Dictatorship and the German Constitution, 1933-1937_Karl Loewenstein

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Dictatorship and the German Constitution: 1933-1937Author(s): Karl LoewensteinSource: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Jun., 1937), pp. 537-574Published by: The University of Chicago Law Review

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937thus derives little benefit from National Socialist jurisprudenceproper,which,by its very nature, is moreapologetic than analytic. For obviousreasons the followingdiscussion,although based exclusively on originalGermansourcesboth in legislationand doctrine,deviates whennecessaryfrom the official Germaninterpretation.

I. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW ORDERTHE SEIZURE OF POWER

OnJanuary 30, I933, the Presidentof the Reich,von Hindenburg,con-ferredupon the leader of the National Socialist GermanWorkersParty,Adolf Hitler, the task of forminga new cabinet. The transitionof powerfrom the cabinet of von Schleicher o the cabinet of Hitlerwas in accord-ance with the actualrequirementsof the political situation andpreservedthe legal continuity. It conformed urther to the practiceof the so-calledpresidential cabinets lately known under the republic. This type of aplainly pervertedparliamentarygovernmentstressed morethe confidencein the President2 han the need of a stable parliamentarybackingfor thegovernment.3 The transformation of parliamentary into presidentialgovernment had been possible only by shifting the legislative powersfrom the Reichstagunder the emergencypowersof Art. 48.Obviouslythis situation could not be continuedforever. The politicalgroupingof the electorate made it imperativeto forma coalitiongovern-ment, (the governmentof the National Union)4which was composed ofthe National Socialist Party and the GermanNational People's Party.In addition, some non-politicalexpert ministers were retained. The keypositions, namely the officeof the Reich-Chancellorand of the Ministerof the Interior,were held by the leadingmembersof the National Social-ist Party.5 The subsequentdissolution of the Reichstag followedthe ac-cepted rules of the parliamentarygame. The elections held on March 5,I933, resultedin the followingdistributionsof votes and seats. The Na-tional Socialist Party polled 43.9% of the total votes cast and obtained288 or 44.5% of the totality of seats while the corresponding iguresfor

2Wiemar Constitution of August ii, 1919, Art. 55 (RGB. I, I383). RGB signifies the Ger-man official aw bulletin, Reichsgesetzblatt.3Id. at Art. 54.4 See Ordinanceof the Reich Presidenton the dissolution of the Reichstagof Febru-ary I, I933 (RGB. I, 45).sThe Ministerof War,Generalvon Blomberg, ympathizedwith the National SocialistParty. Representatives f the GermanNationalists were Dr. Hugenberg,von Papen, andSeldte,thelatter as representativef the nationalmilitaryorganizations.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEWthe GermanNational People's Party were8% of the votes and 52seats.6Thus the majorityobtainedby the coalitionpartiesamounted to 52.5%of all seats and slightlymore than the relativemajorityof all votes cast.In the light of the subsequentevents it shouldbe stressedhere that theelectionsfrom which the National Socialists derived the legal claim torevolutionize he fundamentalorderof the state yielded only a very slen-dermarginof majoritywhich as it is knownwas immenselyexploitedbythe victoriousparties.Moreover, t should be bornein mind that from the viewpointof theWeimarConstitutionthen still in forcegrave objectionscould be raisedagainst the conduct of the elections themselves. The campaignwas nolongerunderthe usualguaranteesof freedom of speech,associationandassemblywhich are indispensable o the free expressionof popularwill.Whilethe flamesof the Reichstagfirewere still smouldering,he govern-ment,underthe pretextof an impendingcommunistrebellion,suspendedby ordinance f the Presidentseven of the fundamentalrightsof the con-stitution: the right of personal iberty, freedomfrom arrest,freedom ofexpression,reedomof assembly,of associationand of privateproperty.7These restrictionsof the constitutionalguaranteestold heavily againstthe democraticallymindedpartiesnot represented n the coalition,par-ticularlythe Social Democratsand the CatholicCenterParty. In addi-tion the Courtof Inquiryinto Elections (Wahlpriifungs-Gericht),8hen

6Thefollowing s a statistical ummary f the election:Name of Party Votes Cast Percentage Seatsof Votes Obtained

National Socialist ....................... x7,277,85 43.9 288Social Democrats...................... 7,181,633 I8.3 120Communists.......................... 4,848,079 2. 5 8ICatholicCenterParty .................. 4,424, oS5 . 2 73German National People's Party......... 3,I36,752 8.o 52BavarianPeople'sParty* ............... ,073,552 2.7 x9GermanPeople'sPar t ................. 432,312 I.I 2ChristianSocialParty .................. 383,969 I.0 4GermanState Party ................... 343,232 o.9 5GermanFarmers Party ................. II4,048 0.3 2FarmersUnion of Wiirttemberg ......... 83,893 0.2 1HannoverianParty..................... 47,743 o. x oMiscellaneous roups................... 5,o66 o.o o* The party of the BavarianCatholicsaffiliatedwith the CatholicCenter.t The partyof big businessand heavy industry.$The formerDemocrats, he only genuinely iberalpartyof the bourgeoisie.

See Potzsch-Heffter, Vom deutschen Staatsleben (vom 30. Januarbis 3I. Dezember, I933) 22Jahrbuch des 6ffentlichen Rechts 83 (I935).7These rights are respectively in Arts. II4, 115, II7, XI8, I23, I24, I53 of the WeimarConstitution. See Ordinance of the Reich President zum Schutz des deutschen Volkes ofFebruary 2, 1933 (RGB. I, 35) and Ordinance of the Reich President gegen Verrat amdeutschen Volk und gegen hochverriterische Umtriebe of February 28, 1933 (RGB. I, 85)8Weimar Constitution, Art. 3I.

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937later calledupon to test the validity of the elections was completely con-trolledby the governmentand was thus unwillingand incapableof stat-ing authoritativelythe validity of the electionprocedure.9To summarizethe election and its results, it is no exaggerationto say that the electionwhich brought National Socialism into power fell considerablyshort ofthe standardsof freedomof public opinionas guaranteedby the Constitu-tion and it is beyond doubt that without the partisan manipulationbythe governmentthe National Socialists and their allies would not haveobtainedeven a relativemajority. The constitutionalbasison whichthereconstructionof Germanyon National Socialist lines rests was createdmainly by fraud and terrorization.

THE ENABLING ACT AND THE AMENDING POWERThe pivotal point of the constitutionalstructureof the Third Reich isthe act of March 24, I933, "on relief of nation and Reich," the famous"EnablingAct" which is described as the first organic statute of theThird Reich.?0The preambleof the act contains the explicit statementthat the vote on the statute "compliedwith the requirements f legislation

amendingthe Constitution." These wordscertify authentically that, inconformitywith Article 76 of the constitution, a majority of two-thirdsof all memberswerepresentand that at least two-thirdsof those presenthad voted in favor of the bill." Beyond doubt the passing of the actthrough the amendingprocess was indispensablebecause the EnablingAct, (? i) involveda processof supplementing he existingconstitutionalcharterwith a new type of legislation, the so-calledgovernmentdecrees(Regierungsgesetze)and thus indirectly supersededArticles 68 to 77 ofthe constitution.12Moreover-and this is in fact the legal key whichopened the door for the subsequentreconstructionof the constitutionallaw-? 2, sentence i, reads as follows: "The statutesdecreed y thegovern-mentmay deviaterom theconstitutionwith the reservationhattheyshouldnotaffect he nstitutionsoftheReichstag ndofthe FederalCouncil"(italicsadded). In addition ? 2, sentence 2, provides: "Thepowersof the ReichPresident are to remain intact." This amazingly simple machinery

9On the basis of his own observations the author entertains substantial doubts as to thecorrectness of the election procedure in March, I933.

o1 Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich of March 24, I933 (RGB. I, I4I).- On the widely ramified and juridically very complex problems of the amending processunder the Weimar Constitution, see Loewenstein, Erscheinungsformen der Verfassungs-anderung (I93I).

12 This pattern of constitutional amendment was called "constitutional amendment by wayof supplement" (Verfassungserganzung); see id., at II4 f.

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWrecommended itself, by contrast to the elaborate cog-wheel system ofdemocratic checks and balances, to people weary of parliamentary com-plications. By a few printed lines in the statute book the governmentnot only monopolized the regular legislative function but also seized theamending power which the Weimar constitution had reserved to qualifiedmajorities of both houses of the legislature acting together with, undercertain conditions, the electorate. The only restriction on the dictatorialexercise of the amending power imposed on the government consisted inthe nominal preservation of the "institutional guarantees"13of the Reichs-tag and Federal Council as such and the maintenance of the presidentialpowers. The latter, however, were implicitly curbed by the reservation inthe act14 which abrogated his rights of participating in the legislativeprocess. Be it noted that the regular type of legislation, that of statutespassed by the Reichstag, was not legally precluded. Subsequently inisolated instances, the Reichstag was convened to pass on acts introducedby the government if their importance from the viewpoint of interior orforeign policy rendered such a formal procedure desirable. On the whole,however, legislation by government decree has become the rule and normallegislation the rare exception.5SSince the National Socialist "movement" had officially proclaimedafter the abortive putsch of I923 that power would be sought and gainedonly by "legal" methods, the juridical doctrine of the Third Reich inces-santly stresses the fact that the seizure and exercise of power were wholly

3 Priorto the Nazi revolution he distinctionbetweenguarantee f constitutional ightsand"institutional uarantees"y whichaninstitutionof the statewasprotectedby thecon-stitutiononly in so faras its bare existencehadto be preservedwas muchdebatedby con-stitutionaltheorists. In retrospect his discussion ndicates he progressive ilutionof thebill of rights during he last yearsof the Republicunderthe auspicesof the versatileCarlSchmittwhoserved he government f the Republicnot less eagerly hanthe ThirdReich.See on the problemof the institutionalguarantee,Schmitt,Verfassungslehre76 (1928);Schmitt, Freiheitsrechte nd institutionelle Garantie n der Reichsverfassung,Rechts-wissenschaftlicheeitragezum 25 jihrigenBestehenderHandelshochschuleerlin,338fif.(1931), Loewenstein,p. cit. supra note iI, at 288 f.; Menzel,Das Ende derinstitutionellenGarantie,8 Archivdes6offentlichenechts(N.F.) 33 (I936).

14"Arts. 8-77do notapply o lawsdecreed ythegovernment." nablingActofMarch24I933 ?3. Thesearticlesregulate he cooperation f the Reichstag,FederalCouncil,ReichPresident ndpeople nthe egislative nd ntheamending rocess.I5Not evenall "organic"tatutes have beensubmitted o the Reichstag.Thus far onlythe followingacts have beenpassedby the parliament:EnablingAct of March24, I933;Reconstruction Act (Gesetz zum Neuaufbau des Reichs of March 30, I934) (RGB. I, 75);the threeso-called"Nurembergaws"(Reichsflaggengesetz;eichsburgergesetz,esetzzumSchutz des deutschen Bluts und der deutschen Ehre) of September i5, I935 (RGB. I, II45,1146) andfinally he actrenewingheEnablingAct ofJanuary, 937, Gesetz urVerlangerungdes Gesetzes urBehebung erNot von VolkundReichofJanuary 0, I937 (RGB.I, i05).

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937conformableto the WeimarConstitution, then still in force. It is truethat a defacto situation has to be accepted as existing henceforwardasbeing dejure because a successful revolution creates new law.'6 Thus anintrinsicallyillegal act is capable of giving birth to a new legal order.Nevertheless, the insistence of the National Socialist doctrine on the"legality" of the seizure of powermakes it necessary to investigate thispoint more closely than it has been possible for legal students to do inthe Third Reich.It is true that an indirect amendmentof the constitution,by an amend-ing statute alone, was permissiblewithout incorporatingsimultaneouslyor later the alteration intendedby the statute in the text of the constitu-tion. This was not explicitly forbidden under the condition that thestatute at variance with the text of the constitution was passed by thequalifiedmajoritiesrequired oramendingacts.17The EnablingAct, how-ever,wasnot only an amendmentof one or several clausesof the constitu-tion but it amountedto a completeoverthrowof the constitutional orderthen existing. Such a basic alteration of the entire constitutional struc-ture,a "totalrevision" n the sense of the French and Swissjurisprudence,is beyond the jurisdictionof the normalamendingorgans. It should besubmitted to the "originalconstituent power of the entire Germanna-tion."'8 Althoughthe majorityof constitutional awyersbefore I933, dis-missingthis distinctionbetweenordinaryandbasicalterationsof the con-stitution,I9maintainedthe applicabilityof Article 7620 forall amendmentswhatsoever,it should be noted that the National Socialist party repre-sented only a minorityand that even by adding the votes of its partner,the GermanNational People'sParty, it remainedconsiderablybelow theuniversallyaccepted minimumrequirements or an amending majority.Anotherchallengeto the constitutionalityof the EnablingAct is evenmore serious. It was passedby a 494-94 vote in the Reichstag, thus con-forming ormallyto Article 76of the constitution. But 8i deputiesof theoutlawed Communistpartywereillegallybarred romattendingthe meet-

I6Seethestatementof the Ministerof the Reich,Dr. Frick, n the Rulescommitteeof theReichstagon March25, I933; Reichsanzeiger (March 25, I933).17This methodof amending he constitution ndirectlyhadbeenconstantlyappliedsince1919, althoughconstitutionalawyersraisedstrongobjection o the laxity of the process; eeLoewenstein, Erscheiningsformen 56 if. (I93I).I8 Such,at least,wasthe opinionof Herr CarlSchmittandhis schoolwhowere nfluentialbeforeandafterthe "fall of men"(meaning he light-hearted hangeof colors of formerop-ponentsof theregime) n March,1933; seeSchmitt,Verfassungslehre2 if., 99, 105 (I928).

I9 See Anschtitz,Die Verfassung es DeutschenReichs403 (4th ed. 1933).20 Art.76of theWeimarConstitution ontainsthe provisions or amendment:two-thirdsvote of two-thirdsof the Reichstag.

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWing and of the I20 members of the Social Democrats only 94 were ad-mitted.2 In addition, 92 members of the Catholic Center, the SocialDemocrats, and minor "splinter parties" voting for the act were pre-vented from giving a free and unbiased vote. The mob unleashed by thegovernment ruled the capitol and the vote was taken in an indescribableatmosphere of terrorization and coercion.The final point bearing essentially on the constitutionality of futurelegislation on the basis of the Enabling Act is the most important. Theact declared in Article 5: "Furthermore this act ceases to be effectivewhen the present government of the Reich is replaced by another one."On June 29, 1933, Dr. Hugenberg, Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture,resigned from the cabinet under pressure. By the withdrawal of the fore-most representative of the German National People's Party the very na-ture of the coalition government was destroyed because only by supportof the German Nationals had the National Socialists attained the relativemajority of votes and seats. It can be argued that the cabinet of Hitler,after the resignation of the coalition partner preserved its formal identityand that no new cabinet was summoned; yet the crux of the situation wasnot different from that under the Enabling Act of 1923.2 The powers ofthe Enabling Act were accorded to a coalition government which as suchhad received the parliamentary mandate. After the resignation of theGerman Nationals, followed immediately by the suppression of the partyitself, the political identity of the cabinet was fundamentally changed.By no stretch of imagination could it be maintained that the sweepingpowers of the act would have been given to the National Socialists alonebecause the presence of the German Nationals in the government was con-sidered by all parties voting for the act as a sort of political brake. Thusthe act lost its political basis and thereby also its legal justification.23It is not beside the point to stress here these constitutional aspects ofthe situation because, if the Enabling Act itself is invalid, every single

21Most of the deputies excluded were in hiding, in exile, in concentration camps, or assassi-nated.22 The Enabling Act of October I0, 1923 (RGB. I, 943) was to expire if and when "a changeoccurs in the present Reich government or in the-parties of which it is at present composed."After the Social Democrats had resigned from the coalition the act became automaticallyinvalid. The formulation in I923 differedfrom that in I933 in so far as the act of I933 lapses"if the present Reich government is replaced by another one" while the act of I923 was to ex-pire when the coalition broke, but in both cases the implied meaning was the same. Thus the

1923 act would seem to provide a pertinent precedent for the subsequent invalidity of the1933act.23 Needless to say nobody within Germany dared to allude to this fact nor did it find ade-quate attention of the constitutional lawyers outside of the jurisdiction of the Third Reich.

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937step of the subsequentrevolutionon the basis of the EnablingAct leadsinto a legalno-man's-land.24While t maybe correctto say that norevolu-tionary government s to be subjectedto the legal standardsof the orderwhichit hasoverthrown, t must be clearlyunderstood hat even a revolu-tionary government s boundby the legal standardsestablishedby it asguidancefor future actions. Otherwise t forfeits the title of a constitu-tional governmentof its own right-a title which the National Socialistsare so anxiousto claim.25On November I2, I933, a new Reichstag was elected which, besides afew non-partymembersappointedon the National Socialist ticket, con-tainedonlypartyrepresentativesof the National Socialists,the only polit-ical party legallyrecognizedsinceJuly, I933. By the ReconstructionActof January 30, I934, which is also an organic act,26 the Reichstag con-ferredunanimouslyupon the cabinet the pouvoir onstituantwithout anylimitations,thusdemolishing he last residuesof constitutionalguaranteesof the EnablingAct. Article4 declaresin unequivocalterms: "The gov-ernmentof the Reichmay enact new constitutional aw." Henceforward,the amendingprocessbecameidenticalwith the ordinarylegislative pro-cedure,both being exercisedby simplegovernmentdecree.

THE VALIDITY OF THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONThe Constitutionof Weimarwas neverformallyrepealed. This would

happenonlyif a newfundamentalcharterwereenacted. Since the govern-ment may, by simpledecree, establish new constitutional law, those in-stitutionsof the ThirdReich which are in conflictwith the Weimarcon-stitution are valid only in conformitywith the principleof lex posteriorderogategipriori.2 Occasionally nstitutionsof the WeimarCharterwere4 This argumentaffectsparticularly he constitutionalityof the act concerning he pro-hibitionof politicalpartiesof July I4, I933(RGB.I, 479)by which he preceding issolutionof the otherpoliticalpartieswas egalized.The Communist artywasproscribedmmediatelyafterthe electionsof March5, 1933. The SocialDemocraticpartywasprohibited t the endof June,1933,by thegovernments f the Landeron instructions f the Reich Ministerof theInterior.This procedure adnot eventhe pretextof legality and wasaccomplished nly byterroror actual violence.The bourgeoispartiespreferredpolitical suicideby "self-efface-ment" under the coercionof the SA, the storm troopers,and the Political Police. Allpartieswerewipedout withinone week(June26 to July 5, I933). Similarly he electionsofNovember 2, I933, andthe ReconstructionAct of January 0, 1934 (RGB.I, 75)aredevoid

of constitutionality.25 See Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 812 ff., notes I2I-24 (I936).26 GesetziiberdenNeuaufbaudes Reichsof January30, I934 (RGB. I, 75).27 Technicallythe patternof constitutionalamendmentwhichconsists in enactingnewprovisionswithoutformallyrepealing he olderonesis spokenof as "constitutional mend-ment by way of dislodgment" Verfassungsverdrangung);ee Loewenstein,Erscheinungs-formen II3 ff., I49ff. (I93I).

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAW REVIEWformallyabolished-such as the FederalCounciland the ReichEconomicCouncilin I934. In other instances provisionsof the formercharter,whilegenerallymaintained,weresubjected o restrictionsorexemptions,28according o the principleof lexspecialisderogategigenerali.9 Morefre-quently, however,the new constitutional law may be characterizedashaving informallyoverruledolderprovisionswhichwere deemed incom-patiblewith the National Socialistpostulateof the supremacyof the to-talitarianleadershipstate. Instead of explicit judicialor governmentalact the mereassumption hat a formerprovisionconflicts with the newsystemof law suffices. Thisvaguenessentails considerabledifficulties orthe courts in applyingthe law. After some significantvacillationstheNationalSocialistdoctrinereverted o the principle hat the judgeis sub-ject to the law. But in view of the manifestcontradictionsbetween theold and the new fundamentalprinciples,what exactly is the law? Abroadrule of interpretations supposedto solve the problem. The judgeis to decide accordingto judicial discretionand conscience whether astatutory provisionnot yet repealedis in conflictwith the spirit of theneworder. Evidentlyno doubt arisesas to rulesof law passed since theseizureof power. The newlaw as the bindingexpressionof the Leader'swillclaimsprecedenceof rightover all otherrulesof law even if containedin the formerconstitution. Concerninghe rulespassedpriorto the Na-tional Socialistrevolution the judge is bound only by his conceptionofthe National Socialist"spirit." The altogetheruniqueand paradoxicalsituation exists that the new National Socialist law overrides not onlyformerordinary aw but also formerfundamental aw. Thus the bulk ofthe Constitutionof Weimar s "de-constitutionalized."30 hisimpliesthatparts of the WeimarConstitutioncontinuedto be in force althoughde-prived of their formal characterand subject to being amendedat anytime by governmentaldecree,governmentordinanceand statutespassedby the Reichstag. Whatever the reference to the National Socialist"spirit"may mean,the obviousresultis constitutionalchaosin the placeof a clear-cuthierarchybetweenorganicand ordinary aw.Particulardifficultiesarose n connectionwith the Bill of Rightsof thesecondpart of the constitution. The most important amongthem31were

28 This pattern of constitutional amendment is spoken of as "perforation" of the consti-tution (Verfassungsdurchbrechung); see Loewenstein, Erscheinungsformen I64 ff., 233 ft.(I 931).

9The numerousviolations of Art. Io9 (guaranteeingequality before the law), in dismissingpublic officials for "political unreliability," or the exclusion of the Jews from the civil serviceand the professions, and depriving them of political rights, are illustrations.3oSee Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 802 if. (1936).3' See note 7 supra.

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937suspendedon the basis of Article 48 by ordinanceof the President ofFebruary 28, I933. This temporary expedient has never been repealedalthoughthe regimehas stabilized tself in the meantime. But most of theother guaranteedrights are equally outlawed, such as the principle ofequality32 and the well established principle of nulla poena sine lege.33The act on the prohibitionof political parties34 uppressed he freedomofassembly,of association and of public opinion.35Space forbidsgiving adetailed description of how the second part of the constitution wasscrapped.36Violationsof the rightof privatepropertyand of the guaran-tee of vested rights-a legal term whichin Germanyhas no political con-notation as in this country-were so frequentthat at present they passunnoticed.37In brief, the Constitutionof Weimarthoughnot formallyrepealedhasbeen materially abrogated. The constitutionallawyer should no longerevaluate the new revolutionary order in terms of a constitutional system

3$Art. Io9. The conceptof equality is particularlyobnoxious o the National Socialistdoctrinewhichextols the values of the "elite"and of the "leaders" s againstwhatis calledthe "soullessmechanization f democratic quality."33Art. ri6. This principle,unconditionally recognized by all civilized nations-wasofficiallyabolishedby the act of June 28, I935 (RGB. I, 839) concerningadditionsto thepenalcode. Convictionof the accused"by way of analogy"was introduced,whichallowspunishment lthoughthe actual factsof the casemaynot justify it. In additionpunishmentwithoutpreviousdetermination f thecrimewas madecompulsoryby the standardsof whathas been called "the soundconsciousness f the people"as interpretedarbitrarilyby thejudge.

34Seenote 24 supra.35The rightof the freedomof opinionwas officiallydeniedby the Editors Act (Schrift-leitergesetz)of October4, I933 (RGB. I, 713) by whichthe exerciseof the journalisticpro-fession s madedependenton politicalconformity.36Oneof the veryfew constitutional ontroversieswhichthe courts werepermitted o in-dulge n arose n connectionwith Art. I37of the constitutionwhichguaranteeshe freedomofassociation or religiouspurposes.Severalof the lesscoordinated ighercourts nsistedthatthis article,becausenot conflictingwith the National Socialistprinciples,was not implicitlyabolishedand that therefore he religioussect of the "Emste Bibelforscher"similar o the"Children f Jehovah"who refused o salute the flag n thiscountry)shouldbepermitted ocontinue.Theproblemwas solvedby declaring hemCommunists.On the legalcontroversy,see Potzsch-Heffter, Vom deutschen Staatsleben (vom 30. Januar bis 31. Dezember, I933),22 Jahrbuchdes offentlichenRechts 210ff. (I935); Stodter,VerfassungsproblematikndRechtspr , 27 Archivdes offentlicen Rechts(N.F.) i66 if. (I936). See further hedecisionsof theSupremeCourt Reichsgericht),uristischeWochenschrift67,2070 (1934);Oberlandes-gerichtDarmstadt,JuristischeWochenschrift774; Sondergericht reslau,DeutscheRichterzeitung no. 432 (I935); Hanseatisches Sondergericht (City of Hamburg), 57 Reichsver-waltungsblatt 700 (I935).37The author s preparing studyon the positionof privateproperty n the Third Reichwhichdemonstrates, n the basis of officialdocumentation, hat the confiscatory rendoftotalitarian egislationandof the practiceunder he FourYearsPlancomesveryclose to thesystemof restricted ropertyunderBolshevism.

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THEUNIVERSITYFCHICAGOAWREVIEWwhich,by the forceof revolutionary ogic,haspassedfromactuallawintohistory.

II. THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE IN REICH AND LANDER38THE TRANSFORMATIONOF THE FEDERAL STATE INTO THE UNITARY STATE

Besides the substitutionof the monocraticsingle party state for themultipleparliamentarytate,by farthemostconspicuousdevelopmentnGermany ince I933consists n the transformation f the federal nto theunitary and centralizedstate. Objectivelyseen this change representsthat achievementof the regimewhich is most likely to be permanent.Beyond doubt, the administrativeunificationof the Reich was delayedby the intrinsic awsof Germanhistory. Even the WeimarConstitutionoffered ittle more than a hesitantandtransitional olution. Thepoliticaltrendof ourage is certainlytoward centralization. Grave doubt,how-ever, exists as to whether the sociologicalstratificationof the Germanpeople justifiesthe headlongplunge into rigid centralizationwhich de-liberately neglectsreligiousdiversities and the tribal peculiaritiesof thecountry. The culturalmultiformity,perhaps he most attractiveresultofhistoricaldevelopment,was scratchedout by a stroke of the legislativepen. Rigidcentralization,however,meets the necessitiesof dictatorship,which is bound to dominatethe territorywithout intermediary nstitu-tions. Thus political coordinationbetween Reichand Landerpromotedthe politicalaimsof the governmentwhich,by coercion,couldovercomesuccessfullythe historical and sentimentalresiduesof federalism.The transformationwasaccomplishedwithin less thanoneyear.39Thefirstpreliminary ct for "co-ordinatinghe Reichand Lander"of March,1933,4?was aimed mainly at leveling down the existing political differenceswithinthe variousstates. Onthe basis of the secondact forcoordinatingthe Lander with the Reich of April, 1933,41 Reich-Regents (Reichs-Statt-halter)were appointedby the Reich President,on advice of the Reich-Chancellor.42 he task of the Regentswas that of enforcing he political

38 The Lander are the states of Germany, such as Prussia.39See Wells, Liquidation of the German Lander, 30 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 350 (1936) for anexcellent discussion.40 Vorlaufiges Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Lander mit dem Reich of March 31, 1933

(RGB. I, 153).64Second Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Lander mit dem Reich of April, 7 I933 ? 2(RGB.I, 173) with alterations of April 25, 1933 (RGB. 1, 225), May 26, I933 (RGB.I, 293)and October I4, 1933 (RGB. I, 736).42Reich-Regents govern at present the following eleven Lander: Bavaria, Wiirttemberg,Baden, Saxony, Thuringia, Hesse, Hamburg, the two Mecklenburgs (now united into oneadminiktrativeunit; until 1937the Regent for the Mecklenburgs was also Regent for Lubeck),

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THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION:1933-1937instructionsof the Reich Chancellor.43Onthe whole they functioned as asort of state president appointedby the Reich. Whileremoved fromlocalpolitics, the Regents were authorized to appoint and dismiss the stategovernments,to dissolve the local parliamentsand to appoint the localofficials. Onlyfor Prussia did the Reich Chancellorreserve to himselfthepowersof the PrussianRegent and simultaneouslydelegatedthem to thePrussianPrimeMinister.44Thus the institutionoftheReich-Regentsguar-anteed political unity within the states and political conformitywith theReich because the Regents as subordinatesof the SupremeLeaderrepre-sented the interestsof the Reich and not of the Lander. Prussia,by thepersonalunion of the officesof the Reich Chancellorand of the PrussianRegent, became a sort of jurisdictionalprovinceof the Reich.In spite of these changes the dualism between the Lander and theReich which was among the main causes of the downfallof the Republicwas by no means overcomepermanently. In fact, the federalistic spiritof resistancewas so deeply rooted, that the Landerpreserveda consider-abledegreeof individualityaspoliticalunits. The influenceof a nationallyhomogeneousparty helped little in suppressingfederalistic tendencies,nor did the Regents, as is illustratedby the attitude of the BavarianNa-tional Socialistswho were pursuingdecidedly Bavarian interests. Thusthe complete elimination of the Lander as quasi-independentpoliticalentitiesbecame inevitable lest the traditionalfederalismwould transcendthe frame of the singleparty state. This huge step was taken in the Re-constructionAct of January 30, I934,45 the second organic act of theThirdReich. The sovereignpowersof the states were transferred o theReichwhile the governmentsof the states were reducedto agenciesof theReich government. The Regents were subordinatedto the Reich Min-isterof the Interior. The result is that at presentthe Reich for all intentsand purposesis a unitary state and that the Lander are only provincialunits administeredby the Reich. The governmentsof the states are con-verted into bureausof the Reich, the officialsof the Landerarehencefor-ward officialsof the Reich and almost all powers of the Lander weretransferred o the central authorities.The planof a regionalsubdivisionof the Reichon geographicalorrath-Oldenburg nd Bremen,Brunswickand Anhalt, and the two Lippes.These territoriesareveryunequal nsize andpopulationandstill reflect he traditionaldynasticboundaries f theGerman tates.

43Act of April 7, I933 ? i. See note 4I supra.44Edict (Erlass) of the Reich Chancellor of April 23, 1933 (RGB. I, 226).45Gesetz zum Neuaufbau des Reichs of January 30, I934 (RGB. I, 75).

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWer economic lines, much debated and until now beset by insuperable ob-stacles, has not yet materialized. Only the Lander of Mecklenburg-Strelitz and of Mecklenburg-Schwerin have been merged into one LandMecklenburg.46 Minor rectifications of the state lines by exchanging terri-tories between the Lander of Prussia, Hamburg and Oldenburg were ac-complished in the so-called "little Reich reform" of I937 by which alsothe time-honored Free City of Liibeck was wiped from the map and itsterritory distributed among the neighboring Lander.47 Any major recon-struction of the territories of the Lander on what is called rational oreconomic lines seems, at least for the time being, impossible, perhaps be-cause of the underground resistance of local interests. Yet an attempt wasmade to break down the stubborn homogeneous state consciousness ofPrussia by making the governors of the Prussian provinces (Oberprasiden-ten) the immediate and personal agents of the Reich government.

Finally political friction arising from the fact that the Regent was per-sonally subject to the orders of the Reich Chancellor but beyond the juris-diction of the Minister of the Interior was removed by the Reich RegentsAct of January 30, I935,48the third of the organic acts. The Regent be-came a subordinate of the Reich Minister of the Interior and thus was in-corporated into the Reich administration as a normal organ. On thewhole, this move was equivalent to a capitis deminutioof the Regents. Al-though nominally not officials of the Reich,49they are political organs of

46Gesetz iiberdie Vereinigung on Mecklenburg-Strelitz it Mecklenburg-SchwerinfDecember i6, I933 (RGB. I, io65). The position of the Saarafter the return to Germany wasrevisedby the Gesetz uiberdie vorlaufigeVerwaltung es Saarlandes f January30, I935(RGB.I, 68). There-incorporationf theSaar ntothe Reichafterseventeen earsofsepara-tionin which hesocialstructure f theReichhadbeencompletely hanged fferedegislativeandadministrativeroblems f the firstmagnitude.The accomplishmentf the taskshowsthe ministerial ureaucracyt its best.47Gesetz tiber Grosqhamburgnd andere Gebietsvereinigungenf January 26, I937(RGB.I, 9I). Fora longtime the denselypopulateddistrictaroundHamburg adlyneededa territorial ealignment ecausepartsof the areaof thecity of Hamburg elongedadminis-trativelyto threedifferent tates. The act organizes "Land"Hamburg the HansestadtHamburg), he territoryof whichwasconsiderablyncreased.No better llustrationof thesubordinate oliticalpositionof theLinder canbefoundthanin theprovisionn Art.I, ? 4of the act: "Constitution ndadministrationf the LandHamburg ndof the Hanse-Cityof Hamburg egulatedby theReich-Ministerf theInteriorn consultationwith theDeputy-Leader."Thus not eventhe ReichRegentof Hamburg articipatesn the establishment fthe fundamental rderof the Land.

48Reichsstatthaltergesetz of January 30, I935 (RGB. I, 65).49Until the enactmentof the newPublicOfficialsAct of January26, I937 (RGB.I, 39)the Regentswereunderthe Reich-Minister ct of February 7, 1930 (RGB.I, 96) and theact of June 30, 1933 c. 6 (RGB. I, 433). The Public OfficialsAct of 1937 ? I84, however, re-

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THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION:1933-1937the Reichsubjectto directordersof the Reichgovernment. In theirpres-ent status they functionas intermediaryagenciesbetween the centralandthe local administrations,but their political power and actual sphereofinfluence s very limited, in fact they aremore a sort of a buffer betweenthe provincesand the capital than a center of independentaction.The solution ultimately found seems logical and satisfies the end ofmaintainingthe essentialunity of political commandwhileallowingfor acertainelasticity of local enforcement. On the otherhand the conscious-ness of statehood which in the past has been one of the cornerstonesofGermanpolitics is submergedfor the time being. It remains to be seenwhetheror not a resurrectiontakes place wheneverthe pressureof theone party state relaxes.As to the relation of the Reich legislation to the legislation of theLander,the ReconstructionAct of I934 disposedof the independent eg-islative powersof the Landerby monopolizing he legislative jurisdictionin the hands of the Reich. Actually, however, the authorities of theLanderexercise,by delegation from the Reich, the legislative power inpurely ocalmatters. Controlof the Reich is providedforby the fact thatlocal statutes may be enacted only by explicit consent of the Reich min-ister to whose departmentthe matter belongs.50In conformitywith thesuppressionof the Lander,uniformReich legislationspreadrapidly overall fieldspreviouslyreserved to the states. Thisprocess,perhapsthe mostbeneficialof all steps undertakenby National Socialism,is called "Ver-reichlichung." Since it is impossibleto enumerateall such uniform stat-utes only a few of the more important fields are mentioned here: civilservice, trade and crafts, press, administration of justice, taxes, traffic,local government,policeand evenmost of the culturalactivities.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LANDERIt is misleading, however, to assume that Germany is at present ahomogeneousanduniformcountrylike France or Italy. It would be moreappropriate o liken the present status of the Lander to that of Scotlandor Wales within the frame of the United Kingdom. The situation maybe summarized as follows: since progressively more functions of theLanderwere transferred o the Reich, the independentgovernmentsof

the Landerwere more and more "hollowedout." Graduallythe politicalpealed most of the Reich-Minister Act of I930 by incorporating many of the provisions of theolder act. The author was unable to verify whether or not this act changed the position of theReich Regents.

50 First Ordinance concerning the reconstruction of the Reich of February 2, I934, ?? i, 3(RGB. I, 84).

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWinstitutions of the Lander were thrown on the dust heap. First to disap-pear were the Lander diets.51 The powers of the suppressed parliaments,insofar as they survived were usurped by the Lander governments, aprocess which reflects faithfully the identical development within theReich.52 As a final solution the Reconstruction Act of I934 not only abol-ished the parliaments of the Lander altogether, but transferred also, as aconsequence of the disappearance of the legislative powers of the Lander,the Lander governments into agencies of the Reich exercising powers dele-gated by the Reich. What little of legislative functions is still left to theLander is thus only re-delegated on trust from the Reich to the Lander.53If the Reich prefers to have a statute passed which applies only to theterritory of the former Land, the government of the Land may do so byand with the consent of the Reich Minister to whose jurisdiction thematter belongs. While nominally such an act bears the signature of thegovernment of the Land it is actually an act of the Reich. It is not clearwhy this indirect method of federal legislation was established. It wouldbe more logical if the Reich government legislated on Prussia or Bavariadirectly, as Congress legislates for the District of Columbia or the Britishparliament for Scotland or Wales.In view of the fundamental change in the federal structure the FederalCouncil (Reichsrat), hitherto the organ of the collective will of theLander, was abolished.54 The final solution brought the Reich Regents

5sThe (First)Act for the coordination f the Landerwith the Reich of March31, 1933(RGB.I, 153) providedor a re-appointment,ot re-election, f the diets n conformitywiththe results of the Reichstagelectionsof March5, I933. Onlythe Prussianparliamentwasexcepted which had been elected simultaneously with the Reichstag on March 5, 1933. Sec. iof the act decreedhe automaticdissolution f theLander-diets hen he Reichstagwassub-sequently o be dissolved.Be it notedthat the independentlections or the Lander-parlia-mentsduring he Republicanperiodhad servedthe same usefulpurposeachievedby "by-elections" or the Britishparliamentn indicating he trendof publicopinion.The Nazistrategyhadconcentratedhe wholestrengthof thepowerfulmachine n such ocal electionsin order o impressts irresistibility n the public,especially n suchstates where he move-ment had less support. By telegram (sic) of Nov. i6, I933, the Minister of the Interior in-structed he Regentsto foregonewelections orthe Lander-diets. eePotzsch-Heffter, omdeutschen taatsleben (vom.30. Januarbis3I. Dezember933), 22 Jahrbuch es6ffentlichenRechts I53 (I935). Thus the Lander-parliaments ceased to exist.s2By ? i of the Coordination ct,see note40supra, hestategovernmentwasempoweredto enactrulesof lawby government ecreeoverrulinghe powersof the parliaments roper.A simplegovernment ecree ouldpassthebudgetand even amend he constitutional harterof the Land.53SeetheimportantFirstOrdinanceoncerninghe reconstructionf the Reichof February2, 1934, ? I (RGB. I, 8i).54GesetzuiberdieAufhebung esReichsrats f February 4, I934 (RGB.I, 89). Similarlythe ReichEconomicCouncil Reichswirtschaftsrat),t firstreorganizedsee act of April5,I933 (RGB.I, I65)), was abolishedby act of March 3, I934 (RGB.II, IS5).

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937Act of January 30, I935,55 which eliminated the last remnants of theseparategovernmentsof the Lander. The Ftihrerand Reich Chancellormay intrust to the Reich Regent the actual conduct of the governmentwithin the Land. Ministersof the Lander whereverthey survive are ap-pointed and dismissedby the Fiihrer,on suggestionof the Regent. TheRegent promulgatesthe statutes of the Lander afterhaving obtained theconsent of the Reich cabinet.It is significantthat in spite of the uniformityintended by the ReichRegent Act the actual situation varies still in the various Lander. InBavaria a Prime Minister and a governmentexist besides the Regent,?6whilein SaxonyandHesse the officesof Regent and of Prime Minister aremergedin the person of the former.57In Prussia the situation is againdifferent. The Fiihrerand Reich Chancellorholds nominallythe officeofthe Regent,but actually,by delegation,the functionsareexercisedby thePrussianMinister President. The membersof the Reich cabinet are ex-officiomembersof the Prussiancabinet with the exceptionof the Ministerof Financeof the Reich, becausePrussiastill retainsher own Ministry ofFinance. In order to avoid duplication in staff and administrationallother originallyseparatedepartmentsof Prussia were in due course ab-sorbedby the correspondingReich ministries. Thus the Prussiangovern-ment is an integralpart of the Reich governmentand conversely. Thissolution of the dualismbetween the Reich and its largest memberstate,Prussia, is strikingly similar to the constitutional settlement under theBismarckconstitutionof I87I, a fact which once more indicates the lawof inertiagoverningstructuralchange.In this connection,mention shouldbe made of a newinstitution, name-ly the so-called Councilof State in Prussia established for advising thestate government,58 hichis a rathersuperfluousmitation of the ItalianGranConsiglioof the Fascist party. All the highest party officialswereappointedto it by the MinisterPresident,in addition to representativesof the church, economic life, labor, science and art, and "othermen ofmerit in the state and nation." Membership s for life but dependentonthe tenureof the partyoffice. The Councilof State is merelydecorative.

ss Reichsstatthaltergesetz of January 30, I935, ??4, 5 (RGB. I, 65).s6 In Bavaria the district party leaders (Gauleiter) hold at the same time the office of thehead of the state district administration (Kreisregierung). They are ex-officio members ofthe Bavaria cabinet (without portfolio).s7Edict of the Reich Chancellor of February 28, I935.58 Prussian Law of July 8, I933, Gesetzessammlung 241. Hamburg has a similar advisoryinstitution.

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWWhile no political importance whatsoever is attached to it, it is a conspicu-ous instrument of legalized party patronage.59

HI. THEGOVERNMENTF THE REICH(REICHSFUtHRUNG)THE HEAD OF THE STATE: THE FUHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR

The essence of the political revolution in Germany may be expressedadequately by the simple statement that the will of one man alone, theFtihrer, is sovereign, free from any constitutional limitations whatsoever.This unequivocal fact, however, is embedded in involved terms of consti-tutional law, evidently because the prejudices and habits of the Germanpeople cling stubbornly to the legalistic mummery by which arbitrarinessis disguised. Psychological rather than technical considerations are re-sponsible for the preservation of the traditional forms of constitutionallaw. While every pattern of constitutional government is necessarilycomplicated and difficult in operation because of the cooperation of vari-ous organs, the dictatorship of the Third Reich is an exceedingly simple,intelligible and logical mechanism. During the lifetime of Reich Presidentvon Hindenburg, the dualism between the Reich-presidency and the officeof the Fiihrer and Reich Chancellor had to be maintained for symbolicreasons although the Reich President had been denuded of most of hispowers.6? The reservation of the Enabling Act that "the powers of theReich President are to remain untouched" was practically meaninglessbecause the functions of the President in connection with the legislative

5sAccordingo ? I4 of the Lawon the Councilof State,theoffice f theCouncillor f Stateis anhonorary ne withwhich, n addition o thegratuitoususeof all staterailroads, salaryis connected.The monthlyremunerationmounts o Iooo marks or members esiding ut-sideofBerlinandto 500marks orthosewhoareresidents f thecapital. ExecutoryOrdinanceof July 7, I933, Gesetzsammlung 265. All members of the Council of State are wealthy menorderive ncome romotherstate orpartyoffices.Yet the lawexplicitly orbids enunciationof thesalary,a pertinentllustration f theofficial loganthat"commonwealakesprecedenceoverprivateweal."60The"OldMan"wasalreadyduring helastyearsof theRepublic deliberately uilt-uplegend or which hegovernment f Dr. Briningis muchmoreresponsiblehanthe NationalSocialistswho,when till inopposition, idnotshy away romviolentattacksuponhisperson.It fitswell ntothepictureofpolitical orruptionccompanyinghe transitionrom heRepub-lic to the singlepartystateof theNationalSocialists hathe who,by virtueof hisoath,wasto be "thecustodianof the constitution," s Herr CarlSchmittandothersemphasized, e-camethe official"protector f theThirdReich" mmediately fter the wirepullersf the "na-tionalrevolution" adpersuaded imto changehiscolors.As substantial ewardorhishis-toricalmissionheacceptedromthe Reichthe gift of thelargeestate of Langenau roundingoff" the familyestate of Neudeck.By the act of July 27, I933 (RGB.I, 595)the estateofNeudeck husenlargedwasexemptedromall taxes"duringenurebya malemember f thefamilyof von Hindenburg." he statutebookrevealsdiscreetly he important ole playedby the maleheir,HerrOskarvonHindenburg.

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937processwere overriddenby the practiceof governmentdecrees. The per-sonal confidenceof the President in the Chancellorwas, in view of therevolutionarypressureof the mobilizedparty, a mere fiction. Still impor-tant, however,was the fact that the President was constitutionally thecommander-in-chief f the armedforces, the Reichswehr.6'The latent conflict was solved, after the death of von HindenburgonAugust i, I934, by the act concerning the head of the state, the SuccessionAct, anotherorganicstatute of the ThirdReich.62The officesof Presidentand Chancellorwere merged into one, and the powers of the Presidentwere transferred o the Fiihrerand Chancellor. Thus finally the statutebook reflected what already existed in reality, namely, the unlimitedsovereigntyof the Fiihrer within the Germanrealm. The officialtitle ofHitler is now that of "Fiihrerund Reichskanzler."63At present the powers of the Fiihrer and Reich-Chancellormay begroupedalong the followinglines. First, he exercises all powers whichstill belong to the President accordingto the Weimar Constitution, in-cludingthe supremecommandof the armedforces,64 owerto dissolve theReichstag,to appointand dismiss the Reich ministersand the publicoffi-cials, theprivilegeof mercy-which, underthe ThirdReich,was extendedto the discretionarypowerof quashing pending criminalproceedings,-and functionsof representing he Reich internationally,and of remodel-ling the governmentaldepartments(Organisationshoheit).In the secondplace he has a new seriesof powers,derived from the organicacts of theregime such as the powers of appointment and dismissal of the ReichRegents, the ministers,the officialsof the Lander,and power to appointthe Deputy-Leader.6'Finally, the Fiihreris endowed with those powerswhich springfrom the National Socialistmythology. By their very na-ture they are incapableof being integratedby the lex scripta. Although

6IWhen the Ftihrer idhimselfof the allegedlyrestive eadersof the partyarmy,the SA,by the ominousblood purgeof June3o, I934, he anticipated he consequences f the immi-nentdeathof theReichPresident,August , I934. Seeon thissubjectLoewenstein,AutocracyversusDemocracyn Contemporary urope,29 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 589 (I935). Thus Hitlerwas relievedfrommakinga choice betweenthe two rival bodiesof the regularand of therevolutionaryparty armyand was able to enlist at once the wholehearted upportof theReichswehr,which the bloodpurgerestored o its undisputedmilitarymonopoly.62Gesetzuiberdas Staatsoberhaupt esdeutschenReichsof August2, I934 (RGB.I, 747).63The bureauof the Reich President,the presidentialChancellery Reichskanzlei), e-mained unchanged.64Even the imperial title of "Supreme War Lord" (Oberster Kriegsherr) was, at least un-

officially, restored.65This right is not yet exercised. Hess acts as Deputy-Leader only in respect to the party.It is more ikely than not that G6ringone day will be promoted o the title andofficeof theDeputy-Fiihrer f the entire state.

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWthey defy adequatetranslation hey may be characterized s follows:theFtihrer s the "bearerof the legalwill of the racialcommunity"as well asthebearerof the ultimateresponsibility s"addressee f the duty of fealty"(Treupflicht).All ministers,officials,Regentsand membersof the armedforces areresponsible o him alone. "Allpowersare concentrated n hispersonwhile he himself is responsibleonly to the nation."66Evidentlythese mystical and symbolicpowersare better translatedinto terms oftheologythanof lawand whilethey have the most tangiblerealityfor thetime being, they can be evaluatedonly by the judgmentof history. Inview of the fait accompli he plebiscitetakenon the mergerof the officeson August 19, I934, was significant only as a declaratory statement.In conformitywith the newnotionof responsibilityn the "leadership-state" the traditionalduties incumbenton all kinds of officeholders reconverted ntotheethicalconceptsof fealty similar o thosegoverning hefeudal relationshipbetween the lord and his retainers (Treueverhaltniszwischen Fiihrer und Gefolgschaft). The official doctrine of NationalSocialismemphasizesthis irrationaland mystical mutuality of supportandprotection,of confidenceandresponsibilityas a fundamental lementof the new constitutionalorder. Outwardly he new conceptof loyalty isreflected n the oath of allegiance o be swornby allpersonsholdingofficein party and state to the Ftihrer.67The solemnobligation s not given tothe abstract entity of the state but to the humanpersonof the Fiihrerhimself.

THE CABINET (REICHSREGIERUNG)Under the WeimarRepublic,the Reichgovernmentwas a rathercom-plicated blendof a parliamentarycabinet, acting in collectivecapacity,and the Bismarckian"chancellorprinciple"which operatedon the as-sumption of the monocraticresponsibilityof the chancellor. Further-more,underthe Republicthe constitutionalposition of the governmentwas obfuscatedby the contradiction hat it was dependenton the confi-dence of both the Presidentand of the Reichstag. This much deploredconstitutionalambiguity ed to thepracticeof presidentialcabinetswhichbecame inevitablewhen the strongradicalparties on the right and theleft wing refusedto lend themselvesto parliamentary ollaboration.66 The Minister of the Reich, Dr. Frick, in a conference of the press held on January 9,

I935, see Meissner-Kaisenberg, Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht im Dritten Reich 49 (x935).67 Gesetz Uiber ie Beeidigung der Beamten und der Soldaten der Wehrmacht of August 20,I934 (RGB. I, 785); Gesetz iiber den Eid der ReichMminister nd der Mitglieder der Landes-regierungen of October i6, 1934 (RGB. I, 973); Public Officials Act of January 26, I937, ? 4(RGB. I, 39): "I shall be faithful and obedient to the Fiihrerof the German Reich and Nation,Adolf Hitler, and I shall fulfil conscientiously the duties of a public official, of which the Lordbe my witness."

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937During a short period after the advent of the National Socialists to

power, the characterof collective solidarity within the cabinet was pre-served, at least as a fiction. After the GermanNationalists were thrownout of the cabinet the leadership-principlewas substitutedfor the powerof the Chancellorof determining,as primus nterpares,the generalpolicyof the government (Richtlinienbestimmungsrecht).The SuccessionActof I934 officiallyconfirmed he actualpractice. Now the membersof thecabinet obey the command of the leader (Fiihrerbefehl)binding uponall. Thus the individualministeris subjected to the discretionary nter-ference of the Fiihrereven within his own department.68The leadership-principleprecludesvotes amongthe membersof the cabinet; the individ-ual ministerconducts the businessof his departmentalone, subject to in-structions of the Chancellor,who also straightensout differencesof opin-ion amongthe ministers.69 mportantdecisionsof the ministersas headsof the departmentsneed also the consentof the ministersof Finance andof the Interiorand in addition the Deputy-Leader may veto them. Onthe whole the individual ministers are more independentthan undertheformercollective system.70Ministerswithout portfoliomay be admittedto the cabinet.7T The legal position of the ministers,at first regulated bythe formerMinisters Act of I930, wasrecentlyrestatedby the Public Offi-cials Act of I937.72

68The StandingOrders f the ReichgovernmentGeschaftsordnung) of May 23, I924, andAprilI4, I926 (RGB. (1924) I, 173, id. (1926 )I, 319), one of the most remarkable constitu-tionaldocuments f therepublic,werenotrepealedbutadjusted.69Evidentlydecisions akenby the wholecabinetafteroral discussionare ratheran ex-ception. It seems that as a rule decisionsare takenby way of signaturesattached to theminutescirculating mong hemembers f thecabinet.It maybe thatthefrequentabsencesof

theFiihrerrom hecapital, o whichheallegedlyprefershisestateat Berchtesgaden,avecon-tributed o this development.Berchtesgadens on thewaytowardbecoming secondcapital7o t is still customary hat the ministerwho is responsibleor the act attacheshis signa-turenext to the signature f the Fiihreron the act. By the countersignaturee assumesre-sponsibility owardthe Fiihrer.See Meissner-Kaisenberg,taats- und VerwaltungsrechtmDrittenReich69 (I935).71Ministerswithoutportfolioare at present:TheDeputy-Leader rior o theassassinationof R6hm,also the Chief of Staffof the partyarmy,and two otherministers, ee Gesetz zurSicherungder Einheitvon Partei und Staat of December , 1933(RGB. I, Ioi6). Severalofficesare directlyunderthe controlof the ReichChancellor uchas the Chiefof the Pressattachedto the Reichgovernment,and Commissioneror economicquestions.The Fiihrermaintainsa sort of privategovernmentwithinthe governmentwhichdoes not contribute othe smoothoperationof the administrativemachineryat the top.72Public OfficialsAct (Deutsches Beamtengesetz)of January 26, 1937 ? I56ff., I84(RGB.I, 39), whichrepealed he ReichMinisterActof I930/33. The ministersareconsiderednot as publicofficialsn the proper ense,but as "holdersof publicoffice" offentlicheAmts-trager),a rathernexplicable uasi-legaldistinction pparently f somepolitical mportance.At presentthe followingministriesof the Reich exist: ForeignOffice;Interior,for the

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558 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWTHE RECH PARLIAMENT(REICHSTAG)In the state underthe leadership-principlehe parliamentceasesto be

an independentorganof legislation. TheReichstaghasbecomeaninstru-mentof dictatorship,destined n the mainforservingas a mouthpiece orofficialdeclarationsof policy on the part of the Fiihrer.73AlthoughtheReichstagformallystill holds concurrent egislativepowers,it has beencalledupon to legislate only in a very few instances. No discussionhasbeen demandedor permitted. After having listened, silentlyor clamor-ously, as the case may be, to the declarationsof the government, heReichstaghasvotedunanimouslyn militaryobedience o thecommand.74In spiteof its rubberstamp haracter, he Reichstaghasbeen re-electedthree times since I933. The first electionoccurredon March5, I933; itwas the last opportunity orvariouspartiesto vote. The secondelection,in the sameyear on November12, served as a demonstrationof nationalunity when Germany eft the Leagueof Nations, while incidentallyen-ablingthe governmentto get rid of the limitationsof the EnablingAct.Thethirdelection,on March29, I936, followed hebreachof the LocarnoTreatyby the remilitarization f the Rhineland. In the last two electionsonly the ticket of the single party, the National Socialists,was offered.All otherpartieshad beenoutlawedpreviouslyby the act prohibiting heformationof new parties.75The universal,equal, secret, and direct suf-frageis nominallystill in force. In conformitywith the raciallegislationJewsand Jewish"mixedoffspring" Mischlinge)werebarred romvotingat the electionson March29, 1936.76Thesuffrages in abeyance ormem-bersof the armed orces. Underthe systemofproportional epresentationinherited romthe WeimarConstitutiona deputyforevery 6o,ooovotersis provided. Not only has the numberof registeredvoters increasedcon-Reich ndPrussia; inance; conomicife, ortheReich ndPrussia; abor,ortheReichandPrussia;ustice,ortheReich ndPrussia; eichswehr;ostmastereneral;ommunica-tions,or heReich ndPrussia; utritionndAgriculture,ortheReich ndPrussia;ublicEnlightenmentndPropaganda;ir;Science,Education,ndCulture,or the ReichandPrussia;orests,nderheReichForestMaster.3The description y Dr. Frick,ReichMinisterof the Interior,of the Reichstagas "theforum o which heFiihrer ndReichChancellor rings heessentialproblems f theGermannation's nteriorandforeignpolicyfor discussion nd decision"s hardly nconformitywiththe facts. Meissner-Kaisenberg,taats-undVerwaltungsrechtm DrittenReich87 (I935).

74See the enumeration in note I5 supra.7sSeeVerordnung zurSicherung erStaatsfuhrungf July 7, I933 (RGB.I, 462) whichcancelled heparliamentarymandates f the SocialDemocrats;GesetzgegendieNeubildungvon Partein of July 14, I933 (RGB. I, 478). According to this act the maintenance of theorganizationf a dissolvedpartyor the formation f a newpartyis treason.76Jewswhovote in spiteof the law arepunishedby imprisonment,ct of March7, I936(RGB. I, I33).


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THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION: 1933-1937siderablyby the returnof the Saar,the vote of Germanresidentsabroadwho weregiven free transportation,and the votes taken on boardof Ger-man vessels abroad,but the political pressureof the party has in fact in-troducedcompulsoryvoting and broughtthe percentageof votes cast tounprecedentedheights. The numberof deputies accordinglyrose from647 in the election of March I933 to 66i in the election of November,I933, and to 747 in the election of March, I936.The monopolyaccordedto the National Socialistswas justifiedby vir-tue of the act guaranteeingthe unity of party and state of December,I933,77 which proclaimed, in ? i, .... . The National Socialist Party isthe exponentof the Germanstate idea and thus insolublyfused with thestate." Sinceprimarieswereunfortunatelyconspicuousby their absenceeven underthe WeimarConstitutionthe selectionof party candidatesisleft exclusively to the discretion of the national manager of the party(Reichswahlleiter), he Ministerof the Interior,in collaborationwith thenationalparty leadersand the districtparty leaders. The voterknew ab-solutely nothingabout the compositionof the electoralticket and the se-quenceof candidateson the list becausethe officialballot paper, headedin every constituency by the Fiihrerpersonally,containedonly the namesof ten prominentparty leaders.78In violation of the electoral law theparty leadersselectedthe actualdeputiesamongabout a thousandcandi-dates only after the poll was taken. Thus the voter simply endorses amoreor less anonymous ist. Sinceit is technically impossibleand politi-cally dangerous o reject the official ticket, it is a travesty of democracyto link this type of "acclamation"with Article i of the constitution, somuch referred to under National Socialism, "All powers of the stateemanatefrom the people." Electionsin the Third Reich are compulsorypopularratificationsof party tickets in which the voter has no influencewhatsoever.79

77Gesetz urSicherungerEinheit on ParteiundStaatof December, 1933 RGB.I,io66).78 At the electionin March,1936,cursorynotes on the list of candidateswerepublishedonly on the day precedinghe elections.79Accordinglyhedeputiesrom he Saarwere ppointedromamonghe Saarvotersbythe Reich Chancellor.Moreover, heact amending heelectoral awof July 3, I934 (RGB.I,

53o)decreedby the cabinet mmediately fterthebloodpurgeofJune30, I934,by whichalsoa considerablenumberof National Socialistdeputieswere"prevented rom exercising heparliamentarymandate,"by assassination r confinemento a concentration amp,reflectsclearlytheactualsituationby providing hatmembershipn theReichstags forfeited"byex-clusionorresignationrom heparliamentaryarty." By this egaldevicea partymemberwhofell from avorwaspreventedromretaininghis seatagainst hewillof theparty;seethe state-mentin the Reichsanzeigero. I55 (1934). By the sameact the leaderof the parliamentarypartydesignates he successorof the eliminateddeputyamongthe substituteson the singlepartyticketpresentedat the last generalelectionto the constituency.

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAW REVIEWIt is true that the Courtof Inquiryinto Elections,composedof mem-bersof the Reichstagand of the SupremeCourt8? as continuedto func-

tion for both elections and plebiscites. Its findings,publishedafter in-ordinatedelay, have been valueless becauseno one daredto contest thelegalityof the electionprocedure.In addition,no impartialcontrolof theelectionprocess tself was possiblebecauseonly party memberswere ad-mitted as membersof the election board and as returningofficers n thepollingstations. The Germanelections arenot to be evaluated in termsof democratic nstitutions. Organizedunderparty pressuretheir resultis a foregoneconclusion. Onlythepercentageof votes cast in favorof theregimeremainsto be determined.Whilethe privilegesandimmunitiesof the deputieshave not been for-mally repealed,they have become moreor less meaninglesssincethe re-moval of the constitutionalguaranteesagainstcriminalproceedings8"e-causetheprincipleof partyallegianceandloyalty towards heLeaderwassubstituted or the ideaof freerepresentation.It shouldbe notedthat thecompensationfor deputies of 6oo marks monthly ($240) continues al-thoughthe Reichstag s convenednot more than once or twice a year.

THE PLEBISCITEOfficial pokesmenof the Third Reich untiringlyclaim for the regimethe title of a "pure,""unadulterated," r even "ennobled"democracy.National Socialism s anti-parliamentarianhough not anti-democratic.It is a truism that no governmenthowever authoritariancan maintainitself indefinitelyagainstthe will of the majority. The only problemwasthat of demonstratingurbiet orbi,the possibly unanimousendorsementof thegovernmentalpolicy-not of theregime tself-by thenation. SinceNational Socialismexcelsin the art of creatingandcontrollingmass-emo-tionalism, he restorationof the ususmodernus lebiscitorumf the caesar-istic type offered tself as a convenientdevice.82In deviationfrom the WeimarConstitution he plebisciteof the ThirdReichis not a legislativeprocessalthough hePlebisciteAct of I933 statesthat "plebiscitesmay be takenalso on statutes."83Thegovernmentmayask the peoplewhetherornot they consentto a measure ntendedby thesWoeimar Constitution, Arts. 31, i66.a8 Gesetzuiberdie Immunitat derAbgeordneten of June23, I933 (RGB.I, 391).82See Loewenstein, Die Diktatur Napoleon des Ersten, i6 Zeitschrift fur offentlichesRecht 635 (I936). Incidentally, the governmental system and technique of Napoleon revealmany striking parallels to the Nazi regime and modern dictatorships in general. See Loewen-stein, The Dictatorship of Napoleon the First, 35 So. Atl. Q. 298 (I936).s3Gesetz fiber Volksabstimmung of July I4, I933, ? i, alinea 2 (RGB. I, 479).

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THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION: 1933-1937government. The term, measure, includes any political act. Although theact prescribes that the plebiscite ought to precede the measure, thus farall three plebiscites were held after the step in question had been taken.An adverse vote was precluded automatically. The simple majority ofthe votes cast decides the issue even if the statute submitted to the voteamends the constitution.

The plebiscite taken on November I2, I933, was to endorse the policyof the government in connection with the withdrawal from the League ofNations.84 The second plebiscite involved the popular opinion on theSuccession Act;85and the third plebiscite was on the repudiation of theLocarno Treaty.86 The percentages of favorable votes for the three pleb-iscites were respectively 93.I%, 84.2%, and 97.8%. The result of thesecond plebiscite would seem to indicate considerable disagreement as tothe wisdom of conferring absolute power on the Ftihrer.A few remarks on the manipulation of the procedures of polling andcounting in order to obtain the desired results must suffice. Clearly recog-nizing the dangers of the plebiscite which, when honestly applied, allowsfor demonstration of divergent opinion, the government took great careto minimize the eventual opposition. In the first place national issues wereselected which would be endorsed even by opponents of the regime proper.Again the formulation of the question on the ballot paper was skilfullysuggestive. The arrangements for polling and counting discouraged the

84The ballotpapercontainedanelaborate tatementof the arguments f the government;see proclamation of the government of the Reich of October I4, I933 (RGB. I, 730). Tech-nically the procedureollowedtheformeract on plebiscitesof January 27, I921 (RGB.I, 79,as amendedby the act of December 31, I923 (RGB. I924 I, i) ). Theofficialballot paperwasto be markedby "yes"or "no"on the blankcirclespace.The resultwaspublishedas follows:Total numberof registeredvoters .......... 45,176,713Total votes cast .......................... 45,491,575Yes ..................................... 40,632,628

No ............................... 2, 10,191Invalidatedballot papers ................. 757,756Abstentions fromvoting................... ,685, x3885 Total numberof registeredvoters........... 45,590,402Total votes cast.......................... 43,569,695

Y es..................................... 38,394,471N o . ................................... 4,301,429Invalidatedballot papers.................. 873,787Abstentions rom voting................... ,980,60786The samemarking echniquewasappliedas in the precedingplebiscite.The followingfiguresweremadepublic:Total numberof registeredvoters........... 45,428,641Total votes cast.......................... 44,952,476Yes .................44,409,522No or invalidatedballot papers............ 542,954Abstentionsfromvoting................... 476, 65

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWopposition. In particular, he arbitrary nterpretationof invalidatedbal-lotpapers,87ndfrequentlyopenviolationof the secrecyof thevote helpedto swell the percentageof popularapprovaleven if one discountsthe rea-sonable doubtsraisedconcerning he truth of the officiallypublished ig-ures. Needless to say that thepressureof thepropagandamachinegearedto its highestpitch succeeded n stampedingpublic opinion. By the con-trol of the party the vote was in fact compulsory. Neverthelessat leastthe majorityof abstentionsshouldbe taken as expressionof opposition.It seemsthat the extraordinarily ighpercentagesof votes in favor of thegovernmentarousedsuspicionevenamongthe docileGermans ndappar-ently a strongminorityof voterswasnotmistaken n appraisingasmerelya hollow echo a plebiscitewhich was strippedentirelyof its democraticingredients.

THE LEGISLATIVEPROCESSA statute passed in the Third Reich is no longer the untrammelled ex-pressionof popularwillmanifestedby freelychosenrepresentatives rbygeneralpopularvotes. It is ratherthe commandof the leader under thedogmaticassumptionthat the Fiihrer'swisdommonopolizesand antici-pates the popularwill. Lawyersunbiasedby the mystical rigamaroleareunable to express this magic or charismaticdoctrine n understandablelegal terms.In practice the normal type of legislationis the governmentdecree(Regierungsgesetz)which is indiscriminately ppliedto all kinds of legis-lative acts whetherthey establishgeneraland permanentrulesof law orregulateonly particularcasesof limitedapplication. The customarydis-tinction betweenformalstatutorylaw, subjectto parliamentayparticipa-tion even if the contentis no generalrule but a politicalmeasure,and ma-terial statutory law, meaningthe establishmentof generalrules of lawwhich are not necessarilysubjectto parliamentaryparticipation s aban-donedwhile the traditionalformalitiesof publication (Verkiindung) ndpromulgation Ausfertigung) re stillobserved. Every governmentdecreeis signedby the Chancellorand countersignedby the minister to whosedepartmentalunctions he act materiallybelongs(federfiihrender eichs-87 In the plebiscite taken on the Locarno Treaty the official ballot papercontained no spacefor a negative vote, but only for "yes." It was generally presumed by the voters that un-marked ballot papers would be counted as "no" since the officialinstructions had deliberatelyavoided any indication of how to reject the proposal. Such papers were, however, counted asaffirmative. The number of such papers left blank was never published. Foreign reportersobserving the procedure in the polling stations testified to the very considerable number ofsuch manifestations of "no."

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THE GERMANCONSTIT'UTION:933-1937minister). Decrees of particular mportancearesignedby the entirecabi-net. The legislative jurisdictionof the government s exercisedregardlessboth of the powersre-delegatedto the Landerand of the nominally pre-servedpowersof the Reichstag. It has been mentionedalreadythat thedistinctionbetweenordinary awandorganic awis completelyobliteratedbecausethe EnablingAct and the ReconstructionAct conferredupon theReich governmentthe amendingpowerwithout limitations. The legisla-tive powerof the cabinetalso embraces he budgetandthemoneyborrow-ing function.88It may be added that the thirdmethod of legislationpro-vided forby the WeimarConstitution,namely a referendumnauguratedby popular initiative, has become obsolete because any combinationofvoters for political purposesnot sponsoredby the government s punish-able as unlawfulorganizationof a political party. Summingup the pres-ent situation, then, it is obvious that instead of the separationof legisla-tive and executive functions deemed essential for constitutionalgovern-ment there is a completeconcentrationof powersin the handsof the gov-ernment. Concomitantly he guaranteesof individualorsubjectiverightsof the individualtowardsthe state area matterof the liberalisticpast andjustly so becausepsychologically he separationof powers impliesthe rec-ognitionof individualor subjectiverightswhichareno longer compatiblewith the totalitarian state.

THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERThe technique of legislation has undergonea complete change. Thestatute is no longer mmediatelyapplicable n practice,but indicatesonlythe generalpolicy of the bill in very broadand not infrequently lamboy-ant termswhile the detailedregulationand practical applicationare leftto the ordinancemaking power. Hence, the unprecedentedgrowth ofordinances,both in volumeand importance. The line of demarcationbe-tween legislativeandordinancemakingpowers s moreorless obliterated.In consequencethereof the distinctionbetween "statutory ordinances,"establishing generalrulesof law underexplicitdelegationby the statute,88 Weimar Constitution, Arts. 85-2, 87. A special provision covering these powers wasinserted in the Enabling Act of 1933 for solving a problem of constitutional law hotly debatedprior to the seizure of power by the National Socialists. Particularly the Board of Control of

the Public Indebtedness (Reichsschuldenverwaltung) had maintained that for the enactmentof the budget and for credit transactions a formal act of the Reichstag was needed and that anordinance of the Reich President on the basis of Art. 48 was insufficient. On the importantconstitutional problem of whether certain articles of the Constitution enjoyed "immunity fromdictatorial interference" (dikaturfest), see Anschtitz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs287, 44I (I933); see also the act of May 5, 1932 (RGB. I, I9I).

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564 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWthe imitsof whichare o becarefullybserved,ndmere"administrativeinstructions,"asbecomemeaninglessecauseboth emanate romthesamesource,namely hegovernmentecree. It wouldbe erroneousoassumehattherebyhehierarchyf thesources fthe awwassimplified.On hecontraryhewideuseoftheordinancemaking owerbynumerousdelegated ndoverlappinguthoritiess confusing,ndthe lackof cer-taintyin jurisdictionmakesbusinessifein Germanyncreasinglyiffi-cult.In viewofthefact thatduringhe nitialperiod fthe"nationalevolu-tion"manymeasuresweretaken,particularly y the Landergovern-ments, orwhichnojuridicalasisexisted, sweepingndemnityActwasnecessary.89 This act legalizing revolutionary lawlessness may be likenedsystematicallyo thefamous ct"concerninghemeasuresf self-defenceof the state" of July, I934, a unique piece of self-justificationwhich"normalized"hecrude llegalitiesommitted y Hitlerhimselfand hisassociates n the bloodpurgeof June30, I934.90Allpowers f issuing rdinancesreat present ombinedn thepersonof theFiihrer nd Chancellorhowields heoldpowers f the Presidentinadditiono the newpowers s leaderof theNationalSocialistParty.91Another erycommonypeofordinances thatonthe basisof a statutewhichusually ontains delegationlause o the effect hatexecutoryr-dinancesmaybe issuedbythe cabinetasa wholeorbyanindividualmin-ister.92n generalhelimitsof theordinance reonlythose ndicated ythegeneral olicyof the statute tself,a fact whichmakes hecontrol ftheordinance-makingowerby thecourts-occasionallyememberedyNationalSocialisturisprudence-whollyllusory.If ever a courtwerebold enoughto invalidatean administrativeact because ultraviresof the89GesetzuiberRechtmaissigkeitonVerordnungenndVerwaltungsaktenf July 3, I934,? a (RGB.I, 530).90GesetzuiberMassnahmen erStaatsnotwehrfJuly3, I934 (RGB.I, 529). Fordetailssee Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 8I0 ff. (I936).

91Gesetz tiberdie Einheit von Partei und Staat of December i, I933 ? 8 (RGB. I, Io060);frequently he ordinance-makingower s delegated o the Deputy-Leaderf theparty.92Generaland unlimitedpowers o makeordinances redelegated o the Ministerof theInteriorby the ReconstructionAct ? 5; to the Ministerof Justiceby the Unification f theAdministration f JusticeAct (Gesetzzur tJberleitung erRechtspflege uf das Reich)ofFebruary I6, I934 (RGB. I, 9I); to the Prussian Minister President Goring in connectionwiththe Four YearsPlan of 1936.TheVerordnungurDurchf'hrung esVier-Jahres-Plansof October 8, I936 (RGB. I, 887)declaresaconically:"I entrust he execution f the FourYearsPlan to the MinisterPresidentGoring.He has the power o issuegeneralordersandadministrativenstructions."This mportant lanwhichcutsdeeply ntotheeconomic truc-ture ofprivatecapitalisms not evendisguised sa formalact.


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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:1933-1937delegation,a new ordinancecould make it valid ex tunc. Nothing illus-trates better the legalized arbitrarinesswhich governs legal life in theThird Reich.93

JUDICIAL POWER AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICEFor obviousreasonsno room is left for judicialreview of statutes. Noconstitutionalcharterexistsby which the legality of the individual egisla-tive act can be measured. The law as a commandof the Leader does notbrook the control involved in judicialreview. Any law emanatingfromthe government s unchallengeableboth formallyand substantially. Thesameis trueof the few acts passedby the Reichstag. The only remainingtest of validity is foundin the principleof lex posteriorderogategi priori,whichguaranteesonceandfor all the legality of the subsequentstatute asagainst a precedingone and the constitution itself.This legal situation could not fail to affect fundamentallythe positionof the judiciarybranchwithin the state. No longerare the judicialfunc-tions wellprotectedagainstthe combinedexecutiveandlegislativepowers.Independenceof judicial administrationis supersededby political sub-servienceto the law as the commandof the Leader. The decisionof themagistrateor court is to serveexclusivelythe political will of the state asexpressed n the Leader'scommand.94Sincethe law andthe discretionarywillof the Fiihrerareidentical,the fundamental enet of Article 102 of theconstitution: "Judgesaresubjectonly to the law"is not formallyaffectedbecausethe judge in obeying the law obeys the Leader'scommand. Yetthe positionof the judiciary s deeply uprootedsince the independenceofjudges and the life tenure of officehas been virtually abrogatedby thenew regulationsconcerningpublic servants.95Thus the postulate of jus-tice according o lawis fulfilledto the letterwhenit is realizedthat the lawis the will of one humanman aloneand that justiceis no longershapedinconformitywith the ethical standardsof public opinion, because publicopinionis moldedby the few at the top.The most incisive transformationof the organizationof the courtsandjudicial administrationconsists in the transfer of judicial sovereignty(Justizhoheit)from the Landerto the Reich. In the place of the former

93See in this connection, the act of December 13, I934 withdrawing all lawsuits involvingthe legality of revolutionary "actions" on the part of public officials or private persons fromthe ordinary courts and transferring them to the Minister of the Interior who settles themwithout appeal. Gesetz uiberden Ausgleich biirgerlicher Rechtsstreitigkeiten of December I3,1934 (RGB. I, 1235); see Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 807 (I936).

94Meissner-Kaisenberg, Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht im Dritten Reich 282 (I935).95See p. 566 infra.

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THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEWDepartmentsof Justiceof the variousLander,at presentdelegatesof theReich-Ministryof Justiceholdoffice n the capitalsof the formerLander.All judicialofficersareofficialsof the Reichandnolongerof the Lander.96In theordinary urisdiction f thecourtssurprisinglyittlewaschanged.On the other hand not a few specialcourts,mainlyfor protectionof theregimeagainst ts enemies,havebeenestablishednwhichcurtailingof thecustomaryguaranteesof due processis characteristic.97n addition,thenewfeudalistic endenciesof creatingseparate"estates"andguildsof thevariousprofessionsand crafts areresponsible or the emergenceof mani-fold professionaland "honor"courts.98The most seriouscompetitionofthe ordinarycourts,however,arises in the party courts which create aseparate aw forparty members.99

CIVIL SERVICEThe politically neutral civil service,togetherwith the army, was thepillarof the Germanstate althoughunder the Empire t was to some ex-tent an instrumentof the rulingclasses and at least in its higherranks,re-cruitedits members argelyfromamongthem. The Germancivil servicewasjustlyrenowned orits administrative fficiencyon thebasis of specialtrainingandgeneralexaminations.The Republicwas intent uponmain-taining the tradition of political neutrality and devotion to the officeamongthe publicofficials. Thenumberof mengainingaccess to the serv-ice by meansof politicalpatronagewas not excessive. NationalSocialismuprooting he traditiondeliberatelyconverted he civil service nto an in-strumentof political domination. Unconditionaldefense of the politicalaims of the regimenow takes precedenceover objective administrativeefficiency. The Germanofficialof today swears oyalty no longerto theabstractnotion of the state or the fulfilmentof his duties,but he pledgespersonalallegianceand unreservedobedience o the personof the Fiihrerhimself. No longeris technicalqualification or the office the exclusiveconditionofappointment,butproofofpoliticalreliability s equallyandin96Compare the gradual development in the following statutes: i., 2., and 3. Gesetz zurVtberleitungder Rechtspflege auf des Reich of February I6, of December 5, 1934, and ofJanuary 24, I935 (RGB. (I934) I, 9I, 1214; id. (I935) I, 68).97The most notorious among them is the Peoples Court (Volksgerichtshof), established bythe act of April 24, 1933 art. III, ? I-5 (RGB. I, 345); see Loewenstein, Law in the ThirdReich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 8o8 (2936); by the act of April 14, I936 (RGB. I, 369), these tri-bunals of the star chamber type were transformed into ordinary courts in the terms of theJudicature Act. The special courts (Sondergerichte) were established by Ordinanceof March21, I933 (RGB.I, 136).98See Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 8o8, n. I04 (I936)." Id. at 809.

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THE GERMANCONSTITUTION:933-1937practiceeven moreimportant.00??he newPublicOfficialsAct of January26, I937, declares n its firstsentence: "TheGermanpublicofficialexecutesthe will of the state and of the National SocialistParty." The legal pre-text of the identity of state and party serves to cover the fact that theonce politicallyneutral civil service has officiallysurrendered o the pat-ronageof the party to such an extent that at present no appointment,except forminorofficials, s possibleunlessthe applicantis a tested mem-ber of the party and has undergonespecial training n the party doctrine.The older officials are rapidly being replacedby party members. Themembershipcard as technical qualificationfor office is responsible,ac-cordingto reportsof unbiasedobservers,for the decay of administrativeefficiencyin almost all walks of public life. Space again forbidsany de-tailed descriptionof the status of public officialsin the Third Reich. Itshould be noted, however,that personsof non-Germanblood and thosemarried to a partner of non-Germanblood are no longer eligible foroffice.101 urthermore, ested rightsof the officialswhich havecontributedso much both underthe Empireand the Republicto the prestige and se-curity of the civil serviceare no longerrecognized. Even the new PublicOfficialsAct of I937 which takes greatpains to return at least on papertothe traditionalconceptsof the civil servicecontains so many political res-ervationsandpitfallsthat securityof tenurecontinuesto dependonpoliti-cal conformity. On the other hand the new act benefitsfrom the relent-less processof weeding out the politically unreliablepublic officialsdur-ing the last years. Since judges and academicteachersare equally sub-jected to the requirementsof civil serviceit is obviousthat political relia-bility of no categoryof officialsescapes a continuousscrutiny. Thus oneof the mai

Dictatorship and the German Constitution, 1933-1937_Karl Loewenstein

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Transcript of Dictatorship and the German Constitution, 1933-1937_Karl Loewenstein