Disarmament and International Securityaiskharvardmun.wikispaces.com/file/view/DISEC.pdf ·...

1 Specialized Agencies

Disarmament and International Security

General assembly

History of the ProblemCurrent SituationPast ActionsProposed SolutionsQuestions a Resoultion Must AnswerBloc Positions

71017171919

Topic Area A:

Cyberwarfare

Topic Area B:

History of the ProblemCurrent SituationPast ActionsProposed SolutionsQuestions a Resoultion Must AnswerBloc Positions

232832

333434

Bioterrorism

Introduction 5History of the Committee 5Topic Area A 6Topic Area B 21Position Paper Requirements 36Closing Remarks 36Bibliography 43

TABLE OF CONTENTS


2 Specialized Agencies2 General Assembly

Dear Delegates,

I could not be more honored to welcome you to the fifty-ninth session of Harvard Model United Nations. Our entire staff of 205 Harvard undergraduates is eager to join with you this January at the Sheraton Boston for an exciting weekend of debate, diplomacy, and cultural exchange. You and your 3,000 fellow delegates join a long legacy of individuals passionate about international affairs and about the pressing issues confronting our World.

Founded in 1927 as Harvard Model League of Nations, our organization has evolved into one of America’s oldest, largest, and most international United Nations simulations. Drawing from this rich history, Harvard Model United Nations has strived to emphasize and promote the unique impact of the UN and its mandates in the eradication of humanity’s greatest problems. Despite its difficulties and often-unfortunate image in the press, the United Nations is truly a global body with representation of 193-member states and is the closest the World has ever achieved to a “Parliament of Man.”

At HMUN, we strive to recreate this body and the international environment it fosters through our emphasis on welcoming more and more international delegations to our conference each year. For the fifty-ninth session, HMUN is proud to welcome delegations from over 35 countries to share their experiences with others from across the World. Not only can you debate global issues in committee, but also discuss the China-US relations with a delegate hailing from Shanghai or EU economic policy with a delegate from Germany. I encourage you to go above and beyond research and discussions within your committee to learn from your fellow delegates.

In this guide, you are about to embark on a valuable intellectual endeavor. Your committee director has worked tirelessly to research and compile this extensive background guide. Please use it as a foundation in your own research for committee and to contribute to your debates and final resolutions. I wish you the best of luck in your preparation and in committee this January.

Sincerely,

Hunter M. RichardSecretary-GeneralHarvard Model United Nations 2012

[email protected]

Hunter M. RichardSecretary-General

Stephanie N. OviedoDirector-General

Ana ChoiUnDer-Secretary-General

aDminiStration

Ainsley FauxUnDer-Secretary-General

BUSineSS

Alexandra M. Harsackycomptroller

Sofia HouUnDer-Secretary-General innovation anD technoloGy

Juliana CherstonUnDer-Secretary-General

General aSSemBly

S. Ethan LyleUnDer-Secretary-General

economic anD Social coUncil

Charlene S. WongUnDer-Secretary-General

SpecializeD aGencieS

59 SheparD Street, Box 205Cambridge, MA 02138Voice: (617)-398-0772Fax: (617) 588-0285

Email: [email protected]

harvarD moDel UniteD nationS 2012

A Letter from the SecretAry-GenerAL

3General Assembly


Dear Delegates,

It is an honor and a privilege to welcome you to the fifty-eighth session of the Harvard Model United Nations General Assembly! The General Assembly has occupied a unique place in history since its founding, as the only forum in which all nations in the world can come together and receive equal representation. It serves as an opportunity for nations to discuss questions and crises of the utmost international importance on equal footing. The topics that the General Assembly debates reflect the full breadth of issues of concern across the globe, ranging from political and social unrest to humanitarian injustice.

HMUN’s simulation of the General Assembly will be a memorable and hopefully educational experience for you, in which you will practice firsthand the foundation of international diplomacy and debate, and hone skills that will be vital for years to come, such as the ability to compromise, negotiate, and effectively present your ideas. You will develop creative and innovative solutions to large scale problems in conjunction with your fellow delegates, and broaden your horizons by adopting an international perspective, exchanging ideas, and forging friendships with students from across the country and across the world.

In Jean Paul Sartre’s masterpiece Nausea, one of my favorite works of all time, it is said “I suppose it is out of laziness that the world is the same day after day. Today it seemed to want to change. And then anything, anything could happen.” Sartre speaks on more metaphysical grounds, and yet his philosophical proposals ring true: the world only stays in its current state because we let it. If you believe that absolutely anything is possible, and truly open up your mind to novel directions for humanity, I believe that you may develop a strong and forward-thinking mindset from HMUN that I hope will prove useful in whatever field you ultimately pursue, from philosophy to science to politics and business. Be the delegate who proposes novel ideas…shock your fellow delegates, catch the attention of your director, think big, and in this way HMUN will inspire your future endeavors. Do not merely reiterate words of others discovered in your research: HMUN should be treated as a thought-intensive and proactive experience.

Best of luck in your preparation, and I will see you next January.

Sincerely,

Juliana Cherston Under-Secretary-General for the General AssemblyCambridge MA, 02138

[email protected]




aDminiStration


BUSineSS




General aSSemBly







harvarD moDel UniteD nationS 2012






aDminiStration


BUSineSS




General aSSemBly







harvarD moDel UniteD nationS 2012 Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the very first session of Harvard National Model United Nations Latin America and to the First Committee of the General Assembly, DISEC.

First, I want to say that I am very excited at the prospect of directing my very own committee at our conference next year. For me, directing DISEC is returning to my roots in the world of Model UN. I still remember my first MUN experience in DISEC as a junior in high school, where I totally blanked out during my first speech and sheepishly returned to my seat without saying anything. However, I learned from that experience and I became focused on being a better delegate and a better person – more knowledgeable, more articulate and more confident in myself. Like many others, I owe so much to my participation in Model UN and I truly believe that it is through Model UN that I have become the person I am today.

At Harvard I am actively involved in all aspects of Model UN – the high school conference, the collegiate conference and the traveling team. However, like all of us, there is more (but not much more) to me than MUN. I grew in sunny Palos Verdes, a suburb of Los Angeles in California. Next year, I will be a sophomore pursuing a government concentration with a secondary in East Asian Studies and a citation in Chinese. In the summer of 2011, I will be studying at National Taiwan University to continue my recovery of the Chinese language. Other random things about me are that I know all the words to Keri Hilson’s “Pretty Girl Rock,” I am an advocate of wearing sunglasses indoors and that I am the subject of a popular meme in the Harvard traveling MUN team.

Come January, I look forward to what each one of you has to contribute to the topics of Cyber Warfare and the Bioterrorism. DISEC allows us the opportunity to discuss important and crucial topics that are not addressed in other General Assembly committees, and regardless of your initial familiarity with these topics, I believe these pressing internation al issues will ultimately prove unique and exciting to debate in session.

Whether it is the phone number of that cutie representing Nigeria, new knowledge on international security, or the experience of your high school careers, I hope that you will all gain something memorable and worthwhile during HMUN 2012. I’m really pumped and I can’t wait to meet you all! Until then, feel free to contact me with questions, comments or a simple hello - it is much appreciated.

Warm Regards,

Timothy Tsai

Director, Disarmament and International Security Committee

Harvard Model United Nations 2012

[email protected]

5General Assembly


HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE

In 1945, the General Assembly was created with the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations. Including all 193 members of the United Nations, the General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. As such it is a medium for multilateral deliberation on global issues specified by the UN Charter. In the General Assembly, each member state has a vote and a simple a majority decides each resolution. However, votes taken on designated important issues, “such as recommendations on peace and security and the election of Security Council members, require a two-thirds majority of Member States.”1

Specifically, the first committee in the General Assembly, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was established to serve as a forum to debate issues pertaining to disarmament and the maintenance of global peace and security in an environment of equality.2 This committee takes measures necessary for the prevention or the reduction of international hostilities and conflict on matters that are not already being discussed by the United Nations Security Council.

While the Disarmament and International Security Committee has the authority to initiate studies and to pass resolutions to promote international political cooperation and “the development and codification of international law,” unlike the Security Council, DISEC does not have the power to impose sanctions or to authorize armed interventions.3 As a preliminary organ, DISEC serves as the first level of discussion for issues within the scope of disarmament and international security. This allows all member states to fully develop their positions and engage in multilateral discussion.

Instead of having binding authority, DISEC’s resolutions function as recommendations to the Secretariat or the Security Council. More specifically, these recommendations are for establishing the “general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament” and for the

“peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair friendly relations among nations.”4

Since its inception in 1945, the Disarmament and International Security Committee has played a critical

INTRODUCTION

The First Committee of the General Assembly, DISEC is designated to advise on matters of international security and disarmament. Formed in 1945, DISEC has served as a forum for the international community to debate issues pertaining to creating and maintaining global security. Since its inception, DISEC has dealt with threats to international security in regions all over the world, most notably in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover negotiations in the First Committee has lead to the creation of nearly all international treaties regarding disarmament such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The topic areas before DISEC in the 59th Session of Harvard Model United Nations are Cyberwarfare and Bioterrorism. The first topic of cyberwarfare explores an emerging form of combat where computers, the Internet, and other networks are the target and vehicle of military attack. The low cost and simplicity of cyberattack makes it a compelling tactic for both state and non-state military organizations. While the full extent of a full scale, state sponsored cyberattack is largely unknown, great energy and resources are currently being invested into producing, testing, and deploying the cyberweapons of tomorrow. This purpose of this topic is to shed light on a new dimension of international security. The question of the possibility of regulating and defining cyberwar will frame the debate on this topic.

The second topic on bioterrorism looks at the ever-present threat of a biological terrorist attack against a nation state. While not as destructive as nuclear weapons, the fallout of a biological attack can have the same devastating amount of causalities. Much like cyberwar, biological weapons are relatively easy to obtain, produce, store and deploy which only increases the probability that a biological terrorist attack will occur within the next few years. This topic will be focused on developing new ideas on counterterrorist tactics that can be implemented worldwide. Looking at the scientific, political, social, and economic facets of this issue is imperative in creating a comprehensive solution that can curb and eventually prevent biological terrorism and the pursuit of biological weaponry.



role in promoting the global effort for disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction and in facilitating international peace and security. While the various studies initiated by DISEC have been invaluable to the Security Council for its continued operations, DISEC’s main contribution to preserving and creating global security is its numerous recommendations for peacekeeping missions to the UNSC. Starting in 1948, the first peacekeeping effort in Israel and the Middle-East has worked to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, and prevent isolated incidents from escalating within the region.5 Since then, the Security Council has authorized over sixty peacekeeping missions, the majority of them having first been recommended by DISEC.

Moreover, DISEC has convened numerous times to resolve issues when the Security Council has failed to exercise its primary responsibility to act to resolve crises. In these instances, the Disarmament and International Security Committee is charged with the duty to

“consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”6 Notable examples of the emergency sessions include, the 1960 session which called for the immediate intervention in the Congo and the 1980 session for the situation in Afghanistan which called for the peaceful ceasefire between the Soviet Union and the Afghani Nationalists.7

Recently, the General Assembly has approved the landmark Millennium Declaration, adopted in 2000, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document which reestablish the commitment of Member States to reach specific goals to attain peace, security and disarmament and strengthen the United Nations as the world’s primary international institution. These documents are reflections of the international community’s commitment to the standards and objectives of the UN Charter.

TOPIC A: CYBERWARFARE

StAtement of the ProbLem

Just as World War I introduced new weapons technology and modern combat to the 20th century,

the information age is revolutionizing warfare for the 21st. Cyberattack refers to the deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive degrade or destroy computer networks or systems as well as the information and/or programs used in these systems or networks. 8 Around the world, cyber technology is becoming increasingly important for weapons systems, defense infrastructures and national economies.9 As such, military leaders consider cyberspace the next frontier of combat – beyond land, sea, air or space.10 In the past, military victories were won through physical conflict of weapons or soldiers. Now technology permits hackers acting with or without state support to wage a new kind of warfare that involves computer sabotage.11

Additionally, cyberspace is not only a new zone of strategic competition but more importantly, the subject of the next global arms-race.12 While the first all-out cyber-war has yet to be waged, cyber-experts and military strategists anticipate that a major interstate cyber-battle could be fought within the next few years.13 Currently, the international community only has a weak system of regulation and governance that covers this emergent threat.14 As global society becomes ever more dependent on cyberspace for both its most basic and its most critical functions, the economic and social impact from a full-scale cyberattack could cripple a modern networked state.

The proliferation of cyberwar technology is an increasingly impor-tant development in military strategy. Its exact practices remain unclear.

7General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security More importantly, many political scientist and military leaders believe that a major cyber-attack on an advanced economy could result in a substantial conventional or in some cases even a nuclear response.15

Moreover, cyberattacks have a number of characteristics that distinguishes them from traditional attacks through conventional or even ballistic weapons. First, cyberattacks can be carried out with high degrees of anonymity and with plausible deniability, which makes them apt for covert operations and for initiating conflict between other parties.16 The rules of engagement associated with conventional weapons do not carry over easily to attacks made in cyberspace.17 Where countries were once hesitant to attack another country for fear of retaliation, cyberattack provides for a covert method of attack and instigating conflict between other parties. The deterrence models governing theories behind why states go to war seem incompatible with cyberwar.18

Second, they are more uncertain in the outcomes they produce, making it hard to determine deliberate and collateral damage.19 Cyberattacks involve a larger ranger of options and possible outcomes. A lone actor can steal information from a country’s secure networks, while a coordinated state-sponsored cyberattack could damage another country’s financial system, which could result in the economic collapse of an entire region. These attacks can also be carried out by actors working in one specific location or from many locations all over the world.20

Legally, the possibility of cyberwarfare is unprecedented within international treaties. Those wishing to normalize cyberwar as another component of conventional war could make the case that cyberattacks can be governed by previously existing charters, such as the Charter of the United Nations.21 Since a cyberattack can be considered a forceful attack as a result, states should be allowed to defend themselves against cyberattacks by conventional means. A hostile attack on a country’s power grid or economic infrastructure could legally be responded to with an air or missile attack on the initiating country.

However, for cyberwarfare to work as an additional component of conventional war, accountability must be ensured. State-to-state models of deterrence work because states that are attacked are then able to locate and retaliate against aggressor states. This transparency does not transfer over into cyberspace.22 Without a heat signature to trace or an enemy soldier to interrogate, states are left to rely on misleading IP addresses which

can be redirected several times in order to mislead state authorities.

In addition to problems of accountability, nongovernmental actors can initiate cyberwar easily and inexpensively. Extreme activists and terrorists alike can launch cyberattacks on state governments with as little as a computer, an Internet connection and a few skilled hackers.23 Compound this scenario with the inherent difficulty in pinpointing the origin of a cyberattack and what ensues is a cyber-battleground where everyone is attacking everyone with a misdirected sense of who the true aggressors are.24 An attack launched by non-state actors from within one country against the government of another can be misread as a state-to-state attack. The victim state is then in a compromised position where it must first determine whether an attack is actually the product of a state operation and secondly, whether it should merely defend itself or escalate conflict to physical space with a conventional attack. 25

The uncertainty surrounding cyberwar and its application by both state and non-state actors make it a difficult component of war to normalize, leaving the questions for this committee to consider: Should cyberwar be accepted as another component of conventional war? How might the international community address the problems of accountability and legality surrounding cyberwar’s application? What can be done to combat non-state use of cyberweapons?

hiStory of the ProbLem

TERMINOLOGY

In researching and discussing cyberwarfare, various technical terms will undoubtedly arise. The following is a brief collection of terminology one should be familiar with to gain a basic understanding of the topic:

Cyber-espionage—the use of networks and computers to obtain private information to improve the political, defensive, or security positions of a state or non-state actor.

Cyber-vandalism—the act of defacing or damaging a network, site, or computer for enjoyment purposes.

Cyberwar—not universally defined as of yet, but refers to the deliberate actions to alter, disrupt or destroy computer systems, devices or infrastructure for the benefit of state and non-state interests.



Botnet—a network of machines that direct and trigger massive amounts of traffic to targeted websites or networks.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack—a mass of data automatically and repeatedly sent to a website server or e-mail address in order to overload the system and cripple the affected computer or block access to the site. DDoS attacks often originate from a worldwide network of infected computer triggered to simultaneously fire off information once instructed by a remote botnet.

Firewall—a network barrier designed to keep out unauthorized access. Most computer uses, corporations, and governments employ the use of firewalls, as hacking and cybercrime have become ordinary occurrences.

Hacker— a talented computer programmer who seeks to gain unauthorized access to computers, typically to do malicious things such as crash the computer or obtain private information.

Rootkits—alternation to security and system logs to hide an intruder’s presence in a system or machine. Rootkits are a back-door method to overcome detection and security measures while maintaining complete control of a compromised system.

Sniffers—tools that analyze networks and monitor all traffic. “Carnivore,” the controversial U.S. government

“sniffer” program, was designed to help federal agents track terrorist or other criminals’ message traffic.

Trojan Horse—a program that appears desirable, but actually contains harmful content. Trojan horses often enable intruders use the machine remotely, as part of a larger cyberattack or to copy sensitive information. For example, a free software program when downloaded erases every file in that directory or copies every keystroke and sends the information back to a remote user.

Virus—a program that propagates itself by infecting other programs on the same computer or network. Viruses can do serious damage such as erasing files or a whole hard disk. Viruses spread when infected files are traded via removable media, network filesharing or through e-mail attachments.

HISTORY OF COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET

The greatest challenge to global cyber security is the fact that no one has taken advantage of the vulnerabilities inherent in the structure of the program or mistakes left by the programmer. Most information out on the Internet

is “safe” from attacks, simply because there is more data than there are computer hackers. The World Wide Web is by nature unsecured. It was created for programmers and scientists, not for governments or individuals hoping to keep national secrets or bank accounts secure and at hand for convenient use.

While most people commonly use the terms World Wide Web, the Web, the Internet, the Net, among others, quite interchangeably, the World Wide Web and the Internet are not the same thing. Simply, the World Wide Web is transmitted over the Internet. The Web cannot exist without the Internet or some other network of computers, but the reverse is untrue. The Internet is the infrastructure for the global network of computers, while the Web is a service communicated through the Internet.

Herman Hollerith is widely regarded as the father of modern automatic computation. He chose the punched card as the basis for storing and processing information and he built the first punched card tabulating and sorting machines as well as the first keypunch.26 The first program-controlled computer was built in 1941; it read, stored, and printed data on punched film and could only operate for minutes at a time. In 1943, the Harvard Mark I was built in the United States.27 In 1944 the United Kingdom built the Colossus, which is regarded as the first operational programmable electronic digital computer. The Colossus, which had limited programmability, was used to break German codes during World War I.28 All three of the aforementioned models were functionally less powerful than today’s handheld calculator.

Computers are fundamentally made up of four parts: the CPU (computer processing unit), memory, input, and output devices. The CPU is made up of two parts, a control unit, which processes instructions and interprets them and the ALU (arithmetic logic unit) which takes inputs from the control unit, performs an operation on them, and sends out the result back out to be written to memory or displayed as output. As computer technology is developed, these operations are performed faster and more efficiently.

Tim Berners-Lee at CERN, SWITZERLAND created the World Wide Web in 1990.

He originally came up with the idea for “a large hypertext database with typed links” as an answer to allow data sharing between physicists from around the world.29 Now, the World Wide Web is regarded as a standardization of how information can be displayed and a database of links to files that have been made public on individual computers.30 The Internet today is a global TCP/IP

9General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security network. United States DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and NSF (National Science Foundation) created its precursors ARPANET and NSFNET for the purposes of connecting large numbers of computers and regional computer networks together.31 TCP/IP is the set of communications protocols, also known as the IPS (Internet Protocol Suite), which allows individual computers to send outgoing and to interpret incoming signals to another computer connected in the network.32

A simple example to think about this process is to consider your computer as your house, your mailbox as your Ethernet port, your data as your mail and the IPS as a delivery service such as UPS. Data is packets of information, not unlike letters or packages in the mail. Mail (data) is given to the delivery service, which has a system or a protocol for how and where to send the mail. For example, addresses must start with the name of the receiver and end with the address. This established system allows the postal service to process your mail and get it to the correct location. Likewise, IPS does the same thing for data. It provides a template for a computer knows that it needs to format the data packet (package to be mailed), so that all the cables and computer terminals that act as the roads and post offices, know where to take your packet. Finally the packet is received at a port, either the physical Ethernet port if your computer is directly plugged in or a virtual port assigned to your wireless connection, after which your computer then accesses the port and reads the data contained within the packet.

HISTORY OF MALWARE

Malware or malicious software refers to any software designed to cause damage to a single computer, server, or computer network.33 The most infamous type of malware are computer viruses, which are computer programs or scripts that attempt to spread from one file to another on a single computer and/or from one computer to another. These programs are spread using a variety of methods, without the consent or knowledge of the computer user.34 A worm is a specific type of virus that self-replicates and spreads itself across many computers.

When early models of the World Wide Web were being developed during the 1980s, the first major cases of malware were released over the net. Most notably in 1988, the Morris Worm, created by Cornell University student, Robert Morris, infected nearly 10% of all

computers connected to the Internet.35 The first malware attack to gain media attention, the Morris Worm inflicted approximately $10 million USD to $100 million USD in damages and revealed the destructive potential the use of malware in a cyberattack.36

As the Internet began to gain popularity among individual users in the late 1990s and 2000s, malware were designed by programmers to make a profit off of forced advertising.37 Since 2003, the majority of widespread viruses and worms have been designed to take full control of peoples’ computers to use for additional cyberattacks. Remote attackers use these

“zombie computers” to send spam, launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS or DOS) attacks, send phisher scams, spread viruses, download pornography, and steal information.38

UK security firm Sophos estimates that 40 percent of spam is now sent by zombie machines. Sandvine, a network security firm, puts the figure at 80 percent. Distributed computing company Akamai blames zombie PCs for a DOS attack that briefly blacked out sites like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo in June. Reuters reports that British teen hackers are hiring out their zombie networks for around $100 an hour.39

Additionally, Zero-day attacks are cyberattacks targeting specific vulnerabilities for which a software update is not yet available. In many cases, details of the vulnerability along with working code are made public through various mailing lists, websites or other online communities.40 This debated process is typically referred to as “full disclosure.” The controversy surrounds the level of risk faced by users of the vulnerable software. While the seller works to engineer and release the necessary update, attackers can compose malicious exploits targeting the vulnerability – exposing users to the risk of these so called zero day attacks.41

Phishing is another widespread form of malware that have affected millions of users. A typical phishing e-mail message is disguised as legitimate correspondence from a bank or e-commerce site. Quite often the e-mail message uses fear tactics to motivate the recipient into clicking a link contained within the message, which then points the intended victim to a fraudulent Web site disguised to look like the actual bank or e-commerce site. Unsuspecting users who enter their login credentials risk becoming victims of credit card fraud, stolen account funds, and even outright identity theft.42

Today’s malware focus is no longer a battle to dominate the computer; it is increasingly a battle for



control of the user’s assets. With money as the motive and the user as the target, experts predict to see an even greater number of cleverly disguised scams, phishing, and other socially engineered attacks in the future.43 The use of targeted rootkit-enabled Trojans will also likely continue to increase across many different internet-based mediums, including social networking sites, file sharing networks, e-mail, and instant messaging.44 Further, it can be expected that these social engineering and traditional malware threats will continue to be supplemented by cross-site scripting attacks and other forms of exploitation.

Moreover, in the past, traditional cyberattacks primarily used widespread, broadcast attacks aimed at computers deployed on networks.45 However, as administrators and vendors fortified perimeter defenses with tools such as firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IP S), attackers responded by adopting new tactics. Instead of trying to penetrate networks with high-volume broadcast attacks, attackers have adopted stealthier, more focused techniques that target individual computers through the World Wide Web.46 This may be driven, in part, by the fact that compromises that affect computers on enterprise networks are increasingly likely to be discovered and shut down. On the other hand, activity that takes place on end users’ computers and/or Web sites is less likely to be detected. As a result, the majority of effective malicious activity has become Web-based.47

current SituAtion

Cyberspace has been established as the new battleground. After land, sea, air and space, military organizations, state and non-state actors are on the brink of implementing what will become the new hybrid wars.48 However, no one can predict what lies ahead for the offensive and defensive use of cyberweapons. Aside from a number of minor scrimmages and exchanges, cyberwar and the full potential of a state-sponsored coordinated cyberattack have yet to be seen. In fact, the very definition and ethical code of conduct for cyberwar has yet to be determined.

NON-STATE ACTORS AND CYBERTERRORISM

Generally, cyberterrorism consists of using computer technology to engage in terrorist activity.

However, this definition is not sufficient as it is too similar to the definition of cybercrime. Terrorism often results in the infliction of harms indistinguishable from those caused by certain types of crime such as death, personal injury, or property destruction. However the harms are inflicted for very different reasons.49 A federal statute, for example, defines terrorism as “committing acts constituting crimes under the law of any country to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence government policy by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”50 As such, cyberterrorism is usually intended to demoralize a population by destroying cyber as well as physical infrastructure. As such the international community should cooperate in order to reduce the potential destruction of a cyber-terrorist attack.

Non-state actors acting in cyberspace are the most diverse and difficult threat entity to identify. Many maybe aligned with established cults or terrorist organizations. Others maybe sponsored by foreign industrial companies that seek to steal or corrupt information from rivals. Terrorists and other non-state actors now recognize that cyberweapons offer them new, low-cost, easily hidden tools to support their causes.51

Terrorists already use the Internet to communicate, to raise funds, recruit and gather intelligence. Additionally, it is known that Hezbollah, Hamas and Al Qaeda are using computerized files, email and encryption to support their operations. For example, Al-Qaeda leaders have encouraged members to promote the organization over Twitter and Facebook; there are even unofficial Facebook pages that are dedicated for recruitment.52 Hamas has also recently launched a new social media campaign, using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to lift its public profile.53 As such, it is possible that these organizations see cyberspace as an additional avenue to inflict damage.

While non-state actors are unlikely to launch a cyberattack on the same potential scale as a country with an operating cyberwarfare force, they can still do a considerable amount of damage with relatively little investment. Additionally, the technology of hacking has advanced to the point that many tools that required in-depth knowledge a few years ago have become automated and user-friendlier.54 Cyberattacks offer terrorists the possibility of greater security and operational flexibility. In theory they can launch cyberattacks from almost everywhere in the world without exposing the attacker to physical harm.55 While a foreign state may hesitate

11General Assembly


to launch a cyberattack against another state to avoid retaliation or negative political backlash, terrorists often seek attention and the increase in fear that is generation with a cyberattack.56

PSEUDO STATE ACTORS AND CYBERATTACKS

Over the last several decades the hybrid phenomena of state-sponsored terrorism and state-sponsored crime have emerged as increasingly serious threats.57 Both present unique legal issues, most notably with regard to attempting to use criminal sanctions to prevent actions sponsored by states. One problem with this case is that determining whether a cyberattack comes from a specific state can be difficult because the origin of the attack is ambiguous. For instance, an attack from Guangdong might come from China itself or it might come from independent hackers.58 Also, the fact that an attack originates outside of the territory of a country does not necessarily mean that the country is not sponsoring the attack. As with physical world examples, state sponsorship

can take many forms, such as providing cyberwarriors with funding, weapons, training and sanctuary.59

In August 2008, when Russian tanks rolled into Georgia, another force was mobilizing—not in the physical world, but online.60 What ensued was one of the world’s first coordinated attacks between state military and online cyberwarriors. Plugged-in Russian nationalists and anyone else with an internet connection willing to help the cause, along with the Russian military, simultaneously hit Georgia’s soft and hard infrastructure. With a simple download from one of many pro-Russian sites, such as StopGeorgia.ru, supporters could download the software and instructions needed to perform what were believed to have been distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on targeted Georgian government sites.61

In fact, according to findings from an open source investigation launched by Project Grey Goose, a volunteer effort by more than 100 security experts from tech giants like Microsoft and Oracle and defense organizations around the world, the August cyberattacks were part of a top-down hierarchy established by expert hackers who dole out targets and instructions to relative novices to bring down Georgian

The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the military’s new cyber command has achieved full operational capability. Currently the



government web sites by flooding the sites’ built-in MySQL feature, a popular software suite used to manage the back-end databases of websites.62 While the actual damage done was minimal, as some email was disrupted and targeted sites were unavailable due to the overwhelming amount of traffic, the theory behind the application of the cyberattack is important to consider.63 No conclusive evidence pinpoints the set of attacks as executed or sanctioned by the Russian government, though no actions were taken to stop the hackers; but this fragmentation between online cyberattackers and the state military highlights the key advantages and threats of cyberwar.64

Although Russia was not directly linked with the cyberattacks on Georgia, sources, such as former Colonel and defector of the Russian KGB, Oleg Gordievsky, tell of departments within the federal security service (FSB) dedicated to coordinating cyberattacks with Russian Special Forces and conventional military operations.65 This jumbled line between government sponsored attacks and individual initiative makes accountability within cyberwar very difficult. On one hand, cyberattack is tempting in that it is very difficult to pinpoint event origins allowing for the instigator to go on undetected. Consequently, the ability to counter cyberattacks is risky when no clear attacker is determined. And when cyberattacks jump from mere online annoyances such as the crippling of websites to the more devastating circumstances of disabling banking systems, electrical and water utilities, and transportation networks, the need for insight and accountability becomes a must.

STATE SPONSORED PROGRAMS

In the domain of national security, intelligence is useful for both tacti cal and strategic purposes. Tactical intelligence is useful to the military services, because it provides advantages on the battlefield against adver-sary forces through direct support to operational commanders in areas such as reconnaissance, mapping, and early warning of adversary force movements or other actions.66As such the electromagnetic spectrum is not an entirely new zone of conflict.

Innovations in cyberweapon technology and human dependence on machines make online targets increasingly attractive for states seeking to achieve greater impact at lower cost. 67 This is especially true for small countries looking to gain an asymmetric edge on the twenty-first-century battlefield. Thus, an ever-increasingly number of members of the international community has sought to integrate cyberwarfare as a response in any future conflict it may be involved in.68 Various aspects of cyberwarfare such as computer network attack and defense are taking an ever more important role in the plans military plans of modern states. It is currently difficult to make an accurate prediction as to how much of an actual threat state-sponsored cyberwarfare will pose to international security. Much will depend on actual events that will eventually force the international community to turn its full attention to cyberwarfare to determine how it should be treated in international law.69

Although the United States took the early lead in cyber-warfare policy and command initiatives, since 2007 a number of states have begun to bolster their cyber-defenses, for the most part without attracting much international attention. These initiatives have included everything from recruiting future cyber-warriors to establishing full-blown cyber-commands. By the start of 2010 China, India, and Russia alongside the US, the UK and South Korea are among the first group of countries to establish formal command and control (C2) over military assets in the cyber-domain. Typically, the creation of a military C2 architecture for cyberspace indicates that a state aspires to acquire offensive cyber-attack capabilities. Three notable rising state-sponsored cyberwarfare programs are examined briefly below.

INDIA

In 2008, the Indian Army started preparing for “battles in the digitized battlefield.” In the past, India had

The cyberattacks against the Georgian military was critical in dis-rupting communication during the 2008 South Ossetia War.

13General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security suffered from numerous cyberattacks.70 As a result, India’s military commanders have embarked on the process of boosting its cyber defense with over 15,000 division-level troops.71 In addition, they have announced the need for cyber-security audits to be performed periodically by India’s Army Cyber-Security Establishment (ACSE). India has also begun to develop a cyber-warfare doctrine based upon its strategic nuclear doctrine. With guidance from the US CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team), New Delhi has established an Indian CERT to assist in reporting incidents, recovering from attacks, and strengthening networks and systems.72 Given India’s burgeoning IT sector and associated knowledge industries, in many respects it is on the way to becoming a “cyber superpower.”73

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Although it has been accused of perpetrating the attacks on other states, (such as Georgia mentioned above) the Russian government has denied any responsibility. However the country is home to a sizeable number of computer experts who are believed to exploit the Russia’s resentment of affluent foreign states by attacking their internet-based operations, targeting foreign financial sites as well as perceived Russia enemies.74 Russian civilian network hackers are generally held in esteem and may be among the independent civilian “patriotic hackers.”75 As noted above, the cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia utilized network systems outside Russian borders were most likely sanctioned, by elements within the Russian government. Experts argue that the Russian cyber strategy is designed to be a force multiplier along with more traditional military actions including WMD attacks.76 In this case, a force multiplier is a military term that describes a weapon or tactic that, when added to and employed along with other combat forces, significantly increases the combat potential of that force. Moreover, the Russian Business Network is thought to own and operate the second largest BotNet in the world.77 Intelligence suggests there are organized groups of hackers tied to the Federal Security Bureau (FSB), which works closely with the Russian military.

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea announced in early January 2010 that it was preparing to launch a military cyber-warfare

command to ward off attacks from North Korea and from other countries on its military and government IT systems.78 As one of the most internet-dependent societies in the world, it has experienced a number of cyberattacks. Some NATO officials have expressed interest in incorporating South Korea and other East Asia countries into its cyber defense network via its Global Partnership Program.79

APPLICATION AND DIFFICULTIES OF CYBERWARFARE

Cyberwarfare refers to deliberate actions by a state to disrupt or destroy computer systems or networks of another state. 80 Cyberweapons are the highly secretive tools being developed today to carry out such attacks. The collateral damage cyberwar poses to military and civilian infrastructure, equipment, and computer networks could be devastating. There are many important characteristics of cyberattacks that should be noted and are described below.

The indirect effects of a cyberattack are almost more consequential than the direct effects of the attack.81 Direct effects are immediate damage to the targeted computer system or network while indirect effects are those that stem from interactions between the attacked systems or network and other devices or networks.82 What this means is that the computer or network that is initially attacked is much less relevant than the systems controlled by the targeted network. For instance, a cyberattack against a computer that controls an electric power generator will also and more importantly affect the generator. In most instances the indirect effect is the primary purpose of the attack. As such, states will have to examine both the direct and indirect effects of a cyberattack in order to determine the appropriate response.83

The outcomes of a cyberattack are often undeterminable.84 Small details of configuration can affect the outcome of the attack which cannot be accurately predicted. One consequence of this factor is that collateral damage and damage assessment of a cyberattack may be impossible to estimate.85

Cyberattacks are often very complex to plan and execute.86 Cyberattacks can involve a much larger range of options than most traditional military operations, and because they are fundamentally about an attack’s secondary effects, there are many more possible outcome paths whose analysis often requires highly specialized



knowledge. The time scales on which cyberattacks operate can range from tenths of a second to years.87

Compared to traditional military operations, cyberattacks are relatively inexpensive.88 The underlying technology for carrying out many types of cyberattacks is widely available, inexpensive, and easy to obtain. An attacker can compromise computers belonging to otherwise uninvolved parties to take part in an attack activity; use automation to increase the amount of damage that can be done per person attacking, increase the speed at which the damage is done, and decrease the required knowledge and skill level of the operator of the system; and even steal the financial assets of an adversary to use for its own ends. On the other hand, some cyberattack weapons are usable only once or a few times.89

The identity of the originating party behind a significant cyberattack can be concealed with relative ease, compared to that of a significant kinetic attack. 90 Cyberattacks are very difficult to attribute to any particular actor and are thus easy to conduct with plausible deniability. Cyberattacks are thus also well suited for instigating conflict between two other parties.91

While the immediate effects of cyberattack are unlikely to be comparable to the effects of weapons of mass destruction (for example, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons), a large-scale cyberattack could massively affect the functioning of a society and lead to many indirect casualties. At the same time, it is possible to imagine that certain cyberattacks might be executed on a smaller scale and with a lower degree of lethality than might be expected if kinetic weapons were used for equivalent military purposes. Thus the policy implications of cyberattack have certain commonalities across the range from non-lethal engagements to wars involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.92

LEGALITY OF CYBERWARFARE

Despite the rush to amass national cyber-arsenals, there is still no international consensus on the application of the “law of armed conflict” (LOAC, referred in some instances as LOW or ‘law of war’) to cyber-warfare, most often considered a form of “irregular warfare.”93 This confusion stems from both the rapid spread of cyberwarfare and the lack of precedent to guide international regulation of cyberspace intrusions.

The LOAC as understood today originated in the mid-nineteenth century, as did the humanitarian regulation of

conflict and violence.94 Since their early beginnings these laws applied primarily to interstate conflict as carried out by uniformed armed forces between two or more states. While some countries believe that cyberwarfare should be judged according to international LOAC established by the UN Charter and other sources, there are many problematic factors with treating cyberspace and cyber warfare with current international law.

First, conflicts that occur in cyberspace cannot be presumed to be between states using traditional military forces. When the law of armed conflicted was first established, only states had the ability to wage war. However since cyberattack weapons are readily available and inexpensive, non-state actors are capable of engaging in armed conflict through the use of cyberweapons.95 Moreover, even individuals acting by their own accords can acquire and use cyberweapons to attack computer systems or networks of a nation-state. Even in non-government hands, these weapons include some that are as capable of doing great harm as those available to governments. Thus, the lines between state, non-state, and individual attackers are unclear in a legal regime that distinguishes between LOAC on the one hand and national criminal laws on the other.96

Second, cyber espionage is problematic to categorize.97 The current LOAC presumes that a clear distinction can be drawn between the use of force and espionage, where espionage is openly not a use of force. However, the

As states develop cyberwarfare programs, the international commu-nity needs to collectively determine if or any restrictions should be placed on cyberwarfare.

15General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security distinction between cyberattack and cyber exploitation may be very hard to draw from a technical standpoint, and may lie primarily in the intent of the user.98 As such, there may be instances where an act of espionage can be deemed as an act of cyberwarfare, which permits the victim-state to retaliate using physical, or cyber weaponry.

Last, it is difficult to determine if an attack in cyberspace is equal to an act of force against a state’s territorial integrity. A target in cyberspace may be known only through an electronic identifier, such as an IP address.99 To what extent should the physical location of a computer matter in determining whether it is a legitimate military target that may be subject to cyberattack? Also, the effects of attacking a given computer may not be felt at all in the immediate geographic vicinity of the computer, thus raising the question of which geographic location is relevant to the determination of legitimacy for attack.100

CASE STUDY 1: CYBERATTACKS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT 1

The Taiwan Strait is one of world’s most dangerous political and military hotspots. Taipei and Beijing are perpetually preparing for war against each other – Taiwan to maintain its democratic status and resist absorption into the People’s Republic China, Beijing to unify China once and for all and to repel any moves towards legal independence by Taiwan. Both China and Taiwan use annual military exercises to simulate the war that both are trying to avoid. China has several hundred missiles aimed at Taiwan and as of 2007; Taiwan has developed offensive military capacity to attack the mainland.101 Nevertheless both sides maintain that diplomatic negotiations will come before any preemptive attack.

At the same time, cyberwarfare is deemed by both Beijing and Taipei as an acceptable way of maintaining a state of hostility without having to launch a physical military attack. 102 In this case, cyberwar offers the prospect of a fast and relatively painless victory should a war break out and this characteristic of cyberwarfare is essential due to the nature of this conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising that both sides have invested in designing and creating new military structures, security architectures, training programs and technology that 1 In this section I use the names “China” and “PRC” interchange-ably to refer to the People’s Republic of China (capital city Beijing), and I use “Taiwan” to refer to the People’s Republic of China and the island of Taiwan (capital city Taipei). This is merely for clarity and should not be taken as an indication of my opinion of Taiwan’s political identity.

promise to take advantage of each other’s dependence on computer networks.103

Assessments of China’s cyberwarfare capabilities vary. The first date given by Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense for a possible Chinese cyberattack was 2010. However that date has since been pushed back to 2005.104 More recently there is evidence that China is using new communications technology to gather intelligence on foreign governments. In 2007, German security experts had discovered that the Chinese military had planted spying software in the computer networks of German government departments.105 Nevertheless, many argue that China has inflated their actual cyberwarfare capabilities.

If China’s cyberattack potential is credible, the greatest threat to Taiwan is if China launches a cyberattack specifically targeting Taiwan’s economic, social and military infrastructures, which would immediately create a crisis. This may, although not necessarily, expose Taiwan to attack by more conventional means, which China’s navy or air force. China can also launch a cyberwarfare campaign that can be conducted alongside multiple concurrent or consecutive combat operations against Taiwan.106 Taiwan’s military exercises demonstrate that Taiwan’s military has planned an offensive cyberattack operation against the mainland to disrupt PRC’s invasion plans, buying them enough time for foreign intervention.

The value of cyberwarfare to both the PRC and Taiwan is that a cyberattack can help each side realize their political objectives with causing the quantity of causalities associated with conventional weapons.107 However, this does not imply that cyberwarfare is entirely bloodless because of the collateral damage caused by a disruption to physical infrastructure. The indirect costs of a cyberattack by either side could be huge. Hospitals, electric girds, power stations, water treatment plants could all be casualties in a cyberattack.

CASE STUDY 2: ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH CYBERWAR

With the escalation of violence in Israel and the occupied territories comes with a less visible threat – an Arab-Israeli cyberwar. Like a classic guerrilla struggle, which is a conflict of the weak against the strong, cyberwar can allow an individual or radical groups to inflict considerable damage to a nation-state’s cyber infrastructure.108 In this case, the weapon of choice can



be nothing more than a laptop computer connected to the Internet. On the ground, the Arab-Israeli conflict appears to be evolving as Palestinian militants shift to new guerilla warfare tactics and Israel responds with increasingly severe military measures. With such innovation and escalation in the real world military tactics, parallel intensification of activity in cyberspace is expected.109

The first cyber conflict between Israel and Hezbollah erupted in 2000 when a group of Israeli hackers crippled the prime website of Hezbollah www.hizbollah.org by encouraging Israeli supporters to ‘bomb’ the site with automated floods of e-mail.110 Hezbollah retaliated by rallying Arab supporters for a counter-attack, which soon downed the main Israeli government website and that of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. These cyber raids continued for some months, with website defacements and denial of service attacks effectively shutting websites. The cyberwar eventually subsided due to its low level of intensity.111 However, as with the conventional war

between Israel and its neighbors, cyberwar once again broke out a few years later.

The conventional war launched between the Israeli state and the Lebanese Shiite Party, Hezbollah, during the summer of 2006, was the scene of one of the most important acts of a wider virtual conflict, the Arab-Israeli Cyber-war, which started with the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000.112 The so-called “July War” has continued since 2006, and is being transposed from a conventional warfare context to a “permanent and ongoing Cyberwar”, in terms of online information control and manipulation as well as repeated attempts to take technical control of official or influential Websites.113

The most dreaded attacks by Israel and Hezbollah are Denial of Service attacks and especially their distributed form (DDOS). This makes detection difficult and the impact stronger. These attacks originally exploit some weaknesses of Internet protocols, which enable them to attack the infrastructure of the Internet like Web sites and Internet service providers. The DOS assault can be launched from a single computer but the attacker can

It is well know that China has a fully operational Cyberwarfare sector. However, its full potential remains unknown.

17General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security also use the DDOS alternative where many “zombie” computers are used to start multiple low attacks at the same time against the target.114 In 2006, thousands of Israeli and Hezbollah hackers have attacked Websites with DDOS.115 Hezbollah hackers have hacked Israeli government and military Websites and in retaliation, the IDF managed to hack the strategic Website of the Hezbollah TV channel “Al Manar”. Thus, Hezbollah was forced to use the Web server of the Quebecker company IWeb Technologies in order to find a new hosting solution for its Website.116 In the purpose of solving the problems of hosting its Websites after each attack, the party uses mobility and dissipation techniques.

The distinction between militaries and civilians among human actors in the Israeli-Hezbollah Cyberwar is difficult to differentiate. The part played by civilians (as targets or aggressors) is reinforced, since the Web gives easier access to online activism. Moreover, military and intelligence institutions also use the new tools offered, and do not limit their actions to just physical battlefields. Indeed, the Web brings civilians and militaries closer, and some of them can now become cyber-soldiers or cybervictims.117 Israeli militaries, Hezbollah fighters but also computer specialists and hacker civilians close to the Party or just anonymous supporters all can be involved in this cyberwar.

As a digital form of asymmetric warfare, cyberwar may be less bloody, but it is potentially highly destructive with far- reaching effects. Whether the hackers on either side are labeled as terrorists or freedom fighters, their conflict looks set to become a key part of today’s era of connectivity and globalization.

RELEVANT UN ACTIONS

While no existing UN document addresses cyberwar specifically, previously existing charters and agreements may cover the end result of cyberattack. Despite the fact that cyberattacks and cyberweapons are not physical by nature, the end result of an attack, either directly or indirectly, poses effects similar to if not greater than conventional weapons.118 The UN Charter defines war as the “use of force” and as “armed attack.” Under these terms, it can be argued that cyberwar is a mere extension of conventional war, where cyberweapons and cyberwar must abide by existing principles of law governing armed conflict. In fact, existing Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) agreements and the Charter of the United Nations already govern the legality of war and behavior during wartime periods. However, the international community stands at a

significant point in time where cyberweapons have yet to be fully employed and accepted as a method of attack.

Nevertheless, both member nation-states and various bodies of the United Nations have been working to implement a mechanism to regulate cyberwarfare. In February 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon advised the Advisory Board on Disarmament Affairs to “pay more attention to cyberwarfare.”119 In his report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the “international community must advance beyond the stalemate that continues to hinder [their] work for disarmament.”120 Additionally, he said that the board needs to consider cyberwarfare and its impact on international security. Noting the many widely reported breaches of information systems in recent year, he further stressed the urgency of addressing cyber security for both the public and private sectors, as they are increasingly dependent on electronic information.121

In 2010, DISEC issued a press release that covered their recent debate on countering potential cyberwarfare.122 In this report, it is noted that the Brazilian delegate stated that “Modern society’s emerging dependence on of the new cutting-edge information and communication technologies was giving rise to new vulnerabilities that could undermine activities of Governments, markets and other entities,” and that the international community should consider establishing instruments to deal with cyberwarfare.123 He also stated that cyberattacks “could be used by terrorists and other criminal organizations.” As such he further recommended the General Assembly to deal with criminal activities involving information and communication technologies.”124

In this report delegates also urged the international community to consider establishment of instruments to deal with cyberwarfare. They stipulated that these cyberwar discussions should be held in “relevant forums, under United Nations leadership, to tackle issues like assessing national network structures to identify effective methods of protection; implementing tools to enable the tracing of the origin of cyberattacks; qualifying national instruments in the area of cybersecurity; and ensuring that discriminatory tendencies that could prevent access of some States to information and communication technologies were avoided.”125

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS



Since the international community has not agreed to a standard approach in regards to cyberwarfare, this leaves it with two main avenues by which to approach the question of cyberwar. Cyberattack can either be treated as an extension of conventional war, with preexisting treaties governing its application.126 Or, cyberwarfare can be deemed too risky and too unpredictable to be applied by government, military, or nongovernmental actors.

There are many military officers and private companies applying pressure on governments to accept cyberwar as yet another conventional mode of attack. There is a growing theory of military strategy that cyber operations need to be normalized just as previous operations in other domains have been normalized.127 Rather than being treated as a special, self-contained superweapon, cyberwarfare has the potential to be just another part of the equation in determining a regional contingency plan similar to air, space, maritime and ground components. In effect, conventional war and cyberwar would simply make up a new hybrid war system, relying on past and future technologies to achieve end results.

If cyberwar is accepted by the international community as yet another asset in the ever growing arsenal of military operations, then the international community should seek to compose a treaty that regulates cyberwarfare. As with other laws of armed conflict, the primary objective of a multilateral cyberwarfare treaty should be to regulate this method of warfare and its consequences.128 Additionally experts believe that existing international law would set precedent for a new cyberwar treaty. The Charter of the United Nations, Law of Armed Conflict and similar treaties governing modern warfare would allow the international community to determine what is permitted in cyberwar.

However, this proposed solution encompasses a number of difficulties based on the stipulation that cyberwar is very different from, and not equitable with conventional war. For example, consider the Charter of the United Nations, which allows a country to defend itself in the event that it considers itself victim of an act of war. On one hand, actual cyberattacks are so vast and numerous, that given any day, it can be assumed that any country could claim to be the victim of cyberattack. This in turn would allow a country to defend itself with force, which can either be applied in the physical or digital realm.

One could expect a spike in state-to-state conflicts if cyberwar was accepted as a legitimate form of combat. With increased development of cyberweapons, the end

product would undoubtedly be tested and used. In fact, internet security companies report at least 130 nations known at present to have information warfare programs under development.129 Hardware and software producers, such as China, France, India and Russia are suspected of manufacturing goods with bugs and rootkits that would allow intruders to spy on and control machines remotely.130 The United States has openly announced its preparations to develop and employ cyberattack. And to test these newly developed cyberweapons would be the National Cyber Range, a plan by the Pentagon to create a self-contained model of the Internet that could be attacked, rebuilt, and attacked again for testing purposes.131

At a first glance, nuclear weapons and cyberweapons have little to no commonalities. However upon further examination, current international law pertaining to nuclear weapons can be applied to cyberweapons. As such, many look at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a possible model for an international cyberwarfare treaty. While not as lethal or physically destructive, the aftermath of a full cyberwar could also prove to be devastating. Financial institutions, vital infrastructure and civilian networks are all subject of cyberattack, either as direct targets or within the scope of collateral damage. Because so much commerce, banking and business now rely heavily on a properly functioning internet, it can be presumed that any large attack on any one country’s network would be devastating to not only the victim country but to business and commerce around the world.

Nonproliferation treaties work because the components of creating a nuclear device are highly restricted and closely managed by the IAEA as well as other governments that have their own agencies monitoring nuclear activities.132 However, several problems are evident when considering this solution for addressing cyberwar. The components of cyberwarfare are already readily available for any state or non-state actor to obtain and use. This kills the effectiveness of any proposed non-proliferation-type treaty aimed at keeping states from engaging in or developing cyberwarfare capability.

Cyberspace has frequently been compared to outer space, as both are boundless and unregulated. Surprisingly, there is no prohibition against using outer space as a weapons platform unless it involves the use of nuclear weapons, which is prohibited by international treaty, and/or such weapons are placed on a planetary

19General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security body such as the Moon, which is also prohibited. The void in between, however, is still unregulated.133

One of the obstacles in applying this analogy to cyberattacks is that few nations have or can reasonably expect to have the ability to wage war in outer space, whereas over 130 nations have the ability to wage war in cyberspace. Another problem is a difference in the threat potential of a cyberattack compared to launching a nuclear weapon from space. There is no one cyberattack that can be compared to the devastation caused by one nuclear weapon, although theoretically the use of a mega-sized botnet like Conficker C involving millions of zombie computers might come close to delivering a network equivalent.134

An alternative to banning a type of weapon in a domain is to ban all weapons in a domain, similar to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Under that treaty regime, Antarctica is off-limits to all types of military development by any nation and is to be used only for peaceful purposes. This won’t analogize for cyberwarfare because it’s impossible to differentiate between code used for peaceful purposes and code used for malicious purposes. However, the problem with the Antarctic analogy is that there are no recognizable boundaries in cyberspace and very few reliable ways to artificially create them.135

Despite the push for inclusion, the question remains, can cyberwar actually take on attributes of conventional war or is it too risky and too uncontrollable a method of attack to be adapted into standard contingency plans? These are other question will remain at the forefront of military and scholarly debate. Nonetheless the United Nations should also play a leading role in the issue of security of information and communications technology in conflict situations, paying attention to identification, classification of information-warfare weapons and establishment of multilateral rules.136

QueStionS A reSoLution muSt AnSwer

If cyberwar is to be normalized as another wartime component, what will govern its application? Do previously existing charters apply to cyberwar or will new treaties be needed to address cyberwar’s intricacies? What are cyberwar’s rules of engagement?

If cyberwar is to be restricted, what will be the terms of disarmament and nonproliferation? How might the international community go about disarming countries with existing cyber operations?

What can to the international community do to make cyberattack more transparent? Is accountability possible within the realm of digital combat?

How can countries better defend against and respond to cyberattack initiated by nongovernmental actors. Are host countries reliable for attacks initiated within their borders? Should states work to crack down on domestic-based cyber attackers? Do victim states have the authority to attack foreign-based cyber intruders without official consent?

bLoc PoSitionS

Due to the current ambiguity of cyberwarfare within international law, states are free to pursue and use cyberattacks as another weapon in their military arsenal. Additionally, since cyberweapons are easily obtained that vast majority of states are capable of creating a cyberwarfare division within their militaries. At the same time every state is opposed to being the victim of a cyberattack, so there is urgency within the international community to impose some sort of regulation on states using cyberweapons against other states. For this topic there should be no arbitrary obstacles that prevent any nation from working with another nation to develop a regulatory or standardization framework for cyberwarfare. Nevertheless, each country’s individual policies and strategies for defense and offense in cyberspace and positions on the proliferation of cyberwarfare technology can be differentiated. Inevitably, many nations will offer different solutions, some of which may have conflicting points. Therefore there are many bloc configurations for this topic. Some states could fall in more than one of the following categories.

STATES WITH MILITARY BASED PROGRAMS

State-sponsored cyberwar programs are those programs, which have developed or are close (within three years) to developing cyberweapons for governmental use. Many countries that fall in this category are mentioned



within this guide. More broadly, this category includes the majority of the developed world with populations that rely on the Internet such as, the P-5, the majority of Western Europe and Some of developed Eastern Asia. Government cyberwar programs often stem from the need to defend against the daily barrage of attacks launched against state and civilian computer networks. These initiatives often blur the lines between defense and offense, as malicious programs are sometimes only defeated through offensive means. Through the application of cyberwar programs, states often seek to accomplish the following:137

Defense against cyberattacks on private and governmental institutions.

Offense against adversary states in the form of cyberattack and cyber-espionage.

The manipulation of large-scale information to deceive the public or elite of a population for purposes of propaganda, psychological campaigns, diplomacy, political and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, efforts to promote opposition movements

Methods to combat nongovernmental actors

COUNTRIES SUSPECTED OF SUPPORTING NON-STATE ACTORS’ USE OF CYBERWEAPONS

Nations within this category are usually those that already have some sort of state-sponsored cyberwarfare military division. However, some states that support non-state actors to use cyberattacks do not have an official cyberwar sector in order to avoid suspicion. Many states that belong in this category are mentioned above and are not limited to developed nations. The states here may support non-state actors because any direct government sanctioned attack may complicate or compromise the state’s political position with the region. As such, they can use individuals or groups to carry out their objectives without being directly involved. Although this certainly complicates the process of potentially regulating cyberwarfare, currently there is nothing preventing these nations from doing so.

This bloc’s position will depend on their former political and economic relationships. This is not to say that nations in this category cannot work together but in the long-run, forming a solution may be difficult as the true intentions of states that use non-state actors in cyberwarfare are not revealed.

STATES WITH DEVELOPING CYBERWARFARE PROGRAMS

States that experience cyberattack against their government and private assets often employ basic means by which to defend against cyber intruders. Most countries in the category are those in the developing world including, Most of South America, some of Western and Eastern Europe, some of the Middle East, and some of Southeast Asia.

These programs are often limited in size and funding, and provide the bare necessities needed to ensure that networks are secure and unhampered. Developing programs often lack the financial and technical resources needed to ensure full cyber security against state and non-state cyber operations. These states may look to gain assistance from foreign countries in funding and training cyber operations, while other states may look to provide basic security without further development of cyberweapons programs.

STATES UNABLE TO PURSUE A CYBERWARFARE PROGRAM

Nations that do not have the resources to form a cyberwarfare division often rely on others for cyber defense and security. Although obtaining a cyberweapon is not difficult the nations in this category may have overarching political, social, and/or economic problems that prevent them from having a dedicated cyberwar program. These nations include the vast majority of the developing world including almost all of Africa, Some of Eastern Europe, parts of the Middle East, parts of South America, most of Southeast Asia, and others. It seems that this group has the most to gain from the banning of cyberwarfare as they do not have the defense to protect themselves or the offensive to launch any potent attack. With this being said some nations in the category may wish to employ state-sponsored or non-state actors to use cyberweapons in their favor. While the countries in this category may not be involved in cyberwarfare at all, they all gain benefits from the regulation of cyberwarfare. As such, this bloc is instrumental in creating an international treaty or resolution that addresses the use of cyberweapons.

21General Assembly


SuGGeStionS for further reSeArch

The nature of cyberwar is one of constant development. Literally every day, breakthroughs in information technology lead to advances on the defensive and offensive fronts of cyberwar. News regarding the development of weapons and of cyber operations is best found in periodicals and documents with quick turn-around rates.

Look towards newspapers and online reporting networks for the most up-to-date and basic coverage. The New York Times has an entire collection of articles covering the various aspects of cyberwar, from state-sponsored programs to theories on deterrence in the digital domain. For more in-depth coverage, consider searching through journals and periodicals such as Aviation Week & Space Technology, Military Technology, New Scientist, and Foreign Affairs. Lastly, a number of policy institutes have produced findings and recommendations on the topic of cyberwar. Consider researching the recommendations of domestic and foreign policy institutes to gain an understanding of your country’s policy. Some popular military policy groups include the RAND Corporation, the MITRE Corporation, the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, the Insitute for Defense Analyses, the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, and the Instituto Liberdade.

TOPIC AREA B: BIOTERRORISM

StAtement of the ProbLem

“The threat of biological weapons from a madman with a batch of plague-inducing bacteria that could kill tens of thousands of people in a single act of malevolence is no longer a far-fetched scenario, but a real threat that is here and now.” –William Cohen, Former U.S Secretary of Defense

Biological warfare agents are defined as “living organisms, whatever their nature or infected material derived from them, which are used for hostile purposes and intended to cause disease or death in man, animals, and plants, and which depend for their efforts on the ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.”138 The vast majority of these agents is microscopic in nature and can have a tremendous impact on agriculture and human health. Small quantities of lethal biological agents can be easily concealed, transported, and released into susceptible populations. This fact contributes to both military and civilian vulnerabilities to biological weapons and to the difficulty of providing adequate protection.

Biological terrorism (bioterrorism) is the deliberate release of living agents (defined above) to directly or indirectly inflict harm or cause death in people, animals or plants.139 As with other forms of terrorism, biological terrorism is rooted in causing terror and psychological fear through the use of political violence. These actions

As biotech research becomes more prevalent, the threat of biological terrorism increases exponentially.



are meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization to reach short-term political goals.140 Bioterrorism poses a unique and complex challenge for individual governments and the entirety of the international community. The threat of biological warfare and bioterrorism is significant due to the fact that small amounts of potent biological agents can cause mass casualties. This coupled with the facts that “biological weapons agents can easily be obtained; technologies for production and weaponization are readily available; only limited financing and training are needed to establish a biological weapons program; and biological weapons have low visibility and relative ease of delivery” highlight how devastating a biological terrorist attack can be if it is successful.141

When examining the optimal conditions for an effective biological attack, researchers look at both the target population and the agent. When aggressors plan a biological attack, they first look for a population that has little or no natural acquired immunity to their selected agent. Along with this factor, they also account for the target population’s access to possible immunization or treatment. An attack on a population that has low immunity and little access to treatment will result in the largest amount of casualties.142

The most important factor of a biological attack is the agent used. Important factors for viable biological agents include: being highly contagious and infective in low doses, being suitable for mass production, storage and weaponization, and having a consistent given effect such as death or disease.143 Another desired factor sought in a biological agent is if it is difficult to identify after being released on a population. These agents that can be lethal could be mistaken for common diseases such as influenza. If the incubation period of the disease is long, a huge epidemic can spread before the attack is even recognized. Genetic engineering of biological warfare agents can alter their lethality, incubation periods and even the symptoms they cause. Resistance to antimicrobial drugs can be enhanced or added and some strains may be produced that evade the host response from conventional immunization.144 Two common agents used in biological terrorist attacks include anthrax and smallpox.

Anthrax is an acute disease caused by bacterium Bacillus anthracis, to which man is relatively resistant to in small doses.145 Weaponized anthrax is highly concentrated which far surpasses the amount necessary to infect and harm a human being. After inhaling the spores, anthrax usually develops within one week of

exposure. Shock and respiratory failure is common after infection and mortality is common even with access to full intensive care facilities, which would not be sustainable in a large-scale terrorist attack.146 Recent cases of anthrax were treated with a combination of various antimicrobial drugs, including those to treat plague and other common pulmonary infections.147 After the 2001 September 11 attacks, the United States have developed vaccines to protect against anthrax however, their recent use by the military has raised concerns over the side effects.

Although smallpox was declared to be defeated in 1980, virus stocks are believed to exist in laboratories outside of the two designated for research in Russia and in the United States. Smallpox is an infectious disease unique to humans, caused by two variants of a virus, Variola major and Variola minor.148 After infection, an abrupt onset of fever and headache may be mistaken for influenza. However a few days later a rash develops and raised fluid filled blisters form on the skin. From here, the disease soon progresses to organ failure and death. There is no practical antiviral treatment for smallpox and over 30% of the infected die.149 Due to the fact that smallpox has been eliminated, vaccination for the disease has declined dramatically. As such, if a bioterrorist attack using smallpox were to take place, the results could be disastrous. Today the U.S. government has only 15.4 million doses of the smallpox vaccine, which is only enough for six percent of the U.S. population. The rest of the world’s stockpiles totals to around 60 million; in the wake of an attack, the vast majority of the world’s population would be defenseless.150

Although the majority of the Member States within the United Nations have ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972, which prohibited the production and retention of stockpiles of biological weapons, some nations have continued to develop an offensive biological weapons capability. There also remains possibility of the continuation of biological weapons programs in Russia, which were developed during the Cold War. Although these programs may be smaller than they were a decade ago, weapons technologies developed by the Soviet Union before its breakup may have become accessible to other nations, as well as to terrorists. Using an evaluation of current trends, Dr. Seth Carus from the Center of Counter proliferation Research has documented numerous instances in which terrorist groups have studied, acquired, attempted to acquire, and even used biological agents.151

23General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security The threat of biological warfare therefore remains,

as does the fear that a terrorist attack using biological weapons could kill millions. These revelations indicate that policies are needed to respond to the threats posed by individuals, developing nations, and nations with advanced biotechnological capabilities and especially rouge terrorist groups.

hiStory of the ProbLem

ORIGIN OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS

Pathogens and biological toxins have been used as weapons through history. Some would argue that biological warfare began in the Middle Ages, when armies used corpses of dead soldiers to contaminate enemy water supplies. Over the next centuries, biological agents were converted into weapons for battlefield and covert use. Authors of Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats, Jeffery Ryan and Jan Glarum have compiled some of the more important historical uses of bioweapons, before the discovery of microorganisms, some of which are listed below:

In the fourth Century BC, Scythian Archers tipped their arrows with blood, manure, and tissues from decomposing bodies.

In 1422 AD at Karlstien in Bohemia, attacking forces launched the decaying cadavers of men killed in battle over the castle walls. They also stockpiled animal manure in the hope of spreading illness.

Francisco Pizarro reportedly gave smallpox virus-contaminated clothing to South American natives in the 15th century.

In a letter dated 16 July 1763, General Jeffery Amherst, A British officer approved the plan to spread smallpox to the Delaware Indians…On 24 June 1763, one of Amherst’s subordinates gave blankets and a handkerchief from the smallpox hospital to the Native Americans.

The same tactic was employed during the [American] Civil War by Dr. Luke Blackburn, the future governor of Kentucky. Dr. Blackburn infected clothing with smallpox and the yellow fever virus, which he then sold to Union troops.152

Although there is evidence of past societies using biological agents to wage war, there are many factors that undermine the legitimacy of past uses of biological attacks. First, it is difficult to verify historical cases of

biological attacks because these records could have been the product of propaganda or rumor. More importantly, humanity’s awareness of microorganisms and their link to infectious disease did not come about until relatively recently. Germ theory, the fact that “infectious diseases are related to and caused by microorganisms,” emerged during the late nineteenth century with the research of Pasteur and other scientists.153 Past military commanders may have accidently used biological attacks by incorrectly associating the effects of disease with some other natural occurring phenomenon.

After the discovery of microorganisms, scientists began to understand that a specific agent is the root cause of diseases, some diseases are transferred by food, water or air, a few agents can infect and cause symptoms in different species and that insects, especially mosquitos, and ticks can transfer disease causing biological agents.154 Once these links were discovered, humanity began to develop methods to not only treat and prevent disease, but also to weaponize it. Scientific knowledge about disease transmission and public health campaigns greatly contributed to increase human survival. During the Industrial Revolution, public health in cities had improved and vaccines and treatments for disease were invented. As such people living in developed nations began to enjoy a high standard of living and had a longer life expectancy. At the same time, undeveloped countries still suffered from the spread of common diseases that were being treated in developed nations.

the weAPonizAtion of bioLoGicAL AGentS

As the people living in the more-developed West were enjoying the innovations in public health and medicine, their governments began to research the potential of biological weaponry as a way to gain superiority on the battlefield. Ryan and Glarum note “the German military has the dubious honor of being the first example of using biological weapons following a state-sponsored program.”155 In World War I, the Germans used biological agents against the Allied packhorses and mules in order to slow the movement of supplies to the frontlines. In order to counter the German bio-threat, France and the Soviet Union began development of their own biological weapons program. Both militaries used their existing chemical weapons programs as the basis for research on biological weaponry.

Suffering thousands of casualties from chemical weapons, The Soviet Union wished to prepare itself from



future chemical and biological threats. As such during the 1920s, secret joint chemical and biological weapons testing were carried out in Russia with the Germans.156 By the 1930s the Soviet Military Chemical Agency began research on the offensive capabilities of anthrax and pneumonic plague.157 However due to the purge in the mid-1930s, the Soviet bioweapon program was more or less halted until the end of World War II.

While the Soviet’s efforts were halted during the 1930s, Japan’s pursuit of biological weapons was much more successful. After the end of World War I, the Japanese military formed Unit 731, which was the section of their military devoted to biological weapon research and development.158 Unit 731 was located in Japan-controlled Manchuria where experiments were conducted on Chinese prisoners of war. A post-World War II investigation of Unit 731 revealed that thousands

were exposed to aerosolized anthrax. Some estimate that more than 3000 prisoners were killed in Unit 731 facilities.159 The Japanese military also conducted several biological attacks throughout World War II. At the end of the war, the Japanese had stockpiled 400 kilograms of anthrax to be used in specially designed fragmentation bombs.160

Responding to British requests to begin developing bioweapons, President Roosevelt approved the United States’ biological warfare program. In 1942, the United States started to develop genetically altered biological agents, aerosols, and bombs. The United Kingdom wanted the United States to mass-produce anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for deployment against Nazi Germany in response to any future attack.161 The United Kingdom’s own program was focused on using anthrax spores in conventional bombs. In 1943, a

Unit 731 was notorious for conducting human experimentation, for creating weaponized biological agents for use in the Second World War.

25General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security mishap in testing caused an outbreak of anthrax in sheep and cattle on an island off the coast of Scotland. As such, the British stopped biological weapons research and closed all weapons testing sites.

COLD WAR STATE SPONSORED BIOWEAPON PROGRAMS

During the Cold War, threats to national security

and survival ensured the continuation of state-sponsored bioweapon programs. A principle rationale for these programs was the existence of enemy fears and desire to gain tactical and unconventional advantages over the enemy. These ideas along with new acceptance of total war seemed to justify producing and using biological weapons against soldiers and civilians of the enemy.

As such, the U.S. bioweapons program only continued to grow, in both size and capability, after the Second World War. U.S. proponents of offensive biological weapons argued that the U.S. should continue their research because of their potential to be effective as a counter to a Communist attack. Driven by the fear of a new threat in communism, U.S. experiments to test biological weapons were carried out on research animals. Recent discoveries reveal that “human research volunteers were exposed to actual live agents…to simulate the release of actual pathogens inside buildings or [cities].”162 In 1947, the U.S. government secretly made a deal with Japanese bioweapons scientist from Unit 731 to protect Japan from war crimes prosecutions in exchange for information on Japan’s program and its use of offensive biological weapons during WWII. Through this deal, evidence of Japan’s use of bioweapons on civilians was suppressed.163

In 1977, the U.S. Army acknowledged “239 intentional releases of noninfectious bacteria in bioweapons experiments.”164 The most pressing example of U.S. military experimentation was in 1950, when a U.S. Navy minesweeper released aerosolized bacteria near San Francisco to see what would happen in the event of a biological state-sponsored or terrorist attack. The results of the experiment revealed that the majority of the 800,000 citizens living in San Francisco were exposed to the released biological agents.165

In the 1960s, the United Kingdom began to retreat from its offensive biological weapons program, since it was already armed with a nuclear arsenal. Along with

France, the UK promoted more legal restraints against biological weaponry.166 As such in November 1969, President Nixon cancelled the U.S. offensive biological weapons program. Nixon was concerned that bioweapons did not offer much to U.S. defensive capabilities and that they also undermined nuclear deterrence. Soon after, the U.S. Army Medical Unit (renamed the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases or USAMRIID) began making vaccines and researching defensive strategies instead of producing offensive weapons.167 Nixon also began the process of destroying the United States’ entire bioweapon stockpile.2

After a short interval, The Soviet Union resumed its biological weapons program after the Second World War. In 1946, with captured data from Japanese Unit 731, the Soviet Ministry of Defense began “research, development, testing, production and delivery of numerous agents.”168 Next, the Soviet Union began to build bioweapon testing and research facilities, known as Scientific Field Testing Laboratories, around Moscow and on the Aral Sea. In the late 1960s, when the West began to reduce their offensive weapon stockpiles, the Soviet arsenal included smallpox, Ebola and Lassa fever.169

In the 1970s, the Biopreparat or the Chief Directorate for Biological Preparations was formed. Current statistics note that the Biopreparat included fifty-two biotechnology sites, which were concealed as civilian pharmaceutical labs and had over 50,000 scientists and technicians working on advanced bioweapon technology.170 The Biopreparat’s main objectives were “to develop pathogen strains that could resist vaccines and antibiotics and could degrade victims’ natural defenses and to discover methods of weaponization.”171At its height, the Biopreparat made and stored hundreds of tons of plague, anthrax and smallpox. Within twenty years, it genetically altered almost sixty biological agents to be used offensively. To deploy these pathogens, the Soviet military armed crop-duster planes, medium ranged bombers, cruise missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles.172

There are no confirmed reports of the Soviet Union testing biological weapons on its civilians. However, there have been many instances of outbreaks of bioweapon-tested diseases among the people in the USSR. In 1971 in Kazakhstan, two children and a young woman were killed due to accidental civilian exposure to smallpox. It should be noted that the U.S. currently has the world’s larg-est and most advanced biodefense program. There is debate on whether or not these biodefenses could be converted into offensive weapons.



Tens of thousands received emergency vaccination and hundreds of civilians were quarantined. Moreover in 1979, Sverdlovsk was affected by an accidental release of anthrax from a nearby testing facility. Over the course of this crisis, around 100 people along with animals in a 30-mile radius were killed.173

In 1992, President Yeltsin announced that the Biopreparat’s offensive weapons program was discontinued with the collapse of the USSR. Since then, the conversion of bioweapons facilities and the destruction of offensive weapons have progressed. However, the quantity and condition of the remaining weapons remain in doubt. It was reported that at least four former Soviet military facilities have not allowed inspectors in their doors. Some reports link former Biopreparat scientists and technicians to other bioweapon programs in Iran and North Korea.174

THE ADVENT OF BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

“Extremist groups worldwide are increasingly learning how to manufacture chemical and biological agents, and the potential for additional chemical and biological attacks by such groups continue to grow.” – Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director of the CIA’s Nonproliferation Center175

Although both superpowers of the Cold War had discontinued their biological weapons programs by the early 1990s, faulty security and incomplete disarmament opened the door for terrorist organizations to obtain biological agents. A terrorist has no interest for military-developed weapons that are designed for precision. Instead, any and every weapon that can be used against their enemies to maximize casualties and psychological terror can be employed in a terrorist attack. As such, biological weapons are desired for their efficiency and effectiveness at carrying the goals of terrorist groups. Ryan and Glarum as well as, Wenger and Wollenmann have compiled some of the more important recent attempted and actual cases of biological terrorist attacks:

In 1972, members of the right-wing group Order of the Rising Sun were found in possession of 30-40 kilograms of typhoid bacteria cultures that were allegedly to be used to contaminate the water supplies of several [U.S.] Midwestern cities.

In 1975, the Symbionese Liberation Army was found in possession of technical manuals on how to produce bioweapons.

In 1984, followers of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh contaminated salad bars with Salmonella bacteria in a small town in Oregon. It was the largest scale act of bioterrorism in U.S. history.

In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, A Japanese doomsday cult, became infamous for an act of chemical terrorism, when members released sarin gas into the Tokyo subway. It also attempted to use biological agents in its exploits.176

In October to November 2001, Microbiologist, Dr. Bruce Ivins3 distributed high quality dry powder anthrax spores in envelopes to U.S. citizens in a series of terrorist attacks on the United States in late 2001.177

These instances prove that terrorist groups of all philosophies have sought and actually used biological weapons for their purposes. Two of the more salient and recent examples of biological terrorism are examined below.

CASE STUDY 1: THE RISE OF AUM SHINRIKYO – 1990 TO 1995

At 8:05 A.M. on 20 March 1995, members of Aum Shinrikyo staged a terrorist attack during the rush hour in the Tokyo subway. Five two-person teams dressed in business suits placed plastic pouches concealed in morning newspapers on crowded subway cars, which were traveling on three separate lines converging at a particular station. As the trains reached the main station, the terrorists released the toxic sarin gas contained in the plastic pouches. The liquid sarin began to evaporate and started to spread through the subway cars and within the station. Hundreds of civilians soon experienced

“trouble breathing, headache, chest pain, uncontrolled coughing, choking, vomiting, impairment of hand-eye coordination, and loss of voluntary control of body functions.” Many victims were overcome by the nerve gas and were knocked unconscious.178

The final toll was eleven dead and more than 5,000 injured, with some 1,700 requiring hospitalization.179 The station where the trains converged is at the center of Tokyo’s government district. It was clear that the Aum Shinrikyo terrorists sought to kill members of the Japanese government. Although this attack caused a significant amount of damage, the poor quality of the sarin and the ineffective method of releasing the gas reduced the potential scope of the damage. It is estimated

27General Assembly


that if done more efficiently, this attack could have caused tens of thousands of casualties.

Aum Shinrikyo, officially organized in 1987, is a religious organization that bases its beliefs and teachings on Buddhism and Hinduism. By the time of the attack, it is estimated that Aum Shinrikyo had a membership of 10,000 in Japan and upwards to 30,000 in Russia.180 Aum is now defined as a cult as it displayed a large degree of dominating the loves of its membership. Comprised of mainly adults in their 20s and 30s, Aum requires all members to donate all assets and to cut off relationships with everyone outside of the organization. In return, cult leaders promised spiritual revelation and a path to true happiness and salvation.181 Aum Shinrikyo is also described as a “criminal religion” as its leaders often commited crimes against its members and other innocent citizens.182

The ability of a small religious cult to acquire the “equipment, materials and technical expertise needed to manufacture and deliver a deadly chemical warfare agent”

was astounding and caught the attention of international community.183 However more importantly, Aum was also experimenting with the development of biological agents for a terrorist attack against some cities in Japan. Between 1990 and 1995, Aum had reportedly attempted to attack with biological weapons at least nine times before finally succeeding with the sarin attack in 1995. Aum claimed that it had more than a dozen members trained in the production of biological weapons and even bought a 500,000 acre farm in Australia to test its weapons.184 During this time period, Aum focused on developing biological weapons based on anthrax and botulinum toxin. It has also been reported that they sought to acquire the Ebola virus for offensive use.

By the end of the 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo’s membership declined and its planned attacks after the 1995 subway incident were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, Aum proved that any group, which desires to develop and use biological and chemical weapons, is capable of doing so.

CASE STUDY 2: THE AMERITHRAX LETTER ATTACKS – SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 2001

After the September 11 attacks on various locations in the United States, at least five envelopes containing amounts of Bacillus anthracis or anthrax were mailed to media companies in New York City and Boca Raton, Florida, and to U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy and Thomas Daschle in the District of Columbia.185 The letters in the envelopes contain anti-American and anti-Israeli remarks while making references to the September 11 attacks.

A final evaluation revealed that thirty-five U.S. postal facilities and commercial mailrooms were contaminated with anthrax spores. Moreover the presence of anthrax was detected in seven buildings on Capitol Hill. The U.S. Postal Service closed two heavily contaminated processing and distribution centers and more than 1.8 million letters, packages, magazines, catalogs, and other mailed items were quarantined at these two facilities.186

At least 22 victims were infected with anthrax from the spores contained in the letters. Eleven people contracted anthrax by absorbing it through the skin while eleven other individuals breathed in the spores. Five people who inhaled the spores died from their infections. 31 other people tested positive for some exposure to the anthrax spores. Approximately ten thousand more people were deeded “at risk” and had to take antibiotic treatment.187

The Aum Shinrikyo Sarin Gas attack is a prime example of how an rogue terrorist organization can obtain and deploy biological and chemical agents on civilian targets.



Immediately after the biological attacks, many news outlets and high profile members of the U.S. government speculated that these attacks were linked to Al-Qaeda and the hijackings of September 11. Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney have publically suggested that the anthrax attacks could be a follow up initiated by Al-Qaeda.188 Nevertheless by the end of October, the White House issued a formal statement that the strain of anthrax used in the Amerithrax attacks was different from the anthrax produced by the Iraqi biological weapons program.189 As such it seems unlikely that Al-Qaeda carried out this biological attack.

In 2008, the F.B.I. and the U.S. Department of Justice identified Dr. Bruce Ivins as the individual responsible for the Amerithrax attacks in 2001. As a top biodefense researcher who worked for the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Ivins had access to the specific strain of anthrax used in the terrorist attacks. Other pieces of evidence also link Ivins to the crime, such as his mental health struggles and his actions and statements that indicate guilt. On 1 August 2008, Ivins committed suicide, knowing that the F.B.I. would charge him with the crime.

Recently in 2011, the National Research Council of the National Academies has declared that the evidence used by the F.B.I. to identify Ivins as the one responsible for the attacks was not sufficient. The panel of researchers claims that case against Ivins was largely circumstantial.190 No one reported seeing Ivins prepare the anthrax in the lab or mail the envelopes and, there is no clear motive for why he would launch this biological attack. Furthermore, some researchers specializing in biological warfare have expressed doubt that a vaccine specialist such as Ivin had the skills to process the anthrax into a powder, which was found in the envelopes.191

Regardless of who was responsible for the attack, the Amerithrax incident was a salient example of real threat of biological terrorism. For one, it proved that the United States, and by extension the rest of the international community, lacked a strategy for biological security. With this attack there has been a worldwide movement to prepare against the threat of bioterrorism. It has been ten years since the Amerithrax attacks and it is clear that the United States along with many other member states have made strides in preparing a biodefense for their citizens. However at the same time, these biodefense systems are mainly unproven and are not broad enough to protect the entire population. The threat of a biological terrorist attack still remains high.

current SituAtion

ASSESSING STATE-SPONSORED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS

Today, no state admits to having an active biological weapons program and there is actual proof of any state preparing for an offensive biological attack. No diplomat has challenged the illicit nature of biological weapons and as such, state-sponsored bioweapons programs have all been declared as dismantled. Nevertheless, given the covert nature of biological weapon programs in the past, no state is willing to claim that the world is free of biological weaponry either.

Additionally, virtually any state that haves a reasonably advanced biotechnological sector has the capability to quickly develop offensive weapons.192 As such, the possibility of state-sponsored biological weapons program is still a threat to the international community. Some states are thought to support terrorist organizations. Therefore, there is the possibility of a state assembling a biological weapon for terrorist groups to use against the state’s enemies. Furthermore, states with biodefense or biotech programs necessarily trains scientists and technicians. These individuals would have access to the information and supplies necessary to produce and ultimately use a biological weapon in a terrorist attack.

Currently, bioweapons can be cheaply produced, especially compared to the cost of developing biodefenses against them. Getting access to equipment and the necessary pathogens would not be difficult as it can easily be disguised as biodefense research. There is enough information available for states to prepare different biological agents and weapons to use in various military situations.193 States that are most likely to pursue a bioweapons program are those involved in regional conflicts. The states with bioweapons can easily use them in order to weaken guerilla resistance or entrenched garrisons without damaging the infrastructure. Additionally, current technology allows scientists to genetically alter the biological agents to effect specific populations.194 This factor gives states to pursue bioweapons without the risk of accidently infecting their own military or citizens.

29General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security Examining the extent of state sponsored bioweapon

proliferation is impossible to verify without classified information. As such, the following claims reflect declassified information and other evidence provided by experts on biological warfare and bioterrorism. According to the 2010 Compliance Report issued by the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in the U.S. State Department, there are nine countries that have signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) but are suspected of having a bioweapons program. These countries include China, Cuba, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan and Russia. The Compliance Report also mentions the possible biological warfare-related activities of Taiwan.4 In addition there are also two states, Egypt and Syria, which may have a bioweapons program but have not, ratified the BWC.195 The three states with the highest possibility of having an active bioweapons program, Syria, North Korea and Iran, are also states that have been linked with possessing dangerous motives or with organized terrorist groups.

SYRIA

Most researchers believe that Syria may have a basic biotechnology program that is capable of supporting and making bioweapons. At the same time, it is unlikely that Syria could produce a large bioweapon stockpile without foreign support. In the 1970s, the USSR gave Syria limited biodefense equipment but these are now obsolete. It is unclear if Syria has developed this defensive technology from the Soviet Union since then. In the 1980s Syria has pursued the development of their biotech and pharmaceutical industries.196 Now it is believed that its bio-industries have given them the resources necessary for an offensive program. Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad stated in 2004 that Syria was entitled to defend itself by acquiring its own chemical and biological deterrent.197 The Compliance Report also notes that the Syrian Government has not modified or rescinded this statement, and that Syria has not abandoned its intent to acquire biological weapons.198

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is believed to have begun development of bioweapons in the 1960s. It is also reported that

the North Korean Academy of National Defense built biological labs, recruited foreign microbiologists and gained supplies for the development of weaponized anthrax, cholera and plague from Japan.199 According the Compliance Report,

North Korea may still consider the use of biological weapons as a military option. Available information also indicates North Korea has continued its past effort to acquire specialized equipment, materials, and expertise, some of which could support biological weapon development. North Korea has yet, however, to declare any of its biological research and development activities as part of the BWC confidence-building measures agreed by the States Parties in 1991.200

As recently as 2006, U.S. State Department officials have stated that the U.S. believes that North Korea has the capability to engage in biological warfare and may have developed and produced biological weapons.201 Additionally, half of North Korea’s long-range missiles and a third of its artillery shells are capable of delivering biological agents.202

IRAN

Iran has been openly accused of working with a number of terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. It is also accused of having offensive bioweapon capabilities. In 1988, then Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani stated “…we should fully equip ourselves in defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.”203 In 2005 reports indicate that Iran has hidden its biological weapons program in its biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in order to keep its activities secret.204 Due to its military infrastructure and biotechnology, Iran could support a bioweapons program without foreign assistance. Recently, Iran has conducted

“chemical and biological defense military strategies” with helicopters and has altered various missile systems to support a biological attack.205 The 2010 Compliance Report states that Iran is still conducting research on biological agents and weaponization and developing mechanisms to deliver agents.206

EXAMINING THE CURRENT STATE OF BIOTERRORISM

While state-sponsored bioweapon programs are dangerous, non-state terrorist groups using bioweapons



is a greater and more realistic threat to the security of the international community. It is widely believed that several terrorist organizations have expressed interest in obtaining biological weapons. Due to worldwide advances in biotechnology and the amount of information available through the Internet, extremist groups worldwide are increasingly learning how to develop biological offensive capabilities.207 A terrorist group that can combine the capability and motivation to use bioweapons will “pose the novel threat of a non-state actor capable of inflicting catastrophic damage against a perceived enemy.”208

Terrorism experts have identified extremist religious groups, particularly those with an apocalyptic worldview as the most likely terrorists to seek nuclear, biological or chemical weapons for the purpose of causing mass causalities.209 Extremist religious groups such as Al Qaeda and Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo do not have broad memberships that they may risk alienating if they choose to use biological weapons. In addition their beliefs may justify using bioweapon as well as other WMDs against nonbelievers.210 Moreover, groups that have ties with state governments, especially those with bioweapon producing capabilities such as Iran or Iraq, can easily obtain bioweapons.

Terrorists are likely to choose four different methods to obtain biological agents: purchase from legitimate suppliers, theft, self-production, and the use of materials, which are naturally contaminated.211 Bioterrorist attacks can come in the form of contaminating food and crops to “suspending pathogens or toxins in a wet or dry formulation and dispersing them over a target area as aerosolized particles.”212

It is important to note that the probability that terrorist would carry out airborne attacks with biological agents within the next five years is low.213 The reasons are that it is technically difficult to produce pathogens and to create the mechanisms necessary to launch the biological attack. For most terrorist groups this task is too difficult so, they will turn to small-scale biological attacks aimed to take out certain people instead of eliminating a large population. With this being said, the case of Aum Shinrikyo proves that anything is possible and ignoring this potential threat is not recommended.

CASE STUDY: AL QAEDA – LATE 1990S TO PRESENT

The main bioterrorist fear in the world is Al Qaeda and its affiliated Islamic Fundamentalist organizations.

These groups are consistently opposed to the United States and its Western allies and have openly stated their intentions to produce and use biological weapons. It is unclear if these threats are exaggerations or if they truly are actively pursuing or planning to use bioweapons.

As early as 1994, Osama bin Laden declared his interest in obtaining weapons of mass destruction, including those with biological attack capabilities. The eleventh book of Al Qaeda’s instructions for Jihad is focused on chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, according to statements made after 9/11, Al Qaeda has been planning to eliminate the Jewish population in Iran by pumping poisons in air conditioning systems where they live and work.214 In 1999, Bin Laden sought to acquire agents such as anthrax, ebola, botulinum, plague and other pathogens through the mail from sources in the former Soviet Union, East Asia, Sudan, Afghanistan and the Czech Republic.215 In 2000, some Al Qaeda operatives are believed to have purchased anthrax and plague from arms dealers in Kazakhstan. More importantly, they have claimed that biological weapons are considered the least complicated and easiest to produce weapon of mass destruction. In addition, an Al Qaeda website stated, “these [biological] weapons are also considered to be the most affordable. With $50,000 a group of amateurs can possess a biological weapon sufficient to threat a superpower.”216

In 2003, a senior Al Qaeda figure, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was arrested. Authorities seized handwritten notes and computer hard drives, which contained information on producing biological agents but not suggesting actual production or the capacity to do so.217 Mohammed told authorities about Al Qaeda operatives who reportedly were college educated and had worked in military labs in foreign countries.218

In 2004, declassified documents were released to the public, which reveal books and research papers dealing with pathogens, and biological weapons, which were found in an Al Qaeda training camp.219 While half of the information pertained to historical or general topics on bioweapons which would be useless for producing a weapon, at least some information could have been used for said purpose. These documents also indicated that Al Qaeda recruited individuals which Ph.D.-level expertise who were familiar with current scientific advances. The books and journals were specifically concerned with anthrax, botulinum and plague.220

In 2005, the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding

31General Assembly


Weapons of Mass Destruction was declassified. The report concluded that Al Qaeda’s bioweapon program was more advanced than previously thought. Specifically it states that,

Al Qaeda’s biological program was further along, particularly with regard to Agent X5, than pre-war intelligence indicated. The program was extensive, well-organized, and operated for two years before September 11…The program involved several sites in Afghanistan. Two of these sites contained commercial equipment and were operated by individuals with special training…Reporting supports the hypothesis that Al Qaeda had acquired several biological agents…and had the necessary equipment to enable limited, basic production of Agent X.221

CURRENT BIODEFENSE AND BIOSECURITY CAPABILITIES

Biological defense is composed of three categories. The first are physical barriers that prevent pathogens from entering the body. These include masks, full body

5 Believed to be Anthrax

suits and other protective gear. Second are medical treatments such as those for prevention and post-exposure responses. The third category includes military options, from preemptive tactical strikes against enemy biological emplacements to strategic deterrence based on the possibility of retaliation.222

Since a biological attack would most likely be in the form of an aerosol cloud, it is vital to have a good first line of defense in the form of physical barriers. For such an attack to cause symptoms in the target population, the biological agent must be breathed in through the nose or mouth. The most effective defense in this instance is the use of masks or respirators. The masks used by militaries during the early 2000s were effective but could not be worn comfortably for long periods of time.223 New developments have led to the production of lightweight, high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter masks that can be worn for extended periods of time. Future protective masks should be lightweight, allow for maximum vision while protecting the eyes and have increased layers of HEPA filter material.224

Proactive medical measures that can be used in the case of a biological attack include vaccination and

While the bioweapon capabilities of Al Qaeda are unknown, most experts agree that the threat of an Al Qaeda biological attack on an major civilian population remains high.



taking certain antibiotics before exposure. However these methods are not ideal for protecting military forces. Effective vaccines exist for anthrax and botulism, but the majority of the military and almost all of the public have not received these vaccinations. Prophylactic antibiotics are expensive to produce, expire quickly, cause side effects and may be useless if the agent used is resistant to antibiotics.225

Medical options after exposure rely on first determining what agent is causing the symptoms and then giving the correct treatment.226 When identifying the biological agent at work, clinical algorithms can be used. However more often than not, a complete examination should be conducted to reaffirm the diagnosis. Further testing in labs can rapidly confirm the presence of the agent used in the biological attack. Over the last few years, identification has become easier as scientists can now focus on a more narrow range of agents. Increased intelligence and studies give doctors and scientists a better understand of which biological agents pose a real threat and what can be treated easily.227 Medical treatment needs to start immediately after symptoms are detected in order to maximize saved lives. Once a biological attack is confirmed and the pathogens are confirmed, proper treatment can be administered quickly.

Nonetheless, biological attacks often present many difficulties, which can overwhelm hospitals or medical treatment centers. In a fully realized biological attack, supplies will be low, space for patients will be minimal and deaths will occur no matter what. If doctors are unable to identify the biological agents or if the pathogens have been genetically altered to resist conventional drugs, the biological attack could reach disastrous results. Therefore it is imperative for government biodefense programs to continue researching and developing new medical options.

If a state is aware of an impending biological attack it has the option to use military force to preemptively take out enemy bioweapons and defend itself. As such, strategic and tactical military actions are important for any comprehensive defense planning. Intelligence plays a large role in biodefense. If a state knows how the enemy will attack or what agent they will use, then it can properly prepare beforehand. The further development of battlefield biological agent detection systems would be a significant addition to biodefense.228

reLevAnt un ActionS

The first international treaty that dealt with biological weapons was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which was passed into international law in 1928.229 The protocol called for the banning the use of chemical and biological weapons but, it did not include clauses on the development, transfer or stockpiling of biological weapons. Overall the Geneva Protocol was a good first step towards biological nonproliferation. However the lack of its scope made it an ineffective treaty at prohibiting countries from developing bioweapons programs during and after the Second World War.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 is an important international agreement aimed at reducing the threat of biological warfare. The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, or other methods of acquiring microbial or other biological agents or toxins, “whatever their origin, method of production, or types, in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.”230 It also prohibits the development or stockpiling of biological weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.231 At the same time the BWC allows states to pursue biological technology for peaceful purposes. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), however, there is no accurate verification mechanism for ensuring compliance with the BWC. The CWC requires declarations based on classes of chemicals

The signing of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention was a huge step in curbing the proliferation of bioterrorism. None-theless, the international community still needs to develop a more comprehensive defense against a possible bioterror attack.

33General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security that pose varying degrees of threats and various levels of inspections to ascertain compliance.232

After the BWC was passed into international law in 1975, five follow up conferences have convened to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful biological activities and to review and to analyze new information and data.233 The Sixth Review Conference held in 2006 adopted a detailed plan for promoting universal adherence, and decided to update and streamline the procedures for submission and distribution of the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). Moreover, the conference also agreed to establish an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to assist States parties in implementing the convention. The roles of ISUs include streamlining administrative and general support for nations wishing to work towards the goals established by the BWC.234 Moreover, an Ad Hoc Group of State Parties to the BWC has met periodically since 1994 in Geneva with the purpose of developing a legally binding protocol that could monitor compliance with the BWC. The Ad Hoc Group has been trying to strike a balance between guarding against the development of biological weapons, protecting intellectual property, and ensuring the performance of essential biomedical research—all of which will enhance national and global security.235

The General Assembly has also passed several resolutions concerning the matter of biological weapons and bioterrorism. Most recently in 2006, the U.N. passed resolution 60/288 which detailed a global counter-terrorism strategy.236This resolution outlined measures to “address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,” “to prevent and combat terrorism,” “to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard” as well as measures to, “ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.”237 It also encouraged the Secretary-General to use all the resources available to him to conduct investigations on suspected states.238

Currently the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs “provides substantive and organizational support for norm-setting in the area of disarmament through the work of the General Assembly and its First Committee…It fosters disarmament measures through dialogue, transparency and confidence-building on military matters, and encourages regional disarmament efforts.”239 It also provides “objective, impartial and up-to-date information on multilateral disarmament issues and activities to Member States,”

which is important for future developments and agreements in the international community against bioweapon proliferation and bioterrorism.240

ProPoSed SoLutionS

The threat of bioterrorism is by no means easily comprehendible. Many different factors, including the peaceful development of biotechnology, contribute to the very real problem of a possible biological threat. As such, formulating a comprehensive strategy is difficult for even a state acting unilaterally, let alone the entire international community working for communally agreeable policies. Note that the following solutions are by no means comprehensive; there are many different approaches and ideas to solve the issue of bioterrorism. Additionally, the delegates should note that some of the following solutions might conflict with their country policies.

The first possible defensive option is altering previous international treaties or writing a new one that can actually restrict the spread of bioweapons and the information and materials necessary to construct one.241 The BWC has failed to prevent states from producing bioweapons so in turn, it is even less effective at stopping terrorists, who are not even bound by the treaty, from gaining weapons. However what the BWC actually does is highlight the commitment of the international community to stop biological weapon proliferation. Therefore, strengthening multilateral mechanisms by fostering cooperation and addressing new threats is a major step in the right direction. However it is not easy to revise the BWC or write a more effective treaty. The fact is, as technology improves and as new biological studies are released, acquiring materials and having the information necessary to develop bioweapons is getting easier. Second, there is no viable way to verify that resources that are transferred are not given to terrorist groups or are not being used for hostile uses. Instead a new BWC or new treaty should focus on multilateral passive biodefenses such as mass producing vaccines or developing antibiotics for preemptive measures.242 In addition working out a new mechanism for inspection and verification that is more agreeable than the one currently in place is undoubtedly important.



An effective biodefense relies on the early detection of a biological attack. Therefore, another solution the international community should pursue is the development and sharing of biosensors. Biosensors are electronic devices that identify the existence of dangerous biological agents in the air.243 After 9/11, early detection of biological agents has been the focus of attention and an area of rapid development. Specifically air monitoring, cloud detection or biological integrated detection systems (BIDS) are being developed by the West.244

Another option that the international community can take to reduce the risk of the proliferation of biological weapons is increasing “translucency” and building confidence.245 As with nuclear and chemical research, development of biotechnology is completely legal under the current international law. However there is always the possibility of state developing weapons under the guise of lawful biological research. Without confidence, the states accused of building bioweapons and the states accusing them cannot engage in effective negotiation to solve the problem. States have no incentive to trust one another and will continue to point fingers without actually doing anything productive.

It is impossible to ask a state to declassify all of its information, especially important ones regarding biotechnology. However it is possible to come up with a framework where states can share informative, non-specific details that prove that they are not developing offensive bioweapons. This is the difference between transparency and “translucency.” It is understandable that each state has information that is classified and cannot be shared. However by implementing translucency polices, the international community can confirm a state’s peaceful intentions.

The protection of air circulation systems and water supplies is another factor that contributes to global biodefense. Air filters can be installed in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning devices to stop the flow of biological agents.246 However, it is not cheap or easy to reinforce current air circulation systems, especially in large, open air environments such as airports. Over time, new construction codes can be enacted that require some form of air filtration defense. Improving water security is a far easier task as a bioterrorist attack on a developed nation’s water supplies would need enough biological agents to bypass filtration and other water-cleaning agents. Still an attack on developing areas can have devastating

results. As such, water quality testing methods for detecting contamination should be developed.

QueStionS A reSoLution muSt AnSwer

How can the international community strengthen the current ban of the proliferation of biological weapons?

What kind of mechanisms should the implemented in order to ensure that countries do not develop chemical weaponry behind closed doors? What can to the international community do to make the production and research of biological weaponry more transparent?

What should countries do in order to prepare in the event of a biological attack? What can the individual countries do in response to a biological attack against a neighboring or allied country? How should the international community act in instance of a biological attack?

Should the international community focus on preventing a biological terrorist attack or deterring terrorists from using biological weaponry?

What types of biological weapons are most dangerous to the security of the international community?

bLoc PoSitionS

Given the fact that every state necessarily is opposed to being the victim of a bioterror attack, there are no nonnegotiable barriers that would bar one particular nation from engaging with or negotiating with another nation. With that being said, each country’s individual policies and strategies for defense against biological attacks and positions on the proliferation of biological technology can be differentiated. Inevitably, many nations will offer different solutions, some of which may have conflicting points. Additionally the always-sensitive area of national sovereignty and how much one state allows foreign or NGO intervention can divide countries when developing a solution. As such, there are numerous bloc configurations for this topic.

NON-SIGNATORIES OF THE BWC AND STATES

35General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security THAT HAVE NOT RATIFIED THE TREATY

States that agree to disarmament treaties need to be convinced that the advantages of joining the treaty outweigh all possible disadvantages. For most states, eliminating all biological weapons reduces the danger that bioweapons pose. In this case for some states, the treaty as a whole may be agreeable but, some finer points could push some states away from signing and ratifying it. States that have signed but have not ratified the BWC include Burma, Egypt, Haiti, Syria and more. States that are not party to the treaty at all include Cameroon, Chad, Israel and more.

Specifically, these nations that do not fully agree with Biological Weapons Convention find fault with points in Articles VII and X of the treaty. Article VII commits parties to provide assistance to any party that is endangered by a violation of a treaty.247 Clearly, this point would be disagreeable to those nations that simply do not have the resources to provide assistance. Article X allows states to partake in the “exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.”248 However, the treaty discriminates between countries that export and import information and materials for peaceful biological development. Article X places regulatory restrictions on counties looking to gain information. As such, the nations within this category complain that they would not receive as many benefits as those counties that export biotechnology.

SUSPECTED COUNTRIES WITH STATE-SPONSORED BIOWEAPON PROGRAMS

As discussed above, the almost-taboo nature of developing offensive weapons there are no states that have openly disclosed information regarding the existence of their bioweapons program. Nevertheless given the evidence and disclosed information gained from various sources, including the U.S. government, it is safe to assume that there are nations that are suspected to possess offensive biological weapons (listed above). It is hard to believe that this group would ever get together to propose a resolution that legalizes biological weapons. Instead these nations could work together to make sure any U.N. resolution or international treaty passed does not interfere with their national sovereignty. It is hard to say, if states that fall in this category could work

together at all. Many states that may have a bioweapon arsenal have political rivals that may also have biological offensive capabilities.

STATES WITH DEVELOPING BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES

As nations begin to industrialize their economies and develop their infrastructure, research and development of biotechnology is inevitable. Continued biotech research is invaluable to improving and sustaining humanity’s wellbeing. Over the decade, biotech has seen a massive boom as more and more countries are investing in developing their medical, agricultural, and industrial sectors, which all depend on biological research.

At the same time, there is always the risk of a developing state to use its biotech to produce offensive weapons. With this being said, this is the fastest growing category and its political position has not been more important. Most countries in the category are those in the developing world including, Most of South America, some of Western Europe, India, some of the Middle East, and some of Southeast Asia.

This bloc’s position on this issue varies and each state’s prior economic and political alliances may dictate where they stand. As they do not want to hinder their biotechnological development, this group will be against any pressures to impede the trade and transfer of materials and information on biological research. However this does not mean that this group is inherently against implementing international protocols to make it more difficult for terrorists from gaining bioweapon-producing capabilities.

STATES WITH DEVELOPED BIODEFENSE PROGRAMS

The countries within this category are those that have highly developed biotechnological and pharmaceutical industries, which allow them to actively research and develop new biodefenses. These states include the majority of the developed world including the P-5, most of Western Europe, Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and others. Since these nations have both the resources and infrastructure necessary to produce biodefenses, they would be expected to give the most support and aid to a country that is a victim



of a bioterrorist attack. Additionally these countries are those most likely to advocate stricter policies in regards to the transfer of information and materials necessary for developing biotechnology. As seen with the historical case studies mentioned above, these countries are also the most likely victims of a bioterrorist attack. As such, it is hard to say how much these nations are willing to cooperate with nations suspected of possessing bioweapons. Also, it is important to note that there are countries that fall in this category that may or may not have biological weapons.

STATES UNABLE TO DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE PROGRAMS

Nations that are incapable of defending themselves against a biological attack or developing an offensive bioweapon arsenal are another possible bloc. These nations include the vast majority of the developing world including almost all of Africa, most of Eastern Europe, parts of the Middle East, parts of South America, most of Southeast Asia, and others. These nations are in a particular situation, as they do not have the resources necessary to either help or hinder the problem of bioterrorism. In fact, these states are the least likely to be victims of a bioterrorist attack. However, this does not preclude that possibility that some biological disaster could strike. In the event of a biological attack within their borders, they would benefit from a strong and coordinated relief effort from outside forces with sufficient aid and money to support their own efforts. However, they are mostly incapable of assisting others in a biological disaster and would be against a resolution by the international community that demands all nation-states to contribute funds or resources for an international biodefense framework.

SuGGeStionS for further reSeArch

The first place to look for research will always be your nation’s government website. However, not many counties in the world have clearly articulated policies on biological terrorism. Additionally looking through the UN website, especially the website of the UNODA, will provide a good historical background on international treaties and previous UN actions for this issue. For more information on biological weapons and biological agents,

it is recommended that you check out the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s website. It has a huge database of biological agents used in bioterrorism attacks. Other sites include the European Union health portal, the Red Cross, or any other health related sites that have information on bioweapon agents.

Don’t forget to look at the websites of major thinktanks such as the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institute. These thinktanks produce well-formulated and well-written reports and policy recommendations on the topic of nuclear nonproliferation. Hopefully, between this study guide and those sites, you will have a strong background and plenty of solutions in time for the conference.

As further developments unfold, it is highly recommended that you use these news and policy sites to remain fully informed. Also consider sources that play to your specific country’s policy. Try searching for domestic news sources that will capture your state’s public opinion and governmental policy.

PoSition PAPerS

Position papers serve to focus and distill the research you have done thus far into a clear and structured format with regard to your country’s position on the given topics. While designed to allow the staff to understand your country’s stance on the topic, it is also an opportunity for you to address some of the basic questions we will be debating during committee. Another way to view the position paper is seeing it as your country’s mandate on a given issue. It will your responsibility tin committee to assume the policy of your respective country, and the easiest way to ensure you fulfill this requirement is to write this paper.

The position paper is to be written in English, typed, with Times New Roman font size 12. Please refrain from adjusting the margins from their standard MLA sizes. The position paper is composed of three parts. The first is the statement of the problem through the lens of your respective countries. The second covers what your country has done in regards to the issues being discussed. The final part, which should also be the longest, should include your proposed solutions for the problem. You must provide a set of solutions that follows your country’s policy as close as possible. Nonetheless, creativity is also encouraged. While this section does not need to be exhaustive due to the page constraints, it

37General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security should provide a glimpse of the many ideas you wish to present.

cLoSinG remArkS

It is my hope that my selected topics, cyberwarefare and bioterrorism, have peaked your interest for debate come January. Both issues are of urgent international consideration and are subject to a wide-range of influence and change. From political, military, social and economic factors, the multifaceted nature of these topics should yield exciting points of contentions and compromise in committee.

It should be noted that this study guide, although very long, is by no means exhaustive and that further research is strongly suggested. Please set some time leading up to conference to research and prepare your country’s stance on the given topics. Due to the volatile and ever-evolving nature of these topics, I am positive that much has developed since my writing of this guide. I highly recommend you all to stay up to date with current affairs – you will be surprised by how much you can learn from reading a few articles.

Finally if you find yourself puzzled at what your country policy exactly is after researching, seek out block and ally positions and stick to them. Additional please note that much of what defines how committee will unfold will take place during session so do not let the details overwhelm you. Stick to big ideas and how your country views those ideas. And as always, do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or concerns that you may have. You cannot imagine how excited I am for HMUN 2012 and I look forward to meeting all of you in January. Good luck and have fun!

endnoteS

1 “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly” June 2011 <http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/

background.shtml>.

2 “Charter of the United Nations” June 2011 < http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml>.

3 “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly” June 2011

4 “Charter of the United Nations” June 2011

5 “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization” June < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/

untso/>.

6 “Charter of the United Nations” June 2011

7 “Emergency Special Sessions” June 2011 <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml>.

8 William A. Owens, et al., eds. Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use

of Cyberattack Capa bilities, (Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, National Research Council,

2009) S-1.

9 James Adams. “Virtual Defense”, Foreign Affairs 2001, August 2011 98.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Rex Hughes. “A Treaty for Cyberspace” International Affairs 2010, August 2011 523.

13 Nathan Hodge, ‘General: we just might nuke those cyber-attackers’, WIRED, 13 May 2009, <http://

www.

wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/general-we-just-might-nuke-those-cyber-attackers/>, August 2011.

14 Hughes. “A Treaty for Cyberspace” International Affairs 524.

15 Ibid.

16 Owens, Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capa

bilities 2.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 David A. Fulghum, “Cyberwar Takes Shape,” Aviation Week & Space Technology August 2011: 48.

22 Owens 2.

23 Ibid.

24 Christopher Drew and John Markoff, “Contractors Vie for Plum Work, Hacking for U.S.,” New York

Times 31 May 2009: 1.

25 Owens 2.

26 “Herman Hollerith”, <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/hollerith.html> August 2011.

27 “The Harvard Mark 1 is Operational” < http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?era=1940>

August 2011.

28 “The Colossus” < http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?era=1940> August 2011.

29 “The First Webpage” <http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?id=1274> August 2011.

30 Ibid.

31 “Feature of the Future ARPANET”< http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?id=1084> August

2011.

32 “TCP/IP” < ttp://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?id=1168> August 2011.

33 “Defining Malware: FAQ” Microsoft Technet <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd632948.

aspx>. August 2011

34 Ibid.

35 David Chandler “No System Immune from ‘Virus’ Attack” Boston Globe 4 Dec. 1988 < http://pqasb.

pqarchiver.com/boston/access/59679950.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date

=Dec+04%2C+1988&author=David+L.+Chandler%2C+Globe+Staff&pub=Boston+Globe+(pre-

1997+Fulltext)&desc=NO+SYSTEM+IMMUNE+FROM+’VIRUS’+ATTACK&pqatl=google> August

2011.

36 Ibid.

37 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2008 < http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_

papers/b-whitepaper_exec_summary_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf>. August

2011 2.

38 Daniel Tynan “Zombie PCs: Silent, Growing Threat” PCWorld 2004 < http://www.pcworld.com/

article/116841/zombie_pcs_silent_growing_threat.html> August 2011.

39 Ibid.

40 Mary Landesman “Malware Revolution: A Change in Target” Mircosoft Technet 2007 < http://technet.

microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc512596.aspx>. August 2011.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2.

44 Ibid.

45 Landesman “Malware Revolution: A Change in Target”

46 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2.

47 Ibid.

48 Thom Shanker and David Sanger, “Privacy May Be a Victim in Cyberdefense Plan,” New York Times

August 2011 3.

49 Brenner 386.

50 Ibid.

51 Anthony Cordesman and Justin Cordesman Cyberthreats, Information Warfare, and Critical

Infrastructure Protection: Defending the U.S. Homeland (Westport: Praeger 2002) 28.

52 Steven Emerson “Jihadi Media Joins Facebook” Modern Tokyo Times 11 June 2011 <http://

moderntokyotimes.com/2011/06/11/jihadi-media-joins-facebook/> August 2011.

53 “A New Role for Jihadi Media” The Investigative Project on Terrorism 11 January 2011 <http://www.

investigativeproject.org/2487/a-new-role-for-jihadi-media>. August 2011

54 Cordesman Cyberthreats 28.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Susan Brenner “At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare” The

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 2007 < http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/

stable/pdfplus/40042831.pdf>. August 2011 421.

58 Brenner 422.

59 Brenner 423.



60 “Marching off to Cyberwar,” Economist 6 Dec. 2008 < http://www.economist.com/node/12673385>

August 2011.

61 Ibid.

62 Jeff Carr, Russia/Georgia Cyber War – Findings and Analysis, Project Grey Goose: Phase 1 Report, 17

Oct. 2008 < http://www.scribd.com/doc/6967393/Project-Grey-Goose-Phase-I-Report> August 2011.

63 Ibid.

64 “Marching off to Cyberwar,” Economist 6 Dec. 2008 < http://www.economist.com/node/12673385>

August 2011.

65 Carr 3.

66 Owens 188.

67 Hughes 523.

68 Dimitrios Delibasis “Information warfare operations within the concept of individual self-defense,”

Cyber Conflict and Global Politics (London: Routledge 2009) 96.

69 Ibid.

70 Hughes 531.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Hughes 532.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Hughes 533.

79 Ibid.

80 Owens 1.

81 Owens 19.

82 Ibid.

83 Owens 20.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Brenner 433,

93 Hughes 533.

94 Ibid.

95 Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare O’Reilly Media, Inc. 23 Dec. 2009 < http://proquest.safaribooksonline.

com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/book/networking/security/9781449377229/the-legal-status-of-cyber-

warfare/the_legal_status_of_cyber_warfare>August 2011.

96 Ibid.

97 Ownes 22.

98 Ibid.

99 Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare

100 Ibid.

101 Gary Rawnsley “The laws of the playground: Information warfare and propaganda across the Taiwan

Strait” Cyber Conflict and Global Politics (London: Routledge 2009) 79.

102 Ibid.

103 Rawnsley 80.

104 Ibid.

105 Rawnsley 82.

106 Rawnsley 81.

107 Rawnsley 91.

108 Giles Trendle “Cyberwar” The World Today 2002 August 2011 < http://www.jstor.org/stable/40476658>

7.

109 Ibid.

110 Sabine Saad, Stephane Bazan, Christophe Varin “Asymmetric Cyber-warfare between Israel and

Hezbollah: The Web as a new strategic battlefield” Web of Science <http://www.websci11.org/fileadmin/

websci/Posters/96_paper.pdf> August 2011.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Owens 206.

115 Saad “Asymmetric Cyber-warfare between Israel and Hezbollah: The Web as a new strategic battlefield”

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Owens 1.

119 “Pay more Attention to Cyberwarfare, Verification, Secretary-General Advises in Remarks to Advisory

Board on Disarmament Affairs” United Nations Department of Public Information 18 Feb. 2009 <http://

www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12108.doc.htm>. August 2011.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 “Fortifying Regional Disarmament and Security, Countering Potential Cyberwarfare, Misuse of Dual-

Purpose Technologies, Focus of Debate in First Committee” United Nations Department of Public

Information 21 October 2010 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gadis3419.doc.htm> August

2011.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.

126 Fulghum 48.

127 Ibid.

128 Hughes 536.

129 James Adams, “The Future of War,” Interactive Week, No vember 27, 2000 August 2011

130 Ibid.

131 Carr 32.

132 Carr 33.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.

135 Carr 33-34.

136 Fortifying Regional Disarmament and Security” August 2011.

137 John Arquila and David Ronfeldt, “Cyber War Is Coming,” Comparative Strategy Vol. 12: 141.

138 Nicholas J. Beeching, David Dance, Alastair Miller, Robert Spencer “Biological Warfare and

Bioterrorism” British Medical Journal 2002, June 2011 <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.

edu/stable/25227413>. 336

139 Laura Meyerson, Jamie Reaser “Bioinvasions, bioterrorism, and biosecurity” Frontiers in Ecology and

the Environment 2003, June 2011 <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/3868091>.

140 George Marshall “Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Techniques” European Center

for Security Studies 2008, June 2011 < http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/

College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper20-en.pdf>.

141 Ronald Atlas “Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism” American Institute of

Biological Sciences 1999, June 2011 < http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/10.1525/

bisi.1999.49.6.465>.

142 Beeching 337.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.

145 Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, Bartlett JG, Ascher MS, Eitzen E, Friedlander AM, et al. “Anthrax as a

Biological Weapon” The Journal of the American Medical Association 1999, June 2011 <http://jama.

ama-assn.org/issues/v281nl8/fiull/jst80027.html>.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.

148 Laurie Garrett “The Nightmare of Bioterrorism” Council on Foreign Relations 2001, June 2011 < http://

www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/20050044> 74.

149 Beeching 338.

150 Garrett 77.

151 Seth Carus “Biological Warfare Threats in Perspective” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 1998, June

2011 < http://informahealthcare.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/10408419891294299>.

153-154

152 Jeffery Ryan and Jan Glarum Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological

Threats Elsevier Inc. 2008 7.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Ryan and Glarum, 9.

156 Malcolm Dando, Bioterror and Biowarfare Oneworld Publishers Oxford 2006, 25.

157 Ibid.

158 Andreas Wenger and Reto Wollenmann Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat Lynne Rienner

Publishers Boulder 2007, 15


160 Ibid.

161 Ryan and Glarum,

162 Ibid.

163 Wenger and Wollenmann 17.


165 Ibid.

166 Wenger and Wollenmann, 16.

39General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security 167 Barry Kellman, Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge 2007 58-59.

168 Kellman, 59.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid.

172 Kellman, Bioviolence: 60.

173 Ibid.

174 Kellman, Bioviolence: 61.

175 Renae Merle, “Bioterror Antidote: Unfilled Prescription, “Washington Post, January 16, 2007, June

2011 < http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/1194967441.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=AB

S:FT&date=Jan+16%2C+2007&author=Renae+Merle++Washington+Post+Staff+Writer&pub=The+W

ashington+Post&edition=&startpage=D.1&desc=Bioterror>.



178 Jonathan Tucker “Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat” Politics and the Life

Sciences 1996, June 2011 < http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/pdfplus/4236227.

pdf>. 167.

179 Tucker “Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat” 167-168.

180 Daniel Metraux “Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo” Asian Survey 1995,

June 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645835>. 1140.

181 Metraux 1141.

182 Ibid.

183 Tucker 168.

184 Steven Block “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons: The terrorist threat is very real, and it’s

about to

get worse. Scientists should concern themselves before it’s too late” American Scientist 2001, June 2011 < http://

www.jstor.org/stable/27857397>. 31.

185 The United States Department of Justice, Amerithrax Investigative Summary 19 Feburary, 2010, July

2011 < http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigative-summary.pdf>. 1.

186 The United States Department of Justice, Amerithrax Investigative Summary 3.

187 The United States Department of Justice, Amerithrax Investigative Summary 2-3.

188 James Meek “FBI was told to blame Anthrax scare on Al Qaeda by White House Officials” New York Daily

News, 2 August 2008, July 2011 < http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2008/08/02/2008-08-02_

fbi_was_told_to_blame_anthrax_scare_on_a.html>.

189 “No proof of Iraqi contamination” The Washington Times, 29 October 2001, July 2011 < http://www.

washingtontimes.com/news/2001/oct/29/20011029-030543-6024r/>.

190 Joe Palca “FBI Faulted for Overstating Science in Anthrax Case” NPR 15 February 2011, July

2011 < http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133775495/fbi-faulted-for-overstating-science-in-anthrax-

case?ft=1&f=1001>.

191 “Scientist’s Suicide Linked to Anthrax Inquiry” New York Times 2 August 2008, July 2011 < http://www.

nytimes.com/2008/08/02/washington/02anthrax.html>.

192 Kellman, 66.

193 Kellman, 68.

194 Ibid.

195 U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and

Disarmament Agreements and Commitments July 2010, July 2011 < http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/145181.pdf>. 10.

196 Kellman, 71.

197 U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control 24.

198 Ibid.

199 Kellman, 69.


201 Ibid.

202 Kellman, 69.

203 Kellman, 70.

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.


207 Kellman, 71.

208 Gregorg Koblentz “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological

Warfare” International Security 2004, July 2011 < http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137478>. 103.

209 Koblentz 102.

210 Koblentz 103.

211 V.M Kalia “Bio-Terrorism: Threat Perception” BioTerrorism and BioDefense Ajay Kumar Jain for

Manohar Publishers & Distributors New Delhi 2005 92-93.

212 V.M Kalia “Bio-Terrorism: Threat Perception” 93.

213 Ibid.

214 Kellman, 73.

215 Kellman, 77.

216 Ibid.

217 Milton Leitenberg “Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism in the First Years of the Twenty-First Century”

Politics and the Life Sciences 2002, July 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4236667>. 17

218 Ibid.


220 Ibid.

221 The Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons

of Mass Destruction March 31, 2005, July 2011 < http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.

pdf>.

222 Stanley Wiener “Biological Warfare Defense” Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense Lynne

Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2000. 119.

223 Wiener 120.

224 Ibid.

225 Wiener 121.

226 Wiener 122.

227 Wiener 123.

228 Wiener 127.

229 “1925 Geneva Protocol” July 2011 < http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/1925GenevaProtocol.

shtml>.

230 Atlas “Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism”

231 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological

(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 1972, July 2011 <http://www.un.org/

disarmament/WMD/Bio/pdf/Text_of_the_Convention.pdf>.


233 “The Biological Weapons Convention” July 2011 < http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/>.

234 “Role of the Implementation Support Unit” July 2011 < http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/

(httpPages)/F8521A510F455706C12573A6003F49F2?OpenDocument>.


236 UN Resolution 60/288. The United Nations Global CounterTerrorism Strategy 20 September

2006, July 2011 < http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.

pdf?OpenElement>.

237 Ibid.

238 Ibid.

239 “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs” July 2011 < http://www.un.org/disarmament/

HomePage/about_us/aboutus.shtml>.

240 Ibid.

241 V.M Kalia 112.

242 V.M Kalia 113.

243 Ibid.

244 Wiener 127.

245 Kellman, 214.

246 Kellman, 165.

247 Hassan Mashhadi “Biological Warfare and Disarmament Problems, Perspectives and Possible Solutions”

Politics and the Life Sciences 1999, July 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4236468>. 100

248 Ibid.



APPENDIX

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, entered into force Mar. 25, 1975.

The States Parties to this Convention,Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including

the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures,

such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents, Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:ARTICLE IEach State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or

otherwise acquire or retain:1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in

quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

ARTICLE IIEach State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible

but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

ARTICLE III

41General Assembly

Disarmament and International Security Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly,

and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

ARTICLE IVEach State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary

measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

ARTICLE VThe States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems,

which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

ARTICLE VI1. Any State Party to this Convention, which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations

deriving from the provisions of the Convention, may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

ARTICLE VIIEach State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United

Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger a result of violation of the Convention.

ARTICLE VIIINothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed

by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

ARTICLE IXEach State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons

and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

ARTICLE X1. The State Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest

possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.



ARTICLE XIAny State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State

Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

ARTICLE XIIFive years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the

Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

ARTICLE XIII1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its

national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XIV1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State, which does not sign the Convention before

its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, may accede to it at any time.2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments

of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XVThis Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be

deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

43General Assembly


bibLioGrAPhic eSSAy

Topic Area A

1. Arquila, John and Ronfeldt, David “Cyber War Is Coming,” Comparative Strategy Vol. 12

2. Brenner, Susan “At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 2007 < http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/pdfplus/40042831.pdf>. August 2011

3. Carr, Jeffery, Russia/Georgia Cyber War – Findings and Analysis, Project Grey Goose: Phase 1 Report, 17 Oct. 2008 < http://www.scribd.com/doc/6967393/Project-Grey-Goose-Phase-I-Report> August 2011.

4. Carr, Jeffery Inside Cyber Warfare O’Reilly Media, Inc. 23 Dec. 2009 < http://proquest.safaribooksonline.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/book/networking/security/9781449377229/the-legal-status-of-cyber-warfare/the_legal_status_of_cyber_warfare>August 2011.

5. Chandler, David, “No System Immune from ‘Virus’ Attack” Boston Globe 4 Dec. 1988 < http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/boston/access/59679950.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Dec+04%2C+1988&author=David+L.+Chandler%2C+Globe+Staff&pub=Boston+Globe+(pre-1997+Fulltext)&desc=NO+SYSTEM+IMMUNE+FROM+'VIRUS'+ATTACK&pqatl=google> August 2011.

6. “Charter of the United Nations” June 2011 < http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml>.

7. “The Colossus” < http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?era=1940> August 2011.

8. Cordesman, Anthony and Cordesman, Justin Cyber-threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Defending the U.S. Homeland (Westport: Praeger 2002) 28.

9. “Defining Malware: FAQ” Microsoft Technet <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd632948.aspx>. August 2011

10. Delibasis, Dimitrios “Information warfare operations within the concept of individual self-defense,” Cyber Conflict and Global Politics (London: Routledge 2009)

11. Drew, Christopher and Markoff, John, “Contractors Vie for Plum Work, Hacking for U.S.,” New York Times 31 May 2009

12. “Emergency Special Sessions” June 2011 <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml>.

13. Emerson, Steven “Jihadi Media Joins Facebook” Modern Tokyo Times 11 June 2011 <http://moderntokyotimes.com/2011/06/11/jihadi-media-joins-facebook/> August 2011.



14. “Feature of the Future ARPANET”< http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?id=1084> August 2011.

15. “The First Webpage” <http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?id=1274> August 2011.

16. “Fortifying Regional Disarmament and Security, Countering Potential Cyberwarfare, Misuse of Dual-Purpose Technologies, Focus of Debate in First Committee” United Nations Department of Public Information 21 October 2010 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gadis3419.doc.htm> August 2011.

17. Fulghum, David A. “Cyberwar Takes Shape.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 19 Jan. 2009

18. “Functions and Powers of the General Assembly” June 2011 <http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

19. “The Harvard Mark 1 is Operational”, <http://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?era=1940> August 2011.

20. “Herman Hollerith”, <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/hollerith.html> August 2011

21. Hodge, Nathan, ‘General: we just might nuke those cyber-attackers’, WIRED, 13 May 2009, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/general-we-just-might-nuke-those-cyber-attackers/>, August 2011.

22. Hughes, Rex. “A Treaty for Cyberspace” International Affairs 2010, August 2011

23. Landesman, Mary “Malware Revolution: A Change in Target” Mircosoft Technet 2007 < http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc512596.aspx>. August 2011.

24. “Marching off to Cyberwar,” Economist 6 Dec. 2008 < http://www.economist.com/node/12673385> August 2011

25. “A New Role for Jihadi Media” The Investigative Project on Terrorism 11 January 2011 <http://www.investigativeproject.org/2487/a-new-role-for-jihadi-media>. August 2011

26. Owens, William, et al., eds. Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capa bilities, (Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, National Research Council, 2009)

27. “Pay more Attention to Cyberwarfare, Verification, Secretary-General Advises in Remarks to Advisory Board on Disarmament Affairs” United Nations Department of Public Information 18 Feb. 2009 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12108.doc.htm>. August 2011.

28. Rawnsley, Gary “The laws of the playground: Information warfare and propaganda across the Taiwan Strait” Cyber Conflict and Global Politics (London: Routledge 2009)

29. Saad, Sabine; Bazan, Stephane; Varin, Christophe “Asymmetric Cyber-warfare between Israel and Hezbollah: The Web as a new strategic battlefield” Web of Science <http://www.websci11.org/fileadmin/websci/Posters/96_paper.pdf> August 2011.

30. Shanker, Thom and Sanger, David, “Privacy May Be a Victim in Cyberdefense Plan,” New York Times August 2011

31. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2008 < http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_exec_summary_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf>. August 2011

45General Assembly


32. “TCP/IP” < ttp://www.historyofinformation.com/index.php?id=1168> August 2011.

33. Trendle, Giles “Cyberwar” The World Today 2002 August 2011 < http://www.jstor.org/stable/40476658>

34. Tynan, Daniel “Zombie PCs: Silent, Growing Threat” PCWorld 2004 < http://www.pcworld.com/article/116841/zombie_pcs_silent_growing_threat.html> August 2011.

35. “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization” June < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/>.

Topic Area B

1. Atlas, Ronald “Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism” American Institute of Biological Sciences 1999, June 2011 < http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/10.1525/bisi.1999.49.6.465>.

2. Beeching, Nicholas; Dance, David; Miller, Alastair; Spencer, Robert “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism” British Medical Journal 2002, June 2011 http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/25227413.

3. “The Biological Weapons Convention” July 2011 < http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/>.

4. Block, Steven “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons: The terrorist threat is very real, and it's about to get worse. Scientists should concern themselves before it's too late” American Scientist 2001, June 2011 < http://www.jstor.org/stable/27857397>.

5. Carus, Seth “Biological Warfare Threats in Perspective” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 1998, June 2011 < http://informahealthcare.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/10408419891294299>.

6. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 1972, July 2011

7. Dando, Malcolm Bioterror and Biowarfare (Oxford: Oneworld Publishers 2006)

8. Garrett, Laurie “The Nightmare of Bioterrorism” Council on Foreign Relations 2001, June 2011 < http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/20050044>

9. Inglesby, TV, Henderson, DA, Bartlett, JG, Ascher, MS, Eitzen, E, Friedlander, AM, et al. “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon” The Journal of the American Medical Association 1999, June 2011 <http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v281nl8/fiull/jst80027.html>.

10. Kalia, V.M “Bio-Terrorism: Threat Perception” Bio-Terrorism and Bio-Defense (New Delhi: Ajay Kumar Jain for Manohar Publishers & Distributors 2005)

11. Kellman, Barry Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007)



12. Koblentz, Gregorg “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare” International Security 2004, July 2011 < http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137478>.

13. Leitenberg, Milton “Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism in the First Years of the Twenty-First Century” Politics and the Life Sciences 2002, July 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4236667>.

14. Marshall, George “Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Techniques” European Center for Security Studies 2008, June 2011 < http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper20-en.pdf>.

15. Mashhadi, Hassan “Biological Warfare and Disarmament Problems, Perspectives and Possible Solutions” Politics and the Life Sciences 1999, July 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4236468>.

16. Meek, James “FBI was told to blame Anthrax scare on Al Qaeda by White House Officials” New York Daily News, 2 August 2008, July 2011 < http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2008/08/02/2008-08-02_fbi_was_told_to_blame_anthrax_scare_on_a.html>.

17. Merle, Renae, “Bioterror Antidote: Unfilled Prescription, “Washington Post, January 16, 2007, June 2011 < http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/1194967441.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Jan+16%2C+2007&author=Renae+Merle++Washington+Post+Staff+Writer&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=D.1&desc=Bioterror>.

18. Metraux, Daniel “Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo” Asian Survey 1995, June 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645835>.

19. Meyerson, Laura and Reaser, Jamie “Bioinvasions, bioterrorism, and biosecurity” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 2003, June 2011 http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/3868091.

20. “No proof of Iraqi contamination” The Washington Times, 29 October 2001, July 2011 < http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/oct/29/20011029-030543-6024r/>.

21. Palca, Joe “FBI Faulted for Overstating Science in Anthrax Case” NPR 15 February 2011, July 2011 < http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133775495/fbi-faulted-for-overstating-science-in-anthrax-case?ft=1&f=1001>.

22. The Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction March 31, 2005, July 2011 < http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf>.

23. “Role of the Implementation Support Unit” July 2011 < http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F8521A510F455706C12573A6003F49F2?OpenDocument>.

24. Ryan, Jeffery and Glarum, Jan Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats Elsevier Inc. 2008

25. “Scientist’s Suicide Linked to Anthrax Inquiry” New York Times 2 August 2008, July 2011 < http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/02/washington/02anthrax.html>.

47General Assembly


26. Tucker, Jonathan “Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat” Politics and the Life Sciences 1996, June 2011 < http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/pdfplus/4236227.pdf>.

27. UN Resolution 60/288. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 20 September 2006, July 2011 < http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement>.

28. “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs” July 2011 < http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/about_us/aboutus.shtml>.

29. The United States Department of Justice, Amerithrax Investigative Summary 19 Feburary, 2010, July 2011 < http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigative-summary.pdf>.

30. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments July 2010, July 2011 < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145181.pdf>.

31. Wenger, Andreas and Wollenmann, Reto Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder 2007)

32. Wiener, Stanley “Biological Warfare Defense” Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2000.

33. “1925 Geneva Protocol” July 2011 < http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/1925GenevaProtoc

Disarmament and International Securityaiskharvardmun.wikispaces.com/file/view/DISEC.pdf ·...

Documents

Transcript of Disarmament and International Securityaiskharvardmun.wikispaces.com/file/view/DISEC.pdf ·...