CAUSE

Did the British doctrine of Parliamentarysovereignty allow viable alternatives toavoid conflict with rebellious colonists?

Viewpoint: Yes. Crown officials had viable alternatives before 1776 thatcould have preserved the essential claims of the contending parties andaverted armed conflict.

Viewpoint: No. The firm position of the British government that Parliamentshould reign supreme throughout the realm prevented the Crown from con-sidering the American position that the empire might be preserved withouttotally subordinating the colonies.

The dispute between Great Britain and America was an internal conflict, acivil war within the British Empire. As such, ultimate responsibility for resolvingthe crisis fell to the home government in London. Yet, why did Whitehall (the Lon-don thoroughfare where the chief government offices are located) fail to resolvethe Anglo-American dispute? In answering this most basic question about theRevolutionary War (1775-1783), some historians have explained that the struc-ture of British politics made the Revolution inevitable. They argue that after theFrench and Indian War (1754-1763), Whitehall, with support from the Britishpeople, was determined to replace its earlier policy of "salutary neglect" towardthe colonies with a policy of strict administration. To that end Parliament enacteda series of measures designed to better regulate American trade and currencyand to raise taxes to help defray the cost of managing the British Empire. Thecolonists made little protest against British measures regulating their trade, butthey strongly opposed Parliamentary laws taxing Americans for the sole purposeof raising revenue. Parliament justified its authority to tax Americans on the doc-trine of Parliamentary sovereignty, that the British legislature possessed com-plete authority over the colonies. The colonials obediently acknowledgedParliament's authority over external affairs (trade and defense) but violentlydenied its authority on internal matters (taxation) since the colonies were not rep-resented in the British legislature. Instead, the colonists argued that only theirelected representatives in the provincial assemblies had the right to enact legisla-tion regulating internal colonial affairs. The Americans therefore viewed the Brit-ish Empire as a confederation with political authority divided between central andlocal governments. The British ruling elite, however, ridiculed the American con-cept of empire. From their perspective one institution must have the final lawmak-ing authority, otherwise confusion, not order, would reign. Either Parliamentpossessed absolute authority over the colonies, or it possessed no authority atall. Thus, Whitehall boxed itself into an all-or-nothing position that left no room forcompromise. Once the Americans had challenged one aspect of Parliament'sauthority over the colonies, the Crown was bound to defend that supreme author-ity and to consider colonial opposition as a threat to the British constitution andEmpire. Unless the issue of sovereignty was first settled, there was no viableplan to resolve the Anglo-American dispute. Since neither contending party waswilling to compromise on this issue, armed conflict was inevitable.

Other historians believe that such arguments, however, are mere excuses.Instead, the fall of the First British Empire was the result of human failure, the

50 unwillingness of the home government to implement viable alternatives to sepa-

ration that were available to imperial officials. One can trace this human failure to the Crown, particularlyyoung King George III and his inept ministers who implemented an inconsistent American policy from1763 to 1774 that served only to encourage and inflame colonial resistance. Both American and Britishleaders offered several proposals to Whitehall to reconcile the imperial crisis, including plans to modifythe British Empire along the lines of the Anglo-American relationship as it existed before 1763 and for thecolonists to tax themselves in support of the empire. This solution was perhaps the best prescription forresolving the dispute, though British officials did not pursue it. Neither did Whitehall seriously considersuggestions made by royal officials granting America representation in Parliament. Instead, it answeredthis proposal with the argument that Americans were "virtually represented" in Parliament. When the col-onists protested Parliament's tax on British tea in 1774, partly on the political doctrine of "no taxation with-out representation," Parliament reacted with the punitively motivated Coercive Acts (1774). Still,Americans hoped for reconciliation and petitioned the King for a redress of their grievances. If Londonhoped to resolve the imperial crisis the Coercive Acts had to be partly repealed. Instead, George IIIresponded to the colonists' supplications by declaring them in "open and avowed rebellion" and sendingan army of more than thirty thousand troops to America to crush Patriot resistance. In December 1775Parliament took the imperial crisis to the point of no return by passing the Prohibitory Act, which sus-pended trade with the colonies and ordered the seizure of colonial ships and their cargo. With both theKing and Parliament responding to their proposals for peace with disdain and anger, Americans were leftwith no other alternative but to create an independent government and military force.

Viable alternatives to armed conflict were readily available to the home government. Its early policyof conciliation, as seen with the Stamp Act (1765) and Townshend duties (1767), quieted American pro-tests and brought subordination. Instead of continuing to implement this successful conciliatory policy fol-lowing the Boston Tea Party (1773), Parliament instituted draconian measures that were certain togalvanize American resistance to the mother country. In short, the British ruling elite, bent on preservingits political supremacy throughout the empire at all costs, failed to consider viable alternatives to separa-tion that would have cost the mother country little financially.

The question of British inability to resolve the Anglo-American dispute illustrates the inherent prob-lems in explaining the causes of the American Revolution, particularly the role played by political leaders.Although most historians saddle British officials with the blame in failing to resolve the imperial crisis, bothBritish and American leaders refused to compromise on the main bone of contention: Parliamentary sov-ereignty. In examining such disputes, students frequently adopt the simplistic explanation that human con-flicts are sometimes inevitable. However, inevitability is not an acceptable answer to any event because itimplies that man's destiny is beyond human control and thus relieves individuals and societies of respon-sibility for their actions. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must be held responsible for their failure topeacefully resolve the imperial crisis. Assuming that the American Revolution was not inevitable, can Brit-ish and American leaders be characterized as blundering politicians and irresponsible agitators who cre-ated a crisis that was highly artificial and that eventually led to a needless war by exaggerating thepotential consequences of compromising on the issue of Parliamentary supremacy? Was Parliamentarysupremacy absolutely necessary for Whitehall to govern the empire as British officials argued? WouldParliament really have lost all control over the colonies if it shared political authority with the Americans?Likewise, if Americans accepted Parliamentary supremacy would it naturally follow that Parliament wouldpass legislation "enslaving" the Americans as Patriot leaders claimed? In the end both British and Ameri-can leaders, in dealing with the imperial crisis, were acting according to popular sentiments in theirrespective countries. Although this fact begs the question of whether political leaders shape or follow pub-lic opinion, perhaps it still points to "the people" as being ultimately responsible for the American Revolu-tion and drives home the importance of a politically involved citizenry.

Viewpoint:Yes. Crown officials had viablealternatives before 1776 that couldhave preserved the essential claimsof the contending parties andaverted armed conflict.

At first glance, students of the AmericanRevolution might find persuasive the thesis thatindependence was inevitable. Three thousandmiles separated British settlers from Europe. The

colonists established self-governing communitiesfrom the start, and they would not submit todomination by England. The American Revolu-tion illustrates that colonialism—during the eigh-teenth century and in later years—simply couldnot work. While these arguments are valid, theydo not represent the last word on the conditionsthat provoked the British colonies to break awayfrom the empire. Leaders of the Revolutionremained loyal to the British Empire until atleast 1776. They favored the consolidated politi-cal system in Britain and later imbued their owngovernment with many of its features. While

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 51

Americans rightly hail their leaders as FoundingFathers, it is foolhardy to believe that theirgenius could only have been used for separatingfrom Britain. Viable alternatives to separationwere within reach, but inflexible leaders in theempire did not appropriate them. The demise ofthe First British Empire was the result of humanfailure—the unwillingness of key leaders to amica-bly resolve tensions that had accompanied itsearly success in America.

The Treaty of Paris (1763) was an endingand a beginning. It finally brought a bitter war

between France and Britain to an end after manyyears of warfare on several fronts, includingNorth America. It was also the beginning of anew outlook among royal officials on how tobest manage the mainland colonies. Theyignored customs and traditions in colonial affairsthat had developed for more than a century. Theold colonial system of Navigation Acts had dem-onstrated that the colonies would comply withpolicies that they considered consistent withtheir interests. Rigid enforcement of the Naviga-tion Acts had never worked, and British officials

52 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

since the reign of William and Mary (1689-1702) recognized that this flexible arrangementwould yield significant dividends for the colo-nies and Britain. When the French and IndianWar (1754-1763) ended, British officialsdecided that it was time to impose the will of theCrown upon the colonies, lest they separatewithout cause. Their single-minded devotion to anew colonial system proved costly.

British officials at home and in the colo-nies insisted upon rigid enforcement of thenew colonial policy on the premise that the col-onies had never paid their fair share to theempire. This decision meant imposing what thecolonies called internal taxes upon them as wellas barring settlers from crossing the Appala-chian Mountains. Britain claimed this policywas for their protection from Native Ameri-cans. For British policymakers, protecting thecolonies meant sending soldiers to America,whom the colonists immediately associatedwith taking away their liberty. Moreover, royalofficials in America advised the Crown ofchanges in colonial attitudes. Sir Francis Ber-nard, royal governor of Massachusetts, warnedthat it is "the proper and critical time to reformthe American governments upon a general,constitutional, firm, and durable plan; and if itis not now, it will probably everyday growmore difficult, till at last it becomes impracti-cal." George III and his advisers began to paymore attention to such warnings.

The reign of George III (1760-1820)turned the British Empire upside down. Hispredecessors had accommodated British policyto the colonial determination to selectivelyabide by the mercantile program of the state.When it was in their interest to trade directlywith Britain they did so, but the colonies con-tinued to transport goods outside the BritishEmpire. Both Britain and the colonies hadprofited from this unofficial arrangement.George III brought in a new wave of advisers,whose views clashed with established leaderssuch as William Pitt and Isaac Barre, both ofwhom considered the new colonial policy pro-vocative. The new King, overly self-conscious,was unprepared for leadership. Directed byJohn Stuart, Earl of Bute, King George IIIannounced in his ascension address that he"gloried in the name of Britain." The Kingbelieved that the colonial policies of his prede-cessors were inadequate. Soon after hisappointment as First Lord of the Treasury in1762, Lord Bute began translating this attitudeinto policy. Though he had been in service withFrederick, Prince of Wales, and the father ofGeorge III since 1738, his tenure was ephem-eral. Lord Bute made enemies for negotiating atreaty with France that many leaders in Britain

considered inadequate. He had also appointedmany of his countrymen from Scotland topolitical offices, an act that disturbed others.He resigned in 1763.

His resignation did not change the evolv-ing imperial policy of Britain. Indeed, his suc-cessor had supported his peace negotiationswith France and shared the belief that the colo-nies required better management. George Gren-ville was appointed Chancellor of theExchequer, and he immediately introduced abill for taxing the American colonies. Thoughhe had been in service during the reign ofGeorge II (1727-1760), he held an antiquatedview toward the colonies. "Great Britain pro-tects America," Grenville boasted, "America isbound to yield obedience." However, the colo-nies had rejected this theory since Parliamenthad adopted the first Navigation Acts in thelate 1600s. No administration had successfullycompelled the colonies to submit to this impe-rial theory. In a succession of measures passedfrom 1763 to 1765, Parliament enacted lawsthat provoked colonial resistance and producedthe theory that guided independence.

Of all the policies of Britain during thisperiod, the Stamp Act (1765) was the mostloathsome in America. The colonies inter-preted this measure as an attempt to reducethem to servitude and to deprive British citi-zens of their property. The resistance that fol-lowed was an attempt to preserve colonialrights—not a call for independence. Imperialpolicies were also catalysts for the theory thatultimately led the colonies to sever ties withBritain. However, resistance began only as ameans to prevent Parliament from abridgingcolonial rights. Had the colonies not acted,they would have unwittingly consented to for-eign taxation and to whatever might follow. Ulti-mately, independence was a by-product of the newcolonialism.

Amid the turmoil in America over theGrenville Acts, there were rapid turnovers inthe English government. Charles Townshendsucceeded Grenville in the Treasury Depart-ment. In the summer of 1766, George IIIwisely appointed Pitt as prime minister. Pitt, afriend to the colonies and an ardent opponentof the Stamp Act, argued that the colonistswere entitled to all the rights of English citi-zens. The government quickly changed againwhen Pitt suddenly fell ill, and the Crown ele-vated Townshend to that office. Unlike his pre-decessor, Townshend was not concerned withcolonial rights, and he acted hastily when exer-cising the powers of Britain. Parliament com-plied with his request in 1767 for special dutieson lead, paint, paper, glass, and tea importedinto the colonies, taxes that produced a new

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 53

wave of protest in America. In addition, Parlia-ment suspended the New York legislature untilit agreed to quarter British soldiers. By 1770Parliament had bowed to colonial resistanceand repealed all the revenue duties except forthe one on tea.

The 1760s ended quietly, but unresolvedquestions of British authority in Americaremained. In the years before the Declarationof Independence (1776) it was not a certaintythat the immediate past would determine thecourse of Anglo-colonial existence. There is noevidence that the colonials were convinced thatreconciliation was impossible. Indeed, after theBoston Tea Party (1773) and the Coercive(Intolerable) Acts (1774) that followed, promi-nent colonists held the conviction that theBritish Empire could survive. At the First Con-tinental Congress (1774) in Philadelphia, colo-nial leaders—including George Washington,James Madison, and John Dickinson—favoredreforming the empire. Led by Joseph Gallowayof Pennsylvania, they made compromise thefirst order of business. Galloway proposed cre-ating an American Parliament, composed ofcolonial and British representatives. Delegatesrepresenting New York, New Jersey, and Penn-sylvania considered the proposal attractive;however, upon the arrival of the SuffolkResolves in Philadelphia the majority rejectedthe Galloway Plan on a vote of six to five. Thecolonies decided to follow the Suffolk confer-ence, calling for boycotting British goods untilGreat Britain repealed the Intolerable Acts.

A grave failure of British leaders was theirinability to see the empire in a new light. Theimperial policy adopted by the administrationof George III was not working. There wereprofound differences in Britain and Americaover colonial administration. British policy-makers missed an opportunity in 1774 toresolve the dispute. Although the coloniesturned down the Galloway Plan, thereremained five states that considered it a work-able solution. It is also reasonable to assumethat the six states voting against it might havereconsidered if the plan was modified toaccommodate more of their interests. How-ever, the empire was unwilling to modify itsimperial policy. This decision was made bymen, and was not some fatal flaw in managinga united kingdom.

The interest in reconciliation in Americawas not fleeting. Not even hostilities in Lexing-ton and Concord in April 1775 or at BunkerHill in June doomed the prospect of peace.The colonies bolstered themselves by formingan army and a navy, but there was no officialpolicy of war. On the contrary, the coloniessubmitted an olive branch to the King, who

further breached their trust with the declara-tion that they were in "open and avowed rebel-lion." Clearly, the imperial policy had collapsedin America; yet, the British government did notpursue alternatives. London evidently consid-ered "peace" to mean "capitulation," and itexacerbated conditions in colonial affairs byturning the rebellion into a world war. Whataccounted for the course of action that pro-duced a new nation? Was it, as one historiandeclared, "That of the men most responsiblefor British policy in 1774 none . . . compre-hended the nature of the crisis that confrontedthe empire."

Indeed, London made critical blundersduring at least two phases of colonial resis-tance. During the 1760s the colonial argumentwas a simple one: the colonies believed thatonly their local assemblies had the constitu-tional authority to tax them. They articulatedthese arguments clearly when they convenedthe Stamp Act Congress (1765). Though colo-nial representation in Parliament was not apopular subject, English officials would havebeen wise to consider it. They instead coun-tered with the notion that since Parliament leg-islated for the entire empire, all Britishsubjects wherever they resided were virtuallyrepresented even though they did not helpelect members of Parliament. This argumentwas not persuasive among the colonists; yet,few of them openly talked about indepen-dence. They evidently saw themselves as Brit-ons, and they wanted to preserve the rightsthat belonged to them.

One decade later the war of words degen-erated into armed conflict. It was not the disas-ter in Lexington and Concord that mademilitary struggle a reality—it was the way Brit-ish officials handled the crisis involving tea.The Coercive Acts drew a line in the sand andwere the catalyst for American unity. Congressquickly assumed the duties of a national gov-ernment for the colonies. If London officialswanted to hold on to the colonies, they had toneutralize the crisis. Instead, they made mat-ters worse by passing such measures as the Pro-hibitory Act (December 1775), suspendingtrade with the colonies, and seizing colonialships and confiscating their cargo. Aggrievedby such acts, Americans readily adopted thereasoning in Common Sense (1776), in whichpolitical philosopher Thomas Paine suggestedthat they were poised to create a new republicof liberty.

The colonies, however, did not want a rev-olution in the truest sense of the word. Theyrepeatedly asked for a reversal of Parliament'slaws and an agreement that they would betaxed by their elected representatives. On 1

54 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

July 1775 Congress officially denied "anydesigns of separation from Great Britain andestablishing independent states." In 1821former U.S. president and Revolutionarystatesman John Adams wrote that a commit-ment to independence during the 1770s was"as far from the truth as the zenith is from thenadir. For my own part, there was not amoment during the Revolution, when I wouldnot have given everything I ever possessed for arestoration to the state of things before thecontest began." The British government wasunwilling to return to the state of affairs thatexisted before 1763. Only the unwillingness ofLondon to compromise best explains why thecolonies ultimately took the path of separatingfrom England.

It requires little imagination to see thathuman failings were primarily to blame for thecollapse of the American wing of the BritishEmpire. Protests against the Stamp Act fellsilent following its repeal. This reaction suggeststhat a Crown conciliatory policy was a sure wayto disarm the colonies. Even the partial repeal ofthe Townshend Acts in 1770 achieved a cessa-tion of colonial boycotts. British officials, how-ever, ignored this policy following colonialdestruction of tea in Boston in 1773. Certainlythe owners of the cargo deserved compensationfor the loss of their property; yet, the draconianpolicy that followed was miscalculated. The evi-dence shows that reconciliation, or at least aconciliatory policy, might have achieved thesame results as repealing the internal taxes in the1760s. No one can say that the British Empirewould have lasted forever, but no certaintyexisted that the political arrangement that hadsurvived for more than 150 years would havecollapsed during an 8-year war. Given this real-ity, there can be little doubt that London didnot give peace a fair chance and shoulders theblame for losing the colonies in 1776.

The self-righteous imperial policy of Britaindrove the colonies to separate from the empire.The inflammatory conduct of royal authoritiesestablished a national American identity in poli-tics and law. The Declaration of Independencestated in clear terms that the colonies were soaggrieved that it was their duty to separate fromBritish tyranny. The arguments in the documentmight have been exaggerated, but they accuratelyenumerated acts of British aggression. For morethan a decade, it implies, George III had consis-tently abused his authority over the colonies.The Declaration made it unlikely that Britainwould ever again control the colonies. Untilthen, a change in British policies would haveended the contest in America.

-STEPHEN MIDDLETON,NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No. The firm position of the Britishgovernment that Parliament shouldreign supreme throughout therealm prevented the Crown fromconsidering the American positionthat the empire might be preservedwithout totally subordinatingthe colonies.

On 19 April 1775, on the town green inLexington, Massachusetts, British and Americansoldiers exchanged the first shots in the Ameri-can War for Independence (1775-1783). Inanother sense, however, the conflict betweenAmerica and Britain already had been raging formore than a decade. The crisis began in earnestin 1763, when the British thoroughly routed theFrench in the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and seized possession of Canada and theeastern Mississippi valley. While valuable, thesenewly conquered lands required protection. Par-liament responded by deploying an army of tenthousand redcoats to America at great expense toprotect the new territory. Moreover, Britain'snational debt had doubled during the war. Newsources of revenue were needed to meet thesefinancial burdens. The Grenville administration(1763-1765) responded by proposing to levy aseries of taxes on the American colonists. Parlia-ment enacted the new taxes, with its membersbasing their power to tax on the doctrine of Par-liamentary sovereignty. By invoking Parliamen-tary sovereignty, however, British leadersadopted a position that subsequently preventedthem from accepting any political innovationsthat might have allowed a peaceful resolution tothe crisis with the American colonies.

The first of these taxes came when Parlia-ment passed the Sugar Act (1764), which alteredthe tariffs charged on foreign (non-British)molasses imported into the American colonies.The colonists objected to the act, but they didnot challenge Parliament's legal authority toissue it. The law could be interpreted as an effortby Parliament to regulate trade in the empirerather than as a tax law aimed at raising revenue.Strictly speaking, the Sugar Act revised theMolasses Act (1733), which also had levied aduty on the importation of molasses into the col-onies. While the colonists argued that the SugarAct was bad policy, they almost universallyagreed that Parliament had the lawful authorityto regulate trade for Great Britain.

At the same time that news of the Sugar Actarrived in the colonies, however, word alsospread that Parliament was considering a stamptax for the colonies. The proposed tax would

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55

AMERICA IS OBSTINATEBritish statesman WilUam Pitt opposed many of theCrown's patterns toward the Thirteen Colonies. In aspeech to Parliament he addressed the situation in Amer-ica as jsganfe the imposition of the Stamp Act (1765):

I have been charged with giving birth tosedition in America. They have spoken theirsentiments with freedom against this unhappyact, and that freedom has become their crime.Sorry I am to hearths liberty of speech in thishouse, imputed as a crime. No gentlemanought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a libertyby which the gentleman who calumniates itmight have profited, nay which he ought tohave profited. He ought to have desisted fromthis project. The gentleman tells us, America isobstinate; America is almost in open rebellion.I rejoice that America has resisted, Three mil-lion of people so dead to all feelings of liberty,as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, wouldhave been fit instruments to make slaves ofthe rest. \ come not here armed at all points,with law cases and acts of parliament, with thestatute book doubled down in dog's-ears, todefend the cause of liberty: if I had, I myselfwould have cited the two cases of Chester andDurham. I would have cited them, to haveshown that even under former arbitrary reigns,parliaments were ashamed of taxing a peoplewithout their consent, and allowed them repre-sentatives. Why did the gentleman confinehimself to Chester and Durham? He mighthave taken a higher example in Wales; Wales,that never was taxed by parliament till it wasincorporated. I would not debate a particularpoint of law with the gentleman. I know hisabilities, I have been obliged to his diligentresearches: but, for the defense of liberty,upon a general principle, upon a constitutionalprinciple, ft is a ground on which I stand firm;on which I dare meet any man. The gentlemantells us of many who are taxed, and are notrepresented The India Company, merchants,stock-holders, manufacturers. Surely many ofthese are represented in other capacities, asowners of land, or as freemen of boroughs, itis a misfortune that more are not equally rep-resented: but they are ail inhabitants, and assuch, are they not virtually represented?...they have connections with those that elect,and they have influence over them. The gen-tleman mentioned the stockholders: I hope hedoes not reckon the debts of the nation as apart of the national estate. Since the acces-sion of King William, many ministers, some ofgreat, others of more moderate abilities, havetaken the lead of government....

None of these thought, or ever dreamed,of robbing the colonies of their constitutionalrights. That was to mark the era of the lateadministration: not that there were wantingsome, when I had the honour to serve his maj-esty, to propose to me to bum my fingers withan American stamp-act. With the enemy attheir back, with our bayonets at their breasts,in the day of their distress, perhaps the Ameri-cans would have submitted to the imposition:but it would have been taking an ungenerousand unjust advantage. The gentleman boastsof his bounties to America Are not thosebounties intended finally for the benefit of thiskingdom? If they are not, he has misappliedthe national treasures. I am no courtier ofAmerica; I stand up for this kingdom. I main-tain, that the parliament has a right to bind, torestrain America. Our legislative power overthe colonies is sovereign and supreme. Whenit ceases to be sovereign and supreme, Iwould advise every gentleman to sell hislands, if he can, and embark for that country.When two countries are connected together,like England and her colonies, without beingincorporated, the one must necessarily gov-ern; the greater must rule the less; but so ruleit, as not to contradict the fundamental princi-ples that are common to both. Jf the gentlemandoes not understand the difference betweenexternal and internal taxes, I cannot help it; butthere is a plain distinction between taxes lev-ied for the purpose of raising a revenue, andduties imposed for the regulation of trade, forthe accommodation of the subject; although,in the consequences, some revenue mightincidentally arise from the latter.

The gentleman asks, when were the colo-nies emancipated? But I desire to know, whenwere they made slaves. But I dwell not uponwords. When I had the honour of serving hisMajesty, I availed myself of the means of infor-mation which I derived from my office: I speak,therefore, from knowledge. My materials weregood; I was at pains to collect, to digest, toconsider them; and I will be bold to affirm, thatthe profits to Great Britain from the trade of thecolonies, through all its branches, is two mil-lions a year. This is the fund that carried youtriumphantly through the last war.... You owethis to America: this is the price America paysyou for her protection.,..

Source: "William Pitt's Speech on the Stamp Act*America's Homepage <http://ahp.gatech,edu/pitt_speech_bp_ 1775.htmt>.

56HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N REVOLUTION

require the use of specially stamped paper (forwhich a fee or tax would be charged) for legaldocuments, diplomas, property deeds, newspa-pers, advertisements, and playing cards. The col-onists correctly perceived the bill to be a taxmeasure, and word of the proposal raised omi-nous warnings from them. The proposed tax,one colonist warned the Grenville ministry,"would go down with the people like choppedhay." Despite the warnings, Parliament enactedthe legislation by overwhelming margins. Thecolonists responded by instituting an economicboycott against British merchants, rioting, andwriting public protests challenging Parliament'slegal authority. What had been for decades a sta-ble and unquestioned relationship betweenGreat Britain and the American colonies wassuddenly thrown into doubt.

The colonists based their resistance to Par-liamentary taxes on the principle of "no taxationwithout representation." In voicing their objec-tions to the Stamp Act (1765) in these terms, thecolonists were drawing on a well-establishedpolitical (and, they believed, legal) principle.Essentially, the colonists claimed that legitimatepolitical authority is based on the consent of thegoverned. They further assumed that consent isexpressed through representation; and, theymaintained, representation is grounded on pos-session of the franchise. The colonists, however,were legally barred from voting in Parliamentaryelections. In no way, they reasoned, could theybe considered represented in Parliament. There-fore, Parliament lacked legal authority to taxthem. Only the colonial legislatures, in whoseelections they participated, could legally imposetaxes on them.

Parliament's defenders offered tworesponses to the colonists' claim to a legalexemption from Parliamentary taxes. First, theycontended that one need not possess the fran-chise in order to have representation in Parlia-ment. Few citizens in England could actuallyvote, because few residents there could meet thelegal voting qualifications. However, Britishleaders explained, nonvoters were still repre-sented in Parliament. Whereas voters were "actu-ally" represented in Parliament, subjects who didnot have the suffrage were "virtually" repre-sented there. Essentially, the idea of virtual repre-sentation assumed a compatibility of interestsbetween voters and nonvoters. Nonvoters werepurportedly represented because they sharedcommon interests with citizens who possessedthe vote. While representing the interests of vot-ers, members of Parliament would simulta-neously pursue the interests of nonvoters.

Many colonists ridiculed the idea of virtualrepresentation. Other colonists argued that evenif virtual representation were a valid political

principle, it did not apply in their case. Englishnonvoters might share common interests withvoters in England, but American colonists hadinterests at odds with those of English votersand nonvoters alike. For example, English voters(and hence members of Parliament) would sup-port legislation that raised colonial taxes pre-cisely because such policies would likely ease thetax burden on English residents. Several mem-bers of Parliament sided with the colonists in thedebate over the Stamp Act. Most famously,Henry Conway, Isaac Barre, and William Pittmade speeches in the House of Commons chal-lenging the claim that the colonists were repre-sented in Parliament.

A potentially devastating problem—boththeoretical and practical—thus emerged. If thecolonists were not represented in Parliament, onwhat basis could Parliament claim authority togovern the colonies at all? If lack of representa-tion precluded Parliament from taxing the colo-nists, why did it not also place the colonistsbeyond Parliament's authority altogether? Notsurprisingly, some of Parliament's defendersbelieved that secession was what the colonistshad in mind all along. Meanwhile, British mer-chants, reeling from the colonial boycott, lob-bied Parliament for relief. By early 1766Parliament was moving to repeal the Stamp Act.Members of Parliament insisted, however, thatthe repeal be accompanied by the DeclaratoryAct (1766), a statute reaffirming Parliament's ple-nary authority over the colonies. Parliament thusreasserted its authority to tax the colonists whilechoosing not to exercise that power.

Most members of Parliament asserted theirauthority primarily by invoking the doctrine ofParliamentary sovereignty. The insistence on Par-liamentary sovereignty was the second and moreimportant response to the colonists' claim thatParliament lacked the authority to tax them.Advocates for Parliamentary sovereignty arguedthat in every society there must be a final, indi-visible, supreme lawmaking authority. Subordi-nate governments might exist with the power toenact by-laws for local populations. These subor-dinate governments, however, remain subject tothe superior power. The alternative—a nationwith two (or more) lawmaking powers exercisingsupreme power over the same people—wouldnecessarily result in confusion, conflict, and ulti-mately the dissolution of society. It would, Brit-ish leaders asserted, create a political monster, animperium in imperio (empire within an empire).From the British perspective the dispute overParliament's authority was simple. Either Parlia-ment possessed complete authority over the col-onies or it possessed no authority at all.

Initially, the colonists resisted this either-orproposition. The colonists distinguished between

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the power to legislate and the power to tax. Theyargued that when their ancestors immigrated tothe colonies they did so with the understandingthat Parliament would retain limited authorityover them. They further argued that the Americancolonists could not be represented in Parliamentand therefore it did not have the authority to taxthem. Additionally, since members of Parliamentcould not be sufficiently familiar with conditionspeculiar to distant, individual colonies, it was alsoagreed that the colonial legislatures would exer-cise legislative authority over their individualinternal affairs. Yet, the colonists also acknowl-edged Parliament's authority in external affairs.They recognized the need for a single, superin-tending authority in the empire to govern mattersof general concern, chiefly in trade and defense.Local colonial governments were inherently inca-pable of governing for the general welfare of theempire. Only Parliament was situated to govern ingeneral affairs.

The colonists' argument was based on sev-eral interconnected innovations in politicalthought. First, in formulating their claim thatauthority in the empire was divided betweendifferent legislative bodies, the colonists concep-tualized modern federalism. Political authoritycould be divided between central and local gov-ernments as long as those governments did notexercise supreme authority in the same jurisdic-tion. By 1787 Americans were fully committedto federalism, embodying it as a core politicalprinciple in the U.S. Constitution. Moreover,when the Framers of the Constitution debatedhow to make federalism practicable, they turnedto the colonial experience for guidance. Recog-nizing that in theory the colonial legislaturesmight pass laws that exceeded their authority orthat were harmful to the welfare of the empire,colonial theorists such as Connecticut clericSamuel Hopkins and Maryland lawyer DanielDulany argued that there existed an institu-tional mechanism for keeping the local govern-ments in check. Colonial governors, theypointed out, were appointed by the King andpossessed veto power. The governor repre-sented the King (and hence, presumably, thewelfare of the empire) and would use the vetoto nullify objectionable colonial legislation.Moreover, they noted that colonial laws weretemporarily suspended until they had been sentto England for the King's approval. If the Kingwished, he, too, could veto colonial legislation.In other words, actions by the colonial legisla-tures were subject to a double veto, and Parlia-ment's authority was thereby secure fromencroachments by the colonial legislatures.

Eventually, the Framers would place thisveto power in the national judiciary, whosepower of judicial review enables it to strike down

state laws that encroach on the jurisdiction ofthe general government. The notion of a writtenconstitution, a binding body of laws, is, like theidea of federalism, an American creation that hasimmediate roots in the colonial dispute withEngland. When pressed to identify the legalbasis for their claim that authority in the empirewas divided federally, the colonists replied thatthis arrangement was laid out in the colonialcharters. They further argued that these charters,issued to them by the king when they settled thecolonies, were legally binding. This contentionabout the charters was consistent with their argu-ment about representation. The colonists werenot represented in Parliament; nonetheless,because they recognized a role for Parliament inregulating the general affairs of the empire, theyconsented (through the charters) to limited Par-liamentary rule.

Another innovation in colonial politicalthought is implicit in the idea of a constitutionas a fixed, binding body of law. By suggestingthat Parliament derived its authority from thecharters the colonists were in fact claiming thatthere is a lawmaking power superior to Parlia-ment. If sovereignty implies the power of a supe-rior to make and enforce rules for an inferior (asleading political and legal philosophers assumed),and if Parliament was subject to a superior ruleof law, then Parliament could not be sovereign.So just where did this superior power reside?According to the colonists, sovereignty restedwith the people. A constitution is a body of lawissued by the people acting in their capacity as sov-ereign. It expresses the will of the people and isthus binding on the government it creates (a consti-tution literally creates the institutions of govern-ment) to carry out their will. If they see fit, thepeople in their sovereign capacity can divide powerfederally between central and local governments.Moreover, because a constitution defines and limitsgovernmental power, one might argue that whengovernment exercises power inconsistent with thesovereign's (that is, people's) will, that exercise ofpower is unlawful and without legal force. That isprecisely how later American constitutionalists,such as New York Federalist Alexander Hamiltonand future Supreme Court Chief Justice John Mar-shall, would defend the power of judicial review asa democratic institution.

The claim that the people are sovereign andthat a constitution, as an expression of that sov-ereign will, binds the institutions of government,was directly at odds with the doctrine of Parlia-mentary sovereignty. By 1765 the doctrine ofParliamentary sovereignty had become an axiomin English political thought and practice. More-over, the doctrine held that Parliament's author-ity in the empire was not merely indivisible, itwas illimitable too. There were no legal limits to

58 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Parliamentary authority other than those thatParliament imposed upon itself. The British con-ceived of a constitution as an organic (asopposed to a fixed) body of law. Governmentalpowers and individual rights change over time, inaccordance with changes in custom, judicial rul-ings, and legislative statutes. In other words,under British law there is no difference betweena Parliamentary statute and the British constitu-tion. A Parliamentary statute is by definitionconstitutional. Of course, Parliament in practicemight not govern arbitrarily. There exist forcescapable of restricting Parliament's use of power,including electoral pressure (which again high-lights the colonists' objection to their disenfran-chisement) and respect for tradition, precedent,and the rule of law. Still, there are no legal limitsto Parliament's authority. As leading jurists ofthe day liked to say, Parliament can do anythingbut make man a woman.

Because British leaders asserted the doctrineof Parliamentary sovereignty, a federal solution tothe British-colonial crisis was impossible. Federal-ism assumes that political authority is limited anddivided among multiple, autonomous govern-ments. The claim that Parliament's authority wasunlimited was at odds with colonial claims that itsauthority did not include the power to tax. Inshort, British leaders offered an all-or-nothingproposition. British adherence to the doctrine ofParliamentary sovereignty prevented Britain fromconceiving political innovations, like those sug-gested by the colonists, that might have preservedthe empire without totally subordinating the colo-nies to Parliament.

Seen in this light, war was probably inevitable.Parliament was certain of its power and was deter-mined to assert it. The colonists, believing thattheir rights were being violated, were determinedto resist the offending power. True, until 1775 theconflict was predominantly intellectual (the BostonMassacre of 1770 involved bloodshed, but it didnot involve conflict between armies). The historicrepercussions of the intellectual contest, however,would be of far greater importance than the physi-cal battle. In fact, one might reasonably claim thatwithout the intellectual conflict a war for indepen-dence might never have occurred. Above all else,the movement toward American independenceproves that ideas do have consequences.

-HOWARD L. LUBERT,JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

References

Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of theAmerican Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.:

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1967).

Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence: AStudy in the History of Political Ideas (NewYork: Harcourt, Brace, 1922).

John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politicsat the Accession of George III (Cambridge &New York: Cambridge University Press,1976).

Ian R. Christie and Benjamin W. Labaree,Empire or Independence, 1760-1776: A British-American Dialogue on the Coming of theAmerican Revolution (Oxford: Phaidon Press/ New York: Norton, 1976).

Jack P. Greene, ed., Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789: A Documentary History of the AmericanRevolution, 2 volumes (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds.,American Political Writing during the Found-ing Era, 1760-1805, 2 volumes (Indianapo-lis: Liberty Press, 1983).

Forrest McDonald, ed., Empire and Nation: Let-ters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, John Dick-inson. Letters from the Federal Farmer,Richard Henry Lee (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1962).

Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolution:Revisions in Need of Revising," Williamand Mary Quarterly, 14 (January 1957): 3-15.

Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolu-tion (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-lina Press, 1953).

Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution: Sources andDocuments on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-1766 (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1959).

John M. Murrin, "The French and Indian War,the American Revolution, and the Counter-factual Hypothesis: Reflections onLawrence Henry Gipson and John Shy,"Reviews in American History, 1 (1973): 307-318.

Jerome R. Reich, British Friends of the AmericanRevolution (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1998).

Ellis Sandoz, ed., Political Sermons of the Ameri-can Founding Era, 1730-1805 (Indianapolis:Liberty Press, 1991).

Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson,The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins ofthe War of American Independence (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

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