Discussion Paper 2 Approaches for Reform FINAL3

7/31/2019 Discussion Paper 2 Approaches for Reform FINAL3

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Discussion Paper 2:Approaches forReform

February 2012

The Vision:A 21st century income security system that

enables all Ontarians to live with dignity, participate in their

communities, and contribute to a prospering economy.


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Queens

Printer

for

Ontario,

2011

ISBN9781443588775(Print)

ISBN9781443588782(PDF)

ISBN9781443588799(.DOC)

Cedocumentestgalementdisponibleenfranais.


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Contents

MessagefromtheCommissioners.........................................................................................1

Chapter1:ReasonableExpectationsandNecessarySupportstoEmployment....................4

Chapter2:AppropriateBenefitStructure ...........................................................................18

Chapter3:EasiertoUnderstand..........................................................................................35

Chapter4:

Viable

over

the

Long

Term .................................................................................42

Chapter5:AnIntegratedOntarioPositiononIncomeSecurity..........................................46

Chapter6:FirstNationsandSocialAssistance ....................................................................50

Chapter7:HowtoProvideInput .........................................................................................57

References............................................................................................................................62

Appendices...........................................................................................................................63

AppendixA:MeasuresofLowIncome ........................................................................................63

AppendixB:SocialAssistanceIncomesComparedwithLowIncomeMeasures ........................65

AppendixC:OntarioWorksandODSPAssetLimitsandExemptions..........................................66


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MessagefromtheCommissionersIn

the

2008

Poverty

Reduction

Strategy,

the

Ontario

government

committed

toreviewingsocialassistanceOntarioWorksandtheOntarioDisability

SupportProgram(ODSP)withafocusonremovingbarriersandincreasing

opportunitiesforpeopletowork.ItsubsequentlyappointedtheSocial

AssistanceReviewAdvisoryCouncil(SARAC)toprovideadviceonaproposed

scopeforthereview.TakingintoaccounttheadviceoftheCouncil,the

governmentestablishedtheCommissionfortheReviewofSocialAssistance

inOntarioinNovember2010.

Ourtaskistocarryoutacomprehensivereviewandprovidespecific

recommendationsforimprovingthesocialassistancesystem.The

governmenthasalsoaskedustoprovideadviceonhowanOntariohousing

benefitalignswithsocialassistancereform.

ThispaperadvancesthedialoguewithOntariansthatwebeganinour

discussionpaperIssuesandIdeasinJune2011,andcontinuedoverthe

summerandfallthroughcommunityvisitsandotheropportunitiestoengage

withpeopleandorganizationswithdiverseperspectivesonsocialassistance.

Weencouragedconversationsthatwouldbringtogetherdifferentvoicesand

reflectregionalandcommunityperspectivesonsocialassistance.Inall,more

than2,000peoplehadtheopportunitytocontributethroughthe11

communityconversations

in

which

we

participated.

Many

other

communities

organizedsessionstodiscusstheissuesraisedinthediscussionpaperandto

brainstormsolutionstosharewithus.Wealsometwithnumerousprovincial

networksandorganizations,includingemployerandlabourgroups.The

Commissionreceivedover700writtensubmissions.

WealsoheldseparatediscussionswithFirstNationstoensurethat

approachestoreformwouldreflecttheiruniqueneedsandpriorities.We

engagedwithFirstNationsthroughtheChiefsofOntario,politicalleadership

andindividualsincommunitiesaroundtheprovince,andsocialassistance

administrators

through

the

Ontario

Native

Welfare

Administrators

Association.

ToincorporatetheviewsandexperiencesofAboriginalpeoplelivingoff

reserve,weengagedwiththeOntarioFederationofIndianFriendship

Centres.

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Someofthekeythemesthatemergedfromtheengagementprocessare

highlightedinthispaper.Amoredetailedsummaryoftheresponsestothe

discussionpaperisprovidedinaseparatereport,WhatWeHeard:A

Summary

of

Discussions

on

Social

Assistance,

posted

on

our

website

(see

page58formoreinformation).

InadditiontoengagingwithOntarians,theCommissionconductedresearch

tolearnmoreabouttheissuesinsocialassistanceandtheexperiencesof

otherjurisdictions.Wealsometwithacademics,technicalexpertsandothers

toaddressgapsinourunderstanding.

Basedonourdiscussionsandresearch,wehavecometotheviewthatwe

needtotransformthesocialassistancesystem;smallfixeswillnotbe

enough.Acrosstheprovince,peopleaskedustobeboldinthinkingabout

howtoreformthesocialassistancesystem.Whilemanyidentifiedspecific

policiesor

rules

that

are

not

working

under

the

current

system,

they

also

calledformorefundamentalchangetothesystemasawhole.

Wehavealsofoundthatpoliciesandprogramsinmanyotherareascreate

challengesforsocialassistanceandconstrainapproachestoreformingthe

system.Thesechallengesareoftwotypes.First,sincesocialassistanceis

wherepeopleturnwhentheycannotbehelpedbyotherincomesupport

programs,inadequaciesinotherprograms,suchasEmploymentInsurance,

putpressureonthesocialassistancesystem.Second,therearefactorsthat

makeitdifficulttohelppeoplemoveintoemployment.Theseinclude,among

otherthings,

the

nature

of

the

labour

market

and

the

lack

of

health

and

other

benefitsformanylowincomeworkers.

Theconnectionsbetweensocialassistanceandsomanyotherareassuggest

thatsomeofthesolutionslieoutsidethesystem.Whileourmandateis

focusedonmakingrecommendationstoimprovesocialassistance,wewillbe

commentingontheseconnectionsinourfinalreport.

Overthecomingmonths,wewillbedevelopingrecommendationsfora

sustainablesocialassistancesystemforthefuture.Weareawareofthe

challengingfiscalconditionscurrentlyfacinggovernmentsandthebackdrop

ofeconomicuncertaintythatcanaffectourgoalofimprovingemployment

outcomesforpeoplereceivingsocialassistance.Inconsideringfundamental

reformtothesystem,weknowthatsomechangeswilltakelongerto

implementthanothers.

Ourpurposeinthispaperistodiscussdifferentapproachestoimproving

someofthekeyareasofthesocialassistancesystem.Thispaperprovides

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opportunitiesforfurtherdiscussion,asopposedtofinalrecommendations.

Asourworkunfolded,westronglydesiredtoengageinfurtherdialogueand

obtainfeedbackonspecificareasofreformtohelprefineourthinking.This

paper

provides

those

opportunities,

rather

than

a

comprehensive

discussion

ofoptionsforreformoraninterimreportonthereview.

Somesectionsofthispaper,particularlythoseaddressingthebenefit

structure,dealwithtechnicalissues.Nevertheless,wehopethatallreaders

willfeelcomfortablerespondingtotheideasoutlinedhere,basedontheir

ownexperienceandunderstandingoftheissues.

Thepaperisorganizedbythefiveoutcomesforthereview(seeChapters1

through5).IssuesrespectingFirstNationsareaddressedthroughoutthe

paper,andChapter6discussesissuesthatarespecifictoFirstNations.For

eachoutcome,weaskquestionsontheapproachesdescribed.Chapter7

repeatsthe

questions

from

the

paper

and

provides

information

on

how

to

provideinputtotheCommission.

WewouldliketoreceiveyourinputbyFriday,March16,2012.Wewill

consideryourinputandourresearchindevelopingourfinalreportto

governmentinJune2012.Welookforwardtohearingyourthoughtsonthe

variousapproachesdescribedinthispaper,oronotherapproachesthatyou

believeshouldbeconsideredtohelpachievefundamentalchange.

FrancesLankin MunirSheikh

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Chapter1:

ReasonableExpectationsand

NecessarySupports

to

Employment

Thereviewwillmakerecommendationsthatwillenablethegovernmentto

placereasonableexpectationson,andprovidesupportsfor,peoplewhorely

onsocialassistancewithrespecttoactiveengagementinthelabourmarket

andparticipationintreatmentandrehabilitation.

TERMSOFREFERENCEFORTHEREVIEW

Thegovernmenthasidentifiedemploymentasakeyrouteforindividualsand

familiestoescapepoverty.Weagreethatoneofthebestwaystohelp

peopletomoveoutofpovertyistohelpthemfindwork.

Somepeoplereceivesocialassistanceforashorttimeandareabletoenter

orreentertheworkforcewiththelevelofsupportcurrentlyavailableorwith

theirownsourcesofsupport.Othersexperiencearepetitivecycleof

employmentandreceivingsocialassistance.Stillothersrequirelongterm

assistance.1

Employment

services

and

supports

must

therefore

meet

awide

varietyofneeds,butwhatiscurrentlyavailableisfailingtoidentifyandmeet

therangeofneedsofpeoplewhoarenotabletoentertheworkforceeasily.

ForpeoplereceivingODSP,forexample,thereislittlefocusonhelpingthem

prepareforandfindemployment.

Thischapterfirstlooksateffectiveemploymentservicesandsupportsto

meetawidevarietyofneeds,includingrecognitionofthebarriersto

employmentfacingpeoplewithdisabilities.Itthendiscussesaccesstothose

servicesandsupports.Bothelementsarecriticaltoachievingthegoalof

1Basedonastudyofclientsfollowedfrom2003to2009,about75percentofclientswho

receivedOntarioWorksreceiveditfor12monthsorlessandthenexitedtheprogram.However,

abouthalfofthosewhoexitedreturnedtoOntarioWorkswithintwoyears.About25percentof

studyclientswhoreceivedOntarioWorksexperiencedacontinuousperiodoftwoormoreyears

ofreceivingOntarioWorks.

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assistingpeopletowardactiveengagementinthelabourforcetothe

maximumoftheirabilities.

FeaturesofEffectiveServicesandSupports

Fourkeyfeaturesofeffectiveemploymentservicesandsupportswere

identifiedthroughourdiscussions,reviewofsubmissions,andresearch:2

Consistentassessmentandcasemanagement:Consistentassessmentandcasemanagementtosetrealisticemploymentgoalsand

manageablestepsforpeople,andtoprovidepeoplewithmultiple

barrierswiththesupportstheyneed

Integratedpre andpostemploymentservicesandsupports:Arangeofintegratedpre andpostemploymentservicesandsupportsthat

aretailoredtoindividualneedsandeffectiveinhelpingpeoplefind

andmaintainwork

Accesstothesamelevelofservicesforpeoplewithdisabilities:Accessforpeoplewithdisabilitiestothesamelevelandrangeof

employmentservicesandsupportsasavailabletopeoplewithout

disabilities

Strongconnectionswithemployers:Strongconnectionswithemployers

to

understand

and

meet

their

business

needs

as

customers

ofemploymentservices

Weheardexamplesofthesefeaturesinanumberofcommunities,butwe

foundthattheyareneitherconsistentacrosstheprovincenorsufficiently

accessibletopeoplewithdisabilities.TheCommissionschallengeistomake

recommendationstoimprovetheconsistencyoftheseeffectiveprogram

features,whilestillallowingforlocalflexibilityandinnovation.

ConsistentAssessmentandCaseManagement

SomeOntario

Works

administrators

are

using

assessment

tools

to

identify

wherepeopleareinthecontinuumofpreparingforandfindingemployment.

Usingthosetools,aclientmaybeidentifiedas,forexample,jobready,in

2See,forexample,DeanHerd(2006),Whatnextinwelfarereform?Apreliminaryreviewof

promisingprogramsandpractices.

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needofpreemploymenttraining,skillsdevelopment,oreducation

upgrading,andsoon.Otherjurisdictionsuseassessmenttoolstomeasure

jobseekerslevelofdisadvantageinthelabourmarketandtoreferpeople,

including

people

with

disabilities,

to

the

most

appropriate

employment

services.

Assessmenttoolscanbeparticularlyimportantinidentifyingpeoplewhomay

befacingmultiplebarrierstoemploymentandrequiringmoreintensive

supportstostabilizetheirlives,oraddressmentalhealth,addictions,orother

issuesbeforepreparingforemployment.

Somestudiesonprovidingcomprehensivecasemanagementtosocial

assistancerecipientswithmultiplebarriershaveshownpromisingresults.3

Weheard,inourcommunityvisitsandthroughsubmissions,aboutthe

positiveresults

of

the

Addiction

Services

Initiative

and

Hostels

to

Homes

pilot

programsoftheMinistryofCommunityandSocialServices,bothofwhich

involveintensivecasemanagement.Wearealsoawareofthecost

componentofthedifferentlevelsofcasemanagement,andofthechallenges

indetermininghowtoallocateresourcestomeetthewidearrayofneeds.

IntegratedPre andPostEmploymentServicesandSupports

Manypeopleemphasizedtheimportanceofpreemploymenttrainingand

learninginpreparingpeoplereceivingsocialassistanceforemployment.

Albertassocial

assistance

program,

for

example,

recognizes

this

through

adistinctLearnercategoryforpeoplewhoneedskillsupgradingortrainingto

getajob.ManymunicipalOntarioWorksadministratorssuggestedthatthe

currentemploymentservicesfundingapproach,whichisbasedpartlyon

outcomesrelatedtoemploymentearningsandexitsfromsocialassistance,

shouldbebroadenedtoincludeperformancemeasuresrelatedtocompleting

preemploymentactivitiesandaddressingbarrierstoemployment.

Avarietyofpreemploymentsupportsandtrainingiscurrentlyavailable

throughOntarioWorks,ODSP,andotherprogramsintheprovince.Inthe

3Whentheboughbreaks:Providerinitiatedcomprehensivecareismoreeffectiveandless

expensiveforsolesupportparentsonsocialassistance(GinaBrowne,CarolynByrne,Jacqueline

Roberts,AmiramGafniandSusanWhittaker,2001)studiedaprojectthatactivelysoughtoutsole

parentsonsocialassistanceandofferedthesefamiliesarangeofservicesandsupports.The

evaluationfoundthat,amongthoseparticipatingintheenhancedservices,25percentofsole

supportparentsleftsocialassistancewithinoneyear,comparedwith10percentwhoexited

socialassistancewithoutanyextrasupportfromcaseworkers.

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engagementprocess,however,weheardthatpeoplehavebeenreferredto

trainingcoursesthatdidnotleadtojobs.Somewomentalkedaboutbeing

trainedaspersonalsupportworkersinlocationswheretherewasno

demand.

Highly

skilled

immigrants

described

being

sent

for

rsum

writing

courses,whichtheydidnotneed.Weoftenheardthattrainingcourses

shouldbeequippingpeoplewithskillsforwhichthereisademandinthe

locallabourmarket.

FirstNationsengagedinopenandfrankdiscussionswithus.Theytoldus

aboutthehealingjourneytheirpeopleandcommunitiesareundertakingin

thewakeofmanyhistoricalchallenges,suchasresidentialschools.Many

FirstNationscommunitieswantflexibilitytodefinetheiremployment

programstobetterreflectthiscontext.Forexample,theOntarioNative

WelfareAdministratorsAssociation(ONWAA)recommendedthattakingpart

incultural

or

community

development

activities

should

be

recognized

as

part

ofarangeofparticipationrequirementsunderOntarioWorks.Intheirview,

theseactivitiescontributetoimprovingjobreadinessandcanhelppeople

whomaybedealingwithmentalhealthissues,trauma,oraddictionsthat

needtobeaddressedbeforeemployment.Suchactivitiescanalsohavea

significantimpactonimprovingthewellbeingofindividualsandcommunities

wheretherearefewjobopportunitiesavailable.

Note:

FirstNations

issues

are

discussed

more

fully

in

Chapter

6,

beginning

on

page

50.

Ourdiscussionsandresearchsuggestthatpostemploymentsupportscanbe

effectiveinhelpingsomeclientsretainemployment,particularlypeoplewith

disabilitiesormultiplebarriersandnewcomerswholackfamiliaritywiththe

Canadianworkenvironment.Postemploymentsupportscouldmean

continuedaccesstoemploymentserviceprovidersforaperiodoftimeafter

startingajob.Thesesupportscouldhelpclientsadjusttoandsucceedinthe

workplace,andtoaccesssocialsupports,suchashousingorchildcare,which

arecritical

to

long

term

employment

retention.

For

employers,

service

providerscouldprovidesupportstailoredtotheneedsofspecificemployers,

suchasassistancewithaccommodationorjobcoaching.Withoutsuch

supports,someemployersmaybereluctanttohirepeoplewhohavebarriers

toemploymentormayfinditdifficulttodoso.

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Whilepostemploymentservicesareavailablefromsomeprovincialfunding

programs,weheardthataccesstotheseservicesisinconsistent.Toensure

thatpeoplewithmultiplebarriershaveaccesstotheseservices,itis

important

that

funding

mechanisms

for

post

employment

services

reflect

the

costofservingarangeofclients.

AccesstotheSameLevelofServicesforPeoplewithDisabilities

Currently,ODSPdoesnotfocusprimarilyonhelpingpeopletopreparefor

andfindemployment.Throughourengagementprocess,weheardfrom

manypeoplereceivingODSPwhosaidthattheywantedtowork,andcould

work,ifbarrierswereremovedandappropriatesupportswereprovided.

Peoplewithdisabilitiestoldusthattheyneedthesamerangeofservicesand

supportsas

people

without

disabilities

(skills

upgrading,

training,

housing,

childcare,etc.),aswellasspecificsupportsrelatedtodisability,suchas

accessibletransportationandgreateravailabilityofattendantservices.

MostpeoplewhocommentedonODSPEmploymentSupportssaidthe

programwasmostsuccessfulforpeoplewithdisabilitieswhoarejobready

andcanbenefitfromsomeassistancetomakethetransitiontothe

workplaceandfrompostemploymentsupportstohelpthemmaintain

employment.Theyrecommendedthatthevariousprogramsintendedto

supportemploymentforpeoplewithdisabilitiesbebetterintegrated.With

betterintegration,

agencies

could

provide

the

full

spectrum

of

services

that

clientsneed,includingassessments,preemploymentpreparationand

training,jobplacement,andpostemploymentsupports.

Employmentservicesandsupportsmustrecognizetherangeofbarriersto

employmentfacingpeoplewithdisabilities.Onestudy,4 whichincludeda

surveyofover500employersinOntario,identifiedthesekeybarriers:

Negativeattitudesandfalseassumptionsaboutpeoplewithdisabilities

Lackof

awareness

about

the

employment

potential

of

people

with

disabilities

4SeeWCGInternationalConsultantsLtd.(1996),Employmentofpersonswithdisabilitiesinthe

ProvinceofOntario.

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andwellbeing.Amongemployers,therehasbeenincreasinginterestin

addressingworkplaceissuesfacingpeoplewithmentalillnessandimproving

employersreturntoworkprograms.Wehavemoreworktodo,however,to

overcome

the

stigma

of

mental

illness

in

recruitment

and

hiring

and

to

learn

howtoaccommodatepeoplewithmentalhealthissuesandepisodic

disabilitiesintheworkplace.

Ourresearchanddiscussionswithhealthserviceprovidershighlightedforus

theimportanceofprovidingearlyinterventionandappropriatesupportsto

peoplewithmentalillnessandotherdisabilities.Thisisessentialfor

participationinemploymentorreturntoworkassoonaspossible.Early

supportscanalsoimprovewellbeingandpreventsocialexclusionandlong

absencesfromthelabourforce.Tofacilitateaccessandreducestigma,itis

importantthatthesesupportsbewellintegratedwithotheremployment

services.We

are

aware

that

the

first

phase

of

Ontarios

Comprehensive

MentalHealthandAddictionsStrategyisfocusingonchildren.Foradults,we

expectthatthenextphasewillprovideopportunitiesforearlierintervention

andbetteraccesstointegratedmentalhealthtreatmentandemployment

services.

Evenwithappropriatesupports,notallpeoplewithdisabilitieswillbeableto

workfulltimeorconsistently.Ourgoalistomakerecommendationsthatwill

respondtotheworkaspirationsofpeoplewithdisabilitiesandencourageand

supporttheirparticipationinemploymenttothemaximumoftheirabilities.

Wealso

want

to

make

recommendations

to

improve,

substantially,

the

employmentservicesandsupportsavailabletopeoplewithdisabilities,

includingmakingthedeliveryoftheseservicesandsupportsmoreeasily

accessible.However,therealityisthatpeoplewithdisabilitiescontinueto

faceamultitudeofbarriers,includingdiscriminationandstigma.Some

peoplewithdisabilitieswillnotbeabletofindemployment,despitehigh

personalmotivation.

Inourresearch,wefoundthatmanycountriesaremovingtowardan

approachthatincludesactiveengagementinthelabourmarketforeveryone

receivingsocial

assistance,

including

people

with

disabilities.

For

example,

the

UnitedKingdomandAustralia,whichhavebeeninvolvedindisabilitybenefit

reformforanumberofyears,havedevelopedtoolstoassessworkcapacity.

AustraliasJobCapacityAssessmentincludesanassessmentofimpairment

againstImpairmentTables,whichareintendedtomeasurethelossof

functionalcapacitythataffectsapersonsabilitytowork.Inaddition,an

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assessmentismadeofwhetherapersonisabletoworkatleastparttime.

Thoseassessedasnotabletoworkatleastparttimeareeligibleforahigher

benefitrateanddonothavetoparticipateinworkrelatedactivities.People

assessed

as

able

to

work

at

least

part

time

are

expected

to

participate

accordingtotheirability.

Note:

Benefitsforpeoplewithdisabilitiesarediscussedinthenextchapter,beginningonpage

29.

Implementingjobcapacityassessmentscanbechallenging,however.For

example,intheUK,issueshavearisenregardingthevalidityofthetooland

theway

in

which

it

is

implemented.

The

related

reforms

are

struggling

to

gain

publicacceptance.ResearchbytheOrganisationforEconomicCooperation

andDevelopment(OECD)notesthatthegoalofdeterminingreasonable

expectationsbyassessingwhetherpeoplearetoodisabledtoworkis

understandable,butitisnotstraightforwardtosetthelevelofcapacity

belowwhichitisimpracticaltoexpectapersontoparticipateinthelabour

market.6Disabilityandtheexperienceofdisabilityarechangeableovertime

andindividualmotivationvaries.Manyenvironmentalfactorsalsohavean

impactonworkcapacity,includingtechnology,jobexpectations,

accommodation,andacceptanceintheworkplace.

Giventhiscontext,theCommissionisseekinginputonwhetherOntario

shouldadoptameanstobetterassessworkcapacityandsetparticipation

requirementsforpeoplewithsomecapacityforemployment,orwhetherthe

Provinceshouldwaittointroducesuchrequirementsuntilsubstantial

progresshasbeenmadeonremovingbarrierstoemploymentforpeoplewith

disabilities,includingthefullimplementationoftheAODA.

StrongConnectionswithEmployers

We

also

looked

at

effective

employment

services

and

supports

from

the

perspectiveofemployers.Employersemphasizedthatitiscriticalfor

employmentserviceproviderstounderstandhowspecificbusinessesoperate

6SeeOECD(2010),Sickness,disabilityandwork:Breakingthebarriersasynthesisoffindings

acrossOECDCountries,p.106.

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andwhattheyrequirewhenhiring.Forexample,somesmallandmedium

sizedemployerssaidtheyneedcandidateswhoareprescreenedandalready

trained.Somelargeremployerssaidtheyprefertodoonthejobtraining

themselves.

Itwasclearfromourdiscussionswithemployersthatthereisnosingle

strategyforsupportingthemtohirepeoplereceivingsocialassistance.

Rather,atoolkitormenuofapproachesisneeded.Thismayinclude

information,technicaladvice,andfinancialincentivessuchaswagesubsidies

andtaxcredits.Someemployerssuggestedthatprovidingfinancialincentives

tosmallandmediumsizedbusinesseswouldassistthemincovering

recruitmentandtrainingcostswhenhiringpeoplereceivingsocialassistance.

Thecreationofafundtoassistsmalleremployerswiththecostsof

accommodatingpeoplewithdisabilitiesintheworkplacewasalsosuggested.

Otheremployers

did

not

favour

wage

subsidies

or

other

financial

incentives.

Intheirview,employershirepeoplebecausethereisagoodbusinesscasefor

doingso.

Wealsoheardfromemployersabouttheeffectivenessofbusinessto

businessapproaches.Forexample,throughtheOntarioChamberof

CommerceGlobalExperienceatWorkprogram,localChambersconduct

outreachtoemployersintheircommunitiestoencouragethemtohire

internationallytrainedprofessionals.Thisprogramcouldbeausefulmodel

forimprovingemploymentopportunitiesforpeoplereceivingsocial

assistance.Members

of

the

Ontario

Disability

Employment

Network

ChampionsLeaguepromotethebenefitsofhiringpeoplewithdisabilitiesto

otherbusinessownersandoperators.Otherrecommendationsfrom

employersincludedestablishingacommonportalwheretheycouldpostjob

opportunities,segmentingemploymentserviceprovidersbyindustrysector,

expandingfundingmodelsthatrewardemploymentservicesbasedonjob

retentionratherthanthenumberofplacements,anddevelopingstandards

ofpracticeforemploymentserviceproviders.

Weheardfromanumberofmunicipalitiesandnotforprofitemployment

serviceproviders

who

are

working

successfully

with

employers

in

their

communitiestomatchpeoplereceivingsocialassistancewithjobs.

Developinggoodworkingrelationshipswithlocalemployersandhavinga

goodunderstandingofthelocallabourmarkethavebeencriticalelementsin

theirsuccess.

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DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS

Howcanemploymentservicesbemademoreeffective?

What

should

the

Commission

recommend

to

encourage

greater

consistencyineffectiveemploymentservicesandsupportsforsocial

assistancerecipients,whilestillallowingforlocalflexibilityand

innovation?

Shouldstandardassessmenttoolsbeusedtoidentifypeoplesneedsandmatchthemtoappropriateservicesandsupports?

Whatshouldbeconsideredappropriateemploymentrelatedactivityparticipationrequirementsforpeoplewithdisabilities?Should

participationrequirementsforpeoplewithdisabilitiesbedifferent

fromthose

for

other

people

receiving

social

assistance?

Shouldatoolbedevelopedtoassesstheworkcapacityofpeoplewithdisabilities?Ifso,howshouldthetoolbedevelopedandhowshouldit

beused?

Whatkindsofengagementstrategiesandincentiveswouldbemosteffectiveinencouragingandsupportingemployerstohiremoresocial

assistancerecipients?

Accessto

Employment

Services

and

Supports

Currently,employmentservicesforpeoplereceivingsocialassistanceare

deliveredinanumberofdifferentways.

ConsolidatedMunicipalServiceManagers(CMSMs)and,inNorthernOntario,

DistrictSocialServicesAdministrationBoards(DSSABs)areresponsiblefor

providingOntarioWorksemploymentservicesthrough133localsites,

includingmainandsatelliteofficesintheprovince.Someprovideservices

directlyandotherscontractthemouttoemploymentserviceproviders,

includingAboriginalserviceorganizations.Accordingtoasubmissionfrom

theCanadianUnionofPublicEmployees(CUPE),theunionrepresenting

manyOntarioWorkscaseworkers,themajorityofcaseworkershave

caseloadsrangingfrom150to200clients.OntarioWorksisdeliveredin112

FirstNationscommunities,53ofwhichreceivebothincomesupportand

employmentservices.

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TheMinistryofCommunityandSocialServicesisresponsibleforproviding

ODSPservicesthrough46regionalsitesintheprovince.ODSPEmployment

Supportsarecontractedoutanddeliveredbyapproximately150community

service

providers.

According

to

a

submission

from

the

Ontario

Public

Service

EmployeesUnion(OPSEU),theunionrepresentingODSPcaseworkers,these

caseworkershavecaseloadsrangingfrom230to380clients.

TheMinistryofTraining,CollegesandUniversitiesfundsEmploymentOntario

(EO).EOprovidesemploymentandtrainingservicestounemployed

Ontariansthrough51regionalEOofficesand400servicelocations.The

servicelocationsincludeamixofnotforprofitserviceprovidersandother

thirdpartydeliveryagents.Therearesixcommunitieswheremunicipalities

deliverbothOntarioWorksandEOservices.WeheardthatEOservicescan

bedifficulttoaccessinsomeFirstNationscommunitiesandotherareasof

theprovince.

EOisnotprimarilydesignedtoservesocialassistancerecipients.Currently,

17percentofpeoplereceivingservicesfromEOaresocialassistance

recipients.Almosthalfofthe$1.2billioninfundingforEOcomesfromthe

federalgovernmentthroughtheCanadaOntarioLabourMarket

DevelopmentAgreement.Thefundingcanonlybeusedtoprovideprograms

andservicestoEIeligibleclients.

Peoplereceivingsocialassistancetoldustheywantedaccesstothefullrange

ofemployment

and

training

programs

available

to

other

unemployed

Ontarians,includingthoseofferedthroughEO.Weheardmanyexamplesof

socialassistancerecipientsnotbeingabletoaccesstherightservicesatthe

righttime,ornotbeingabletofindtheservicesandsupportstheyneedin

theircommunities.

Thecurrentapproachseparatessocialassistancerecipientsfromother

jobseekers.Thisreinforcesthestigmaofreceivingassistanceandmakesit

moredifficultforpeople,especiallypeoplewithdisabilities,toaccessawider

rangeofservices.Theseparationalsoresultsinserviceduplicationandgaps,

confusion

for

jobseekers

and

employers,

and

administrative

inefficiencies.

Inadditiontoemploymentservices,asdiscussedinthefirstsectionofthis

chapter,manypeopleidentifiedtheneedforbettercoordinationor

integrationofsocialassistancewithotherservicesandsupports,suchas

childcareandhousing.UrbanAboriginalpeoplealsodrewourattentionto

14


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b)Municipalities/FirstNationsdeliverallemploymentservices

AsecondapproachcouldbetoallowmunicipalitiesandFirstNations

todeliverallemploymentservicesforpeoplereceivingsocial

assistance,whether

Ontario

Works

or

ODSP.

This

would

help

ensure

thatpeoplewithdisabilitieshaveaccesstothesamelevelandrange

ofemploymentservicesandsupportsasotherpeoplereceivingsocial

assistance.Inadditiontochildcareandhousingsupports,whichthey

accessthroughmunicipalitiesandsomeFirstNations,peoplewith

disabilitieswouldalsobeabletoaccessemploymentservices.This

approachwouldallowaonedoorentrytoservicesandimproveease

ofaccessforclients.Municipal/FirstNationdeliverywouldprovidea

commonentrypointforallpeopleseekingemploymentandsocial

services,whichwouldreducethestigmaassociatedwithsocial

assistance.This

approach

would

also

build

on

municipalities

and

First

Nationsexpertiseinlocaleconomicdevelopmentandworkforce

planning.

Inadditiontointegrationofsocialassistanceemploymentservicesat

thelocallevel,linkagesbetweenmunicipalities/FirstNationsandEO

couldbestrengthenedinordertoimproveaccesstothefullsuiteof

EOservices.Betterlinkagescouldbeachievedthroughinformation

sharingandserviceagreements.Theseagreementscouldfocusthe

rolesandresponsibilitiesinvolved.Forexample,municipalitiesand

FirstNationscouldprovideintensivecasemanagementtopeoplewho

havemultiple

barriers

to

employment

and

refer

people

who

are

job

readytoEOor,forFirstNations,tothesupportsavailablethroughthe

federalAboriginalSkillsandEmploymentTrainingStrategy(ASETS).

Wheretheyhavetheinterestandhavedevelopedthecapacity,

municipalitiesandFirstNationscouldtakeontheroleofdesignated

EOserviceproviders.ThiswouldrequireachangeintheProvinces

currentapproachtoselectingproviderstoformitsEOnetwork.Some

municipalitieshavealreadystructuredtheiremploymentservicesand

supportstoserveabroaderpopulationaswellaspeoplereceiving

socialassistance.

c)EmploymentOntariodeliversallemploymentservices

Athirdapproachcouldbetoconsolidateallemploymentserviceswith

EOproviders.Socialassistanceadministratorscouldretain

responsibilityforoverallcasemanagementofpeoplereceivingsocial

16


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assistance,includingreferralstoEOandotherservices,andfor

ensuringthatpeopleareparticipatinginemploymentrelated

programs.

Inthis

model,

it

would

be

important

to

ensure

that

the

specialized

or

intensiveservicesthatsomesocialassistancerecipientsneedwould

beavailable.Thisapproachwouldalsorequireimprovedand

integratedlocallabourmarketplanninginordertotakeadvantageof

municipalandFirstNationsexpertiseinlocaleconomicdevelopment

andtheirconnectionstoemployersintheircommunities.

Weareawarethatanystructuralchangeinthewayservicesaredelivered

wouldlikelyinvolvechangesinaccountabilitiesandreportingrelationships.

Newapproachestodeliverymayalsohaveanimpactonstaffroles,which

wouldrequire

significant

discussions

with

Ontario

Works

and

ODSP

caseworkersandtheirunions.

DISCUSSIONQUESTION

Whichapproachwouldbemosteffectiveinimprovingthedeliveryofemploymentservices?

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Chapter2:

AppropriateBenefitStructure

Thereviewwillmakerecommendationsthatwillenablethegovernmentto

establishanappropriatebenefitstructurethatreducesbarriersandsupports

peoplestransitioninto,andattachmentwithin,thelabourmarket.


TheTerms

of

Reference

for

the

review

ask

us

to

make

recommendations

to

improveemploymentoutcomesforpeoplewhocanworkandtoprovide

adequateincomesecurityforthosewhocannot.Theyalsorequireusto

adviseonmethodologiesfordeterminingthebenefitstructureandlevelof

rates.

Withinthoserequirements,wewanttomakerecommendationsthatachieve

threekeyobjectives:

Adequacyofbenefits Fairness

as

between

people

who

are

receiving

social

assistance

and

lowincomepeoplewhoareworkingbutnotreceivingsocial

assistance

WorkincentivesToachievetheseobjectivesefficiently,anewratestructureforbothOntario

WorksandODSPmustalsobelesscomplexandmoretransparent.

BalancingAdequacy,FairnessandIncentivestoWork

Thefollowingsectiondiscussesthechallengesofachievingtherightbalance

amongthethreeobjectivesbydescribing:a)howtheyinteractwithone

another;b)thedifficultiesinestablishingaratemethodology;andc)howthe

tradeoffsbetweenthethreeobjectivescouldbeaddressed.

18


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a)Interactions

OttawaPublicHealthpointedouttousthatinOttawa,afamilyoffourwith

childrenovertheageofsixcanexpecttopay$759permonthfornutritious

foodand

an

average

rent

of

$1,227.

If

this

family

relies

on

Ontario

Works,

alongwithchildrensbenefitsandothertaxcredits,OttawaPublicHealth

estimatesthattheywouldbeleftwithonly$25afterrentandfoodcosts.A

singlepersoninOttawacanexpecttopay$254permonthfornutritiousfood

andanaveragerentof$715forabachelorapartment.Ifthatpersonrelieson

OntarioWorksandtaxcredits,OttawaPublicHealthestimatesthatthe

individualwouldbeshort$334eachmonth.Weheardfrommanypeople

thatthebenefitstructureshouldmorecloselyreflectthecostofliving,

includingthecostofnutritiousfood,securehousingandcommunity

participation.

Thebenefitstructuremustalsotakeintoaccountfairnessasbetweenlow

incomeworkersandpeoplereceivingsocialassistance.Peoplereceiving

socialassistancemayhavesomeemploymentearningsandremaineligible

forsomefinancialsupportandotherbenefitsfromsocialassistance.Therate

structureshouldnotleadtoasituationwhereapersonworkingatalow

wagejobandnotreceivingsocialassistanceisatadisadvantagecompared

withapersonworkingatthesamejobandalsoreceivingsomesupportfrom

socialassistance.

Thebenefitstructureshouldalsoensurethatworkpays;inotherwords,that

thereissufficientfinancialincentiveforapersontotakeonemployment.We

alsohavetorememberthatthereisconsiderablediversityinthepopulation

receivingsocialassistance,andmanyfactorscanaffectapersonsdecisionto

moveintoemploymentorabilitytodoso.Wehavenowayofknowinghow

muchanyparticularindividualwouldbeaffectedbytheextenttowhichwork

pays;forexample,somepeoplemayattachconsiderablevaluetothenon

financialbenefitsofworking,suchasinclusionorparticipationinthe

community.However,theliteraturesuggeststhatmorepeopleareattracted

toworkasthefinancialrewardsforworkingincrease,sobalancingthe

objectivesofadequacy,fairnessandincentivesisimportant.

Toarriveataratestructurethatbalancesthesethreeobjectives,weneedto

considerthefollowing:

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Anadequacymeasure:Whatlevelofincomeisnecessarytoobtainthebasics,suchassafe,cleanhousing,anutritiousdiet,clothingand

transportation?

Areference

wage:

How

do

social

assistance

rates

and

benefits

comparewiththewagesandassociatedbenefitsthatanindividual

mightreceiveinthelabourmarketiftheyweretoexitsocial

assistanceforemployment?Weneedtobeabletocomparesocial

assistanceincomeswiththisreferencewage.

Abenefitwithdrawalrate:Atwhatrateshouldbenefitsbereducedorwithdrawnwhenpeoplebegintoearnemploymentincome?The

benefitwithdrawalrateisanimportantpartoftheMarginalEffective

TaxRate(METR),asexplainedintheboxbelow.

TheMarginalEffectiveTaxRate(METR)istherateatwhichincometestedtaxcredits

andbenefitsarewithdrawn,combinedwiththeimpactofincometaxes,asincomerises

throughincreasedearnings.TheleveloftheMETRdeterminestheextentofthe

financialincentivetowork.IfMETRsarelow,peoplelosetheirbenefitsmoreslowlyas

theybegintoearn,increasingtheirincentivetowork.IfMETRsarehigh,peoplelose

theirbenefitsmorequickly,reducingtheincentivetowork.

CurrentlyinbothOntarioWorksandODSP,benefitsarewithdrawnatarateof50cents

foreverydollarearned.Thisrate,combinedwiththelossofanyotherbenefits,or

increasesinincometaxesowedresultingfromincreasedearnings,formstheoverall

METR.

Thesocialassistancebenefitwithdrawalrateof50percentisintendedtoprovidean

incentiveforpeopletomakethetransitiontoemployment.Itwasintroducedin2005,

replacingamorecomplexapproach,involvingdifferentratesofwithdrawalatdifferent

earningsthresholds,whichwasconfusingtoclients.Thereisnoconsistentapproach

usedamongjurisdictions,anditisverydifficulttodeterminetherightlevelof

incentive.

Therelationshipbetweenadequacy,thereferencewageandthebenefit

withdrawal

rate

is

such

that

if

steps

are

taken

to

address

any

two

of

them,

thethirdcannotbecontrolledindependently.Thisisillustratedinthe

followingthreeexamples:

20


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Example1:

Benefitsaresetatanadequatelevelandarephasedoutentirelyatthepointwhen

earningsreachthereferencewage.Thisautomaticallydeterminestherateatwhich

benefitsare

withdrawn

as

income

is

earned.

Example2:

Benefitsaresetatanadequatelevelandtherateatwhichbenefitsarewithdrawnas

incomeisearnedisestablished.Inthiscase,theincomelevelatwhichbenefitsarefully

withdrawnwillbedifferentfromthereferencewage.

Example3:

Areferencewageandtherateatwhichbenefitsarewithdrawnarebothset.Inthis

case,thelevelofbenefitswillbedeterminedautomaticallybythisformula,andmayor

maynotmeetthelevelofadequacy.

Aswetrytobalancethethreeobjectivesofadequacy,fairnessand

incentives,wedosointhecontextofthegovernmentscommitmentto

reducingpovertyinourprovince.Someoftheissuesaretechnicaland

complex.Wehavetotacklethem,butwearemindfulthatadequacyisreally

aboutwhetherpeoplewhohavefallenonhardtimescanadequatelyfeed,

clotheandhousethemselvesandtheirfamilies.

Inourdiscussions,weheard,frompeoplewithlivedexperienceofsocial

assistance,thatthecurrentbenefitstructureisnotworking.Theytoldusthat

formany,

the

threshold

of

adequacy

is

not

being

met,

and

that

people

should

beabletoretainagreaterportionofanyearnedincome,atleastuptoa

pointofmorecloselyreachingadequacy.Weoftenheardthesuggestionthat

thebenefitwithdrawalratethatapplieswhenpeoplebegintoearn

employmentincomeshouldbeloweredfromthecurrent50percent.

LoweringtherateofwithdrawalofbenefitsorMETRwouldimprovethe

financialincentivetoworkforsocialassistancerecipients.However,itwould

alsomeanthatsocialassistancerecipientswithemploymentearningswould

continuetoreceivesocialassistanceathigherincomesfromearningsthan

theydo

now,

and

could

be

better

off

than

people

who

are

working

at

similar

jobsbutnotreceivingsocialassistance.Forexample,iftheamountofearned

incomeretainedincreasedfrom50percentto75percent,theearned

incomelevelatwhichapersonwouldexitsocialassistancewouldbefour

timesthesocialassistancerate.Apersoninthissituationwouldhaveamuch

higherincomeatthatpointthanalowwageworkerwouldearnfrom

21


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employmentonly.Ontheotherhand,wewerealsotoldthatpeoplewere

opentotheideaofretaininglessoftheirearningsifratesweremore

adequatetobeginwith.

Itmust

be

emphasized

that

the

dilemma

presented

by

the

trade

offs

betweenadequacy,fairness,andincentivesisrootedinthelabourmarket,

wherewagescanbelow,andthereisgrowingincomedisparity.Theway

forwardtomanagethesetradeoffsandachieveanappropriatebenefit

structurewouldbefarlessdifficultifthelabourmarketprovidedbetterand

moreequitableincomesandbenefits.Withtheprevalenceoflowwage,non

standardwork,movingintoemploymentoftenmeansaninsecurefuture,

relativelylowearnings,andalossofvaluableextendedhealthbenefitssuch

asprescriptiondrug,dental,andvisioncare.

Individualswho

exit

Ontario

Works

for

employment

may

continue

to

receive

healthbenefitsforsixto12months.PeoplewithdisabilitiesreceivingODSP

haveaccesstothesebenefitsindefinitelyaftertheyexitsocialassistancefor

employment,althoughmanyODSPrecipientsweheardfromareunderthe

mistakenimpressionthattheywilllosetheirhealthbenefitsiftheyreturnto

work.

Intodaysjobmarket,thevastmajorityofpeopleworkingintemporary,part

time,orlowwagejobsdonothaveemployersponsoreddental,medical,or

druginsurance.Oftwopeopleworkingsidebysideatthesamejob,theone

whois

in

the

process

of

exiting

social

assistance

continues

to

have

health

benefitsforaperiodoftimewhiletheother,whodidnotreceivesocial

assistance,hasnohealthcoverageinthisworkplace.Thelackoffairnessin

thissituationisapparent.Weheardinourdiscussionsthatlosinghealth

benefitsuponmovingintoemploymentcouldbeapowerfuldisincentiveto

exitingtheprogram.Manypeople,especiallyparentswithchildrenwhohave

medicalconditionssuchasasthma,toldusthattheyfounditverydifficultto

leavesocialassistancegiventheriskofnothavinghealthbenefits.The

conversemayalsobetrue:theavailabilityofhealthbenefitsmaybeafactor

inseekingsocialassistanceforpeoplewhoneedthesebenefitsbutcannot

otherwiseafford

them.

22


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27/69

comparedwithanyofthelowincomemeasures(seeAppendixB:

SocialAssistanceIncomesComparedwithLowIncomeMeasures).Thereare

widevariationsinhowincomescomparewitheachmeasure,inpercentage

terms,

across

different

types

of

recipients

and

across

Ontario

Works

and

ODSP.Forexample,asoleparentwithonechildreceivingODSPreceives

$24,882(includingchildrensbenefits)ayear,or106percentoftheMBM

thresholdforasingleparentwithonechild(butasnotedabove,theMBM

doesnotconsideradditionalcostsoflivingwithadisability).Asingleperson

receivingOntarioWorksreceives$7,952ayear,or48percentoftheMBM

thresholdforasingleperson.

Itisalsodifficulttofindabenchmarkfordeterminingtheratelevelsthat

wouldresultinfinancialincentivestowork.Thereisnoobviouslabour

marketincomebenchmarkorreferencewagetouseforcomparisonwith

socialassistance

incomes

to

determine

whether

an

individual

would

be

better

offworking.Itcouldbebasedonanyofthefollowing:

Fulltimehoursatgeneralminimumwage,whichissetbyprovincialpolicy

Theaverageactualearningsofpeoplewhohavefullyexitedthesocialassistancesystem,basedonthefirstyearfollowingtheirexit

Aproportionoftheaverageactualemploymentearningsofworkingage

adults

Areferencewageisintendedtocapturewhatpeoplemightexpecttoearn

throughemployment.Inpractice,however,peoplemayearnmoreor(more

often)lessthantheirexpectations.Actualearningsforpeopletransitioning

fromreceivingsocialassistancewillvary,dependingonlocallabourmarket

conditionsandanindividualscapabilitiesandskills.Thismeansthatany

benchmarkforareferencewagewillhavelimitations.

Settingthereferencewageatthefulltimeminimumwagewouldreflectthe

lowestamountthatpeoplemightearnifworkingfulltime;however,

minimumwage

is

apolitical

construct

without

aclear

methodology

for

arrivingatthefigure.Averageactualearningsafterexitfromsocialassistance

wouldnotreflecttherangeofcapabilitiesandearningpotentialofpeople

receivingsocialassistance.Thereisasimilarproblemwithusingaproportion

24


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ofaverageactualemploymentearnings,andfindingarationalefor

determiningwhatproportionshouldbeusedisafurtherdifficulty.

Combiningthesetwolessthanperfectmeasuresofadequacyandincentives

toarrive

at

arate

structure

raises

further

questions.

For

example,

rates

could

bebasedonaproportionoftheMBMandaproportionofareferencewage.

Whataretheappropriateproportions?WhatpercentageofMBMis

acceptableforimprovingtheadequacyofsocialassistance?Whatpercentage

ofareferencewageisenoughtoensureafinancialincentivetowork?As

notedabove,thereisgreatdiversityamongpeoplereceivingsocial

assistance,andpeoplewillresponddifferentlytovariouskindsofincentives

towork.

c)AddressingtheTradeOffs

Thetradeoffsbetweentheobjectivesofadequacy,fairnessandincentivesto

workarecomplex.Eventhoughthedifficultiesarefirmlyrootedinthe

structureofthelabourmarket,weneedtoaddressthem.Thefollowingare

twoapproachesthatcouldeasethedilemma.

i)ExtendedhealthbenefitsforalllowincomeOntarians

Thisapproachinvolvesmakingworkpaybyprovidingextendedhealth

benefits,suchasprescriptiondrug,dental,andvisioncare,ona

universal,incometestedbasistoalllowincomeOntarians,regardless

ofwhether

they

are

working

or

receiving

social

assistance.

Several

provinceshavetakenstepstoprovideextendedhealthbenefitsto

lowincomeearnerswhoarenotreceivingsocialassistance.For

example,Albertaprovideslowincomeadults,whoarenotreceiving

socialassistance,withprescriptiondrug,dental,andvisioncare

benefitsiftheydonotreceivethesebenefitsthroughtheiremployers.

Itmaybeeasytomakethecaseforthisapproach.MostCanadians

believe,formanygoodreasons,thatideallyhealthbenefitsshouldbe

availabletoall.However,thereisthepracticalquestionofhowtopay

forsuch

an

expansion

of

health

benefits.

Should

government

fund

it

directly,orshouldemployersberequiredtoofferthesebenefitsto

theirlowincomeemployees?

Weknowthatitisanunevenplayingfieldwhenitcomestoemployer

providedextendedhealthbenefits.Introducinggovernment

25


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supportedextendedhealthbenefitscouldleademployerstodecrease

thebenefitstheyprovideiftheycurrentlyofferthem.However,there

maybestrategiestohelpleveltheplayingfield,suchasapooled

insurance

program

for

employers

not

currently

providing

benefits.

ii)Varytheratestructureovertime

Inthisapproach,aratestructurecouldbeestablishedthatchanges

overtheperiodinwhichanindividualreceivessocialassistance.The

rationaleisthatincentivestoencouragetransitiontoemployment

maybemoreimportantintheshortterm,butinthelongterm,the

needforadequacymayincrease.

AreportfortheSocialPlanningCouncilofWinnipeg8 suggeststhat,for

peoplewhoreceivesocialassistanceforashorttime,itmaybe

sufficienttosupportonlybasicneeds,includingsomeoftheitems

coveredbytheMBM(suchasfood,clothingandfootwear,shelter,

personalneeds,householdsuppliesandtransportation).Overthe

longerterm,peopleneedtobeabletocoveradditionalcosts,suchas

recreationcostsforchildrenandreplacementoffurnitureand

appliances,tomaintainabasiclifestyleandparticipateinthe

community.

Usingthisrationale,ashorttermbasicratecouldapplyduring,for

example,thefirst18to24months,withadditionalfundsavailable

onlyin

emergency

situations.

This

would

ensure

that

abasic

level

of

benefitisavailableforpeopleinneedoftemporaryassistance.Rates

couldbesetatalevelbelowthereferencewageinordertomaintain

incentivesforseekingemployment.

Peoplewhoareunsuccessfulinsecuringemploymentwillbeinneed

oflongertermincomesupport.Manydifferentfactorscouldleadto

thissituation,includinglackofavailablejobs,lackofopportunity

owingtodiscriminationorstigmaattachedtohavingadisability,lack

ofaccesstoaffordablechildcare,beinghomeless,multiplehealthor

socialbarriers,

and

many

others.

After

the

initial

period

described

above,ahigherratecouldbeavailabletoreflectlongerterm

adequacy.Thetradeoffbetweenadequacyandincentivetoworkis

8SeeHarveyStevens(2011),Improvingtheadequacyofsocialassistancebudgets:Arationalefor

makingcurrentratesmoreadequateandamethodologyforpricingbudgets.

26


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morerelevanttothosewhoarecapableofworkingthanforthose

whocannotwork.

Oneofthequestionsaboutthistypeofdesigniswhetheritwould

reducethe

incentive

for

people

to

exit

the

program

once

they

receive

socialassistanceatthehigherrate.Anotherquestioniswhethersome

people(suchaspeoplecaringforpreschoolchildrenorsufferingfrom

amedicalcondition)shouldbeeligibleforthehigherrateattheoutset

ifitcanbeassumedthattheywillrequireassistanceoverthelonger

term.

d)UniversalIncomeTestedBenefits

Atsomeincomelevels,therearemeasuresthatmayalsohelpeasethetrade

offsby

making

work

pay

and

improving

fairness.

i)Earnedincomesupplement

Anearnedincomesupplementcanbeavaluablemechanismto

supportlowincomeworkers.Manyjurisdictionshaveintroducedsuch

supplements,includingmanyU.S.states.In2007,Canadaintroduced

theWorkingIncomeTaxBenefit(WITB)toenhancetheincomesof

lowincomeworkersandprovideanincentiveforthosenotworkingto

entertheworkforce.

Ascurrently

designed,

WITB

is

not

working

as

well

as

it

could

to

meet

thatobjective.9 Thevalueofthebenefititselfislow,anditbeginsto

phaseoutatanincomelevelwellbelowfulltimeminimumwage.For

peoplereceivingsocialassistancewhilemovingintoemployment,

withdrawalofWITBatsuchlowearningslevelsandwithdrawalof

socialassistanceatthesametimemaymeanthattheywouldbe

worseoffbyexitingsocialassistance.Abetterdesignedearned

incomesupplement,withahigheractualvalueandlaterwithdrawalas

incomerisesbeyondareferencewage,wouldbemorelikelyto

provideincentivetoexit.

9ItshouldbenotedthatOntariosPovertyReductionStrategyrecommendedchangestothe

federalWITB.

27


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Inamethodologyforsettingrates,whatproportionswouldbalanceadequacy,fairnessandincentives?

ShouldhealthbenefitsbeprovidedtoalleligiblelowincomeOntarians?

If

so,

how

should

the

cost

be

covered?

ShouldOntariouseatworateapproach,basedonhowlongsomeonerequiressocialassistance?Ifso,shouldtherebeexemptionsfrom

startingatthelowershorttermrate?

Wouldanearnedincomesupplementbeagoodmechanismtoincreasetheincentivetowork?Ifso,howshoulditbedesigned?

Wouldahousingbenefitimprovefairnessandtheincentivetowork?Ifso,howshoulditbedesigned?

DesigningBenefitsforPeoplewithDisabilities

Thedilemmaoftradeoffsbetweenadequacy,fairnessandincentivesiseven

morepronouncedindesigningabenefitstructureforpeoplewithdisabilities.

Historically,peoplewithdisabilitiesreceivedsocialassistanceunderthe

FamilyBenefitsAct(FBA).UndertheFBA,ratesweresomewhathigherthan

theratesforpeoplewhowereexpectedtoseekemploymentandwho

receivedsocialassistanceundertheGeneralWelfareAct(GWA).In1995,

GWArateswerereducedby21.6percent,whileratesforpeoplewithdisabilitiesundertheFBAweremaintained.In1997,whenODSPreplacedthe

FBA,ratescontinuedatahigherlevelthantheOntarioWorksratesthat

replacedtheGWA.Wecouldnotfindastatedreasonfortheratedifferential,

butitislikelyinrecognitionofthehigherlivingcostsofsomepeoplewith

disabilities,aswellasexpectationsthattheymayhavelowerearning

potential.

Withthehigherrates,ODSPbenefitsaremoreadequatethanOntarioWorks

benefits.TheODSPbenefitstructureputsapriorityonadequacyoverfairness

(bycomparison

with

low

income

workers)

or

incentives.

This

makes

sense

in

asystemthatassumesthatmostpeoplewithdisabilitiesareunlikelytowork.

However,weneedtoshiftawayfromthatassumption.Weneedtorecognize

theworkaspirationsofpeoplewithdisabilities,providecriticalemployment

29


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supportsandservices,andactivelysupportasuccessfultransitionintothe

labourmarketforthosewhocanwork.

WeweretoldthatODSPrequiresacultureshift,awayfromafocuson

disabilityand

toward

afocus

on

ability.

At

the

same

time,

the

benefit

structureneedstobetteraddressincentivestoworkandfairnessforlow

incomepeoplewithdisabilitieswhoarecurrentlyworkingandnotreceiving

ODSP.Thiswillnotbeaneasytask,butitiscriticalthatwefindwaysto

improvethecurrentsituation.

Inthinkingaboutsolutions,itisimportanttoconsiderthetwodimensionsof

incomesupportforpeoplewithdisabilities,asmentionedabove:additional

livingcostsandlowerearningpotentialofsomepeoplewithdisabilities

resultingfrombarrierstoeducationalopportunitiesandemployment.

Withrespecttolivingcosts,therehasneverbeenaclearmethodologywithin

socialassistancefordetermininghowmuchhigherratesshouldbeinorderto

reflectcosts.Atasystemlevel,quantifyingtheextracostsrelatedtodisability

isdifficultbecausepeoplehavesuchvaryingneeds.Itwouldinevitably

involveaveragingthecosts,whichwouldnotreflecttheactualcostsfor

individuals.Still,throughtheengagementprocess,disabilityandother

organizationsrecommendedthatthegovernmentworkinpartnershipwith

peoplewithdisabilitiestoassessthedirectcosts(e.g.,medicalsupplies)and

indirectcosts(e.g.,needingmoretimetocompletetasks).

Despitethedifficultyofquantifyingcosts,programsorsupplementsthat

coverthehighercostsoflivingwithadisabilityhaveanimportantroleto

play.Anumberofsuchprogramsdoexist.Forexample,forlowincome

peoplewithdisabilities,thecostofpurchasingcertainassistivedevicesis

coveredthroughtheMinistryofHealthandLongTermCarescostbased

AssistiveDevicesProgram.Somemedicalcostsaredefrayedthroughthe

MedicalExpenseTaxCredit.Itisimportanttoremember,however,thatthe

costsofsomedisabilitiesarefarlesstangible,andverydifficulttoassess.

Thereisalsoanimportantroleforsomeformofincomesupplementthat

recognizesthelowerearningpotentialofsomepeoplewithdisabilities.

Chapter1describessomeofthemanybarrierstoemploymentthatpeople

withdisabilitiescanexperience,includingnothavingtherightskillsand

training,facingworkplacediscrimination,andtheabsenceofworkplace

accommodation.Thesebarrierslimittheemploymentopportunitiesavailable

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topeoplewithdisabilities.Aslongasthebarrierscontinuetoexist,and

reducetheearningpotentialofsomepeoplewithdisabilities,wemustfind

effectivewaysofprovidingthemwithadditionalincomesupport.Wemust

also

bear

in

mind

that

some

people

with

severe

disabilities

are

unlikely

to

generatesignificantearningsovertheirlifetimes,andweneedtoensurethat

theyhaveincomesecurity.

SinceratesinODSParecurrentlyhigherthaninOntarioWorks,anincome

supplementisalreadybuiltintothecurrentratestructure.Forpeoplewith

disabilitieswhoareworking,thedisabilitytopupintheWITBalsoactsasa

typeofincomesupplement.Ideally,however,lowincomepeoplewith

disabilitiesshouldhaveaccesstoanincomesupplementrelatedtotheir

disabilityinsteadofrelatedtowhethertheyreceivesocialassistance.Thisisa

matteroffairness,anditwouldhelpaddressthetradeoffdilemma.There

arevarious

approaches

to

designing

and

delivering

such

asupplement.

TheratedifferentialwithOntarioWorkscouldberemovedfromthecurrent

ODSPrateandanewsupplementarydisabilitybenefit,outsidethesocial

assistancesystem,couldbeprovidedtoalllowincomepeoplewith

disabilities.Asapersonsemploymentearningsincreased,thisbenefitcould

bephasedout.Ineffect,thismodelwouldmirrorthegovernmentsapproach

intheOntarioChildBenefit.Itprovidessupporttochildreninalllowincome

families,regardlessofwhethertheyarereceivingsocialassistance.

Determiningthevalueofthisadditionalfinancialsupportwouldrequiresome

analysisand

design

work.

Anewprogramcouldalsobedevelopedtoprovideasecureandadequate

basicincomeforpeoplewithseveredisabilitieswhoareunlikelytogenerate

significantearningsovertheirlifetimes.Theprogramcouldbesimilartothe

supportlowincomeseniorsreceivethroughtheOldAge

Security/GuaranteedIncomeSupplement/OntarioGuaranteedAnnual

IncomeSystem,orsimilartoAlbertasAssuredIncomefortheSeverely

Handicapped(AISH)program.Anothermodeltoconsidercouldbethebasic

incomeplanforpeoplewithseveredisabilitiesthathasbeenproposedbythe

CaledonInstitute.

10

10SeeMichaelMendelson,KenBattle,SherriTorjmanandErnieLightman(2010),Abasicincome

planforCanadianswithseveredisabilities.

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Intheengagementprocess,somepeoplesaidthatthistypeofbenefitmodel

makessenseforpeoplewhohavelittleprospectofworking.Othersargued

againstanapproachthatdividespeopleaccordingtoseverityofdisability

because

it

does

not

account

for

the

changeability

of

disability,

particularly

episodicdisabilities.Achallengeinthismodelisthat,asdiscussedin

Chapter1,attemptingtoassessworkcapacitycanbeverydifficult.

DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS

Howshouldincomesupplementsforlowincomepeoplewithdisabilitiesbedesignedanddelivered?Shouldsuchsupplementsbe

providedoutsidethesocialassistancesystem?

Shouldtherebeaseparatebasicincomeprogramforpeoplewithsevere

disabilities

who

are

unlikely

to

generate

significant

earnings?

DealingwiththeComplexityofBenefits

Thecurrentarrayofbenefitsandratesattemptstoreflecttherangeof

individualcircumstances.Socialassistancenowpaysabasicneedsamount

andashelterallowance,basedonanumberoffactors.Factorsincludefamily

type(singleindividual,soleparent,couple),thenumberand(forODSP)age

ofanychildren,andlivingarrangements.

Addedto

this

structure

is

arange

of

special

benefits

to

address

specific

client

needs.Theseincludebenefitstoassistwithaddedcosts,forexamplewhen

startingfulltimeemploymentorforpeoplewhorequirespecialdietstohelp

managemedicalconditions.Somespecialbenefits,suchasassistancewith

thecostofmoving,repairinghouseholdfurniture,oradditionalworkrelated

expenses,areconsidereddiscretionaryandmaybeavailableinsome

municipalitiesandnotothers.

Asthisstructureaimstoaddressawiderangeofindividualcircumstances

andneeds,ithasbecomeverycomplicatedanddifficulttoadminister.We

alsoheard

that

the

current

structure

is

inconsistently

applied,

at

the

administratorsdiscretion,andisnotalwaystransparenttoclients.

Oneapproachtodealingwiththeseissuesistosimplifythestructureby

mergingsomeorallofitselements:

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receivingsocialassistance,throughtheprogramsandpolicies

deliveredthroughtheMinistryofHealthandLongtermCare.

Thecurrentmethodofcalculatingratesiscomplex,andtheresultingratesdo

notreflect

actual

costs,

such

as

the

expenses

of

asingle

person

versus

a

couple.TheMBMusesascalederivedfromthecostsforafamilyoffourto

calculaterelativecosts;theremaybeotherapproaches.Further,thereisno

rationaleforthehigherbasicneedsamountprovidedtoanondisabled

spouseofanODSPrecipientcomparedwithaspouseofanindividual

receivingOntarioWorks.Weneedabetterrationaleforthedifferentrates

thatapplytodifferenttypesofhouseholdsorfamiliesandabetterwayof

calculatingthoserates.

Clearly,therearemanywaystoapproachthetaskofsimplifyingand

improvingthe

benefit

structure.

It

will

be

important

to

look

at

each

of

the

elementsofthecurrentstructuretodeterminewherechangesareneeded

andwhichonesmakethemostsense.

DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS

Howshouldthecurrentratestructurebechangedtoreducecomplexity?

Shouldsomespecialbenefitsberolledintoastandardrate?Ifso,whichones?

Shouldthespecialdietaryneedsforalllowincomepeople,includingthosereceivingsocialassistance,beaddressedthroughtheMinistryof

HealthandLongTermCare?

Howshouldthedifferentratesfordifferentfamilytypesbeestablished?

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Chapter3:

EasiertoUnderstand

Thereviewwillmakerecommendationsthatwillenablegovernmentto

simplifyincomeandassetrulestoimproveequityandmakeiteasierto

understandandadministersocialassistance.


Amajor

theme

in

the

engagement

process

was

the

complexity

of

the

social

assistancesystem.Bothcaseworkersandpeoplereceivingsocialassistance

commentedonthedifficultyofnavigatingthemazeofbenefits,eligibility

criteria,rules,andexceptions.Weheardfromsomecaseworkersthatthey

canspend70percentoftheirtimeadministeringtherules.Manypeople

recommendedchangestospecificrules,suchasthoserelatedtoearnings

exemptions,treatmentofotherincome(includingchildsupport),thebenefit

unit,andassets.MoredetailonrulesisprovidedintheCommissionsreport

ontheengagementprocessandwillbeincludedinourfinalreport.

In

this

chapter,

we

look

at

the

main

systemic

reasons

for

complexity,

explore

approachestoensurecompliance,andquestionsaboutrisktolerance.We

alsolookattherulesassociatedwiththetreatmentofassets,asagood

exampleofcomplexityinthesystem,anddiscusspossibleapproachesto

change.

Complexity,ComplianceandRiskManagement

Thecomplexityofthecurrentsystemarisesfromthreemainsources:the

complexityofthepolicyobjectivesthatunderliethedesignoftheprograms,

asurveillance

approach

to

monitoring

compliance,

and

the

administration

ofriskthattakesplacewithinapublicandpoliticalenvironment.

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identificationtoolthatwillbeusedtobettertargetpeopleforeligibility

reviewswhomaynotbereportingincomeorchangesinotherfinancial

arrangements.

Aneffective

audit

based

approach

should

produce

the

same

level

of

complianceasthesurveillanceapproach.Theadvantageofanauditbased

systemisthatitcanmoreefficientlyfocusadministrativeresourcesonhigh

risksituations,potentiallyfreeingupresourcestoimprovedirectsupportsto

people.Themajorityofsocialassistancerecipientsdonotmisusethesystem,

andthisapproachalsohastheadvantageoftreatingthemwithahigherlevel

ofdignityandtrust.

However,thereisamajorchallengeinmakingtheauditbasedapproach

practical:selectiveauditingiseffectiveonlyifthosecaughtmisusingthe

systemface

strong

enough

penalties

to

discourage

others

from

misusing

the

system.Suchpenaltiesarenotasdifficultachallengeintheadministrationof

taxcollection.Asdiscussedabove,inasocialassistancesystemthatprovides

alowlevelofbenefitstobeginwith,itisasubstantialchallengetofind

enforceablepenaltiesthatarestrongenoughtodiscouragemisuse.

Weneedtoconsidertheacceptablelevelofrisktolerancetomaintainthe

integrityofthesystem.Thereisacostbenefitaspecttomanagingrisk:the

costofincreasedenforcementsetagainstthepotentialoffurtherreducing

misuse.Itcanbechallengingtoweighthecostsandbenefitsofanew

approachagainst

the

level

of

political

and

public

tolerance

for

not

catching

misuse.Thequestionofanappropriatelevelofrisktoleranceremains,in

eitherthecurrentsystemorthealternativeauditbasedsystem,assuming

appropriatepenaltiescanbefound.

DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS

Shouldthesocialassistancesystemmovefromasurveillanceapproachtowardanauditbasedsystemofverificationand

monitoring?

Whatpenalties

would

be

required

and

feasible

in

an

audit

based

system?

Whatistherightlevelofrisktolerance,ineitherthecurrentsystemoranauditbasedsystem?

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TreatmentofAssets

Inourdiscussionsandthroughsubmissions,weheardthatthecurrent

requirementthatindividualsdepletetheirassetsbeforebeingeligiblefor

socialassistance

creates

challenges

in

terms

of

financial

self

sufficiency.

Asset

ruleswereconsistentlyidentifiedasmajorobstaclesforpeopletryingto

makethetransitiontoworkandbecomemorefinanciallyresilient.Many

peoplefeltthattheassetrulesaretoostringentandthattheycontributetoa

cycleofpoverty.Wealsoheardthatthecurrentrulesassociatedwithassets

arecomplexanddifficulttounderstand.

Thereareanumberofchallengeswithrespecttothetreatmentofassets,

primarilystemmingfromfundamentalpolicyconflictswithinthecurrent

approach.Tosomeextent,theseconflictsalsodrivethecomplexityofthe

rules.The

following

discussion

looks

at

the

policy

issues

and

suggests

possible

approachestoresolvingthemandsimplifyingtherules.

Currently,individualsareexpectedtouseallfinancialresourcesavailableto

thembeforeturningtosocialassistance.Therationaleisthatitwouldnotbe

appropriateforpeopletoreceiveincomesupportwhentheyhaveassetsthey

couldusetosupportthemselves.Consistentwiththisview,assetlimitsfor

OntarioWorksaresetatalowlevel,generallyequivalenttoaboutonemonth

ofsocialassistanceandchildrensbenefitpayments.Ontheotherhand,one

ofthekeyobjectivesofOntarioWorksistoassistpeopleinasuccessful

transition

to

employment

and

achieve

independence

from

social

assistance.

Inthiscontext,therequirementtodepleteassetsattheoutsetreducesan

individualsfinancialresilienceandabilitytobreakoutofthecycleof

dependence.Withassetsdepleted,itismorelikelythatpeoplewillneedto

fallbackonsocialassistancewhenfacedwitheventemporarysetbacks.

Morebroadly,thecurrenttreatmentofassetsunderminesanotherpolicy

objective:encouragingpeopletosaveforthefuture.DepletionofRRSPsor

otherretirementsavingsassets,forexample,couldunderminelongterm

financialsecurityinlateryearsandcausepeopletoaccessothersocial

programsoncetheyreachtheageof65.Verylowassetlimitsdonotallow

forsavingsorthecreationofassetsthatmayassistpeopleinthelongerterm.

Inaddition,thereisnopolicybasistoexplainwhyassetlimitsshouldbe

higherforODSPthanforOntarioWorks.Aswiththeratedifferencebetween

thetwoprograms(discussedinChapter2),thereisnoapparentrationalefor

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thedifferenttreatmentofassets.Thedifferencemayreflecttheassumption

thatindividualsgenerallyreceiveODSPforlongerperiodsoftime.Itmayalso

reflectthefactthatODSPrecipientsarepermittedtoreceivegiftsofupto

$6,000

annually

(which

are

then

considered

assets),

another

inequity

betweenthetwoprograms.Similarly,thereisnoclearrationaletoexplain

whyaspouseordependentadultchildofanODSPrecipienthashigherasset

limitsthanthespouseordependentadultchildofapersonreceivingOntario

Works.Formoredetails,seeAppendixC:OntarioWorksandODSPAsset

LimitsandExemptions.

Thereareanumberofapproachestorevisingassetrulestohelpstrengthen

thepolicybasiswhilesimplifyingprogramrules.

OneapproachcouldbetoincreaseOntarioWorksassetlimitstoequalthose

ofODSP.

This

could

help

facilitate

asuccessful

exit

from

social

assistance

and

resultinmoresimplifiedandstreamlinedadministration.However,raising

assetlimitsmayalsomakemorepeopleeligibleforsocialassistance,

increasingoverallprogramcosts.

Asecondapproachcouldbetoincreaseassetlimitsforaninitialperiodof

timewhenanindividualfirstenterstheprogram.Thiswouldallowthosewho

areinneedofshorttermassistance,perhapswhileawaitingEmployment

Insurancepaymentsorthestartdateofanewjob,toaccesssocialassistance

withouthavingtospenddowntheirassets.

Anotherapproachcouldbetomakechangestotherulesthatwillhelp

improveanindividualslongertermfinancialsecurity.Forexample,thelimits

onspecificassetssuchasRRSPscouldbeincreased,orotherassetbuilding

strategiescouldbeintroducedsuchasIndividualDevelopmentAccounts

(IDAs).AstudybySocialandEnterpriseDevelopmentInnovations(SEDI)

showedthatIDAsimprovedsavingsforlowincomeearnersincludingsocial

assistancerecipients,insevenprovincesacrossCanada.11

Regardlessofwhetheranyoftheseapproachesareadopted,theruleson

assetscouldbesimplifiedbyreducingthenumberofspecificexemptionsand

introducingacombinedblankettotalassetlimit.Inthisscenario,therewould

beonetotalassetlimitforallcombinedassets,withtheexceptionoflarge

items,suchasaprincipalresidence,whichwouldremainspecificallyexempt.

11SeeSocialResearchandDemonstrationCorporation(SRDC)(2010),Learningtosave,savingto

learn:Learn$avefinalreport.

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Quebec,forexample,setsatotal$60,000limitforliquefiableassets,which

includesRRSPs,RESPsandtrusts.(QuebecscashlimitissimilartoOntarios,

andotherassetssuchasprimaryresidencesandvehiclesareeachsubjectto

separate

maximums.)

Thistypeofapproachwouldreducethetimeandresourcesspentintryingto

determinethenatureofspecificassetsandappropriatetreatment,andit

wouldmaketherulessimplertounderstandforbothindividualsand

caseworkers.ItmayalsomeettheneedsofFirstNationswhoexpressed

concernthatthecurrentrulesdonotreflecttherealitiesofNorthernlifeor

makeexceptionsforitems(e.g.,snowmobiles,fishingandhunting

equipment)thatareusedfortraditionalFirstNationsculturalpurposesor

thatmaypromoteselfsufficiency.

DISCUSSIONQUESTION:

Shouldassetlimitsbechanged?Ifso,how?

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Chapter4:

ViableovertheLongTerm

Thereviewwillmakerecommendationsthatwillenablegovernmentto

ensurethelongtermviabilityofthesocialassistanceprogram.


Achievingsubstantialimprovementsinkeyareasofthesocialassistance

systemwillgoalongwaytowardmakingthesystemsustainableforthe

future.Makingchangestoemploymentservicesandsupportsandtothebenefitstructure,andreducingthecomplexityofthesystemoverall,are

discussedinthepreviouschapters.Itisalsoimportantthatwedesigna

systemthatisviableforFirstNations,andthisisdiscussedinChapter6.

Thischapterlooksatadditionalapproachestocoordinatingorintegrating

socialassistanceonasystemwidebasis.Theseapproachesareintendedto

maketheadministrationofthesocialassistancesystemandthedeliveryof

servicestopeoplereceivingsocialassistancemoreeffectiveandefficient.We

areawareofeffortstakingplacewithintheprovincialgovernmenttoimprove

servicesto

Ontarians.

These

include

the

work

being

done

by

ServiceOntario

toexamineopportunitiestoexpanditsnetworktopotentiallydeliverservices

onbehalfofothergovernments,aswellastheeffortstotransformOntarios

systemofbenefitadministration.

InChapter1,welookedatthepotentialofintegratingemploymentservices.

Chapter2setoutapproachesforarevisedbenefitstructure,including

providingadisabilitysupplementoutsidesocialassistance.Theremayalsobe

approachestodeliveringOntarioWorksandODSPincomesupportthatcould

resultinimprovedcoordinationandadministrativeefficiency.Asthese

variousapproaches

to

reform

are

considered,

the

question

arises

as

to

whethertwoseparateprogramsinsocialassistanceareinfactnecessary.

Thefollowingdiscussionsetsoutthreeapproachestoimprovingintegration

anddeliverytohelpachievelongtermviability.Theremaybeothers.

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OtherPrograms

Twootherprogramsthatarepartofthesocialassistancerevieware

discussedhere:TemporaryCareAssistance(TCA)andAssistanceforChildren

withSevere

Disabilities

(ACSD).

It

has

been

suggested

that

for

the

long

term,

bothprogramsmaybebetteralignedwiththeMinistryofChildrenandYouth

Services(MCYS)inlightofitsareasofresponsibilityandexpertise.

TCAisintendedtoprovidesupportforchildreninfinancialneedwhileinthe

temporarycareofanadult,suchasagrandparent,whodoesnothavealegal

obligationtosupportthechild.Intheengagementprocess,some

stakeholdersraisedconcernsthatTCAratesarelessthantheamounts

availabletofosterparents,andthatTCAisavailableonlywhencare

arrangementsaredeemedtemporaryatthediscretionofthecaseworker.

Currently,TCAisnotincludedinthemandateforchildprotectionservicesas

definedundertheChildandFamilyServicesAct.However,itisimportantthat

childrenlivingtemporarilyoutsideoftheparentalhomeandreceiving

financialsupportfromthegovernmentbeassuredasafeenvironmentand

accesstoservices,includingpermanencyplanning.WelearnedthatinBritish

Columbia,responsibilityfortemporarycareassistance(whichwassimilarto

Ontariosprogram)wasremovedfromitssocialassistancesystem.Asaresult

ofareviewbytheB.C.RepresentativeforChildrenandYouthin2010,the

programwasincorporatedintothechildwelfaresystemtoensuremore

consistent

oversight

of

child

safety

in

temporary

care

situations.

A

similar

approachcouldbeconsideredforOntario.

ACSDhelpslowandmoderateincomeparentswithsomeoftheextracosts

ofcaringforachildwhohasaseveredisability.Parentscanreceiveupto

$450amonthtohelpwitharangeofdisabilityrelatedcosts,suchastravelto

medicalappointments,specialequipmentorparentalrelief.Theamount

dependsonactualcostsandfamilyincome.AlthoughMCYShastheleadfor

theprogram,itisestablishedbytheOntarioDisabilitySupportProgramAct,

1997anddeliveredinconjunctionwithsocialassistance.ACSDcouldbefully

transferredtoMCYSinordertoclarifyaccountabilityfortheprogramand

allowMCYStointegrateACSDwithitsotherservicesforchildrenwithdisabilities.

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DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS

WhatarethestrengthsandweaknessesofthesethreeapproachestothedeliveryofOntarioWorksandODSP?Arethereotherapproaches

thatshould

be

considered?

ShouldfullresponsibilityforTemporaryCareAllowanceorAssistanceforChildrenwithSevereDisabilitiesbetransferredtotheMinistryof

ChildrenandYouthServices?

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AshasbeendocumentedandstudiedbytheMowatCentreTaskForceonEmploymentInsurance(EI),manyOntarianshavelimitedaccessto

EI.AnumberoftheTaskForcerecommendationscouldbeconsidered

to

improve

access

to

EI

and

prevent

unemployed

Ontarians

from

turningtosocialassistance.

FirstNationsdependencyonsocialassistanceisinparttheresultoffailuresinthemanypolicyframeworksaffectingtheirpeopleand

communities.Thisisdiscussedmorefullyinthenextchapter.

Otherpoliciesandprogramdesignsthatdirectlyhinderourabilitytodevelop

solutionstoimprovesocialassistanceoutcomesincludethefollowing:

Theavailabilityofprescriptiondrug,dentalandvisioncarebenefitstolow

income

earners

is

limited,

as

is

discussed

in

Chapter

2.

Thereisgrowingawareness,inCanadaandaroundtheworld,ofrisinginequalityinincome.Recentreports,includingthosebythe

ConferenceBoardofCanadaandtheOrganisationforEconomicCo

operationandDevelopment(OECD),havehighlightedthechallengeof

risingincomeinequality.TheOECDpointstothereducedimpactof

meanstestedtransfersandchangesinincometaxratessincethemid

1990sasoneofthemainfactorscontributingtoincomeinequality.

AccordingtotheOECDreport,priortothemid1990s,theCanadian

taxbenefitsystemoffsetmorethan70percentoftheriseinmarket

incomeinequality;thishassincedeclinedto40percent.13

Wagepolicies,includingtheminimumwage,alsocontributetothewideningdisparitiesbetweenhighandlowincome.

ThereisnolongtermfederaldirectionregardingtheWITB,including,forexample,whetheritmaybeenhancedorreviewed.Asdiscussedin

Chapter2,amorerobustearnedincomesupplement(whetherit

buildsonthefederalWITBorisamadeinOntariobenefit),which

takesintoaccountbothOntariossocialassistanceratesandthe

percentofprimaryapplicantsandsponsoredimmigrantswhorepresentlessthanonepercent

ofprimaryapplicants.TwopercentofprimaryODSPapplicantsarenewcomers,including

refugeeclaimantsandsponsoredimmigrantswhorepresentlessthanonepercentofprimary

ODSPapplicants.13

SeeOECD(2011),Dividedwestand:Whyinequalitykeepsrising.CountryNote:Canada.

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structureofthewagemarket,couldactasanincentiveforpeopleto

exitsocialassistanceoreliminatetheneedforthemtoapplyforit.

Intheareaofhousing,theabsenceofafederallongtermfundingcommitment

and

anational

housing

plan

means

alack

of

affordable

housingtosupportpeopleinneed,includingpeoplereceivingsocial

assistance.

ForFirstNations,thecomplexsetofrelationshipsandjurisdictionalissuesbetweenFirstNations,thefederalgovernment,andprovincial

governmentmakesitdifficulttomakeprogressonthebroadsetof

issuesunderlyingFirstNationsexperiencewithsocialassistance.

Lastly,therearealsoanumberofcomplexinteractionsbetweensocial

assistance

and

other

income

support

programs.

Forexample,manypeopleturntosocialassistanceduringtheapplication

processforotherprograms,likeEIorCPPDisability(CPPD),whiletheyare

awaitingadecisiononwhethertheyareeligibleorduringthewaitingperiod

beforebenefitpaymentsbegin.Thecurrentarrangementsforthe

reimbursementofsocialassistancefundsreceivedduringtheseperiodsare

complicated,timeconsumingandpoorlycoordinated.Workisgoingon

betweengovernmentstoimprovesomeexistingprocesses,buttheremaybe

othermoreefficientwaystoimprovetheseinteractions.Examplesinclude

newinvestmentsintechnology,improvedpolicycoordination,andthe

developmentofasupplementorotherprepaymentprogramwithinEIorCPPDforapplicantsawaitingdeterminationofeligibility.

AnotherproblematicinteractionhappensbetweenRentGearedtoIncome

(RGI)housingandsocialassistance.RGIhousingprovidesseparaterentscales

forindividualsonsocialassistance,andtheamountpeoplepaydependson

theirfamilysizeandwhethertheyarereceivingOntarioWorksorODSP.

Thesescalesalsosetathresholdforearnings.Abovethethreshold,an

individualwillswitchfrompayingtheamountsetintherentscaletopaying

30percentofearnedincome.Theproblemwiththisinteractionarisesfrom

thecalculation

of

an

individuals

earned

income.

RGI

calculates

earned

incomebasedonactualearnings,nottakingintoaccountthe50percent

earningsexemptionthatsocialassistanceapplies.Asaresult,peopleon

socialassistanceenduppayingdisproportionatelymorefortheirhousingas

theybegintoearnemploymentincome.Toimprovethesituationfortenants

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receivingsocialassistance,achangetotheRGIhousingmethodofcalculation

wouldberequired,determinedthroughdiscussionsbetweentheProvince

andmunicipalities.

DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS

Aretheremajorandproblematicprograminteractionsthatwehavenotmentionedhere?

WhatpositionshouldtheCommissionrecommendthatOntarioconsidertakingonspecificintergovernmentalissues,includingFirst

Nationsissues,relatedtoincomesecurity?

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communityeconomicdevelopmentandreplacingitwithcomplacencyand

reinforcedsocialbarriers.Theyexpressedastrongdesiretoreformsocial

assistanceasameanstoelevateindividualsoutofdependenceandthereby

build

healthier,

self

sustaining

communities.

AnumberofFirstNationsleadersandadministratorsspoketousaboutthe

needtodevelopanewrelationshipforworkingwiththeprovincialand

federalgovernments.Theyalsospokeofthedesiretoregaincontrolover

theirfuturesthroughincreasedcontroloversocialservices.ONWAAspoketo

usaboutfourprinciples,previouslyadoptedatanAllOntarioChiefs

Conference,withrespecttoFirstNationssocialassistancereform:14

Socialse

Discussion Paper 2 Approaches for Reform FINAL3

Documents

Transcript of Discussion Paper 2 Approaches for Reform FINAL3