FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

CREDIT OPINION8 May 2020

Update

RATINGS

Deutsche Bank AGDomicile Frankfurt am Main,

Germany

Long Term CRR A3

Type LT Counterparty RiskRating - Fgn Curr

Outlook Not Assigned

Long Term Debt A3

Type Senior Unsecured -Dom Curr

Outlook Negative

Long Term Deposit A3

Type LT Bank Deposits - FgnCurr

Outlook Negative

Please see the ratings section at the end of this reportfor more information. The ratings and outlook shownreflect information as of the publication date.

Analyst Contacts

Michael Rohr +49.69.70730.901Senior Vice Presidentmichael.rohr@moodys.com

Yana Ruvinskaya +44.20.7772.1618Associate Analystyana.ruvinskaya@moodys.com

Peter E. Nerby, CFA +1.212.553.3782Senior Vice Presidentpeter.nerby@moodys.com

Laurie Mayers +44.20.7772.5582Associate Managing Directorlaurie.mayers@moodys.com

Ana Arsov +1.212.553.3763MD-Financial Institutionsana.arsov@moodys.com

Deutsche Bank AGRegular update - Restructuring progress mitigatescoronavirus-related earnings strain

SummaryWe assign A3 (negative) long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings to DeutscheBank AG (DB). We also assign Baa3 junior senior unsecured (non-preferred) debt ratings andA3 Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRRs), as well as a ba1 Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA), toDB.

DB's ratings reflect (1) its ba1 BCA and Adjusted BCA; (2) the results of our Advanced Loss-Given-Failure (LGF) analysis, providing three notches of rating uplift for deposits and seniorunsecured debt, as well as one notch for its junior senior unsecured debt; and (3) a one-notchadditional rating uplift for the bank's deposits and senior unsecured debt ratings, based onour assumption of a moderate level of government support for these debt classes.

DB's ba1 BCA reflects the high earnings volatility and tail risks resulting from the bank'scapital markets businesses, which are currently undergoing a major strategic revamp.Therefore, DB's BCA also reflects the significant challenges the bank faces in swiftly executingits strategic plan, particularly with regard to sustaining its revenue base and reducing thedrag of its non-core unit, as well as sustainably stabilizing its core banking franchise. Theba1 BCA also takes into account the fact that the restructuring will have to progress duringa period of an unprecedented macroeconomic shock caused by the coronavirus outbreak,as well as persistently ultralow interest rates, limiting DB's ability to generate capital. TheBCA positively incorporates DB's progress in executing on its more radical shift in strategy, itssufficient capitalization, clean balance sheet and solid liquidity.

Exhibit 1

Rating Scorecard - Deutsche Bank AG - Key financial ratios

2.2%

14.7%

-0.4%

25.5%

39.4%

-5%

5%

15%

25%

35%

45%

-3%

3%

8%

13%

18%

23%

Asset Risk:Problem Loans/

Gross Loans

Capital:Tangible Common

Equity/Risk-WeightedAssets

Profitability:Net Income/

Tangible Assets

Funding Structure:Market Funds/

Tangible BankingAssets

Liquid Resources:Liquid BankingAssets/TangibleBanking Assets

Solvency Factors (LHS) Liquidity Factors (RHS)

Deutsche Bank AG (BCA: ba1) Median ba1-rated banks

So

lve

ncy F

acto

rs

Liq

uid

ity F

acto

rs

Source: Moody's Investors Service

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Credit strengths

» The bank's adequate capital and solid liquidity metrics will help alleviate the restructuring burden

» Its moderate reliance on confidence-sensitive wholesale market funding has been further reduced post downsizing

Credit challenges

» Significant execution challenges related to strategic re-engineering

» Although reduced, ongoing reliance on capital markets activities to generate sufficient returns

» Weak efficiency ratios and very modest overall profitability, which are likely to improve only from 2021 onward

Outlook

» The negative outlook on the bank's senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings reflects the persistently high execution challenges atDB, highlighted by the recent more radical shift in the bank's strategy.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade

» The negative outlook indicates that there is no imminent upward pressure on DB's ratings.

» In the medium term, substantial completion of DB's strategic plan, which results in sustainable and improved earnings, coupled withstable capitalization, displaying tangible common equity (TCE)/risk-weighted assets (RWA) of around or above 13% and a leverageratio of around 5%, could result in upward rating pressure. The ratings could further be supported by a lower dependence on morecostly and confidence-sensitive capital markets funding, as expressed by its market funding ratio staying well below 30%, while DBmanages to maintain its current liquidity strength.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade

» Downward rating pressure would develop if DB failed to show tangible progress in achieving its new strategic milestones,particularly with respect to revenue attrition, realized cost savings and capital release unit (CRU)-related de-risking costs. Theratings could also be downgraded if DB faced additional market challenges or additional litigation costs significantly beyond thosecovered by the existing reserves. In addition, the ratings could be downgraded if the bank experienced a material risk managementfailure or material deterioration in the group's liquidity or capital positions.

» Downward rating pressure could also result from a significant and sustained decrease in the volume of bail-in-able debt, leading to ahigher loss severity of DB's junior senior unsecured or other liability classes at failure, potentially resulting in a lower rating uplift asa result of our Advanced LGF analysis.

This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page onwww.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history.

2 8 May 2020 Deutsche Bank AG: Regular update - Restructuring progress mitigates coronavirus-related earnings strain

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Key indicators

Exhibit 2

Deutsche Bank AG (Consolidated Financials) [1]

12-192 12-182 12-172 12-162 12-152 CAGR/Avg.3

Total Assets (EUR Billion) 951.8 1,021.8 1,106.7 1,098.2 1,085.1 (3.2)4

Total Assets (USD Billion) 1,068.4 1,168.0 1,328.9 1,158.4 1,178.8 (2.4)4

Tangible Common Equity (EUR Billion) 47.5 51.2 51.9 45.6 47.3 0.14

Tangible Common Equity (USD Billion) 53.3 58.5 62.4 48.1 51.4 0.94

Problem Loans / Gross Loans (%) 2.2 2.3 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.95

Tangible Common Equity / Risk Weighted Assets (%) 14.7 14.6 15.1 12.8 11.9 13.86

Problem Loans / (Tangible Common Equity + Loan Loss Reserve) (%) 18.8 17.0 11.2 14.9 15.3 15.45

Net Interest Margin (%) 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.45

PPI / Average RWA (%) -0.1 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.36

Net Income / Tangible Assets (%) -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.15

Cost / Income Ratio (%) 101.5 93.0 91.9 96.6 95.8 95.85

Market Funds / Tangible Banking Assets (%) 25.5 29.8 33.1 35.4 31.1 31.05

Liquid Banking Assets / Tangible Banking Assets (%) 39.4 47.7 52.6 48.5 47.3 47.15

Gross Loans / Due to Customers (%) 76.9 72.8 71.9 79.5 79.8 76.25

[1] All figures and ratios are adjusted using Moody's standard adjustments. [2] Basel III - fully loaded or transitional phase-in; IFRS. [3] May include rounding differences because of thescale of reported amounts. [4] Compound annual growth rate (%) based on the periods for the latest accounting regime. [5] Simple average of periods for the latest accounting regime. [6]Simple average of Basel III periods.Sources: Moody's Investors Service and company filings

ProfileDeutsche Bank AG (DB) is the largest German bank, operating through a European as well as a global network, servicing private,corporate and institutional clients. As of 31 March 2020, the bank reported total assets of €1.5 trillion and €1,158 billion of assets undermanagement.

DB offers a wide range of investment, financial and related products and services to its clientele, served by around 87,000 employees in70 countries globally. The bank now focuses on four main businesses: (1) The Corporate Bank (CB) offers corporate finance, transactionbanking and capital markets products; (2) the Private Bank (PB) offers retail banking and wealth management services in Germany andabroad, (3) the Investment Bank (IB) caters to the needs of corporate and institutional clients, including the trading and hedging offinancial products; and (4) Asset Management (AM) has a broad range of product offerings surrounding investment funds and relatedproducts and services to both retail and institutional clients.

DB's BCA is supported by its Weighted Macro Profile of Strong (+)DB's Strong (+) Weighted Macro Profile is mainly driven by its exposure to Germany (Aaa stable) and the United States (Aaa stable),and also incorporates exposures to other European Union (EU) countries, such as Spain (Baa1 stable) and Italy (Baa3 stable).

As the largest private-sector bank in Germany, DB benefits from an environment with very high economic, institutional andgovernment financial strength and a very low susceptibility to event risk. However, operating conditions for the German bankingsystem are constrained by overly high cost bases, high fragmentation in an oversaturated market, persistently ultra-low interest rates,modest fee income generation and strong competition for domestic business.

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Detailed credit considerationsOur assigned baa3 Asset Risk score continues to incorporate high execution risks related to the bank's strategic revamp, as well as themarket, credit and operational risks and periodic concentration risks inherent to DB's remaining capital markets activities.

Continued execution remains key to stabilizing DB's credit profile and ratingsIn July 2019, DB announced a deep overhaul of its capital markets operations and the formation of a wind-down unit (the 'CRU') tohelp facilitate the proposed rundown of some of its global capital markets activities. To support the achievement of a more balancedand sustainable business model, DB is undergoing an ambitious plan1 to simplify and meaningfully downsize its Investment Bank (IB)and to reposition an independent Corporate Bank (CB) at the core of the go-forward business model. The plan makes substantiallydeeper and more definitive cuts to some of DB’s trading businesses, in particular to global equity sales and trading; the bank’s ratesbusinesses; as well as further adjustments in the investment banking operations now designed to support the CB's success. With the IBdeemed to provide capital market access and support to the corporate banking core, we estimate that the share of IB-related revenuewill fall below 30% of the total group revenue from about 36% in 2018 (Exhibit 3), reducing the bank’s reliance on volatile earningsstreams and lowering the capital intensity of its business mix.

Exhibit 3

DB's revenue mix will shift away from capital markets businesses

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Before (2018) Post downsizing

ECM, DCM, Advisory CIB Sales & Trading DB Transaction Banking Private Clients Asset Management

Sources: Company reports and Moody's Investors Service estimates

The significant cost and execution risk, as well as the potential disruptiveness of this latest, more radical, strategic revamp, highlightsthe persistent profitability and business model challenges that DB faces, and will continue to constrain the firm’s credit strengthover the next 12-18 months. However, the strategic endpoint will be credit positive, placing DB on firmer ground than previous,less fundamental restructurings. At the same time, and even if DB reaches its 8% ROTE target by 2022, its performance – althoughmaterially improved – will continue to lag that of its global investment bank (GIB) peers.

Since the announcement of the plan, DB has made progress in shedding non-core operations...DB's progress in executing on its more radical shift in strategy has put the bank in a better position to absorb the impacts of thecoronavirus-driven macroeconomic shock while remaining positioned at its current rating level. Nevertheless, continued fast andsteady progress in achieving the new goals and repositioning DB’s business model will be important to maintaining its current creditstrength, which we believe will continue to be supported by its clean balance sheet and solid capital and liquidity metrics duringexecution.

As the coronavirus pandemic unfolds, DB and its peers will face a delicate act to balance earnings pressures, customer forbearanceand efforts to support the economy while maintaining strength in capital and liquidity; and continue the proposed restructuring at asufficient pace. We see DB entering this period from an improved position following the restructuring measures initiated in summer2019. Being domiciled in Germany could also prove supportive to the bank's risk profile, since Germany has launched the largestsupport program in Europe to safeguard its economy from the coronavirus-related shocks. Also, corporate and household debt inGermany are at low levels relative to other European countries, and stood at 59% and 54% of GDP, respectively, as of the end of 2019.

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This provides DB's most important customers with additional leeway to cope with the crisis without immediately becoming overlyindebted.

The downsizing of the CRU continued during Q1 2020, in particular with regard to deleveraging (leverage exposures declined to €118billion, from €281 billion in Q1 2019). Risk-weighted assets declined 34% year-over-year to €44 billion, including an unchanged€26 billion of operational risk-weighted assets. Further reducing the profitability drag of the CRU – exacerbated by the most recentcoronavirus-driven charges – continues to be important to maintaining DB's credit strength; in particular because tangible benefits ofthe restructuring may not become visible before the end of 2020 and into 2021.

...but revenue stability has become increasingly difficult to achieveDespite the bank's ambitious efforts and short-term success in reshaping its more volatile capital markets earnings streams to date,it is not clear if management will succeed in sustaining its revenue base2 in the remaining fixed-income-related businesses, as well asgrowing its corporate banking and private banking franchise into an extremely uncertain macroeconomic environment in 2020 andpotentially beyond.

During Q1 2020, DB managed to improve underlying revenue; and costs benefitted from restructuring efforts. DB reported total grouprevenues of €6.3 billion in Q1 2020, virtually flat year-over-year and despite the negative effects of the persistently ultra-low interest-rate environment and business perimeter changes as a result of the restructuring. At the same time, adjusted costs declined 8% to €5.5billion, reflecting DB's cost reduction measures initiated in and executed during 2019. Supporting the result, the IB's revenue increased15% while all other core divisions recorded a cumulative 1% growth in revenue. As a result, all segments were profitable, supporting a32% growth in DB’s 'Core Bank' pretax profits year-over-year to €1.1 billion (Exhibit 4).

Exhibit 4

Core profitability improves as restructuring progresses, yet DB's profitability got suppressed by coronavirus-related reserve buildsAdjusted quarterly pretax profits by business line (excluding litigation, impairments, DVA and one-offs), € m

(1,500)

(1,000)

(500)

-

500

1,000

1,500

Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020

Corporate Bank Investment Bank Private Bank Asset Management Consolidation & Adjustments Capital Release Unit

Sources: Company reports and Moody's Investors Service

The cost management side of DB’s profitability puzzle has come together quickly since the new management took over in April 2018.In 2019, the bank's (adjusted) cost base declined 6% year-over-year to €21.5 billion, reflecting faster-than-expected progress inrunning down the bank's staff base. DB expects adjusted costs3 to arrive at €19.5 billion in 2020 (Exhibit 5), and reiterated its target ofachieving a 5% leverage ratio and 12.5% CET1 ratio by 2022, the year its restructuring plan concludes.

5 8 May 2020 Deutsche Bank AG: Regular update - Restructuring progress mitigates coronavirus-related earnings strain

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Exhibit 5

Progress has come quick on the cost side of the profitability puzzle

-14.0%

-12.0%

-10.0%

-8.0%

-6.0%

-4.0%

-2.0%

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Q1 2020

Revenues* Costs^

*As reported by DB. ^Excluding restructuring, litigation and transformation costs and other significant charges.Source: Company reports and Moody's Investors Service

Qualitative adjustments capture strategic uncertainties and continued reliance on capital markets activitiesAnother round of senior management changes and strategic shifts just one year after the last strategic reshuffle highlights theexecution challenges and strategic uncertainty facing the bank, and are reflected in a one-notch negative adjustment for CorporateBehavior in our scorecard. In addition, the adjustment captures the risk that potential funding market dislocations, as currentlytriggered by the adverse market effects of the coronavirus pandemic, may negatively affect DB's ability to refinance its moreconfidence-sensitive funding elements at acceptable spreads.

In addition, and despite the proposed downsizing, DB will retain a signifiant reliance on capital markets activities for income generation:capital markets-related revenue will account for around 30% of DB’s total revenue in 2021 (Moody's estimate). We generally considercapital markets activities both opaque and potentially volatile, posing significant challenges for the management of such activities, inparticular because these businesses carry significant risk management and risk governance challenges; opaque risk taking; and intrinsicmarket, counterparty and operational risks, and display the high confidence sensitivity of the customer and funding franchises.

These structural challenges continue to result in a one-notch negative qualitative adjustment to DB's BCA in respect of remaining'Opacity and Complexity', an adjustment currently shared with all large GIBs.

Solid capital and leverage position help mitigate tail risksDuring 2020, DB expects the CET1 ratio could dip modestly below the 12.5% guidance level (Q1 2020: 12.8%, see Exhibit 6) as a resultof the bank's as well as the various governments' efforts to support clients and the economy. The related extension of credit to itscustomers is therefore likely to lead to growth in risk-weighted assets as well as its balance sheet. In light of the latter, DB expects it willbe unlikely it can reach its 4.5% leverage ratio target for 2020 (Q1 2020: 4.0%). Under the new strategic plan, DB's management stilltargets a leverage ratio of 5.0% by 2022. If achieved, this would close the long-standing gap with its peers.

The challenges in maintaining its Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio at or above the medium-term target level of 12.5%, aswell as the expected volatility in the ratio during restructuring, have led to our four-notch negative adjustment to the bank's initial a1Capital score, resulting in an assigned Capital score of baa2. To safeguard financial flexibility as part of its new strategic revamp, DB willnot pay a dividend in 2019 and 2020, providing a certain buffer in case of unexpected developments.

Mitigating risks to its capital position, DB has resolved several litigation proceedings that posed large tail risks for bondholders, therebysignificantly enhancing its financial flexibility. As of the end of March 2020, total litigation reserves were €1.0 billion and the amountof reasonably possible contingent liabilities was €2.0 billion as of the same date. However, the possibility of additional litigation andconduct-related charges — the occurrence and amount of which are very difficult to forecast accurately — remains a tail risk for futureearnings, which could potentially set back DB’s progress in executing its plans.

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Exhibit 6

CET1 ratio and Tier 1 leverage ratio for Moody's-rated GIBs, as of 31 March 2020

15.3% 14.6%

13.1% 12.8% 12.8% 12.7%12.3% 12.3% 12.1% 12.0% 12.0%

11.2% 11.1%

6.2%5.3% 4.5%

4.0%

5.4%

4.2%

6.0% 5.9%5.3%

3.9%4.2%

6.0%6.4%

0.0%

3.0%

6.0%

9.0%

12.0%

15.0%

18.0%

baa2 a2 baa2 ba1 a3 baa2 a2 baa1 baa2 baa1 a3 baa1 a3

MS HSBC BCS** DB UBS* SG JPM GS CS* BNP RBC CITI BAC

CET1 ratio Tier 1 Leverage ratio Median CET1 ratio (12.3%) Median leverage ratio (5.3%)

Notes: (1) Basel III fully phased in advanced approach for all US banks; (2) Tier 1 leverage ratio for US banks is the supplemental leverage ratio (SLR).*UBS and CS leverage ratios reflect Common Equity Tier plus Low Trigger Additional Tier 1 and High-Trigger Additional Tier 1 securities. For the computation of the leverage ratio, the Swissregulator allowed for a temporary exclusion of cash at central banks until 01 July 2020. The ratios shown here do not include this benefit.**Barclays (BCS) leverage is reflective of the spot UK leverage ratio.Source: Company reports and Moody's Investors Service

Weak efficiency ratios and very modest overall profitability need to improveWe assign a b3 Profitability score to DB, taking account of its historically high earnings volatility, weak efficiency ratios and verymodest profitability outlook over the next 12-18 months. Improving its profitability metrics according to its new strategic plan willtherefore be important to overcome a key relative weakness for DB, which has been and still is constraining its ba1 BCA. To illustrate,the total cash and non-cash charges of the new plan will amount to no less than €8.0 billion during the 2019-22 restructuring period,although 73% of these costs had already been digested as of the end of the first quarter 2020.

While long-standing issues limit the profitability of German banks in general, DB must also contend with the expense of maintaining itsfixed-income capital markets footprint, as well as growing its corporate and private banking franchise against fierce, although slightlyretreating, competition. Persistently low interest rates and extended periods of low volatility, which suppress net interest and tradingrevenue (with the notable exception of Q1 2020), will likely constrain DB’s earnings somewhat going forward, additionally strainingDB's below-par profitability relative to most of its European banking peers (Exhibit 7).

Exhibit 7

DB is persistently less profitable than its GIB peers

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

Q1-17 Q2-17 Q3-17 Q4-17 Q1-18 Q2-18 Q3-18 Q4-18 Q1-19 Q2-19 Q3-19 Q4-19 Q1-20

Deutsche Bank Barclays BNP Paribas Societe Generale HSBC UBS Credit Suisse

Source: Company reports and Moody's Investors Service

As mentioned above, the key challenge for the bank will be to maintain and grow revenue, and to ultimately generate positiveoperating leverage on a sustainable basis. In particular, stabilizing revenue in adjacent businesses after the downsizing of its capitalmarkets operations and simultaneously growing revenue in the core bank will remain a difficult task in a highly challenging and

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extremely volatile market environment following the coronavirus outbreak, further characterized by additional uncertainties on globaltrade, the potential repercussions of the United Kingdom's (Aa2 negative) decision to leave the EU (Brexit), as well as a persistentlylow interest rate environment affecting larger parts of DB's European businesses. Indeed, many of DB’s peers were able to afford andsustain more effective restructurings (and investments) because of the support from their stable earnings contributors, such as multi-local retail and universal banking, as well as global asset and wealth management operations.

However, since DB announced its restructuring program in July 2019, DB faced lower-than-anticipated client attrition, well below ourinitial estimate of €3.0 billion of (gross) run-rate revenue losses. DB continues aiming to offset part of the expected revenue strainby refocusing on higher-margin businesses within fixed income and currencies, in particular credit and securitized products, as wellas fostering its strong global transaction banking franchise. The bank will also focus on less capital-intensive earnings streams andon non-institutional clients within the reorganized segments, retreating further from serving lower-margin, and more counterparty-risk-sensitive clients, such as hedge funds. In addition to exiting select businesses, these perimeter adjustments will reduce thebank's diversification in the fixed-income and currency flow business. In turn, this may reduce the necessity to significantly investin technology to be able to compete with larger flow franchises of its peers, such as JPMorgan Chase & Co. (Aa1/Aa2 stable, a24) orCitigroup Inc. (Aa3/Aa3 stable, baa15), and yet does not free DB from having to maintain best-in-class platforms to be able to defendits remaining franchise in fixed income. If not executed carefully, DB risks losing a higher-than-expected share of revenue. Over time,however, bondholders may benefit if the scale and ambition of the investment bank is further curtailed and the less capital-intensiveand more predictable businesses perform in line with the bank's medium-term targets.

In addition to a potentially higher-than-expected revenue attrition in adjacent businesses over time, and as recently indicated bysharply rising loan-loss charges, the decade-long benign credit cycle has turned as a result of the global coronavirus outbreak, leadingto higher loan-loss charges eating into DB's underlying profit-generation capacity. During Q1 2020, DB booked loan loss charges of€506 million, up from €140 million in Q1 2019. Cost of risk therefore increased meaningfully, although the reported 44 basis points(annualized; against risk-weighted assets) are still not in excess of previous experiences during crisis. As of 31 March 2020, DB has built€4.3 billion in allowances for potential loan losses, which we consider adequate in relation to its diversified loan book; and reservelevels are broadly in-line with its peers. In addition to higher loan loss charges, DB also suffered mark-to-market losses on creditpositions within its Investment Bank. However, we understand this was largely offset by related hedging and risk management gains inthe quarter.

Strong liquidity position and sound funding profileWe assign a baa1 Funding Structure score to DB, one notch above the bank's initial score. The positive adjustment reflects DB'simproved tenure for a larger part of its confidence-sensitive wholesale funding and further is captures our expectation that DB wouldbecome less dependent on such funding sources, adding flexibility to managing refinancing costs and executing on the announcedplans over the next 12-18 months.

Following planned business reductions and exits, and considering the fact that DB's stock of loss-absorbing debt is well above theminimum stipulated under the EU's minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL; Q1 2020 fully-loaded excesswas €18 billion), DB will continue replacing some maturing junior senior unsecured debt with less costly preferred senior unsecureddebt, or issue less junior senior unsecured debt. Further, the group's total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) amounting to €112 billion asof the end of the third quarter was well in excess of DB's €75 billion requirement6.

DB's funding largely consists of €567 billion of customer deposits (of which some 55% were granular retail deposits), constituting 57%of its net liabilities (including equity) as of 31 March 2020 (Exhibit 8). Debt capital market funds outstanding totaled €149 billion, equalto around 15% of net liabilities.

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Exhibit 8

DB's balance sheet is highly liquid, a credit positive

63

459

267

56

149

47

567

92

113174

Other Assets

Loans to customers

Highly liquid securities

Trading assetsReverse repos and securities borrowed

Cash and equivalents

Deposits

Brokerage paybales

Trading liabilities

Long-term debt

Other liabilities

Equity

Liquidity reserves

81% loan-to-deposit ratio

€994 billion €994 billion

Derivatives

Brokerage recievables

Derivatives

Source: DB's Fixed Income Investor Presentation Q1 2020 and Moody's Investors Service

Liquidity remains a credit strengthLiquidity remains a comparative and credit-positive strength of DB and has significantly reduced the bank's refinancing risk. Thisis reflected in our a1 Liquid Resources score, in line with DB's a1 initial score. The assigned score contains a one-notch downwardadjustment to the initial score to reflect asset encumbrance on a sizeable portion of assets that are designated as liquid in our initialratio and score. At the same time, we make an offsetting one-notch upward adjustment based on our consideration of the group'sconservative management of liquidity across its various branches and subsidiaries, as well as its high stock of high-quality liquid assets.With a reported liquidity reserve of €205 billion as of 31 March 2020, largely comprising central bank cash and other highly liquidsecurities, DB mitigates substantial parts of the risks associated with refinancing of more confidence-sensitive wholesale marketfunding (€68 billion MREL-eligible debt outstanding as of the same date7).

DB's liquidity reserve is also well in excess over the requirements stipulated by the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), which stood at 133%as of the end of March 2020 (net buffer: approximately €40 billion, see Exhibit 9). Going forward, however, we expect anticipatedbalance-sheet expansion – resulting from the bank's as well as the government's efforts to mitigate the negative effects of coronaviruspandemic – to consume some of the excess liquidity. On the other hand, this will help reduce the negative carry associated withholding cash at the central banks.

Overall, DB has an a3 Combined Liquidity Score, derived from its assigned a1 Liquid Resources score and its assigned baa1 FundingStructure score. The combined score reflects DB's strong liquidity resources mitigating its partial reliance on market funds; andcontinues to highlight funding and liquidity as a relative strength supporting the bank's BCA.

Exhibit 9

DB's LCR is well in-line with its peer groupGIBs' LCR, as of 31 March 2020

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

180%

200%

CS HSBC BCS SG UBS DB GS BNP RBC BAC MS JPM Citi

Q4-19 Q1-20

Source: Company reports and Moody's Investors Service

9 8 May 2020 Deutsche Bank AG: Regular update - Restructuring progress mitigates coronavirus-related earnings strain

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Environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerationsThe global banking sector has been classified as “Low” risk in our environmental risk heat map8 and as “Moderate” risk in our social riskheat map9.

In line with our general view on the banking sector, DB has a low exposure to environmental risks. For social risks, we also place DB in-line with our general view for the banking sector, indicating a moderate exposure to such risks. This includes considerations in relationto the rapid and widening spread of the coronavirus outbreak, given the substantial implications for public health and safety anddeteriorating global economic outlook, creating a severe and extensive credit shock across many sectors, regions and markets.

Governance10 is highly relevant for DB, as it is to all banks. Because of the complexity of its global operations, DB's ratings incorporatea one-notch downward adjustment for Opacity and Complexity in the qualitative section of our BCA scorecard. A complex legalstructure and global footprint increase management challenges and the risk of strategic errors. In the case of DB and other GIBs,the aforementioned factors are also combined with complex capital markets activities, with significant exposure to derivatives andstructured products, which also makes reporting and oversight more difficult, as illustrated during and after the 2007-08 financial crisis.

However, for DB and its peers, we believe that governance frameworks and related controls and processes have materially improvedsince the financial crisis and following various issuer-specific shortcomings in the past. Nonetheless, corporate governance remains akey credit consideration, given the new emerging risks, and continues to be a subject of our ongoing monitoring.

Support and structural considerationsLoss Given Failure (LGF) analysisDB is subject to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, which we consider an operational resolution regime. Therefore, we applyour Advanced LGF analysis, where we consider the risks faced by the different debt and deposit classes across the liability structureshould the bank enter resolution. In line with our standard assumptions, we assume a residual tangible common equity of 3%, as wellas asset losses of 8% of tangible banking assets in a failure scenario. We also assume a 25% runoff of junior wholesale deposits and a5% runoff of preferred deposits. Moreover, we assign a 25% probability to junior deposits being preferred to senior unsecured debt. Weapply a standard assumption for European banks that 26% of deposits are junior.

The results of our Advanced LGF analysis are as follows:

» For deposits and senior unsecured debt, our LGF analysis indicates an extremely low loss given failure, leading to three notches ofrating uplift from the bank's ba1 Adjusted BCA.

» For junior senior unsecured debt, our LGF analysis indicates a low loss given failure, leading to one notch of rating uplift from thebank's ba1 Adjusted BCA.

» For subordinated debt and junior securities issued by DB, our LGF analysis indicates a high loss given failure, given the small volumeof debt and limited protection from more subordinated instruments and residual equity, leading to a one-notch deduction from thebank's ba1 Adjusted BCA. We also incorporate additional notching from the Adjusted BCA for junior subordinated and preferenceshare instruments, reflecting the coupon suspension risk ahead of potential failure.

Government support considerationsWe assume a moderate probability of government support for both deposits and senior unsecured debt of DB, which we considera domestic systemically important financial institution, resulting in a one-notch additional rating uplift. For junior senior unsecureddebt11, subordinated debt and hybrid instruments, we believe the potential for government support is low, and these ratings, therefore,do not benefit from any government support uplift.

Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRRs)Our CRRs are opinions of the ability of entities to honor the uncollateralized portion of non-debt counterparty financial liabilities(CRR liabilities12) and also reflect the expected financial losses in the event such liabilities are not honored. CRRs are not applicable tofunding commitments or other obligations associated with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicer and trustee obligations,and other similar obligations that arise from a bank performing its essential operating functions.

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DB's CRRs are positioned at A3/P-2The bank's CRRs, before government support, are positioned three notches above the ba1 Adjusted BCA, reflecting the extremelylow loss given failure from the high volume of instruments, primarily junior senior unsecured debt, which are subordinated to CRRliabilities. DB's CRRs further benefit from one additional notch of rating uplift provided by government support, in line with our supportassumptions on deposits and senior unsecured debt.

Counterparty Risk (CR) AssessmentOur CR Assessment is an opinion of how counterparty obligations are likely to be treated if a bank fails and is distinct from debt anddeposit ratings in that it (1) considers only the risk of default rather than both the likelihood of default and the expected financial losssuffered in the event of default, and (2) applies to counterparty obligations13 and contractual commitments rather than debt or depositinstruments.

Because the CR Assessment captures the probability of default on certain senior operational obligations, rather than expected loss, wefocus purely on subordination and take no account of the volume of the instrument class.

DB's CR Assessment is positioned at A3(cr)/P-2(cr)The bank's CR Assessment, before government support, is positioned three notches above the ba1 Adjusted BCA, based on thesubstantial buffer against default provided by more subordinated instruments, primarily junior senior unsecured debt, to the seniorobligations represented by the CR Assessment.

In addition, DB's CR Assessment benefits from one additional notch of rating uplift provided by government support. This reflects ourview that any support provided by government authorities to a bank, which benefits deposits and senior senior debt, is very likely tobenefit operating activities and obligations reflected by the CR Assessment as well. This is consistent with our belief that governmentsare likely to maintain such operations as a going-concern to reduce contagion and preserve a bank's critical functions.

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Methodology and scorecardMethodologyThe principal methodology we use in rating Deutsche Bank AG is the Banks methodology, published in November 2019.

About Moody's Bank ScorecardOur bank scorecard is designed to capture, express and explain in summary form our Rating Committee's judgment. When readin conjunction with our research, a fulsome presentation of our judgment is expressed. As a result, the output of our scorecardmay materially differ from that suggested by raw data alone (though it has been calibrated to avoid the frequent need for strongdivergence). The scorecard output and the individual scores are discussed in rating committees and may be adjusted up or down toreflect conditions specific to each rated entity.

Rating methodology and scorecard factors

Exhibit 10

Deutsche Bank AG

Macro FactorsWeighted Macro Profile Strong + 100%

Factor HistoricRatio

InitialScore

ExpectedTrend

Assigned Score Key driver #1 Key driver #2

SolvencyAsset RiskProblem Loans / Gross Loans 2.2% a2 ←→ baa3 Operational risk Market risk

CapitalTangible Common Equity / Risk Weighted Assets(Basel III - fully loaded)

14.7% a1 ↓ baa2 Nominal leverage Expected trend

ProfitabilityNet Income / Tangible Assets -0.4% caa1 ←→ b3 Return on assets Expected trend

Combined Solvency Score baa1 ba1LiquidityFunding StructureMarket Funds / Tangible Banking Assets 25.5% baa2 ←→ baa1 Term structure Extent of market

funding relianceLiquid ResourcesLiquid Banking Assets / Tangible Banking Assets 39.4% a1 ←→ a1 Stock of liquid assets Expected trend

Combined Liquidity Score a3 a3Financial Profile baa3Qualitative Adjustments Adjustment

Business Diversification 0Opacity and Complexity -1Corporate Behavior -1

Total Qualitative Adjustments -2Sovereign or Affiliate constraint AaaBCA Scorecard-indicated Outcome - Range ba1 - ba3Assigned BCA ba1Affiliate Support notching 0Adjusted BCA ba1

Balance Sheet is not applicable.

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De Jure waterfall De Facto waterfall NotchingDebt ClassInstrumentvolume +

subordination

Sub-ordination

Instrumentvolume +

subordination

Sub-ordination

De Jure De FactoLGF

NotchingGuidance

vs.Adjusted

BCA

AssignedLGF

notching

AdditionalNotching

PreliminaryRating

Assessment

Counterparty Risk Rating - - - - - - - 3 0 baa1Counterparty Risk Assessment - - - - - - - 3 0 baa1 (cr)Deposits - - - - - - - 3 0 baa1Senior unsecured bank debt - - - - - - - 3 0 baa1Junior senior unsecured bank debt - - - - - - - 1 0 baa3Dated subordinated bank debt - - - - - - - -1 0 ba2Non-cumulative bank preference shares - - - - - - - -1 -2 b1

Instrument Class Loss GivenFailure notching

Additionalnotching

Preliminary RatingAssessment

GovernmentSupport notching

Local CurrencyRating

ForeignCurrency

RatingCounterparty Risk Rating 3 0 baa1 1 A3 A3Counterparty Risk Assessment 3 0 baa1 (cr) 1 A3(cr)Deposits 3 0 baa1 1 A3 A3Senior unsecured bank debt 3 0 baa1 1 A3 (P)A3Junior senior unsecured bank debt 1 0 baa3 0 Baa3 Baa3Dated subordinated bank debt -1 0 ba2 0 Ba2 Ba2Non-cumulative bank preference shares -1 -2 b1 0 B1 (hyb) B1 (hyb)[1]Where dashes are shown for a particular factor (or sub-factor), the score is based on non-public information.Source: Moody’s Investors Service

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Ratings

Exhibit 11

Category Moody's RatingDEUTSCHE BANK AG

Outlook NegativeCounterparty Risk Rating A3/P-2Bank Deposits A3/P-2Baseline Credit Assessment ba1Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment ba1Counterparty Risk Assessment A3(cr)/P-2(cr)Issuer Rating A3Senior Unsecured -Dom Curr A3Junior Senior Unsecured Baa3Junior Senior Unsecured MTN (P)Baa3Subordinate Ba2Pref. Stock Non-cumulative B1 (hyb)Commercial Paper -Dom Curr P-2Other Short Term -Dom Curr (P)P-2

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS

Outlook NegativeCounterparty Risk Rating Baa1/P-2Bank Deposits A2/P-1Baseline Credit Assessment baa1Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment baa1Counterparty Risk Assessment A3(cr)/P-2(cr)Issuer Rating Baa2

DB PRIVAT- UND FIRMENKUNDENBANK AG

Outlook NegativeCounterparty Risk Rating A3/P-2Bank Deposits A3/P-2Baseline Credit Assessment ba1Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment ba1Counterparty Risk Assessment A3(cr)/P-2(cr)Subordinate Ba2

Source: Moody's Investors Service

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Endnotes1 DB expects larger parts of the plan to be completed by the end of 2020. The plan makes substantially deeper and more definitive cuts to some of DB’s

trading businesses, in particular to global equity sales and trading, as well as the bank’s rates businesses, as well as further adjustments in the investmentbanking operations now designed to support the corporate banking franchise's success. DB will refocus its market activities to focus on increasing revenuefrom less capital-intensive businesses deemed critical for supporting the growth of its corporate client base. Relative to previous plans, the cuts will alsoextend deeper and more swiftly into middle- and back-office functions, reducing ongoing infrastructure costs for exited business lines and products. Atthe same time, DB must still absorb the expense of legacy risk positions, acquired in part before 2012, that no longer fit its revised strategy, as well as theassociated cost of exiting these businesses.

2 At its 2019 'Investor Deep Dive', management guided for lower revenue growth, largely owing to lower interest rates negatively affecting its PB franchise.The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in revenues for the PB segment is now expected to come in at 0% during the 2018-22 period, a decline from the2% CAGR outlined in July; the latter excluding interest rate and balance sheet efficiency impacts. Within the CB, the revenue CAGR is expected to remainunchanged at 3%. The IB is expected to perform better and DB lifted its revenue CAGR assumption to 2% from 0%, in part owing to better client retentionand anticipated resilience in institutional client revenue. In Asset Management, the revenue CAGR was slightly lowered to 1% from 2%. At group level, DBnow expects revenue to come in at around €24.5 billion by 2022, a slight reduction from the earlier €25 billion target. This includes a cumulative negativerevenue effect of €1.2 billion during the restructuring period from lower rates and equity markets.

3 As per DB definition. Excludes transformation-related charges and the impact of the Global Prime Finance transfer to BNP Paribas in Q4 2019.

4 Ratings related to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

5 Ratings related to Citibank, N.A.

6 DB's TLAC requirement of 6.0% is measured against its leverage ratio exposure of €1,248 billion as of 31 March 2020.

7 This includes senior preferred and senior non-preferred issuances, as well as AT1 and Tier 2 instruments.

8 Environmental risks can be defined as environmental hazards encompassing the impacts of air pollution, soil/water pollution, water shortages and naturaland man-made hazards (physical risks). Additionally, regulatory or policy risks, such as the impact of carbon regulation or other regulatory restrictions,including the related transition risks such as policy, legal, technology and market shifts, that could impair the evaluation of assets are an important factor.Certain banks could face a higher risk from concentrated lending to individual sectors or operations exposed to the aforementioned risks.

9 Social risk considerations represent a broad spectrum, including customer relations, human capital, demographic and societal trends, health and safety,and responsible production. The most relevant social risks for banks arise from the way they interact with their customers. Social risks are particularly highin the area of data security and customer privacy, which are partly mitigated by sizable technology investments and banks’ long track record of handlingsensitive client data. Fines and reputational damage because of product mis-selling or other types of misconduct are further social risks. Social trends arealso relevant in a number of areas, such as shifting customer preferences toward digital banking services increasing information technology costs, agingpopulation concerns in several countries affecting demand for financial services or socially driven policy agendas translate into regulations that affectbanks’ revenue bases. Pressure on profitability can be particularly severe for small banks that have limited options to mitigate declines in net interestincome, their main revenue source. By contrast, large institutions equipped with resources to invest in new businesses or technology will be somewhatable to overcome these challenges.

10 Corporate governance is a well-established key driver for banks and related risks are typically included in our evaluation of the banks' financial profile.Further factors such as specific corporate behavior, key-person risk, insider and related-party risk, strategy and management risk factors and dividendpolicy may be captured in individual adjustments to the BCA. Corporate governance weaknesses can lead to a deterioration in a company’s credit quality,while governance strengths can benefit its credit profile. When credit quality deteriorates because of poor governance, such as a breakdown in controlsresulting in financial misconduct, it can take a long time to recover. Governance risks are also largely internal rather than externally driven.

11 In particular, for junior senior unsecured debt, the 2018 legal changes to Germany's bank insolvency rank order has lowered the likelihood of governmentsupport being available for these instruments, because they legally rank pari passu with most of the outstanding (statutorily subordinated) seniorunsecured instruments issued up until 20 July 2018. This pari passu ranking of new junior senior unsecured debt with legacy (statutorily subordinated)senior unsecured instruments makes it less likely that German authorities would selectively support the legacy instruments (which we reclassified intojunior senior unsecured debt), following clarification that the German authorities expect these liabilities to bear losses in a resolution. As a result, we havereduced our government support assumption for these instruments to 'Low' from 'Moderate'.

12 Examples of CRR liabilities include the uncollateralized portion of payables arising from derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion ofliabilities under sale and repurchase agreements.

13 The CR Assessment is an opinion of the counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual performance obligations (servicing), derivatives(for example, swaps), letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

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