PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Vol. 8, 47-59 (1988)

Development administration in the context of world economic recession: some ideas on service provision

in Southern Sudan

DONALD CURTIS

University of Birmingham

SUMMARY

This papers brings together several strains of thought around an outline suggestion for reform of education administration and finance in the Southern Sudan. Administration has to be seen in terms of incentives and disincentives to action. The administration of the Southern Sudan constitutes the largest part of the elite of that part of the country and consumes most public funds as salaries. In political interactions with sections of the public there is a more pressing need to respond to the demands of educated youth for salaries than to make adequate provision for non-salary expenses of services to the public. But the system is not in a stable state and the full contradictions of the situation, for politicians, bureaucrats and public, are revealed by the financial restrictions enforced as a result of national debt and international recession. Politically leaders in government service and disaffected leaders in military opposition in the bush both continue to demand a fairer distribution of central resources. But the possibility of generating, at the grass-roots, both the resources necessary for non-salary costs and the necessary influence to demand services, is something which could be further explored in the interests of all parties. This is a potential new direction for reform in development administration.

ADMINISTRATIVE INCENTIVES

Administration takes place in a political context. This context may be expected to constrain and influence the operations of the public sector in many ways, but also provides opportunities which need to be explored. Such seems to be the general finding of a number of recent writers (Grindle, 1980) who, prompted by developments within the wider field of organization theory, have brought the attention of development administration theorists back full circle to the concerns of Riggs (1964) and some others of the Comparative Administration Group. Now the obvious fact that national or regional or even local government units work in a political context, and are inter-penetrated with it, is once again recognized. An influential working document from the World Bank by Heaver (1982) takes up

Dr Curtis is a member of the Development Administration Group at the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, PO Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT, England.

0271-2075/88/010047-13$06.50 0 1988 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

48 D. Curtis

this theme, discussing the incentives and disincentives which bear upon adminis- trators as a result of unofficial as well as official priorities within and around the politics of administration. The significance of this document lies in its discussion of the practical possibilities of influencing incentives which, it is argued, should be on the agenda of those who design schemes and projects in the Third World.

Heaver notes that there is often very little incentive for either administrators or politicians to create schemes which bring resources to the rural poor. One could add that there are plenty of examples of administrative agencies which seem to have little concern with output at all. While there is plenty of scope for playing politics within the political and administrative apparatus, when it comes to representing the interests of the poor there is a ‘coalition of indifference’ (Heaver, 1982, p. 18). Yet, Heaver argues, by influencing incentives, presumably from the stance of an international agency such as the World Bank, it is possible to change the orientation of an administration towards rural producers. Amongst other cases, he cites the Training and Visit system (T&V), which has been fostered by the World Bank in India and elsewhere, as a successful example of administration built up around a carefully constructed system of rewards and incentives. For governments to adopt such a scheme, the primary inducement is of course the conditional offer of financial resources by an outside agency. As such it offers no solution to the problem of the vast majority of poorly motivated administrations where no such external (and expensive) levers can be expected.

Another generalized solution to the problem of administration that is currently being promoted by international agencies is that of privatization. One argument for privatization can be expressed in terms of incentives. A break-up of bureaucratic structures and exposure to market forces would at least have the virtue of relating organizational output to returns, and relating needs to provisions; that is, in so far as those in need of a service are able to express a financial demand for it. No claim is made by the advocates of privatization that equity will necessarily result, but it is pointed out that any resulting growth may make many more people better off than they would be under an administrative system that purports to be equitable but fails to deliver the goods. However, it is often the apparently inequitable nature of the market that makes privatization politically unacceptable to Third World governments. Privatization as a solution also requires some ‘deus ex mach- ina’ to carry out the break-up of bureaucracy, since bureaucracies in Third World countries are very powerful interest groups and may not be expected to wither away without protest. It is possible that some aid agencies may play God and, by exercising conditionality, cajole governments into some moves towards debureau- cratization. But again, it should not be expected that aid can be so central to the politics of the Third World that this is a general solution to the problems of poor performance of bureaucracies.

So where should one look for an interpretation of Third World bureaucracies and political systems that both interprets relevant social forces and identifies points of change or agents of intervention that could lead to better services for the rural poor?

Riggs, in tune with the modernization notions of his time, saw possibilities in the gradual differentiation of national elites into more distinct political and administrative interest groups working through more clearly divided and counter-

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balancing structures. This was seen as a process which would occur naturally, but which could be helped along by outside bodies such as aid agencies.

More recently, a number of writers in the political economy tradition have argued that the state, whatever its formal structures, is likely to represent the interests of the ruling class (Alavi, 1972, 1982). This reasserts the simple ‘coalition of indifference’ thesis. In this view, change can only come about when new social forces are generated at the bottom of the economy which are powerful enough to demand change. To some this must await revolutionary conditions. Others see scope for participation through a variety of forms of social organization (see, for example, Cohen and Uphoff, 1979).

The present paper argues that the coalition of indifference is not a stable state, but the result of a balance of social forces which is in a constant state of movement. At a time of recession, even members of the elite are aware that formal or informal formulae for the control and dispersal of resources through government that have been arrived at in time of expansion are no longer likely to satisfy even those who have hitherto managed to attain a share. New formulae are needed to contain or reorientate the frustrations and contradictions that result from diminish- ing real public sector resources. In this situation the direction of change can be influenced as much by ideas-which are free-floating-as by other forms of reality. This paper attempts no more than to be a small contribution at the level of ideas. It has been written in response to the very real problems which are being faced in many debt-burdened Third World countries. It stems from administrative analysis and training visits to the southern parts of the Republic of Sudan in 1984. (These visits were part of a management training programme financed by the Overseas Development Administration, London. The views expressed here are those of the author.) Other papers written for the programme consider in more detail the practical, financial and other administrative problems of government in the south of the country (e.g. Pickering and Davies, 1985).

The suspicion that the interests of a ruling class or elite underpin the apparatus of the state and the policies of governments, and lead to a coalition of indifference, can be refined and also qualified. The qualifications and refinements indicate in what directions there may be strategic opportunities for those who would further social goals such as the promotion of welfare or productive opportunities amongst the urban or rural poor. As background to this paper one may note:

(1) Interests of dominant sectors of the population, as politically expressed, are often several and sometimes contradictory.

(2) In looking after the interests of key sectors of the population rulers may still have to take into account the interests of other sectors in order to widen the base of political support or to balance interests that would otherwise be too powerful. They may find that they can win external friends or resources by doing so.

(3) Finally, interests are always open to alternative interpretations. Dominant sectors of the population do not always, or even often, subscribe to an interpretation of their interests which will ensure that they benefit in the long term, or even the short or medium term.

50 D. Curtis

This last point may need illustration. Political elites take decisions about invest- ments and pay-offs and seldom do so intending their own disadvantage. These investments and expenditure patterns need be informed by some long-term view of what the consequences will be. Many investments do not produce increased benefits even to those who make them. Awareness of this fact leads concerned politicians to take decisions which, while in no sense being against the interests of the predominant social forces, nevertheless constrain them. For instance in Tanzania and in several other countries, from time to time the incomes of govern- ment officials are deliberately held in check so that more public expenditure can go directly to productive investment. This will benefit the wider economy. But it is only against the interests of the administrative class in a very narrow interpret- ation of that interest. For the class itself may grow to employ their sons and daughters if the current employees exercise restraint.

It is in the possibility of alternative interpretations of interests that hope for administrative or political development lies.

SUDAN AND THE SOUTHERN REGION

There are two related questions about the nature of the political process in the Southern Sudan which need to be addressed if one is to see what scope there is for change. The first concerns the interests of the ruling elite and centres around the issues of whether this elite is unified in its interests, or divided. The second is whether, perhaps in consequence of division, elements of the elite are dependent upon support from sections within the masses. The argument is that division amongst the elite, leading to ‘plural’ sources of potential leadership, is a good thing in that it requires different sections of the masses in return. A unified elite, on the other hand, may look after itself with impunity and the interests of the masses may be quite neglected.

In the South education is probably the key to membership of the elite. Alterna- tive routes to wealth and influence are few. In the Northern part of the Sudan there is a powerful merchant class controlling trade and, to the extent which it exists, the manufacturing of modern goods. This provides its own means of attaining influence within society through accumulation of wealth and social stand- ing. In the South representatives of this class are but a relatively poor branch of the community from the North. In the North, merchants play a prominent part in many local and central government councils. In the South, since the last Civil War their role has been peripheral. Very often in the North a merchant will be chairman of the council but in the South merchants may find some minor role, perhaps, under Numiere, through membership of the Sudan Socialist Union in which they represented the ‘National Capitalist’ interest, but they have not been a dominant element within the political process. In short the merchants of the South, mostly Arabic-speaking Muslims, have had limited opportunity or incli- nation to convert wealth and commercial position into political leadership. The merchant interest has been less able to assert itself over other elite sectoral interests within the South. In the North it is a dominant interest.

Professionals in the South have, for the most part, worked for government. They share the status of civil servants with general administrators. They are small

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in number, often the school fellows of administrators with small differences in subsequent training or career paths. So by background and position they share with the administrators concerns about pay and conditions of service, schooling for their families and living conditions in the towns.

This leaves the politicians. Here again we find that many of the politicians are by background professional or administrative persons. The 1972-1985 constitution allowed people in public office to stand for election to political positions, only requiring them to resign if successful. Upon retirement from politics such a person is often received back into the public sector employ. There is no pool of educated persons from which the political leadership could otherwise be drawn.

From this we can conclude that in terms of social background the Southern elite have been very much one group; their life situations share many features. In terms of the above argument it is likely that their collective need for support from below is minimal. Periodic elections have been held, but the choice which the electorate face is limited both by the educational backgrounds required of the candidate-literacy, ability to speak in English or Arabic-and by the fact that the one legitimate party under Numiere, the Sudan Socialist Union, provided an organizational forum within which that part of the ruling elite which was currently playing the political game shared out the political roles.

As a group the political elite may be strong simply because they are not replaceable by any clear alternative group. As individuals they may be vulnerable, particularly in exposed political roles but also in top administrative roles. This vulnerability, however, is in the face of their peers within the South or superiors at the national level, rather than the public as such. It is in conflict with their peers over offices that differences of tribe and religion come to the fore. It has to do with resentments over the allocation of resources which these top positions carry, or the power which they may generate over the centre. Top positions change hands frequently. In the former Southern region there were said to have been over a hundred and sixteen ministerial changes over a period of 10 years up to 1983.

The Southern elite have been divided in their response to the North. While some remained in government or the army others have returned to armed struggle in the bush. This division, while unhappy for all concerned, may be less fundamen- tal than it appears. There still remains a sense of common membership of an elite and, I argue below, a common sense of grievances at the division of national resources that has been experienced. Any alternative regime would still have to face, and come to terms with, the social and economic forces at play in the region.

The strength of the elite in relation to the public has two limitations. One is the pressure from the up-and-coming educated generations for inclusion within the privileged group of public servants. The other is the need, which was still maintained in Sudan under Numiere, to submit the political leadership to periodic confirmation or replacement by the public. These two processes are powerful enough to set up contradictions within the political/administrative sphere and to contribute to instability in the tenure of top positions. The one pressure leads towards the expansion of public sector employment to the limits, or beyond the limits of any funds available. The other is a pressure towards the provision of services to the public. The two pull in contrary directions because in practice there is not enough money both for employment of masses of persons and to meet non-

52 D. Curtis

salary expenses. In practice one finds medical staff but no drugs or bandages; school teachers (sometimes in surplus on the payroll) but no books or transport to take them to their posts; and offices, to quote one example, with 17 drivers for two vehicles.

The contradiction is apparent in political and administrative culture also. At the highest political levels the values of planning, rationality, service orientation and redistribution towards the poorer sections of the population are attractive. These concur with administrative norms nationally, and with pressures from aid agencies. Lower down in the political system, where active recruitment of support is necessary, the demands of the situation lead to norms favouring the support of particular sections of the population, whether these be batches of youths emerging from training institutions or the people of a place demanding a road or dispensary or an agricultural project to employ their sons.

The evidence seems to be that the restraint upon employment that would be needed in order to have funds with which to provide an actual service to the public is not there. This suggests that politically the demands for youths for jobs are more coherent and organized than the demands of ordinary folk for services. These demands also come annually, while the expressed demands for services come every so many years at elections. It seems then that if the political elite express a need for support in their actions it is the youth who will succeed them to whom they are most sensitive.

The immediate consequences of these political configurations are several:

(1) the public sector is over-manned relative to the resources available to it; (2) output from the public sector is minimal and there is little pressure from

(3) central grants are consumed by the public service in employment; (4) in so far as local taxes can be exacted they transfer wealth from the rural

population to the civil servants and daily paid workers in government who largely live in towns.

outside or from inside to increase it;

Second-order consequences are also considerable, first for officialdom: officials and workers get used to a situation in which pay is not related to output; often pay is itself delayed or not forthcoming at all, so discipline is difficult to maintain.

Second, in politics: promises of services are given and usually broken; politicians become vulnerable and short-term spoils of office in consequence become more attractive to them; when contradictions between promises and performance no longer enable a convincing political strategy to be pursued, revolt or possibly even revolution is pursued.

Third, in the countryside, the people are less easily convinced that the public sector can provide services; they are reluctant to pay taxes because they do not lead to visible returns; they see the public sector simply as a potential provider of jobs for their sons if the sons can make the grade and they themselves exert enough influence.

There would seem to be considerable vested interests behind this situation. Yet it need not be seen as a stable configuration of forces. Nor is it a situation which is incapable of generating or accepting new interpretations of the various interests

Development Administration in World Economic Recession 53

involved. Scope for re-interpretation may rest in the contradictions themselves, and the way in which they affect different parties.

Politicians within the present context are vulnerable. Jobs offered cannot always be delivered, and if delivered may be subject to unreliable pay. In this case the political patronage involved in granting jobs may rebound. Promises for services in towns and countryside are usually unmet unless some foreign agency is prepared to step in and foot the bill.

The public for their part receive little, and in return pay as little as they can. Presumably they are open to any new formula which ensures that their needs for clean water, and aspirins, and school books, and seeds, and fertilizers are met at a price which they consider to be fair.

For administrators the frustrations are equally real. Work satisfaction is usually denied, and the whole edifice of rationality to which an administration is implicitly committed is seen to be without much substance. It could be argued that as long as the pay and the privileges keep coming civil servants may remain satisfied. However the ability of the economy to sustain these privileges is challenged in a time of international recession. Sometimes the pay has not been forthcoming; admittedly this is particularly for the lower-paid, more remote and consequently less vociferous elements in the public sector, but nevertheless all feel threatened. At all levels of pay the effects of inflation bite. Civil servants find themselves part of a large, but low-paid organization. All this serves to undermine confidence that this kind of political formula can work even for those sections of the population that appear to be most privileged.

These contradictions mount up during a time of recession. However the standard response has been that the central government should provide a larger share of national resources to the regions. This is the position often asserted by officials in government, and it appears to underpin the grievances of those under arms in the bush. It may be that current allocations are open to question on grounds of equity, but while this goal is being pursued the possibilities of increasing wealth and well-being through the use and circulation of locally generated resources tends to be neglected. Also there can be no confidence that any increase of resource allocations from the centre would not be equally subject to the forces which have led to high salary expenditures and low capital or other recurrent expenditures.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

In so far as the above sketch model of the relationship between local political forces and administrative performance to any degree represents real forces and responses in Southern Sudan, what are the implications? What direction should attempts at administrative reform or development take?

The standard response from aid agencies to administrative development in the South, as elsewhere where performance is judged to be poor, is to assume that what is required is training in known administrative skills. This response rests on the assumption that poor performance is the result of inadequate skills: skills that are apparently available in other places where authorities work better and have a higher output.

If the argument developed in this paper is followed through it becomes apparent

54 D. Curtis

that skills are certainly needed, but skills in handling a quite different configuration of political and social forces to that found, say, in an English local authority. So much so that not only the skills but also the administrative formulae and procedures which could yield success will be different. It is most likely that at least the seeds of these new administrative and financial practices will be found in the attempts of some leaders in the Southern Sudan-or similar situations-elsewhere to do something about the situation in which they find themselves. Training therefore needs to adopt a highly exploratory pattern.

TOWARDS A NEW FORMULA

What may be required is a formula which can bring some stability to the political process, some services to the public in return for their taxes, and a productive role from the public sector employees through which they earn their self-respect and a role within the economy. This formula has to be such that it is in the interests of the various parties to enforce it.

A new formula must take the current political configuration as its starting point because one cannot wish away political forces or the economic circumstances from which they arise. What are required are administrative and organizational meas- ures which would provide new opportunities for new groups of people so that they can gain more influence in the system.

It is also possible to look for forms of administration and programme funding which would do more to stimulate the local economy. This in turn would improve the prospects of some increase in local resources flowing through the public or semi-public sector. But to ask for some increase to the tax collection is not useful if it simply allows the administration to move into further expansion of employment without the prospect of improved performance.

The main stumbling block in the search for new patterns of service provision will remain the pressure from the ‘schooled’ to receive the rewards of schooling in the form of employment in the public sector. This should be recognized as an inevitable force that needs to be counterbalanced by forces supporting the delivery of public services. One response would be to find means of handling the non- salary costs of public services outside the normal revenue flow and in a manner in which the beneficiaries of the services have some ability to ensure that revenues raised are used on the material requirements of the service.

This is not a far-fetched suggestion. Already, through self-help activities, local beneficiaries make considerable contributions to the capital account, so to speak, by contributing material and labour in the construction of schools and clinics. In some programmes the responsibility for providing buildings rests entirely with the locally benefiting community. Recurrent costs are less easily arranged through voluntary self-help effort but nevertheless parents are in fact contributing cash to school funds on a routine basis. When teachers’ salaries are not forthcoming they have in some cases kept the schools going by providing food for the teachers.

What one should be looking for is a means of regularizing and developing these initiatives into local management systems for schools, clinics, water supplies, farm services and others. Through these management systems members of the public would be able to exercise control over the critical resources which make a differ-

Development Administration in World Economic Recession 55

ence between getting a service and not getting one. Their financial contribution would ensure their influence. The organization to which they contribute at school or clinic level would be necessarily decentralized and participative. In the North of the Sudan where participation in public service provision is extensive, it is very often a local merchant who is the major contributor and effective controller of public participation. Sometimes, in the name of effective management, public resources such as water supplies have been privatized by government. In the South, where the merchant class is much less prominent, there is a better chance that local management could be based upon various forms of collective organiz- ation.

This is, of course, in part a request for a system of direct user fees for certain services. Leonard (1985) argues for a cautious approach to such a policy on the grounds that in many African countries farmers are already subsidizing industry and the urban population through direct or indirect charges upon their productive activities. In this case user fees would constitute an additional charge. The problem of hidden charges through controlled prices offered by parastatal organizations or disadvantageous foreign exchange rates cannot be addressed in this paper. How- ever the direct charges suggested here can be offset by a reduction in taxation. Other things being equal this will give more discretion and more power to the users, and may lead to the actual provision of a service which taxation has failed to provide.

For the administrators and professionals locally raised resources would ensure that they have something to do. Although as officials they would not control resources directly, the non-government organizations at local level might require administrative counter-checks on their activities as well as continuing professional guidance and assistance in actual service provision. The fact that public sector budgets are almost entirely consumed by salaries would be of much less conse- quence if complementary resources for the material side of programmes were raised locally outside government.

For politicians local organizations always provide a useful base within their constituencies. This would not prevent local organizations from becoming an effective countervailing force within the political system.

As an example of how this could be managed there follows a suggestion for the development of education services through the development of improved school funds controlled by Parents and Teachers Councils.

SELF-RELIANT SCHOOLS: A SUGGESTION FOR IMPROVEMENT OF SCHOOL PROVISION THROUGH LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND

At present school places are available for only about one-third of the school-aged children. Schools are concentrated in towns and along the main roads. There has been a general retreat from the more remote schools, many of which were started without many resources through self-help endeavours shortly after the end of the Civil War (1972). Most schools are desparately short of equipment, and even the existing salary bill is sometimes more than can be met regularly by the authorities.

The following is an outline proposal for raising some part of the expenses of the education service directly from the benefiting population. The resources would

56 D. Curtis

be raised in a manner that the rural population could most readily manage, and in a way which would both encourage them to pay and enable them to have some direct influence upon the regularity and performance of teachers at school. The idea is that parents would contribute an agreed quantity of farm produce to the school for the teachers in payment for schooling. This payment in kind would also act as a stimulus to the local economy.

The problem

Teachers’ salaries are the largest single budget item at Area Council level. Primary schooling is also the most direct service which these councils can deliver. At present rural households are not paying anything directly towards this service because their social service tax goes to local councils which do not have responsi- bility for education. They do, however, find themselves paying high prices for essential equipment for their children.

Arrears on teachers payments are common, even in normal financial years. In consequence teachers are often not in post and cannot be disciplined for not being so. No money is available to pay for transfer costs. Education budgets are almost entirely consumed by salaries.

The scheme: first version

The objective in this version is to transfer 25 per cent of the expense of teachers’ salaries on to the local community in which they serve, through payment in kind by parents. This would be offset by a reduction in social service tax, which is seldom collected in full in any case. This local contribution would have the effect of releasing council funds for education support activities. The parents would have an incentive to pay because the payments made would be related to services received.

Payment in kind would encourage economic expansion through local production of surplus food. It would enable farmers to pay in the medium in which they produce. Payment in kind at the local school to the teachers directly would also cut down overall transport requirements. It would encourage school teachers to be on station in their schools and provide parents with some sanction against teachers if they fail to turn up.

On the other hand teachers would benefit, being provided with food valued at ‘farm gate’ value rather than the market price value to which many are accustomed. They would have 25 per cent of their salaries in inflation-proof form. If they themselves grow their own food they could get together and sell off what they do not need in the local market.

Estimations

Let us say that the average teachers salary is fS60/month.

The market price of a tin of sorghum = fS7 The ‘farm gate’ (i.e. farmers selling price) of a tin of sorghum = fS4.50

Development Administration in World Economic Recession 57

If 25 per cent of a teachers’ salary is to be met by the parents of say 40 children

25% of fS60 = fS1Ymonth

= fS180lyear

fS180 = 40 x 4.5

= 1 tin sorghum per student per year

So one tin of sorghum per student per year, at farm gate prices, would provide for 25 per cent of the average teachers’ salary.

This is well within the capability of small farmers. For instance an average family in basically subsistence farming might require for its own consumption 12 bags of sorghum or its equivalent; 12 bags are 72 tins. With say three children in school an additional three tins of production would be a small burden upon the household.

Organization

The sorghum could be delivered at the school once a year, with representatives of the education authority present to see fair play. Each teacher would thereafter be responsible for storing or selling hidher own supplies. If teachers chose to sell the grain they should be able to get a price which would more than compensate them for their trouble.

One weakness of this version of the scheme would be that the funds saved by the Area Council on teachers’ salaries would remain in the Council’s common chest where they would be subject to strong pressures from many sources. In all probability they would go to pay salary arrears in other sectors of Council activity. The objective of increasing resources to education at the school level would in this case be frustrated.

A possible response to this would be to transfer the savings on salaries directly into a trust fund that could be administered by a committee with representatives of parents, teachers, the Council itself and perhaps persons eminent in political or religious institutions. Perhaps foreign agencies could also be usefully involved. This trust fund could be linked to a supply system through which books and other aids to learning could be delivered to the schools in return for payments from the trust.

It would be imperative that the Councils’ budget did not show a smaller bill for teachers’ salaries. Otherwise the negotiating position of the Council with central authorities would be weakened and the Area might finish up with additional burdens on the parents and no overall increase in resources for education. So the deal between parents, teachers, Council and the Trust would have to be made annually, after budget approval. This would allow for some schools to remain outside the scheme and so not benefit from the food supplies and the material supplies.

58 D. Curtis

Second version of the scheme

During Workshop discussions with senior administrators a simpler version of the self-help response to recurrent funding of school materials emerged. The same assumptions were accepted for levels of contributions and resulting funds.

Organization

In this case parents would contribute one tin of sorghum (or equivalent as agreed) to the school on the day arranged some time soon after the harvest. The Parents and Teachers Council would be responsible. Teachers would then have the option of purchasing what supplies they required at a favourable rate: say fS5 per tin of sorghum. Traders would be invited to bid for the remaining quantity, the highest bidder paying the Parents and Teachers Council for his purchase. This trader, or another, would supply the school with teaching materials to a quantity and price agreed.

The education officer of the Area Council should be present, along with other key persons, to witness that the agreed arrangements were being followed by all parties. Politicians should be encouraged to take a lead in encouraging their self- reliance resources so that their leadership is acknowledged and support assured.

If the grain were sold immediately upon its collection at the school no storage difficulties would be experienced at the school. Problems of space, weavils and theft would be avoided. However if the Parents and Teachers Council had the capacity to overcome these difficulties a larger return from the sorghum would be gained by storing it until prices had risen in the market.

The advantages of this version would be that: it removes the transactions from the sphere of the Councils budget, while enabling officials to take a role in encouraging the scheme and observing the transactions; it makes the teachers’ participation optional but still favourable to them; it also keeps the transactions close to the parents where they can observe what is happening, and still have the chance to withhold their contributions if school materials do not appear.

CONCLUSIONS

The scheme which has been outlined in its two variants has not been tested in practice. Before it could be tried out it would face tests of political acceptability at higher levels of government. In terms of the pronounced public philosophy in the Sudan in 1984, if such a scheme were seen as ‘self-help’ it would be acceptable, while if it were seen as ‘payment for services’ it would not. In the local political administrative arena the strength of the scheme would be that it would equate with and legitimate what is happening anyway on a small scale as basic services break down in the face of declining resources from the centre. The interests of teachers, whose actual experience is that pay is erratic and subject to inflation, those of parents who face declining services and lack means of influencing out- comes and those of local politicans who are currently unable to deliver what they promise would all be furthered. The suggestions represent two attempts to think through, in an intuitive manner, a formula which would balance incentives and

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sanctions to be workable within current constraints. The remaining and sizeable obstacle is the entrenched belief to be found among many of the local elite both within the service of the state and in conflict, that central government ought to provide, and that it is only the inequites in the arrangements for the distribution of funds which prevent there being sufficient to provide an adequate service.

If the formula were taken seriously a rather novel form of administration would emerge. Effectively a ‘grass-roots’ level of decision-making and exercise of power would be added to the tiers that already exist. The whole structure would maintain the softness which Myrdall (1968) saw as the characteristic of administrations in which informal bargaining over shares in resources takes precedence over formal control over their delivery to the public. But since the lowest level (made up of those who should be the receivers of services) would raise some of its own resources the consumer would, for the first time, be given a small degree of power. As such it might be considered as one route towards administrative development. It is a route more open in times of recession than in times of expansion, and it does not require the heavy hand of conditional aid.

REFERENCES

Alavai, H. (1982). ‘State and class under peripheral capitalism’, in Alavi, H. and Shanin, T. (eds), Introduction to the Sociology of ‘Developing Societies’, Macmillan, London.

Alavi, H. (1972). ‘The state in post-colonial societies, Pakistan and Bangladesh’, New Left Review, No. 74, JulyIAugust.

Cohen, J. M. and Uphoff, N. T. (1979). ‘The Cornell Rural Development Participation Project’, Rural Development Participation Review, 1( l), summer.

Grindle, M. S. (1980). ‘Policy content and context in implementation’, in Grindle, M. S. (ed.), Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Heaver, R. (1982). ‘Bureaucratic politics and incentive in the management of rural develop- ment’, World Bank Working Papers, No. 537, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Leonard, D. K. (1985). ‘African practice and the theory of user fees’, Agricultural Adminis- tration, 18, 137-157.

Myrdall, G. (1968). Asian Drama: an enquiry into the poverty of Nations. Penguin, Har- mondsworth.

Pickering, A. K. and Davies, C. J. (1985). Decentralization Policy and Practices in the Southern Sudan. DAG,. University of Birmingham.

Riggs, F. W. (1964). Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass.