The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1996

DIRECT I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F DREAMS: N E U R O P S Y C H O L O G Y

Leland van den Daele

For the past several decades, discussion of the clinical use of dreams has been overshadowed by other technical developments in psychoanalysis, the use of transference, the object relations implications of psychoanalysis, and constructivism (EIIman, 1991). The decline of the clinical discussion of dreams has been accompanied by a spate of academic theories of the source and function of dreams. The academic theories largely have been inspired by developments in neurophysiology, cognitive theory, and dream laboratory investigations that seemed to support the reassessment of the clinical role of dreams as a centerpiece of psychoanalytic technique (Hob- son and McCarley, 1977; Crick and Mitchison, 1986).

FREUD'S THEORY OF DREAM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY

Freud's dream theory reflected the knowledge of neurophysiology and anatomy of his day. Freud has been taken to task by contemporary dream researchers for the naive view that wishes cause dreams (Hobson, 1988). A more appropriate paraphrase of Freud's formulation is that wishes find ex- pression in dreams, but that the causes of dreams are multiform: The stim- uli of dreams include outside noises, sudden awakening, and internal states (hunger, thirst). The common denominator across dreams is Freud's formu- lation that dreams act as the guardian of sleep (Freud, 1900).

Nineteenth-century neuroanatomy distinguished the gross anatomical differences between man and the higher primates, but not the differences in hemispheric function. Neuroanatomy indicated two levels of function: a paleontologically earlier level of organization, and a later, superimposed level of organization characteristic of humans. Freud's theory of dream for- mation literally parallels these distinctions rendered in the neuroanatomy of his day. Freud's dream theory asserts that dream and language reside in

Dr. van den Daele is Professor of Psychology and a Fellow of the American Board of Clinical Psychology.

Address correspondence to Leland van den Daele, Ph.D., FAClinP., Program Director, Psy- chology Doctorate Program, California Institute of Integral Studies, 9 Peter Yorke Way, San Francisco, CA 94109.

253 0002-9548/96/0900-0253509.50/1 �9 1996 Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis

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hierarchical relation as geological strata. Language and abstraction exist as the highest products of mind and are a late civilizational achievement. In contrast, the image represents an earlier mode of mentition (Freud, 1900). This earlier mode is closer to the instincts and biological urges than to language, which owes its form and content to humankind's unique heritage and socialization.

In the dream state, the earlier mode of mentition is reinstated, and so the dream reveals the phylogenetic determinants behind the facade of civilized persona. Language, nevertheless, bears a linkage to imagery in dreams. Language stimulates dreams through day residues that bear upon infantile wishes. The investigation of dreams reveals a complex interplay between contemporary concerns and more primitive urges. Behind the facade of dreams exists underlying dream thoughts 1 that may be deduced from the patient's free association and the dreams' content. The mind's dialectic is between the primitive and the modern, the instinctual and the socialized.

Freud's theory of the dream and associated mental processes assumes a two-step functional organization of neural processes that corresponds to the old brain and the neocortex. The old brain employs images as the vehicle of mental representation, and the neocortex employs thought and language.

MODERN PHYSIOLOGICALLY BASED THEORIES OF DREAMS

Contemporary dream laboratory research has long ago suggested a deeper foundation to dreaming than Freud's hypothesis of the mind's re- sponse to disturbing stimuli. Since 1953, when Nathaniel Kleitman first described rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, the REM cycle has been the centerpiece of dream laboratory research. At intervals of about 90 minutes during the sleep state, adults display rapid eye movements (REM). When adults are awakened during REM, they report a dream about 80 to 90 percent of the time, and when awakened during non-REM sleep, about 50 to 60 percent of the time. Dreams during REM sleep are replete with visual imagery, whereas dreams during non-REM sleep are more likely to be dream thoughts or mental conversations, with relatively sparse visual imag- ery (Ephron and Carrington, 1966). In 1895 to 1900, when Freud wrote The Interpretation of Dreams, he was unaware of REM cycles. Had Freud been aware of REM cycles, his theory of the function of dreams would no doubt have taken a different form (EIIman and Weinstein, 1991).

Dream laboratory research has produced its own physiologically based literature about dreams and its own dream theories. Rather than put psy- chology or dream experience first, these approaches put physiology first. Physiologically based theories provide a coherent foundation for hypoth- eses that concern dreams, but just as psychological theories must attend to

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results from physiological studies, physiologically based theories must at- tend to results from psychological research and observation.

In 1977, Hobson and McCarley proposed the activation-synthesis model of dream production. The model suggested that dreams reflect memories and associations elicited from the neocortex and associated structures by random signals from the brain stem. Foremost among these signals are pontine-ge- niculate-occipital cortex (PGO) spikes that commence at the brain stem and terminate in the visual cortex. According to the original Hobson and Mc- Carley model, dreams do not derive from wishes or from any purely psycho- logical stimulus, but from the physiology of neuronal regulation. REM sleep occurs when acetylcholine levels rise and it fades when acetylcholine levels fall. In their initial formulation of this theory, Hobson and McCarley em- braced the view that dreams were inherently meaningless. Whatever mean- ing dreams seemed to possess arose from what Freud called "secondary revi- sion" and what the dreamer in his awake state imputed to the imagery of the dream. In recent revisions to his theory, Hobson has admitted that dreams possess order and that this is a function of the psychology of the individual (Kahn and Hobson, 1993). Moreover, PGO spikes may merely serve to switch from one dream episode to another, and may not provide the sole basis for the succession of dream images as the early Hobson and McCarley model suggested (Sutton, Mamelak, and Hobson, 1992).

In 1983, Crick and Mitchison formulated a reverse learning scheme to account for dreams. Strongly influenced by the original Hobson and Mc- Carley model, the scheme proposed that dreams are initiated by random stimuli, in particular PGO spikes, projected to the cortex from the brain stem. The effect of these random stimuli is to produce a random activation of cortical neural networks along with the day residue of superfluous thoughts. The random activation of these nets facilitates the deactivation of these associations through refreshing network links and thus rids the mind of superfluous thoughts. As Crick and Mitchison quipped, "We dream to forget." Like the original Hobson and McCleary model, the Crick and Mitchison scheme accounts for what seems absurd or bizarre in dreams, but cannot account for dream narratives that display sometimes highly complex, and therefore not random, dream structures. Accordingly, in 1986, Crick and Mitchison revised the scheme to exclude narrative dreams, which do not fit their hypothesis.

In 1972, following suggestive research by others in neurophysiology and animal behavior, Jonathan Winson published the first of a series of papers that inaugurated a new line of neurophysiological investigation on the fac- tors that support and maintain dreams. The model, which might be dubbed "strategic rehearsal" theory, draws from paleontology, comparative anat- omy, neural cell physiology, and the theory of neural networks.

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Strategic rehearsal theory begins with the observation that the majority of mammals display a prominent electroencephalographic signature when in situations of high salience to survival. The signature cycle is designated theta rhythm and is characterized by a 5-cycles-per-second (CPS), high- amplitude waveform. Cats display theta rhythm during predation; rabbits, when apprehensive; and rats, during exploration. In his milestone research, Vanderwolf (1969; Whishaw and Vanderwolf, 1973) showed in animal studies that theta rhythm also occurs during the periods of rapid eye move- ment (REM), that is, during periods of sleep that correspond to dream pe- riods in human subjects.

Winson (1972, 1985, 1990, 1993) argued that the occurrence of theta rhythm is a species-specific response contingent upon a species' predomi- nant adaptive strategy, and during dreams, the animal reinstates that rhythm, so that a link exists between the species' predominant adaptive strategy and its dream activity. Hippocampal theta-wave activity is partic- ularly adept at the modification of cellular responsiveness to stimulation (Winson,1985; 1990), so that under the aegis of theta-wave stimulation, a neuronal cell displays synaptic change and an increased rate of firing (Lar- son and Lynch,1986; Larson, Wong, and Lynch, 1986; Rose and Dunwid- die, 1986). The 200-millisecond time delay in electrical stimulation mod- ifies neuronal physiology in a way that pulses of electrical stimulation at other times do not (Pavlieds et al., 1988). The end result is that neurons subject to hippocampal theta activity undergo long-term potentiation (LTP) to heightened activity when compared to unstimulated cells. Therefore, dreams are employed to rehearse, consolidate, and enact species-specific adaptive strategies that possess a high neurophysiological salience (Winson, 1985; 1990; Pavlieds and Winson, 1989).

Hippocampal theta-wave activity triggers LTP by activation of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor sites in neurons. However, in pri- mate species where olfactory dominance has been replaced by visual dom- inance, hippocampal theta activity has not been demonstrated as a mecha- nism for LTP. Nevertheless, theta activity occurs in children and adults when emotionally aroused in wakeful states and when falling asleep (stage 1 sleep) and in REM states (Tortora and Anagnostakos, 1987). Winson (1990) suggests that in primate species, alternative but analogous hippo- campal mechanisms that result in LTP occur through activation of NMDA. He concludes, "Rather than being a cauldron of untamed passions and destructive wishes, I propose that the unconscious is a cohesive, continu- ally active mental structure that takes note of life's experiences and reacts according to its own scheme of interpretation" (1990, p. 96).

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DIRECT INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS AND NEURAL ORGANIZATION

In recent papers, the author (van den Daele, 1992a, 1992b) has pro- posed a theory of direct interpretation of dreams based upon clinical obser- vation and psychological research. The theory proposes that dreams dis- play different levels of organizat ion. The levels of organizat ion approximately correspond in successive stages of cognitive complexity em- bodied in Stern's amodal cognition (1985), Piaget's stages (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958), and the author's postformal stages (1975). As David Foulkes (1982) demonstrated in a landmark series of developmental studies on the characteristics of dreams, dream organization undergoes development with age.

In addition to differences in organization, dreams also display differ- ences in content and pragmatic orientation (van den Daele, 1992b). The theory identifies three primary pragmatic orientations that organize dream themes. These are a subjective orientation, an objective orientation, and a relational orientation. Dreams characterized by a subjective orientation concern the inner world, self-definitions, self-evaluations, self-states, feel- ings, emotions, wishes, and desires that impact upon the sews aims and purposes. Dreams characterized by an objective orientation entail the outer world, the objective realm of cause and effect, the consensually ob- served, how things work, and the like. Dreams characterized by a rela- tional orientation subsume interpersonal roles, rules, expectations, reac- tions, and consequences as these relate to interactions with others.

In accord with the conclusions of the plurality of dream laboratory re- searchers, the theory of direct interpretation posits that a dream is not a product of disguise. Like the hypotheses put forth by Hobson and Mc- Cleary, and by Crick and Mitchison, the theory accepts that sometimes dreams are bizarre and show little inherent organization. These dreams are "unelaborated" and therefore little cortical activation is likely. In fact, such dreams would seem not to contradict Hobson and McCleary's random stimulation hypothesis. In the developmental hierarchy of dream organiza- tion, such dreams are likely to be classified at the amodal levels or the early preoperational level. When dreams display integration of higher levels, the idea that a dream may be accounted for by a random stimulus cannot be supported.

Similarly, in agreement with Hobson and McCleary, and Crick and Mitchison, the theory of direct interpretation acknowledges that some dreams may be the consequence of PGO activation of the occipital cortex, but with a difference. The pontine-geniculate axis interfaces directly and indirectly with the major anatomical networks in older portions of the brain that "preorganize" experienced gestalts. In a revision of Freud's topo-

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graphic and structural theories, the author (van den Daele, 1994) has pro- posed three interdependent neurological networks that correspond to the subjective, objective, and relational categories identified in the theory of direct interpretation. These networks exist in the old brain and preorganize and coordinate afferent and efferent information, and in humans are richly interconnected with the cerebral cortex.

The anlage of the subjective, objective, and relational modes of experi- ence are the anatomical networks oriented to inner {endogenous-intra- organismic) regulation, outer (exogenous-transactional) adaptation, and their coordination (relation). Milner terms these the intraorganismic sub- system, the transactional-perceptual subsystem, and the integrative sub- system (1967, pp. 157-164). The sensory aspect of the intraorganismic subsystem describes a set of neural networks identified by anatomical con- nections between the pons, the thalamus and midfrontal areas, the gyrus cinguli, hypothalamus, and prefontal association areas (1967, p. 154). The sensory aspect of the transactional-perceptual subsystem includes path- ways to the thalamus, the cerebellar-striatal-thalamic subcircuit, and the sensory neocortex (1967, p. 158). The integrative subsystem is comprised of thalamocortical components described in part by Penfield's centren- cephalic integrating system (Penfield, 1950). These subsystems provide the foundation for natural categories of higher mental processes that organize cognitive and configural awareness (van den Daele, 1994). The activation of any one set of pathways inhibits others, so neural activation of higher centers is selective and accords with the "preorganization" ordained at lower centers.

The three subsystems possess particular relation to Winson's observa- tions about animal adaptation and theta rhythm. The prepotence of fear in rabbits suggests the endogenous-intraorganismic subsystem organizes re- sponse; the exploratory behavior of rats, the exogenous-transactional sub- system; and the predatory behavior of cats, the integrative subsystem. Dis- tinct cortical pathways appear to organize adaptive response in rabbits, rats, and cats. The subsystems mobilize hippocampal theta activity in the service of LTP.

Human adaptation is characterized by its plasticity: Adaptive strategy is not dominated by any one cortical subsystem; rather, the predominant style of human behavior may be organized by any of the major subcortical sub- systems. The vast elaboration of the cortex in homo sapiens enormously enriches potential survival strategies. The role and importance of cortical feedback is enormously more significant than in other mammals, including nonhuman primates. With this augmentation of adaptive flexibility, the use of theta rhythm for LTP by the major subcortical subsystems is likely to provide only one means for LTR Humans are likely to rely to a greater extent than other species upon self-maintaining network activation for LTP.

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According to the hypothesis of self-maintaining network activation, the primary subsystems in concert with other codeterminants of sleep and the REM cycle activate a cortical network. Some cortical networks have a ten- dency to greater activity due to recency and intensity of stimulation and are more likely to be activated. Once a cortical network is activated, feed- back and feed-forward pathways to subcortical subsystems and the hippo- campus ensure continuation and continuity of the dream. Thus, dreams are not random and their narrative form is a direct consequence of the self- maintaining role of cortical networks.

In accord with this hypothesis, PGO stimulation is now known to be only one axis of many associated with the cortical stimulation in the pro- duction of dreams (Sutton, Mamelak, and Hobson, 1992). The brain stem itself contains specific cell sites that reciprocally inhibit and promote sleep and REM cycles (Barhdoyan et al., 1989), which underscores the funda- mental function served by REM activity. In primate evolution, theta rhythm is decoupled from a single subcortical system, and in its place specific pathways, signature forms of stimulation, and specific network activation are associated with each of the primary subsystems.

DREAM ACTIVITY AND HEMISPHERIC SPECIALIZATION

Few sleep laboratory theorists have discussed the role of hemispheric differentiation in dream production. The nondominant or right hemisphere specializes in extremely important adaptive tasks with particular facility in spatial relations and manipulation of complex arrays. The dominant or left hemisphere specializes in language and linear algorithmic processes. The nondominant or right hemisphere lacks facility in language and linear algo- rithms, just as the left hemisphere lacks facility in spatial relations and gestalt organization (Watt, 1990). In the waking state, functional organiza- tions centered on one or the other hemisphere may be engaged by appro- priate task selection.

Electroencephalographic studies of hemispheric activity in the sleep lab- oratory possess some inherent limitations because experimental manipula- tion of hemispheric processes in the dream state is problematic. Informa- tion about hemispheric contribution to dream production comes from studies of neurological injury, commissurectomy, and investigations of in- telligence and dream production.

When injury to the nondominant hemisphere occurs or when a patient is commissurectomized, dream originality and complexity decline. In a land- mark clinical paper, Hoppe (I 977) reports that the dreams of commissurec- tomized patients deal with the banal aspects of everyday life with a paucity of symbolism. In terms of the typology of direct interpretation, dreams of commissurectomized patients appear to obtain a level of complexity no

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greater than the early concrete operational subject whose average age is about 8 years old.

Among young children, Foulkes (1982) reports that the highest correla- tions between intelligence subtests and dream complexity occurs for block design, matching familiar figures, and discerning embedded figures. These intelligence subtests are known to be associated with nondominant hemi- spheric function. Considering these observations and research results, the nondominant hemisphere likely takes the predominant role in the elabora- tion and integration of dream material.

The functions of the nondominant hemisphere may be described as the "configural" mind; and the functions of the dominant hemisphere, as the "logicolinguistic" mind (van den Daele, 1994). Logico-linguistic and con- figural products arise in independent mental apparatuses that process in parallel. The logical-linguistic mind is a functional system whose products are ordinary thought and language. The configural mind is a functional system that operates upon and organizes perceptual gestalts, visualization, imagination, and episodic memory.

In accord with these distinctions, hemispheric research suggests that signs and symbols predominantly activate distinct neural pathways. The comprehension and production of language employs centers in the domi- nant hemisphere, and the comprehension and production of symbols in- volves centers in the nondominant hemisphere (Watt, 1990). The distinct pathways involved in these processes find an application in the treatment of developmental dyslexia. Children who cannot be taught to read lan- guage expressed in English can be taught to read language rendered in Chinese (Rozin, Poritsky, and Sotsky, 1971). English employs phonetic tran- scription, and Chinese makes use of pictographs.

The logical-linguistic mind digitizes experience; the configural mind syn- thesizes experience. One mind is not higher and the other inherently lower. The two minds reciprocally influence one another, each with its specializations. The subcortical subsystems that mediate endogenous regu- lation, external transactions, and their integration pre-process and relay in- formation to both hemispheres of the cerebral cortex. Both the Iog- icolinguistic mind and the configural mind derive fundamental gestalts from earlier strata of the brain (Figure 1).

Complex feed-back and feed-forward pathways operate between these levels of brain anatomy and organization, but the nondominant hemi- sphere has a particular resonance with the old brain networks. The devel- opment of grammatical language is a late evolutionary achievement associ- ated with the elaboration and vast increase in depth of the cerebral cortex. Very probably, prehuman thought is imagistic and concretistic. This gives the configural system a unique advantage in the representation and elab-

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intraorg,~ ~ ~ ~ R , .at?onal actional

FIG. 1. Cartography of mental organization. Mental systems are divided between phylogenically older and newer strata connected by complex pathways. In the dream state, the relative participation of these systems determines the type and complexity of dream products.

oration of pregrammatical experience. Communication with earlier brain centers is facilitated by imagery and visualization. For this reason, in Figure 1 the configural system is represented by bidirectional arrows to illustrate its strong reciprocal communication with precortical subsystems.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE N O N D O M I N A N T HEMISPHERIC ROLE IN DREAM PRODUCTION

The theory of direct interpretation suggests that dream products that dis- play a level of cognitive complexity at the concrete operational level and beyond are derived through the dominance of the "nondominant" hemi- sphere. The same is true of original, symbolic, and creative dreams. If the "dominant" hemisphere rules by day, the "nondominant" hemisphere rules by night.

The role of the nondominant hemisphere in the production of dreams is consistent with the theory of direct interpretation and illuminates important characteristics of dreams. First, dreams are relatively undisguised. The lan- guage of dreams is founded upon the universal mechanisms of representa- tion of perceptual experience. Cultures and cultural experience may vary,

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but when culture patterns and scenarios that characterize a culture's expe- rience are known, culture-specific dreams may be understood. This is be- cause perceptual-symbolic representation obeys common rules indepen- dent of culture. Second, dreams reveal causes and conditions that may be logically or linguistically unformulated in the person or culture. This is so because the value structures, the logical algorithms (syntax), and the labels (semantics) available to a culture or to a person may be unavailable to represent or describe a given reality. The nondominant hemisphere by- passes these restrictions by representation in the natural language of expe- rience. Third, dreams are uniquely sensitive to body processes and condi- tions. This follows from the particular attunement of the nondominant hemisphere to natural representations from earlier brain strata and the non- dominant hemisphere's proclivity to configurations of information.

RECIPROCAL HEMISPHERIC DOMINANCE

In the waking state, the left hemisphere appears "in control" because the subject's actions seem governed by instructions, words, and their deriva- tives. His awareness and his capacity for reflection are coupled with these processes. Matters are different in the dream state. In the dream state, af- fects, emotions, actions, interactions, emergent events, and the possible and the impossible are embodied in dream sequences and scenarios. Lan- guage in the dream state ordinarily does not lead events, but follows them. The dreamer's awareness and his capacity for reflection are coupled to dream events. In the dream state, the right hemisphere is ordinarily "in control."

The characterization of right hemispheric function as dominant requires that right hemispheric function not be identified simply with piecemeal tasks and abilities. The gestalt function of the right hemisphere must be understood as a general strategy of integration and adaptation to the inner, outer, and social worlds. This form of relation characterizes the state of mind of artists when they engage their art. As a mode of engagement with everyday reality, ordinary time, language, and logic are subordinated to feeling, intuition, and the artist's sense of "fit," "rightness," "aptness," and so on. In the dream state, the dreamer is an artist.

Wakefulness and the dream state represent states of complementary hemispheric dominance. The shift of dominance occurs because the modes of organization that characterize the distinct hemispheres cannot simultaneously maintain dominance. The modes of organization entail dif- ferent priorities, different emphases, and different forms of processing. If the two modes were dominant simultaneously, disorganization would fol-

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low. When one hemisphere is dominant, the other is nondominant, and vice versa.

Given that the distinct hemispheres process in such radically different ways, the problem of hemispheric communication remains. The problem here is not so much an anatomical issue since the cerebral commissures exist. The problem is a compatibility issue: How is information in such different formats to be communicated from one hemisphere to the other?

As hypothesized, earlier in the paper, dreams are initiated by one of the three primary systems--the endogenous-intraorganismic system, the exog- enous-transactional system, or the relational system--through a complex feed-back/feed-forward set of connections between the cortical and mid- brain centers. The right hemisphere engages the input from the midbrain centers and operates upon this material in accord with the type of mate- rial and cognitive development of the dreamer. During the dream state, the left hemisphere as dominant is largely "off-line." However, as the subject dreams, both hemispheres display cortical activation that often exceeds cortical activation in the wake state. The mind in the dream state actively constructs and deconstructs experience, likelihoods, possibilities, and outcomes, but under the dominance of the right hemisphere. The right hemisphere actively forms and informs the pathways of the left hemisphere.

During the dream state, the configural mind appears to remain preoc- cupied with the same issues for extended periods of time. Analyses of the cognitive complexity and pragmatic orientation of dreamers in month-long dream diaries show that dreamers sustain their preoccupation with a dream theme for successive nights, sometimes for weeks, before they shift to some other dream theme (van den Daele and Relph-Wikman, 1994). Often, dream complexity connected to a theme increases on successive nights, which suggests that the configural mind in the dream state benefits from previous dream cognition, just as the conscious mind profits from previous language-based cognition (Figure 2).

When the left hemisphere returns to "on-line" dominant status, the indi- vidual may not be aware that he has dreamed or even be aware that he has spent two to three hours of his sleep time in a dream state. If the individual is not conscious of his dreams, how then is conscious thought influenced by the modification of neural nets laid down by the configural mind?

The consequences of dream cognition are new pathways of association. The dreams of the subject function in accord with Winson's interpretation of the LTP literature. The pathways potentiated by dreams correspond to modifications of neural nets. Dreams, even when unconscious, guide thought by enhancement of connections in neural nets.

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Subject 110

- ' ~176 O n e M o n t h "r e P e r i o d

Dream Type

Cognitive Complexity of

Dream

FIG. 2. During a period of one month, the subject reported dreams classified as either normative (dark shaded) or subjective (light shaded). Dreams of different types occurred in clusters. The subject's normative dreams often obtained formal operational complexity while subjective dreams remained concrete operational. Objective dreams were noticeably absent. The subject's protocol is typical of" dreamers' long-term preoccupation with selected dream themes that are worked over from a particular perspective.

The configural mind operates symbolically in terms of complex totalities. The logical-linguistic mind manipulates words or other tokens put into cor- respondence with precepts, images, symbols, or abstractions. Insofar as a dream can be translated into words, a correspondence exists between im- ages and words. When a person does not remember a dream, nevertheless a latent correspondence between dream images, ideas, and words has been established by the dream process. When confronted with an issue that relates to the dream material, conscious problem solving typically con- forms to the potentiated connections.

Conscious thought is dominated by words and language. Words and lan- guage associated with images that touch upon the pathways potentiated by dream formulations are guided by these pathways. In addition, complex situations and interactions in day-to-day life that touch upon the pathways potentiated by dreams are guided by these pathways. In this manner, the products of configural comprehension bias perception, thought, and ac- tion, but do not completely determine perception, thought, and action. The configural mind has its say through biasing certain tendencies, directions, and lines of consideration. In the state of logicolinguistic dominance, these

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dispositions and intuitions may be examined and checked against reason and the perceptions of others.

Although a preferred vehicle for social interaction and communication, the use of Iogicolinguistic products, words, and ideas linked to words shows why Iogicolinguistic dominance during the sleep state would show poor results as an organizer of adaptive response. The products of Iog- icolinguistic mind impose the limitation of subject, action, and object in such a way that coherence entails a partitioning and narrowing of theme to some aspect of a totality. This is admirably suited to analytic representa- tion, but not synthetic completeness. Furthermore, much experience has no analog in words, and so any Iogicolinguistic-based representation of experience would be highly incomplete.

In contrast, images, scenarios, and episodes, the products of configural operations, are a far richer vehicle for the organization of fundamental adaptive networks than Iogicolinguistic products. Logicolinguistic products require extralogical reference for validation. Assertions rendered in words require some "state of affairs" in relation to which to be examined (Quine, 1953). The primary source of extralogical reference for Iogicolinguistic for- mulations is the construction of the configural mind. The products of con- figural mind link images of real-world perception and action to inner emo- tion and disposition and the powerful inference engine of analogical processing. The use of the configural mind as the foundation of thought and action speeds thought and behavior. In the environment of evolution- ary adaptedness, response based upon configural, imagistic gestalts is more economical, plastic, and immediate than adaptation based on Iog- icolinguistic formulations. 2

The hemispheres exist in complementary relation and serve different functions. Dreams provide the opportunity for the nondominant hemi- sphere to creatively modulate and inform the general structure and activ- ities of the dominant hemisphere. The reciprocal cooperation and domi- nance of the right and left hemispheres in the organization of general plans effects a solution to the problem of disorganization that would likely occur if both hemispheres struggled for simultaneous dominance of higher-order functions.

SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSION

Although the role and importance of the interpretation of dreams has been deemphasized in clinical discussions for the past several decades, new models of dream physiology suggest the central role and importance of dreams in the regulation of behavior. According to a body of current research, dreams potentiate new pathways of problem solving. A review of

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the neurophysio logical l i terature pert inent to direct interpretat ion suggests dreams are sustained by midbra in anatomical networks wi th feed-back and feed-forward links to the cortex. The anatomical networks are termed the endogenous- in t raorganismic system, the exogenous-t ransact ional system, and the relat ional system that correspond to subjective, object ive, and rela- t ional dreams in direct interpretat ion. Just as ordinary thought is the prov- ince of the dominant or left hemisphere, dreams are the prov ince of the nondominant or right hemisphere. Dur ing REM states new pathways of problem solving are laid down by the nondominant hemisphere. In the awake state, thought and behavior about content that relates to dream ma- terial f o l l ow these pathways. The new neuropsychology of dreams reaf- f i rms the central role of dreams in the organizat ion of affect, emot ion, in- tention, and general adaptation.

NOTES

1. In the Interpretation of Dreams, when Freud used the term "dream thoughts," he meant thoughts dominated by language. For Freud, "thought" usually meant language-dominated mentation. In the broad sense, thought can be primarily imagistic or affective and need not be dominated by language at all, but it is a strong habit of Western philosophy and psy- chology to understand thought as an extension of ordinary language.

2. A rare syndrome that afflicts the nondominant hemisphere provides strong evidence con- sistent for these propositions. In about 5 percent of patients with right hemisphere stroke, patients deny any evidence of damage due to the stroke even though damage may entail complete paralysis of their left side. When patients are subjected to tasks that reveal their inability to use their left side, such as being handed a tray with dishes that requires both hands to balance, patients typically rationalize their inability to perform the task by any number of reasons not including their paralysis, for example, "1 am tired today," or "My arthritis is acting up." When patients are given a stimulant that permits the traumatized right hemisphere to communicate with the left hemisphere, patients quickly recognize their paralyzed state. When the stimulant dissipates, patients again revert to denial and rationalizations about their inability to perform simple actions. Without treatment, the state of denial usually lasts about two weeks following the stroke, so reduced participation of the nondominant hemisphere in the assessment of reality greatly reduces adaptation.

The behavior of stroke patients with this syndrome reveals that the right hemisphere is the repository and reference base for the patients' beliefs about the world. These observa- tions reveal that in the waking state for the healthy person, the nondominant hemisphere is not dormant, only nondominant, and revisions of reality representations occur. However, it is hypothesized that the general integration of this new information would require substan- tial dream time to provide the revision of the self-image, working relations with others, and the self's general plans and aims. The function of the nondominant hemisphere in the dream state is continuous with its function in the waking state, but in the dream state, the nondominant hemisphere is given a freer canvas to organize and render coherent the multiple ramifications of experienced reality.

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