PICOP vs Base metals dec 6, 2006

DOCTRINE

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking

assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an

interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of

the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of

the natural resources in the area.

FACTS: Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a Mines

Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining andDevelopment CorporationPursuant to the

terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the

mining claims with theBureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines

Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its

mining claims

Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging

concession in Agusan del Sur, BanahawMining and petitioner PICOP entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to the

areaconcerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining

claims Banahaw Mining thereafter converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral

Production Sharing Agreements.While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December

18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-sevenmining claims in favor

of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity).

The transfer includedmining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as

well as those covered by its mining operating agreement withCMMCI.Upon being informed of

the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by

Banahaw Mining infavor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private

respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claimsOn November 18, 1997, petitioner

PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII

anAdverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application on the

following grounds:

I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS

WILL VIOLATE THECONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF

OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty of

September 25, 1968 issued by thenPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber

license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and

enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of

Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential

Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract becauseit did not create any

obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause

finds no application. Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive

possession, occupation and exploration of the concession areas covered.If that were so, the

government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control and supervise the

exploration, developmentand utilization of the country's natural resources.

ISSUE:w/n the impairment of contracts apply?

HELD No.The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement An examination of the Presidential

Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's commitment to

uphold theterms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and

adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which arethe basic sources of raw materials

for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove

timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as

mineral resources, occurring within the concession.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any

manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession

andenjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete

abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of thesovereign power to control and supervise the

exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

Merida vs People june 12 2008

DOCTRINE

In People v. Merida (G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008), the Supreme Court ruled that cutting a

tree in private land for timber without a permit from the DENR was punishable under this

provision.

FACTS: The government hailed Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon,

Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting],

gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod,

Ipil,Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M.

Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownershipThe RTC handed judgment rapidly. In its Decision

dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to

fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion

temporal and ordered the seized umber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.

[12]The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial

admissionsthat he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this

finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut thetree, the trial court held petitioner liable

for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

ISSUEw/n sec 28 of PD 705 prohibiting the cutting gathering and collecting of timber and other

forest products apply to Petitioner .

HELD

Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private Property Without Permit

Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts[25]penalized under PD 705, provides:SECTION 68.

Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License

. — Any person who shall cut ,gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from

any forest land, or timberfrom alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,

without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents

as required under existingforest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties

imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided,That in the case of

partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,

collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to

the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on

Immigration and Deportation.The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the

government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,removed, or

possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area

where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied) Section 68 penalizes three

categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest

products from anyforest land without any authority; (2) thecutting, gathering, collecting, or

removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any

authority;[26]and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal

documents

Momongan vs Judge Omipon

Facts:

Judge Omipon conducted a PI for the violation Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order

No. 59 against the owner of the truck used for gathering timber and forest products but found no

probable cause hence he issued an order for the release of the truck. Petitioner filed an action

against Judge Omipon alleging that respondent Judge should have turned over the truck to the

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte

for appropriate disposition.

Issue;

Won Judge Omipon has a mandatory duty to turn over the truck to CENRO

Held:

No. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices,

deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other

forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices and turn over

said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. A period of about two

weeks lapsed, from the time the seizure was made before a complaint was filed. During this

period, the apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs and the truck to the

nearest DENR field office for proper action and disposition since the duty to turn over the truck

to the nearest DENR field office rests on the officials apprehending the illegal logs. There being

no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be

visited with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office in San

Juan, Southern Leyte.”

Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994

DOCTRINE:

Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a

regular court in keeping with theexhaustion of administrative remedies.

FACTS:In the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent

court and prays for the continuation of the hearing inCivil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that

what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction, i.e., "restraining theentry

of safety matches into the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of

the Forestry Code and for damages,"to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated

by the importation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection

and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."

Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to

incidents before the Court of TaxAppeals because the instant action is not a protest case where

the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since it could not avail of the

remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing

Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala. Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or

incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The onlysubject of this

incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products

which is to be enforced by theBureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs

Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiturecases and, in fact, it is the

duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations.The

enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is

within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the

Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban isdevoid of any

legal basis. Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to

impound the imported matches, as petitioner insisted, isclearly an interference with the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a

judge toimpound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and

declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, anusurpation of the prerogative and an

encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs

directedagainst the Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation

of matches by private respondent AJIC may not begranted without the court arrogating upon

itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.

ISSUEw/n the BOC holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importation

HELDPetitioner’s position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined

for the enforcement of the import ban under theTariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all

diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. Theenforcement of

statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of

Customs has the power to"promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the

provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary of

Finance."

Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any particular

method of procedure to be followed by anadministrative agency, the agency may adopt any

reasonable method to carry out its functions."But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's

correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations

mayalready take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would

preclude the court from interfering with it under thedoctrine of primary jurisdiction

People vs CFI feb 13 1992

DOCTRINE:

Mere possession of lumber is punishable; ownership is not an element of the crime.

FACTS

Charges were levied against private respondents for the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined

and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised

Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:That on or about the 28th, 29th

and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of General Nakar,

Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

namedaccused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does

whose identities are stillunknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the

Infanta Logging Corporation, with intent to gain,conspiring and confederating together and

mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously enter the

privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased

father,Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally

cut, gather, take, steal andcarry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and

without any authority under a license agreement,lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of

different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND

TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) includinggovernment

charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.On the first

issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the

opinion of the trial court, theinformation substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of

qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While itwas admitted that the

information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the

consent of the state,"nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally

cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without theconsent of said owner and

without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs

of differentspecies. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or

permit for utilization of forest resources, includingtimber, then the allegation in the information

that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease,

license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent

of the state.

ISSUEW/N the theft of logs was committed in contravention of PD 705

HELDThe SCs agrees with the petitioner.Sec. 68.Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or

other products without license.— Any person who shall cut,gather, collect or remove timber or

other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public lands,

or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or

permit, shall beguilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of

the Revised Penal Code. . . .When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the

facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency

of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically

admitted, meet the essentialelements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103

Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165SCRA 57).The elements of the

crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed

timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered,

collected or removed belongs to the government or to any privateindividual; and 3) that the

cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement,

lease, license, or permit granted by the state.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.

Thus, the failure of the information toallege the true owner of the forest products is not

material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without anyauthority or license

from the government.

The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject

matter because the information was filednot pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as

prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705The SC thereby granted the position and reversed the trial

court’s order of dismissing the information

Aquino vs People

Facts:

On behalf of Teachers’ Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead

Benguet pine trees within the Teachers’ Camp in Baguio City to be used for repairs

of the Teacher’s Camp.

DENR issued the permit.

Forest rangers filed a criminal complaint against Cuteng (supervisor of the cutting of the

trees), Nacatab (supervisor), Masing (sawyer), and Santiago (sawyer)for violation

of PD 705. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were

covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic

meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters.

The market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest

charges were P11,833.25.

The sawyers alleged that they were not aware of the trees to be cut because the

were under the supervision of the petitioner. While petitioner alleged that he was

sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers’ Camp. He allegedly informed his

superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit.

However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the

vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could

not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and

Santiago were accompanied by three other men.

RTC- the sawyers and the supervisor were found guily

CA-acquitted the sawyers but convicted petitioner.

Issue:

Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of

PD 705.

Held:

No. The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or

remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from

alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In

this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of

the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine

trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession

of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers’ Camp for repairs.

Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense

because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.

 

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the

sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the

Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was

really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner

administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section

68 of PD 705.

 

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of

PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who

ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.

Mustang Lumber vs CA june 18, 1996

DOCTRINE:

Possession of lumber is not a crime under PD 705. Timber is the punishable act

FACTS

The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs that were

seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Readily, the SAID

organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at thesaid

lumberyard.During the sting operation, the team members saw coming out from the

lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loadedwith lauan and almaciga

lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required

invoices and transportdocuments, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and

impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, QuezonCity. The team was not

able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.On 23 April 1990,

Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's

permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen

days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.On the same date, counsel for the

petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already

secured therequired documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was

submitted.

[

In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April

1990 of the petitioner's truck, which wasmoving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in

Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without coveringdocument

showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that

search and seizure must besupported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the

settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified,viz

., a search of a moving vehicleThe trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3

May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of theGovernment for the

reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive

Judge Osorio they shouldhave been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the

warrant.On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash

and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on thefollowing grounds: (a) the information does not

charge an offense, for possession of lumber , as opposed totimber , is not penalized inSection

68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber

falls within the purview of the said section, the samemay not be used in evidence against him

for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch

35of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which

involves the legality of the seizure,raises a prejudicial question

ISSUE:Whether the complaint charges an offense

HELD No. The petitioner proposed to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on

the ground that it does not charge anoffense. Respondent Judge granted the motion reasoning

that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER,which is neither

"timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence,

possession thereof withoutthe required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under

the said section.Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information

may be quashed on the ground that the facts allegedtherein do not constitute an offense. It has

been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments

inthe information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the

elements of the offense, andmatters aliunde

will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the

Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained

of as constituting the offense.

Tan vs People

Facts:

The accused Tan et al were charged of the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the Information,

under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277.

Th forest guards intercepted 2 trucks loaded with narra and white lauan lumber owned by the petitioner

without legal documents.

(1) the constitutionality of Section 68 of EO 277, (2) the treatment by the lower court of lumber as timber and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705, as amended, and (3) the alleged retroactive application of EO 277.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Held:

Petitioners contend that possession of manufactured lumber is not punishable under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended. As explicitly provided in Section 68 of both PD 705 and EO 277 (the law that amended the former), only the cutting, gathering, collecting and/or possession, without license, of timber and other forest products are prohibited. As expressly defined under Section 3(q) of PD 705, lumber is not timber or a forest

product. It is only in Section 79 of the same law where the sale of lumber, without compliance with established grading rules and standards, is prohibited. Petitioners submit that the forest laws and regulations sufficiently differentiate between timber and lumber; therefore, court should not construe lumber as timber.

The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 24 in which this Court expressly ruled that "lumber is included in the term timber." 25 We quote at length the Court's discussion:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber of lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.

Taopa vs People

Facts:

the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes

seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido

Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1[1] as amended, in the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes.

In this petition,2[6] Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He

alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the

seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

1[1] Revised Forestry Code.

2[6] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa’s alibi because

Cuison’s testimony proved Taopa’s active participation in the transport of the

seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded

with the cargo in front of Taopa’ Both the RTC and the CA gave scant

consideration to Taopa’s alibi because Cuison’s testimony proved Taopa’s active

participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the

CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa’s house and

that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to

where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa’s (and

Ogalesco’s) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck.

The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of

timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover,

the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was

likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and

Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

 

However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed

on Taopa.

 

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,3[7] refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the

Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation

of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft.4[8] The law

treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products

without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified

theft.

 

Articles 309 and 310 read:

 

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: 

1.      The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)

 2.      xxx 

3 [7] Section 68 provides: “Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. – Any person who shall xxx possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.”

4 [8] Merida v. People, G.R. No. 158182, 12 June 2008 citing People v. Dator, 398 Phil. 109, 124 (2000).

Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

  

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.5[9]

Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be

reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from

14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four

years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence6[10] imposable on Taopa

shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the

minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and

5 [9] The CA did not contest the correctness of the value as stated in the information. However, the CA clarified that the value of the lumber pegged at P99,120 was inclusive of surcharges and forest charges. The CA thus provided a breakdown of the values for a more correct computation of the penalties to be imposed on the accused. The relevant portion of the CA decision reads: “The Statement of Lumber Apprehended, which was prepared by Forest Ranger Jose San Roque, states that the market value of the 113 pieces of lumber is only P67,630. It appears that that the amount of P99,120 was arrived at by adding regular forest charges in the amount of P7,940 and 300% surcharges in the amount of P23,820 to the market value of the lumber pegged at P67,[63]0.”Rollo, p. 39.

6 [10] Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103) provides: “SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. xxx”

eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its

minimum period.

 

The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the

medium period7[11] of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or

16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of

reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16

years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and

21 days of reclusion perpetua.

 s house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were

Monge vs People

Facts:

Tigoy vs CA june 26, 2006

DOCTRINE

In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special

law such as in the present case, thecommission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is

sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law,

and that it is done knowingly and consciously.

7 [11] The medium period is imposed following Article 64 of the RPC which states: “When there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.” Although PD No. 705 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC. Hence, the rules in the RPC for graduating by degrees or determining the period should be applied. This is pursuant to People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555.

FACTS Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986,

introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to LolongBertodazo who revealed a desire to rent the

trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to DipologCity

In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner

Rodolfo Tigoy who had been employed by himas truck drivers for two ears, to bring the two

trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is about fifteen (15) minutesaway

from Iligan City. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of

the construction materials by LolongBertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to Dipolog

City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoyallegedly went home

to return to Larapan at four o’clock in the morning the next day. When they arrived, the trucks

had been laden with bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas.That same morning of

October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City),

while escortingProvincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along

with the members of the Special Operation Group,received a dispatch from the 466th PNP

Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue

andgreen loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the

checkpoint. Upon receiving the report, Tome, alongwith PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3

Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept the two trucks at

LilianTerminal, Ozamis City.At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in uniform

among the police officers, flagged down the two trucks but the same just sped away and

proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol vehicle, they chased the

trucks and overtook thesame at Barangay Manabay. They blocked the road with their vehicle

causing the two trucks to stop.The police chief hassled the driver who had alighted from the

green truck why he did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did notanswer. When he

inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver replied that there is "S.O.P," which means

grease money in street parlance. This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded

with "hot items."Immediately thereafter, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong,

Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest products without

legal permit

ISSUE:W/n knowledge was necessary to incur liability for the violation of the timber law

HELD: No. The crime is mala prohibita

Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or not petitioner Tigoy is guilty of

conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without the necessary permit in violation of the

Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.

277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, provides:Section 68.

Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. – Any

person who shall cut,gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest

land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,or from private land, without any

authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as

requiredunder existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties

imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of theRevised Penal Code. . . .There are two ways of

violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or

other forest productswithout a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products

without the required legal documents.Petitioner was charged with and convicted of

transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code.

He,Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers

in

flagrante delicto

as they were transporting thesubject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.Petitioner maintains

that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the

unlicensed lumber in the trucks.He believed that what he was transporting were bags of

cement in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was notaround when

Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.When finally

accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome identified as the driver of the green truck,

Sumagang, but who actually wasTigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to

the road block first, being the lead driver) offered "S.O.P." which towitness Tome meant that

the trucks were carrying "hot items."Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did

they fear inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in street parlance is grease

money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these

questions is that the driversknew that they were carrying contraband lumber. This Court

believes that the drivers had knowledge of the fact that they were transportingand were in

possession of undocumented lumber in violation of law. In offenses considered as

mala prohibita

or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the present case,

thecommission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the

intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by thespecial law, and that it is done knowingly and

consciously.Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove

conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven bycircumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the

mode, method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from theacts of the

accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community

of interest. It is not even requiredthat the participants have an agreement for an appreciable

period to commence it

Pallada vs People

Facts:

People vs Que dec 17, 1996

DOCTRINE

In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of said acts. However, in the second

offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the crime.

Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548

loaded with illegally cut lumber will passthrough Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,

members of the PTF went on patrol several times within the vicinity of GeneralSegundo Avenue

in Laoag City.On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1

Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in the morning, they posted

themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later,

they saw aten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and

apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before

the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705as amended by E.O.

277. The Information alleged:That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named accused, being

then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, withintent of gain,

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody

258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a

total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalentto 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of

P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do sofrom the proper

authoritiesAccused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the

258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legalsource. During the trial, he presented the private land

timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR)

to Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal. [14]

The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from theforest area covered by

the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th PLTP’s

of Cayosa andSabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his

hauling services

ISSUE:Whether or not Appellant’s activities consist an offense

HELDYES. Possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a violation of the RFC.When

the police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to prove that he has

the permit to possess and transport thelumber. All he had was the permit for the coconut slabs.

He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon firstinspection of the

load.Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the accused was aware that he needed

documents to possess and transport the lumber, butcould not secure one and therefore,

concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it could not be seen by merely looking at the

cargo.There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code:a.By cutting, gathering

and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and b.By possessing timber

or other forest products without the required legal documents.In the first offense, one can raise

as a defense the legality of said acts. However, in the second offense, mere possession without

proper documentation consummates the crime.