The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 5 | Article ID 2418 | May 02, 2007

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Did It Really Help to be a Japanese Colony? East AsianEconomic Performance in Historical Perspective

Anne Booth

Did It Really Help to be a Japanese Colony?East Asian Economic Performance inHistorical Perspective [1]

Anne Booth

Since the 1980s, a widespread view has arisenin the literature that the post-1950 economicsuccesses of Taiwan and the Republic of Koreahave been due, in part at least, to the legacy ofJapanese colonialism. This paper challengesthat view by comparing Japanese economicachievements in both Taiwan and Korea withthose of the British, French, Dutch andAmericans in their Southeast Asian colonies.The paper examines the record of economicgrowth and structural change across thevarious colonies, and also discusses policiesrelat ing to government revenue andexpenditure and to trade, exchange rates andthe balance of payments. The paper also looksat some non-monetary indicators relating toliving standards, including mortality rates andeducational enrolments. The main conclusion isthat the facts do not wholly support the casefor Japanese exceptionalism.

" J a p a nh a sa l w a y sb e e ng r o w t h -oriented,i nc o l o n i a lareas aswell as ath o m e ;

and it isclear thatJapaneser u l ehelped toi n i t i a t eintensivegrowth inb o t hK o r e aa n dT a i w a n "(Reynolds1 9 8 3 :956)

In the second part of the twentieth century, thetwo former Japanese colonies of Taiwan andthe Republic of Korea have 'forged ahead' inthe race for economic growth, and haveachieved considerable success in narrowing thegap in per capita GDP between themselves andboth the USA and Japan. Aside from the twocity states of Hong Kong and Singapore, noother former colony in Asia has achieved thesame success in catching up. In several,including India, Indonesia and the Philippines,per capita GDP was lower in relation to that ofthe USA (and in the case of India and Indonesiain relation to that of their former coloniser) in2000 than it had been in 1913 (Tables 1 and 2).Until the 1980s, most scholars wishing toexplain the post-1950 growth of both Taiwanand the Republic of Korea stressed the policiesadopted by the governments which hadobtained power after the end of Japanesecolonialism. Most Korean scholars viewed theJapanese era with abhorrence, and while this

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was less the case in Taiwan, those seekingreasons for the remarkable growth andtransformation which occurred after 1950 inthe Republic of China were inclined to stresspost-1950 policy changes, especially in landreform and trade and industrialization policy,although several writers did emphasize theJapanese record in promoting technologicalchange in rice agriculture (Myers and Ching1964; Myers 1969; Myers 1970; Hayami 1973;Carr and Myers 1973; Thorbecke 1979).

The Japanese Empire, 1895-1932

By the early 1980s, a 'revisionist' school wasbecoming more influential, which tried toanalyse in more depth the policies followed bythe Japanese in both colonies and the extent towhich they laid the foundations for the rapidgrowth and structural transformation whichoccurred after 1950. The seminal collection ofessays edited by Myers and Peattie (1984) hada particularly important impact in the English-speaking world. In his introductory chapter,Peattie pointed out that Japanese colonialofficials tended to model their policies on the'superbly successful modernization effort whichJapan itself had undertaken in the threedecades after the Meiji leadership had

overthrown the Tokugawa feudal order'(Peattie 1984: 23). According to Peattie, theconditions in both Taiwan and Korea when theJapanese took over were not greatly differentfrom those in Japan in the late 1860s; theywere static peasant societies whose smallruling elites were corrupt and inefficient andlargely resistant to change. Apart fromconsolidation of military and political power intheir hands, the colonisers set themselves thetwin goals of agricultural expansion andtransformation of social attitudes throughexpanding the educational system. By the1930s, as Japanese imperial ambitionsexpanded to take in much of China, andultimately Southeast Asia as well, the industrialsectors of both colonies were also developed toprovide essential inputs into the Japanese wareconomy.

To many subsequent scholars seeking to find areason for the superior performance of Taiwanand the Republ ic of Korea, Japanesecolonia l ism did indeed appear moredeve lopmenta l in both i t s a ims andachievements, in comparison with colonialregimes in other parts of Asia. In the case ofTaiwan, Amsden (1985: 79-80) continued theemphasis of earlier authors such as Myers onthe agricultural transformation brought aboutby the Japanese, as well as achievements inprimary education and the development ofinfrastructure. On Korea, Cumings put forwardthe view that 'the colonial period played anundeniable role in placing Korea above mostThird World nations by 1945' (Cumings 1984a:481; see also Cumings 1984b), while Kohli(1994) argued that by sweeping aside therapacious and predatory Yi state, the Japanesewere decisive in shaping a political economythat later evolved into the high-growth SouthKorean path to development. Kohli stressed thereforms in both the civilian bureaucracy andthe police which laid the foundations for thepost-1945 state. In addition, he discusses therole of the state in industrial developmentunder the Japanese and also Japanese policies

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aimed at controlling the 'lower classes'including both the peasantry and the industrialworking class. In fact, according to his analysis,there was a striking degree of institutionalcontinuity between colonial Korea and theSouth Korean state under Park Chung-Hee(Kohli 1994: 1285).

The arguments of Kohli, and those of otherrevisionists on Korean development, weresubjected to critical review by Haggard, Kangand Moon (1997). They pointed out that therewere serious questions about the enduringnature of the Japanese legacy; that the belief inthe continuity of the Japanese colonialadministrative system displays a 'technocraticbias' in that it ignores the importance of thepolitical elites who control the administration;that the evidence that the Korean firms andentrepreneurs who rose to prominence after1960 had roots in the colonial era wasquestionable, and that the post-1960 growthperformance in Korea was made possible, inpart at least, by a reversal of Japanese colonialpolicies, especially those regarding agrarianreform and education. Other scholars havepointed out that Japanese policies in bothKorea and Taiwan were intended first andforemost to serve Japanese interests, and inthis respect did not differ from those of colonialpowers in other parts of Asia (Howe 2001: 43;see also Chang and Myers 1963: 436).

It is not the purpose of this paper to enter intothe debate on the causes of the rapid growth inboth Taiwan and South Korea after 1960. Mypurpose is rather to look at the record of othercolonial regimes in Southeast Asia and to placethe debate over Japanese colonialism in a widerperspective. By reviewing the record in British,Dutch, French and American colonialpossessions, I argue that we are in a betterposition to assess the colonial legaciesbequeathed to independent states. [2] The keyquestion posed in the paper is the following.Was the difference in economic performance,and in broader development indicators,

between the various colonies in East andSoutheast Asia sufficiently striking at the endof the 1930s to provide a clear indication oftheir post-1950 economic trajectories? If theanswer is no, then that would support thosewho argue that i t was the process ofdecolonisation itself, or the policies adopted bypost-independence regimes (some of themintended to reverse rather than sustain colonialpolicies) that have determined the post-1950outcomes. On the other hand if the evidencesuggests that the Japanese colonies wereobvious ly ahead in terms of severa ldevelopment indicators in the late 1930s, thenthe case for Japanese 'developmentalcolonialism' is supported.

I begin by examining the evidence on economicgrowth and structural change across colonialterritories in East and South East Asia in thefirst four decades of the 20th century. I thendiscuss policies relating to government revenueand expenditure and to trade, exchange ratesand the balance of payments. I also look atsome non-monetary indicators relating to livingstandards, including mortality rates andeducational enrolments The final section drawsconclusions on the nature of the colonial statein East and Southeast Asia and the legaciesbequeathed by these states to post-colonialgovernments.

Economic growth and structural change

By 1913, the USA had already become theworld leader in terms of both total and percapita GDP (Maddison 2003: Tables 8b, 8c). Ofall the major Asian economies, only Japan had aper capita GDP which was more than onequarter of that of the USA; in most of thecolonial territories and in China, per capitaGDP was well below 20 per cent of that in theUSA (Table 1). After Japan, the highest percapita GDP in 1913 was in Hong Kong andSingapore, followed by the Philippines,Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. South Koreaand Taiwan were below all these countries, and

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above only Burma (Table 3). By 1929, Taiwanand South Korea had overtaken Thailand, butwere still below the other three SoutheastAsian economies. It was only during the 1930s,a period of slow or negative growth in mostparts of Southeast Asia that the two Japanesecolonies grew much faster than in other partsof Southeast Asia, although by 1938 thePhilippines still had a per capita GDP aboveeither of them.[3]

As would be expected given the generally lowlevels of per capita GDP in 1913, most Asianeconomies were predominantly agricultural,with more than 40 per cent of GDP comingfrom the agricultural sector, except in Japanwhere the share had already fallen to under 30per cent (Table 4). In Korea almost 60 per centof GDP accrued from agriculture and forestry,which was a higher share than in thoseSoutheast Asian countries for which we haveestimates, with the exception of Burma (Table4). Agricultural growth was certainly rapid inboth Taiwan and Korea after 1913, and by 1938value added in agriculture had doubled inTaiwan and almost doubled in Korea. Theperformance in Thailand, Indonesia and Burmawas not as impressive, mainly because of thevery slow growth in the 1930s. In most parts ofAsia over these years, the non-agriculturalsectors were growing faster than agriculture,so that by 1938 the agricultural share of GDPhad fallen everywhere except in Thailand. InIndonesia by 1938, agriculture accounted forabout one third of total GDP, compared with 35per cent in Taiwan and 41 per cent in Korea. Bythe 1930s, non-agricultural employment hadalso become significant in several parts of Asia.In Japan, over half the economically activepopulation was working outside agriculture; inIndonesia, Burma and the Philippines theproportion was around 30 per cent. This was ahigher ratio than in Taiwan and Korea (Table5).

The rapid agricultural growth in both Koreaand Taiwan after 1913 was largely based on

smallholder agriculture, albeit with a highincidence of tenancy. Estate agriculture wasunfamiliar to the Japanese, and the colonialofficials felt comfortable with the landlord-tenant regimes which existed in both colonies,and saw little reason to change them (Ho 1984:385). After the serious shortages and rice riotsof 1918, the Japanese government began tofacilitate the transfer of Japanese high yieldingrice varieties to both Taiwan and Korea, in thehope that both colonies could provide Japanwith rice. Farmers’ associations andagricultural cooperatives were established;they appear to have functioned moresuccessful ly in Taiwan than in Korea(Thorbecke 1979: 137). The ponlai variety inparticular diffused rapidly, and fertiliser useincreased in both colonies (Hayami 1973: Table2.1; Myers and Yamada 1984: 437-9).Government investment in irrigation also grew,which led to an increase in double croppingespecially in Taiwan.

By 1925, Korea was supplying Japan with overfive per cent of its total rice consumption, andTaiwan a further 2.8 per cent; both thesepercentages increased over the 1930s (Ka1995: 135). Taiwan also became an importantsupplier of sugar to Japan, displacing importsfrom Java, although the development of theTaiwanese sugar industry was assisted by avariety of direct and indirect subsidies (Ho1971: 320-23; Lin 1973: 15-17; Schneider 1998:164). There can be little doubt that theintroduction of a "Meiji agrarian strategy",including considerable investment in irrigationand rural infrastructure, and the large marketin metropolitan Japan all served to acceleratethe pace of agricultural growth in both Koreaand Taiwan, and by the late 1930s, rice yieldswere much higher than in other parts of Asia(Table 6). The impact of Japanese agrarianpolicies on the welfare of the rural populationsin both colonies was more controversial, andwill be discussed below.

In much of Southeast Asia after 1900, colonial

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governments were also actively seeking topromote agricultural growth, both for homeand foreign markets. The growth of riceproduction was quite rapid in the decades after1910 in land abundant parts of Southeast Asiasuch as the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand,and in southern Vietnam (Cochinchina),although nowhere was it faster than in Taiwan(Table 6). Much of this growth was due to thereproduction of traditional varieties andtechnologies over more land, but some colonialgovernments, notably the Dutch in Java, did tryto develop new varieties which increaseddouble cropping, and thus annual production(Barker and Herdt 1985: 58; van der Eng 1996:81-91). In Peninsular Malaya, in Sumatra, andin southern Vietnam, the English, Dutch andFrench colonial authorities facilitated theacquisition of land by large estate companies togrow crops such as tobacco and rubber. Theexpansion of rubber estates after 1900 inSumatra and Malaya in turn led to a rapidgrowth in smallholder production, so that bythe late 1930s almost half of all rubberproduction came from small producers (Booth2004: Table 10). Much of the rubber went notto markets in the metropolitan powers but tothe USA. This growth of both estate andsmallholder export production in response tothe opportunities offered by world marketdemand had no counterpart in either Taiwan orKorea, where export growth was tightly gearedto the requirements of the Japanese market.

Turning from agricultural to industrial growth,there were differences between the twoJapanese colonies both in growth of themanufacturing between 1911 and 1938, and inthe size of the sector by the late 1930s. From avery small base in 1911, industrial growth inKorea was more rapid than in mainland Japan;between 1911 and 1938, there was an almostten-fold increase in value added from themining and manufacturing sectors. Growth wasparticularly rapid over the 1930s, and by 1938,manufacturing and mining accounted foraround 16 per cent of Korean net domestic

product. In Taiwan, industrial growth wasslower, especially over the 1930s, but becausethe manufacturing and mining sector waslarger to begin with, it accounted for a greatershare of net domestic product than in Korea,around 24 per cent by 1938 (Mizoguchi andUmemura 1988: 231-39). In Korea, the growthin the 1930s has been attributed to theestablishment of large capital-intensive plantsby Japanese zaibatsu including Mitsui,Mitsubishi and Sumitomo in sectors such aschemicals, metals and textiles (Grajdanzev1944: 152-171; see also Ho 1984: 364-69 andWoo 1991: 35). Industrial development appearsto have been more capital intensive in Korea,so that the percentage of the labour forceemployed in industry was lower (Table 5). Suh(1978: 47-51) argues that total employment inmanufacturing actually fell in absolute termsover the 1930s; this was entirely due to a verysharp decline in the employment of women. [4]

It is often asserted that, right up until 1940, theindustrialisation which took place in South EastAsia was largely restricted to agricultural andmineral processing. British, French and Dutchcolonial regimes were supposedly intent onpreserving colonial markets for their ownmanufactures, and had little interest inencouraging either their own nationals oranyone else to establish industrial plants intheir colonies. In fact the evidence does notsupport these rather crude generalisations,especially in the inter-war era. The increase innational income which undeniably took placebetween 1900 and 1930 in British Malaya,Indonesia and the Philippines, and to a lesserextent in Burma and Indochina did lead toincreased demand for a range of manufactures,some of which by reason of high transport costsor perishability could profitably be produced inthe home market, even without tarif fprotection.

The world slump of the 1930s had a seriousimpact on agricultural exports (both in terms ofquantity and price) in most parts of South East

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Asia, and forced many colonial officials toconsider economic diversification as a means ofinsulating their populations against thevagaries of world markets. "Among thesolutions offered none was seized upon withmore enthusiasm than industrialisation"(Shepherd 1941: 4). The flood of manufacturedexports from Japan also served to increaseofficial support for colonial industrialisation;after all if Japan could industrialise using itsabundant supplies of cheap labour, why notJava, Luzon or Vietnam? Already by 1930, theindustrial labour force accounted for more thanten per cent of total employment in BritishMalaya, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines(Table 5). Much of this employment was insmall-scale and cottage industry, but theestimates of van der Eng (2002: 171) indicatethat value added in the industrial sector(manufacturing, utilities and construction) inIndonesia comprised around fifteen per cent ofGDP in 1930. During the 1930s, the Dutchmade great efforts to attract foreign investmentinto the large-scale manufacturing sector, withconsiderable success. Companies such asGoodyear, National Carbon, Unilever and Bataall built Indonesian plants during the decade,and in addition breweries, paper mills,canneries and several large weaving andspinning mills were established (Booth 1998:44) . By 1941 , the indus t r ia l sec tor(manufacturing, utilities and construction)accounted for around 20 per cent of GDP (vander Eng 2002: 172).

Although French policies in Indo-china werenot supportive of industrialisation which mightcompete with French imports, official attitudesbegan to change in the inter-war years,especially with regard to yarn and textiles. Indensely settled Tonkin, concern about ruralunemployment led to some support for both thespinning and weaving industry, which alsoassisted small producers. A government surveyof 1940 found that Tonkin had 55,000 weavers,and a total of 120,000 textile workers (Norlund1991: 86-89; see also Shepherd 1941: 30-31).

In the Philippines, much of the industry whichdeveloped until 1918 was based on agriculturaland mineral processing, although considerablediversification occurred during the 1920s. By1939, the manufacture of clothing andembroideries, together with "native textiles"employed almost 170,000 workers according tothat year’s Population Census, the greatmajority women. Manufacturing industry as awhole employed over 11 per cent of all workers(Kurihara 1945: 16-17). By the 1930s,Philippine officials were arguing that onlycomplete autonomy in tariff matters wouldallow the Philippines to industrialise (Espino1933: 11-12). But even under a tariff systemwhich gave most American manufactures duty-free access to the local market, manufacturingindustry accounted for around 21 per cent ofgross value added in 1938 (Hooley 1968:Tables 1 and 3).

Anti-Japanese fighters in Korea, circa 1910

The evidence would hardly seem to constitutean overwhelming case for "Japanese colonialexceptionalism" on grounds of economicgrowth leading to rapid structural change awayfrom agriculture and towards industry and themodern services sector. Per capita GDP growthwas quite rapid in both Taiwan and Korea inthe twenty five years from 1913 to 1938, but itonly outpaced that in Southeast Asia after1929, where the effects of the world crisis ofthe early 1930s were more severe. Certainlythe growth in rice output and yields wasimpressive, especially in Taiwan, but riceoutput also grew rapidly in some of the landabundant parts of South East Asia. Neitherdoes it appear that industrial growth was morerapid in Taiwan and Korea than in some partsof South East Asia. In fact Taiwan ressembledeconomies such as the Philippines, Indonesiaand British Malaya in that industrialisation wasvery largely based on agricultural processing,at least until the 1930s. In Korea, industrial

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growth was rapid, but from a very low base,and the acceleration during the 1930s waslargely the result of investment in heavyindustry by Japanese conglomerates. Therewere parallels with Indonesia, where there wasalso quite rapid growth in manufacturingindustry based on investment from foreignmultinationals in the latter part of the 1930s. Itseems probable that by 1940, industryaccounted for roughly the same share of grossdomestic production in both Korea andIndonesia, although it employed a higher shareof the labour force in Indonesia. One historianof Korea has claimed that "colonial industrialgrowth was a powerful historical earthquake"(Park 1999: 158). If that was the case,earthquakes of a similar or stronger force werealso felt in several parts of South East Asia.

What were governments doing? The mythof the nightwatchman state

One of the enduring concepts of colonial statesin many parts of Asia is that they were almostentirely concerned with maintaining law andorder, and with raising the revenues necessaryto support the costs of such activities. Colonialstates were considered to be 'nightwatchmanstates' with 'no self-conscious programme ofactive economic development' (Morris 1963:615). Those writers who support Japaneseexceptionalism argue that the Japanesecolonies were characterised by more activistgovernments; in the case of Korea, Kohli (2004:40) argues:

The colonial state in Korea wasa busy state. While pursuing theimperial interests of Japan, itevolved a full policy agenda,including the goal of Korea'seconomic transformation. Theb r o a d s t r a t e g y o ftransformation was two-pronged: The state utilized itsbureaucratic capacities todirectly undertake numerous

economic tasks, and, moreimportant, the state involvedpropertied groups- both in thecountryside and in the cities,and both Japanese and Koreans-in production-oriented alliancesaimed at achieving sustainedeconomic change.

But was such a policy agenda unique to Korea?In fact, by the first decade of the twentiethcentury, all the colonial powers in South EastAsia had established effective administrativestructures which prioritised the reform of fiscalsystems. Independent Thailand also carried outreforms of government revenue policy after1892 ( Ingram 1971: Chapter 8) . Themetropolitan powers wanted tax systems underthe direct control of colonial administrations,which would be sufficiently buoyant to fundboth current expenditures and provide asurplus for investment. Old practices ofrevenue farming were eliminated over the lastdecades of the nineteenth century, in favour ofmore diversified systems relying not just onland taxes but also on export and import duties,excises, sales taxes and in some casescorporate and individual income taxes[5]. BothHo (1984: 357-8) and Kohli (2004: 42-43) havediscussed the reforms of revenues systemswhich followed upon the Japanese occupationof Taiwan and Korea, including reformed landtaxes following the Meiji model. But in otherparts of Asia, colonial regimes were going evenfurther in increasing total revenues anddiversifying revenue sources.

By 1910, government revenues per capita werehighest in the Federated Malay States, whereexport duties already accounted for around 30per cent of total government receipts and landtaxes a further eight percent (Fraser 1939:Appendix A). Revenues from monopoliesincluding the sale of opium were also importantas they were in the Straits Settlements, whereby 1910, per capita revenues were roughly thesame as in Taiwan, and much higher than in

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Korea. Revenues per capita in Korea didincrease quite rapidly after 1910, and werearound the same (in dollar terms) as in thePhilippines and Burma by 1929 (Table 7). Theproportion of revenues derived from the landtax and from import duties fell in Korea after1911, as other forms of taxation and non-taxrevenues including monopoly profits increased(Kimura 1989: Table 5). Kimura argues that thelack of progessivity in the revenue systemfavoured higher income groups includingindustrialists and senior officials, most of whomwere Japanese. By the latter part of the 1930s,both Taiwan and Korea were still dependent onnon-tax revenues, including revenues frommonopolies for around half of governmentrevenues (Table 8). Several Southeast Asiancolonies, including the Philippines, Burma andIndonesia were more dependent on taxrevenues. This did not necessarily mean a moreprogressive tax system, although it is probablethat in those economies where around half ofall government revenues were derived fromincome and land taxes and customs duties, theoverall impact of the revenue system was moreprogressive[6].

A Japanese Government-General building erectedin front of

the Gyungbok Palace, the symbol of Korean Royalpower.

In discussing the overall incidence of the fiscalsystem, it is essential to look at expenditures aswel l as revenues. Broadly speaking,expenditures rose and fell with revenues,reaching a peak in 1929, and falling thereafterin both South East Asia and Taiwan and Korea(Tables 7 and 9). But in most cases, the matchwas not perfect with expenditures above orbelow revenues for several years. In the case ofTaiwan, expenditures tended to be lower thanrevenues for most years, and the budgetsurplus was one factor in the large balance ofpayments surplus in Taiwan after 1920(Mizoguchi and Yamamoto 1984: 408-12). InKorea, expenditures and revenues were broadlyin balance. In several South East Asiancolonies, such as Indonesia, the FMS and thePhilippines, budgets swung into deficit in theearly 1930s, as revenues fell with falling exportreceipts and governments found it difficult tocut expenditures at the same rate (Booth 2003:436-38).

What sorts of expenditures were accordedpriority by the different colonial regimes?During the first three decades of the twentiethcentury, most colonial regimes in South EastAsia were devoting a considerable part of theirbudgets to education, health, agriculture andpublic works, including irrigation. Thecomparative study carried out by Schwulst(1932: 57) in 1931 found that the Philippines,the FMS and French Indochina were allspending more than 40 per cent of totalbudgetary out lays on these sectors .Administrative expenditures, together withdefence and debt service, accounted for muchof the rest. In Taiwan, expenditures onagriculture, education and public worksaccounted for over 60 per cent of budgetaryoutlays for most years from 1910 to 1938. InKorea by contrast, expenditures on public orderand administration took up a larger share ofbudgetary expenditures for much of the periodfrom 1911 to 1938, although governmentexpenditures on transport accounted foraround one third of total expenditures by the

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late 1930s (Mizoguchi and Umemura 1989:289-93).

It is difficult to generalise about governmentexpenditure priorities in any of the colonialterritories in East and South East Asia over thedecades from 1900 to 1940. They changed withchanging external circumstances, and changingpressures from the metropolitan powers. Butthe evidence does not support any facileargument that expenditures in the Japanesecolonies were more 'developmental' in thesense that sectors such as infrastructure,education, or agricultural development wereconsistently allocated higher shares of totalexpenditures than in other colonial territories.The record on education and health outcomesis examined below. Here it worth noting that,while by the late 1930s both Taiwan and Koreahad high endowments of both roads andrailways (relative to area) in comparison withmost parts of South East Asia, neither colonywas better served than Java, which comparedfavourably with Taiwan in terms of transportinfrastructure (Table 10). British Malaya didwell in terms of both roads and electric powercapacity. Nowhere in South East Asia wasirrigation as extensive as in Korea and Taiwan,although colonial governments in bothIndonesia and Vietnam did give irrigationdevelopment high priority, and devotedsubstantial budgetary resources to it until the1930s.

Trade and exchange rate policies

An influential model of a colonial economywhich was developed in the 1960s and 1970semphasized an open economy which is tightlytied via both trade and investment flows to themetropolitan power, "so that bilateralism maybe a more approriate description thanopenness" (Ho 1984: 381; see also Paauw andFei 1973: Chapter 1). In such a model, exportswere entirely agricultural and mineral andsupplied from enclaves which were not tightlylinked to the rest of the "hinterland", where the

great majority of the population lived. Importswere determined by the requirements of theexport industries for both consumption andcapital goods, and were usually well belowexports in value, so that a large export surpluscould be used to finance outward remittancesof profits; part of the export surplus wasaccumulated as foreign reserves in themetropole. Such reserves were then used tomaintain strict parity between the colonialcurrency and that of the colony via a currencyboard arrangement. Ho (1984: 382) argues that"in many respects the Japanese coloniesdeveloped in the manner suggested by themodel". In the case of Taiwan, exports to Japanonly comprised around 20 per cent of totalexports immediately after the Japaneseoccupation, but by the late 1930s this had risento 88 per cent. Taiwanese exports weredominated by rice and sugar almost all ofwhich went to Japan. Korea was already quitetightly tied to the Japanese economy in terms ofboth exports and imports by early in thetwentieth century, and these tight linksremained until the end of the 1930s (Table 11).

But other aspects of the colonial model fit theKorean experience less well. In particular,Korea never ran large export surpluses, eitherbefore or after the imposition of Japanese rule.Imports often exceeded exports by fifteen percent or more. Given that the balance of trade inservices was also negative, Korea was runningcurrent account deficits for most years from1911 to 1938. These deficits were funded bytransfers from the Japanese government, andafter 1927 by increasing long-term capitalinflows. Taiwan, by contrast, ran exportsurpluses consistently after the early twentiethcentury; after 1916, exports often exceededimports by more than 30 per cent (Table 11).The current account of the balance of paymentswas in surplus in all years from 1915 to 1938;these surpluses funded outward capital flowsback to Japan, either through loans from theTaiwanese central bank to firms in Japan, orthrough flows of reserve funds from the Taiwan

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government back to Japan (Mizoguchi andUmemura 1988: 295-98; Mizoguchi andYamamoto 1984: 408-11).

Elsewhere in colonial South East Asia, mosteconomies were running large surpluses on thebalance of trade from the 1890s onwards. Themain exceptions were the Philippines andFrench Indochina where, until 1915, the tradebalance was frequently in deficit (Tables 12 and13). However a surplus of exports over importsdid not mean that the current account wasnecessarily in surplus, as the balance onservices was almost always in deficit. We onlyhave complete balance of payments estimatesfor two colonies for the period from 1890 to1940, Indonesia and French Indochina. In bothcases, when the balance of trade was large andpositive, the current account balance wassubstantially lower. In Indonesia, on averagethe current account balance was positive formuch of the period from 1901 to 1939 (KorthalsAltes 1987: Table 1; Booth 1998: Table 5.5). InIndochina, the record was much more mixed.There were large inflows of capital in the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries onboth government and private account, mainlyto develop infrastructure and to support thegrowing French bureaucratic presence(Bassino 2000a: Tables 2 and 3a). Currentaccount surpluses were consistently positiveand large only for the years from 1936 to 1944.It is probable that over these years outwardremittances by the Chinese were an importantfactor driving the large surpluses (Bassino2000a: 335).

The surpluses on the trade account recorded inthe Philippines after 1915 were not as large asin Taiwan, and were probably largely offset bynegative balances on services. Balance ofpayments estimates prepared by the Americangovernment for the decade from 1925 to 1934indicate that for most years the deficit onservices together with interest and dividendmovements offset the positive balance of trade(United States Tariff Commission 1937: Table

8). In the Federated Malay States, large exportsurpluses were recorded for most years after1900, but they were to some extent offset bydeficits in other parts of British Malaya. Whenconsolidated export and import data for all ofBritish Malaya were published in the inter-waryears, the export surplus was much lower, andas in the case of the Philippines, it wasprobably offset to some extent by deficits inservices. In the case of Burma, wherecommodity export surpluses were consistentlyabove 40 per cent from 1906 onwards, thecurrent account was in all likelihood positiveand used to finance outward remittances ofIndian workers, and subventions by Burma tothe British Indian government in Delhi[7].

There was also considerable variation withinEast and Southeast Asia by the 1930s in thedegree of dependence of the colony on themetropole for imports and exports. While thetwo Japanese colonies were very dependent onJapan for both imports and exports, only onecolony in South East Asia demonstrated similardependence. That was the Philippines, whereexports of sugar in particular benefited frompreferential access to the American market(Table 11) . Elsewhere the degree ofdependence on the metropole was not as high,and in Indonesia it fell over the last fourdecades of Dutch colonial rule. The reason forthe low dependence on metropolitan markets inboth Indonesia and British Malaya by the late1930s was the rising importance of othermarkets, especially the USA for two of theirprincipal exports, rubber and tin. In the case ofBurma, rice exports went largely to BritishIndia and to other parts of Asia.

In contrast to the Japanese colonies, where theexport sectors were tethered tightly to therequirements of the metropolitan economy, thecapitalist enterprises which controlled the mainexport industries in Indonesia, Malaya andFrench Indochina were concerned with sellingto those markets where demand was highest.This was a risky strategy; when there was a

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downturn in world demand for staples such asrubber, tin and petroleum products as a resultof the industrial slump of the 1930s, togetherwith a rise in protectionism, many marketswere severely curtailed. The worst affectedcolony was Indonesia. The Dutch home marketwas small and there was not a large Dutchempire in other parts of the world to absorbIndonesian exports of sugar, rubber, tin andpetroleum products. The Philippines, which hadquotas for its sugar exports in the Americanmarket was more fortunate, and in this respectresembled the two Japanese colonies.

Trends in living standards in colonial Asia

A frequent criticism made of many colonialeconomic systems in Asia and elsewhere is thatthe economic growth which occurred did notbenefit the great majority of the population.While exports may have boomed, andgovernment revenues expanded, nutritionalintakes for the mass of the population did notimprove, access to health care and seculareducation was severely limited, and as a resultmortality rates were high, and many peoplewere illiterate. Wage labour opportunities werelimited, and wage rates were low. In Koreawhere criticism of the impact of colonialpolicies on welfare has been especially strong,it has been argued that by the 1930s,"pauperization among Korean farmers wasbecoming increasingly a pressing problem evenfor the colonial policy makers" (Chang 1971:176). In spite of some progress in the adoptionof new production technologies, r iceconsumption per capita fell steadily from 1912to 1930, forcing the great majority of thepopulation to eat more inferior foods such asmillet (Lee 1936: 275). Although there wassome improvement in rice availability towardsthe end of the 1930s, total grain availability percapita was still in 1937-41 well below theaverage for 1912-16 (Johnston 1953: 55).

The fall in domestic rice availability in Koreaafter 1910 has been explained by the increase

in the proportion of arable land controlled bylarge-scale commercial owners, many of themJapanese. Rents were often paid in kind, so thata high percentage of the rice crop passed tolandlords and then into the export market(Johnston 1953: 55). By 1938, over half of allfarmers in Korea were tenants who did not ownany land (Grajdanzev 1944: 109: Myers andYamada 1984: 451-2). Myers and Yamadaargue that the "dysfunctions" in Koreanagriculture (especially regarding access toland) were much greater than in Taiwan, whererural living standards appear to have beenhigher by the late 1930s. Certainly riceavailability per capita was higher in Taiwan(Table 6). However Gill (1998: 133) suggeststhat it was not so much coercion as the wellorganised export marketing networks whichencouraged both landlords and tenants inKorea to sell rice to the Japanese rather thanthe local market. He also argues that changingrelative prices might have induced Koreans toswitch from purchases of calories to othergoods.

Several authors have used anthropometricevidence to examine trends in living standardsin both Korea and Taiwan during the Japanesecolonial period. In Korea, Gill (1998: 124-6)claims that the Korean population becameshorter beginning with the birth cohorts of thelate 1920s, and a secular growth in height onlybegan with birth cohorts from the early 1950s.He argues that reduced grain consumptionexplained at least part of the decline in thecolonial period. In Taiwan by contrast, Morganand Liu (2005) argue that rural food intake andper capita incomes improved from the 1910s tothe 1940s, and this in turn led to an increase inmale heights. Ka (1995: 144) argues that ruralliving standards in the 1930s in Taiwanunderwent "substantive growth"; he cited theestimates of Mizoguchi (1972: Table 3) onrising real wages, in both manufacturing andagriculture. On the other hand, Chang'sanalysis of farm household surveys in Taiwanover the 1930s indicated some decline in rice

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consumption per capita between 1931 and1937, although there was a sharp increase inintake of sweet potatoes (Chang 1969: Table14). Chang explains this switch in terms ofmovements in relative prices; real per capitaexpenditures of farm families between 1931and 1937, according to his estimates, increasedby around 12 per cent.

Turning to South East Asia, it is striking howmuch variation there was by the end of the1930s in per capita rice availability (Table 6).In Java, per capita availability of rice was only85 kg by 1937-39, and in the Philippines 97 kg,which was slightly higher than in Korea. Thiscontrasts with 181 kg in Thailand, and 140kg inIndochina. In both Java and the Philippines,calorie intake was augmented by other foodsincluding corn, cassava and sweet potatoes.The time series produced by Mears (1961: 248)on rice availability in Java shows somefluctuation between 1921 and 1941, but nodiscernible upward trend. In the Philippines,the series on rice and corn availabilityproduced by Mears et al (1974: 355-57) showedincreases in per capita terms until themid-1920s, and then some decline. A study ofliving standards in the Ilocos region of northernLuzon in the 1930s by Lava (1938: 24) foundthat families of five (three adults and twochildren) were subsisting on 5,700 calories perday, which was wel l be low minimumrecommended intakes. An examination of livingstandards among sugar workers and found thatthe typical family "spends almost the entireincome for food and clothing of the lowestquality and quantity" (Runes 1939: 30).Although Lava (1938: 81) conceded that "actualstark starvation does not exist in thePhilippines except in isolated cases" and thatliving standards in the Philippines could havebeen higher than in parts of Japan, both hisstudy and that of Runes cautioned against anycasual assumption that the population of thePhilippines had shared equally in the fruits ofthe economic development which had occurredin the American era. Indeed Kurihara (1945:

40) quotes some authors who argued that theliving standards of many in the Philippines inthe late 1930s were little better than in the lastphase of Spanish rule.

These arguments contrast with the assertion ofWilliamson (2000: 23) that living standards inthe Philippines doubled under the Americanoccupation. The only evidence adduced tosupport this claim is a series on real wageswhich shows a steady rise from the latter partof the 1890s to the early 1920s, and then somedecline, although real wages more thandoubled between 1895-99 and 1935-39(Williamson 2000: Table 1.2). He argues thatreal wages in the Philippines were 80 per centhigher than those in Japan in 1920-24, andmore or less the same as in Japan by 1935-39.After 1910, real wages in the Philippines werehigher than in either Korea or Taiwan, or inThailand and Indonesia[8]. Space precludes athorough critique of these data here; the mainpoint to make is that it is very difficult tocompare real wages across countries, partlybecause labour markets operate in differentways, partly because series on (for example)agricultural wages are not always comparableand partly because inadequate attention isoften paid to differences in purchasing powerof currencies, across countries and over time.

Demographic indicators are probably a morereliable guide to changes in living standardsover time than wage data. We do not have longtime series on, for example, infant mortalityrates for all parts of East and South East Asiafor the early part of the twentieth century, butwe do have figures for most countries by the1930s. It seems clear that infant mortality rateswere lower in Taiwan, the Philippines andBritish Malaya than in Indonesia, Indochinaand Burma (Table 14). The data on crude deathrates (which are probably less reliable, as theyare derived from registration data) tell asimilar story. There can be little doubt thatinfant mortality rates and crude death rates fellin Taiwan over the Japanese period, and life

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expectancy increased (Barclay 1954: Tables 36,37 and 39). Kimura (1993: 643) argues thatthere was also a decline in death rates in Koreaafter 1920. In the Philippines there was alsosome decline in both indicators over theAmerican period (Zablan 1978: Tables 79 and90). Banens (2000: Table 7) shows a decline ininfant mortality rates among the Vietnamesepopulation in Hanoi between 1925 and 1938,admittedly from a very high level, while inBritish Malaya, Vlieland (1932: 110) estimatesa fal l of around a third in the StraitsSettlements between 1911 and 1931. No doubtin all cases, colonial governments would haveattributed these declines to better access tomodern health facilities, and especially inurban areas, to better provision of sanitationand clean drinking water[9].

Taiwan's Presidential Office was originally theOffice of the Governor-General

in the Japanese colonial government

The final set of welfare indicators relate toeducation. Here the differences betweencolonies were quite stark by the 1930s. In spiteof the assertions of authors such as Maddison(1990: 365) that the Japanese were moresuccessful in increasing access to educationthan the other colonial powers, the evidenceindicates that neither in Taiwan nor in Koreadid the Japanese surpass the Americanachievement in the Philippines. By 1940/41 itwas estimated that just over two millionstudents were enrolled in public schools in thePhilippines, and a further 180,000 in privateschools. Of these a remarkable 40,000 were in

post-secondary institutions, a much largerfigure than in Korea or Taiwan, or in anyEuropean colony (Bureau of Census andStatistics 1960: 21-29). In Korea, tertiaryenrolments were much lower, and a highproportion of the students were Japanese (Kim1985: 168). In Taiwan, the Taihoku ImperialUniversity was established largely for researchpurposes, and few Taiwanese students wereaccepted. The ten specialised middle schools,which were located in the cities and largetowns, were open to all Japanese boys, but onlya few carefully selected Taiwanese (Kerr 1942:53). The Japanese government in Taiwan didmuch more in developing primary education,but until the end of Japanese rule, almost allTaiwanese were denied access to highereducation, and the jobs which required tertiaryqualifications. In both Korea and Taiwan, thegoal of the Japanese educational system wasonly to "fashion the lower track of the two-trackMeiji education system" (Tsurumi 1984: 308).

The Philippines and Taiwan were well ahead ofmost other parts of East and South East Asia interms of the ratio of educational enrolments tototal population by the end of the 1930s (Table14). At the other end of the scale wasIndochina; both here and in the NetherlandsIndies, provision of education to the indigenouspopulation was very limited. In British Malayathe ratio was above that of Korea, althoughthere a disproportionate number of studentswere Chinese and Indian rather than Malay.The "plural society" which had been created bylarge-scale in-migration from China and Indiato Malaya, Burma and Indonesia had led to askewed access to education by race. Correctingthis bias proved to be a major challenge forpost-independence governments.

Conclusions

To return to the question posed at thebeginning of this paper, was there already clearevidence by the late 1930s that Korea andTaiwan had benef i ted from Japanese

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"developmental colonialism" to a greater extentthan elsewhere in Asia? In fact, it would appearfrom Table 14 that if a composite index ofhuman development were to be constructed for1938 on the basis of per capita GDP,demographic data and educational enrolments,the Philippines would have come out on top.[10] Taiwan would certainly have been second;if we allow for the probable understatement ofper capita GDP in the Maddison data, Taiwanmay have been top of the rankings, or firstequal with the Philippines. Although both Koreaand Malaya had higher per capita GDP, andsimilar demographic data, they scored less wellthan both Taiwan and the Philippines oneducational enrolments. It is likely that FrenchIndochina would have come bottom followed byBurma and Indonesia. Although per capita GDPwas relatively low in Thailand, crude deathrates were lower and enrolments higher than inFrench Indochina, Burma, or Indonesia. [11]

It may well have surprised the Philippinegovernment in the late 1930s to have learnt ofits top slot. Senior officials were conscious thatin several sectors, especially agriculture, otherparts of South East Asia were technically moreadvanced.[12] As we have seen, surveys carriedout in the late 1930s showed that manyPhilippinos were very poor, and that many ofthe gains from American rule had accrued to asmall urban middle class. It was, to aconsiderable extent, their children who hadbenefited from the expansion of secondary andtertiary education. Critics of American rulehave pointed out that the result of Americanpolicies was to entrench this class in business,the professions, in senior government positionsand in politics, where they remain dominant tothe present day. American rule "did little totransform the existing Philippine powerstructures" (Kang 2002: 27). Elsewhere in Eastand South East Asia the colonial legacy mayhave been more meagre, and the process ofdecolonisation more violent and prolonged, butthe new elites which assumed power after 1950have in several cases proved more effective in

promoting rapid economic development.

Those who want to defend Japanese"developmental colonialism" can point to theachievements of the Japanese in transferringJapanese rice technology to both Taiwan andKorea, and to the impressive improvements inphysical infrastructure in both colonies. Butwere these achievements really enough toestablish the foundations for the transformationof both Taiwan and the Republic of Korea after1950? On the negative side, critics can point tothe large balance of payments surpluses whichaccumulated in Taiwan, and which fuelled thehigh level of remittances back to Japan. Themechanisms by which these transfers occurredhave yet to be elucidated in detail, at least inthe English-language literature. But it seemsthat the protectionist regime which theJapanese established within their empire led tohigher prices for agricultural products, such asrice and sugar, than would have prevailed in afree-trade regime. The ultimate costs forJapanese colonial policies in both Korea andTaiwan were borne by consumers in both thecolonies and in metropolitan Japan, who had topay higher prices for commodities such as riceand sugar, compared with consumers inSoutheast Asia, and in other parts of the world.[13]

Much work remains to be done on the fulleconomic impact of different colonial systemsin Asia in the first part of the twentieth century.What I have tried to establish in this paper isthat the case for Japanese exceptionalism is farfrom proven, at least until the late 1930s.Arguably a full assessment of the Japaneselegacy should continue at least until 1945, andshould probably also take into account the post-war developments in both Taiwan and theKorean peninsula. This would involve anevaluation of the ambitious Japanese plans topromote industrial growth in Korea andManchuria and also of the full impact of theJapanese military occupation on the economiesof Southeast Asia. Such an assessment is

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beyond the scope of this paper. In additionmore work needs to be done on policy-makingin the former colonies in the crucial post-1945period. Those who argue that it was post-colonial policies, including comprehensive landreform and rapid increases in educationalprovision, as well as reforms in the traderegime, which were crucial in transformingboth Taiwan and Korea, especially the south, inthe 1950s and beyond would appear to have astrong case. But why were such policies notpursued with the same vigour in SoutheastAsia? This is the crucial question which needsmuch more research.

Anne Booth is Professor of Economics (withreference to Asia) at SOAS, University ofLondon

E m a i l : a b 1 0 @ s o a s . a c . u k(https://apjjf .org/ab10@soas.ac.uk)

This article was written for Japan Focus. Postedon May 7, 2007.

Notes:

[1]. Versions of this paper have beenpresented in seminars in London, Melbourne,Canberra, Singapore and Tokyo. I am verygrateful to participants for many helpfulsuggestions, and to two referees; I accept fullresponsibility for all remaining errors of factand interpretation.

[2] I cannot claim to be the first to havecompared Japanese colonialism with that inother parts of Asia. Cumings (1999) examinesthe Japanese legacy in Korea with that of theFrench in Indochina while Kang (2002)compares Korea and the Philippines. I try tolook at both Korea and Taiwan in a broaderSouth East Asian perspective.

[3] It should be noted that the Maddison data

have been challenged by Fukao, Ma andYuan (2005) who argue that his method ofadjusting GDP data for differences inpurchasing power was faulty for Japan,Taiwan and Korea. They argue that Koreanreal per capita GDP was lower in relation tothat of Japan, and Taiwan real per capitaGDP higher, than is indicated in Table 2.

[4] Eckert (1996: 14-27) examines theevidence on economic and social change inKorea after 1930, which he argues is littleresearched and still very controversial. Hepoints out that the opportunities for Koreanworkers to climb the skill ladder in industrywere very limited, but does not address theemployment of women.

[5] On the demise of revenue farming acrossSouth East Asia, see the various essays inButcher and Dick (1993). It should be notedthat the Philippines was a partial exceptionto the trend towards centralisation, in thatthe American administration wished toencourage the emergence of strong localgovernment (Hutchcroft 2000), althoughLuton (1971) argues that in some respectsthe fiscal system became more centralisedafter 1900.

[6] Kimura (1989: 303) argues that the landtax in Korea was in theory a proportional tax,but in practice "fundamentally regressive".This contrasts with the situation in Java,where by the inter-war years the land taxwas a tax on the presumptive income fromagricultural land and broadly progressive inits incidence (Furnivall 1934)

[7] See Shein Maung et al (1969) for ananalysis of the provincial contract system andits implications for Burma.

[8] Williamson appears to be using an urbanwage series, and urban-rural wagedifferentials by 1918 were substantial; see

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Doeppers (1984), pp. 39-41. In the late1930s, a minimum wage was imposed inurban labour markets for public sectorworkers which would have further widenedurban-rural differentials; see Kurihara(1945), pp. 42-43.

[9] Infant mortality rates were often higher inurban than rural areas, probably due to lackof clean water, and poor sanitation. Gooszen(1999: 192-3) cites Dutch research whichfound very high infant mortality of more than400 per thousand in parts of Batavia(Jakarta) in 1917-19, which were similar tothose reported by Banens (2000: 36) forHanoi. Vlieland (1932:110) found that infantmortality rates in urban Singapore werehigher than in the more rural FederatedMalay States.

[10] If the Maddison data understate percapita GDP in Taiwan relative to Korea, thenTaiwan would probably be first equal withthe Philippines.

[11] The lack of reliable data on lifeexpectancies and literacy for several parts ofEast and Southeast As ia make thecomputation of a Human Development Index(HDI) for the late 1930s difficult. An HDI hasbeen computed by Metzer (1998: 57) for 36countries in the late 1930s which puts thePhilippines at 22, above most Latin Americancountries, with the exception of Chile.Thailand was ranked at 26, and India bottonat 36. No other Asian country was included inMetzer’s estimates.

[12] Davis (1932: 23-8) stressed the gap inyields of rice and sugar between Luzon andJava, and the more advanced development ofexperimental stations for sugar in Java, andrubber in Sumatra and Malaya. He alsostressed that the Philippines was "backwardin adopting a definite plan of developmentextending over a period of years and in

consistently carrying out that plan". Daviswas a Republican appointment as GovernorGeneral.

[13] See Anderson and Tyers (1992) for adeeper analysis of the welfare effects ofJapanese rice policy in the inter-war years.

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