Devenish, Towards an Integrated and Integrating Model of the Self

8/18/2019 Devenish, Towards an Integrated and Integrating Model of the Self

1/28

Towards an Integrated and Integrating Modelof the Self: Psychological andPhenomenological Perspectives

by Stuart Devenish

accessed at http://www.metanexus.net/essay/towards-integrated-and-integrating-model-

self-psychological-and-phenomenological-perspectives 2/9/2!"

#ho is the $ that %nows the bodily me& who has an image of myself and a sense of identity

over time& who %nows that $ have propriate strivings'( $ %now all these things& and what is

more& $ %now that $ %now them. )ut who is it who has this perspectival grasp' *$t is much

easier to feel the Self than to define the Self +,llport& !9"!& p. !2.

$n this paper we +a psychologist and a phenomenologist/theologian attempt to develop an

integrated and integrating model of the Self& using ,llports 0uestions as agent provocateurs.

#e observe that ,llport1s 0uestions allude to ,ugustine1s observation that ($ have become a

0uestion to myself( +onfessions& 3. ,ugustine was no stranger to the 4inward-turn&

confiding to his readers that: 56he field of my labours is my own Self. $ am not now

investigating the tracts of the heavens or measuring the distance of the stars or trying to

discover how the earth hangs in space. $ am investigating myself& my memory& my mind *

#hat then am $& my 7od' #hat is my nature'8 +onfessions $3.

6he 0uestion of 5who8 or 5what8 is the Self is the great unanswered 0uestion of psychology

+rai%& oro& oscovitch& Stuss& #inocur& 6ulving& ;


2/28

philosophical& theoretical& conceptual and empirical framewor%s. oreover& with each

successive generation of scholars& these framewor%s become more complex& sometimes more

convoluted& and typically more inaccessible to scholars wor%ing with and within other

framewor%s.

$n contrast to previous approaches& in this paper we propose a specific definition and model

of the Self I and one that transcends classical psychological conceptions of the Self. 6his

transcendence occurs by adopting a transdisciplinary psychological-phenomenological

approach which incorporates first-person perspectives from philosophical in0uiry +Genon&

2>= Jalle& !99& and combines these perspectives with a model-based approach that is

common in psychology and which forms the basis of psychometric modelling and empirical

investigation. Specifically& the model combines %ey psychological constructs such as self-

consciousness and self-concept& with %ey phenomenological entities such as the


3/28

a. #hilst the urgency for transdisciplinary investigations of the Self is

increasingly recognised +not least in the theme of the conference of which this paper forms

one part explicit and focussed transdisciplinary models of the self are curiously absent from

the broader psychological literature. ore typically& the Self as Self is ta%en for granted ininvestigations of the Self& without actually studying the Self per se& but rather studying how

the self operates in the world +e.g.& sordas& !99E. $n contrast& our study focuses on the Self

itself& including the Selfs fundamental structures and processes. 6hus& our study is a first-

order transdisciplinary study of the Self& rather than a second-order study of the Self where

the nature and structure of the Self are implied from its action in the world.

a. Hur transdisciplinary approach is deliberately designed to be transcontextual

i.e.& the psychophenomenological constructs in our modelling and discussion are not derived

from& or said to apply specifically to& any particular context. $n other words& we suggest that

our construction of the Self is universal. 6his claim needs to be tested. Aowever& the point

here is that we have not& unli%e psychophenomenological approaches typical in recentscholarship +e.g. von Lc%artsberg& !9"& attempted to design a study with specific contextual

generation and application.

a. Hur approach is centred on a model of the phenomena we describe and

analyse. odelling is not typically used in phenomenology& but is widely used in psychology.

Aowever& the particular type of model we propose is a descriptive-theoretical model I thus

also distinguishing our model from the analytical-statistical models commonly used in

empirical psychology.

a. #e explicitly use our descriptive-theoretical model not only to integrate the

discussion throughout our paper& but also to explicitly integrate the different but

complementary understandings and insights from psychology and phenomenology we

access. $n this way& our model is both integrated and integrating +as is our claim in the title of

the paper. 6hus our paper represents a model-based approach not only to the subMect under

investigation +the Self but also to our transdisciplinary methodology.

a. Hur descriptive-theoretical model& common to other models of its type& has

the additional functionality that it is& at once& a more abstract and a more concrete

representation of the phenomena under investigation than is possible to construct using

language alone. Jisual representations of reality 5get at8 reality in a different way to

language. Gotably& however& this feature of our model is particularly important in the study

of the Self. 5Nudge #illhelm +one of


4/28

!. #e recognise that reud first used a model of the Self +implicating the id& ego and

superego that was built& at least in part& on phenomenological +or 0uasi-phenomenological

investigations of dreams& memories& mental representations of relationships& etc. Aowever&

reuds model was essentially antagonistic& focussing on the ever present possibility of thedisintegration of the self as a result of the id being in more-or-less continuous conflict with

the superego mediated by a sometimes overwhelmed ego +Lvans& !9E. $n contrast& our

model focuses on the positive integration of various elements of the Self and the way these

elements wor% together to enhance the functioning of the $ as a stable& effective and unified

entity.

Structure of the Paper

$n this paper we discuss five %ey aspects of the psychophenomenological approach we have

ta%en to the Self. 6he first three of these points emerge as psychophenomenological

5constructs8 from ,llport1s 0uestions i.e.& +! the %nowing $= +2 the reflective Self= and +@ the

relational Self. 6he remaining two aspects utilise the foundations +or bases provided by the

first three aspects in: +E developing and describing a proposed model of the Self= and +C

delineating potential 4tests of the model from psychological and phenomenological

perspectives.

Section 1: The Model

Combining Psychology and Phenomenology

,lthough psychology has forged a well-earned place within the academy& its core-business

has been to obMectively explain and account for phenomena which are not separable fromsubMective human experience. 6hus& there is a central tension +some would say a fatal flaw

e.g.& Ausserl& !9> in psychology whereby psychology attempts to obMectively isolate certain

elements of subMective experience for the purposes of gaining greater understanding of both

the obMectified elements and the subMective experience itself. $n this paper we disagree with

criticisms suggesting that: +a there are no obMective elements implied in subMective

experience& and thus +b that attempts to obMectively isolate elements from subMective

experience are untenable. Aowever& we agree that obMective elements posited to be part of

subMective experience that are not consistent with& or not tested against& subMective

experience are 0uestionable. or these reasons& we propose a combined psychological-phenomenological perspective that allows for analytical investigation of subMective

experience& but tests the analysis against first-person phenomenological references to human

experience.

The Knowing I


5/28

Ohenomenology implicitly recognises the subMectivity and subMective ownership of human

experience& and see%s to describe this experience in and on its own terms. 6hus&

phenomenology recognises that the human Self 4owns its own experiences& and so the Self is

1expert1 in its own affairs. 6his epistemological foundation provides a logically consistent

basis for phenomenology. Oerhaps surprisingly& however& the 4expert nature of the Self alsoprovides a firm evidentiary basis for the 5Self-reports8 +in both clinical and research settings

commonly used is psychology. 6hus& psychology that focuses on the ordinary person1s

%nowing $ is a psychology drawing on a consistent epistemological foundation I namely the

epistemically privileged %nowledge of the $ about the Self.

Despite the epistemic authority of the $ in regards to the Self& a purely phenomenological

account of the Self remains at the level of description and& thus& leaves the Self largely outside

the reach of analysis and analytical conceptualisations that might drive a clearer

understanding of the actual nature& structure and operation of the Self within the human

person. Out another way& phenomenology +and related philosophical approaches fail to

transcend descriptions of entities and processes implicated in subMective experience.

Osychology& on the other hand& ta%es the Self-reports of the $ as evidence that can be analysed

to generate an understanding of the Self beyond the level of description. 6he test of these

analyses& however& is the extent to which they concord with description. 6hus& description is

not superseded by analyses& but neither is analysis limited to description +7iorgi& !9C.

$n the preceding sections we have identified limitations of both psychology and

phenomenology in analysing and describing the Self. Aowever& we suggest that the

limitations of both psychology and phenomenology are complementary i.e.& the descriptivelimitations of psychology and the analytical limitations of phenomenology are each

addressed by the strengths of other discipline. oreover& the common epistemological basis

of phenomenology and psychology +self-reports generated by the


6/28

hence& the activation of 0ualitatively different systems of cognition. #e return to this point

later in the paper.

The eflective !Knowable" Self

6he Self exhibits the reflective ability to +at least partially be seen by the $& thus allowing the

$ to generate Self-analytical intuitions concerning its Self. oreover& this reflective ability&

combined with the $s ability to report data provided by the Self& provides the empirical basis

of psychology and phenomenology. $n particular& the Self provides the $ with emotional and

motivational data that allows the $ to construct its personality and identity +or identities& see

Oembro%e& 22 i.e.& the Selfs reflective ability enables the $ to understand what type of $ it

is.

oreover& within this reflective framewor%& Self-exploration becomes a natural and

fundamental aspect of being i.e.& the


7/28

no valid inferences about the $ could be drawn from Self-examination. 6hus& the relational

nature of the Self to the $ provides the ontological +state-of-being basis for answering the

0uestion: 5#ho am $'8 6hus& when the $ as%s the 0uestion 5who am $8 it draws on subMective

data provided by the Self which is valid because the Self is in unitary relationship to the $. $n

other words& the identity +who-ness of the un%nown $ is disclosed to the $& because the%nowable Self is in an identity +or 4unitary relationship to the $.

Descartes as%ed the complementary 0uestion: ()ut what then am $'( with the answer (,

thing that thin%s. #hat is that' , thing that doubts& understands& affirms& denies& is willing&

is unwilling& and also imagines and has sensory perceptions( +Descartes& !99". Hur response

to Descartes is that the only way that a 4thing that thin%s can %now that it is a 4thin%ing thing

is if: +a the thing that thin%s is able to construct an obMective representation of itself +and

thus refer to itself as 5what8 rather than 5who8& and +b this obMective representation

corresponds to the 4reality of the thin%ing thing. $n fact& our model shows how the $

constructs an obMective cognitive representation of its Self and& in doing so& is able refer to

itself obMectively as 5what8. oreover& this obMective representation of the Self has validity for

ma%ing inferences about the $ because this representation is built on data supplied to the $ by

the Self which is in an identity relationship with the $. 6hus& the inseparable relationship of

the Self to the $ +and vice versa& provides the ontological basis for constructing an obMectified

+although not necessarily complete self-%nowledge& and thus provides the pathway for the $

to come to an indirect %nowledge of itself.

Descartes& therefore& missed +or perhaps Must obscured the critical insight in his famous

formulation: 5$ thin%& therefore $ am8. ore accurately he might have said: 5$ relate&therefore $ am8 or +more fully 5$ am in an inseparable relationship to my Self& therefore my

subMective experience of& and my obMective thoughts about& my Self have ontological validity

in determining 4that& 4whom and 4what $ am8.

#ases for Investigating the Self

6he above sections have indicated how the nature of the $-Self actively supports a

transdisciplinary psychological-phenomenological approach to the modelling Self.

Specifically& the conscious& reflexive& and unitary $-Self provides different bases for the study

of the Self I as indicated in 6able !.

6able !

)ases for a 6ransdisciplinary ,pproach to odelling the Self


8/28

$spect of Psychophenomenological $pproach #asis Provided


9/28

6he proposed model is comprised of some basic structures and implies a range of Self-related

processes. 6hese structures and processes are described in both psychological-analytical and

phenomenological-descriptive terms below.

#asic Structures of the Model

6he $ is synonymous with the whole-person +7allois& !99". 6he $ has the capacity for Self-

perception and Self-reflection. 6hese perceptive and reflective capacities are embedded in&

and constitute a +perhaps 4the %ey element of& consciousness. Aowever& the $ is aware of

+perceives and reflects on more than Must its Self +)andura& 2= . Aence&

why the 4consciousness circle is larger than the 4self-consciousness circle in the odel.

6he Self of which the person is consciously aware is the internal boundary or internal surface

of the $. $n other words& the Self is the $ perceived from inside the $ +


10/28

because $ cannot go outside of my-Self to observe the outer boundary or surface of myself $

can only infer what $ must loo% li%e to other $s. 6his inference is made on the basis of

cognitive& affective& and behavioural information supplied to the $& about the $& by other $s.

6his information is stored in memory& and processed in conMunction with information about

the Self gained from Self-reflection +Nac%endoff& !99E= #yer ; arlston& !99E. ,ny%nowledge of what $ loo% li%e to other $s +persons is& then& always gained indirectly from

other $s who observe +what $ call me and provide 5person-al8 feedbac% to me about me.

Similarly& other $s cannot see 5me8 directly I they can only infer what $ am 5really li%e8 on

the inside from information $ provide to them +verbally/non-verbally&

intentionally/unintentionally about 5me8 +Smith& oats ; #alling& !999.

6he $ perceives the Self through the $s capacity for Self-perception. Aowever& the $s

perception of its Self is imperfect and incomplete +7ur ; Sac%eim& !9>9= = Bapp& 2!. 6his limited Self-perception is represented in the model by self-

consciousness 5circle8 in igure ! being of smaller diameter than the 5Self8 circle.

$mportantly& these conscious Self-perceptions include cognitive +thought and affective

+feeling elements +Aiggins& !9>= )lechman& !99. oreover& 4conscious means that

certain Self-perceptions are available to consciousness I not that these perceptions are

always the focus of conscious attention. Gevertheless& under certain unhealthy psychological

conditions& perceptions of Self may become 4all-consuming i.e.& excluding all& most or many

other perceptions on an acute or chronic basis.

)ased on its imperfect and incomplete self-consciousness& the $ through consciousness

constructs a more-or-less organised and relatively stable set of mental representations of itsSelf. 6his mental representation is the $s +4my self-concept. 6he self-concept represents the

$s most accessible information about itself& and may be interpreted as the $s 5wor%ing8

mental representation of its Self. #hen a person describes themselves they most easily utilise

information about the Self stored schematically in the self-concept +Schell&


11/28

Some Processes Implied in the Model: elations to Phenomenological

%escriptions of Self in Plain &anguage

6he $ is an active agent and so the Self +which is Must the $-perceived-from-the-inside is also

active. Oart of the $s activity is the exercise of control over the Self +i.e.& over its Self through

consciousness. 6his is what is meant by Self-control. Aowever& the Self can also control the $

by over-riding conscious Self-control. 6his is what is meant by being 5out of control8 or

demonstrating a 5lac% of Self-control8. , central tension within the person is the extent to

which the $ through consciousness will control the Self I or vice versa +e.g.& Ayten& adden&

; ield& !99E.

6he $ receives information from its physical and social environments +,dolphs& !999= rith ;

rith& !999. Some of this information directly relates to the nature& characteristics and

capabilities of the $ +and& hence& indirectly of the Self. #hen this information is consciously

recognised as 5new8 information& the person is said to be 5discovering more of themselves8+e0uivalently& 5discovering more of their Self8. 6his Self-discovery expands or extends self-

consciousness and& hence& consciousness as a whole. 6he person may also discover more of

themselves +their Self through Self-reflection +onway ; Dewhurst& !99C= Drets%e& !999.

Self-reflection describes the process by which the person intentionally see%s to:

!. expand their self-consciousness from within +through some form of thought and/or

action I perhaps such as prayer or meditation that ma%es additional information about the

Self available to self-consciousness= and/or

2. see%s to better integrate& organise or reorganise information about the Self so that

Self-schemas become more complex and 5information-rich8 I and presumably more

representative of the 4actual Self.

Got all stored Self-related information is retained or integrated into the self-concept.

oreover& integration of Self-%nowledge into the self-concept does not guarantee that Self-

%nowledge will be retained over the life-span of the person +


12/28

information +new or old about the Self into the self-concept for precisely the same reasons.

$n this case& the self-concept may be under-developed and& if so& will be less useful and

functional in integrating and directing the Self. #hatever the potential reluctance of the

person to retain and assimilate information about the Self& the extent to which self-

consciousness and self-concept matches the actual Self is one measure of mental health.Oersons with robust mental health 5%now themselves8 and have strong 5sense of Self8. $n

contrast& persons with poor mental health typically report having a poor self-concept and/or

a wea% or fragmented sense of Self. Ohrases such as 5$ dont %now who $ am anymore8 reflect

an incomplete and/or poorly organised self-concept. oreover& the self-concept I whether

an accurate representation of the 4current Self or not acts as organising force for personal

behaviour and action. 6hus& a person is more li%ely to act in ways that are congruent rather

than incongruent with their self-concept I with negative or positive psychological and other

conse0uences depending on the congruence between self-concept and the actual Self.

onversely& uncontrolled by consciousness& the Self will act according to its own volition i.e.&

as its own agent +)andura& 2!. $n such cases the Self may act in congruence with the

persons Self-%nowledge and self-concept I in which case the psychological harmony of the

person is maintained. ,lternatively& the Self may act in ways that are incongruous with the

self-concept. $n such cases psychological disharmony results until the self-concept is

rearranged to better reflect the actual Self I or vice versa.

6he extent to which a persons consciousness of Self represents their actual Self is also a

measure of the persons ability to exercise Self-control& Self-direction and Self-regulation

+ele& !99>. Oersons with limited and/or inade0uately organised self-concepts typically find

it difficult to define values& goals and purposes that direct the Self in productive andorganised ways. Such individuals may describe themselves as being 5all over the place8

5feeling lost8& 5not %nowing which way to turn8& 5living from day to day8& etc. Oersons with

poor Self-%nowledge and hence poor Self-control& direction and regulation may be described

by others as being 5impulsive8& 5erratic8& or 5directionless8. )ecause Self-%nowledge +the sum

total of information about the Self contained in self-consciousness is intuitively understood

by the person to be critical to a sense of person-al wellbeing& the individual with poor Self-

%nowledge will often be preoccupied with developing their Self-%nowledge. #hen this is the

case& the person may be described by others as being 5Self-centred8 - although the persons

real problem is that the Self is not centred enough i.e.& the persons self-concept is soinade0uate that it is failing to provide the individual with a sense-of-Self that is sufficiently

defined and internalised +4centred to sustain healthy psychological functioning.

Shifts of Consciousness

6he function of consciousness in the model of Self is critical& and implies some important

additional processes to those described above.


13/28

6he 5default8 mode of consciousness is for the $ to be focussed on the external world:

!. acting more-or-less automatically I yet at the same time purposefully - in accordance

with stored procedural and episodic memories& and

2. reacting according to incoming 4data from the external world +experienced through

sensation& and according to internal data generated from somatic sensations& emotions& andongoing cognition.

6his mode of consciousness will continue until data from the external world enters

consciousness in such a way as to trigger a shift from externally oriented perception to

internally oriented perception - such that the $ is now focussed internally on the Self rather

than externally on the world. 6his data reaches the $ through normal attentiveness to the

external environment& but the 0uality or 0uantity of the data triggers a shift to the internal

mode of perception because the external element or event is recognised by the $ as either:

!. unrecognised +4new data that needs to be consciously processed in some way&

and/or

2. recognised +4old data that triggers a stored memory that needs to be consciously

processed in some way.

QG): , shift to internal perception may also be triggered by internal somatic sensations such

as hunger& or very familiar external settings and situations that re0uire so little conscious

external attention that the $ drifts +as much as shifts to internal perception. SubMectively& this

latter shift may be described as 5daydreaming8. $n the following section& however& we are

concerned with more radical shifts of perception as these shifts hold greater implications for

the Self - as will be examined below.R

$n either case& the incoming data is instantly& and often automatically& processed in

conMunction with information available from procedural and episodic memory. Hn the basis

of this cognitive processing the following general pattern occurs.

irst& processing provo%es an initial +sometimes very strong emotional response from the

Self. QG): $mplicit here is that the Self is the source of emotion within the $& and that

emotions are generated in response to +often automatic cognitive processes within

consciousness.R 6he $ responds to this emotional response by shifting perception to the Self.

6he $ will also attend to physiological reactions that arise in association with emotions

generated by the Self. 6hese physiological reactions may& in turn& directly give rise to further

emotions& or indirectly give rise to further emotions by stimulating cognitive processes that&

in turn& stimulate 4downstream emotional reactions. $n this way a cycle of physiological&

emotional& and cognitive responses may form which can act to maintain& escalate or

eventually decrease the emotionally aroused state of the $.

#hilst the primary attention of the $ is on the Self& the $ may rapidly shift its attention bac%

to the external world depending on the nature of further incoming data. ,lternatively& the $


14/28

may become so focussed in its Self that the $s attention to the external world is largely

terminated. $nternally focused attention +of varying degrees may last from seconds to

months and perhaps even years. $n some extreme cases& emotional destabilisation within the

Self may be so great that it becomes a more or less permanent feature of the $ +e.g.& in post

traumatic stress disorder through to full-blown mental-brea%down or insanity.

$n less extreme circumstances to those described immediately above& the $s assessment of

the Selfs emotions can& broadly& be dealt with by the $ in one of two ways: assimilation or

accommodation. Knder conditions of assimilation& the $ is able to reconcile the incoming

data with the Selfs emotional reactions to the conscious processing of that data in a way that

does not fundamentally alter the $s self-consciousness or self-concept. Knder these

conditions& the $s self-consciousness and self-concept are sufficiently congruent with the

Selfs emotional reactions that no substantial change in self-consciousness or self-concept is

re0uired in order to maintain a sense of psychological e0uilibrium within the Self.

Knder conditions re0uiring accommodation the incoming information& and the emotional

reactions of the Self resultant from cognitive processing of this information& provo%es the $ to

fundamentally alter its perception of itself. Knder these conditions& the incongruity of the

self-consciousness and self-concept with the Selfs emotional reactions is so great as to cause

ongoing psychological dise0uilibrium until the $s perceptions of its Self are changed to better

match emotions emanating from the Self. $n other words& the $ reorganises its self-

consciousness and self-concept in order to reach e0uilibrium with its Self.

6he pattern above implies that the $ see%s e0uilibrium between its concept of its Self and

data provided to the $ by the Self. #hen there is a large perceived discrepancy between the

perceived Self and self-concept& internal psychological tension arises which the $ see%s to

resolve. 6his resolution may occur by the $:

!. Deciding that the emotional data received from the Self was disproportionate to the

original external data. Ohenomenologically this situation can be described as an 5over-

reaction8 by the Self.

2. Deciding that the Selfs emotional reaction was not disproportionate but represents

important +non-ignorable data from the Self that implies some aspect of the Self not

previously part of self-consciousness not integrated into self-concept. Ohenomenologically&

this situation may be described by the $ as the $ 5learning something about its Self8 I

e0uivalently 5learning something about my Self8.

Hnce new data from the Self is located in self-consciousness it is available to be integrated

into self-concept. $mportantly& the association of this new Self-data with the recent memory

in consciousness of the Selfs emotional response may mean that the new Self-data is more

li%ely to be integrated into the self-concept +if for no other reason than the $s desire to avoid

future emotional trauma if possible. ,lternatively& the psychological pain involved in


15/28

integrating new data about the Self into the self-concept +which may involve the explicit

recognition by the $ of some unpleasant realities about its Self - and hence the $ itself may

cause the $ to postpone integration of new Self data into the self-concept& including attempts

to forget or indefinitely ignore the data itself. $n such cases& psychological dise0uilibrium

may persist with a variety of negative +and sometimes serious psychological conse0uencespossible.

evisiting the Self'Concept

)ased on the analysis above& we can revisit the self-concept and somewhat redefine this

concept as the $s cognitive representation of itself I not strictly spea%ing the $s

representation of its Self.

Specifically& the $ cannot %now itself in the external world because the $ cannot venture

outside its Self to view itself. 6hus& the $ cannot ma%e itself directly the obMect of its ownattentions. Aowever& the $ can indirectly ma%e itself the obMect of its own attentions by:

!. constructing an obMective cognitive representation +a mental prototype of itself

called the self-concept&

2. deriving from this concept what it +the $ might loo% li%e to the external world& and

@. continuing to assess the validity of its self-concept through intersubMective en0uiry.

6hus& the self-concept is really the $-concept I but is perhaps not totally misnamed because

the $-concept is inevitably built upon data provided to the $ by the Self in response to the $s

cognitive processing of external data. 6hus& the Self provides the raw material from which the

$ constructs its $-concept and& in this sense& the $-concept is at least co-authored by the Self.

Lmphasising the critical nature of this co-authorship& if the $ for whatever reason 4loses

touch with the Self +under conditions of self-alienation& then the ongoing development of

the self-concept is threatened. Knder these conditions& phenomenologically& the person may

say: 5$ dont %now who $ am anymore8. ,nalytically& the $s $/self-concept has become

indistinct because the ability of the $ to sense the Self through consciousness has been

interrupted or impaired in some way.

$ Second Shift in Consciousness

$mportantly& the $s attention to itself as obMect represents another important shift in

consciousness +the first being the shift from an external to an internal orientation in

consciousness. #hen the $ is sensing its reflective Self it is relating subMectively to its Self

because the Self is providing the $ +through consciousness with direct subMective +emotional&

motivational& 5feeling8 information in response to external information processed

cognitively by the $. Aowever& as indicated previously& implicit in the emotional and

motivational reactions of the Self is data about the Self itself - what was called above 5Self-


16/28

data8 as distinct from the raw +explicit emotional data from which Self-data is extracted. 6he

$ extracts this data about the Self and uses it in constructing its self-concept. ritically& in

doing so& the $ shifts from subMectively experiencing the Selfs incoming reactions& to

obMectively decoding and manipulating embedded information about the Self in order to

construct its obMective representation of itself. 6his obMective representation of the $ then becomes the $s $nternal #or%ing odel +$# of who and what it is.

Hn the basis of this obMective representation of itself& the $ is able to answer the 0uestion:

5#ho and what am $'8. oreover& revisiting the 5


17/28

6he discussion above has highlighted two important shifts in consciousness +external to

internal and subMective to obMective. 6hese shifts in consciousness represent four distinct

states of consciousness as outlined in 6able @.

6able @

States of onsciousness

Lxternal $nternal

HbMective onscious $ attending to the external world onscious $ attending to the self-concept

SubMective onscious $ surmising the nature of the $

based on its obMective representation of the $.

onscious $ attending to the Self

6able @ indicates that four distinct states of consciousness can be derived from the shifts in

consciousness identified.

The (ull Model

Hn the basis of the preceding discussion& our odel of the Self can be amplified to include

some critical additional processes.


18/28

Section ): Testing the Model

6esting a model of the self is& by its nature a difficult proposition. #e suggest& however& that

three tests of the model may be appropriate:

a. 6he model should be consistent with plain language +phenomenological

accounts of the Self communicated through Self-referential language. 6his test is not Must an


19/28

anecdotal test& but an authentic first-person phenomenological test because of the $s

epistemic privilege in describing and referring to the Self.

a. 6he model should also be consistent with psychological/scientific language

about the Self. 6his test is critical because the odel utilises Self-related psychologicalconstructs and variables and should do so in a way that is congruent with the way these

constructs and variables have been developed in the psychology literature. Hne way of

demonstrating this congruence is to show that odel-derived definitions of %ey psychological

constructs and variables are consistent with corresponding definitions extant in the

literature.

!. 6he odel should broadly comply with the 0ualities and characteristics of a 5good8

social scientific model. ,ny particular selection of these 0ualities and characteristics will be

necessarily subMective. Aowever& various 0ualities and characteristics can provide some %ey

criteria by which to evaluate the relative worth of models.

The Plain &anguage Test

#ith respect to the first Ooint above& we have already indicated how our odel is consistent

with various self-referential statements drawn from plain language. urther testing of this

sort could be usefully carried out in further examinations of the congruence between the

odel and various examples of self-referential language. Aowever& at this stage& we do not

foresee any particular self-referential statements that would be particularly problematic to

deal with in terms of the model. Gevertheless& as an additional plain language test of

theodel and its ability to accommodate and clarify language used in referring to the $-Self&

we revisit ,llports 0uote that began this paper - deconstructing this 0uote in light of ourodel in a way that clarifies ,llports meaning and demonstrates how the odel may be

applied in psychological and phenomenological discourse.

,llport: #ho is the $ that %nows the bodily me&

Comment# $he %no&s 'me( only partially and 'me( implies 'all of me( not )ust my body*

...who has an image of myself and a sense of identity over time&

+ho has constructed an ob)ective ,self-concept from &hich my sub)ective understanding

of myself in the &orld may be derived*

...who %nows that $ have propriate strivings'(

+ho %no&s the "elf as supplying emotional motivational and volitional 'data(*

$ %now all these things& and what is more& $ %now that $ %now them.

%no& 'these things( because the fundamental capacity of the is its %no&ingness* %no&


20/28

that %no& 'these things( through the dual functioning of consciousness and the reflective

ability of the "elf to respond emotionally to self-%no&ledge held in consciousness*

)ut who is it who has this perspectival grasp' *

t is the . but only indirectly %no&n through reflection on the ob)ectified ,self-concept*

$t is much easier to feel the Self than to define the Self

t is much easier to feel the "elf than to define either the "elf or the * /evertheless e0plicit

emotional data emanating from the "elf contains implicit data about the "elf from &hich

the can construct indirect 'definitions( of both the and the "elf*

The Scientific &anguage Test

#ith respect to scientific/psychological language& 6able E indicates how important several

important Self-related constructs derived from psychology are consistent with& and may be

defined in terms of& the proposed odel.

6able E

odel-)ased Definitions of the Self-Belated onstructs

Construct *+tant %efinitions Model #ased %efinition

tualiation 6he full realiation of ones potential. Bealising the potential of the Self by maximis

consciousness and constructing a self-concep

congruent with the actual Self.

wareness onscious %nowledge of ones own character& feelings&

motives and desires


21/28

ntrol 6he exertion of one1s own will on personal self -

including the wilful direction of behaviours and

thought processes.

6he exercised ability of the $ in directing the

the Self -especially when the Self wills differe

the $.

eterminism ,ctions of the self to the extent that these are actions

directed by the self.

6he ability of the $ to cause and direct action

Self.

ficacy , person1s belief concerning

their ability and capacity to accomplish tas%s and

respond to challenging situations.

,n aspect of the self-concept that containing

internalised beliefs about the ability of the Se

effectively in particular situations and with re

particular tas%s.

teem 6he extent to which a person li%es& accepts& and

respects themselves as a person.

Oositive evaluations of the Self by the $ based

conscious %nowledge of the Self.

gulation Self-monitoring& self-evaluation& and self-

reinforcement I especially as these are deployed in the

pursuit of particular personal goals.

6he $s ongoing monitoring and evaluation of

which may result in self-control or other self

processes by the $.

l% 6he persons automatic internal dialogue deployed

when influencing the persons actions& thoughts and

feelings.

6he $s use of internally directed language an

to elicit certain actions and/or reactions from

derived from http://allpsych.com/dictionary and related sources

6able E indicates that important Self-related constructs can be defined in terms of the model.

oreover& these definitions are consistent with extant definitions from the literature. ,gain&

more detailed testing of the model is re0uired in this area I particularly with respect to a

more thoroughgoing analysis of %ey constructs and their congruence with the proposed

odel. Aowever& we thin% that the congruence of the sample of definitions above provides

evidence that the odel is congruent with some existing psychological constructs and& as

such& may be congruent with others.

The ,-ood. Model Test

6he representational status of models in philosophy and science is hotly debated +e.g.& )ailer-

Nones& 2@= Da osta ; rench& 2@= rigg& 2"= organ ; orrison& !999. Aowever&

there is some consensus that 5good8 models fulfil several %ey criteria. ,mongst the most

important of these criteria& and the extent to which the current odel addresses these

criteria& are those outlined below.

http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/person.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/person.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ability.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ability.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/capacity.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/capacity.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/capacity.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_talkhttp://allpsych.com/dictionaryhttp://allpsych.com/dictionaryhttp://allpsych.com/dictionaryhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/person.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ability.htmlhttp://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/capacity.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_talkhttp://allpsych.com/dictionary


22/28

a. Salience: Go model can represent everything. Aence& any model should

selectively represent only those elements that are most relevant.

$he present model is limited to five %ey elements 1 "elf consciousness self-consciousness

and self-concept2*

a. Oarsimony: 6he model should be as simple as possible& without being

simplistic.

$he present model is simple in the sense that it involves relatively fe& variables but is

arranged in such a &ay that several %ey relationships bet&een variables are identified .

thus not over-simplifying the representation of the "elf and its related processes*

a. $nsightfulness: 6he model should concisely capture the relevant dimensions

of the problem in a way that facilitates creative and original insight.

$he present model originally and creatively addresses %ey dimensions of the "elf 'problem(

- particularly including the relationship bet&een the and the "elf and ho& this

relationship mediated by various states of consciousness defines the "elf-system as aunified &hole &ith distinct but clearly interrelated parts*

a. oherence: odels do not exist in isolation but within interloc%ing systems.

6hus& any particular model should be coherent with other related models.

$he present model dra&s on constructs from e0isting theoretical frame&or%s but

demonstrates in a more integrated fashion than previously ho& these is constructs are

operationally and ontologically related to each other . thus enhancing the coherence of our

current %no&ledge of the "elf*

a. $ntelligibility: 6he model must be intelligible and& in doing so& should build

on previous %nowledge.

$he present model uses language structures and processes familiar not only to researchers

and theoreticians in many fields but also to the 'common man(* $hus the model should be

easily understood in a variety of scholarly and everyday conte0ts enhancing the potential

of the model to contribute to previous %no&ledge*

a. Oredictive apacity: 6he model should predict future events= or at least

provide insight into future possibilities.

$he present model can be used to predict future events given certain initial states* 3or

e0ample if the self-concept is represented as a small circle 1thus indicating an

underdeveloped and potentially unstable self-concept2 then predications about the overall

functioning and psychological stability of the may be made*

!. alsifiability: rom a scientific perspective a %ey test of any model is the extentto

which it can be falsified. $n one sense all models are falsified by definition i.e.& all models

represent incomplete abstractions of reality +Da osta ; rench& 2@. 6he test& then& of any


23/28

model is not whether the model is right or wrong but how wrong the model is. $n the present

case& the model could be falsified by demonstrating that:

a. the models theoretical categories are vaguely defined or arbitrarily chosen=

b. the model fails to account for one or more plain language statements used

phenomenologically to describe Self-understandings=

c. the model fails to accurately account for& in terms of the model itself& one or

more psychological concepts related to the Self=

d. one or more existent theories +drawn from any discipline relating to Self are

incompatible with the model and/or inexplicable in terms of the model=

e. the model fails to provide any additional insight or integration to definitions

of Self and Self-related structures and processes.

$he present model in contrast to the statements above represents a theory-driven account

of "elf that is congruent &ith corresponds to complements and e0tends e0istent plain

language and scientific accounts of the "elf in an insightful integrated and thoughtfully

structured manner*

or the reason above& we suggest that the odel may be accepted a 5good8 model of the Selfand& as such& may be used in a variety of contexts and across +at least two disciplines to

systematically& parsimoniously and insightfully describe and analyse the Self.

Conclusion

Developing an understanding of the $-Self that 5holds water8 is an exceedingly difficult tas%.

Aowever& in this paper we have utilised a transdisciplinary& model based approach to the Self

as a way of addressing ,llports most provocative 0uestions about the Self. $n doing so& we

have clearly explicated the model& shown how the model is consistent with existing

phenomenological and psychological accounts of the $-Self& and also shown how the model

arranges and explains %ey self-related constructs and processes in order to develop an

integrated and integrating understanding of the $-Self that may be utilised in the fragmented

field of psychology and& hopefully& in other disciplines as well.

Acknowledgments

+e gratefully ac%no&ledge the invaluable contributions of Dr* Maureen Miner and Dr*

Marie-$herese Proctor in the preparation of this paper* $his paper &as )ointly sponsored

by the !ustralasian Centre for "tudies in "pirituality and the !ustralian College of Ministries*


24/28

eferences

,dolphs& B. +!999. "ocial cognition and the human brain. $rends in Cognitive "ciences

4+!2& E"9-E>9.

,llport& 7.#. +!9"!. Pattern and gro&th in personality. Gew Tor%: Aolt& Binehart& ;

#inston.

)abey& S.A.& Pueller& S.& ; E.

)lechman& L.,. +!99. Moods affect and emotions. ?awrence Lrlbaum ,ssociates:

Aillsdale& GN

sordas& 6. +!99E. $he sacred self# ! cultural phenomenology of charismatichealing*)er%ely: Kniversity of alifornia Oress.

onway& .& ; Dewhurst& S. +!99C. 6he self and recollective experiences. !pplied Cognitive

Psychology ;& !-9.

rai%& .$..& oro& 6..& oscovitch& .& Stuss& D.6.& #inocur& 7.& 6ulving& L. ;


25/28

Drets%e& . +!999. 46he mind1s awareness of itself& Philosophical "tudies 9C: !@-2E.

Lvans& .S. +!9E. 6he concept of the self as the %ey to integration. Journal of psychology

and Christianity 4192& E-!!.

auteux& -

C@.

rith& .D.& ; rith& K. +!999. $nteracting minds: , biological basis. "cience 9=6& !"92-!"9C.

7allagher& S. +2. Ohilosophical conceptions of the Self: $mplications for cognitive

science. $rends in Cognitive "ciences >+!& !E-2!.

7allagher& S.& ; Shear& N. +Lds.& +!999. Models of the self . ?ondon: $mprint ,cademic.

7allois& ,. +!99". $he mind &ithin the &orld &ithout . ambridge: ambridge Kniversity

Oress.

7iorgi& ,. +Ld. +!9C. Phenomenology and psychological research* Oittsburg: Du0uesne

Oress.

7ur& B..& ; Sac%eim& A.,. +!9>9. Self-deception: , concept in search of a

phenomenon. Journal of Personality < "ocial Psychology 4: +2& !E>-!"9.

Aall& 6.#. +2E. hristian spirituality and mental health: , relational spirituality paradigm

for empirical research.( Journal of Psychology and Christianity 94& ""-!.

Aall& 6.#. +2>. Osychoanalysis& attachment& and spirituality: Oart $$: 6he spiritual stories

we live by. Journal of Psychology and $heology 48 & 29-E2.

Aiggins& L.6. +!9>. Self-discrepancy: , theory relating self and affect. Psychological

Revie&& in press.

Ausserl& L. +!9>. $he crisis of European sciences and transcendental

phenomenology*6rans. David arr& Lvanston: Gorthwestern Kniversity Oress.

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Freud/Psycho/http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Freud/Psycho/http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Freud/Psycho/


26/28

Ayten& .& adden& 7.N.& ; ield& D.O. +!99E. Lxchange delays and impulsive choice in adult

humans. Journal of the E0perimental !nalysis of ?ehavior 69 22C-2@@

Nac%endoff& B.S. +!99E. Social organiation. $n B.S. Nac%endoff +Ld.& Patterns in the mind#

@anguage and human nature +pp. 2E-222. Gew Tor%: )asic )oo%s.


27/28

ele& ,.& +!99>. Beal Self-deception& ?ehavioral and ?rain "ciences 2: 9!-!@".

organ& .& ; orrison& . +!999. Models as mediators# Perspectives on natural and

social science. ambridge: ambridge Kniversity Oress.

Gystedt& ?.& Smari& N.& ; )oman& . +!99!. Self-schemata: ,mbiguous operationaliations of

an important concept. European Journal of Personality 8 & !-!E.

Oembro%e& G. +22. Moving to&ards spiritual maturity# Psychological competitive and

moral challenges in Christian living* Gew Tor%: Aaworth Oastoral Oress.

Bapp& ). +2!. $he handboo% of cognitive neuropsychology # +hat deficits reveal about

the human mind . Ohiladelphia: Osychology Oress.

Beisner& ,. +2C. 6he common factors& empirically validated treatments& and recovery

models of therapeutic change. $he Psychological Record 88142 @>>-E.

Schell& 6.?.& -!>@.

Schut& ,. +!9>@. Collected papers # $he problem of social reality* . Gatanson +Ld.. 6he

Aague: artinus GiMhoff

Sherman& N.#.& ; 2-9@.

Smith& L.B.& oats& S.& ; #alling& D. +!999. Hverlapping mental representations of self& in-

group& and partner: urther response time evidence and a connectionist model. Personality

< "ocial Psychology ?ulletin 98 & >@-2.

Symons& .S.& ; Nohnson& ). 6. +!99>. 6he Self-reference effect in memory: , meta-

analysis. Psychological ?ulletin 595& @>!-@9E.

6aylor& . +2. Journeys to selfhood# egel and Kier%egaard . Gew Tor%: ordham

Kniversity Oress.

Jalle& B. +Ld. +!99. Phenomenological inFuiry in psychology# E0istential and

transpersonal dimensions. Gew Tor%: Olenum Oress.

von Lc%artsberg& B. +!9". @ife-+orld E0perience# e0istential-phenomenological research

approaches in psychology. #ashington D: enter for ,dvanced Besearch in

Ohenomenology ; Kniversity Oress of ,merica.


28/28

#yer& B.S.& Nr.& ; arlston& D.L. +!99E. 6he cognitive representation of persons and events.

$n B.S. #yer& ; 6.

Devenish, Towards an Integrated and Integrating Model of the Self

Documents

Transcript of Devenish, Towards an Integrated and Integrating Model of the Self