Discription of A German Raid

8/8/2019 Discription of A German Raid

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James V. Mckndr~lv,~ .

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iirmy Schools,

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*+ .Training. :jecti_o-n,

:r ( in com$?:an&eR with pa ragr o+~‘~h16, S ,‘O; 148, a ..

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PREl?ARATIOMS. The Germans began >rel3arations or M+ .th e -ra id severa l weeks per’ha LJ s th ree months, before it

.i took'place.* Its purybs3 seems to have been to determine , ~ .. I,

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*definitely hen and where American troo:>s ad gone into. . the line. The ~)artici.~antsere carefully selected & :- +*:

attack troqs, four-fiftlis olunteers. Their numbers. . :.*..,c .

were between 210 and 250 men, with five officers. The I -..l'%'

Germans preyared modol trenches like those to be raided i .. 4 . ;.

‘. and,'carefully nd repeatedly rehearsed the operation...' .; *IJ~:'wasostponed from time to time until German observe>s a 7 .I

‘. .’:. , 4.’? ~~,~ad~~twicee>orted the appearance of Americans on heights

'.back of the French lines. (These are said to have been. 4* mounted parties- f Ar.%illery en). German patrols made

"'themselves entirely familiar with the ground to be trat-4

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, ersed. The' night of-the ra id, th e hostile patrols workedI!,

.- ,I.cl_.o$eo the American wire on both sides of the Artois

’ t .“. .‘. ’ . ‘*salient without disturbance from the garrison beyond av

‘*.littlep+ineffective ire from our advanced ?ostS. These l . ”: 1.

“‘; 1, i ,’ iat’rols placed sections of I,i;Je,illed with explosive,,*.'..

a:‘pn.der .the north east an d south wire, appa rent ly to be: . . .#,t? fired ia’ter #durin g th e bomI@rdment . One of th ese Fa iling’J ti

_ _’ l’ : ;‘.: to’. ‘qs$lode, th ey cut thr ough th e wire by ha nd. Tap e vias . l’<>.‘..-.:~*L;‘

laLd..,to- guide th e ma in body. Telephone conn ection was . . ,,. ‘$ * ‘*

. d_ ‘ . %” _,.I*. - “%?&_nt ain ed .with It he Germa n line. When all was ready,

; - .:.:’ :&ge ,:&jqery .l;Tas telephoned to comm ence firin g._& *

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f.. .f. “I**t-r, ._ ‘C /j .i_ _ :t * .: ~ (@&&GE; i barrage wa$ :,ut down not only on th e

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,A: ,,& “kr tozs’,,, sa lt&t , which &a s to be ro..ided, but also on th e,...-:_, r$ , adjac,ent e.enter s of re$ist an ce, Bore an d Yser. A German ”. . a _._.

: 2 l;. *‘.A, ‘i. -d,$s:ert%r’rej?orts I.6 batt eries engaged.. On the Artois & l ..".$)*,'*,+psakient',he-,bambardment as as .follows: .very acqprate‘&: .;a\..r S’. .) , c.,Kand dstruqtiye fire of 100's and 155’s using high ex$o- ,

d.,'.S, ,I..“;.f;;,.f'..;;~~~';.~Ls~$~Y@son1:'.,theorth trench. Boyau Nerd - sketch herewith)

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‘; :.,:,’ by one of his sergeants. The reconnaissance does not*.ei’. ^ appear to have been a very thorough one.

Itijor urnett, commanding the American battalion,was not to take over the command of the sector occuRi& by his~~~:..:..t,ro'opsntil 6 A.M. of the 5th instant. Meantime, he remained$;:as an observer with the French major commandinI%'~_he Prench Left a lieutenant as adviser with 11?

the sector.eutenant

fort who commanded Company P.Corn..

LIAISON. Company 5, 16th Infantry, left this sector aUeutenant Patterson, who had been with

remained to give Comqany F the benefit of his know-he local terrain,

runners, rockets, and pigeons.Communication was by telephone,

All communications, exceptwere in charge of Prench detachments.

the walls of the trenches.

The telephone

The Prenchts for the service'of machine, uns in PO-

Nord east of B.C.Co. P.C. to flank the section of BoyauThe Est trench was to be flanked by French

machine guns at Yser. .

. /L%U?mR. The night of November 2-3 was dark, notwith-

standing the moon, because of the heavy fog and rain.

IXCIBBNTB OB NIGBT. Near midnight, the extreme easternpost, No. 1, heard some one in the wire and fired in thatdirection. No. 4 and other gosts to the west thereof alsodetected noises in the wire and fired. The second platoon2:;;:;: Ericksen) sent u:! ighting rockets but these revealed:-

The German bombardment came down abou.t'2*50 .M.The lisiening Tests generally maintained their qosi&ons;the remainder of the men, under the orders of their Rlatoontleaders, ook refuge in dugouts,- and sentries therefor mere

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As soon as the bombardment started, Lieutenant

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McLaughlin, in command of the Zpirst latoon, visited his,:;‘-i,.

:)osts long Boyau Nord and the Posts at Pl, P2, and Pa. Re-:.>’turning through Boyau Nord, he attempted to turn into Est

: trench but was blown 2as-t ts entrance by the e,qlosion of.,I: a shell'behind him.

‘,By this time the bombardment was at its

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height; Boyau Nord was rapidly being knocked to Sieces under'i:,I ,.._]:y,:. i the accurate and destructive fire of the German 105's andi-; l6O's and movement therein had become almost imL>ossible. AtI!.,>g,( s i,: _,.:Bc:'the same time, the German '7~~s ere kee?,lings-t rench under;,I ,:, About threes j,..,

aheav~~ rain of shrapnel and shell fragments.&$:: ; o~,clocL he barrage lifted from Est trench, apparently to$'?:[1he westward of Reffin trench, but continued to play on Nord$‘$-%*>and ud Boyaus weat of Raffin trench and as far back as the;1,~~i~__,'.-bal;talionost of Co-mmand,:,!“C JX.eutena.ntcLaughlin was in a_G.. .&gout of Boyau Nord between Est and Raffin trenches with some\ "i_.i .i_.:::. six or seven men,:, I:; ; aoore

one of who-m as -.,osteds a sentry at theAs the barrage lifted, two or three men apTeared close

-at hand moving west in Bopu Nerd..for Americans,

The sentqr, taking them

‘, was 2istoleii t close quarters and killed.

Lieutenant XcLoughlin, followed by his men, rushed u;7 heefcairs but was struck on the helmet by a fragment of shallor grenade and knocked unconscious back down the stops. Inthe narrow trencZ,i,he Germans passed a second 2artg of &.mer-icans v&o fail& to recognize them as enemies until the Germansfired at the:1 rom behind. These Germans, assisted by otherson the ground above, for a few minutes fought this Americandetachment and those from the dugouts near Raffin trench with



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;?istol nd banCl gmxtade. li"iaallgisZg?earing to he south.After a ferr ixutes T4ieutensnt 3LOU~hlin recovered COilSCiOUS-ness, cailleut of his dugout and, moviilg ast on Boyau Mord,found,that the 130st t Pg had taken Shelter from the bombard-ineZlt ; and that 3?2 nd 21 had been engaged with and had drivenoff a i)arty f Gemans moving above ground around,these :>!oStS.In Est trenc;l nd on the ground between it and Raff'n Zrench,Lieutenant XcLoughlin found. r-roead Americans.iothernise As eix:>ty.

$TW'trench

six men aVag frOE1 t,The Germaws had driven one;grou;3 f

ai16 lizcil captured the lxelve re'maining.The main body of the Germans had evidently passed along'theparapet of the trench while a small 2,arty leaned u:, hedugouts belon. .B

All telephone connection iTas ost immediately after thehostile bombardment started. Communication by runner alongBoyaus Nord and Sud became very difficult not only because,of the heavy shell fire thereon but also because of the phgsi-cal difficulty of travel over the battered areas. Runners

nevertheless did i,lakeheir way, but slowly.

DRX'RNSI- B_";R,iGR, Fe2ri.n~on the o;lening f the bombardmen?,

a raid, Lieutenant Comfort,tried to get the French

operators to tele;,,hone request to the French artillery forhelp, but YES persuaded against this action by the Trenchlieutenant on duty at the company Post of Command. Lieutenant-Patterson, a short time later, tried to send up a rocket Sig-nal for barrage but was dissuaded from so doing by the Frenchlieutenant. Lieutenant Ericksen, commanding the secondplatoon,. ade the rocket signal for barrage about fifteenminutes after.the bombLr3r-iien-tegan and repeated this callten minutes later. The Prench artillery saw the signal butdid ilOt es-Jond. Major Burnett early suggested to the Prenchmajor that he call for barrage but the Prench officer did not

believe a raid nas coming and declined to call. The Frenchmajor began to telephone for a barrzse about ,the time theGermms-vere &ifting their OWA. By that time, the wireswere broken. A 1i.gh-tefensive bar&-age as finally obtainedabout 5:45 li. .

CONDUCT OP OZ'IC?3RS. Lieutenant Comfort, commandingthe company, Lieutenant 1&!LOUghliil,st Dlatoon, LieutenantEricksen, 2nC Platooil, and Lieutenant Patterson, the liaison,officer from Company B, were all out in the Boyau Nord duringthe height of the bombardment endeavoring to retain commandand control of their nidely scattered grou-,\s. LieutenantComfort visited Est trench after the bombardment began and‘before the Germans came in; Major Burilett ent u;) o Com~2anyF as soon as the firing ceased. :'lorkingver badly batteredtrenches and in the dark, rain and mud, greet difficulty was.

e-xperienced n checking u? the many small groups and in deter-mining r;hat ad occurred. .NoC ntil daylight was it evidentthat the Germans had raided and cleaned up Est trench.

(The foregoing statements are based Upton he visit ofthe investigating officers November -7 o the scene of theraid, examination of the terrain, questioning on the s2ot ofmany of the ;)artici;)ants;onversations I-:ithhe French in-

vestigcting officer from Headq,uarters th A%iy, with theChief of Intelligence, 9th B.C., Commander 18th Division,Kaj 2 Idwshall, Lieu-b. $cLoughlin, ieut. Hugo, Brench majorwho commanded sector; consider&tion 0-i"e;lorts f GeneralBordeaux, General Sibert, Colonel Ely, Kajar Marshall, Lieu-t.Comfort, Lieut. Ericksen, Lieut. PIcLoughlin; ritten statements

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a-d_ German prisoner).

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: .(a) mli a rdia, eIe.bo33tel;~reyared, made by 2icked

>,troops and sup>or";ed ;T eavy zad. ccurately placed artillery

~;...~,” .^fire, nil1 almost certalnlg- ucceeo in obtaizning~~o~n~,risoners.

... -,= (b) In general., h e beLa-r?iorf the American officers

,.and men was very goodG Considering all the ciiwunStznces,Licuts. Comfort, LIcLoughlin, rickocn, and Patterson, under .the most difficult conU.tions, ais~lagea great courage and .

- an earnest desire to ,:o hsi:: ull duty.

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(4 The preliminary re~onnaissahce of the position tobe oecu-piea :: onFany P we,s ot made in sufficient detail, .

nor were enough men in the first line platoon made. amilial;during daylight rrith he post they were to oocupy and aefend.

(a) To avoid hostile observation, the relief wEds adeat night. It F~ould ave Seen better for the relievingcompany to cross the e:-,iosedround so as to arrive in thetrenohes at daybreak and so give the z'on he whole day tobecome.fami1i.w with their surroundings and rehearse theiraction in case of a night attack. In any c3se, non-com-

missioned officers should have 'been ent during the afternoonto t&e over all trench equipment*

(4 As will usually be the case, the division ofauthority in the battalion sector bekeen French and Americanofficers led to confli.Gting deas and indecisive action. wit-

ness the delay in cs.llLn,for a defensive barrage.

(f) Tele;lhone witchboards and o],erators ere Prench, .

.speaking language not understood by most of the Americanofficers using this means of communication. Nisunderstandings

anil onfusion necesszrilg resulted. (This aiffictulty, f5. course, is sim$y incident to the conditions under i?hich he:_I

battalion ws getting its training, and must be borne).

;.i. .id'* (g) IV0 atrols rrcre ent to the front. The ground

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between the o>~osing trezxhes WLS distinctly German ground.Our troo;,s'must ake no mnTa land distinctly American land.

I'i, ‘: The ions $resence of Germans about our wire and deliberate/I.(i .:, 'Jre2arztions or the rzid would hardly have been possible if,':,.: 8’ the.American troo:js ad done any patrolling. And cei%ainly

when their presence became evident, strong patrols should_,.; _, ,have been sent to drive them off instead of resting content;.1 with a little firing. (The excuses offered are xot sliffi-

cient; i.e., that the 7rench have laid many tra>s in front,that the difference in language would lead to the French

:. firing into 0u.F atrols, and that the e:$erience of 3reviouS *

j. battalions shows our patrols are likely to suffer from ourown fire). The battclion is npw under orders from higherauthority to send out strong patrols, each of an officer and25 men. These patrols are too large to be easily concealedand they offer 8 great mark for any hostile party to ambush.

. .- (h) Extreme 8ispersion of units made 00mmand ma oo-ordinate action at night an impossibility. The Artois

,salient, n reality, is entirei; too large for a stubborndefense by one som2cnyc The deployment for the daytimeinto widely se>ara.ted.roqs minimizes losses under artilleryfire and still permits a strong flanking and direct fire to \

be brought over the open ground in front. It is, tkerefore,

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well adapted for the daytime defense of this extensive position.But at night the main portions of the garrison should eachbe concentrated. To disperse at night into these widely

separated, small groups is simply to invite capture in de-

tail by any moderately strong ra.iding party. Likenise,to remain below ground in dugouts or even in the trenchesupon the aBgroach of the hostile party renders each groupalmost helpless before an enemy who keeps the bulk of hismen above ground. An attack at night above ground oanbest be met with the dofenders above ground. Each platoon

should, therefore, have been ooncentrated in the center ofits section. Small parties, each of some three men only,should have covered the front and flanks, and these shouldhave given warning by flare as J-Jell s by runner of theenemy’s approach. Xlile the German barrage was on Esttrench, the main body of the platoon must, of course, r,emaj.nin deep dugouts, but with every arrangement for prompt exit

therefrom. This means sentries at the hesd of each stair-my, at least half of the men lined up in double column offiles on the steps, prepared to rush out at the first B,and tho others alert and ready to follow. The platoon

leador should be at the head of the stairs carefully ob-serving the barrage. The instant it lifted, he shouldgive the word; his men should sprint up the stair.s and outof the fire trench to' the ground above and, in the case inquestion, bohind the trench. Once there, tho platoonwould be able to act as a whole under the command of itsofficer, 'and oould use the rifle, pistol, bayonet andgrenade upon somewhat equal terms with its enemy.. EvenFjhen so greatly outnumbered as in the present case, the

platoon assembled on top of the ground wguld have c muchbetter chance of driving off its opponent, of causing himto pay dearly for any prisoners taken, and of a succ8s~sffdretrsat if compelled thereto.

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To fwilitato rapid exit, hand ropes should be placed

on both sides of the dugout steps, the trenches ttiemselvesshould be provided with steps or.rsmps, and the whole pro-cedure drilled until everg man knows eziactly what he is to do.

It is, of course, true that the relief of the Frenchoom2any at night, followed almost immediately by the G8?XU3Z

raid, and preceded by an inade,quate preliminary reconnaissanceof the ground made these rather elaborate arrangements im-practicable. But such elaborate arrangements must be madeif raids of the sort in question are to be defeated.

(i) The Security detachments in front, Bl, P2, B3,were unnecessarily strong as they were required only togive warning. Two posts located at Pl and 23 would havebeen sufficient in this case and the strength of each COuLdwell have been reduced to th?88 men. The men so gXin8d

should have been added to the platoon's main body, whichshould do the fighting.

(j1 The German aTtiller appears to have registeredon the Artois trenches some days prcely. The support-

ing artillery observers should have noted what the Germanswere doing and warned the ix%ntry of what to expect.

(k) Artillery aSt3igned he -duty of defensive barrage .

must haV8 no discretion as to opening fire. When called

for by the infantry, the barrage must be put'down imm8di&t8ly.

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'The responsibilL-ty'for n unnecessary barrage must rest withthe infantry.

(1) On the morning of November 7, groups of severalmen each were found in position near the stations of the

machine guns and automatic rifles.A total of four or

five observation stations for the whole Artois salientwould have been'sufficient to give warning of any hostilemovement. The men so gained should have been added tothose engaged in cleaning, repairing, and draining thebattered trenches. The breaches in the wire needed fuither

repairs. A number of unused trenches should have beenwired and entangled so as to forbid their use to the enemy.AImnunition, ocket, and sandbag dumps required cleaning and

an orderly arrangement of contents. Details from the re-

serve company should have been brought up to assist in thiswork of repair. Dugouts shoulh be drained, cleaned, lightedand made as comfortable as yossible. While the emerienced

soldier endures necessary discomfort un~ompla3nIngly, heman5fesl-s is experience by ma-g himself comfortableunder circumstances that discourage the Berienoed.Under grea,t iscomfort, the morale of troops will alwaysbe better for a reasonable amount of labor in making arrange-ments which tena to lessen their discomfort and to producean air of order and discipline. Psychologioally also,soldiers are much more likely to hold strongly defenceswhich they have norkea hard to place in order and whtihthey therefore unconsciousl,y ome to regard as their own,than those in which this personal interost is lacking.

cm) Beio:e this raid the sector had heen_ ery quietfor a long period. Everyone concerned had fallen into asense of false security and the disbelief that the Germanshad any intention.of strenuous action. This tendency to

become careless [email protected] sectors in the measures for de-fense must be continually combatted.

Cd There was a lack of intelligence or disciplineon the Bar-t f some artillerv observers. who themselvesxffere?l none of thebut who precipitate5a little, might have

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evil consequenoes of their e~osure,a raid on the trenches that, postponedbeen better met.

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Discription of A German Raid

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