Desierto vs Heirs of Margarita Ventura

Facts:

Heirs of Margarita Ventura ( the Heirs) filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang. Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina to investigate the claims of the Heirs agaist her former husband Edilberto. Celerina supported the report with public documents which she falsified and Palacio issed a recommendation based on that report to award the landholding in dispute to Edilberto.

The DARAB recommended that the charged against the respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The CA then took cognizance of the case and granted the provisional dismissal the complaint against respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 but denied the dismissal of the complaint for falsification of public documents.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling:

The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

That since the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the case is void.

Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS

On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman submitted three Amended Informations to the Sandiganbayan against Virginio Villamor (Municipal Mayor) and Dinah Barriga (Municipal Accountant) of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. The First Amended Information charged Barriga and Villamor with Malversation of Public Funds. The facts of this information stated that on or about January 1996, the said acccused had in their possession and custody public funds amounting to P23,047.20 intended for the payment of 5 rolls of Polyethelene pipesto be used in the Corte-Canumong Water System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. Being public officers, they were held accountable for the funds. However, by this same capacity, the said accused misappropriated, took, embezzled, and converted the said amount for their own personal use and benefit.The second and third Amended Informations charged Villamor and Barriga with Illegal Use of Public Funds

The facts of the Second Information stated that on or about November 1995, the said accused had in their possession and control public funds amounting to P1305.00, representing a portion of the CVWSP Fundintended and appropriated for the Construction of Deep Well and Spring Box (Level I projects) and Water Works System (Level II projects) of specific brgy beneficiaries and recipients. By reason of the duties of their office, they are held accountable for the said funds. However, by such capacity, they connived, confederated and helped each other to disburse the said amount for the Spring Box of Brgy. Natimo-an, Carmen, Cebu. - abrgy not included as a recipient of the CVWSP Trust Fund. Thus, the accused used the said fund to a public purpose different from which it was intended or appropriated. The facts of the Third Information stated that on or about January 1997, the accused had in their possessionP267, 537.96 from the CVWSP Fund intended for the same purpose as that in the 2nd Information. However, the accused disbursed the said amount for the construction & expansion of Brgy. Cantucong Water System, a level II project, thus the public funds were used for a public purpose different from that which it was intended or appropriated.

ISSUES:

1.WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.

2.If the court has jurisdiction, WON Barriga should also be held liable:

A. Despite the Amended Informations' failure to show the intimate relations between the crimes charged and her official duties?

B. Despite being only of SG 24?

C. Despite the fact that she is not an accountable officer since, as Municipal Accountant, the funds in theAmended Informations were not under her control of administration?

HELD:

1.Yes. Based on the allegations in the Amended Informations and RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan hasoriginal jurisdiction over the crimes of Malversation and Illegal Use of Public Funds.

RA 8249 -SB has orig jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees,at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the time of thecommission of such crimes.

2 classes of public office-related crimes under Sec.4(b), RA 8249:

a. Public office is constituent element - offense cannot exist without office

b. Intimately connected with public office - perpetrated by p.o./employee while in exercise of functions

The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and feloniesunder the first classification. The Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in Section(a)(1) to (5) under the second classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular.

The public office of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio Villamor is a constituent element ofmalversation and illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayor’s position is classified as SG 27.Since the Amended Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co-accused in committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her.

2.Yes.

A. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of thecrime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that the accused committed thecrime in the performance of his duties.

B. The classification of the petitioner’s position as SG 24 is of no moment. The determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal accused is classified as SG27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense.

D. Under Section 474 of the Local Government Code, she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.

Even then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal Code.

The name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.

It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds/ property by virtue ofher official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer/private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.

The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer in committing six counts of malversation is also a co-principal in committing those offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.

Lilia Organo vs Sandiganbayan

320 SCRA 684 – Criminal Law – Crimes Committed by Public Officers – Plunder; Jurisdiction

Remedial Law – Jurisdiction of Courts – Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

In 1996, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Lilia Organo for the crime of plunder as it was alleged

that she and some other government officials stole P193 million from the government.

Organo filed a motion to quash alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Republic

Act No. 8249 which provides that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over government employees who do not belong

to Salary Grade 27. Organo was able to prove that her position in the Bureau of Internal Revenue does not belong to

Salary Grade 27.

The Sandiganbayan denied her motion. It insisted that under the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080, as amended), the

Sandiganbayan was vested with the jurisdiction over plunder cases and since RA 8249 is a general law and that RA 7080

is a special law, RA 7080 should prevail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can try plunder cases where the accused is below Salary Grade 27.

HELD: No. The Plunder Law itself provides:

Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan only had provisional jurisdiction over all plunder cases. In 1997, when RA 8249 was passed which

further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, there is already no question as to which plunder cases are within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The said law finally prescribed that the Sandiganbayan has no

jurisdiction over government employees which are below Salary Grade 27. RA 8249 is a special law the intention of which

was to declog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan. As such, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Organo. The case

should be filed in the appropriate court.

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit.

No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

October 26, 2012 §   1 Comment

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the

“extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate

ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522

containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice

Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time

to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the

request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government

must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should

take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual

deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is

so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international

law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there

appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local

state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting

papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative

action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there

appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local

state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal

law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the

incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international

law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the

reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of

international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most

countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national

legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute

and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of

the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine:

The “sweetheart theory” cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

Facts:

Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioner’s threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.

Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, BBB, AAA’s mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.

The petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned. Hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of “not guilty.” The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. The trail court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty and sentenced him to reclusion temporal and to pay an indemnity of Php. 75,000 and damages of Php. 50,000.

Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. The CA modified the decision of the trial court. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and ruled that the trial court erred in awarding Php. 75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by law.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on the grounds that there was no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart” relationship

Held:

No. The “sweetheart theory” cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.