The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 9 | Issue 40 | Number 1 | Article ID 3611 | Oct 03, 2011

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Discordant Visitors: Japanese and Okinawan Messages to theUS　　諧調に乱れあり−−米国へ日本政府と沖縄の伝えるもの

Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Gavan McCormack

Discordant Visitors: Japanese andOkinawan Messages to the US

Gavan McCormack and Norimatsu Satoko

Governments come and go in Japan, NodaYoshihiko’s the most recent, being the thirdsince the general elections of 30 August 2009brought the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) topower, following those of Hatoyama Yukio andKan Naoto. In the weeks following hisassumption of office, Noda has stated his corevision for the office on many occasions,including his inaugural Diet speech as PrimeMinister on 13 September. He promises toconfirm, deepen, and strengthen the alliancewith the US, “the axis of Japan foreign policyand security.”That means, above all else, hewill construct the base for the Marine Corps innorthern Okinawa designed to substitute forthe Futenma base that squats dangerously inthe middle of the township of Ginowan.

The fact is, however, that for the past 15 yearsa series of Prime Ministers – seven of the LDPand three of the DPJ1 – have tried withoutsuccess to accomplish this. Inter-governmentalagreements on the “Futenma ReplacementFacility” have been made, postponed, revised,and postponed again (1996, 2006, 2009, 2010,and 2011), mostly because of the constantopposition in Okinawa, and Noda is no morelikely than his predecessors to resolve theissue. The Okinawan opposition has grownsteadily more determined over those fifteenyears, especially the last two, since the DPJtook power promising to transfer Futenma baseoutside of Okinawa and then reneged on itspromise. So Noda takes office pledging to do

the impossible, and therefore is almostguaranteed to join the conga line of PrimeMinisters jigging offstage after the others inthe near future.

Prime Minster Noda Yoshihiko at theinaugural speech on September 13

On 21 September, meeting President Obama atthe UN headquarters in New York for the firsttime, Noda assured the President that“We will

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strive to achieve cooperation in line with theagreement between Japan and the UnitedStates, and I will do my best to gain theunderstanding of the Okinawa people.”2

First reports (from AP and Kyodo)3 of themeeting said it lasted 45 minutes, but that wassoon revised downwards to“about 35minutes”(which, allowing for interpreting,meant at most twenty minutes). There canscarcely have been time for detailed discussionof anything but the agenda ranged far andwide, from the two parties “hailing” theiralliance, Noda declaring it “even moreunwavering” than it had been and Obamapromising that “much, if not most of the historyof the 21st century will be written in Asia, andthe United States wants to be a full part of thathistory going forward.”4 They then movedbriskly through the Japanese tsunamicatastrophe of March, the ongoing nuclearcrisis that it precipitated, Japan’s gratitude forAmerican aid, the global economy (whichworried both), North Korea (with Japan, asalways at high-level meetings, seekingAmerican help in solving the problem ofabductions of Japanese citizens by North Koreathree or four decades ago), the free trade TransPacific Community project (Noda’s governmentwas thinking about it), restrictions on US beefimports (it was thinking about that too), to theHague Convention on the Civil Aspects ofInternational Child Abduction (this seems tohave consumed much of the attention of themeeting and on this too, Noda’s governmentwas thinking, although it was known to beunenthusiastic). Obama also thanked Noda forJapan’s $5 billion contribution towardsAfghanistan reconstruction programs and Nodapromised that he would achieve “stablegovernment,” which, given his extremelyfragile position, seemed highly unlikely.

Though all these matters were on the agenda,Japanese reports concentrated almostexclusively on the single item of Futenma andthe oft-repeated Japanese pledge for

construction of a new base at Henoko toreplace it. In the first account of the meeting bya participant, the Department of State’s KurtCampbell, Assistant Secretary of State for EastAsian and Pacific Affairs, said that

“Both s ides understand that we areapproaching a period where we need to seeresults, and that was made very clear by thePresident."5

Japan-US Bilateral Meeting (photo from thewebsite of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Campbell quoted no direct words from thepresident, and he is well known as a coremember of the Washington “Japan handlers”who have long insisted on and demanded thatJapan proceed with the base construction, so itwas not surprising that he would choose toemphasize this point. In the first reports of thetalks published in Japan (in Yomiuri shimbun),these words, which Campbell had given noindication were the President’s, were placedwithin quote marks as the direct speech of thePresident.6 The Japanese media immediatelyhighlighted the words “need to see results,”making it sound as though Obama had issuedsomething close to an ultimatum.

In later reports, the Yomiuri attributed itssource for the “Obama” remark to unnamedJapanese government sources.7 The Japanesemedia soon built a picture of the meetingreplete with insights into its mood and thePresident’s mind. There was (according to theAsahi, quoting “a Japanese governmentofficial”) an “unexpectedly tense atmosphere,”

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/1109_sk.html

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in which Obama “pressed for action,”8 andaccording to the Japan Times (quoting“sources”) Obama was “impatient andirritated” and Noda was under pressure.9 JijiNews Agency offered the most dramaticaccount:

“The President cut into the discussion as if notto waste a second, saying, ‘The time to produceresults is approaching.’ According to sourcesaccompanying the Prime Minister, without evenwaiting for the other participants includingSecretary of State Clinton to introducethemselves, the President turned upon thePrime Minister to demand of him in firm tonesprogress on the Futenma problem.”10

Oddly, however, the Japanese Government’sreport on the meeting gave neither direct norindirect reference to any view the Presidentmight have expressed on this matter,11 andwhen Noda himself was questioned about it ata press conference in New York, he shook hishead at the suggestion that Obama had pressedhim for action on the Futenma replacement orsaid “the time has come for action.” As Nodaput i t , he himself had explained that“determined to reduce the base burden onOkinawa, he would sincerely explain thesituation and seek Okinawa’s cooperation,” towhich Obama responded that he would “lookforward to developments.”12 He could hardlyhave said anything else. Noda, in other words,simply assured the President, as he hadassured the Diet and the people of Japan, thathe intended to push ahead with the baseconstruction. If the President had really made astatement about “approaching a period wherewe need to see results,” it would be remarkablefor the Foreign Ministry’s report to include nomention of it. Asked by an opposition memberat the Lower House budget committee meetingon 26 September about Obama’s reported useof the words “need to see results,” Nodareplied, “I take this to be the private view ofthe individual who conducted the briefing [ie.,Campbell] , not to be coming from the

President.” 1 3 .

I t is a lso c lear that Japan’s nat ionalbureaucracy and mainstream national mediasupport the position to move ahead with thebase construction plan in Okinawa. They havelong done so. On the eve of the New Yorkmeeting, the Asahi declared that Noda neededto “start by trying to win the trust of people inOkinawa.” 14 The Yomiuri summed up after thetalks, saying, “the government must accelerateits negotiations with the Okinawa prefecturalgovernment to advance the relocationplan.”15 As both papers well knew, however, thepeople of Okinawa have insisted in everydemocratic forum possible that they would notaccept any new base. The only way to “win thetrust” of Okinawans, therefore, would be to tellthem that it was revoking all agreements onnew base construction and that it was askingWashington to quickly and unconditionallyclose and remove its Futenma base. But such aview was scarcely to be heard in Tokyo orWashington.

MCAS Futenma (photo from the MainichiDaily News)

The unidentified “sources” that insisted Obamahad been irritated and had demanded earlysteps to resolve the stalemate must bepresumed to be the very same Japaneseofficials who during the time of Prime Minister

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110920p2g00m0dm004000c.htmlhttp://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110920p2g00m0dm004000c.html

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Hatoyama (2009-2010) did all they could tosabotage their Prime Minister and promote theHenoko project, while urging Washington notto show any weakness in negotiating withhim.16 For them to have isolated the sentencefrom the Obama-Noda meeting in which Obamasaid whatever he said in response to Noda’spledge - ignoring other matters that seem tohave drawn greater attention such as theHague Convention - and to thus turn themeeting into one for the delivery of an Obamaultimatum to Noda was therefore hardlysurprising.

The Noda-Obama meeting was all the morebizarre for following by two days a lecturegiven at George Washington University inWashington D.C., by Okinawan GovernorNakaima Hirokazu that flatly contradicted thePrime Minister.17 Nakaima declared thatopposition in Okinawa to the Okinawan baseproject was almost total. He spoke of theunanimous declaration within the prefecturalparliament (the Prefectural Assembly), and theexplicit opposition of all 41 local governmentmayors and heads, including the mayor of thecity of Nago, the designated site for the newbase. Nakaima told his Washington audiencethat the relocation plan “must be revised,”continuing that Futenma was “not anacceptable option” and that if the nationalgovernment was to choose to proceed “againstthe will of the local citizens,” it might lead to“an irreparable rift … between the people ofOkinawa and the US forces in the prefecture.”In other words, as this conservative Okinawatop official sees it, the national government’sspecific agenda for “deepening” the alliance(that Noda would express to the President twodays later) threatens to plunge it into crisis.

Okinawa Governor Nakaima Hirokazu,giving a speech at George WashingtonUniversity

These two meetings – Nakaima in Washingtonon 19th and Noda in New York on 21 s t

September – delivered to the US totallydifferent and contradictory messages. Both sawin utterly different light the projectedconstruction of a base for the Marine Corps inNago. Nakaima’s speech exposed theemptiness of the Noda-Obama meeting and theabsurdity of the continued statements by liberaland conservative mainland opinion leaders andmedia alike that more effort and more sinceritycould somehow solve the problem. The beliefthat the near universal Okinawan hostilitycould be reversed by more “sincerity” onNoda’s part was an insult to Okinawans.

By his repeated insistence that the projectwould go ahead, Noda implied that i fpersuasion (which meant bribery) did not work,

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then force would have to be invoked. Obviouslycontemplating this prospect, GovernorNakaima told a Washington press conferencethat the only way that base construction couldgo ahead would be by recourse to “bayonetsand bulldozers,” i.e. in the way that the baseswere first built under US military governmentin the 1950s.18 Instead, he insisted, “The twogovernments should stop doing deals andreturn the bases promptly.”19

In other words, Okinawa’s most senior officialbelieved that base construction would call forrolling the tanks through Nago. The “alliance”supposedly in the name of democracy, would becalled upon to justify its crushing. Nakaima’saddress exposed to the Washington audiencethe depth of the confrontation between thenation state and the prefecture of Okinawa. Forthat, there is no precedent in Japan’s modernhistory, and it deepens year by year.

What is clear from the exchanges surroundingthe Noda visit is that Japan’s top bureaucratsand Washington’s “Japan handlers” aredetermined to press ahead with the Henokobase construction. They will brook no dissent,whether by a Japanese Prime Minister (such asHatoyama, 2009-2010) or by Okinawa peopleand institutions. Fifteen years ago, LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP) Prime MinisterHashimoto Ryutaro decided that the projectcould not be carried forward by force. Nogovernment since then has dared to suggestotherwise, with the result that governmentafter government has sought to softenOkinawan resistance by combining carrots andsticks, but utterly failed to change it. Instead,the opposition has become more determinedand more united.

Obama must feel some Okinawa-relatedirritation over the fact that Congress in Junedelivered him its own ultimatum, slashing $150million off the Pentagon’s estimates and sayingit would not authorize further payments for theGuam base transfer (designed to accommodate

some of the relocated Marines from Okinawa)unless the Pentagon could provide a thoroughjustification. Senior figures of both majorparties in the Congress are increasinglydubious about the long frozen relocation plans,most famously declaring them “unrealistic,unworkable, and unaffordable.”20

The all-party, all-Okinawa rally against theplan to built a “Futenma Relocation

Facility” in Henoko, on April 25, 2010

The US-Japan “alliance,” forever being“deepened,” thus actually grows shallower andemptier. Rarely has there been a leaders’meeting more devoid of substance than this onebetween Noda and Obama, with its pious andflatulent phrases about the United States beingpart of the history being written in Asia, “goingforward.” Tellingly, the one positive Japaneseact that Obama referred to was one nearly twoyears old – the contribution announced inNovember 2009 of $5 billion over five years toAfghan reconstruction. Of course Japan paysmuch greater sums than that to support thePentagon, the dollar and US policy generally,including more than double that in directsubsidy towards expenses of the US militarybases in Japan (the so-called “sympathypayments”) on a per-year basis,21 but Obama’sadvisers must have decided that it might be tooembarrassing to offer public thanks for that.

The two Okinawan papers presented a view ofthese events so different from that of thenational media as to suggest they were from acompletely different world. The Okinawa Timesspoke of Noda delivering Obama a “bad check,”since he had no concrete policy and noprospect of resolving the problem.22 As Ryukyushimpo put it, “the Henoko transfer plan not

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only completely fails to gain the support of theOkinawan people, but it has lost the support ofCongress too. Do not those politicians andbureaucrats who make up the Ampo [SecurityTreaty] mafia, and who see themselves asrealists, realize that they have become‘unrealists?’”23

Although Noda as DPJ Prime Minister fromSeptember 2011 expresses a resolve to breakthe stalemate, he cannot believe that there isany room left for “persuasion.” He can, andalmost certainly will, try to put together anattractive financial package to try to find anappropriate price at which Okinawa will beready to sell its soul – but ultimately he and hisadv isors can on ly be assumed to becontemplating the use of force. Tellingly, hisMinister of Foreign Affairs, Genba Koichiro,declared that in order to honour the agreementwith the US on base relocation and “reduce theburden on the Okinawan people,” he would“continue to engage with the people ofOkinawa in all sincerity, even if stomped uponand kicked.” Genba in other words portrayshimself and his government as victims ofOkinawan “stomping and kicking,” a bizarrereversal of roles in the relationship that hintedat the same readiness to resort to forcebecause it could be seen as retaliatory. Hiscomment passed with little note in mainlandJapan but outraged Okinawans.24

The Noda government in its early weeksrepeatedly declared that it would deliver on themany promises former governments had madeto Washington about Okinawa. Both Noda andGenba, repeating the mantra about lesseningthe base burden, insisted on increasing it,requiring Okinawa to continue bearing itshugely disproportionate base burden for thesake of the all iance in the form of theconstruction of a new base at Henoko. Tokyowill prevail, they keep repeating, but thecitizens of Okinawa have for fifteen years ofmass, non-violent resistance defied all theTokyo promises, threats and bribes designed to

crush or neutralize them. No amount of“sincerity” on the part of Noda and hisMinisters seemed likely to overcome thatdetermination, and violence would threaten thevery fabric of Japan’s security in whose name itwould be taken.

The US-Japan “Alliance” runs aground on thereef of Okinawan resistance. By making thepromises he has made, supposedly in order to“deepen” the “alliance,” Noda heads towardsexposing it to its greatest crisis.

Gavan McCormack and Norimatsu Satoko areco-ordinators of The Asia-Pacific Journal. GavanMcCormack is an emeritus professor atAustralian National University and NorimatsuSatoko is director of the Peace PhilosophyCentre in Vancouver, B.C. They are currentlyengaged in writing a book on the Okinawaproblem.

Recommended citation: Gavan McCormack andNorimatsu Satoko, 'Discordant Visitors:Japanese and Okinawan Messages to theUS,' The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 40 No1, October 3, 2011.

Notes

1 Takeshita, Obuchi, Mori, Koizumi, Abe,Fukuda, and Aso of the LDP, and Hatoyama andKan of the DPJ.

2 “Obama hosts Noda, ‘advises action on base’,”Japan Times, 23 September 2011.

3 AP, Kyodo, Futenma broached at first summit,Obama hosts Noda, advises action on base,”Japan Times, 23 September 2011.

4 US Department of State, “US Foreign Policyin the Asia-Pacific Region,”21 September 2011,link.

http://fpc.state.gov/172931.htm

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5 US Department of State, “US Foreign Policyin the Asia-Pacific Region,”21 September 2011,link.

6 “Shusho ‘Futenma isetsu ni zenryoku,’ Beidaitoryo ‘shinten kitai,’” Yomiuri shimbun, 22September 2011.

7 Takeshi Endo, “Noda-Obama hold 1st talks,“23 September 2011.

8 “Rough start: Obama pressed Noda at firstmeeting,” Asahi shimbun, 23 September 2011.

9 “Unrealistic promise on Futenma,” JapanTimes, 24 September 2011.

10 “Noda shusho Futenma shinten e kadaiseou,” Jiji News Agency, 22 September 2011.For a detailed survey of Japanese mediacoverage, see Satoko Norimatsu, “Noda Obamakaidan hodo wa okashii,” Peace PhilosophyCentre 23 September 2011, “Nichibei kaidan,Obama hatsugen to sareta mono o Noda gahitei,” Peace Philosophy, 24 September 2011,and “Noda Obama kaidan hodo wa okashiisonogo,” 27 September 2011.

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Nichibei shunokaidan (gaiyo),”22 September 2011, link.

1 2 “Futenma isetsu gigi ga fujo, kubi okashifgeru shusho,”Ryukyu shimpo, 24September 2011.

13 “Shuin yosan i de noda shsho bei daitoryo nokekka motomeru hatsugen hitei,” Ryukyushimpo, 26 September 2011.

14 "Editorial: Noda should win Okinawa’s trust

to solve Futenma,”Asahi shimbun, 19September 2011.

15 “To strengthen US alliance, Noda mustproduce results,”Yomiuri shimbun, 24September 2011.

16 See Gavan McCormack, “Deception andDiplomacy: The US, Japan, and Okinawa,”TheAsia-Pacific Journal, 23 May 2011.

17 The Nakaima speech seems to have beenprinted in full only in the Okinawan media, andcovered only briefly elsewhere. See full text inEnglish in Satoko Norimatsu, ”OkinawaGovernor Nakaima: An Irreparable Rift inOkinawa/Japan/US Relations would result fromforceful construction of Henoko base.” PeacePhilosophy Centre, 22 September 2011.

18 “Unrealistic promise on Futenma,” JapanTimes, 24 September 2011.

19 “Okinawa Governor denies a Japan-U.S. dealon US military realignment package,” Ryukyushimpo, 26 September 2011 (in English).

20 On the statement by Senators Levin, MacCainand Webb, see Gavan McCormack, “Deceptionand Diplomacy,”op.cit.

21 The Government of Japan agreed early in2010 to continue these payments at the 2009rate of Y188 billion per year for five years. Attoday’s exchange that means approximately$2.4 billion per year, $12 billion over the fiveyears.

22 “‘Bei kokubo kengen hoan’ Futenma minaoshino michi hirake.”

http://fpc.state.gov/172931.htmhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110922-OYT1T00086.htmhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110922-OYT1T00086.htmhttp://ww.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110922006466.htmhttp://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201109/2011092200947http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201109/2011092200947http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_23.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_23.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_24.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_24.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_24.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_27.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_27.htmlhttp://www.mofa.go.jpmofaj/area/usa/visit/1109_sk.htmlhttp://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-182108-storytopic-53.htmlhttp://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-182108-storytopic-53.htmlhttp://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2011/09/okinawa-governor-nakaima-irreparable.htmlhttp://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-09-25_23882/http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-09-25_23882/

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23 “Nichibei shuno kaidan, min-i hitei shiteminshushugi ka,”editorial, Ryukyu shimpo, 23September 2011.

24 See, for example, “Genba gaisho hatsugen,fumitsukete iru no wa dare ka,” Ryukyushimpo, 7 September 2011.