates a very

)�( �� (��# �� ((�� @(�# �� &�(�(� ��his strategy and tactics in this particular negotiation. In

fact, the author states ��((�� @(�� )� ��(�� (��&� ��'��#� ��&& )�� sequence

&�=� ��)��)��(�� (��(�� &�!01�.��((�� @(��(�and behaviors during the

negotiations seemed to be a logical extension of his general beliefs, formulated many years prior to public

service.[176] On the other hand, another study of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and China during the

��((�� (�)�)�� ((�� @(�� (�&�� ,,$��were only indirectly related to

American foreign policy behavior.[177]

Let us finish this section by looking at the operational code of top-level officials in the George W. Bush

administration. It is frequently argued that one of the most important causal factors behind the Bush

��(��@(�� )�(��'�� /��D�was the neoconservative worldview of powerful officials such as Deputy

Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, and I. Lewis Libby,

B�) �� (�� @(�)�� &�&�(��&&�� (.�/��(��(��(( �� that the president himself was motivated by

this worldview. An approximation of the neoconservative operational code is presented in box 3.1. You should

make your own judgments about whether someone with this operational code would have been likely to use

military force in Iraq in 2003.

Box 3.1. The Neoconservative Operational Code

-98-

A. Philosophical Questions

1. Q: What is the essential nature of politics? Harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental

�� 5

=7�/�@(��M## (��)��)�&��)��(� �� ).�� &�� (��(� � � �� (+()��(

�� (�� (��#�� (��H��(+�(�� '��and they hate America and its

democratic institutions. A world of democratic states would be much more harmonious.

2. Q: �� 6��7�� %��6��% goals?

(Optimistic or pessimistic?)

A: Optimistic. The U.S. has an opportunity to restructure the world so as to increase democracy and

freedom. American values will become universally accepted; the American model of democratic

)��(��(��( ��(��'�� (�A��9��.��.,.�leadership will produce bandwagoning

by others.

3. Q: Is the future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

A: Yes, at least in the long term. Democracy and freedom will spread throughout the world, though there

may be short-term setbacks.

4. Q: How much control can political leaders have over historical development? What is the role of

the individual in shaping history? What is the role of chance in human affairs?

A: Leaders with the courage to pursue large goals can make a difference.

B. Instrumental Questions

1. Q: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives? (For instance, on the basis of

purely unilateral national interest or on the basis of multilateral considerations involving self-

restraint?)

A: American national interests should have clear priority over other goals.

2. Q: How are goals pursued most effectively? (For instance, through force or diplomacy?

Unilaterally or multilaterally? Through threats or promises and rewards?)

A: Unilateralism is preferable to multilateralism. Threats of force, especially those made by states with

unrivaled military power, are effective. However, deterrence, defense, and containment may not work

against rogue states and terrorists; preventive force may be necessary.Countries are more likely to be

taken advantage of if they � �� (.�=�� ( � �� (�@��.

-99-

3. Q: How are risks calculated, controlled, and accepted? (For instance, through slow escalation of

�� 5+

A: The lesson of Vietnam is that slow escalation is unlikely to be effective. The lesson of 9/11 is that the

risk of inaction is greater than the risk of taking military action.

4. Q: ��&�� %6�� 5)�� is the utility

of preemption, prevention, or surprise? Should force be used simultaneously with negotiations?

Should one only negotiate from strength?)

A: In the current era timing is extremely crucial. Time is not on our side. The U.S. cannot afford to wait

until threats are manifest. Preemption and prevention may be preferable to defense. One should always

negotiate from strength.

5. Q: ��%� �� %�� %6�� 5

=7�J�� (�� && )��' ��# ��)��)(�# �� ' �� # + (� )��in the hands of a

dominant hegemonic power.

Source: Greg Cashman and Leonard C. Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of

Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 334.

The Structure and Dynamics of Images: Why Images Resist Change

Although the content of images and belief systems varies enormously among different individuals, the structure of

these beliefs is much more regular. Certain definite patterns can be discerned in the way incoming information is

dealt with, in the way images are formed and maintained or changed, and in the relationships among the different

parts of the belief system. One of the most interesting issues has to do with the process by which images are

either changed (or preserved) as a result of new information.

Our images constantly shift and are reappraised as new information is received, but as cognitive psychologists

tell us, most of us engage in selective perception.�9�� ( �6�� <� ��(� �?8��( ��(

we want to see or expect to see, we ignore many things that do not fit very well with our existing images of the

world. This is especially true if the information is ambiguous.[178] To help us cope with the daily information that

bombards us in a complex environment, we use previous images as a cognitive filter to reduce complexity, to

screen out inconsistent or irrelevant information, and to make sense of the world. However, when the new

information )� �� (�@��&�� (�� #��(� ��)�� (�� @(�� ( ��images, a

number of factors inhibit image change. Information that is contrary to our current image of the world must cross

a higher threshold to gain admittance into our worldview compared to information already consistent with our

current image.

How images change is not entirely understood, but one important factor is the complexity &��'��@(

image structure. A simple image contains less information and that information is much more internally

)�(�(� ��+��all sums up in the same direction. Simple images tend to be very rigid and difficult to change; they

-100-

�� ' ��# �<)�( �.?�=�complex image, on the other hand, has both more information and more diversity of

information, even inconsistencies. Because such an image is so eclectic and diverse, its holder is more open to

the possibility of change. Cognitive complexity is generally related to the ability to adapt to novel or ambiguous

(��(+��.

Political psychologists who have explored the related concept of integrative complexity (measured from the

public statements or communications of leaders) have found that high integrative complexity is associated with

crises that are resolved peacefully, while lower levels of integrative complexity are associated with crises that

end in ��.�� ' �)�� *��(��(�# ��(()�� <#�� ?� ()��(�widely

�� &� ��(�� (��&�� <��?��) ((+�� .,.�� )�(��cross the 38th parallel in the Korean

War, the Bay of Pigs crisis, and the Johnson ��(��@(� ()��&�� B� ��. [179]

� �@(�)�(�� &�)�� (�� (�(��) ��)�� .�E� �&�� conclusions of cognitive

psychology is that individuals strive for cognitive consistency. We try to reduce the inconsistencies between

��'��(�# �� &(.�M��(�� <)�(�(� �)��( � �(.?�=��()� ��)��# �� )�(�(� ��(�&��

causes cognitive dissonance.[180] 9 ��@�� )��' ��((��) �' ��

of two ways: by modifying our original image or (more likely) by striving to retain our original image. Striving to

retain the original image is especially likely if central, core values are challenged by the new information.

Consistency theory argues that beliefs are hierarchical in nature, with strong core beliefs at the top that are

particularly resistant to change and associated intermediate and peripheral beliefs that are more malleable. When

change occurs, it tends to be incremental and it takes place at the margins among peripheral beliefs. In the rare

event core beliefs are changed, this presumably sets off a cascade of related changes among many associated

peripheral beliefs.

Many techniques exist for retaining the original image in the face of such discordant information: (1) We may

simply ignore or reject the new information; (2) we may discredit the source of the new information; (3) we may

twist or distort the information or reinterpret it in a way that conforms to our present image; (4) we may search

for alternative information that does conform to our present image of the world; or (5) we may simply treat it as

<�� *) ��)��' (�� .?[181] We may also participate in premature cognitive closure , shutting

down the search for new information as soon as our preexisting beliefs have gained adequate support. In all

these cases, our bias toward consistency impairs our ability to accurately perceive the world, to make realistic

judgments, and to actually learn from our own actions and the actions of others.

�� ((� ��)��' �)�(�(� �)��(�� (�� *�� )��&��# �� &(+ ' ��those that are

��))�� +�� (�(��' �� .�E�� )�� *�(� �to contradictory (and correct)

information actually strengthens our inaccurate beliefs. Consider public opinion in the United States concerning

whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction at the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003. In the early days

of the war, large majorities of Americans (in some instances well over 80 percent of those polled) indicated they

were certain or fairly certain of this. In July of 2006, two years after the Iraq Survey Group had issued its

authoritative conclusion that there were no WMDs in Iraq, a Harris Poll showed that fully 50 percent of

Americans still believed that Iraq had WMDs when U.S. forces invaded that country.[182] Similarly, in

September of 2002, polling data indicated that 51 percent of Americans believed Saddam Hussein was directly

responsible for the September 11 attacks, a belief totally devoid of any substantive support. In 2003, as the

-101-

United States went to war against Iraq, this figure actually rose to 53 percent. Though it has gradually declined

since that point, in 2008 the number was still an astounding 28 percent of Americans. Meanwhile, a 2007 Pew

Global Attitudes Project poll taken in the Islamic world indicated that the number of people who did not believe

Arabs carried out the September 11 attacks ��(��(��+��40�� ) ��&��(��-��(��54�� ) ��&

Indonesians, 53 percent of Jordanians, and 41 percent of Pakistanis. Many thought the U.S. or Israel was

responsible.[183]

Why do mistaken beliefs persist in spite of contrary evidence? First, because of their very nature, negative

impressions are quicker to form but also more resistant to change. (This has to do with how system 1 processes

information.)[184] Second, recently reported studies indicate that the presentation of information and arguments

to rebut or debunk misinformation may paradoxically contribute to the � (�� )��&�� (��&��.�� @(

say, for instance, that a newspaper reports (��(��<�� .,.��' �� (�� (��

Saddam Hussein had � ��(�&��((�� (��)��.?��&�� #� ��(�� (�&� D �� D��

� � �� ))�� &��#��(�<#��?��&��(�� be retained on second hearing

�� <��?��&�� #��.�� <#��?��&�� *�(�(�� (��# �� &

systems and is therefore �� )) ((�#� .�E� �&�� #��@(�(#)�()�(�� (��(�� things

�� )) ((�#� �� (��(�� (�� )�� +��(�)�( �� #��&��+

are deemed to be true. The facts or arguments that are asserted first have a structural advantage over later

denials.[185]

Two warnings should be issued at this point. First, in spite of all we have said so far, most individuals are able to

perceive reality correctly in many cases.[186] Not everything is distorted. And second, cognitive consistency is

not always irrational. /��# �D�� )��'� ��)��&��(�# ��)�(�(� �� @(�current

image. It has to be evaluated in some way, and given the complexity and uncertainty of much information, we

may quite logically evaluate it in a manner consistent with our current image of the world, especially if it accords

with our past experience.

Although the tendency toward cognitive consistency is not always irrational, its presence does indicate a

systematic bias. The original image is given preference, and new information is made to fit preexisting

hypotheses. Since the various images in the belief system are highly interrelated, any major adjustment of beliefs

(especially core beliefs) is likely to set off a chain reaction that would in turn place a severe #�� @(

��&��3��) ((��(�(� �+(��&�� ' ��)��)��(.�Stability of images is therefore

preferred.[187]

As cognitive psychology has developed over the years, a more complex picture of belief change has begun to

emerge called schema theory.�=))��()� �� (�@(�# �� &(�� (��#

structured as hierarchically as originally thought. Instead, beliefs are more fragmented, more horizontally

organized, less inter-connected, and less consistent.[188] Beliefs are organized into somewhat autonomous

��)� �(�&�� #��&& � ��(� )�(�&�� @(��.�9� �� &��about the

world is presented, people will then amend individual schema by adding subtypes or exceptions to the rule.

People will still resist change to core beliefs, but schemas cannot resist change if the new information is

unambiguous and obviously relevant. �� #�� (��(��(��&��&��+��#��(��

�� &��#� +�(�� to be found in the realm of international politics.[189] The good news is that, if individuals

-102-

have beliefs and images that are organized less tightly and less hierarchically (as in relatively autonomous

schema), they are more likely to change their beliefs over time than those whose cognitive structures are more

coherently and hierarchically organized in the way described by consistency theory.[190]

What determines the type of cognitive structure a political leader is likely to have? E� @(�� ' ��&� *� ��( ��

role are both important. Research indicates that experts (including experts on international affairs) are likely to

develop rather coherent belief systems, while those with only limited knowledge or experience tend to hold

more fragmented and inconsistent beliefs.[191] Steinbruner has connected typical cognitive processes to

governmental roles.[192] Midlevel officials and advisers (many of whom have spent time in academia) tend to be

<�� )�� (?�� )�(�(� ��# �� &(��H ��single value. They have strongly

deductive thought processes and are able to act with great confidence in interpreting current situations. The

models here are Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisers to presidents Nixon and

Carter. On the other hand, high-level officials at the top of the decision-making chart tend ��# �<�)��

�� (.?�� ( �� (�� # �� (�(�� *� ��(.�They sit at the center of political cross-

pressures and information; their beliefs � ��# ��(��#� ��<&��&�� #� �(��)��&�) ��

they quite literally ��.?�� )�� (�'�)��7�<,��) ��(�� *� �� ) �does

not commit him to a particular belief pattern, he will adopt several competing patterns, not at once, but in

( D �) .?[193] One thinks here of Franklin Roosevelt, Jimmy Carter, Lyndon Johnson, and Bill Clinton.

More recent evidence from the schema perspective indicates that since experts have information organized

along more dimensions, they can actually incorporate much more inconsistent data as exceptions to their

schemas. But these inconsistent data have �� ' ��(��)�� ()� ��(.��(��<� '��)�( (��(�

confront a greater � ��&� '�� ) �(�� 3� ' �� ()� ��(�?�)� ��(��)��

��*�)��<��&�� )��# �� ( �)��)��&��#�� ((�likely to be influenced by

��.?[194] Philip Tetlock finds that political experts actually do very poorly in predicting or forecasting events. In

spite of their extreme confidence in their predictions, they performed about as well as monkeys throwing darts

would in predicting the probability &� ' ��(.��(��(� (� )�� &�� *� ��(��<� �� ?��)��

thinking �� )��' ��&��#�(�)��)�� (��' �((� *� ��(��<&*?��)��work

inductively from many facts.[195]

The Resistance of Images to Change: Some Examples

� �@(�� *�� &�� (��)�� @(�� &�� .

,'� ��G � ��, )� ��G�#�)� '@(�&� ��)� (�� !02 (+��K��)�) ((��(��

United States on arms control, withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan, unilateral reduction of troops in

Eastern Europe, renouncing the Brezhnev doctrine (which in turn permitted democratic revolutions in Eastern

Europe), reducing Soviet forces in Mongolia and along the Soviet-Chinese border, pressuring Vietnam to

remove its forces from Kampuchea, and virtually abandoning Marxist � �� (��) (�� JH��#�D +

created a situation of severe cognitive dissonance &�� <��9��(?�� ,�� (.

Instead of changing their images of the Soviet Union, many American policy analysts in the late 1980s resorted

to various techniques to preserve their already existing )��' �(��)�� (.�G�#�)� '@(��)� (�� &��(�

-103-

discredited as mere public � ��(��(�)��)�� (�� )�� 9 (�@(�� &�� ,,$.�6��

special problem of international politics is, after all, that since deception is common, actions by other states that

��)�&�� @(�� )��# � �(��)�� H ��(�� # �� attempts to deceive.) Alternatively,

G�#�)� '@(��)� (�� (�relatively meaningless gestures, or they were reinterpreted so as to

be consistent with Cold War images. For instance, they were seen as simply a temporary retreat brought on by

a combination of Western strength and firmness and by the horrendous condition of the Soviet economy rather

than as concessions brought about by any real change in Soviet thinking (an example of the fundamental

attribution bias). And Gorbachev himself was seen as an exception to his predecessors, and one not likely to

last very long given the opposition to his policies from more hardline Soviet elites.[196] As a result of these

�� 3�� ( �'�� )��D (�� )�� (��(()�� G�#�)� '@(�<� ��?�&� ��)��)��

virtually everyone in Washington by surprise and after they happened, U.S. leaders were rather slow to assess

the real importance &�G�#�)� '@(�� '��&� ��)��(D�� (�&��

cooperation.

The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was at the heart of the problem, and at the center of the action

�� /=��(�$# ��G�� (�� /=@(�)�� &�,'� �� *� �� from 1979 to 1982. He became its deputy director

of intelligence from 1982 to 1986 as Gorbachev first entered office and took over as deputy director of the CIA

from !025��!020��(�G�#�)� '@(��(&��)� (�� )� �� .�M �� became deputy

national security adviser from 1989 to 1991, as the Soviet Union descended into chaos.[197] Recently

� )��((�&� ��/=��)� ��(�(��&� ��G�#�)� '@(�&��(��) � �� to the UN in December 1988

that he would unilaterally cut 500,000 troops from the Soviet army and withdraw six tank divisions from Eastern

-�� /=@(��(�(� &�G�#�)� '@(�&� ��)��(��(�<�� (��7��)��(�for

� �� +�� ,�� (+#�� *��O)��)��(@�# �� it and other centers of

)��(�� .?�� +�&� ��,'� ��&��'��installations in Vietnam, the Indian Ocean, and the

Mediterranean Sea and its abandonment &��3,'� �� (��( ' ��9��)�&��)�(+��/=��

incredibly described <J()�@(�� *��(�� (��#��)��.?[198] Washington Post reporter

David Kaiser illustrates how personal and political dynamics added to the problem: Secretary of State George

Shultz, who had many private conversations with Gorbachev, knew that Gorbachev and his policies were in fact

quite different from the norm; however, he was apparently unwilling to voice his views about Gorbachev to

other members of the national security team because he was afraid that Gates and Defense Secretary Caspar

9 ��# �� <��))( ��&�# �� ((��U' .?[199]

One of the classic studies of images has to do with a very similar set of circumstances. Ole Holsti undertook to

�� &��)�� (�(�� # �� &�(�(� ��&�-�( �� @(�secretary of state, John Foster Dulles.[200] In

��)��M�(��(�� (� ��F�� (@�� &�� ,'� �� he was capable of changing

his image if new events and information challenged it.

,��&�)��M�(��&��F�� (@(�� ' � '��&�� ,,$��(��(#K )��)�� +

even when he perceived reduced Soviet hostility. Positive Soviet actions, such as the signing of the Austrian

State Treaty in 1955 (which removed the Red Army from Austria) and the reduction of the size of the Soviet

army, did not )�� F�� (@(�� '��&�� ,'� ��.�/�(� �� ( �)� ��' �moves were

credited to Soviet internal weaknesses: the result of necessity rather than good will. What is important about this

is that if cooperative Soviet actions � � ��#� ��)�� ( )� ��@(�#�(�)�� &�� ,'� ��

-104-

how could the Soviets reliably demonstrate to American officials their good intentions? What could the Soviets

have done to indicate to Secretary Dulles their good will? The implication is that nothing short of the dismantling

of their own system would have done it. (These cognitive dynamics were probably also in play among many

members of the George W. Bush administration in its analysis of Iraq in the run-up to the war in 2003.)

Kissinger has referred to this kind of image structure as the inherent bad faith model.[201] An individual who

holds this type of image structure will be able to explain away almost any sincere change in behavior by the

opponent; there is virtually nothing the opponent can do therefore to change the original image. This kind of

image structure clearly makes learning questionable. The problem is bad enough if leaders in one country have

closed images of this nature; imagine what would happen if leaders in both countries have similar image

structures.

How Images Might Be Changed

,��) �� ( �(��# ��#��(��&�'��&�� @(�� ( �� (�it take to bring about a

change? It appears that a change in images comes about more easily if new information descends all at once

rather than piece by piece over extended periods of time.[202] Small bits of information coming at irregular

intervals stretched out over time are easily discounted, assimilated, or otherwise coped with. On the other hand,

spectacular events (often of a profoundly disturbing character) and dramatic pieces of conflicting information

that strike all at once virtually demand that the individual take action to deal with the discrepancy. The

occurrence of spectacular events, however, may not be enough to induce a major change in image. Real change

may require both spectacular events and the accumulation of less impressive, long-term developments that

challenge the image.[203]

Some parts of a belief system are easier to change than others. According to both cognitive consistency theory

and schema theory, beliefs that have short-run consequences rather than long-run consequences are most likely

to be altered. Fundamentally, the � ((3�� (�&�� @(�# �� &�(�(� ��

change than its central or core parts and they are most likely to change first. As Stein (��(��<� �� (

make the smallest possible change; they will change their beliefs incrementally, generate a large number of

exceptions and special cases, and make superficial alterations rather than rethink their fundamental

�((��(.?[204] When central beliefs change, they initiate a corresponding cascade of changes to related

peripheral beliefs.

Several studies of the operational codes of world leaders indicate that in fact beliefs do change over time,

sometimes over a period of just a year or two. What is most interesting, however, is that contrary to prevailing

hypotheses, philosophical beliefs (basic assumptions) are more likely to change than instrumental (tactical)

beliefs. And when instrumental # �� &(��)�� )�� (�� # �' �� .�/��$ �(��@(�(��&

change in the operational code of George W. Bush over four separate time periods, the events of September 11

brought about reversal of several philosophical beliefs. His view of the nature of the political universe (P-1) and

of the ability to realize political values (P-2) were both substantially affected in a negative direction, and his view

&�� )��#��&�� &�� 6�3:8��(�� )�� (� ��.�M� ' ��(�@(� instrumental beliefs did not

)�� ))��L�� (��#� +��consistency theory would predict.[205] In fact,

$ �(�� (��' ��& ��(�� (�&�� (�� )�� (�� @(�operational code. While some beliefs

-105-

may change, especially as a result of traumatic events, they do not trigger a very comprehensive overhaul of the

belief system.

�� )�� @(�# �� &(�� (�(��)�� (��(�� (��.�For instance, leaders

��)�� (�� (�� (�� (+� �� who tend to have rather simple, black/white

�� (�&�� +�� ((�� change their views, as what they believe is likely to be protected by ego-

defense � )��(�(.�E�� <�)�� (?�� )�� # ��#� �to change their

belief systems. A distinction frequently made by political psychologists �(�# �� <� �� (?��<&* (?�6�

classification originating with the political ��(�� /(�� 8.�M �� (�<�� #��?��&* (

<�� (.?�� #�� (��(��) �� (�� that is

a grand, overarching scheme that can be (and frequently is) applied to virtually everything. Hedgehogs are

deductive thinkers who reason from the top down, from one big theory to details that are predicted by, or are

consistent with, the theory. Foxes �� )��' ��(�(�� (��&�� #��+&��

accumulation of facts and evidence to larger theories. They tend to be skeptical of overarching theories that

*�� ' �� @� �� )�� (��)�� (��to new information.[206]

As you have probably guessed, George W. Bush is a hedgehog rather than a fox. This clearly played a role in

his approach to the decision for war in Iraq in 2003. Cashman ��$#��(�@(�� '� ��&�� '��

sums it up like this:

�(�� (��# ��<�� )�� .?�.�.�.�M ��(�� ((�� )��' ��from moral,

religious, and political principles rather than inductively from empirical facts. He is a fundamentalist

rather than a rationalist; his approach to information ��() ��<�� ?�� (�� ( �&

to nuanced, complex thinking. In /(�� @(�&��(�)��(��&�� &*�.�.

. President Bush is clearly a hedgehog. He is not a seeker of facts or opinions. His decision style is

to make decisions quickly without detailed study and investigation. . . . He is predisposed to

believe things on faith and principle without examining the evidence and to hold these beliefs with

�#(�� ) ��.�M ��(��<�� # �� ' �?�� than a pragmatist.[207]

9�� ( �� (��)��)� ��(��)(��) �� (��# )� (�)�� #�� +&�� *�� <,��

Hussein has weapons of mass destruction that constitute a threat to the United States, and this threat requires

�� ' ��)��#�� .,.?+�� big idea drives everything else and is relatively impervious to change. Table

3.2 summarizes the factors that aid or inhibit image change.

9 ��' �� ( ��( ' ��&�� (�� (�@(�&�� ((��(��#�� international politics

changed as a result of the traumatic events of September 11. �� (�� C�� @(�)�' �(��

hardline, anti-Soviet world view in the wake of the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan provides another

interesting example of (temporary) image change. Although the Soviet intervention certainly qualifies as a

spectacular event, it came in the wake of other international (and domestic) events that probably had a

cumulative impact on the president. Soviet activity in Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviet arms buildup, continued

human rights violations by the Soviets, the toppling of the Shah of Iran by anti-American forces led by Ayatollah

�� (��)��(�� @(�,=��//�� ,'� �(�� rising prominence within his

foreign policy inner circle of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski probably all had an effect on the

-106-

�� (�� .�� @(�� &�the world was changed rather dramatically. His vision was no longer that of a

benign and liberal world where states could get along together through reason and diplomacy and law, but of a

world where states harbored aggressive intentions against each other �� @(�� (�)��

always be counted on to abide by laws or listen �� (�+�� &�) ��(��&� D ��# � ��

instead of diplomacy. A (��(��)�� (�(�&�� @(�� )� �# &� ��&� �� ,'� �

intervention in Afghanistan (using the computerized Verbs in Context System) confirms a change in his

fundamental assumptions about the world. The results showed a significant decrease in his cooperative view of

the world (P-1) and a decrease in his optimistic view of his ability to realize his goals (P-2).[208]

While the natural resistance of images to change probably contributes to the stable, incremental nature of foreign

policies, Jervis argues that a major change in image by a national leader always brings about a change in

policy.[209] This may or may not be true, but the Carter presidency provides a good example. =&� �� @(

<)�' �(��?�� (��&�� ( ��&��)� (�� &� )� ��a more hawkish approach: he withdrew

SALT II from Senate consideration, placed a grain embargo on the Soviets, began to restore a military aid to El

Salvador, expanded covert support for mujahideen forces in Afghanistan, and increased the defense budget.

Evoked Sets

Another important influence on our interpretation of reality is the phenomenon of < '� ��( �(.?�� (��

we are concerned about when information is received play a role in determining how we will interpret

information by creating predispositions to notice certain things and to neglect others.[210] While most of our

correct inferences about the world are strongly influenced by our expectations, seeing what we expect to see

can create some consequential distortions in our evaluations of the world.

A perfect example can be found in the July crisis that preceded the outbreak of World War I. (You will

� � �# ��(�(��&��()((��&��( ��9�� //@(�psychological breakdown.) British Foreign

Secretary Grey sent a note to the German government warning of dire consequences if war were to begin.

��( ��9�� //@(�evaluation of this note was conditioned by the fact that he had just received information of

the Russian military mobilization. The timing of these two messages predisposed him to view the British letter as

part of a joint British-Russian plot against Germany. The British information was interpreted in light of the just-

received Russian information. /��(��(��) �� ( �@(�< '� ��( �?�� (�6��(8� �) ��&

a combined Russian-British threat to Germany in 1914.[211]

-107-

Evoked sets certainly played a role in the U.S.S. Vincennes@(�(��&��/�� !022.��

)� �@(� *� )��(�� && )� ��#�� (��(.�N��(��.,.�� ) +#�( �� ) ��(�&�/��

)��)��(+��predicted a strike against an American ship in the Persian Gulf. Second, just minutes

before the Iranian plane took off there was an attack: Iranian boats fired on a U.S. helicopter and U.S. ships

then skirmished with a flotilla of Iranian vessels. Third, recent military reports indicated that F-14s were now

stationed at Bandar Abbas airbase.[212] Thus, the American crew expected an attack; they expected aircraft in

the area to be hostile; and they were predisposed to see Iranian F-14s flying out of Bandar Abbas. In the light

of the ambiguous information available about the plane on the ��()� �� )� �@(� '� ��( �� &��

(erroneously) the plane as a military F-14 rather than the civilian airbus that it was.

The Role of Decision-Stage Psychology: The Rubicon Theory

Several theorists, Geoffrey Blainey most prominently, suggest that overconfidence on the eve of war is a primary

causal factor in the decision for war. Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney have furthered this thinking with

their so-called Rubicon theory, which helps explain why leaders on both sides seem to be overconfident just

prior to the outbreak of war. Based on a series of psychological experiments, they identified a sequence of

stages in the decision-making process, each of which activates a different mindset or cognitive orientation.[213]

The first stage of decision making is a deliberative/predecision stage. At this stage, leaders do not believe that

war is inevitable. Once leaders believe that war is inevitable, their mindsets change to the

implemental/postdecision stage. The difference is so crucial that the dividing line is seen as crossing a

psychological Rubicon. On the far bank, the deliberative mindset approximates the rational actor model outlined

early in this chapter. Leaders are reflective, are open-minded, search diligently for answers, and weigh the

expected utilities of various alternatives. On the near bank, the implemental mindset takes over, and the

cognitive process undergoes interesting changes that trigger a number of processing biases. The focus shifts to

carrying out �� )�( ��)�( +��.�=��(�� (�� )��)� ��H ��#��&�� vision: they

focus on achievement of goals and avoid being distracted by alternatives or doubts. They resist reconsideration

of alternative courses of action. They are less receptive to incoming information and search instead for

information that supports their choice. They process information in a more biased way. When beset by cognitive

dissonance, they subconsciously try to fit contradictory information into their preexisting beliefs. They are

vulnerable to self-serving evaluations and to the illusion that they can control events. Most important, they are

' �)�&�� #�� +�#��the probability of victory, the benefits of said victory, and the relatively low

costs of the enterprise.

All of the cognitive aspects of the implemental stage push leaders in the direction of overconfidence.

Overconfidence may then lead to war in two ways: a direct decision for war or indirectly through the pursuit of

more risky war plans and tactics. The $#�)�� (�� (�(� �(�� )�) ��&�#�(� ��+��

idea that once a decision has been made, those responsible for it engage in subconscious efforts ��<#�(� �?��

support the notion that the decision will work, as a way of decreasing (�� ((�� )� �(�� (�� @(� �

that might result from a disastrous policy choice. The Rubicon theory is slightly different in that it suggests that

the crucial point is not the point at which the decision is actually made, but the point at which war appears to be

inevitable, no matter what one does.

-108-

Johnson and Tierney test the theory by examining the leaders in France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and

the United States in the days before the outbreak of World War I. They attempt to determine the point at which

leaders decided that war was inevitable, whether this perception precipitated a change from a deliberative mode

of decision making to implemental mode, and whether the result of this was overconfidence. They claim the case

of WWI is consistent with the Rubicon theory, and the theory has potential utility for explaining other wars.

The Role of Misperception

J�(� �) ��(�))�� '��@(�� ) ��(�&�� )�� (��to reality. As you may

have already realized, misperceptions by national leaders abound in international relations. This is in part natural.

Policy makers cannot ultimately know what is really going on in much of the external environment. International

politics are rarely experienced directly. Instead, national leaders learn about them through secondhand reports:

through the press, from emails from diplomatic stations around the world, through briefings by advisers, or

through the television screen, as reported by CNN or Al Jazeera. Additionally, as we have already seen, our

understanding of external events is subject to the misinterpretation that is provided by our preexisting images and

belief systems. Our perceptual screens may bias and distort information received from the environment.

We have already provided some evidence that many foreign policy decisions are, in fact, nonrational.

Misperceptions may be a key component in such nonrational decisions.[214] In fact, misperceptions by national

leaders have frequently been cited as the immediate cause of war. World War I, Vietnam, Korea, the Middle

East Wars of 1967 and 1973, the first Gulf War, and the Iraq War of 2003 are typically seen as examples.

Cashman and Robinson look at seven cases of interstate war in the last 100 years and find ��<��(��

case did the leaders in the initiating country, operating under what we have called the fog of prewar, accurately

perceive the situation in which �� &�� ( �' (.?[215]

In cases in which leaders would not have chosen war if they had had a more accurate understanding of real-

world conditions, we can say that misperceptions had a causal effect on the choice for war. But misperceptions

are notoriously difficult to define. True misperceptions are distorted images of current real-world situations,

whereas mere erroneous judgments are errors in assessing probabilities or predicting future contingencies; the

difference is pretty thin.[216] Keeping that in mind, let us move forward.

A number of misperceptions are typically related to war: misperceptions of the opponent and his intentions,

��(� �) ��(�&�� @(��)��#�� (��&�the relative balance of power, misperceptions of

�� @(�� ((��' �� @(�� (��(� �) ��&�� (�(��'�' ��(�� @(

policies, misperceptions of the intentions and capabilities of third countries, and misperceptions of the

inevitability of war and of its eventual outcome. Each of these misperceptions is associated with a particular

causal path to war. Let us take them one at a time.

1. Misperceiving the opponent as having more hostile intentions and as undertaking more hostile

activities than is actually the case�6��)�' �( ��&�� ) �' �� (�'� �� @(��

activities as threatening to them).

�� *�� &�� @(�� (��(��#�#�� &�� (��)��(� �) ��(.�It is due

-109-

�� )�#�� && )�(�&�� ) �� ' �(��@(�� (�from his military capabilities and

to the related tendency to do this on the basis of worst case analysis. These problems are compounded by the

�� @(�� (��conceal his intentions through strategic deception.

�� A9��9��/�� '�� (�� )��((�)�)�( �&�� ' � (��&�� (@

�� (�� (�� $( ' ��@(�� (�� (�� classic statement of the predicament. TR

wrote in 1904 that the Kaiser

sincerely believes that the English are planning to attack him and smash his fleet, and perhaps join

with France in a war to the death against him. As a matter of fact, the English harbour no such

intentions, but are themselves in a condition of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intend to form

an alliance against them with France or Russia, or both, to destroy their fleet and blot out the

British Empire from the map! It is as funny a case as I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear

bringing two peoples to the verge of war.[217]

C��,� ((�� (�(��(�� &�(��) ��7�<9� �� #��of war believes that his

adversary will strike him, the chances of war are fairly high. When both leaders share this perception about each

�� @(�� # )� (��'��) ��.?[218]

Overperception of threat was a major problem in the crisis that initiated World War /.�$# ��@(�)��

analysis of documents from the 1914 crisis demonstrates that the perception by German leaders of the intentions

of the Triple Entente was significantly more hostile than was warranted by an objective analysis of the

situation.[219] The Germans therefore reciprocated the hostility that they believed, erroneously, they were

receiving from their opponents.

Overperception of threat was also a major problem for senior members of the George W. Bush administration

� ��/��D�� !A:.�� ) ��&�� ,�� (��&�/��D@(��(( ((��&�9JF

)��#��+)� ��)��#��)��)� �� (+�� # � �� (.

Jack Levy sees two paths to war that may be generated by an exaggerated perception &�� @(

intentions. The first path is a direct one: a preemptive strike may be launched against the state that is perceived

to harbor hostile intentions. The second path is an indirect one in which the perceiving state increases its military

capabilities to compensate for the hostile intentions that it perceives to be held by the rival state, and the rival

responds accordingly, initiating a spiral of ever-increasing hostility, which ends eventually in war. [220]

It should be noted that occasionally the opposite perceptual fault is present: the opponent is perceived as being

less hostile than is really the case. During the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s many political leaders in the

� (��((� �� G ��&V�� (�� #K )��' (�of limited political goals and a peaceful Europe.

$�)�� #�@(� *��is that this misperception can be attributed to the projection of their own

national '�� (�6��( �&3�� (8��M�� @(�G ��.[221] Knowing little about other countries, we

may tend to see them and their leaders as being similar to ourselves. The consequences of underestimating the

�� @(�hostile intentions are, of course, a false sense of security and a lack of defensive preparation.

,��M(( ��@(�� ) ��(�� =� ��)��'�(�� :�6��(�� attack of the coalition

-110-

forces in 1991) provide another example of under-perception of threat. Based on postwar interviews with Iraqi

officials and on Iraqi documents, Duelfer and Dyson uncover a lengthy list of misperceptions held by Iraqi

leaders (and also by American officials).[222] In the run-up to the 2003 war, Saddam and other Iraqi leaders (1)

underestimated U.S. hostility and its commitment to use force against Iraq; (2) misread the effects that the end

of the Cold War and the September 11 attack would have on U.S. policy on Iraq, which gave the U.S. both the

incentive and the unfettered ability to take action in the Persian Gulf; (3) overestimated U.S.-Iraqi shared

interests in fighting Islamic terrorism and balancing against Iran; (4) overestimated the omniscience of U.S

intelligence agencies, assuming that the Americans were well aware that Iraqi WMDs no longer existed; (5)

misread the United Nations and its ability to constrain �.,.��)��L��658�( ��&��+�.,.3��#��

� ��(+�� '�� U.S. might treat Iraq. The cumulative effect of these misperceptions was that

Saddam was unaware of the serious jeopardy he had put himself in.

2. Inaccurate perception of military capabilities and the relative balance of power between ��

��% �� weaker than is the case.

Geoffrey Blainey suggests that wars begin when leaders in different states have different perceptions about their

relative strength. Conversely, wars cease because those same leaders come to share a similar perception about

their relative strengths and weaknesses.[223] In a sense, the actual combat of war gives each nation involved a

crash course �� (��+�� ( �&��(�)�( �# �� ( �� ) ��(�were

correct.

� #��()' �(��&�' �<#��(��)��( (?�� ) ��ended in war, leaders in the

initiating countries grossly misjudged the military balance and were sure of victory if the crisis were to result in

war. For instance, in the J�� -�(��9��&�!051��(( �� # )�� <��*�)�� ?��

cornucopia of weapons and men he saw during his inspections of Egyptian positions in the Sinai.[224] The

Pakistani decision to pursue full-scale combat with India over the Kashmir in 1965 was due in part to the sense

of overconfidence that Pakistani leaders gained from the brief border skirmish in the Rann of Kutch earlier in the

year.[225] And prior to the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian perception that Japan would not risk war was

#�( �� (� �) ��&� *�� $((��(� ��+��perception that rested in part on racial

stereotypes.[226]

=��&�� #' �� *�� (��)��(� �) ��&�� @(�)��#�� (�created a feeling of

overconfidence that heavily influenced the decision to initiate war. Clearly such misperceptions are important;

�&� ��(�� (�� (�� @�� *� )��Q�/��cases where the perception of the military

balance is erroneous (as revealed by the (�� @(�(#( D �� & �� 8�� )��# �&��

confident in stating that misperception was a direct cause of the war. In fact, Levy has argued that the

perception of a military advantage is probably a necessary condition for war, though it is probably not sufficient

by itself, since leaders usually require that the war not only be won but be won without prohibitive expense.[227]

=��&& � �� &�' �)�&�� ) ��(��'�' �� G �� 9.��(��(��@(� decision to attack Iraq

in 2003. While in many ways the perception of the military balance (highly in favor of the U.S. and its allies) was

)�� )�� )�'�� (��@(�perceptions of the postwar balance was fatally flawed. It was assumed that

once the Iraqi army had been defeated, there was little chance of pro-Saddam insurgency or anti-American

-111-

opposition forces, let alone a full-blown civil war that American occupation forces would have to deal with.[228]

An overestimation�&�� @(�� (�� && � ��.� Lebow

finds that one of the most important perceptions of threat involves the perception of an impending dramatic shift

�� #��) �&�� ' �(��@(�&�'�.��(�was a factor in roughly half the thirteen brinkmanship

)��( (�� #�@(�(��. [229] Misperception of future�(��&�(�� @(��(��'�� )� �� ' �&�

preventive war+��&�� )��) �&�'�)��(�� ) �' ��# �� a war

fought later, when the chance of success is perceived to be worse.

Perceptions of immediate�)�� (�� #��) �&�� (��+ (� )��)�� (��(��3

term tactical advantage that would give one side an immediate military advantage. Such perceptions of

immediate, tactical changes in the military situation create a motive for preemptive war+�� & ��(�

a perceived imminent attack by an opponent. While not all such perceptions are false, history provides adequate

examples of erroneous perceptions of tactical advantage. With regard to the outbreak of World War I, Tsar

��)��(�//@(�order to mobilize Russian troops on July 30, 1914, was based on the erroneous perception that

G �� ( )� �� (��(��$((��+�� (�that would give her a

decisive edge if not quickly countered by Russian action. In reality, no such secret preparations had occurred;

Germany did not order premobilization until July 31, in response to the Russian mobilization. French mobilization

was apparently #�( ��(��(� �) ��&��( )� ��G ��)��3��&�<� �(�&��(��(?�&

reserves.[230] With regard to the Six Day War, we shall perhaps never know whether the Egyptians and Syrians

planned to attack Israel in the summer of 1967; over four decades later, the matter is controversial. Israeli

leaders, however, were certain that the attack was imminent.

The preceding discussion has probably already alerted the reader to the powerful multiplier effects of

��(� �) ��(.�=��' �� ) ��&�� @(��(�� (�coupled with a misperception of his

relative military weakness would certainly be a potent combination. Unfortunately, misperceptions are rarely

<��)�� ?L�� tend to be twins or triplets.

Since perceptions of strength are linked both to perceptions of intentions and to perceptions of risk, there are

two corollaries to the basic misperception of relative strength:

2a. The inaccurate belief that the opponent will give in to your threats and ultimatums rather than go to

war.

2b. The misperception of the degree of risk one faces in initiating a conflict .

The defining characteristic of the brinkmanship crises that Lebow investigates is that the initiator fully expects the

adversary to back down rather than resort to arms. In each crisis that he investigates these initial perceptions

were proved to be inaccurate, and the initiator either had to back down or face actual hostilities. His findings

suggest that the presence of a vulnerable commitment by the opponent is not a precondition for brinkmanship

crises; what counts is the perception�#�� '�� #� �)�� *�(�(+�� ) ��(

frequently erroneous.[231] Misperception thus appears to be a major cause of war in brinkmanship crises.

A good example is the misperception of Indian leaders in the 1962 crisis with China in the Himalayas. Indian

-112-

leaders believed that China would back down when confronted ��/��@(�� ((�' �<&��)�?�&

manning military posts in the disputed � ��(+ ' ��(� ��#��&��(

involved. This perception by Indian political leaders was abetted by a sycophantic military that was unwilling to

challenge what they believed to be an erroneous image of Chinese behavior.[232]

Not only do different individuals have different propensities for risk taking, but they also perceive different

degrees of risk in the same or similar situations. Jervis maintains that (unlike what many historians have

suggested) Hitler was not reckless in his attempts to dominate Europe in the 1930s but merely certain the other

side would back down.[233] It was not that Hitler was more willing to take risks than others, but that he believed

the risks of war were slight.

Perhaps the classic case of misperception of risk was the American decision to try to unify Korea after the initial

task of driving back the North Korean attack on the south had succeeded. Both Chinese strength and Chinese

willingness to defend North �� ( ' � �� #�� =� ��)��(�� +��)��#��G � ��

MacArthur and his staff. Part of the problem was bureaucratic. Army intelligence played down the evaluation of

Chinese strength both to avoid demoralizing the South Korean army and to avoid the wrath of MacArthur,

whose position on Chinese strength was well known. J�)=��@(�(��&&�6�� /�� )�� (

later) had learned to be properly submissive to their leader. Consequently, MacArthur was unaware of the

anxiety of some of his generals because his closest subordinates had insulated him from it.[234] De Rivera

suggests that the basis for this was that MacArthur had a psychological need to be free from disagreement and

be surrounded by people supportive of his own views, a need created by his own lack of self-esteem.[235]

To some extent the misperceptions about Chinese capabilities and intentions were also based on wishful

thinking by American leaders. Though warnings abounded that the official interpretation of Chinese strength

and intentions was inaccurate, U.S. leaders persisted in their adherence to the image of Chinese weakness and

#�&&.�9��@(�� a pelican looking for a quick meal and with his administration under

attack from the Republicans for being soft on communism, the creation of a unified and democratic Korea

would certainly have been the answer to a host of political problems for Truman and Secretary of State

Acheson. On the other hand, failure to push ahead with unification would be seen as appeasement. According

to Lebow, Truman and Acheson needed a victory in North Korea; there was no acceptable alternative. In the

face of information that such a victory might be complicated by Chinese entry into the war, American leaders

responded by bolstering�6��&�� '�� ) �� &�) �� @(�# �� &8��selective attention to

information in order to dismiss Chinese threats as a bluff.[236] Thus, they were able to conclude that the risks of

pushing northward across the 38th parallel were relatively small.

3. Perception that war is inevitable.

There are two versions of this perception. The general phenomenon of war may be seen as an inevitable feature

of the landscape of international relations, or specific wars may be perceived as inevitable at specific times. Each

perception has an impact on the willingness of leaders to opt for war.

Evan Luard has remarked on the importance of the perception of the general acceptability of war as a feature of

international relations. He believes that ultimately decisions &�� (@�# �� &(��#��7�<�#�

-113-

its usefulness, legitimacy or morality, about its value in enhancing national prestige, upholding national honor, or

asserting national will; above all about its normality as a constant feature in �� # ��'��&�(�� (.?[237]

Luard traces beliefs about the normality of war in the international system from 1400 to the late twentieth

century. He argues that the main change is not in the degree to which war in general has been regarded as

� �� 6��(��(�@��)�� )�8�but in the type of war that is seen as legitimate in successive

periods.[238] Recently some scholars have made the argument that, at least among the advanced industrial

democracies of the North, the spread of peaceful norms since the end of World War I has meant that war no

longer is seen as serving a necessary political, social, or economic function and that offensive war is not

acceptable among these states.[239]

The bottom line, however, is that while attitudes toward outright aggression may have gradually become more

negative, war is still seen as an acceptable instrument of national policy under certain circumstances. And to the

extent that war is perceived as a normal and acceptable feature of international relations, leaders will continue to

include it in their repertoire of options for dealing with other states.

The extent to which political leaders perceive that a particular war is inevitable at a particular point in time may

be an even more important factor in the decision to go to war. Whether this actually constitutes a misperception

is difficult to say; �&� �� )�� (�� ) .�� (@�&� )�(�(�� )��(��#��future

realities are substantially unlike their perceptions of current realities; the latter can more easily be seen as

accurate or inaccurate than the former.[240] Nevertheless, we shall consider such predictions to be

misperceptions since they are commonly treated as such in much of the writing about war.

World War I appears to some authors as the classic example of a situation in which leaders on all sides

perceived war as inevitable.[241] All of the European crises that immediately preceded it led to international

conferences of leaders or foreign ministers. But these attempts to settle the Austro-Serbian crisis by means of an

international conference never really got off the ground. We can speculate that it was probably seen by many as

a useless waste of time, given the perception that war was inevitable.

The perception that war is inevitable, combined with the perception that the present time will be more

advantageous militarily than a future time, creates an especially dangerous set of circumstances. Certainly this

was the case in the July 1914 crisis. German and Austrian leaders felt that the summer of 1914 might be the last

opportunity to win such a war, which would certainly come sooner or later. [242] Russian rearmament would be

)�� #��!0!5A!1��)� ��)�� (�environment. Ironically, many British and French

leaders, the French general staff in particular, also believed it would be best to fight Germany sooner rather than

later. Similar perceptions affected French decision making in 1870 prior to the war with Prussia and Japanese

�� (��!0 :A"��# �� ' �� (�� )��'�� '�(3W3'�(�$((��

be quickly lost.[243]

4. Perception that the war will be relatively inexpensive and short .

Generally decision makers must believe that war will be winnable, short, and not prohibitively expensive.[244]

On the other hand, if war is seen as being ruinous, political leaders will be less likely to plunge their nations into

-114-

it.

�� (��(��@(�� ) �� :��<(�)�� ?��/��D��be short and relatively

inexpensive with little postwar nation-building was certainly a part of the reason why the decision for war was so

compelling. The same was true with World War I, for several reasons. First, there was the power of historical

analogy. �� (�� ((�&�� (��K��(��-�� +�� N��)3��((��9�� =(��3��((��

9��+� �� 3) ��(�� (� �� *� )�� &�� (�� .�, )�� (�the belief that no great

power could financially sustain a long war, especially given the commercial and financial interdependence of

European states. Finally, there was the factor of military strategy. European militaries emphasized the offensive

side of warfare, believing offensive strategies and technologies to have a decisive advantage over the

defense.[245] �� (��(�� &� ��(� � @(�&& �( ��D�)��' �)� ��opponent

placed on the defensive, thus precluding a long war. This brings us to an important corollary misperception.

4a. The perception that offensive weapons and strategies are superior to defensive weapons and

strategies. As we will see in chapter 10, Stephen Van Evera claims that even though defenses are usually

superior to offenses (as they were in World War I), the perception that the offense has an advantage is a crucial

factor in pushing leaders toward the decision for war.[246] It places a hair trigger on crisis interactions; it leads to

the belief that conquest is easy and defense is difficult; and it leads to opportunistic wars, preemptive wars, and

preventive wars.

5. Misperceptions of the intentions (and capabilities) of third states .

Blainey points out the importance of perceptions (or misperceptions) concerning the behavior of third states:

who will enter the war on whose side and who will remain on the sidelines, who will honor their alliance

commitments and who will weasel out.[247]

The correct perception of third-party intentions can be enormously beneficial. American leaders correctly

perceived that no European states would intervene on behalf of Mexico in 1846. European leaders correctly

perceived the American Civil War would prevent the United States from aiding Mexico against their intervention

in the 1860s. And C�� ( �� (��))�� ) �' �� ' � ��@(�side

in its 1937 invasion of that country.

Misperceptions are just as plentiful, however. The typical misperception (perhaps a kind of wishful thinking) is

�� @(�� (�� @(�� (�� &��&�� )�� (.

Erroneous perceptions of this (�� )��&& )�� (@�)(�3# � &��(�(�&�� (��#��&��#�

)��#��' �)�&�� ) .�N��(��) ��M�� @(�� ) ��would receive no outside

assistance was rudely corrected by the British and French declaration of war in 1939. In 1914 German and

Austrian leaders believed the war against Serbia could be kept localized without outside intervention by other

great powers. �� ( �@(�� ) ��(��'�' � ��(�� ( � ��' �been a crucial

factor in German calculations. While the decision of the North Korean and Soviet leadership to attack South

Korea was probably based (erroneously) on the perception that the United States would not intervene, the

��(��@(�decision to send UN troops into North Korea was based on the (equally erroneous)

perception that China would remain neutral in spite of her protestations to the contrary.[248]

-115-

In the weeks preceding his 1990 attack on Kuwait, Saddam Hussein almost certainly perceived little risk that

the United States would intervene. He was probably aided in this misperception by U.S. leaders. Just as the

initial North Korean attack on South Korea may have been affected by the absence of a formal U.S. military

commitment ��,�� 6�(�� &�� #��, )� ��=)� (�@(�<� & �( �� ?8��,��M(( ��@(

decision was probably affected by statements by the U.S. State Department that the United States had no

formal commitment to defend Kuwait. Additionally, at a hastily called meeting between Saddam Hussein and

American Ambassador April Glaspie in Baghdad just days before the attack (as Iraqi forces were massing on

the Kuwaiti border), the American envoy, adhering to standard policy positions, assured the Iraqi leader of the

American desire for good relations and declared that the United States took no position on the dispute between

Iraq and Kuwait.[249]

The perceptions that war will be economically manageable and militarily winnable and that there will be no third-

party surprises all create a sense of optimism that Blainey believes is a key to the cause of war. He argues that it

is exceedingly doubtful whether there has been a war since 1700 in which the initial hopes about the impending

war were low on both (�� (.�M �)�)�� (��<��(��(��'�� .�=��)��)� �( (

��(��(��)�( �&��.�=��)�� (��(��(��)�( �&�� ) .?[250]

Why Misperception? Two Answers

Given that misperceptions are plentiful and harmful, why do they occur so often? Social scientists generally point

��)�� (�&�#��(��&& )�� ) ��(+��'�� and motivated biases. Unmotivated

biases generally derive from the normal cognitive mechanisms by which our brain works to process information.

This type of bias is pervasive and largely unavoidable, as we have discussed. The cognitive approach used by

Jervis �� (�< ��(�H (�� (��)��)��' ��(��(�� )�(��making by gross

(��&�)��(��#� �� ( ��&��) ((��.?[251]

An alternative approach is offered by Irving Janis and Leon Mann, who argue that the primary source of

perceptual distortion is motivational.[252] Their basic assumption is that we are all emotional beings (rather than

rational calculators) with strong psychological needs to construct and maintain positive images of ourselves and

our environment. In the midst of a crisis, if there appear to be no alternatives that promise success, the

psychological toll becomes too great for leaders. Unable to face the discouraging truth about their options, they

retreat to a psychological state of %��6��6 �%��in which they refuse to submit their plans to reality

testing. Janis and Mann identify �� &��(�&�� & �(�' ��'��) +��)��(��(��&�� (��(�#��

and bolstering. These are all methods of coping with stress, but each leads to some kind of perceptual

distortion.[253]

Lebow summarizes the difference between the cognitive approach of Jervis and the motivational approach of

Janis and Mann:

For Jervis, the starting point is the human need to develop simple rules for processing information

in order to make sense of an extraordinarily complex and uncertain environment. Janis and Mann

take as their fundamental assumption the human desire to avoid fear, shame, and guilt. Jervis

describes cognitive consistency as the most important organizing principle of cognition. Janis and

-116-

Mann contend that aversion of psychological stress is the most important drive affecting cognition.

Whereas Jervis concludes that expectations condition our interpretation of events and our

receptivity to information, Janis and Mann argue for the important of preferences. For Jervis, we

see what we expect to see, for Janis and Mann, what we want to see.[254]

� #�@(��(�(�&�� )��( (�� (�� )�)�(�� '��approach provides the

better explanation for misperceptions. His study of brinkmanship crises indicates that crisis initiators uniformly

(and erroneously) expected the adversary to back down rather than resort to war. Lebow found, however, that

��<#K )��' ?�good opportunity for aggression existed in only a third of the cases. In each case, however, there

was a perception that an opportunity existed and there were also strong needs on the part of the initiator to

pursue aggressive foreign policies. Lebow suggests that decision makers are more responsive to internal

imperatives than to external developments. Aggression would seem to be less a function of opportunity than it is

a function of need.[255]

Linking Individual Characteristics: Beliefs, Personality, and Leadership

� �@(��#�� &�� ) ��(�� *�� (�( ' ��&�� '��3� ' ��factors we have been describing

and links them to war. In his Why Leaders Choose War, Jonathan Renshon attempts to assess the impact of

several individual level factors ��' �� (�� )�� &�'��&��)��&��+�� ' ��' ��

undertaken to counter a perceived serious future threat.[256] His study is a qualitative assessment of three cases

&�� ' ��' ��6��@(�� , H�9��!045��/(�� @(��)��/��D@(��)� �� )��!02!��

the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003) and two cases in which leaders contemplated preventive war and decided

against it (the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in the immediate post-WWII period and India and

��(�� (�A!01!�9�� 8.

$ �(�� (�H (��( ' ��&�)��(��))��&��)��@(�� ((�to use preventive war: (1)

� )�� ' ��' �(��+�� (�� perception of decline, (2) the perception that there is

only a short window of time in which to act, (3) the belief the situation gives an advantage to the side that strikes

first, (4) the belief that war is inevitable, (5) an inherent bad faith image of the enemy, and (6) a black-and-white

worldview that includes making stark moral contrasts between good and evil. While all of the factors appear

important, Renshon )�)�� (��<� �� (+�� (�)�� (��(�� (�� K�� (+

play � �� (.?[257]

9�� (�$ �(��@(� *��&�� )�( (�� ' ��>�N��(��)�(�� ' ��' ��places a premium on

(�� (��.�/�� )�( (�&��$ �(��@(�K�� is that without the strong prowar stances by

Anthony Eden in 1956, Menachem Begin in 1981, and George W. Bush in 2003, war would have been less

likely. Decisions for �� ' ��' �� D�� (�� &�( �&3)�&�� ) +��

of the threat and about the morality and utility of the use of force in response. But leadership strength was just as

important for those administrations that chose not to use preventive force.

Second, the inherent bad faith image of the enemy appears to be crucial. The perception that the opponent is

implacably hostile, is unpredictable, and cannot be trusted is pretty much the foundation for a decision for

preventive war. But because it is also present in the two cases where war was not selected, what appears to be

-117-

important is that the bad faith images are particularly rigid, intense, and personalized.[258] The presence of an

�� #��&�� (�� +�� idea that war is inevitable (the stronger the

image of the enemy as evil and threatening, the more likely war will be seen as inevitable, at least in the long run)

and the use of historical analogies that compare the opponent to figures such as Hitler or Mussolini. All of these

)�� (�� <� �'�� '��(�)��.?[259] The bad faith image is closely connected to

another psychological variable: black-and-white thinking. Indeed, the cases where all of these phenomena were

present were the three cases of war. Clearly, a Manichaean world view that relies on rigidly categorizing states

as good or evil means that once states are coded as evil, they are seen as more threatening. This also has an

��#�� && )�� (7�<M�� )�(��(�� &� ��(�� #��#��) ��#�� @(�'� �

that they are on the O��@�(�� (�� )�(��)�� (� �.?[260] Black-and-white thinking also makes it

�(� ��&�� (��( �� )�� (+( �� @(�� (��M�� +�(�� (�&��H��

problem.

Third, situations in which leaders choose preventive war or opt to forgo it both involve substantial risk, and

therefore propensity for risk (and prospect theory) needs to # �� ))��.�<=��()((��&

preventive war is inherently framed in terms of losses. By the time leaders have decided to consider preventive

action, they have already framed a given issue in terms of something bad that may happen in the future, that is,

�� &��(( (.?[261] Since this is true both for those leaders who choose war and those who

forgo it, the decision involves individual psychology, which affects whether something is framed in terms of gains

or losses, how a reference point is calculated, whether individuals are predisposed toward taking risks, along

with numerous other variables.[262]

The Role of Stress

=(��&�� @�� ' ��#�� (��( �� (��(�� (�interfere with their

ability to make rational decisions, we must also be aware that even normal individuals have difficulties making

rational decisions under conditions &�(�� ((.��( ��))��)��&&�) (+�� (�� (�� (� �(�

foreign ��(� �(��( )��'�( �(��)�� (��'�( �(��(��+ �)�� stress on an

almost daily basis. Stress is physiologically induced by the combination of threats, sleeplessness, anxiety, time

pressure, frustration, information overload, and the inner conflicts that risky decisions entail.[263] International

relations scholars assume that stress is at its height during times of crises.

Stress induces a cluster of hormonal and metabolic changes in the human body. Stress reactions are brought on

by neuromodulator chemicals called catecholamines (which ��)�� 8.�E��#�� (@

automatic reaction to stress makes several things happen very quickly: Adrenaline is secreted; stored

carbohydrates begin &�� #��(��#��H�� #��@(� � �� ( �' (�� '�� the

effects of muscular fatigue; the blood becomes more coagulable; the heart beats faster; and breathing patterns

�� .�=��&��(�)�#�� (��) ��<�� ?+& ��(�&�� #�� (��&��(� ��

and optimism, all of which might lead to miscalculations.[264] The presence of these chemicals in the

bloodstream makes us feel more disorganized and distracted and more reliant on habitual responses. These

� �)� ��)��(�<(��down the prefrontal cortex, which houses higher-level cognitive functioning, and

encourages �� ) �� ) �� )��# ��'��.?[265] In other words,

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they give priority to what Kahneman calls system 1.

All of these changes prepare men and women for some type of extraordinary physical * ��+&�� )��((�)

�� ' (�&�<&��&��.?�M� ' ��(��) �� times the circumstances that stimulate these bodily

)�� (��@�� the actual expenditures of physical energy, the individual is often left in a

frustrated, disturbed, and debilitated state. These ancient mechanisms that evolved to prepare us for stressful

encounters may now actually detract from our ability to deal with stressful situations.[266]

� �@(�� *�� &�� Vincennes. In July 1988 the U.S.S. Vincennes, an Aegis cruiser sent to help

guard U.S.-flagged tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, erroneously shot down a commercial

airliner flying from Iran to Dubai. It had been a stressful day for the captain and crew. U.S. ships in the Gulf had

just finished a skirmish with Iranian boats, sinking two, when radar reported a plane taking off from Bandar

Abbas airfield in Iran. Information regarding this plane from radar and electronic intelligence sources was

ambiguous, and the captain and crew had only a scant few minutes to determine what to do before the plane

would be within range to launch an air-to-sea torpedo at the Vincennes. In an attempt to determine whether the

plane might be a commercial airliner, one crew member was given the task of checking the airliner guide for

flights from Bandar Abbas; the crewman hurriedly thumbed through the guide and missed the flight (which was

( ' �� (�� 8.�=�� )� ��)�� )�� )�� @(�� from the screen, leading all

concerned to believe the plane to be descending toward the Vincennes rather than ascending. Independent

psychologists who reviewed the incident concluded that the mistakes were due to a combination of stress,

information overload, and a breakdown in communication among the Vincennes staff in the Combat Information

Center.[267]

Incidents such as these sometimes provide the spark from which wars explode, either because they are used by

governments as an excuse for initiating a war that has been long desired or because the incident genuinely

arouses a passion for retribution that can seemingly be met in no other way. States respond in anger; this anger

is reciprocated; an escalating spiral of violence and counterviolence leads to war. In this particular case, war

between the United States and Iran was avoided, but states are not always this fortunate.

Experimental simulations and the study of individuals under real conditions of stress both conclude that stress

has some rather debilitating effects on the ability of individuals to react rationally to their environment. Table 3.3

provides a short list of the possible effects of stress.[268] Ole Holsti sums up very nicely our knowledge of its

nasty effects:

The conclusion is sobering: men rarely perform at their best under intense stress. The most

probable casualties of high stress are the very abilities which distinguish men from other species: to

establish logical links between present action and future goals; to create novel responses to new

circumstances; to communicate complex ideas; to deal with abstractions; to perceive not only

blacks and whites, but also the many shades of grey which fall in between; to distinguish valid

analogies from false ones, and the sense of nonsense; and, perhaps most important of all, to enter

into the frames of reference of others. With respect to these precious attributes, the law of supply

and demand seems to operate in a perverse manner; as crisis increases the need for them, it also

appears to diminish the supply.[269]

-119-

This is not to say that all stress is bad. Moderate levels of stress are actually beneficial for the average person:

they concentrate the mind. Even high levels of stress may increase performance for elementary tasks, though

only for a short time. The negative effects of stress generally come at the extreme ends of the spectrum. Low

� ' �(�&�(�� ((�&��&)(�� @(� � �� (�� #� ��)� ��stress may impair cognitive

&�)��(+ (� )�� &��) ((��.�Stress especially degrades our ability to deal with

complex circumstances marked with )�(�� #� ��) ��+ *�)�� (�&�() ��(�� (()��

international crises. Thus, the relationship between stress and the decision-making quality is curvilinear rather

than linear and looks like an inverted U.[270]

The effects of stress can also be compounded by physical factors such as age, health, and fatigue. But since

national leaders tend to arrive in office in their more mature years (this is being charitable: some arrive well past

their prime), the news is not all that wonderful. Increased age is associated with an increased susceptibility to

illness and fatigue and with a decreased ability to cope with stress. The only saving grace may be that leaders

with past experience under stress may perform better. At any rate, while it would be nice to be able to create a

stress-free environment for our political leaders (and make sure they get plenty of rest), it would appear that

stress, unfortunately, is just one of those things that come with the territory.

Stress also varies according to the individual. While stress is debilitating for some, others seem to thrive on

stressful situations. Jerrold Post notes that what threatens one leader may invigorate another. For Israeli prime

minister Menachem Begin, external threats from Arab states acted as a tonic, but internal Israeli political

criticism was quite stressful.[271] Prime Minister Anthony Eden suffered a severe case of exhaustion at the height

of the 1956 Suez Crisis due to stress (and possibly an addiction to amphetamines). And the chief of staff of the

Israeli Defense Forces, Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, collapsed at the height of the 1967 Middle East crisis and

needed thirty-six hours of rest.

Uri Bar Joseph and Rose McDermott examined the effects of stress on five Israeli political and military leaders

in command positions on the crucial second day of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Two of the four performed

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poorly (including Defense Minister Moshe Dayan), while two others performed relatively well (including Prime

Minister Golda Meir). The authors conclude that two factors account for their differences. The first variable was

a sense of personal accountability or responsibility for the problem. Those who failed to properly prepare for

the war performed poorly once it actually began, while those who had taken necessary preparations for the

possibility of war performed well. The second variable was the presence (or absence) of a positive social

support system. Leaders who were surrounded by supportive staff and others capable of providing them with

personal psychological reassurance performed well; leaders who lacked a close team of supporters or who felt

they had lost the trust and support of their comrades performed poorly.[272]

There is little doubt that personality makes a difference in how leaders respond ��(�� ((.�=(��(��(��(��<��

(�� ((��'��(�# )� �� ( �' (.?[273] The typical defensive patterns and coping mechanisms

used in the past become intensified and exaggerated. Anxious people become more anxious and their cognitive

abilities become seriously degraded. Leaders with compulsive personality characteristics (and government

cubicles are filled with these types) react with increased attention to detail. Their compulsive characteristics

become virtually disabling: They become overwhelmed by detail, unable to see the big picture, and indecisive,

seemingly paralyzed by doubt. In the end, the decision is most likely to be the result of frantic impulse rather

than careful weighing of evidence and viewpoints.

Leaders with narcissistic personality characteristics (also highly represented in the councils of world leaders)

follow a different path to dysfunction. The mild narcissistic personality features of some leaders may bloom into

full-blown character disorders. Their extreme self-centeredness and egocentricity mean that they are not likely

to admit ignorance or accept constructive criticism. By itself this is problematic, but narcissists are also likely to

have surrounded themselves by toadies who are well-practiced in telling the leader what they think he wants to

hear instead of supplying him with the unvarnished truth. Thus they tend to be out of touch with political reality.

The && )��&�(�� ((�� (��)��)� ��(��)(��(�� ' �)��)� ��(��)(+��

suspiciousness, their stubbornness and rigidity, their unwillingness to compromise, �� & �(�' � ((+��

intensified and become dysfunctional. Their heightened suspiciousness leads to the construction of worst-case

scenarios and the conclusion that compromise is impossible and that preemptive force is necessary.[274]

Those leaders whose personality profile includes risk-acceptance are generally more comfortable with stress,

and high-risk situations may actually bring out the best in them, whereas risk-averse leaders may find their

abilities much more impaired. But even in risk-acceptant personalities, there is a level of stress that will adversely

�&& )��K�� L��@(�K(�� (��(��)�� ' �.[275]

9�� (�� '�� ) +&�� *� �� (�� (��D��' �)�( �(�� (+(�� (��the negative effects of

stress on decision making, a few studies point in the other �� )��.�� )� ��9�� & ��@(�(��&

international crises provides some limited evidence that high levels of stress evoke greater attentiveness by

decision makers to the actions of others, leading to appropriate responses. Their study indirectly infers the level

of stress felt by decision makers based on two variables: (1) a ten-point scale judging the level of threat to the

state and (2) a ten-point scale ranking the ��&& � �) (�� # �� (�� (��'�' �+�� D��

power (small power/superpower) representing the greatest threat, though cases involving two superpower

adversaries are also ranked at the most dangerous level. They were interested in the degree to which the actions

&��' �(�� (��)� �� )�� @(�# ��'��7�F��)��(�(��a nonviolent trigger event lead to a nonviolent

-121-

response? Did a crisis triggered by a violent act lead to a violent response? Their data show that actions were

most likely to be appropriately matched under conditions of high stress, while conditions of low stress were

more likely to lead to unmatched responses (nonviolent triggers leading to violent responses).[276] Finally,

B ��H# �� @(��(�(�&��3��(��&� �� ' �� )�(��(� indicates that stress actually had a

rather limited impact on decision making.[277]

Conclusion

This chapter has examined those factors that might explain the differences in the behavior of individuals

regarding war: different psychological needs, different personality traits, cognitive biases inherent in the way the

brain processes information, differences in willingness to take risks, different perceptions (and misperceptions)

of the environment ��&�� @(�� (��&& � �� (�&�� )� (��&& � �) (

in ability to change or adjust present images.

Several points should be made in summary. First, virtually all the theories and concepts discussed in this chapter

undermine normal assumptions about the ability of government leaders to make rational decisions. They support

the notion that decisions for war or the escalation of conflict are likely to result from nonrational, subconscious,

or emotional processes rather than purely logical calculation. Errors might result from the need for cognitive

consistency and the failure to incorporate new data into old beliefs, from cognitive limitations, dysfunctional

operational codes or schemas, motivated or emotional bias, reliance on inappropriate analogies, the framing of

reference points and options, feelings of low self-esteem, stress brought on by fear and anxiety, and so on.

Determining which of these departures from rationality is most responsible for a particular policy error is

difficult.[278]

Second, it seems likely that many of these individual-level variables are highly interrelated. If, for the sake of

argument, we identify a major cause of war to be an overestimation &�� @(��(��)��

predisposition (in spite of tremendous risks) to confront that opponent with hostile actions in the hope of forcing

him to #�)�� ( ' �� (�&�'��#� (�� '�� ' �+)��' �&�)��(��personality

'��#� (�� '��#� (+��)�#�� ) �()��(��.

We have seen how psychological needs might foster misperceptions concerning the risks inherent in a crisis

situation and about the relative military capabilities of the states involved. It is also likely that operational codes

��&� �) �� @(�perceptions of the opponent and of the strategies most likely to be effective in dealing

with that opponent. Leaders with a hawkish operational code are more likely to perceive opponents as

aggressors who will back down in the face of bullying tactics. They therefore are predisposed to follow hardline,

brinkmanship-type tactics against others. Actions by rivals may trigger analogies and historical lessons that serve

to heighten the calculation of threat and the need to use force to counter it. Leaders whose personalities are

characterized by risk acceptance or by dominance or power motivation will be inclined to pursue tough, high-

��(��)��)(�'�(3W3'�(�� '��(.�� ( ��leaders with narcissistic or paranoid personalities or with

active ego defense mechanisms are prone to discount warnings of risk in their pursuit of foreign policy. Finally, a

� �� @(��#��)�� (�� )�� )�� &�� (��(�� be influenced by personality

variables and psychological needs as well as cognitive variables such as image structure, use of heuristic short-

cuts like analogies, and �� )�� &�� @(�� )� .

-122-

Third, we have a lot of evidence from case studies (though some of it is fairly unsystematic) that misperceptions

have frequently accompanied decisions by national leaders to go ��.�F � �� @(�� ) ��(

(and her psychological state) in time of crisis is fraught with danger. Any such analysis should be viewed with

caution. But the evidence from an extremely large number of cases indicating that decision-making elites have

been the victims of misperceptions is virtually overwhelming. What we know from these cases is that in a sizable

number of instances, elite misperceptions appear to have played a crucial role in the decision to go to war. What

we % �� (�)��@��(�� ( ��(� �) ��(�))�� .�9��' �happened if

they had not? Would war have been prevented? How widespread are such misperceptions across the universe

of cases of interstate war? Neither can we at this time be precise about the exact relationships between

misperceptions and other individual-level variables.

Finally, none of the ideas we have encountered here add up to a fully developed theory of war. We do not as

yet have a psychological or cognitive theory of war. Individuals matter, but how, when, and why they matter is

not very easily or very parsimoniously incorporated into theories of war. Nevertheless, these individual-level

variables are often important enough that if they are omitted from our explanations, we will fail to understand the

reason for war. Perhaps Herbert Kelman has put this in perspective best. He has argued that there can be no

really autonomous psychological theory of war and international relations, only a general theory of international

relations in which psychology plays a role.[279]

While it would seem that psychological and cognitive variables may not always play the determining role in

whether war breaks out, they are certainly quite important. As we will see in later chapters, psychological and

cognitive factors are also highly interrelated with variables at other levels of analysis. This increases their

importance as elements of a theory of war.

If national decisions for war really are affected by the factors we have identified in this chapter, what are the

implications for solving the problems of war? If psychological factors really are that important, one implication

might be that selection for high office ought to be conditional upon passing a rigorous psychological examination.

And frequent psychological checkups for the political elite ought to be instituted just as often as physical

checkups. Unfortunately, political candidates are about as likely to submit to observation and testing by

professional psychiatrists as they are to refuse campaign contributions from wealthy admirers. In the final

analysis, states are probably best served simply by developing procedural checks on decision making so that

(�� (+�� (&& ��&��(�)��)�� (&�)��(+)��

make the momentous decision of war and peace.

Let us switch gears for a moment. We have assumed thus far that the key element in the cause of war is the role

of the individual national leader. However, this may be an oversimplification. Decision making is not always an

individual process; frequently it is a collective political process. Government decisions are typically made by

small groups of people. If this is the case, then the role of the individual may be less important than how the

members of the decision-making group interact with each other to determine government policy. We must move

on therefore to explore explanations &�� *�� ' ��&��(�(+�� (��.

1. N��)� �� (��(��( �F�� )��<� ��(��( �G� ��J ��?�International

Security��4��.�"�6,�� !87�! 1A"5.�� (�� 6!!�8��<� )�( �� (�� (�differ, it is entirely possible that

variance in the traits of individuals explains the differences in international relations. For instance, although not all wars have

-123-

been caused by aggressive, risk-tolerant, greedy, or vainglorious leaders, those leaders who did manifest these traits regularly

� ��.?

2. John Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War��:�� .�6� ��7�,�.�J��@(��!02�8��!:4.�-��(�(�� .

3. �� &��(�&��E� �M�(��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J�� (�B� � ��(�)��)��7�O��' ��) ((@

=��)� (�?�In Search of Global Patterns, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1972), 127; Margaret Hermann,

<-&& )�(�&�� (��)� ��(��)(�&��)�� (��N� ��)��?��Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for

Comparative Foreign Policy Studies�� .�J.�-�(��,.�,�� .�N.�M ��6� ' ��M��(��=7�,�� !0128��4!A4�L�and

��)��<� ��(��( �G� ��J ��?�!"!.

4. =#��J�(��<=�� &�M��J��'��?�Psychological Review 50 (1943): 394.

5. Although empirical evidence exists for the presence of physical and security needs, and indeed for their hierarchical nature,

empirical validation for the existence of J�(��@(�� (��(��)��.�, �$((�N��H� ��<=#��J�(��@(

Hierarchy &�� (+=��-*�(��-'��?��Human Needs and Politics, ed. R. Fitzgerald (Rushcutters Bay,

=(��7�� ((��!0118��:5A4!.

6. $�� (� ��,��C( �� <$ ��&�� -��(��Violence and Aggression: The Dark

,�� &�M��, �&3-(� ��?�Psychological Review�! :��.�!�6!00587�4A::.

7. Lloyd S. Etheredge, A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978);

( ��(��.�,.�-�� <� �(��N� ��)��?�Psychology Today ��J��)��!014��:1A"�.

8. F�'��9�� <J �(�� J��' (�&��)��=)��(��F�(��) �?�� The Psychological Assessment of Political

Leaders�� .�C ��(��6=��=�#�7��' �(��&�J�)�� ((�� 48��!4:A11.

9. 9�� <J �(�� J��' (�&��)��=)��(��F�(��) �?�!42.

10. See discussion of findings in Martha Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston, Introduction to

Political Psychology�� .�6� ��7��(�)�� ((I��%�N��)�(�� ! 8��2A�0.

11. F.�9�� <J �(�� J��' (�&��)��=)��(��F�(��) �?�!42L��F.� 9�� <=(( ((�� (@

� �(�� (�?��The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, ed. J. Post (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

� 48��:�A::.�, ��(�� <,�� (��J��' (�� &��)��#��J�)�)(�(�?

Buffalo Studies�"�6!05287��0A42��)�� C �( ��Explaining Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982),

��A�:.

12. F�'��G.�9�� =#��C.�,� ��<�� =��(�(��(�� )��D �&��=(( ((�� )�� (�?��A

Psychological Examination of Political Leaders, ed. M. G. Hermann (New York: Free Press, 1977), 60.

13. Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), and Power and Personality

(New York: Norton, 1948).

14. �.�9.�� C.�J.�N�� (�� <�(�)��)��,�� (��,)��/�� )��Motives (SIAM), Phase 2: Group

J��' (��/�� $ ��(�G�� (�?��=��$ ��VX-2018-6-2, Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, 1967, and D. G. Winter,

The Power Motive�6� ��7�N� �� ((��!01:8��#��)�� J.�M ��<-&& )�(�&�� (��)� ��(��)(�of Political

� �� (��N� ��)��?�55.

-124-

15. 9�� <J �(�� J��' (�&��)��=)��(��F�(��) �?�!40.

16. J�� G.�M ��<-*��N� ��)�� '��(�� (��)� ��(��)(�&��)�� (�?

International Studies Quarterly��"�6!02 8��1A"5��)�� 9�� <J �(�� J��' (�&��)��=)��(�� F�(��) �?

163.

17. 9�� ,� ��<�� =��(�(��(�� )��D �&��=(( ((��)�� (�?� 60.

18. �.�9.�� <J��' (��,��/�� (��&��)��(� �(@�F�� ?� Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology��J��,�� 2��.�:�6!0528��7�!A�:��)�� M ��<-&& )�(�&�Personal Characteristics

&��)�� (��N� ��)��?�55.

19. F�'��G.�9�� <,��M(( ��7�J��'��(��J ��(�&�, �&3E�� $ ��(��(�?� in The Psychological

Assessment of Political Leaders�� .�C.��(��6=��=�#�7��' �(��&�J�)�� 48��:1�.�M(( ��@(��#' 3�' �� ranking

on affiliation should be seen in context: he had close political relationships only with those who were seen as similar to himself

and in whose company he felt safe. He tended to rely on an inner circle of trusted advisers who were either members of his

family or friends from his home town of Tikrit. His need for affiliation did not extend beyond this rather closed circle.

20. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

21. J��$� �)��<�� J ��&�F��(��?�Psychological Review 61 (May 1954): 200, cited in Jensen,

Explaining Foreign Policy, 26.

22. T. W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950).

23. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, 25.

24. 9�� <=(( ((�� (@�� (�� (�?�:�A::.

25. ��-�� <� �(��-&& )�(��=� ��)��N� ��)��!202A!052�?�American Political Science Review 72

6C� �!01287�":"A4!L��G��M.�,� ��<� �(��-&& )�(��=� ��)��N� ��)��!050A!02"7�=�, )�� (��&

/�� (��G � ��H�� ?�International Studies Quarterly�:��.�!�6J��)��!02287�0!A!�:.

26. -�� <� �(��-&& )�(�?�""0.�,� ��(��#� ��)�&��&& � �) �between the effects of introverted and

extroverted personality on U.S. policy toward �� ,'� �� !050A!02"�� .

27. , ��) �� J (D��<$�(�� F�(��#�� &�9��?� International Studies Quarterly 25,

�.�"�6F ) �# ��!02!87�4"�A"5L�� J (D��The War Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981).

28. ��)��<� ��(��( �G� ��J ��?�!:1.

29. J�� M ��<=(( ((�� N� ��)��$� �E�� (�&�,#3,��=&��)�� (�?��Role Theory and

Foreign Policy Analysis�� .�,.�G.�9�� 6F��7�F� ��' �(�� ((��!0218��!5!A02.

30. J�� G.�M ��<,��M(( ��@(�� (��,�� ?��The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, ed. J.

�(��6=��=�#�7��' �(��&�J�)�� ((�� 48��:14A25.

31. ,� �� )��F�(��<� �(��N� ��)�7��@(�/��D�F )�(��(�?�Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 3

6C�� 587��20A: 5.

-125-

32. C ��(��<=(( ((�� (��F�(��) 7�� )�� (��&�� ?�in Post, The Psychological Assessment of

Political Leaders��50A! "L�( �50��11A12� (� )��.

33. �(��<=(( ((�� (��F�(��) �?�2 .

34. �(��<=(( ((�� (��F�(��) �?�2 .

35. �(��<=(( ((�� (��F�(��) �?�10A2 .

36. �(��<=(( ((�� (��F�(��) �?�! .

37. �� &�� (��(��<=(( ((�� (��F�(��) �?�0:A! L��$��<� �(��N� ��

��)�7�� ( �&�,��?�Political Psychology�!"��.�"�6!00:87�5 1A�4.

38. ��<� �(��N� ��)�7�� ( �&�,��.?

39. N�� ( (�&�,��@(�&�� C� �!0"!��( �,��,.�J�� &�� Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (New York:

Vintage, 2003); Adam Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York: Viking, 1973); and William Taubman, Khrushchev: The

Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

40. , �C.��(��<=(( ((�� (��F�(��) ?L�$.�$�(��C.��'�) ��$.�M��<��)�((�(��, �&3-(� �

J�� ?�Journal of Personality and Social Psychology�5 ��.�5�6C� �!00!87�0!!A!2L�$.�$�(��M.�� <=

Principle Components Analysis &�� )�((�(��)�� (��/�' ��N�� -'�� ) �&��(��(��)��B��?

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology�4"��.�4�6J��!02287�20 A0 �L��.��<=��' �,��&

Narcissism, G �� , *�$� �E�� (��=�� (��(�)��,�� (�?�Psychological

Reports�5"��.�:�6C� �!02087�000A! 5.

41. �.,.�M( �&�$ �� ( ��' (�� &�N� ��=&&��(��<�� (��G�&��(�(�?�Statement by Jerrold Post,

F ) �# ��!!��!00 �6��.�:2!A" !8��,G�E��9�(��F.�.��1991; McNeill-Lehrer News Hour, February 2, 1991, interview

�� G��C ��(�.�C.��(�L�<,��M(( ��@(�� (�� G�&��(�(�?��The Political Psychology

of the Gulf War�� .�,�� $ �(��6��(#��7��' �(��&��(#�� ((��!00:8��"0A55.�, �also the analyses of

Saddam Hussein all found in Jerrold Post (ed.) The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders7�C.��(��<,��M(( ��

&�/��D7�=��)��(�)��)��&�� ?�::4A55L�9�� 9 ��#��<G � �� (��(��-��F & �( (�?�:51A1 L

David G. Winter, <J��'��(��J ��&�, �&3E�� $ ��(��(�?�:1 A1"L�J�� G.�M ��<,��

M(( ��@(�� (��,�� ?�:14A25L�,� �� G.�9�� J��,)��& �� J�)�� F.��<,��M(( ��7

E� �� &(��E#K )��=��(��?�:21A0!L�� , �& ��<,��M(( ��@(�/�� ' �� *��

,�� ((�?�:0!A05.

42. �(��<,��M(( ��7�=��)��(�)��)��&�� ?�:"�.

43. �(��<,��M(( ��7�=��)��(�)��)��&�� ?�:"0.�,�� $ �(�� agrees with this analysis, but

adds that narcissistic rage+�� *�� '�� (��( ��)�((�(��)��K�� @(��( �self-image

+� �(��# �� ))��M(( ��@(�)�( .�<��(��rage interfere with good judgment . . . Grandiosity

interferes with judgment because �� (��' � (��&�� @(�(��(��#��&& )��)��)�(��) (.�Rage

interferes with judgment because the emphasis is on getting even and proving � @(�� (��6�� ( �&��8

rather than finding an effective strategy ��( �� (��)��(.?�9�� D� �� & �(��M(( ��@(�K��

!00 A0!�G�&�9��(�K(��(�� '�� ' ��(�� :��.� ,�� $ �(��<�� G�&�9��$ '�(�� ?

in The Political Psychology of the Gulf War �� .�,�� $ �(��6��(#��7��' �(��&��(#�� ((��!00:8��:�0A41L

D� ��(�&��:""A"4.

-126-

44. N��)�( �(�� (�&�� !02 A22�/��3/��D�9�� :�/��D�9��( �G� ��(�� and Leonard Robinson, An

Introduction to the Causes of War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

45. Jerome Frank, Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (New York: Random House-Vintage, 1967),

59.

46. John C. G. Rohl, The Kaiser and His Court�6��#�� 7��#�� ' �(�� ((��!0218L�$# ��9�� <� �� (��

Pathologies: �� ( �� N�� F )�(��(�&��9��!0!"��!0:0�?��Psychological Dimensions of War, ed.

� ��G��6� �#��=7�,�� !00 8��!":A52L��$�)�� #��Between Peace and War: The Nature of

International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1981). This summary draws on a previous summary in Cashman

and Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War ��15A10.

47. Rohl, The Kaiser and His Court, 21.

48. See Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover

Publications, 1964).

49. Rohl, The Kaiser and His Court��!!A�1L�9�� <� �� (�� (�?�!4:L�� #��Between Peace and War , 143.

50. 9�� <� �� (�� (�?�!4".

51. Lebow, Between Peace and War ��!"�A":.

52. , � (� )��$( �J)F ��<�� N ��&�$��7�� J ��&�� ()� ��&�)�Advances for Political

,)� �) �?�Perspectives on Politics��.�"�6F ) �# �� "87�50!A1 5L�$( �J)F ��<J��/�� (�(7�� ( �&�

/�)� �(��F�� # �� )��,)� �) �� ()� �) �?�Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 3 (September 2009):

41!A2:L�� .��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(7��(��(��-��-��$ ��(��(�?

International Security��"��.�"�6,�� 87�!!5A45L�C��) �G�((�,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��7�Rational,

�(�)��)�� )��J� �(�?��Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and

Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, � 28��! �A!"L��C��J �) ��<$��(�)��

/�� )(�?�International Organization�40�69�� 487�11A! 5.

53. ��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�!�"A�4.�=�#�(�)��(��&� ��(�� (� would include love, fear, anger, joy,

sadness, and shame.

54. J)F ��<�� N ��&�$��?�50�.

55. J)F ��<�� N ��&�$��?�50:.

56. Antonio Damasio, 8�� 9�� %��/��(New York: Putnam & Sons, 1996); Hanna

Damasio, Thomas Grabowski, Randall Frank, Albert G��#��=��F��(��<�� $ ��&�� (�G�� 7�� ,��

of a Famous �� (�� (��#�� ?�Science��5"��.�4!5��6!00"87�!! �A4L�=�� )��M��F ��(��

Daniel Tranel, and =��F��(��<F )��=�'�� (��# &� �� =�'�� (�,�� ?� Science 275,

�.�4: "�6!00187�!�0:A04L��=�� )��F�� M��F��(��<��)� ��H��&�� F )�(��3J��

Deficit of Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal �� *�� (��(�?�Brain�!�:��.�!!�6� 87��!20A�� !.�,��H ��

J)F ��<�� N ��&�$��?L�C.�G.�,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?L��J �) ��<$��

Psychology ��/�� )(.?

57. J �) ��<$��(�)��/�� )(�?�0:A0".�/�@(��(�� that people with brain damage similar to

-127-

-��@(�� #� ��))�� K�� trustworthiness of people based on their faces.

58. Damasio, 8�� (��H ��J)F ��<�� N ��&�$��?�50".

59. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 139.

60. J �) ��<$��(�)��/�� )(�?�0"��04.�J �) ��also suggests (97) that emotion is

important to identity: It is the emotional content &�� @(�� '�� (�� #�(�(�&��(�.�/� ��) (� ��

and ��)� �� (��(��)�� (��)� ��.�<�� *��(�why group members trust each

�� (��(��3�� # �(.?

61. ,��H ��,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�!!!.

62. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 29.

63. ,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�!! .

64. F.�E' �#� ��<N� �9��7��M�' �/��F�@��?� New York Times , January 2, 2007, D1.

65. $# ��C �'�(��<�� (�� &(�?�Political Psychology��1��.�4�6� 587�5"!A5:L�D� ��(�&��5"4.

66. , ��&��(��) ��,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�!!�A!:.

67. ��,�'�)��J ��((��N��)�� -�� (��F��J�)G� ��<�� =&& )��M ��(��)� in Judgments of Risks and

� � &��(�?��Heuristics and Biases, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (New York; Cambridge University

�� ((�� 8��:01A"� �� & �� Thinking, Fast and Slow, 103.

68. ��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�!:5.

69. =��(�<��(�(�� +�� (��#��(� )�&�)�#K )�(�� & � ��(.?�J)F ��<�� N ��&

$��?�50�.

70. According to mood theory, we are more likely to remember things that are consistent with our present mood. Stein also

suggests that analogies are triggered by emotional ) (7�� @(��<�&& )��)�� ((�(�&��(��

+ ' ��(��generated similar emotions of anger and fear in the past become more accessible. Learning from history can thus

# ��' ��#��&& )��(�� (�#��.?�,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�505L�( ��(�J)F ��

<J��/�� (�(�?�415.�E�� ( �G�� <J��J ��?�American Psychologist 36, no. 2 (1981):

!�0A"2.

71. Kaheman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 69.

72. J)F ��<J��/�� (�(�?�415.

73. ��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�!"5A"1.

74. ��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�!"!

75. ��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�!:2.

76. ��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�!":.

-128-

77. J)F ��<J��/�� (�(�?�415.�� (��' ��(�� )�� )) ��of risk if they perceive the

��(��(��.��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�144.

78. Y. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 76. Some researchers

note that fear promotes relatively pessimistic assessments of risk, but anger leads to relatively optimistic assessment. Thus,

��( �� (�� @(�# ��'��would be generally more likely to respond with a risky military

action than one whose primary reaction was fear. In the latter case, the more likely response would be caution. See

J)F ��<�� N ��&�$��?�505A01.��(��(�� ( ��)��&��C ��& �� F�)� �� <� ��

Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific Influences ��C�� ) �?�Cognition and Emotion 14, no. 4 (200):

"1:A0:.�E�� (�(�� (��(��)��)��(�� && )� ��#�� assessment of the target. As Paul Slovik notes, those

who hated Saddam Hussein were likely to feel his possession of WMD created a large risk for the U.S., while those who saw

him as sane probably saw the threat as presenting the U.S. with less risk. ��,�'�)��<��(��-��, *��)(��

Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment �� &� ��?�Risk Analysis�!0��.�"�6!00087�520A1 !��D� ��J)F ��<��

N ��&�$��?�501.

79. ��&��<�� ((��&�9��)(�?�!:".

80. N�� *) �� '� �(�&��(�� ( �C��) �G�((�,� ��<N� ��)��Decision-Making: Rational,

�(�)��)�� )��J� �(�?��Foreign Policy: Theories, Actions, Cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and

Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, � 28��! �A!"L��C � ��=.�$(��<�� &�M�� ,��

of 9��)(�?�International Studies Review��.�:�6=�� 87�"4A14.�, ��(�� Thinking, Fast and

Slow.

81. ,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�! 0.

82. John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 112.

83. $(�� &�M��?�4!.

84. ,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�! 1A2.�,� ��@(��()((��(��=.��' �(�� F.�� <='��#��7

=�M ��(��)�&��C��N� D �)��#�#��?�Cognitive Psychology 4�6!01:87�� 1A:�L�F.�� .�,�'�)��=.

Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and R. Jervis,

<$ �� ( ��' � ((��N� ��)��C�� (�?�Political Psychology�1��.�:�6!02587�"2:A4 4.

85. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 144.

86. =.��' �(��F.�� <C�� ) ��7�M ��(��)(��( (�?��Kahneman et al., Judgment under

Uncertainty��:A� .�� .��Introduction to Political Psychology��:0A" .

87. ,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��J��?�! 2.�, ��(�� .��Introduction to Political Psychology��:0A" .�/�@(��(

true that desirable outcomes are seen as more likely to occur than undesirable ones, but this is a motivated bias rather than an

��'�� #��(.�/�@(�related to the general tendency toward wishful thinking.

88. $.�C �'�(��<� �) ��J�(� �) ��/�� )(�?�:!0A�:.

89. See Martha Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston, Introduction to Political Psychology, 2nd ed.

6� ��7��(�)�� ((�� ! 8��" A"!.�� )�) ��&�� &�� attribution error dates to observations of Fritz

Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1958). An early, classic study of the

fundamental attribution #��(��(�-.�-.�C� (��B.�=.�M��(��<�� =��#��&�=�� (�?� Journal of Experimental

-129-

Psychology�:�6!05187�!A�".

90. ��F@=�� International Politics, 2nd ed. (Boston: Wadsworth/Cengage, 2012), 168.

91. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow��!00A� .�,��) �� ( D �) ��)�� ) ��(�� (�� && )�

increases the weight or importance of our first impressions of other people, groups, or countries. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast

and Slow, 83.

92. Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 41. For the halo effect, also known as the positivity effect, see S.

Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993).


94. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 79. This search for causality begins at a very early age in humans. Apparently, even

six-month-old infants will interpret a sequence of events as a cause and effect relationship in which the first act in the

sequence causes the second. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 76.







101. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 217.

102. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 116. To some degree, reliance on historical analogies is underpinned by

the principle of representativeness+�� 3��)��' �� )��< *�� (�� (�# �� ' ��a

��)��((�&� ' ��(.?�,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��J��?�! 1A2L�( ��(�$(��<�� &�M��?�5:.

103. ,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�! ".

104. Ernest May, 3:�� 4 ��(��;��%0�� < ��( �� (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1973); Paul Diesing and Glen Snyder, Systems, Bargains, Decisions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1977), 321.


106. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 147.

107. Garry Wills, 9�� 6� ��7�� !0248��25A: 1.

108. See Simon Sebag Montefiore, Young Stalin (New York: Knopf, 2007), and Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (New York:

Vintage/Random House, 2003).

-130-


110. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), quoted in Ernest May, 3:�� 4 ��(��2!A2�.

111. The following draws on May, 3:�� 4 ��(��0!A! !.

112. Kennedy and his advisers also saw the situation in Vietnam as symbolically similar to that faced by the Truman

administration with regard to China in 1949. Here the lesson was that if Vietnam were to go communist, the administration on

whose watch ��(�))�� # �#�� &�� <�((?��(&& ��)��)�� # ��<(&��

)��(�?��(�� ((�&�� .

113. Pentagon Papers, II, ed. Sen. Gravel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 650, quoted in May, 3:�� 4 ��(��02A00.


115. See Greg Cashman and Leonard C. Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from

World War I to Iraq�6��JF7�$��%�� &� �� 18��)�� 1��</��D?�� (�.�:::A4 .

116. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decision of 1965 (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1992), 10, 21.

117. Khong, Analogies at War, 253.

118. Khong, Analogies at War��"A�2.�, ��(�F #��9 �)��(��<�� $� �&�� &�,�(� �(��,)� ��(��Foreign

��)��F )�(��3J��?�Political Psychology�!4��.�!�6!00"87�!1A::.

119. Khong, Analogies at War��4A�5.�� && � �) �# �� ( �(��# �� schema is used to

refer to a more abstract and general theory about how the world works, while analogies are more concrete and specific.

Nevertheless, many scholars use the terms more or less interchangeably.


121. Khong, Analogies at War��2A�0.

122. As Khong notes, the Munich/1930s analogy and the Korean analogy were somewhat fused together and were mutually

reinforcing, but this sixth point is where the Koran analogy departs from the Munich analogy.


124. The perseverance effect is largely due to the fact that the use of schemas is a top-down process that is easily able to

withstand information deemed to be discrepant or irrelevant, not out of any need for cognitive balance per se.

125. Khong, Analogies at War��:4A:5.

126. F.�� =.��' �(��<��(� )�� 7�=��=��(�(�&�F )�(��J�� $�(��?�Econometrica 47 (1979):

�5:A0!L�� ' �(�� (.��Choices, Values, and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and A.

�' �(��F.�� <=�'��) (��(� )�� 7��' �$ �� ( ��&��) ��?�Journal of Risk and

Uncertainty�4�6!00�87��01A:�:.

127. C�)�� '��<��(� )�� $��) ��/�� $ ��(�?� International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997):

-131-

21A!!�L�� '��<=��/��)��(� )�� ?��Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International

Conflict�� .��#��N��6=��=�#�7��' �(��&�J�)��!00"8��1A��L�� '��<��(� )��Theory and International

$ ��(7�� )��=��)��(��=��)��#� �(�?�Political Psychology�!:��.��6!00�87��2:A:! L�� '��<��(� )�

Theory and International Relations: Theoretical =��)��(��=��)��#� �(�?��N��Avoiding Losses/Taking

Risks��!!0A"5L�� '��<�((�=' �(��N��-&& )�(��/�� &��)��?�� Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manus

J��(��6=��=�#�7��' �(��&�J�)�� ((�� 8��!0:A��!.�, �also Jeffrey Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great

Power Intervention in the Periphery�6/��)��7�� ' �(�� ((�� "8��0A: ��&��(��.


129. � '��<��(� )�� $��) ��/�� $ ��(�?�20.

130. McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics��0.�� (�� (�(�� ((��' �(��+��

to balance a �((+�(��)�� &�!.4��.4��!.�� Thinking Fast and Slow, 284.

131. $.�� <��(��(��' �� &��(� ��) �?�Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (1980):

:0A5 .

132. =)��(�(��(�D�#��(��(�� ))�� & � �) ��#��(.�� '��<��(� )��Theory, Rational Choice, and

/�� $ ��(�?�0 A0!.

133. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 282; see also 287, 305. He argues that the fact that among territorial animals, the

defenders almost always win, suggests that animals (including humans) probably fight harder to prevent losses than to

accumulate gains.

134. � '��<��(� )�� /�� $ ��(�?��2".�� &�� ((�does not need to be particularly

high; the fact that a loss (any loss) exists is more �� .�� '��<��(� )�� /��

$ ��(�?�284, drawing on Robert Jervis, The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989),

170.

135. � '��<=��/��)��(� )�� ?�!:.�=(�� (� �( �� <&��(� ��'��#� .?�� '��<�((�=' �(��

N��-&& )�(��/�� &��)��?�!01.

136. McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics��"A�4.

137. $# ��C �'�(��<��)��/��)��(�&��((�=' �(��?��Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks , ed. Barbara Farnham (Ann

=�#�7��' �(��&�J�)��!00"8��:A" .�P� ��(�&��24. One of the problems regarding framing is that prospect theory

does not provide as yet any neat theoretical explanation for how individuals might choose a reference point in order to frame a

problem.

138. � '��<��(� )�� $��) ��/�� $ ��(�?�0!.

139. Levy and Thompson, Causes of War , 152.

140. � '��<�((�=' �(��N��-&& )�(��/�� &��)��?�� .

141. � '��<�((�=' �(��N��-&& )�(��/�� &��)��?�!02.

142. Levy and Thompson, Causes of War , 150.

-132-

143. C �'�(��<��)��/��)��(�&��((�=' �(��?��4.

144. � '��<��(� )�� /�� $ ��(�?��21.

145. Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

146. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow��!":��:!4A!5.

147. McDermott argues this effect is worsened if leaders use analogies linking their opponents to historical bogeymen like

Hitler. Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics ��: A::.

148. ��(��(�(� �� (�� & �� (�� <!T�F)�� ?�� &��$��,(��The One Percent Doctrine (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

149. C �'�(��<��)��/��)��(�&��((�=' �(��?�:!.

150. =�� J)/� �� <��(� )�� ,'� ��)��(�,��!055A!051�?��Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks ,

�.��#��N��6=��=�#�7��' �(��&�J�)�� ((��!00"8��! !A!2.

151. J)/� �� <��(� )�� ,'� ��)��(�,��?�!!5.

152. �� (�C.�,��'��<�� #�7�� !010�,'� ��/�'�(��&�=&��(��$ ��(� )��?�� Washington

Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, September, 2011. http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/the-kremlin-and-

kabul-the-1979-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-in-retrospect.html.

153. C.�G.�,� ��<��)��J�()��)��' ��F � �� ) �/7�� B� ��&��?��Psychology and

Deterrence, ed. R. Jervis, R. N. Lebow, and J. G. Stein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University �� ((��!0248��:"A40.

154. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks, 37.

155. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks��4!A4�.

156. It is probably true that while the decision to proceed north of the parallel was riskier than the alternative of simply

stopping the military effort at the 38th parallel, many civilian and military leaders believed the risks were fairly low: the North

Korean forces were clearly routed and on the run, the Soviet Union had shown no signs of being willing to intervene, the

Chinese had threatened to intervene but appeared weak, making their threat less than fully credible. A military victory was

seen as relatively easy in this context.

157. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks��!A��.

158. �� J�� M ��<9�� (�$�(�(>�F��N� ��)��J��?�Journal of

Conflict Resolution�"!��.�4�6E)�# ��!00187�5!!A:1.

159. � '��<��(� )�� /�� $ ��(�?�: 4.

160. ��)'�B ��H# �� <$ ��$ )�) ��H��$�(��N� ��)��F )�(�� J��.?

161. Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 77.

162. �� M ��<9�� (�$�(�(>?�5�4.

-133-

163. �� M ��<9�� (�$�(�(>?�5:!A:�.

164. J �) ��<��(� )�� )��,)� �) �?�! .

165. Jervis suggests that prospect theory is most useful in explaining those situations in which leaders persevere in

deteriorating situations in which they face major losses �&�� )�( ��.��C@(� ()��&�� B� ��

and the Japanese ��)�� M��#��&��&�� .�,�� (�,��@(�� )�(��&��!01:.�Note that in each case,

domestic political losses were as important as international �(( (.�$# ��C �'�(��<��)��/��)��(�&��((�=' �(��.?�E�

the Japanese decision, see Cashman and Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War , chapter 3, and also Jeffrey

Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), chapter

4. On the 1973 war, see Stein, <��)��(��J�()��)��(��' ��F � �� ) .?

166. Levy and Thompson, Causes of War , 138; Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking , 77.

167. Definitions of concepts such as images, perceptions, and schemas vary from author to author. This definition of image is

a matter of personal taste and should not be considered as definitive.

168. E� �M�(��<N� ��)��F )�(��J�� (�B� � ��(�)��)��?�!��.

169. �� (�F �& ��,� �� )��F�(��<��)�J�(� �) ��/�� Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq

-*� �� ) �?�International Security�:5��.�!�6,�� !!8��11A! L�D� �&��15.

170. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1965).

171. =� *�� G �� <�� E� �� 7�=�� )� ��=��)�� ,��&��)�� Leaders and Decision-

J��?��The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Erik Hoffman and Frederick Fleron (New York: Aldine, 1980), 170.

172. Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953).

173. G �� <�� E� �� ?�!1�A1:��E� �M�(��<N� ��)��F )�(��J�� (�B� � ��(�)��)��?�!:2.

174. See Starr, Henry Kissinger��"4A"1.

175. E��F�� (��( �E� �M�(��<�� OE� �� @�=��)�� ,��&��)�� (7�C��N(� ��F�� (@

��(��)��/�(�� &(�?�Canadian Journal of Political Science�:�6!01 87�!�:A41L�&��,'� �� (��(

F��(��<�� ,'� ��N� ��)�� &�,�(� �7�� &(��)(��N� ��)��E�)� (�?�International

Studies Quarterly�:1�6!00:87�:1:A0"L�&��J��( �M��N ��<�� E� �� &�J��S ��7�Defensive or

E&& �(�' �$ ��(�>?�Security Studies�!"��.�"�6� 487�5:1A5�L�&��$�#�� (��( �,)��)��</� ��(��

Pragmatism? =��E� �� =��(�(�&��H��$�#��,�� (�?�Political Psychology�!0��.�"�6!00287�52:A

1 5L�&��C��( �,� �� 9�� J��,)��& ��<�� )��Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisers:

Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities �� E� �� (�?�Political Psychology��!��.�:�6� 87�4�0A":L�&��C��

Carter, see Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer, and J�)�� <,�(� ��)��) �� (�&��E� �� =��(�(7

Measuring and J� ��C�� @(�E� �� ?�International Studies Quarterly�"��.�!�6!00287�!14A20L�&��G.

H. W. Bush and Clinton, see Stephen Walker, Mark ,)��& ��J�)�� <�� (�� E� �� (��N� ��

Policy Conflicts �� (�3��9��9��?�Journal of Conflict Resolution�":��.�4�6E)�# ��!00087�5! A�4L�&��G.�9.

�(��( �C��$ �(��<,��#�� &�,�(� �(7�� E� �� &�G �� 9.��(��?�Journal of

Conflict Resolution�4��.�5�6F ) �# �� 287�2� A"0.

-134-

176. ,� �� G.�9�� <�� /�� &�) �# �� &(�� '��7�M ��((�� @(� Operational Code and the Vietnam

9��?�Journal of Conflict Resolution��!��.�!�6J��)��!01187�!4!A4�.

177. Starr, Henry Kissinger, 159.

178. $# ��C �'�(��<M�� ( (��J�(� �) ��?��International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed., ed. James

Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), 240.

179. J�� M ��<=(( ((��N� ��)�� '��(�� (��)� ��(��)(�&��)�� (�?

International Studies Quarterly��"�6!02 87�1A"5L��.�, �& ��.�� )��</�� ' �� *��&��)��(� in

/�� ( (�?�Journal of Conflict Resolution��!�6!01187�!50A2"L��.�, �& ��.�� )��.�$�� H��<9�� )

and Integrative �� *��?�Journal of Conflict Resolution��!�6!01187�"�1A"�L��.�� )��</� ��&��B�)��(�&�G��

from Public Statements &�F )�(��3J�� (�?�Journal of Personality and Social Psychology�:1�6!01087�!:!"A�"L��

(��F.�G.�9�� <=(( ((�� (@�� (�� (�?� �1A�0.

180. The classic work is Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL: Row, Patterson, 1957).

181. E� �M�(��<��' �F��)(��/�� (�&�� -� ��?��Image and Reality in World Politics, ed. John Farrell and

Asa Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). The tendency toward cognitive dissonance affects not only how new

information is processed, but also how the images in our belief system are organized. For instance, some beliefs are created

and maintained not on the basis of direct evidence but because they are logically connected to other established beliefs:

Consistency of belief requires they be present. On this point see John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 97 and 114.

182. �� (�M�� <M��&�&��.,.�,�� ' (�/��D��9JF�?�Washington Post , August 7, 2006,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/07/AR2006080700189.html.

183. ,��B ��<� �(�(� �) �&�J��(��=�� #��)��)��=��)��?� Washington Post , September 4, 2007,

A3. The number declined by 2010, but was still significant. See, &��(��) ��<, �� # ��!!�=��)�(�E��(�?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/september_11_attacks_opinion_polls.


185. B ��<� �(�(� �) �&�J��(.?

186. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision��! A! !.�, ��(�F��S�� (��<,� �-'�� ) �$ � '�� J��3

J�� M�� (�(�?�in The Analysis of International Politics, ed. J. Rosenau, V. Davis, and M. East (New York: Free Press,

1972), 245.

187. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 102.

188. , �$(��<�� &�M��?�45A40.�C��$ �(��@(��(�(�&�operational codes suggests that in

fact beliefs are not internally consistent; however, this may be due in part to the way that operational code indices are

constructed using �� B �#(�� *��,�(� �.�C.�$ �(��<,��#�� &�,�(� �(�?�840.

189. ��(��<� �� &�,�(� �(��,)� ��(�?��4A�1.��(��(��,.��.�N�(� ��,.�-.�Taylor, Social Cognition, 2nd ed.

6� ��7�J)G��3M��!00!8��M.�J��(��$.��.�S�K�)��<�� ' �� (� )��' ��,)��(�)��?��The

Handbook of Social Psychology��:�� .�� .�G.��H ��-.�=��(��6� ��7�$��M( �!0248��!:1A�: .

-135-

190. Khong, Analogies at War, 246, notes that it took two years of contrary evidence from the battlefield in Vietnam for

McNamara to abandon his belief of the efficacy of aerial bombing (based on the 1944 bombing of Germany analogy), while

��(��#� ��)�� 9��$(��@(�(�� for the WWII bombing analogy.

191. $(��<�� &�M��?�41A42.

192. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision��!�"A:5.

193. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 129.

194. ��(��<� �� &�,�(� �(��,)� ��(�?��2.��(��(�� '�� ) ��N�(� ��Taylor, Social Cognition; and J.

��)� ��,.��.�N�(� ��,.�-.��<,)� ��)��( (�&�� &�� ?� in Attitudinal Judgment, ed. J. R. Eiser (New York:

,�� 3B ��!02"8��!01A��5.

195. Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2005).

196. , ��&��(��) �� (�� <�� 9��/(�@��$ ��E' ��?� Time , September 5, 1988.

197. He then became director of the CIA from 1991 to 1993 and was appointed secretary of defense for both George W. Bush

and Barack Obama from 2006 to 2011, after a hiatus from government as the president of the University of Texas.

198. $# ��( ��<F)� ��(�F ��.,.�/�� ) �/�(��(��J�(�� (�?�Washington Post , March 11, 2001, A15.

199. ��( ��<F)� ��(�F ��.,.�/�� ) �/�(��(��J�(�� (.?

200. , �E� �M�(��<��' �F��)(��/�� (�&�� -� ��?��M�(��<�� &�System and National Images: A

��( �,��?��International Politics and Foreign Policy��4":A4 .

201. Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 210.


203. ��F �()��$�)��J ��<-&& )�(�&�-' ��(��/�� /�� (�?��International Behavior,

�.�M.�� !:�A21.�� ))��# )�( �&��K��()) (( (��(�� (�failures. See Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs:

Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). On foreign policy learning in general, see

C�)�� '��<� ��N� ��)�7�,� ��) ��J�� &� ��?�International Organization�"2�6!00"87��10A:!�L

George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds. Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1971);

and Jerel Rosati, Joe Hagan, and Martin Sampson, eds. Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global

Change (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

204. ,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�! 5.

205. $ �(��<,��#�� &�,�(� �(.?

206. , �� ()((��,� ��<N� ��)��F )�(��3J��?�! 5A1.

207. Cashman and Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War ��::4A:5.

208. ,� �� 9�� J��,)��& ��J�)�� <,�(� ��)��) �� (�&��E� �� Code Analysis: Measuring

-136-

��J� ��C�� @(�E� �� ?�International Studies Quarterly�"��.�!�6!00287�!14A20.�E��

��)� ' ��(��@��(�� a reversal of beliefs. Feng found that the Korean War simply reinforced and

strengthened ��&�' �&�J��S ��@(��(��)�� * (�� ' �� (�� .�M��N ��<�� E� ��

�� &�J��S ��.?�� )�� (�� *� ��(�)�(��dramatic events may trigger a kind of defense mechanism that

consolidates preexisting beliefs rather than changing them. Phillip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How

Can We Know? �6��) ��7��) ��' �(�� ((�� 48��!:!A:�.




212. ��)�� C��<, ' ��J�� (��F ��?�Newsweek ��C��!2��!022��!2A�".�=�(��(��))��

April 1989 when an Iraqi aircraft erroneously shot down a friendly Egyptian training jet armed with missiles that was flying to

an international air show in Baghdad. The Iraqi air defense command had been at a heightened state of alert for several weeks

after Israeli officials publically ��) �� )�) ��' ��/��D@(��)� �� .�=��/��D�� defenses

had become accustomed to a shoot-first strategy during the Iran-Iraq War. ��)�� </��D�(�J��M�' ��F��

C ��9�(�/(�� ?�Washington Post , April 29, 1989, A16 and A26.

213. F��)�F.��.�C��(��F��)�� <�� $#�)�� &�9��7�M�� to Conflict Reaches the Point of

��$ ��?�International Security�:5��.�!�6,�� !!87�1A" .�� (�#�( ��M ��H�M )��( ��

G��H ��<�� (��' �N�)��J��'��' �((�B�� ,�� (�&�J��?�Motivation and

Emotion�!!��.��6C� �!02187�! !A� .

214. C�)��,.�� '��<J�(� �) �� ( (�&�9��7�� )�� (��=��)�� #� �(�?�World Politics 36,

�.�!�6E)�# ��!02:87�15A00.

215. Cashman and Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War , 376.

216. C�)�� '��<J�(� �) ��(�� ( (�&�9��7�� )�� (��=��)�� #� �(�?�World Politics 36,

�.�!�6!02:87�15A00L�� '��(��Causes of War , 135.

217. Quoted in Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 74.

218. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 211.

219. $# ��<� �) ��=)�� !0!"��(�(�?��Image and Reality in World Politics , 122.

220. � '��<J�(� �) �� ( (�&�9��?�22A20.

221. Lebow, Between Peace and War, 200.

222. �� (�F �& ��,� �� )��F�(��<��)�J�(� �) ��/�� Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq

-*� �� ) �?�International Security�:5��.�!�6,�� !!87�1:A! .

223. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973), 246.

224. Lebow, Between Peace and War��"�A":.

-137-

225. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1972), 200, cited in Stoessinger, Why

Nations Go to War��!�4A�5.

226. Lebow, Between Peace and War��"4A"5.

227. � '��<J�(� �) �� ( (�&�9��?�2".�, ��(�F��)�C��(�� Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and

Glory of Positive Illusions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

228. See Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

229. Lebow, Between Peace and War, 62 and 83.

230. Lebow, Between Peace and War��:2A"!.


232. Lebow, Between Peace and War��!5"A55.


234. Lebow, Between Peace and War��!42A5!.

235. Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, OH: Charles Merrill, 1968)��"1A41.

236. Lebow, Between Peace and War��!41A12.

237. Evan Luard, War in International Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 329.

238. Luard, War in International Society ��)�� 2��:�0A12.

239. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and also

Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011).

240. � '��<J�(� �) ��(�� ( (�&�9��?�2!.

241. For instance, Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Dell, 1962).

242. Lebow, Between Peace and War, 254; and Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (New York:

��!0148��"4��44��:02A" �.

243. Luard, War in International Society ��:5 A5!.

244. Lebow, Between Peace and War��5"A54.

245. On these points see Blainey, The Causes of War �� 2A0��)��The Guns of August��"4A5��!"�.

246. Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

247. Blainey, The Causes of War ��41A51.

-138-

248. Blainey, The Causes of War ��41A51�� '��<J�(� �) �� ( (�&�9��?�0!A0:.�N�� ,'� �� ( �

and North Korean perceptions of the situation, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners:

Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

249. Washington Post , August 4, 1990, and October 21, 1990.

250. Blainey, The Causes of War , 53.


252. Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment (New

York: Free Press, 1977).

253. This discussion of Janis and Mann is based on Lebow, Between Peace and War ��! 1A! .


255. Lebow, Between Peace and War��14A15.

256. Jonathan Renshon, Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).

257. Renshon, Why Leaders Choose War, 143.

258. Renshon, Why Leaders Choose War��!4!A4:.




262. Renshon, Why Leaders Choose War, 147. Several factors were deemed to be less useful in explaining preventive war.

Declining power was seen as less important than the perception of declining relative power. Indeed, a real decline in material

power was not present between Britain and Egypt in 1956, Israel and Iraq in 1981, or the U.S. and Iraq in 2003. Perceptions of

closing windows of opportunity appeared important only to the extent that they interact with perceptions of declining power

and the belief that conflict is inevitable. In the Suez Crisis there was no evidence that British leaders thought in terms of

windows at all. (And of course in the U.S.-Soviet early Cold War situation and the India-Pakistan relationship, windows were

clearly perceived, but leaders still opted against war. Finally, perceptions of offensive advantage did not seem important. In

two of the three cases of preventive war, such perceptions were absent.

263. C��$ �(��,�� $ �(��<�� )��) �&�N� ��)��F )�(��J��?�Political

Psychology 29, no. 4 (2008): 512; Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking (Stanford, CT: Stanford University

Press, 1998), 75.

264. �(��<�� /��)��&��(�(3/��) ��,�� ((��)��J�� (�?�"25.

265. J)F ��<�� N ��&�$��?�501.

266. ��(�9� � � ��<F )�(��3J��/�� (�(7�,� ��)��N�)��(�?�International Studies Quarterly

!1��.�:�6, �� # ��!01:87�: �A".

-139-

267. ,��,D�� (��<,�� ((��)��(�� B��) �� (@�F��&�C ��?�Washington Post , October 17, 1988.

268. N��C ��(��<�� /��)��&��(�(3/��) ��,�� ((��)��J�� (�?��Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis

Management�� .�=� *�� G �� 6�� E7�9 (�'� �� ((��!00!8��"1!A0"L��)'�B ��H# �� Risk Taking and

Decisionmaking (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Jonathan Renshon and Stanley Renshon, <��

��)��) �&�N� ��)��F )�(��J��?�Political Psychology��0��.�"�6� 287�4 0A:5L��,)�� Danger and

Opportunity: Decision Making, Bargaining, and Management in Three United States and Six Simulated Crises, Ph.D.

��(( ��#��' �(�� !01"��51A52��)�� )��Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977),

!25A21L�F�� C�� 9 �((��</�� &�$��?�Journal of Conflict Resolution 22, no. 4 (December 1978):

1��L�E� �M�(��<�� (�&��(�(�F )�(��J��?�in International Relations Theory, ed. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi

6� ��7�J�)��!0218��""A2!L�E� �M�(��<��(�(�J�� ?��Psychological Dimensions of War, ed. Betty Glad

6� �#��=7�,�� !00 8��!!5A"�L�E� �M�(��=� *�� G �� <�� -&& )�(�&�,�� ((�� &��) �&

N� ��)�3J�� (�?��Political Science Annual, vol. 6, Individual Decision Making, ed. C. P. Cotter (Indianapolis, IN:

�##(3J ��!0148��44A:!0L�G.�� .�N�� .�� 3��<F )�(��3J�� ,�� ((7�,)��&

Alternatives �� (�)�� ?�Acta Psychologica�5"�6!02187��!0A�2.

269. Ole Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War�6J�� 7�J)G��3P �(��' �(�� ((��!01�8��!00A� .

270. Crisis situations create other problems that impair decision-making that are not directly related to stress. Crises frequently

reduce the size of the policy-making group, further decreasing the likelihood that leaders will get wide-ranging advice and

analysis. Leaders also tend to rely on ad hoc communication channels and reduce their communication with adversaries

��)��(�(.�$(��<�� &�M��?�50A1

271. �(��<�� /��)��&�,�� ((��)��J�� (�?�"1:.

272. ��3C( ��$( �J)F ��<� �(��N�)�� ,�� ((7�=))��#��and Social Support of Israeli

� �� (�� 9��?� Journal of Conflict Resolution�4��.�!�6N #�� 287�!""A1 .

273. �(��<�� /��)��&�,�� ((��)��J�� (�?�"0 .

274. �(��<�� /��)��&�,�� ((��)��J�� (�?�"15A2:.

275. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking ��14L�M�(��<��(�(�J�� ?�!�1.

276. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis��!1!A2".

277. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking , 395.

278. , �J �) ��<$��(�)��/�� )(�?�21A22.

279. M �# ��.�� <,)��3�(�)��)��=��)� (�� ,��&�/�� $ ��(�?��International

Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. H. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965).

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