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This is an Arabian Peninsula Background Note (APBN) written by J.E. Peterson N.B. This background note is a preliminary attempt to present in summary form the essential details of a particular set of circumstances or event in Arabian Peninsula history. It lays no claim to being comprehensive or fully accurate. Although considerable effort has been made to assure the reliability of the information it contains, its accuracy is limited to the information contained in the sources listed in the note. The contents of this note may be freely quoted and cited provided both the author and source are given. A complete listing of APBNs is contained on www.JEPeterson.net. Please cite in the following manner : Peterson, J.E. “Tribes and Politics in Yemen.” Arabian Peninsula Background Note, No. APBN-007. Published on www.JEPeterson.net, December 2008. © J.E. Peterson, 2008 Arabian Peninsula Background Notes APBN-007 December 2008 Tribes and Politics in Yemen Yemen’s government is not a tribal regime. Yet tribalism pervades Yemeni society and influences and limits Yemeni politics. The ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih regime depends essentially on only two tribes, although it can expect to rely on the tribally dominated military and security forces in general. But tribesmen in these institutions are likely to be motivated by career considerations as much or more than tribal identity. Some shaykhs also serve as officers but their control over their own tribes is often suspect. Many tribes oppose the government in general on grounds of autonomy and self- interest. The Republic of Yemen (ROY) government can expect to face tribal resistance to its authority if it moves aggressively or inappropriately in both north and south. But it should be stressed that tribal attitudes do not differ fundamentally from the attitudes of other Yemenis and that tribes often seek to operate within ROY politics as other constituencies and political parties do. Tribalism is a strong force but not a monolithic one with a universal point of view. The Tribal Nature of Yemen Yemen, perhaps more than any other state in the Arab world, is fundamentally a tribal society and nation. To a very large degree, social standing in Yemen is defined by tribal membership. The tribesman is the norm of society. Other Yemenis either hold a roughly equal status to the tribesman, for example, the sayyids and the qadi families, or they are inferior, such as the muzayyins and the akhdam. The tribes in Yemen hold far greater importance vis-à-vis the state than elsewhere and continue to challenge the state on various levels. At the same time, a broad swath of central Yemen below the Zaydi-Shafi‘i divide – including the highlands north and south of Ta‘izz and in the Tihamah coastal plain – consists of a more peasantized society where tribal ties and reliance is muted. Nevertheless, the “detribalized” peasantry still possess tribal names. The emphasis on tribes in Yemen is socially and politically important because it forms the fundamental reference point for a great majority of Yemenis. Tribalism,

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This is an Arabian Peninsula Background Note (APBN) written by J.E. PetersonN.B. This background note is a preliminary attempt to present in summary form the essential details of a particular set ofcircumstances or event in Arabian Peninsula history. It lays no claim to being comprehensive or fully accurate. Althoughconsiderable effort has been made to assure the reliability of the information it contains, its accuracy is limited to theinformation contained in the sources listed in the note. The contents of this note may be freely quoted and cited providedboth the author and source are given. A complete listing of APBNs is contained on www.JEPeterson.net.

Please cite in the following manner:Peterson, J.E. “Tribes and Politics in Yemen.” Arabian Peninsula Background Note, No.

APBN-007. Published on www.JEPeterson.net, December 2008. © J.E. Peterson, 2008

Arabian Peninsula Background NotesAPBN-007

December 2008

Tribes and Politics in Yemen

Yemen’s government is not a tribal regime.Yet tribalism pervades Yemeni society andinfluences and limits Yemeni politics. The ‘Ali‘Abdullah Salih regime depends essentially ononly two tribes, although it can expect to relyon the tribally dominated military and securityforces in general. But tribesmen in theseinstitutions are likely to be motivated by careerconsiderations as much or more than tribalidentity. Some shaykhs also serve as officersbut their control over their own tribes is oftensuspect. Many tribes oppose the governmentin general on grounds of autonomy and self-interest. The Republic of Yemen (ROY)government can expect to face tribal resistanceto its authority if it moves aggressively orinappropriately in both north and south. Butit should be stressed that tribal attitudes donot differ fundamentally from the attitudes ofother Yemenis and that tribes often seek tooperate within ROY politics as otherconstituencies and political parties do.Tribalism is a strong force but not amonolithic one with a universal point of view.

The Tribal Nature of Yemen

Yemen, perhaps more than any other statein the Arab world, is fundamentally a tribalsociety and nation. To a very large degree,social standing in Yemen is defined by tribalmembership. The tribesman is the norm ofsociety. Other Yemenis either hold a roughlyequal status to the tribesman, for example, thesayyids and the qadi families, or they areinferior, such as the muzayyins and theakhdam. The tribes in Yemen hold far greaterimportance vis-à-vis the state than elsewhereand continue to challenge the state on variouslevels. At the same time, a broad swath ofcentral Yemen below the Zaydi-Shafi‘i divide –including the highlands north and south ofTa‘izz and in the Tihamah coastal plain –consists of a more peasantized society wheretribal ties and reliance is muted. Nevertheless,the “detribalized” peasantry still possess tribalnames.

The emphasis on tribes in Yemen issocially and politically important because itforms the fundamental reference point for agreat majority of Yemenis. Tribalism,

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qabaliyah, not only assures membership in acollective unit but defines the tribesman inrelation to the world and provides protectionand assistance whenever necessary. The family,the clan, the tribe, the confederation allcomprise stages in the definition of theindividual and the delineation of the politicallandscape. While tribes putatively consist ofcommon descent groups, the genealogy is farless important than the existence and workingsof the interlaced web. This not only definesmembership and status, but also territory sincemuch of the country is finely detailed into acomplex tribal geography. In tribal terms,their territory has always been the same.Therefore, tribal identity is also territorialidentity.1

The tribesman enjoys rights and benefitsfrom tribal membership but also bearsresponsibilities, among them answering“summons” when the position or territory ofthe tribe is threatened. The fluidity oftribalism should also be kept in mind. Whileterritorial lines have been fixed for centuries,the alliances between tribes and betweencomponents of tribes may change with greatrapidity. Much depends on the situation, theproximity of a particular tribe to the crisissituation, and on the leadership of the tribalunit. Tribal units who respond in one way toa particular situation may well respond in adifferent or even diametrically opposite way ina subsequent similar one. “There is noconvention of solidarity, however, nopermanent coercive structure, and no standing

authority coincident with a section or tribe; sothe relation is problematic between the sets ofmen defined by shared ‘ancestors’ and thegroups of men who actually form on a givenoccasion.”2

It is tempting to regard shaykhs of tribes aswielders of considerable power. This may betrue in some cases, due to either the strengthof personality of the individual shaykh or thedominant position of the shaykhly family, orboth. Yet it is far more common that shaykhsare less potentates or even chairmen than theyare simply notable figures who have beenentrusted with certain authorities on specificoccasions and in limited ways.

The tribe in Yemen retains much of itsessential social and cultural role. The tribe isa corporate unit. In the absence of strongcentral authority, an adequate nationaleconomy, and countrywide socialization ofYemenis as citizenry, tribal identification andallegiance remains paramount for tribalmembers. The tribe provides protection for itsmembers and requires the assistance of itsmembers for the tribe’s protection. The tribe,especially through its shaykh, may providesomething of a welfare system for members inneed. Tribes have traditionally organized theirown affairs, both individually and collectively,with minimal interference from the state.While the shari‘ah and secular authority playedvarying roles in shaping behavior, thecombination of qabaliyah (tribalism, i.e. a codeof ethical behavior) and ‘urf (common or triballaw) “provided both ethical codes andmechanisms for the peaceful resolution of

1. Paul Dresch, “The Tribes of Hashid wa-Bakil asHistorical and Geographical Entities,” in Alan Jones,ed., Arabicus Felix: Luminosus Britannicus; Essaysin Honour of A.F.L. Beeston on his EightiethBirthday (Oxford: Ithaca Press for OxfordUniversity, Board of the Faculty of Oriental Studies,1991), p. 11.

2. Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History inYemen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989),p. 88.

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disputes.”3

The tribe also serves as an economic unit.It has been estimated that about three-quartersof Yemenis were originally tribal and engagedin cereal- and livestock-based agriculture.Households were not self-sufficient but bandedtogether in tribal communities to organize andshare common use of water supplies andirrigation, harvesting requirements, andgrazing lands, as well as disaster relief andproviding labor for local “public works.” Evenwhere the population has been “detribalized”into peasantry, it acts collectively to meetemergencies and some maintain commonproperty.4

In more recent times, individual tribescreated more extensive common self-helpschemes, the ta‘awun or cooperative (morefrequently called a local developmentassociation, LDA). Increased expectations, lowgovernment capability to provide assistance,and the remittances sent or brought back bytribesmen who had gone to work in SaudiArabia and farther afield, spurred thewidespread adoption of LDAs throughoutnorthern Yemen in the 1970s. Typically thesecooperatives built schools, roads, drinking-water systems, and other locally requiredimprovements.5 Government assistance wasminimal, consisting for example of arrangingfor a foreign development agency to loan abulldozer for a road mainly built by locallabor.

Many of these economic activities were

supervised by the tribal shaykh, who served aswell as the focal point of interaction withother tribes and vis-à-vis the government. Forthe most part, shaykhs emerge from establishedshaykhly families although it is not required.Within the family, there is no hard and fastrule of succession, which largely depends onpersonal qualities. But the position of shaykhgenerally gives little or no authority overtribesmen. It often denotes less a rank than afunction: the shaykh is the one who carriesout the wishes of the tribe, who solves internaldisputes, and who speaks for the tribe indealings with other tribes or the outsideworld.6

There are some exceptions, which aregenerally the paramount shaykhs who oftenwield great influence within their tribe andtheir confederation and whose power isenhanced by their wealth and ownership ofland in areas outside tribal territory. Theirposition and status has been augmented bytheir incorporation into the state system andresultant opportunities to acquire more wealthand influence. Prominent examples includethe Bayt al-Ahmar of Hashid, Bayt Abu Ra’s ofDhu Muhammad, and Bayt al-Shayif of DhuHusayn.7 Nevertheless,

“The few great shaykhs are exceptional.The influence of such men can rise andfall freely without changes in thetribes’ formal structure and withoutmajor changes in group alignments,while their own position is made moredifficult by the fact that in all but thesmallest unit there are numerousshaykhs, not arranged in a hierarchy or3. Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The

Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998;Cambridge Middle East Studies, No. 9), p. 64.

4. Carapico, Civil Society, p. 64.

5. Carapico, Civil Society, p. 109.

6. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, pp. 89and 102.

7. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, p. 102.

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even in order of precedence. Indeed,the number of shaykhly families isindeterminately large. At any giventime, the extent of the unit with whicheach is identified seems arbitrary, andas we have already seen, it is not therule for a higher-order section or for atribe to recongize a single shaykh.Where one is recognized he is referredto as ‘the shaykh of shaykhs’ (shaykh al-mashāyikh), a title which forconvenience we can gloss as paramountshaykh. His position is expressed in adocument which his brother shaykhsin the tribe all sign.”8

Traditionally there were four main andpermanent tribal confederations in Yemen.The most important of these are the Hashidand the Bakil. The Madhhaj lost importancein the twentieth century (in part becauseelements were absorbed by the Bakil) and thefourth confederation has disintegrated.Technically, Hashid and Bakil are tribes, bothderiving from the Hamdan,Yemen’spreeminent tribe of the medieval period. Bothoccupy much of northern Yemen to the northand east of Sanaa and both are constituted bya large number of subsidiary tribes. Their totalpopulation has been estimated at more than500,000.9

Part of the reason for the ascendancy ofHashid has been the long-time effectiveleadership provided by Bayt al-Ahmar, of theHumran section of al-‘Usaymat tribe. Nasir al-Ahmar served as paramount shaykh in theearly 20th century, his son Husayn succeededhim and remained head of thetribe/confederation until his death at the

hands of Imam Ahmad in 1959. Husayn’s son‘Abdullah then took up the position, which heexploited as his power base to play asignificant role on the national scene until hisdeath at the end of 2007. An important figurein the republican cause during the 1960s civilwar in North Yemen, he subsequently served asspeaker of the legislature and a founder of al-Islah Party and it could be said that he was theonly player to remain a force nationally fromthe early 1960s until 2007. It can also beassumed that one reason that Hashid –particularly the tribes of al-‘Usaymat, Kharif,and Bani Suraym – remained such a cohesiveunit was the steady leadership of Shaykh‘Abdullah.

The other confederation, Bakil, has notenjoyed the same cohesion and its shaykhshave paled in comparison with the Bayt al-Ahmar. It was noted in the 1980s that theparamount shaykh of the Bakil at that time,Naji b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Shayif (from the DhuHusayn) was unable to command muchinfluence over his own tribe, let alone alliedones, and consequently ‘Abdullah al-Ahmarpossessed the ability to summon Bakili tribesto war.10 Nevertheless, the Abu Luhum familyhas been prominent on the national scenesince the 1962 revolution, as described below.

As in most other countries of the MiddleEast, the cohesion and influence of tribes hasweakened in Yemen over the last few decades –although perhaps not to as great an extent as

8. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, p. 102.

9. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, p. 24.

10. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, pp.103-105. Dresch also notes as an example of thedifference between the two confederations that“identity cards and army pay-books used to have aspace to record the man’s tribe (qabilah) and, whileBakilis would usually put Arhab or Nihm or whateverwas apt, men from at least the three Hashid tribesmentioned would almost always put simply Hashid.” Ibid., pp. 104-105.

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elsewhere, in part because of the weakness ofthe government. There are a number ofreasons behind this. Amongst the northerntribes, the effect of decades of labor migrationto Saudi Arabia has upset the traditionalpecking order, as tribesmen come back withtheir savings and less inclination to followestablished shaykhs. At the same time, manyshaykhly families have taken up residence inthe towns, loosening their ties to the tribes andthus their influence. This has made a potentialopening for the government to interfere inwhat used to be regarded as tribal matters.

While the tribe serves as the “norm” ofYemeni society and the shaykhs animate andsometimes guide the tribes, note should also bemade of the importance of families from twoother sectors of Yemeni society. The sayyidfamilies constitute the descendants of theProphet Muhammad and thus membership ishereditary. Historically, the sayyids played akey role in Yemeni politics, particularly in thenorth. The Zaydi imams had to be of sayyiddescent and they generally appointed membersof other sayyid families as their lieutenants andprovincial governors. More generally, sayyidsserved as neutral arbiters between tribes andreligious scholars. Their villages wereconsidered hijrah, i.e. protected places. Therevolution of 1962 and demise of the royalistcause during the ensuing civil war severelyimpacted the status and role of the sayyids.The Hamid al-Din family, from whose ranksthe last four imams came, was banned fromthe country. Many other sayyids were killed inthe 1960s and their property confiscated.Their position among the tribes suffered aswell, an effect exacerbated by the ouster ofsayyids from their countryside homes andemigration to the cities where they enteredcommerce and government administration.

Nevertheless, a number of prominent

sayyid families have continued to play apolitical role. Examples of prominent sayyidsin the previous Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)and the present ROY would include thefollowing. Yahya b. Muhammad al-Mutawakkil (Bayt al-Mutawakkil of Shaharah),an army officer during the 1960s civil war,member of the Revolutionary CommandCouncil that seized power in 1974, andsubsequently an ambassador and governmentminister. ‘Ali b. Qasim al-Mu’ayyad (Bayt al-Mu’ayyad of Sa‘dah) was an ambassador andmember of the Consultative Council. Ibrahimal-Kibsi (Bayt al-Kibs of al-Kibs in Khawlan al-Tiyal) ran the royalists’ office in Jiddah duringthe 1960s civil war and later served as DeputyForeign Minister. Members of the Sharaf al-Din family (of Kawkaban) have served in lessergovernment positions.

The Bayt al-Wazir (of Wadi Sirr in BaniHushaysh) sought to overthrow the Hamid al-Din imam in 1948 and named their ownimam. Later, they formed a “Third Force”between royalists and republicans during the1960s civil war. Isma‘il b. Ahmad al-Wazirserved as the longtime YAR and ROY ministerof justice and legal affairs. Ibrahim b. ‘Ali,mostly based in the United States and marriedinto the Abu Ra’s shaykhly family, hascontinued to be a thorn in the side of Yemenigovernments, frequently accused of formingpolitical/religious groups seeking to advanceZaydi and family causes. He was a primaryfounder and head of the Union of PopularForces.

In the south, the sayyid families saw theirposition imperilled by independence and manyfled the country. Their subsequent role inROY politics largely has been one ofopposition to the Sanaa government. The al-Jifri family provides a good example.Muhammad al-Jifri played a traditional

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mediatory role in ‘Awlaqi from the 1930s butis better remembered as president of the SouthArabian League, formed in 1951. His sonYahya served as the minister of trade andindustry in the short-lived DemocraticRepublic of Yemen (DRY) government. Just asprominent as Muhammad is ‘Abd al-Rahmanb. ‘Ali al-Jifri, who moved to Saudi Arabia afterAden’s independence and allegedly gainedSaudi citizenship. After unity, he founded theSons of Yemen League in Yemen, an smallindependent conservative party, and became amember of parliament. Not surprisingly, ‘Abdal-Rahman threw his lot in with the southernsecessionists and was rewarded with theposition of vice-president of DRY. Escapinginto exile, he took advantage of a 2006amnesty to return to Yemen. ‘Ali b. Zayn al-‘Abdin al-Jifri has attracted attention as a strictIslamist and supporter of al-Islah. AnotherJifri, ‘Adnan b. ‘Umar, serves as the ROYminister of justice.

The sayyids of the Hadramawt played moreof a regional role during the Protectorateperiod and their families were well representedin the Hadrami diaspora across the IndianOcean. In the absence of powerful triballeaders, the British supported Hadrami sayyidfamilies in their quest for “state-building” inthe region, who worked in alliance with theQu‘ayti ruler. The ‘Attas family not onlyprovided a descendant who served asIndonesia’s foreign minister but Haydar b.Abu Bakr al-‘Attas, an engineer, was elected tothe Politburo of the Yemeni Socialist Party(YSP) of South Yemen. In the aftermath of theJanuary 1986 bloody infighting for control ofthe YSP, Haydar was selected as President ofSouth Yemen because of his neutral,technocratic status. He also served as the firstPrime Minister of the united ROY untiljoining the secessionist south during the 1994

civil war (which named him the DRY PrimeMinister). Mention might also be made of BuBakr al-Kaf, a Hadrami sayyid who made afortune in Singapore but spent all of it onpublic and charitable works in theimpoverished Kathiri State during the 1930sand 1940s.11

Similarly, the qadi families have playedsignificant historical roles in northern Yemen.Unlike the sayyids who form a hereditary caste,anyone can become a qadi through personalmerit and religious studies. More often,however, qadi status is passed down throughparticular families. Furthermore, the qadifamilies did not suffer the fate of many sayyidsafter the revolution, in part because they hadtended to oppose the Hamid al-Din imamswell before 1962.

Perhaps the most prominent qadi family isthat of al-Iryani. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Iryaniserved as President of the YAR from 1967 until1974 and his cousin ‘Abd al-Karim was thelongtime Prime Minister during much ofPresident ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih’s tenure.Muhammad, from another branch of thefamily, served as ambassador to the UnitedStates and provincial governor. Other Iryanishave been YAR and ROY ministers. Thewidespread al-‘Ansi family has also providedgovernment officials and ministers, bothduring the time of the imams and in the YARand ROY governments. Because they havebeen unable to protect their qadi statusadequately, the family has made an

11. It might also be mentioned that some Hadramisayyid families migrated over the centuries across theborder into the Dhufar region of Oman and from thereto the eastern Omani port of Sur. The present Omaniforeign minister, Yusuf b. ‘Alawi b. ‘Abdullah, andformer minister of trade and commerce Salim al-Ghazzali are contemporary representatives of thesefamilies.

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arrangement with the Ahmad b. Kūl faction ofthe Dhu Muhammad tribe, which haseffectively made them tribesmen.12 (Al-‘Ansishould not be confused with al-Anisi, i.e. fromthe prominent tribe of al-Anis.)

Another long-important family is al-‘Arashi. The best-known family member inrecent times was ‘Abd al-Karim b. ‘Abdullahwhose father represented Imam Yahya in Aden.‘Abd al-Karim became a trusted subordinate ofIbrahim al-Hamdi and then Ahmad al-Ghashmi. Upon the latter’s assassination,‘Abd al-Karim served as acting President andmany felt that he should assume the officepermanently since he was in the mold offormer president ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani.Although ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih managed tosnare the presidency, ‘Abd al-Karim continuedin public service as speaker of the Majlis al-Shura, vice-president of the YAR, and memberof the ROY presidential council at unity.Other members of the family includedMahmud b. ‘Abdullah and Yahya b. Husayn,both of whom served as ROY ministers oftourism. In the end, it could perhaps beconcluded that qadi families, although stillimportant in rural areas, now play only arelatively marginal role on the national scene.

Tribe vs. State in Yemen: Background

Tribes and states have co-existed uneasily inYemen for innumerable centuries. Tribes

played contentious roles vis-à-vis four states inYemen over the past century, resisting theexpansion of state control over their domainand, seemingly paradoxically, beinginstrumental in the overthrow or support ofrecent state systems.

The Hashid and Bakil tribes were known asthe “wings of the imamate” in pre-1962 NorthYemen. Without a standing army until the1950s, imams were forced to call upon triballevies to defend the region, defeat rivals, andimpose order. To ensure compliance of thetribes, the Imams kept sons of shaykhs hostagein Sanaa, where they received their education.Thus, when Imam Yahya was assassinated in1948, his son Ahmad was forced to travelthroughout the northern countryside to rallythe tribes behind him. As a result, he was ableto regain control of Sanaa but the price paidwas giving the tribes leave to sack the capital.This was one reason why Imam Ahmad choseto reside in Ta‘izz and why Sanaa backed therepublicans during the 1960s civil war.

Tribes were also important in the south.Britain occupied the port of Aden in 1839 anddeclared it a crown colony in 1932. To protectAden, Britain gradually forged treaties ofprotection with petty rulers and shaykhs in thehinterland. The resultant Aden Protectoratewas a patchwork system of indigenous controland British supervision. While some areas,particularly in the Western Aden Protectorate,easily accepted protected status, less controlwas exercised over the east and the area of theRadfan mountains, north of Aden andabutting North Yemen, was continuallychallenging British authority. The Royal AirForce (RAF) was entrusted with responsibilityfor security in Aden and the Protectorate andemployed air power to keep what wereregarded as recalcitrant tribes and rulers inline. Thus action was taken between 1919 and

12. Gerd-R. Puin, “The Yemeni Hijrah Concept ofTribal Protection,” in Tarif Khalidi, ed., Land Tenureand Social Transformation in the Middle East(Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), p.488.

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1949 against the Subayhi tribe, the Mansuri (asection of Subayhi), and the Qutaybi on atleast five occasions each.13

Again, tribes in the north and south wereinstrumental in the replacement of these tworegimes. The failure of the assassination ofnew Imam Muhammad al-Badr in September1962 provoked a long civil war betweenrepublicans and royalists. Despite the directinvolvement of Egyptian troops in support ofthe republicans and the strong indirect supportof Saudi Arabia for the royalists, the ebb andflow of the war on the battlefields dependedheavily on the shifting allegiances of the tribes.Hashid’s support for the Republic was theconsequence of Imam Ahmad’s dispute withBayt al-Ahmar. Shaykh Nasir b. Mabkhut al-Ahmar, the paramount shaykh of Hashid, wassignificant in the election of Yahya Hamid al-Din as Imam in the early 20th century. ButShaykh Nasir’s son Husayn, who hadsucceeded him as paramount shaykh, ran afoulof Imam Ahmad in 1959. In anger, the Imamordered the execution of Shaykh Husayn andhis son even though they were under hisprotection. As a consequence, the Bayt al-Ahmar and the Hashid supported therepublicans against Ahmad’s son Muhammadal-Badr.

The Bakil also tended to side with therepublicans. The execution by Imam Ahmadof a number of the Abu Ra’s, the shaykhlyfamily of the Dhu Muhammad, resulted intheir support for the republicans for the samereasons as Bayt al-Ahmar. Another prominentBakili shaykh, Sinan Abu Luhum of the Nihmtribe, had fled to Aden to escape Imam Ahmadand returned north to support the republicans

during the civil war. The opposition to theImamate of these shaykhs cost themconsiderable standing within their tribes.

Many of the shaykhs and sultans who hadenjoyed treaty relations with the British joinedin the attempts to create the South ArabianFederation and/or joined the conservativeSouth Arabian League seeking Britishwithdrawal. As the struggle against the Britishintensified during the mid-1960s, they wereincreasingly relegated to the sidelines. Thosewho did not flee in the 1966-1967 period werekilled by the National Liberation Front (NLF)and by the Front for the Liberation ofOccupied Southern Yemen (FLOSY). Manyretired to comfortable lives in Jiddah and onlya few continued to intrigue against the newgovernment in Aden.

Strenuous efforts were made to paint theresistance to the PDRY as a broad anti-Communist front. But the very nature of theresistance movement militated against tribalsolidarity. Nationality was promoted as thecommon identifier, not tribalism. Those tribesthat did oppose the PDRY en masse tended tobe the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes fromthe interior fringe of the country, the marginalregion that shaded into al-Rub‘ al-Khali. Theyincluded elements of Sa‘ar, al-Manahil, and al-Mahrah, many members of which moved tothe Gulf. The anti-PDRY movement survivedon donations and recruitment from tribesmenworking in the Gulf and on largely Saudisubsistence. While a few significant raids weremade in the first few years after Aden’sindependence, they gradually faded intoinsignificance. Tribal support for thesecessionist DRY in 1994 was of only marginalimportance.

Officially and in many ways practically, thenew regime in Aden was anti-tribal. Tribes,along with religion and “feudalism,” were seen

13. J.E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986),pp. 35 and 82.

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as part of the old order that had beeneliminated. Nevertheless, the NLF partyleadership and the ranks of the officer corpsand civil servants not surprisingly included ahigh proportion of tribespeople. As the NLF’ssolidarity dissolved into internecine struggles,tribal members rallied to the defense (or theavenging) of fellow tribesmen in leadingpositions. The ‘Awaliq, who had been heavilyrecruited for the army and the police, werecaught in the middle of this. Many seniorofficers and policemen were ‘Awlaqis but werepurged in the early days of independence. Thepreponderance of ‘Awlaqis in the rankscontinued for years.

Although tribalism had little to do withthe circumstances that produced the 1994 civilwar, it did play diametrically opposing roleson the two sides. The energy of tribalism inthe south seems to have been sapped duringthe PDRY period. Although the ex-southernarmy included many tribesmen in its ranks,tribes as such played little role in the actualfighting. The tribes in the line of fire, notablyal-‘Awaliq, Yafi‘, and the tribes of Radfan,simply exercised prudence and stayed out ofthe fighting. Efforts to engage the tribes of theHadramawt and east just fizzled.

Northern tribes, however, were opportunedby the Sanaa government to provide assistance.While no tribes as collective units took placein the fighting, a large number of tribesmen,using their own rifles and vehicles, turned outalong the battle front and poured into thesouth. Northern victory provided them withan age-old tribal privilege: looting. Inaddition, there seems to have been some tribalmingling with Islamists and Afghans in thedestruction of property in the south includingthe brewery and the domestic tradingcorporation. It is rather unlikely thattribesmen who were not also Islamists had

anything to do with the widespread destructionof mosques and tombs. Bakil tribes,presumably desirous of acting against Sanaaand loosely allied with the Yemeni SocialistParty (YSP, descended from the NLF) stayedout of the fray as did those of al-Madhhaj.

Tribes in the ROY State

The ROY government faces a paradoxicaldilemma. On the one hand, it wishes toextend central authority throughout thecountry, through such measures as assumingresponsibility for law and order, the provisionof social services, and enhancement of taxcollection. On the other hand, much ofYemen is a very tribal society with a stronghistory of self-reliance and autonomy. Anygovernment presence is problematic in certainareas of the country – either because offormidable tribal resistance to outsideinterference (particularly in the north or west)or because of resentment over governmentpolicy – especially in the south as a result ofthe 1994 war and economic dissatisfaction.Considerable swatches therefore maintainstrong resistance to ROYG presence. This isnothing new. The imams confrontedconsiderable and stubborn resistance to theircontrol, as did the Ottomans, the British, andthe Egyptians.

In dealing with tribes, the government hasa choice of directions to take. It can activelywork to reduce tribal independence, throughforce (reducing autonomy or crushingresistance), blandishment (providing directfinancial or development assistance), orencouragement (extolling the benefits of closerintegration into a national community).Alternatively, the narrowly based regime couldchose to rely on the tribes for tangible support

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against a skeptical and growing urbanpopulation, southern discontent, and/or al-Qa`idah and like-minded religiopolitical-basedopposition.

In truth, the regime has chosen elements ofboth strategies. The growing reach of the statehas reduced tribal freedom of action in manyareas. Government supervision/presence hasbeen strengthened through southern Yemen topacify the region. At the same time, thegeneral (and especially economic) weakness ofthe state requires it to co-opt shaykhs,including incorporating their participation inthe system as well as securing through themthe cooperation of their tribal units. Theregime also has a history of relying uponindividual and corporate units of tribesmen toback up the armed forces. This was clear inthe 1994 war and the strategy has resurfaced infighting against the Huthi group in the farnorth.

It is obvious that President ‘Ali ‘AbdullahSalih has a tribal background. It is alsoobvious that he has created an inner web ofsupport from members of his family, his clan,and his fellow Sanhani tribesmen.Furthermore, he has co-opted some prominentnon-Sanhani Hashidis, as well as the Hashiditribe of Hamdan San‘a’.

But it should not be assumed from thisthat Salih’s rule is tribally based. The idea thatthe regime is a condominium of Zaydi andHashidi interests is misleading. While tribes asa whole and certain tribes – or sections oftribes – have some affinity with the presentregime, they are just as likely to jostle foradvantage within a larger set of political actorsand chafe at or resent government andparticularly regime actions and policies. Inpart, this set of circumstances derives fromboth socioeconomic changes in the countryover the past several decades and the – what to

call it? – urbanization, nationalization,globalization of major shaykhs. Many of thesenow live in Sanaa, some have positions in thegovernment or military, and most are engagedin commerce.

‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih’s authority rests mostfundamentally on three concentric rings ofsupport.14 The first is that of immediaterelatives. These would include his brotherMuhammad as head of Central Security, hishalf-brother ‘Ali Salih as head of theRepublican Guard, his nephew YahyaMuhammad ‘Abdullah Salih as head ofCentral Security, and most importantly his sonAhmad, who most Yemenis believe is beinggroomed to replace his father in the mannerthat Bashshar al-As`ad replaced his fatherHafiz. The inner circle also includes thepresident’s eldest daughter Bilqis, who enjoysconsiderable influence despite not having anysignificant position, and his son-in-lawMuhammad Duwayd, head of the PresidentialPalace. The web is commercial as well aspolitical: the president assumed a partnershiprole in Hayl Sa‘id Enterprises, Yemen’s largestcompany, his nephew Tawfiq took over thetobacco and matches company, his maternalcousin ‘Abdullah al-Qadi began running thepharmaceutical monopoly, and a son-in-law,‘Abd al-Khaliq al-Qadi, headed the nationalairline.

The second circle consists of members ofthe president’s Bayt al-Ahmar clan. Perhapsthe most prominent of the broader clan is ‘AliMuhsin al-Ahmar, commander of militaryforces in the northwest of the country and theprosecutor (many say the instigator) of the waragainst the Huthi group in Sa‘dah province.

14. A good exposition of the relationships, ties, andoffices is given in Dresch, Modern Yemen, pp. 189and 201-203.

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The third circle involves two tribes, thepresident’s own Sanhan and the allied Hashiditribe, Hamdan San‘a’. Members of these twotribes occupy key positions throughout thecivil government and the military/securityapparatus. A good number have married intothe president’s family. The president’stendency to rely on fellow Sanhanis is obvious.The connection of Hamdan San‘a’ with theregime derives from it being the tribe ofPresident Ahmad al-Ghashmi, who succeededand may have ordered the killing of PresidentIbrahim al-Hamdi. During Ghashmi’s briefpresidency (1977-1978), ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salihserved as his right-hand man and, in the eyesof many Yemenis, was the actual assassin of theHamdi brothers.

Before and after the assassinations, the twoworked hand in hand, using members of theirtwo tribes, to diminish the influence of Hamdiand his fellow, relatively reformist, officer,colleagues in the Revolutionary CommandCouncil – as well as to consolidate their ownpositions by enlisting and promoting Sanhaniand Hamdani tribesmen in the officer ranks ofthe military. Although the two tribeshistorically were small and unimportant, theirrise to ascendancy at this time was probablyhelped as well by their proximity to Sanaa andtherefore their ability to defend the capitalagainst internal threats. Yemenis and inparticular tribal members have been more aptto characterize this structure of ruling asmahsubiyah (patronage) than as qabaliyah(tribalism).15

Rather than being a tribally based systemof rule, the Yemeni regime seems to resemble

the structure of Saddam Husayn’s Iraq interms of concentric circles of trust and supportfrom immediate family, clan, and tribe.Because tribes were a more powerfulcomponent of politics in Yemen than theywere in Iraq, ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih has been farmore careful regarding the impact of hispolicies and actions on tribes than Saddamneeded to be. At the same time, it can benoted that with the deterioration of his controlover events in the 1990s, Saddam tookincreasing steps to bring tribes – or at leasttribal shaykhs – into the system. Salih reliesupon tribes for armed manpower at times andmajor shaykhs have been co-opted into thesystem through payments, government andofficer positions, seats in parliament, andcommercial opportunities. But Salih does notexert the same level of control across the statethat Saddam did. The tribes of Yemen havenot been integrated into the political systemunder Salih’s control. Instead, they constituteone sector of players or constituencies in thegrand game of Yemeni politics. Salih does notcontrol them: he deals with them, he prodsthem, he contests them.

Rather than there existing another level ofallied tribes supporting the regime – evenamongst Hashid – Salih has cultivated alliedshaykhs. The most important of these wasShaykh ‘Abdullah Husayn al-Ahmar. Shaykh‘Abdullah played various roles on the nationalscene since the civil war of the 1960s, Hisoriginal power base was as paramount shaykhof the Hashid, which served him well duringthe 1960s war and the early years of thereconciled YAR. But eventually hetransformed into a Sanaa politician. To besure, he still was highly influential among theHashid, the leading tribal shaykh in thecountry, and one of the most importantarbiters or mediators in tribal affairs large and

15. Paul K. Dresch, “The Tribal Factor in theYemeni Crisis,” in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, ed., TheYemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences(London: Saqi Books, 1995), pp. 41-42.

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small.But, more importantly, he and his sons

took up residence in Sanaa and they becameinvolved in lucrative commercial enterprises.He struck an early alliance with ‘Ali ‘AbdullahSalih, which won him the position of speakerof parliament and he served as the regime’spoint man in relations with Saudi Arabia.Supporters in Saudi Arabia encouraged andperhaps assisted him in the founding of theYemeni Reform Grouping or al-Islah (discussedbelow). Al-Islah was used at first to bolsterSalih against the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)of the south, becoming junior partner in analliance with Salih’s General People’s Congress(GPC). When Salih determined that he coulddo without the alliance, al-Islah was jettisonedinto the opposition. This does not indicate abreak between Salih and ‘Abdullah, however,although there may have been friction. Theshaykh was instrumental in rallying thenorthern tribes behind the regime during the1994 civil war and he remained an importantliaison between the Saudis and Salih, withwhom Riyadh has frosty relations and a majorreason why Saudi Arabia quietly supported thesouth in the 1994 war.

Other shaykhs have been co-opted into theSanaa web, both in politics and in commerce.Some have served as ministers in variousgovernments. Mujahid Abu Shawarib of theKharif tribe, a relative (and rival) of ‘AbdullahHusayn al-Ahmar, rose from a minor tribalposition answering to Shaykh ‘Abdullah to aprominent military career and head of theYemeni Ba‘thi Party. Although he had somesupport from Hashid for the presidencyfollowing the 1978 assassination of Ahmad al-Ghashmi, he failed in his quest and had tosettle for the relatively empty title of deputyprime minister and later personal adviser tothe president. While a tribal shaykh,

Mujahid’s prominence and standing derived asmuch, if not more, from his military careerand participation in the 1974 coup that putthe Command Council in charge with Ibrahimal-Hamdi at its head.

Another larger-than-life figure from thetime of the 1960s civil war was Sinan b.‘Abdullah Abu Luhum, shaykh of the Nihmtribe and sometime paramount shaykh of theBakil. Intriguer against Imam Ahmad,republican defender and even briefly a memberof the presidential council and a minister inthe new YAR, he opposed President ‘Abdullahal-Sallal and supported the “third force”leading to the Iryani government. His rewardwas long-time governorship of al-Hudaydah,which he ran as a virtual fiefdom. Sinan wasregarded as a maker and breaker ofgovernments. Although decidedlyconservative, his daughter was married tofrequent prime minister Muhsin al-‘Ayni, aself-described Ba‘thist, and Sinan oftensupported his son-in-law in the government.Yet his leadership of the Bakil wascompromised by his support of the republic inthe 1960s while much of the confederationremained royalist. Two brothers, Dirham and‘Ali, both army officers and cousins of Sinan,became members of the Command Council in1974, although they were soon purged. Indeed,a number of Bayt Abu Luhum pursuedmilitary careers, including two of Sinan’sbrothers. But from the beginning of the Salihpresidency, the family seemed to fade into thebackground. Another family member,Muhammad ‘Ali Abu Luhum, took an activepart in the creation of the United BakilCouncil in the early 1990s.

Firm leadership of the Bakil has long beena problem. The Al al-Shayif family haveprovided the shaykhs of Dhu Husayn forgenerations and several shaykhs in the last

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century or two have died opposing theOttomans and the imams. Shaykh Naji b.‘Abd al-‘Aziz was elected paramount shaykh ofthe Bakil about 1981 but he was soonsuborned by ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih into leadinga quiet life in Sanaa. Another al-Shayif,Muhammad, subsequently claimed leadershipof the confederation.

The Abu Ra’s family of the DhuMuhammad have been equally prominent inBakili and national contexts. Shaykh Aminrallied the Bakil to the republican cause in the1950s and then was an influential figure in the“third force” that helped engineer the Iryanigovernment. He served as a minister of stateuntil his death in 1978. His son Sadiq usedhis work with the local developmentassociations as a stepping stone to ministerialportfolios of agriculture, civil service, and localadministration, but never figured highly in thenational political scene or amongst the Bakil.

The most important of all these shaykhs,‘Abdullah b. Husayn al-Ahmar, died on 29December 2007. Shaykh ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar’sdeath prompts several key questions. First, canhis position and influence within the regimebe replicated by someone else, most notablyone of more of his sons? Four of ‘Abdullah’ssons have held parliamentary positions (twowith the GPC and two with al-Islah) and arewell-known and powerful in Sanaa. In Yemen,as elsewhere in the Middle East, it is notunknown for sons to take up their fathers’mantle upon the latters’ deaths.

One of the best known of them is Hamid,who has been prominent in al-Islah and theJoint Meeting Parties (JMP). In recent years,he has become increasingly critical of thepresident and the GPC. In June 2006, hepredicted a peaceful popular revolution wouldoverthrow the military-family alliancedominating the regime, as well as the

businessmen who supported the system, andweapons dealers and smugglers. In thatcontext, he proposed postponing presidentialelections for two years and the formation of aninterim government to carry out constitutionalreforms and bring the JMP into a coalitiongovernment.

Husayn is a former GPC member ofparliament, who hinted at creating analternative party in 2005 when he was notelected to the GPC’s General Secretariat. Thisidea evolved into the National SolidarityCouncil (NSC), created in 2007, consisting ofshaykhs (largely Hashid?), businessmen, andacademics, with Husayn as its chairman. Nota real party, the NSC claimed it would utilizethe organs of civil society to bring aboutdevelopment that the regime is unwilling orunable to do. Another son, Sadiq, has stayedaway from state institutions and was electedhead of Hashid upon his father’s death. Inaddition, Himyar, a GPC MP, is DeputySpeaker of Parl. and Midhaj is a members ofparliament under the Islah banner.

The temptation to answer the question ofwhether Shaykh ‘Abdullah can be replaced isno, that he was sui generis. ‘Abdullah arose toprominence when the tribes were paramountand victory in the 1960s civil war depended onwhich way the tribal winds were blowing. Nowthe tribes form just one of a number ofconstituencies in Yemeni national politics.Furthermore, ‘Abdullah made his reputationduring critical and unique periods in Yemen’sevolution: the early years of the reconciledYAR, the Hamdi period of consolidation, andthe 1994 civil war. Such opportunecircumstances for another self-made individualmay never reappear.

His sons may have the ambitions but notthe opportunities. Both Hamid and Husaynhave chosen to oppose the government and

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presumably could achieve greater influence orposition only if the government fell or theywere co-opted. Sadiq may be head of Hashidbut, as pointed out elsewhere in this paper, thetitle of shaykh al-mashayikh does not carry thesame resonance that it did in times past, evenwhen ‘Abdullah b. Husayn was still the shaykh.More broadly, factors mitigating against asmooth continuation of strong al-Ahmarinfluence in the present regime are (a) thevariable qualities of the sons (who have beeninvolved in at least several shoot-outs withsecurity personnel in Sanaa), (b) the president’sdeclining need for a figure of ‘Abdullah’sunique status, and (c) the decreased importanceof tribal blocs to underpin the regime.

It could be argued that Yemenicircumstances remain fluid enough forsomeone else to rise to prominence. But fromwhere? Secular, “liberal,” politicians in Sanaahave insignificant power bases and the armyhas been molded to serve ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih’spurpose. Mujahid Abu Shawarib, ‘Abdullah’sfellow Hashidi and brother-in-law, would havedearly liked to supplant ‘Abdullah and even‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih but never succeeded and,in addition, he had the misfortune to passfrom the scene before ‘Abdullah. His sonJubran, although now head of Kharif, does nothave the standing of his father. ‘Abd al-Majidal-Zindani undoubtedly would like to exert thesame level of influence but his side of al-Islah,i.e., the radical Islamist party, never controlledal-Islah and Zindani does not have the naturalstanding with the tribes. No one cancommand a pan-tribal leadership, least of all anon-Hashidi (i.e. no Bakilis need apply).

The second question is there any otherfigure with a shaykhly background who canrally the tribes either in support of or inopposition to the regime? The sons of otherkey shaykhs from an older generation, such as

Jibran and Yahya b. Muhammad AbuShawarib, Saba b. Sinan Abu Luhum, andMuhammad b. Naji al-Shayif, have found itdifficult to follow in their father’s foodstepsbecause of changed circumstances from theearly years of the independent states. Thetribes remain vitally important in Yemen buttribalism no longer means the same thing. Asone observer put it at the turn of the 21st

century, Shaykh ‘Abdullah used to be referredto as shaykh mashiykh al-yaman(paramount shaykh of Yemen). That isnot a phrase that is heard any more. Adecade ago, within that form ofcommon knowledge, Hashidis used toboast that their tribes, unlike others,were united ‘like an army unit’. Thatis not a boast I have heard from aHashid tribesman for a long time:indeed many of them seemdemoralized. Although it is hard toimagine tribes ever acting against theShaykh – he is held in great respect,and rightly – it is just as hard toimagine tribes (Hashid included)acting with him in the way they usedto even twenty years ago. The Shaykh’sundoubted influence has little to dowith traditional ‘asabiyyah (solidaritybased on tribe).”16

At this point, succession to ‘Ali ‘AbdullahSalih would most likely be from someonewithin the clique he has established. Mostnotably, he has been pushing his son Ahmadto succeed him but it could well be someoneelse close to him. The name of ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar has been advanced but it may well bethat ‘Ali Muhsin is too confrontational, tooIslamist, and too tainted by his imbroglios in

16. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” p. 40.

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the war against the Huthis. The essential pointfor the purposes of this paper is thatsuccession is most likely to lie within thenarrow base fashioned over the past thirtyyears. While that base has a very strong tribalcomponent, “tribal” in this context means thesuperior position of just two tribes, Salih’s ownSanhan and the allied Hamdan San‘a’, noteven the rest of Hashid and certainly not theBakil. In addition, while the armed forces andsecurity apparatus provide a vital bulwark forthe regime, they are really only tribal in theabove sense. That is, while most of the soldiersand many of the officers belong to tribes, theiridentification with and loyalty to the ROYgovernment and socialization into a widerYemeni context makes their tribal affiliationalmost incidental in a political context.

While tribal shaykhs may entertain loftyambitions and tribespeople chafe paradoxicallyat the intrusion and the weakness of thecentral government, it seems clear that thecapability – or unity – of the tribes en masse toalter the course of Yemeni politics has becomeseverely limited. This is not to say that tribesare unimportant but just that they createnuisances for the government and are nolonger corporate actors beyond the local level.

It is wide of the mark to assert that there isa collective tribal political consciousness.Instead, the tribes and tribespeople constituteconstituencies within broader politicalaggregations. In this respect, they are perhapsanalogous to “working class white men” or“evangelical Christians” in US politics.Certainly tribal interests are represented in theGeneral People’s Congress (GPC) but much inthe same way as tribal interests are representedin the security forces. Tribesmen pursuepolitical or military careers the same as otherYemenis. As pointed out above, prominentshaykhs and sons of shaykhs occupy a number

of GPC seats in parliament. But, after all,tribespeople constitute a significant number, ifnot a majority, of Yemen’s population and soit is no surprise that a member of a particulartribe should be elected to parliament in histribal district. Furthermore, it is notsurprising that ambitious individuals, whethertribal or not, should ally themselves with theGPC, the most powerful party in Yemen andthe party of the president.

The tribal aspect of al-Islah has been morestrongly stressed. But to say it is the organ oftribalism is as inaccurate as contending that itis the Islamist party. In many respects, itsgenesis and continuation owes much to apartnership of two men, ‘Abdullah b. Husaynal-Ahmar and ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani.‘Abdullah had played a role in the formationof the Islamic Front in 1979, which emerged asan armed force supporting the government inits efforts to extinguish the NationalDemocratic Front in southern North Yemen.Not long after that, ‘Abd al-Majid beganflexing his muscles as (briefly) minister ofeducation and by creating multitudes ofreligious institutes, allegedly financed withMinistry of Education and Saudi money.While the two men, and their respectivefollowers, had some interests in common (forexample, their opposition to ‘Ali ‘AbdullahSalih), their cooperation in formation of al-Islah seemed to be principally a marriage ofconvenience. The merged network andresources was stronger and more able tocontend with Salih’s GPC.

Paradoxically, however, the relegation of al-Islah to ineffectual opposition in electoralterms perhaps has been the reason behind itslongevity: if al-Islah had been swept intopower, divisions between the tribal andIslamist camps would have quickly deepenedand doomed the alliance. While both wings

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tend to be conservative in social and politicalterms, the tribes are less accepting of a strictIslamist state than they are of a weak andcorrupt secular state. Furthermore, the generic,Sunni, salafi/Wahhabi emphasis of the Islamistwing directly threatens the Zaydi tribes of thenorth. This seems to be a contributing factorto the Huthi rebellion and the government’sresponse.

It is perhaps paradoxical to speak on theone hand of President Salih’s reliance onfellow and allied tribesmen in the military forthe maintenance of his position while, on theother, refuting the notion that the securityforces are tribal in nature. To repeat fromabove, the construction of Salih’s powerdepends on the loyalty of a clique, not tribalYemen. The fact that tribesmen are sprinkledliberally throughout the security forces and atall ranks is not because Salih and his associateshave inserted them there so much as the armyhas long served as a positive avenue ofemployment and advancement. Only the twotribes in alliance with Salih can be said to havebenefitted from close political relationships.Even most Hashidi tribes have not beenfavored, although Kharif and Bani Suraym aresaid to have done fairly well. It perhaps caneven be said that the domination of Sanhanand Hamdan San‘a’ in the army has provokedresentment and even coup attempts by othertribes, even Hashidi ones. Tribesmen in thearmed forces, rather than being tribalsupporters of the president, are more likely tobe Islamists and therefore closer to Zindaniand perhaps other even more extremistfigures.17 It almost goes without saying thatsouthern tribes play no significant role in themilitary or security services. They are morelikely to pose a threat to the regime than be

supporters of it, especially since southerners inthe army have been said to have been used ascannon fodder in the Huthi fighting outsideSa‘dah.

A striking effect of changes in the ‘Ali‘Abdullah Salih period has been thetransformation of many major shaykhs awayfrom their traditional role as heads orchairmen of their own and allied tribes and asthe spokesmen for their tribes in their dealingswith other tribes or the state. Increasingly,these shaykhs no longer reside in their tribalterritories but in the capital. Their interestsare geared toward business and politicalconcerns are often to secure and defend a seatin parliament, often as a member of the GPC.

One of the early prompts for thistransformation was the emergence of so-called“youth shaykhs.” They, along with fellowtribesmen, had gone abroad to work andreturned with wealth and newfound standingamongst those who had had their horizonsbroadened. Many of these used thecooperatives (also known as local developmentassociations or LDAs). Indeed, ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mujahid Abu Shawarib togetherfounded the Hashid cooperative. EvenIbrahim al-Hamdi saw involvement with andpromotion of LDAs as a route toadvancement.

The most prominent example of this sea-change undoubtedly was ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar.Details of his transformation and of his careerare given above. While his death has left avacuum in national affairs and in effectiveleadership of al-‘Usaymat as well as Hashid, hisemergent role and status as part of the Sanaascene probably will mean that his son Sadiqwill not replace him as a paramount shaykh inthe same way.

Another alternative for the ambitions of“youth shaykhs” was a career as an army

17. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” pp. 41 and 107n22.

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officer. Mujahid Abu Shawarib provides agood example, as do a number of the AbuLuhum from the Bakil.

The foregoing should demonstrate that thetribal role in Yemeni politics has beenimpacted by a number of social and economicdevelopments. The LDAs provide an exampleof how improvements in tribespeople’sstandard of living can be achieved outside of,or at least in parallel with, traditional tribalways. Furthermore, tribal loyalties facecompetition from emerging political partiesand both pan-Arab and Islamist ideologies.

None of this has passed unnoticed toeither the average tribesperson or his or hershaykh. Numerous attempts were made torally groups of tribes behind banners ofcommon or confederal interests. During the1960s civil war, important conferences at‘Amran and Khamir were held to try to resolvethe divisions created by the war. ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar sought to form a tribal conference forall Yemen and there were several subsequentconferences aimed at restoring the Bakil totheir rightful prominence.

At least four conferences were held duringthe years between unity in 1990 and theoutbreak of civil war in 1994. Mattersdiscussed at these conferences included theIraqi invasion of Kuwait and the expulsion ofYemeni workers from Saudi Arabia, theprotection and preservation of ‘urf (tribal law),and, in one case, another attempt to framelarger tribal concerns within a Bakiliframework. As one observer has put it, thewide-ranging, and not necessarily tribal, natureof concerns expressed at these conferences ledto other national conferences and togetherthese constitute expressions of civil societyinstead of narrow attempts to preserve a

mythical tribal past.18 The formation of theNational Solidarity Council in 2007 may beseen in a similar light: although a coalitionmostly of tribes and shaykhs, the councilexpressed its commitment to using instrumentsof civil society to reform Yemeni politics heldcaptive by a bad regime and to advancedevelopment.

Given the factors outlined above, it isproblematic to think of a tribal cadresupporting the regime or forming a unified“loyal opposition.” In the first place, thecollective power of the tribes in former NorthYemen has ebbed markedly over the pastquarter century while the tribes in the formerSouth Yemen were neutralized, if notmarginalized, during the period 1967-1990.Any previously existing tribal power base hasbecome more restricted and more fragmented.

Secondly, the tribal bloc that longprovided the “natural” backing of andinfluence within Yemeni governments, i.e.Hashid and to a lesser extent Bakil, hasdisintegrated as a bloc. In addition to beingsubjected to socioeconomic and politicalchange that has occurred during the Salih era,the Hashid have also seen their paramountshaykh, ‘Abdullah b. Husayn al-Ahmartransformed from a leader and representativeof the Hashid party to a government insiderwith his political and financial interestscentered in Sanaa and less with his tribesmen.His own al-‘Usaymat tribe has not benefittedmaterially from his presence on the nationalscene. In general, individual tribes are on theirown, resulting in severe limitations ofinfluence or power, and attempts to resurrectalliances or confederations do not producemuch.

18. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” pp. 49-54.

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Tribes vs. the ROY State

Some observers have postulated that therehas been a major change in the nature of tribesand tribalism in Yemen since the 1990s, drivenin part by the distancing of shaykhs from theirtribes – i.e. the shaykhs have been drawn to thecenter, leaving their constituents to fend forthemselves economically and psychologically.19

At the same time, the greater mobility oftribespeople, including labor migrationabroad, reduced tribal loyalty.

This has produced at least three effects.The first has been a growing atmosphere of“lawlessness.” Severe damage has beensustained by the system and code of tribalism.Incidents of theft and banditry havemushroomed. Shaykh Sadiq b. ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar, at the ceremony investing him withleadership of Hashid after his father’s death,felt compelled to beseech tribesmen to stopcommitting revenge killings, highway robberiesand wars that he regarded as creating incurablecrises, weakening the national economy, anddestroying development.

A second effect has been a tendency to relyon one’s own means to deal with or pressurethe government. This can be seen most clearlyin the emergence and spread of kidnapping offoreigners. Formerly strictly off-limits, thispractice has become almost routine,particularly by tribes of al-Jawf and Ma’ribwho have boldly snatched foreign hostages offthe streets of Sanaa as well as relying ontourists that have strayed into their territory.Many of these kidnappings, as well as a relatedpractice of sabotaging the oil pipeline, havebeen directed at gaining more employment fortribes in whose territory oil is being extracted,

as well as forcing the government to releasetribesmen in official custody. Nearly all thesekidnappings have been brief and hostages havebeen released unharmed, often after the allegedpayment of ransoms. Notably, the Muradtribe has carried out the kidnapping offoreigners, in part to get financing for localdevelopment projects, and the Murad tookaction against government forces to secure theremoval of the corrupt head of a militarybattalion stationed in the region. The Jahmtribe has also been involved in the kidnappingof foreigners and other tribesmen – notablyfrom Sanhan during a dispute.

But a third effect has involved thedevelopment of alliances with – and/orconversions of tribesmen by – Islamistextremists on either practical or ideologicalgrounds. This has produced violent outcomesto kidnappings. The Bani Dabyan wereimplicated, at least at first, in the kidnappingof 16 tourists by the Aden-Abyan Islamic Armyin December 1998 and the subsequent deathsof four of the tourists. Sinan al-Harithi andhis associates, killed by an American Hellfiremissile, had been enjoying refuge with thetribes of al-Jawf. The ‘Abidah tribe has athorough history of kidnappings, thesmuggling of drugs, and providing sanctuaryto extremist groups. Special forces searchingfor extremists in ‘Abidah tribal territory inDecember 2001 clashed with tribesmen,resulting in deaths on both sides. About thesame time, eighty foreign students and teachersat the Dar al-Hadith religious institute in‘Abidah territory were expelled from Yemen.Tribal connivance would have been necessaryin the extremist operation at Ma’rib in July2007 when seven Spanish tourists andaccompanying Yemeni drivers and guards weremurdered. There must have been tribalknowledge of at least the possibility of a

19. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” pp. 35 and 38.

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similar operation at Shibam in January 2008 inwhich a number of Belgians were killed orwounded. It is probably impossible to tell towhat degree tribal involvement was for reasonsof practical alliance or was the result of theconversion of individual tribesmen toextremism.

One seemingly paradoxical reaction to theSanhani/Hamdani (and by extension Hashidi)domination of the ROY state was the re-emergence of two weakened tribalconfederations. A number of attempts hadbeen made at resurrecting Bakili cohesion,including by various competing shaykhs.More intriguing has been the reappearance ofthe nearly moribund al-Madhhaj in thesouthern part of the ex-YAR. An al-Madhhaj/Bakil alliance was actively sought bysome, even in conjunction with the sayyid-organized Union of Popular Forces or the YSP.The south has seen some growth in tribalexpression as well, not in opposition to thestate but for bargaining power with the state.Certainly, one reason for these developmentshas been to challenge Hashidi dominance. Inaddition, the reappearance of al-Madhhaj owedsomething to unity and the restoration oftraditional ties with tribes south of theprevious border.20

Given the weakness of the state and itsinability to improve the standard of living ofits people, tribes and tribespeople have becomeincreasing exasperated with the governmentand the now-urban-based officer andbusinessman shaykhs. Accordingly, they haveresorted to pursuing alternative means ofearning money. Smuggling of narcotics,currencies, and weapons across the border withSaudi Arabia has proven lucrative for the tribes

of the north and east. These activities havebeen supplemented by hijackings andkidnappings for ransom. In addition, moneyflows into the tribes through the shaykhs fromneighboring regimes while well-heeled Islamistsin the Gulf fund religious institutes andcharities, fueling a growth in Islamistsentiment in the countryside.

Tribal unrest in the south most likely willgrow for two almost inevitable reasons. First,northern domination of the south willcontinue, stoking resentment amongst mostsoutherners, the tribes included. Second,economic deprivation will also continue,especially as oil production begins to rundown. The amount of water available forcultivation and animal husbandry is expectedto decline rapidly and tribe-against-tribe andtribe-against-government fighting is almostinevitable.

Given the relative strength of the ROYgovernment (as demonstrated in 1994), itseems unlikely that southern tribes will uniteagainst it. Should insurrection break out,tribes may take part or sit aside as they did in1994. However, since the 1994 secessionattempt broke the back of southern Yemen’sexisting leadership – both the YSP and thebroader coalition of exiles that were recruited– it is difficult to see where leadership foranother attempt will emerge. Perhaps the onlypossibility will be through Islamist movements.At present, however, there are deep divisionsbetween the existing, essentially status quoMuslim leadership, as represented by stateimams and sayyids, and more extremisttendencies. Neither al-Qa‘idah nor the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army has seemed to garnerextensive public support.

Tribes provide many of the foot soldiersfor Islamist opposition in Yemen but fewleaders or ideologues. Tribal connection with20. Carapico, Civil Society, pp. 203-204; Dresch,

“Tribal Factor,” pp. 45-56.

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Islamist figures and movements tends to bebased on factors other than zealotry, such ascommon dissatisfaction with governmentcorruption and direction. For example, it hasbeen said that ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani haslittle standing – and thus little appeal –amongst the tribes. The involvement oftribesmen in the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army,which kidnapped a group of Western touristsin 1998, some of whom were subsequentlykilled in a shootout with the army, seems to befor the same reasons that apply to urban andpeasant individuals. The ranks of the Afghans,not surprisingly, include tribesmen.

Of course, appeals to tribal honor maycause a tribe to provide assistance to anIslamist tribal member and some shaykhs, suchas Tariq al-Fadli, may use their position orstatus to rally tribespeople around them. ButTariq’s commitment to the Islamist cause hasbeen questioned in recent years as he hasdrawn closer to the GPC, allegedly to advancehis chances of regaining family property andhis own prosperity. It also may well be thatsupporting Islamists is seen as being counter-productive. If a tribe wants representation inparliament, for instance, its chances are muchbetter with a GPC candidate than one from al-Islah.21

The operations against the Believing Youthgroup in Sa‘dah, better known as al-Huthigroup, have magnified the attention, appeal,and tenacity of this group. The governmenthas charged the group with seeking tooverthrow the government and to restore theZaydi imamate. But it also seems reasonably

clear that the group was singled out for attackby the government and specifically by ‘AliMuhsin al-Ahmar, allegedly because ofWahhabi/salafi zeal. There are no reliableestimates of the numbers of committedmembers of the group but a series of summercamps centered on Zaydi traditions exposedthousands of young men to al-Huthi beliefs.It is reasonable to assume that many Huthisbelonged to local tribes and as governmentoperations killed local tribespeople, their tribesjoined the Huthis in resistance.

The extent to which the affair, particularlythe heavyhanded actions and the incompetenceof the government, has engendered sympathythroughout the country cannot be gaugedaccurately. However, the ability of this groupto continue the fight in Sa‘dah provinceagainst sustained military action, supported bypro-government tribes, indicates that it hasmanaged to gather additional support. Morepuzzling is its ability to engage in heavyfighting against troops at ‘Amran andespecially in Bani Hushaysh territory on theoutskirts of Sanaa. Whether Bani Hushayshtribesmen joined Huthi forces is unknown, asis the relevance of Bani Hushaysh being theseat of al-Wazir sayyid family, itself involved inperipatetic anti-government agitation.

The Huthi affair points to possible, evenlikely, ramifications for the broader Yemenisituation. The ability and effectiveness ofHuthi indoctrination in rural summer campsleads to the possibility of similar activities inother areas, whether Zaydi or especially Sunni.Disaffection with the government – itscorruption, its domination by a small clique,and its inability to carry out necessarydevelopment and social services – is widespreadand is accentuated by the country’s dismaleconomic situation, endemic poverty, and lackof opportunities for young Yemenis. These

21. Elizabeth Mechelle Langston, “The IslamistMovement and Tribal Networks: Islamist PartyMobilization Amongst the Tribes of Jordan andYemen” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky,2005), pp. 203-204.

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grievances can easily be played upon byextremist groups in the same way as al-Huthi.

While the regime may feel that it needs tokeep Islamists such as ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindaniat least partly placated, it is unlikely to haveany influence with extremist groups. Theseregard the government as being beyond thepale and seek take advantage of Sanaa’sunpopular connection to the United States. Itwould take little to recruit significantly amongdisaffected youth. It may be surmised thaturban youth are more susceptible to this typeof recruitment but as the Huthi affair and theinter-connection of extremists with tribes in al-Jawf, Ma’rib, and Shabwah indicate, ruralyouth are also recruitable. In fact, the ties andtribal codes that constrained aberrant behavioramongst tribespeople have deteriorated in thelast decade or two, leaving the door wide openfor alienation and recruitment.

Tribal Aspects of Yemen’sInternational Relations

The connections of Yemeni tribes to SaudiArabia are long and complex. Yemenis nearlyunanimously hold the opinion that theprovinces of Najran, ‘Asir, and Jizan werestolen by the Saudis in the 1934 war. Tribal,sectarian, and cultural linkages still abound.The populations of those lost provinces maybe overtly Sunni but many appear to harborZaydi backgrounds. There is a very closeconnection between the Isma‘ilis of Najran andthose of Yemen. The Najrani tribe of Yam, anIsma‘ili tribe, has maintained close relationswith Yemeni Isma‘ilis. The Yam asserted theircontrol over the Isma‘ili Jabal Haraz regionwest of Sanaa in the eighteenth century, andmore recently served as soldiers in the army of

Imam Yahya. The Hashidi Hamdan and BakiliWa’ilah tribes also straddle the border.

Over the last thirty or forty years, literallymillions of Yemeni men have emigrated toSaudi Arabia to work and of course many wereexpelled because of their government’s stanceafter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Cross-border ties between tribes have strengthenedbecause of cooperation in smuggling. Thispresents a serious problem for the Yemenigovernment because it erodes what littlecontrol it has in peripheral areas. It is evenmore serious for Riyadh because of theimports of arms and covert entry by Islamistextremists.

While government-to-government relationshave often been strained, Saudi relations withYemeni tribes have often been very close. Ithas been a Saudi policy since 1962 to keepYemeni states weak and providing largesse tothe tribes was welcomed by the tribes and theirshaykhs. Shaykh ‘Abdullah Husayn al-Ahmarwas always regarded as the Saudis’ man inSanaa (or at least one of them). At the sametime, Salafi proselytization has quickened intribal areas throughout Yemen but particularlyin the north. Whether facilitated by the Saudisecular administration (in contrast to itsIslamist foreign-policy apparatus) or not, theperception in Yemen is that the Saudis aredeliberately spreading Wahhabism across thecountry.

At the same time, however, Saudi Arabiahas long cultivated a penchant for shootingitself in the foot when it comes to Yemen. In2000, poverty amongst the Isma‘ilis,resentment of Al Sa‘ud greed in the region,and the invasion of a mosque by mutawwi‘inin Najran set off a major disturbance resultingin dozens of Isma‘ili deaths at the hands ofSaudi police. The government accused thosearrested of practicing witchcraft and sentenced

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seventeen of them to death (their sentenceswere later reduced). Another incident in 2008stoked Yemeni anger more strongly. EighteenYemenis who had illegally entered the kingdomnear Khamis al-Mushayt were captured bySaudi border guards and set on fire. Afterinterrogation and medical treatment, they weredeported to Yemen. The Saudi governmentdenied the reports and claimed that they hadbeen rescued from a fire in a garbage dump.Additionally, the Saudi decision a few yearsago to build a large-scale barrier wall betweenthe kingdom and Yemen not only aroused theire of Yemeni nationalists but in particularincensed the Wa’ilah since it threatened tosplit the tribe completely in two.

Although the Dhufar war of the 1960s and1970s was an internal rebellion, the PopularFront received sanctuary and materialassistance from South Yemen. While Dhufaritribes naturally were in the thick of the war onboth sides, Yemeni tribes were only marginallyinvolved in the fighting. However, theterritory of the Mahrah nation spans thepresent border between Yemen and Oman. Anumber of Mahri tribes or sections of tribesdefected from Yemen to Oman, in large partbecause life on the Omani side was morepromising than poor austere PDRY. There arealso several Mahri and other South Arabiantribes residing astride the border.Furthermore, since the three main clans ofSalalah, one mountain tribe, and the largest ofthe badu tribes inland are Kathiri, there areties to the Yemeni Kathiri although these arenot thought to be close.

The reaching of a border agreementbetween Yemen and Oman in the mid-1990sopened the border up to freer crossings andtrade. One unanticipated effect was a certainamount of banditry by Yemeni tribesmeninside Oman. This, however, has remained a

criminal problem without politicalconsequences. Almost paradoxically, Oman’shistory of hostility with South Yemendissipated after Yemeni unity and in the 1994Yemeni civil war, Oman tilted carefullytowards the secessionist south. A prominentbusinessman in Oman, Ahmad Farid al-‘Awlaqi, pleaded the southern case to thesultan and after joining the fighting wasnamed DRY governor of Shabwah. Hereturned to Oman afterwards to resumeconcentration on his business empire. In thefollowing 14 years, there were few issues to marYemeni-Omani relations and no serious issuesarose with tribes from either state’s borderregions.

There are at least two different reasons whyYemeni tribes may have a broader impact onYemeni foreign policy. The first is their innateconservatism. On the local level, this translateto suspicion of the government and its localrepresentatives, as well as foreigners connectedto the government. On a more national level,perceptions of government are ambivalent.The government can provide benefits but alsoit can restrict freedom and, especially throughthe corruption of local and national officials,can act capriciously. Encouragement byforeign powers, including or especially theUnited States, of more government intrusionin tribal areas and affairs in furtherance ofcounter-terrorism activities may well provokea tribal backlash and, given the proliferation ofarms in the country, violence.

The second reason derives from the impactof international media. While newspapers andsatellite television may be restricted to thebetter educated and more prosperous sectors ofthe population, radio broadcasts and word ofmouth keeps people in remote areas abreast ofnews regarding their country, the Arab world,and the West. As long ago as the 1930s and

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1940s, Western visitors to Yemen werefrequently quizzed over events in Palestine,Communism, and the progress of World WarII. In a more globalized world, it should notbe surprising that Yemenis of all varieties,including the average tribesperson in Razih orRadfan, will be aware of American activity inIraq and support for Israel. But theconsequent hostility to the United States itprovokes is not a “tribal” phenomenon as such

attitudes can be observed throughout Yemensociety. It can be reliably postulated thatcollective tribal action against a foreign threatis possible only in the event of foreign/ROYaction against the tribe, its allies, or itsmembers.