DIGESTS IN AGRARIAN REFORM CASES

SUBMITTED BY:

ALICER, DIANA JEAN

LAW 2B

SUBMITTED TO:

ATTY. ROWENA FALCULAN-MARIINSTRUCTOR

G.R. No. 174647/ December 5, 2012

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Rosa and Pedro Costa

Facts:

Respondent spouses are the registered owners of a a parcel of land in Sorsogon which they voluntarily offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform ( DAR ) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Land Bank computed and valued the respondents’ land at Php 104, 077.01. However, respondents rejected their valuation and sought the determination of just compensation with the Provincial Adjudication Board of the DAR. The PARAD rendered a decision in favor of the respondents, valuing the property at Php 468,575.92. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Determination of Just Compensation before the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court ( SAC ). The SAC rendered a decision finding the valuation made by the PARAD as the more realistic appraisal of the subject property. LBP then sought recourse before the Court of Appeals but said court affirmed the decision of the SAC. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the compensation fixed by the PARAD as affirmed by SAC is in accordance with the valuation factors mandated under Sec.17 or R.A. 6657.

Ruling:

Ruling in the affirmative the Supreme Court said that the responsibility of determining the value of the land placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking under the voluntary the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement is initially lodged with LBP but in the event that the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR Adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR Adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as the Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation.

In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider the following factors as provided in Sec. 17 of R.A. 6657:

1. The acquisition cost of the land.2. The current value of like properties.3. The nature, actual use, and income of the land.

4. The sworn valuation by the owner.5. The tax declarations.6. The assessment made by government assessors.7. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers, farmworkers, and the

government to the property.8. The non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution of the

said land, if any.

Considering all these factors, the valuation made by the Provincial Adjudicator of Sorsogon, and the potentials of the property, the Court considers the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator as the more realistic appraisal which could be the basis for the full and fair equivalent of the subject property while the Court finds that the valuation of the petitioner LBP in this particular agricultural land is unrealistically low. The Courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

Petition is denied.

G.R. No. 181370/ March 9, 2011

Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo vs. Remedios Loyola

Facts:

Remedios Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, was awarded by the DAR, under R.A. 6657, a parcel of land located in Cavite covered by a certificate of Land Ownership Award ( CLOA ) and a Transfer Certificate of Title. Julian Lebrudo, now deceased and represented by his son Reynaldo, alleged that sometime in 1989 he was approached by Loyola to redeem the lot which was then mortgaged by Loyola’s mother to a certain Trinidad Barretto and to help her in obtaining title to the lot in her name by shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of title of the lot from her mother. In exchange for his help, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the lot. Thereafter, title to the said lot was transferred to Remedios Loyola. She then allegedly executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, waiving and transferring her rights over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. Upon refusal by the respondent to make good on her promise, the petitioner sought the assistance of the Sangguniang Barangay, the PNP, and the DAR to mediate. However, despite the steps taken to amicably settle the issue, no settlement was reached. This prompted Lebrudo to file an action against Loyola. The PARAD of Trece Martirez, Cavite decided in favor of the petitioner but the DARAB reversed said decision in an appeal seasonably made by the respondent. The Petition for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was likewise denied. As a result, Lebrudo filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the DARAB and consequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petioner is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot covered by R.A. 6657 on the basis of a waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the alleged Sinumpaang Salaysay.

Ruling:

Resolving the issue in the negative, the Supreme Court said that a certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided in R.A. 6657 and other applicable laws. Sec. 27 of R.A. 6657, as amended by R.A. 9700, provides that lands acquired by beneficiaries under said ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten years. It is clear from the foregoing provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

( CARP ) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of ten years. However, the law enumerated four exceptions:

1. Through hereditary succession;2. To the government;3. To the Land Bank of the Philippines;4. To other qualified beneficiaries.

Any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights within the ten year prohibitory period is void, except as provided by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In the present case, petitioner’s claim is untenable as the law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of the land reform rights within ten years from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions. Furthermore, the Court cited DAR Administrative Order No. 3 which enumerated the qualifications of an agrarian reform beneficiary, to wit:

1. The beneficiary must be landless;2. He must be a Filipino citizen;3. He must be an actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at

the time of the filing of the application;4. He must have the willingness, ability, and aptitude to cultivate and make the land

productive.

Herein petitioner does not qualify as beneficiary because he was a previous awardee of a landholding under the CARP and, therefore, not landless. Moreover, Lebrudo is not an actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application.

Petitioner’s basis’ for his claim, the two Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by the respondent in his favor, were illegal and void ab initio for being patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by the agrarian laws.

The main purpose of the Agrarian Reform law is to ensure the farmer-beneficiary’s continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land he tills. To do otherwise is to revert back to the old feudal system whereby the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land and thus circumvent the government’s program for freeing the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.

Petition is denied.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Honeycomb Farms Corporation

G.R. No. 166259/ November 12, 2012

Facts:

Honeycomb Farms Corporation ( HFC ) was the registered owner of a parcel of land which it voluntarily offered to the DAR for coverage under R.A. 6657 for Php 581,932. Subsequently, the LBP fixed the value of the land at Php165,739.44 and sent a Notice of Valuation to HFC. The HFC rejected LBP’s valuation and it filed a petition with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for a summary administrative determination of just compensation. Pending resolution by the DARAB, HFC filed a Complaint for Determination and Payment of Just Compensation with the RTC. Meanwhile, on May 1998 the DARAB issued a decision affirming LBP’s valuation. On the other hand, the RTC rendered a judgment fixing the just compensation at Php931,109.20. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. HFC claimed that the RTC’s valuation is not supported by the evidence on record and presented evidence which shows that the market value of the land at the time of the taking is Php113, 000 per hectare while the LBP raised the issue of whether the RTC (SAC) had jurisdiction to hear HFC’s complaint in view of the pending DARAB proceedings. It further argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it took judicial notice of the property’s roadside location, its proximity to a commercial district, its incomplete development as coconut and corn land, and its condition as grassland to determine just compensation and it further questioned the award of consequential damages and attorney’s fees for lack of legal and factual basis. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and dismissed HFC’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On HFC’s Motion for Reconsideration, the CA recalled its previous decision and reinstated the RTC’s decision with modification that the award of attorney’s fees in favor of HFC is deleted. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the complaint filed by HFC pending determination by the DARAB of the same issue.

2. Whether or not HFC committed forum shopping.3. Whether or not the RTC and the CA committed serious error when it took judicial notice of

the property’s roadside location, its proximity to a commercial district, its incomplete development as coconut and corn land, and its condition as grassland to determine just compensation.

Ruling:

On the first issue:

The SAC properly acquired jurisdiction over HFC’s complaint for the determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the DARAB proceedings. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. Under Sec. 57 of R.A. 6657, the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, has exclusive original jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. It would subvert this original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of the administrative decisions. In accordance with the settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation of the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts.

The taking of property under R.A. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.

The Court further ruled that LBP’s argument that HFC failed to exhaust administrative remedies had no merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue has been rendered moot and academic. In the present case, the issue is already moot and academic considering that the valuation by the LBP had long been affirmed in toto by the DARAB in its May 1998 decision.

On the second issue:

The Court ruled that HFC is not guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different for a, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in another. The Court, in Yu vs. Lim, has laid down the requisites of forum shopping, as follows:

1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions;

2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;

3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in two cases, such that any judgment that maybe rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

In the present case, HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third element of litis pendentia is lacking. The DARAB’s valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any interested parties. The SAC will still have to review with finality the determination, in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

On the third issue:

The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the land in question without the requisite hearing. The SAC erred in concluding that the subject land is commercial in nature. The parties must be given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before the court can take judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of a landholding. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution and within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Petition was granted and the assailed amended decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside. The special civil case for the determination of just compensation is remanded to the RTC of Masbate.

G.R. No. 170685/September 22, 2010

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Enrique Livioco

Facts:

Respondent was the owner of a parcel of sugarland in Pampanga which was adjacent to residential subdivisions and an international paper mill as indicated in his voluntary-offer-to-sell form submitted to the DAR. Livioco offered his sugarland for acquisition under the CARP. Following Sec. 17 of R.A. 6657 and DAR AO No. 17, series of 1989, as amended by AO No. 3 series of 1991, the LBP set the price at Php827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco was then promptly informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds had been kept in trust pending his submission of the ownership documentary requirements. Apparently, Livioco did not act upon the notices given to him by DAR and LBP. Sometime in 1991, LBP issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has earmarked Php827,943.48 as compensation for Livioco’s 26-hectare land. Two years later, Livioco requested for a reevaluation of the compensation. The DAR denied the request on the ground that there was already a perfected sale. Subsequently, the DAR took possession of Livioco’s property and awarded it to 26 qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Livioco then filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOA’s and to recover the property but the same proved futile.

Issue:

Whether or not the just compensation was determined in accordance with law.

Ruling:

No. The valuation of the property was unlawful. The SC ruled that the value of respondent’s property should have determined by its character and its price at the time of the taking.

As to the character of the property, the SC ruled that the land should have been valued as an agricultural land. The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential, because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to approve land use conversions so as to prevent fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform coverage. Even reclassification and plans for expropriation by local government units (LGUs) will not ipso facto convert an agricultural property to residential, industrial or commercial. Thus, in the absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of respondent’s property or an actual expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of said property changed from agricultural to residential. Respondent’s

property remains agricultural and should be valued as such.

As to the price, Section 17 of RA 6657 provides:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

As to the time of the taking, the SC ruled that the value of the property must be valued at the “time of taking,” which is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.

G.R. No. 93100/June 19, 1997ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORMG.R. No. 97855/June 19, 1997

PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Facts:

Petitioners are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail some sections in RA 6657 as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in AO Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of DAR as unconstitutional considering that CARL extends to aquaculture lands when the constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands and that questioned provisions similarly treat aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated and differently treat aquaculture lands and industrial lands, when they are similarly situated.

Issue:

Whether or not the questioned provisions are unconstitutional insofar as they include in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.

Ruling:

The constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of RA No. 7881 expressly stating that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of the CARL. While the court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act. The petition was dismissed.

G.R. No. 103302/August 12, 1993

NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP. vs DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV

Facts: Petitioner Natalia Realty is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba,

Antipolo, Rizal with a total of 125.0078 hectares. On 18 April 1979 Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis and the Natalia properties were within the areas proclaimed as reservation townsite. EDIC corp. developed the Natalia properties into low-cost housing subdivisions and reservations, thus, the Natalia properties later became Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On 15 June 1988, RA 6657 or CARL, went into effect so the MARO issued a notice of coverage on the undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia immediately registered its objection to the notice of Coverage. On 17 January 1991, SAMBA filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC corp. before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain the petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by the SAMBA members. The Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with the development of the subdivision. Petitioner move to dismiss the complaint, however, it was denied and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Arbitrator. Petitioners also wrote a letter to the Secretary to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither the Director nor the Secretary took action on the protest-letters. Hence a case filed in the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion against respondent for including the undeveloped areas within the coverage of CARL.Issue:

Whether or not lands classified for residential, commercial or industrial use as approved by HLURB prior to 15 June 1988 covered by RA 6657 or CARL.

Ruling:

No. Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations DAR itself defined "agricultural land" as those lands which are devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the DENR and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the HLURB and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,commercial or industrial use." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." Furthermore, the Secretary of Justice even noted in an Opinion that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657." Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.

G.R. No. 178046/ June 13, 2012

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Montinola-Escarilla and Co., Inc.

Facts:

Respondent MECO was the owner of a parcel of agricultural land in Agusan del Sur. A portion of the whole lot was acquired by the government in 1995 under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. 6657). Petitioner LBP initially valued the land at Php823, 204.08 but the same was rejected by the respondent. Pending summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation before the DAR Regional Adjudicator (RARAD), MECO filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC which constituted a four-member Board of Commissioners to evaluate and appraise the just compensation of the subject property. Meanwhile, the RARAD rendered a decision fixing the just compensation at Php823, 204.08. On the other hand, the Board of Commissioners were not able to come up with a unified valuation of the property. The RTC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation at Php7, 927. 660. 60. Petitioner LBP and DAR Secretary filed separate motions for reconsiderations which were both denied. LBP appealed to the CA, averring that the RTC erred in disregarding R.A. No. 6657 and its implementing guidelines, DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, in valuing the subject land. It contended that the valuation heavily banked on present considerations or future potentials of the subject property instead of its value at the time of taking. The CA set aside the RTC's valuation for failure to give due consideration to the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. It adopted the Commissioners' Report submitted by the two commissioners as the only unbiased determination of just compensation. However, it deleted the award of attorney's fees for being improper. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in adopting the valuation in the Commissioners’ Report.

Ruling:

Ruling in the negative, the Court held that the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking. In the implementation of R.A. No. 6657, Section 17 provides the manner by which just compensation is determined, thus:

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The potential use of the expropriated property is only considered in cases where there is a great

improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, but should never control the

determination of just compensation.Under DAR A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994, the landowner shall not be compensated or paid for

improvements introduced by third parties such as the government, farmer-beneficiaries or others. Hence, it was erroneous to reclassify the acquired property into cornland and cocoland based on plaintiff's (MECO) evidence considering that the improvements were introduced by the farmer-beneficiaries.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the case was remanded to the RTC for the determination of the proper just compensation.

G.R. no. 175055/ June 27, 2012

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Heirs of Maximo Puyat and Gloria Puyat

Facts:

Respondents are the heirs of Maximo and Gloria Puyat and the pro indiviso owners of the subject property. The records do not disclose when the DAR placed the Puyat’s land under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27. It is however clear that the DAR issued several emancipation patents in favor of various farmer-beneficiaries in December 1989. The Puyats did not receive any compensation for the cancellation of their title over the awarded portions of the subject property. Two years after the DAR awarded the property to farmer-beneficiaries, the LBP received DAR’s instruction to pay just compensation to the Puyats. Respondents received LBP’s initial valuation together with the notice of acquisition and valuation form but rejected the valuation. The heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation with the RTC of Cabanatuan City. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. Upon LBP’s motion, the trial court modified the compensable area to the actual area acquired by the DAR. LBP appealed the modified decision to the CA which rendered a decision affirming the decision of the lower court. LBP moved for a reconsideration which was denied. Hence the present petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using the factors appearing in Sec. 17 of RA 6657.

2. Whether or not it is proper to impose 6% legal interest per annum on the unpaid just compensation.

3. Whether or not the case should be remanded to the RTC for the computation of just compensation using Sec. 17 of RA 6657 as amended by RA 9700.

Ruling:

On the first issue:

Ruling in the affirmative, the court held that when the government takes a property pursuant to PD 27, but does not pay the landowner just compensation until RA 6657 has taken effect it becomes more equitable to determine just compensation using RA 6657. In the case at bar, respondent’s title to the property was cancelled and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries on March 1990. In 1992 LBP approved the initial valuation for the just compensation that will be given to the respondents. Both the taking of respondent’s property and the valuation occurred during the effectivity of RA 6657. When the acquisition process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, the process should be completed under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having suppletory effect only.

On the second issue:

Resolving the issue in the affirmative, the SC held that the LBP’s claim that the imposition of 6% interest by the trial and appellate courts constitutes a double imposition of interest is unwarranted. The 6% interest reate imposed by the trial and the appellate court would be a double imposition of interest

had the courts below also applied DAR AO No. 13 series of 1992. But the fact remains that the courts below did not apply DAR AO no. 13. In fact, that is precisely why the LBP appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, and the latter’s decision to this Court. Therefore, the LBP is cognizant that the lower court’s imposition of interest cannot constitute a double imposition of a legal interest.

On the third issue:

Ruling in the negative, the court held that RA 9700 took effect at a time when this case was already submitted for resolution. All the issues had been joined and the parties had argued exhaustively on their various contentions. The issue regarding the applicability of RA 9700 to the instant case was not among those discussed in the party’s memoranda. To rule that RA 9700 decrees a remand of the case would be abhorrent to the rules of fair play. With respect to land valuation, all Claim Folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009, shall be valued in accordance with Sec. 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700. In the instant case, LBP received the claim folder for the respondent’s property in 1992, which was long before the effectivity of RA 9700 in 2009. Further, DAR AO no. 02-09 makes clear distinctions with respect to the laws that should govern the valuation of lands to wit:

1. The compensation of lands covered under RA 9700 shall be:a. The amount determined in accordance with the criteria in section 7 of the said law

and existing guidelines on land valuation.b. All previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by

landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 6657, as amended.

Lands yet to be acquired and distributed by the DAR when RA 9700 took effect shall be valued using RA 9700, while lands already acquired but unpaid when RA 9700 took effect shall be valued using Sec 17 of RA 6675. The trial and appellate courts arrived at the just compensation with due consideration for the factors provided in Sec. 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700. Petition was denied for lack of merit and the decision of the CA was affirmed.