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Digital Activism: For better or for worse?

Alice Gina Mary Crowley

9th Conference of the Australasian Institute of Computer Ethics (AiCE

2020)

1. Introduction

In 2012, Seth Meyer joked on Saturday Night Live, “Look, if you make a Facebook page, we

will ‘like’ it—it’s the least we can do. But it’s also the most we can do”. Myer alludes to a

number of academics and pundits concerned about the effectiveness of digital activist

campaigns. With the inception of Web 2.0, many hoped the Internet would enhance civic

engagement and make the political class more accessible [2, 3]. However, a number of

studies [4-6] have concluded that the Internet only reinforces existing socioeconomic

inequalities and the current political order [7]. This paper examines the factors which limit

the effectiveness of digital activism, including ‘slacktivism’, a lack of control over the

narrative, socioeconomic barriers, and ‘woke washing’. The aim is not to undermine the

usefulness of digital activism, but promote a critical mindset towards online campaigns by

offering directions for improving their effectiveness.

2. Defining Digital Activism

Digital activism is defined as using online media to partake in activist activities, with the goal

of accomplishing agendas along socioeconomic, environmental or political lines [8-11].

George and Leidner [12] claim that digital activism consists of clicktivism, metavoicing,

assertion, e-funding, political consumerism, digital petitions, botivism, data activism,

exposure, and hacktivism. The literature provides a number of examples of online activist

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efforts, including the EZLN Zapatista movement [13-17]; the use of Indymedia to provide

non-corporate accounts of the 1999 World Trade Organisation protests [18]; the

operationalisation of citizen blogs in the aftermath of the US September 11 attacks [19]; the

Arab Springs [20-22]; and Kony 2012 [23].

3. Factors which limit the effectiveness of digital activism

Despite the initial optimism of the Internet enhancing political participation, a number of

scholars are sceptical of this perspective. Habermas [6] warned of the Internet’s propensity to

decrease the quality of public discourse, arguing the public sphere would separate into groups

united by special interests. From this perspective, the Internet may threaten existing modes of

political participation [24]. This section examines the ineffective aspects of digital activism.

3.1 Slacktivism

The increased presence of social-political organisations on social media has made it easier for

citizens to support these causes. However, a criticism of this increased presence is that it

enables people to become ‘slacktivists’ [25, 26]. Slacktivism, sometimes referred as

‘clicktivism’, is the “willingness to perform a relatively costless, token display of support for

a social cause with an accompanying lack of willingness to devote significant effort to enact

meaningful change” [26] (p.1148). Examples of slacktivist activities include Facebook or

Instagram frames and filters; liking, sharing or retweeting posts; online petitions; and hashtag

campaigns [27].

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Slacktivism is a contested concept. Some argue that slacktivist activities increase awareness

for social-political causes [30-32]. Vie [32] examines the Human Rights Campaign that

encouraged users to change their Facebook profile picture to a red logo in support of same-

sex marriage. She argues the mass support of the campaign helped the issue gain prominence

An example of Facebook frame activism featuring the French Flag, to allow users to show their support after the November 2015 Paris attacks. Image source: Brown, 2015

#BringBackOurGirls, an example of a hashtag campaign which trended globally on Twitter after 276 girls were kidnapped from a secondary school in Nigeria. Source: Clinton, 2014

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in public discourse. Štětka and Mazák [33] investigate political engagement concerning the

2013 Czech Parliamentary elections, finding that individuals who engaged in slacktivism

were more likely to also participate in traditional forms of social activism. Similarly, Obar

[34] argues that slacktivist activities are central to the operations of larger charities and

advocacy groups.

Others have alternatively claimed that slacktivism satisfies individuals’ moral and

psychological needs, thus excusing them from participating in offline forms of socio-political

engagement [35]. Breuer and Farooq [36] studied a Brazilian anticorruption campaign and

found that low-effort online activities did little to increase individuals’ participation in the

offline elements of the campaign. Morozov [37] discusses now deactivated Facebook group

‘Saving the Children of Africa’, who despite having 1.2 million members, only raised

US$6,000. The concern that slacktivism hinders

tangible support has led, for example, to UNICEF

Sweden’s “Likes Don’t Save Lives” campaign

(Figure A) [38]. From a different perspective,

Cornelissen, Karelaia and Soyer [39] explore the

relationship between slacktivism, moral licensing

and impression management. They argue that

creating a favourable impression on social media

is a major reason why individuals engage in

slacktivist activities. Moreover, individuals who

‘liked’ a cause on Facebook were more likely to

engage in immoral behaviour afterwards.

Kristofferson, White and Peloza [26] contend that

Figure A: example of UNICEF Sweden’s ‘Likes Don’t Save Lives’ campaign. Image source: Elsen, 2016

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the more private the slacktivism (e.g. signing an online petition), the greater the likelihood of

subsequent and deeper engagement with the cause. In turn, public displays of slacktivism

(e.g. sharing a post on social media) had the opposite effect. Therefore, slacktivism becomes

counterproductive when the focus moves from the cause to the individual [40].

Overall, the effectiveness of slacktivism as form of political engagement remains hotly

contested. It is important to recognise that whilst social media should be a part of any social-

political movement, is not a means to an end. Technology may enhance the effectiveness of

such campaigns, but physical commitment is central to its success [41].

3.2 Lack of narrative control

Digital activism typically relies on individuals on social media sharing content with their

friends and adding to existing content. A downside to this collective action is the potential

loss of control over the message, and the dilution of common frames and identities [42].

According to [43], the organisers of #SafeStampede had to constantly monitor the online

discourse surrounding the hashtag, as the Twitter community frequently used the term to

express other concerns such as preventing impaired driving and protecting animals. Darius

and Stephany [44] discuss ‘hashjacking’ as a strategy in German politics (whereby a group

steals the hashtag associated with a particular movement) and suggest that right-wing

politicians and their supporters actively polarise discourse by stealing the hashtags of other

established political parties. A recent and well-known example of hashjacking is when

LGBTQ Twitter users stole the hashtag belonging to far-right group Proud boys, by filling it

with photos and messages of love and pride [45]. Whilst this instance illustrates how

hashjacking can be used for positive purposes, it also highlights how the message fidelity of

digital activist campaigns can be difficult to control.

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3.3 Socio-economic barriers

Another potential weakness of digital activism is the socioeconomic barriers which restrict

the access of online campaigns from those who need it. A number of studies [46-49] indicate

that individuals with higher incomes and education levels are more likely to participate in

online civic engagement activities. This relates to the ‘Digital Divide’ which is broadly

defined as the gap between those individuals who have access to information and

communication technologies, and those who do not [50-54]. Low-income communities

generally have limited access to digital technologies due to financial constraints and a lack of

infrastructure [55]. Moreover, the increased access to information reaped by the Internet

benefits the middle- and upper-income groups, at the detriment of lower income earners.

A number of scholars have also identified consumption gaps relating to digital inequality. For

example, the production of online content requires time and labour costs, and in the digital

economy this is often unpaid [56, 57]. Thus, the production of online content is more costly

than its distribution [58]. Lower income communities therefore may not have the disposable

labour required to be involved in digital activism [59]. This unequal content creation between

socioeconomic groups is a continuing problem. From a global perspective, third world

countries are unable to match the technological and ideological capacities of advanced

nations, making them unable to be both equal receivers and contributors to the global media

ecosystem [60]. For instance, despite being the second largest continent, in June 2020 Africa

had an Internet penetration rate of 39.3% compared to 94.6% in North America [61]. The

one-way flow of information from powerful societies to less powerful societies subjects these

poorer societies to the influence of the former. This situation directly impacts which activism

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campaigns are heard and which have limited outlets, thereby further perpetuating the existing

cycle of poverty and disenfranchisement [46, 47, 59, 62].

3.4 Brand activism & ‘woke washing’

Social media is now a central tool for marketing and communications [63]. Moreover,

companies are increasingly using online platforms for promoting their corporate social

responsibility efforts [64, 65], and embracing ‘brand activism’. This term refers to when a

brand attempts to encourage social-political change, whilst also seeking “reputational and

economic benefit via consumer appreciation of association with cause” [66] (p.446). A 2018

survey revealed that 64% of consumers would reward firms that engage in some kind of

activism [67]. With these economic incentives, also comes the potential for brands to act

inauthentically to obtain greater profits.

Sobande [68] and Vredenburg et al. [69] discuss ‘woke washing’ which refers to inauthentic

brand activism whereby a brand’s practices do not align with their messaging. Consider Nike,

who made Colin Kaepernick the face of their 30th anniversary advertising campaign [70]. At

face value this was a meaningful move, but public records indicate that in 2019 less than 10%

of Nike’s 300-plus vice-presidents worldwide were black [71]. Nike thus marketed

themselves as being concerned with racial inequality, but there was a misalignment between

their messaging and their practices [68]. Similarly, after George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis

in 2020 [72], a number of companies posted on social media calling for change. Three of

these companies include Procter and Gamble, Adobe, and Hersheys – all of which did not

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have a single black board member in 2019 [73] (see Figure B below to see these social media

posts).

The growing use of social media to promote corporate social responsibility initiatives makes

it easier for brands to capitalise off current social issues with the sole goal of creating profits.

Companies cannot create the social change they are promoting if they are unwilling to change

their own practices. Therefore, ‘woke washing’ is a negative consequence of digital activism

– not only in the sense that it lacks tangible efforts to address causes, but also because it

constitutes a risk to the ability of brands who are engaging in authentic activism to translate

to social change [66]. Companies need to go beyond saying they ‘stand with black people’ or

they ‘want to empower all women’ by creating long-term plans for social inclusion – and that

begins internally [70].

Figure B: Racial equality posts made by Hersheys (2020), Adobe (2020), and Procter & Gamble (2020)

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4. Discussion & Conclusion

This paper has highlighted some of the negative factors associated with digital activism, and

in doing so, offers some directions in terms of how online activist campaigns can be

improved. An important step to improving this effectiveness is for governments to address

the growing digital divide, not only to enhance the civic engagement of low-income

communities, but to enable the concerns of these individuals to materialise as meaningful

activist campaigns. The current literature makes several suggestions on how this could be

achieved, including increasing broadband access in areas lacking infrastructure, providing

community centres for individuals to access technology, offering financing to low income

earners, and changing citizen attitudes [77, 78].

Another pertinent point is that digital activism is not a means to an end but reinforces the

offline components of social-political movements. Where possible, advocacy groups should

see online and offline activism as intertwined, rather than solely perceiving digital activism as

a replacement for traditional methods [79]. Campaigns should create online content which

seeks to mobilise offline participation, rather than content which solely promotes other forms

of online activism in order to avoid encouraging slacktivism. It is worth noting that, like

digital activism, there are weakness to offline activism – but discussing these are beyond the

scope of this paper. In a Covid-19 world, however, where physical activism is not always

possible, advocacy groups will need to work to make meaningful relationships with their

supporters, without being able to have person-to-person contact. Future research couple

explore how this could be achieved.

Finally, digital activists should make it part of their campaigns to call out woke washing, and

hold companies and institutions to account for inconsistencies in their messaging and

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practices. Overall, this paper hopes to reignite the discussion on the effectiveness of digital

activism, and to encourage both advocacy groups and citizens to be critical of their activist

activities and how these can be improved to achieve greater social change.

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