digested cases for Admin and Election law

8/13/2019 digested cases for Admin and Election law

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1.TAULE vs. SANTOSAugust 12, 1991 G. R. No. 90336

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5,

1989 for being null and void.

Facts:

An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the

absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president.

Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in

the manner it was conducted.

Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a

purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being

the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.

Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as

possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.

Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC.

2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest.

Decision: Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued inexcess of jurisdiction. However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted

immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He

is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as

provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code.

It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.

2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the

sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the

presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC

since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances,

the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to

question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.

The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No.89-09.

DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational

meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the

meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was

a clear violation of the said mandatory provision.

Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his

memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local

Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of

barangay councils


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2. MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]

Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed,

petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation

of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provis ion of the Bill of

Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the

limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law

has authorized her to do so.

Issue:Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and

advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed

with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and

order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the

conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violencedirected against the state and

instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its

existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the

essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the

return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest

and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED


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3. Ang-Angco v. Castillo,

Ang-Angco v. Castillo, No.L-17169, SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, 9 SCRA 619,February 16, 1960, Argued, November 30, 1963, Decided.

Facts:

The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by any CentralBank release certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-Angco to secure the immediate release of

the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-

Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angcowhich stated that his office had no objection to the release of the

concentrates but could not take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the

Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco

finally released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an administrative

complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his

office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.

Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over all executive departments, bureaus

and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative casein subordinate officers of the executive branch

of the government.

Issue:

Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the classified civil service.

Previous History:

Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over all executive departments, bureaus

and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative casein subordinate officers of the executive branch

of the government.

Ruling:

The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified civil service.

It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid down in

connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process

as guaranteed by said law. The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or

remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees but not with

regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be

exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the

appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section

10 [3],Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress

has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law isthe Civil Service Act of 1959.

It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the administrative case of an employee

under classified service even with the authority of the President without submitting the case to the Commissioner of

Civil Service.


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4. Araneta v Gatmaitan G.R. Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957

Ponente: Felix, J.

Facts:

The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and

Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving topetition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of

Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the

President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in

answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camaries Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the

typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22

Thereafter a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources and director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null

and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel

Bay by executive proclamation and held that the Eos 22 and 66 are invald.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the President has authority to issue Eos 22, 66 and 80

2. Whether or not the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the

President.

Held:

1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine

waters come within the powers of the Secreatry of agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President

of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations,

decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, Eos 22,66 and 80 restricting andbanning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority or law.

2. Yes. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation og the

Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our

supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by

regulations and such restriction as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When

the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issues EO 80 absolutely

prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the san Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an

anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which

were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.


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5.EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

FACTS:This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seekingto annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance

of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines

created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.

Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:

To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical)

lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper

recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to

establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .

To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any

public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under

Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces

tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando

Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as

witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to

declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."

ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations

HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization andthe analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing

but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes

no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be

authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose

is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance ofwitnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to repor

findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an

effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the

authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same

restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all

the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely

exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated

in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose o

the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the

subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the

Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to

depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public

officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information

sought to be


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6 .SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs.HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of ManilaBranch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the

extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the

said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522

containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending

evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting

copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request afte

he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the

RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any

proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take

precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferentia

consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize

treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution

as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a

conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and

to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is

needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a

conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was

enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the

above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a

municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts

are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law

over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules

of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle

lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the

Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated i

they are in conflict with the constitution


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7. G.R. No. 132248 January 19, 2000

HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, petitionervs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent.

Denial of a Motion to Dismiss

Facts: Moral filed a mandamus and injunction case seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a decision which had already become

final. Pefianco filed a Motion to Dismiss. The judge denied the motion without stating the basis why Ps motion should be denied.

Issue: Whether thejudges denial of the motion was proper

Held: No. Rule 16 mandatorily requires that the resolution of a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons

therefor. The rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss for lack of merit. The challenged

order of the trial court falls short of the requirements stated in Rule 16.

ACTS: Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty. She was dismissed

Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. I

was denied.

HELD: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any

investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a

reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation committee.

Respondent had been accorded these rights


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8. CARIO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities

to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the

Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to

return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at theRamon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec

41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout

signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of

Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with

RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually

elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human

Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their

replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding theSec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the

striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not hav e been replaced without a chance to reply to

the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is

empowered to investigate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human

rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the

fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the

functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.

receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and politica

rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a

quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factua

conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to

the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such

appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.


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