Detachment Gateway to the World of Spirituality

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Detachment: Gateway to the World of Spirituality

GOFFREDO BARTOCCI

World Psychiatric Association, Transcultural Psychiatry Section

SIMON DEIN

University College London

Abstract Mystical states are common cross-culturally. Here we examinethe prevalence and general characteristics of these states. We then proceedto critically examine the theories purporting to explain these states: psycho-analytic, cognitive and neurobiological, all of which attempt to explain thebreakdown of the boundaries between the self and external world. Weconclude by exploring the implications of mystical states for culturalpsychiatry.

Key words dissociation • mysticism • psychiatry • religion • spirituality

Introduction

In 1979, Raymond Prince, one of the pioneers of modern-day culturalpsychiatry, pointed out in his paper, ‘Religious Experience and Psychosis’,that mystical experiences were reasonably common in the general popu-lation and discussed the fact that both religious experience and psychosiscould be seen as ways of adapting to stressful life events. His paperunderscores the importance of religious experience for culturalpsychiatry. Here we revisit the subject of mystical experiences asking how

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we might understand them and what the implications are for culturalpsychiatry.

Cultural psychiatry has for a long time been interested in altered states

of consciousness. These states are of inherent interest in themselves butmore particularly we would argue for the information they give about thenormal functioning of human consciousness.1 Anthropological evidencesuggests that the ability to experience the transcendent and to apprehendmeanings and purposes extending beyond our individual lives is fairly universal. The phenomena of shamanism (Eliade, 1964; Halifax, 1979),soul flight (Harner, 1982) and spirit possession (Bourguignon & Evascu,1977; Goodman, 1988) attest to the universal tendency of humans toextend the boundaries of the self 2 while in an ‘altered state of conscious-

ness’.An ‘altered state of consciousness’ (ASC) is marked psychologically by

an individual’s differing perceptual responses, processes of memory formation, cognitive ability, personality structure, stimuli response andaffect from the ordinary or modal state of consciousness for the person. Itcan be demonstrated neurologically through external observations includ-ing: changes in EEG and cardiovascular functioning; autonomic nervoussystem functioning; neurochemical and hormonal changes in the brainand latterly through neuroimaging studies including PET and SPECT

scans.Religious experiences often, but not always, occur in altered states of

consciousness.Anthropologists have noted the surprising consistency withwhich various groups across time and culture have demarcated this typeof experience from other types of experience. It has been named as acentral aspect of religion and as a core dimension of religiosity. The term,however, is variously defined in the literature, or it may go undefined. Itmay appear under a host of different labels including mystical, ecstatic,numinous, anomalous, paranormal, out of body, transcendental and

conversion experiences. The most common operationalization of the termreligious experience relates to a sense, feeling, or perception of being in thepresence of the ‘sacred’, ‘holy’, or ‘supernatural’. We accept that each of these terms itself is culturally laden but argue that what unites them is afeeling of being in contact with a powerful transcendent other (howeverthis is culturally defined) which may extend to an unity with this other asexemplified in mystical experiences.

To date, the academic study of religious experience has been dominatedby a number of generally unconnected approaches: doctrinal analysiswhich emphasizes the study of texts; anthropological and socio-politicalapproaches emphasizing society’s interpersonal, cultural and religiousinteractions; phenomenological approaches which focus upon subject-ive religious experience; and scientific objective research including

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psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive neuroscience and various neurobio-logical approaches. These approaches, although valuable, have generally been unidimensional in their vector of influence with the concrete influ-

encing the abstract, i.e. religious consciousness (Andresen & Forman,2000).

However, religious consciousness can affect culture and society throughits language, theology and belief systems. Culture and consciousnessreflexively influence each other as do biology and consciousness. Andresenand Forman (2000) have argued for a pluralistic methodology in the study of religious experiences incorporating anthropology, cognitive science,neuropsychology, philosophy of mind and a myriad other fields in anendeavour to understand how consciousness functions and how it may

play a role in the constitution of reality, in spiritual experience, in doctrine,and in ritual. These authors argue that the study of religion will be greatly enhanced from an interdisciplinary consideration of how both conscious-ness and religious experiences may actively influence and in turn be influ-enced by neurophysiology.

Here we specifically examine one type of religious experience: mysticalstates. The term ‘mystical’ derives from the Greek root muo, referring toclosing the lips or eyes, and has the connotation of being hidden or beyondthe realms of ordinary experience. The term mystical experience is used in

the literature in two ways. In the broad sense it refers to a form of percep-tual experience granting acquaintance of a state of affairs that are of a kindnot accessible by way of sense perception, somatosensory modalities, andstandard introspection. Mystical experiences tend to be experiences felt orexperienced beyond the realms of ordinary consciousness and generally,but not always, occur in an ASC. Many authors define mysticism in thisway. For example, Happold (1990) defines mysticism as follows:

Mysticism has its fount in what is the raw material of all religion . . . the

inspiration of much of philosophy, poetry, art, and music . . . a conscious-ness of a beyond . . . of an unseen over and above the seen.

In the ‘narrow’ sense, mysticism refers to a form of unitive experiencegranting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs of a kind not access-ible by sense perception, somatosensory modalities or standard introspec-tion. Stace (1961) argues that the central core of mystical experienceinvolves the apprehension of an ultimate non-sensuous unity in all thingsin which ‘all is one’. In this article we will largely focus on these unitivetypes of experience.

Mystical experiences share common characteristics despite the cultureor religion in which they occur. However, the ways in which the experi-ences are communicated and the narratives relating to them are deeply cultural.3 It is important to point out that not all mystical experiences are

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described by those experiencing them as ‘religious’. For instance the unionof the person with nature may be described in secular terms but the experi-ence still has the quality of self-boundary loss.4

The unitive experience was well described by the German idealist,Malwida Von Meysenburg:

I was alone upon the sea shore . . . I felt that I . . . returned from the solitudeof individualisation into the consciousness of unity with all that is . . . [thatI knelt] down as one that passes away, and rose up as one imperishable.Earth, Heaven and sea resounded in one vast world encircling harmony. . . .I felt myself one with them. (Von Meysenburg, 1900; quoted in James, 1983[1902], p. 395)

Malwida’s experience is a feeling of being connected with the things of theworld as if she were part of them and they part of her. Her experienced self becomes semi-permeable and flows in with or perhaps through herenvironment. There is a lack of boundaries between consciousness andobject. Here the object and the perceiving person are united.

Mystical states are typically defined in the literature either as introvertiveor as extrovertive. Both ways relate to an apprehension of the ‘One’, butreach it in different ways. The extrovertive way looks outwards into theexternal world and finds the ‘One’ there, whereas the introvertive way

involves turning introspectively and finding the ‘One’ in the self. The extro-vertive mystic continues to perceive the same world of objects as the non-mystic but sees these objects transfigured in such a manner that a sense of unity derives from this perception. For the introvertive mystic, ordinary sensory-intellectual consciousness disappears and is replaced by a new kind of mystical consciousness. In this state, awareness of the world andmultiplicity are obliterated. In all cultures and religious groups, the essenceof this experience is that of an undifferentiated unity, though each cultureor religious group interprets this undifferentiated unity in terms of its own

cultural understandings.Mysticism has traditionally been described as having two strands:

apophatic and kataphatic (Johnston, 1997). These terms are related to thetwo main opposing ways in which a mystical experience can be induced.Whilst in apophatic mysticism the emphasis is on reducing sensory stimu-lation, in kataphatic mysticism the emphasis is on increasing extraneoussensations. Apophatic mysticism can be induced by fasting, meditation,sleep deprivation, reduction of environmental stimulation and slowingdown breathing. Kataphatic mysticism involves diverse practices whichheighten bodily movement and sensory stimulation and includeschanting, ecstatic dance and various ritual activities and generally requiresthe presence of other participants, unlike apophatic mysticism. It is of considerable interest that these differing modes of bringing about mystical


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states are common in many cultural groups. Modern cultures appear toprefer apophatic mysticism which can be performed to an extreme level tomake external reality disappear as a means of gaining contact with the

Holy, as in the case epitomized by the words of Evagrius of Pontus (399AD): ‘Do not allow your mind to undergo the impression of any outwardform’ (Bartocci, 2000, p. 385).

General Characteristics of Mystical States

In The Varieties of Religious Experience (1983 [1902]), William Jamesprovided a general model of mystical experiences which has sustained thetest of time and has been appropriated by other authors. James suggested

that all mystical experiences include four elements: they are ineffable, havea noetic quality about them, are limited in duration, and the mystic ispassive. Ineffability refers to the fact that these states are more like states of feeling than intellect, and are therefore difficult to communicate ineveryday language. On account of this, mystical literature is replete withparadoxes, symbolism and metaphor. Noetic quality refers to the fact thatmystical experiences are states of knowledge, insight and revelationbeyond the grasp of the intellect, whereby there is an awareness of unity with the absolute and the acquisition of great truths. This knowledge

might lead to permanent transformation in the person. Mystical states aregenerally transient. Lastly there is a feeling of passivity whereby the indi-vidual feels swept up by a ‘higher power’, and this may be accompanied by a sensation of separation from bodily consciousness. There may be anoverwhelming sense of being ‘taken over’, associated with a sense of loss of agency.

Mystical experience may also be associated with other affective andperceptual phenomena. As is widely reported by all those who have amystic experience, the general rule is that the moment of detachment is

closely followed by an experience of pleasure (Ware, 1974). This sense of pleasure can amount to extreme feelings of ecstasy or exuberant joy withthe world. Rarely is the apophatic mystic unable to re-engage withmundane reality and to come out of the ‘embrace with the holy’, since thisstate is perceived to be pleasant and risk-free.

Visual experiences have sometimes been reported in mystical states.However, most mystics and commentators on mysticism down play theimportance of these visions, and claim that, while often part of mysticalexperience, they do not form a necessary part of the core of mysticism. Infact, in some religious groups such as Sufism, mystical experience isconsidered as being essentially emotional, and visual experiences areconsidered to be of little religious significance. The goal of Eastern mysticaltraditions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Sufism) is enlightenment – the


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awakening of the capacity to perceive the ‘true’ nature of the self and theworld – not visions of angels or Buddhas. The same can be said for Westernmysticism. As Walter Hilton, a 14th-century English mystic, fervently

argues, ‘visions of revelations by spirits . . . do not constitute true contem-plation’.

James argued for a spectrum of mystical states of consciousness, rangingfrom the non-religious to the most religious and profound. He went on toargue that in ‘simple’ experiences, there is a slight widening of the field of consciousness, whereas in the more profound experiences consciousnessexpands to include items which appear to be hidden or just out of reach,including memories and sensations. As awareness increases to includemore and more external and internal information, the sense of the self and

the boundary between the self and environment seems to dissipate. Theexperience is one of unity with information formally defined as non-self.For the mystic the experience is very real. However, we would ask to whatextent can we actually invent ideal entities without falling into in thedomain of the unverifiable concepts of a pseudologia fantastica?

According to James, this experience may not be beneficial for someonewho does not have a strong sense of self to begin with, and these peoplemay see mystical experiences as frightening. James refers to some mysticalexperiences in terms of ‘diabolic mysticism’, in which cases mystical ideas

are seen as symptoms of insanity. He defines these as the ‘lower mysti-cisms’. Although they derive from the same psychological mechanisms asthe classical religious sort, the experiences are negative. For instance, the16th-century Christian mystic, John of the Cross, describes his depressionexperienced by the mystic yearning for union with God as ‘the dark nightof the soul’. James argues that all mystical experience, whether experiencedas positive or negative, should be recognized as available states of consciousness.

Following James, authors have generally emphasized the unifying and

ego transcending aspects of mystical experience. Some, however, havetended to secularize this experience. In his essay ‘Religious Aspects of Peak Experiences,’ Maslow (1964) uses the term ‘peak experiences’ to encom-pass the spectrum of mystical states of consciousness but secularizes thisexperience to avoid the religious connotations of the term ‘mystical’. Thesepeak experiences or experiences of transcendence are not supernaturalphenomena; they are natural and open to analysis by the psychologist orscientist. They do not require a religious context for their expression. ForMaslow these peak experiences are unifying, noetic and ego transcendingand give a sense of purpose to those experiencing them.


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The Prevalence of Mystical States

As early as 1979, Raymond Prince discussed four population surveysregarding mystical experiences. In these surveys 20% to 40% of thosesurveyed reported a mystical or religious experience. Mystical experienceswere described by informants in different ways, for instance, ‘a sense of existing in a unitary place outside time and space’ or of ‘being immersedin a kind of objective or ultimate reality that eludes verbal description’.Many authors have claimed that mystical experiences by which individualsattain a feeling of unity or oneness are relatively frequent (Hardy, 1979;Hay & Morisy, 1978; Hood, 1975; Stace, 1961). Although experiences of aspiritual presence are commonplace, ecstatic mystical states in whichsubjects describe a feeling of universal love or become identified with someaspect of the cosmos occur less commonly.

Theories of Mystical States: Psychoanalytic Theories

Here we examine three theoretical perspectives on mystical states: psycho-analytic, cognitive and neurobiological. We can ‘explain’ spiritual ormystical experience at any of these ‘levels’, yet as Lancaster (2000, 2004)argues, the predominant scientific view would hold that only the neuro-

biological level has the ring of authenticity about it because it indicates thematerial cause of the conscious experience. A phenomenon may beexplained in two senses. First, it can be explained in terms of constructswhich convey an adequate picture for us to gain a meaningful view of thephenomenon. Second, it can be explained in terms of the real eventscausing it. In a similar way, Henningsen and Kirmayer (2000, p. 479)distinguish between the causa materialis, how a certain function ismaterially realized, and the causa efficiens, the causes that explain transi-tions of states of behaviour or experience. The former requires knowledge

about the lower neuronal levels, the latter does not.Traditional psychoanalysis sees spirituality and mysticism as a regres-sion to, or fixation on, the infantile stage. Freud, in Civilization and itsDiscontents, reduced the ‘oceanic experience’ of mystics to ‘infantile help-lessness’ and a ‘regression to primary narcissism’. In a similar way, Princeand Savage (1965) proposed the concept of regression in an attempt toaccount for mystical consciousness. They saw mystical states, at least insome sense, as a return to the state of early infancy which may be the mostfavoured moment for learning. However, theories that dismiss mysticism

as regression fail to engage with the noetic aspects of objectivity and reality and transcendence of space and time. Parsons (1999), in his study of Freud’s theories of mysticism, argues that psychoanalysis has generally over-reduced mysticism to psychological regression or pathology. By


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contrast, Jung (1969) saw mystical experiences as a sign of health and as apowerful agent of transformation.

Many of the ideas about mystical experience derive from the work on

attachment and detachment (Bartocci & Prince, 1998). A useful psycho-analytic paradigm for understanding these experiences is the peek-a-boogame in which the mother hides from the baby and then reappears (passiveform), or the baby covers his or her face to make the external world dis-appear and then uncovers the eyes to make it reappear (active form). Bothmystical states and the active form of the peek-a-boo game are associatedwith the disappearance of the external world. The most striking character-istic of the game is the joy manifested by the baby at seeing the maternalfigure or external world reappearing after having been hidden from the

baby’s view (Maurer, 1967). It is important to point out that spiritualseekers are not the only ones who make an effort to achieve religious typesof ASC through a complex set of means and procedures often hingingupon detachment from the external reality: children too resort to ‘beinggone’ fantasies (named by Freud (1920) as ‘o-o-o’, following his nephew’smurmurings in his disappearance stage) that are rooted in detachmentdynamics with the aim of producing a particular state of consciousnessthat is generally the consequence of an external situation that is perceivedto be a negative stimulus.

The ‘being gone’ fantasies of children do not have any religious signifi-cance but are a way to detach from a negative perception of external reality.However, the detachment phenomenon (‘o-o-o’) is available to take onmore elaborate forms and meanings, depending on cultural influences.Just as intense pleasure is characteristic of mystical states (Ware, 1974),pleasure occurs at the moment of reappearance in the peek-a-boo game.The term ‘tension-pleasure’ (Schur, 1962) suitably describes the particularmental situation experienced in this phase of the game (Bartocci, 2004).

To bring about this sense of self-loss we need to consider the existence

of dual physiological mechanisms for neutralizing the external world andone’s self. The first is achieved by thickening the ‘wall’ between the self andthe external world; the second mechanism enhances an illusory lack of barriers between the self and the external world, through the creation of afictitious mystical undifferentiation between the self and an external worldthat becomes being and nothingness, death and love at the very same time.St Angela of Foligno (1248–1309) was known to say: ‘You are I and I am

you.’ It is obvious that between these two different ways of ‘relating’ one’sself with the external world lies a whole range of processes that draw fromindividual experiences tuned by respective cultural beliefs.

A number of defence mechanisms may be involved in the self-loss orself-floating process. Prince and Savage (1965), exploring the concept of regression, discussed three behaviours and experiences that may underlie


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the mechanism of the transcendence: (1) Lustman described the defenceof imperceptivity among newborn infants. During circumstances regardedas extremes of pleasure and pain, i.e. active suckling and colic, infants were

completely unresponsive to auditory or tactile stimulation; (2) Lewindescribed the concept of the dream screen, pertaining to babies having a‘blank dream’, ‘a vision of uniform blankness . . . a sort of backdrop orprojective screen’; finally, (3) the Isakower phenomenon, a hypnogogicexperience described as:

a large, round, dark mass seems to approach the beginning sleepers, or itmay be a grey cloud, it envelops him . . . he loses his sense of the self-boundary and cannot say where the division is between his own body andthe mass. . . . There may be a heaviness lying on top of him, and perhaps a

humming, babbling or murmuring of unintelligible speech.

In the poorly trained spiritual seeker, when the detachment operationsare not driving the subject to culturally tuned mystical states, they may shift into a state of blankness, clouding of consciousness, imperceptivity similar to the states described above. In this way the individual turns adefensive dynamic of early infancy into a compulsive-repetitive behaviour.In fact, considering that the fantasy of making external reality disappearmay become culturally organized, it assumes some inherent stability. A sort

of ‘compulsive self-reliance’ (Fraley & Shaver, 1999; Kobak, 1999) wouldappear to be the natural outcome of learning to make oneself detachedfrom any stimuli. Once the perception is shut off, it is not difficult to reachthe stage of stripping the self of all material encumbrances (Prince &Savage, 1965)

Cognitive Theories of Mysticism

To date there has been little scholarly attention given to mystical states by

cognitive psychologists. Representation is a central theme in cognitivediscussions of consciousness. By representation is meant the ability of asystem to constitute itself (or a subset of itself) to correspond in some way to something other than itself. One such representation, that of the self,plays a critical role determining what we are conscious of. Lancaster (2000,2004) describes how cognitive psychologists have conceptualized mysticalstates as arising from the attenuation of self-representation, together witha concomitant shift towards normally preconscious processes. Morerefined theories of mystical experience await future developments in

cognitive science, especially those devoted to the psychology of self-representation.


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The Neurobiology of Mystical States: Causation or

Correlation?

For the past two decades research has pointed to correlations betweenbrain activity and mystical experiences. Specifically those brain areasassociated with the boundaries of the self and the perception of time, thetemporal and parietal lobes, are found to be implicated in these types of experiences. A number of neuroscientists have recently argued for a neuralbasis for religious experience. For instance in 1997 neurologist VilayanurRamachandran told the audience of the Society for Neuroscience thatthere is ‘a neural basis for religious experience’. What is the evidence forthis?

Persinger (1983) noted that a number of mystical experiences can beobtained by temporal lobe stimulation: out-of-body experiences, vestibu-lar sensations, travelling through time and space, auditory experiencesincluding the voice of God, visual perceptual alterations, bright lights,looking down the tunnel and peacefulness. He concluded ‘the God experi-ence is an artefact deriving from changes of the temporal lobe’ (Persinger,1987, p. 137).

Fenwick (2001) reviewed evidence relating temporal lobe disturbance(such as epilepsy) with religious experience. He concludes that the

temporal lobe is to some extent involved in the synthesis of mysticalfeelings and states. It is not uncommon to find fragments of mysticalexperience in the epileptic aura. Work by Waxman and Gechswind (1975)and Bear and Fedio (1977) give a strong impetus to the link betweentemporal lobe pathology and religious experience.

A further understanding of the biological basis of religious experiencebuilds upon the insights of Fischer (1971), who describes two directionsin which consciousness can be altered: the ergotropic pathway of increas-ing arousal, culminating in the extreme of mystical ecstasy, and the

trophotropic pathway of decreasing arousal, culminating in deep trance.The former is based on sympathetic nervous system activation and thelatter is based on parasympathetic nervous system activation. Thesepathways can be stimulated by drugs, such as LSD, and can be demon-strated to be different in that the EEG shows increasingly higher frequency discharges on the ergotropic and an increase in lower frequency dischargeson the trophotropic pathways. These paths are not opposite but, in fact,proceed in parallel. These states are very close to each other and it is notuncommon to find a person in a high state of hyperarousal going directly

into a state of trance without retracing his steps along the ergotropicpathway.

Experimentally it has been found that as the person is taken from thearousal level of daily activity to the extremes of hyper or hypo-arousal, a


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number of subjective and objective phenomena are consistently repro-duced. The boundary between the observer and observed, between subjec-tive and objective, is increasingly blurred. The link with chronological time

of the physical world is broken. Time can appear to speed up or slow downdepending on certain personality parameters. Newberg and D’Aquili(2000, pp. 255–256) have built on these ideas for understanding the neuro-physiological processes occurring in mystical states. They note:

During certain types of meditation . . . We have proposed that as thehypertrophotropic state creates a state of oceanic bliss, the ergotropiceruption results in the experience of a sense of a tremendous release of energy . . . activity is so extreme that ‘spillover’ occurs . . . This may be associated with the experience of an orgasmic, rapturous or ecstatic

rush, arising from a generalised sense of flow and resulting in a trance-likestate.

Newberg, D’Aquili and Rouse (2001) used SPECT (single positronemission computerized tomography) scanning to make an image of thebrain of Tibetan Buddhist monks and Catholic nuns during meditationand prayer. During these activities, there was a marked decrease in activity of the posterior superior parietal lobe and marked increase in the activity of the pre-frontal cortex predominantly on the right side of the brain. They concluded that the sensation of absorption of the self into ‘somethinglarger’ can be attributed to decreased activity of the posterior superiorparietal lobe, the brain’s ‘orientation’ area responsible for defining theboundaries of the self. A lack of stimulation of the left lobe will result inan individual’s loss of sense of self. On account of lack of definition of these physical boundaries, he or she would feel connected with theirsurroundings. A lack of stimulation of the right lobe would enhance theindividual’s feeling of unity with the world, as the brain would no longerbe creating the perception of a physical space.

The increase in activity of the pre-frontal cortex is related to the processby which meditators reach their peak. The pre-frontal cortex has beendubbed the ‘attention association area’ and can be broken down intoseveral parts. The medial area gives an individual a sense of personal driveand allows him to plan future actions. Damage to this area results in lack of motivation whereby individuals no longer have the initiative to act ontheir thoughts. This area has been called the seat of personal will. Thedorsal lateral area allows individuals to concentrate on a given task orobject by sorting out extreme sensory inputs.

As a result of hyperactivation of the prefrontal cortex, the hippocampusinhibits the flow of signals between neurones in other parts of the brain,specifically the orientation areas which become ‘deprived’ of neuronalactivity and can no longer function to maintain a sense of self. This results


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in what Newberg calls a ‘softening of the boundaries of the self ’, resultingin a sense of oneness and spiritual unity.

Newberg’s work appears to demonstrate that there is a specific brain

activity associated with religious experience. However, it is important topoint out that a SPECT scan can only look at one part of the brain, theneocortex, and not the older subcortical structures. Is it possible to arguefrom these experiments that religious experience is simply an effect of neurological processes in the cortex? In a critique of this research, Calta-girone and Hosinski (2002) point out that it is impossible to determinefrom correlational studies the extent to which religious experience causesbrain activity, or brain activity causes religious experience. They provide anumber of criticisms of other findings above.

First, religion has been reduced to a simple or singular concept dis-regarding the other well-understood elements that exist. Newberg andD’Aquili essentially argue that mysticism is religion. However, religioncontains other accepted elements, such as sacramentalism, silence andaction (Haught, 1990). These elements may be more important thanmysticism in religious systems. Therefore, by claiming that neurosciencecan explain mysticism, one cannot suppose that neuroscience hasexplained all other forms of religious experience. Unless neuroscientistscan explain these other forms of religious phenomena by neurological

means, they have not demonstrated that religion is solely a product of thebrain (Albright, 2000).

Second, even if neurological induction methods can cause specificphenomena, this does not mean that they are the primary cause. Simply because we can artificially stimulate an event, it is not warranted toconclude there are no other external triggering events for that experience.

A third argument against neurological explanation is that it leads to aform of physicalism. One version of this physicalism involves the claimthat in the future neuroscience will be sufficient to explain all that we know

about the human person. This implies that if we were to know the set of states of the human being, the order in which they progress and the startdate, then one could determine the person in every respect (except withregard to the physical world interacting with the person). However, thisform of determinism does not seem to fit with our understanding of reality. Even if we understand each part of the brain perfectly, this does notguarantee anyone could know anything of the whole system, especially of the whole person (Clayton, 2000, p. 625).

Caltagirone and Hosinski (2002) conclude that current research has notdemonstrated that religious experience is an effect of neurologicalprocesses. All that the research really shows is that there are specific neuro-logical processes that are associated with mystical experience. However, wewould argue that this field of research broadens the dialogue between


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religion and science and may provide fruitful insights for further under-standing the neurological correlates of religious experience.

Pathologization and Normalization of Spiritual States

Historically, mental health professionals and diagnostic classifications havetended to ignore or pathologize intense religious and spiritual experiences.Such experiences have been described using various pathological labels:‘ego regression’, ‘borderline psychosis’, a psychotic episode and a temporallobe dysfunction (Lukoff, Lu, & Turner, 1992). There is, however, someevidence to suggest that those who have mystical experiences score loweron various psychopathology scales and higher on measures of psychologi-

cal well-being than controls (Hood, 1996).Prince (1979) highlighted the fact that a considerable number of shared

religious beliefs, despite their low congruence with reality (e.g. ‘Jesus wasborn from a virgin’), and despite the fact that they are essentially unveri-fiable (e.g. ‘if I confess my sins, I will go to heaven’) or at least highly improbable (e.g. ‘I will meet up with my friends after I die’), nonethelesscannot be defined as pathological.

From a psychiatric point of view, it is imperative that healthprofessionals ensure that people who experience an ‘eruption of the super-

natural’ in their life are not misdiagnosed and treated ‘for a biogenetic(incurable) brain disease such as a major psychosis rather than a curablespiritual illness’ (Castillo, 2003). We agree with Castillo when he arguesthat in Western cultures, egocentrism and a loss of spiritual explanationsfor psychosis, and an emphasis on physiology and the psychopathology of the various dimensions of ‘spirituality’, construct a clinical situation inwhich people with functional and temporary ‘psychotic’ episodes aretreated for a incurable brain disease rather than being treated for a set of phenomena which can be understood under the framework of trance

states.In other words, psychiatrists must differentiate between those who have

not succeeded in mastering detachment dynamics such that they areincapable of re-engaging in mundane daily affairs and, by contrast, thosewho remain within a cultural definition of their mystical experience, andmay even claim a special role in the society for having been blessed by the‘kiss of the absolute’.

Certainly, it is not an easy anthropological task to evaluate the meaningof the different performances of the devotee engaged in ASC. The ritualswaying of one’s head in front a white wall or a gleaming mosaic, or thefascination felt for a mummified body in a shrine, are both acts of devotionon the part of the devotee and a training of the brain for repeatedtranscendence from reality. But the negative side-effects of facilitating


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detachment may drive the person to an annihilation of the self, and thesacrifice of his own physical life, which in the fundamentalist religion istaken as a coherent goal of human existence. Social reinforcement thus

facilitates the extreme process of detachment up to the point of engender-ing a kind of group ego ideal that does away with the very life instinct.5 Asan example, the rhythmic alternation of negation and re-affirmation (‘noGod but God’, in Dhikr) has proven to be very effective in eliminating themundane and creating ‘a mental re-presentation of God as the one realbeing. Thus it is negation and affirmation at the same time, which is very typical of Islam in general’ (Landolt, 1965, p. 72).6

This technique is a sort of ‘concentrated’ form of the method used by Christian mystics envisaging self-sacrifice followed by re-affirmation in the

presence of God. In fact, mystic ascent ‘involves the surrender of the self and self-sacrifice. The Christian must kill and make nothing of his ownwill’ (Dickinson, 1965, p. 78). Through this procedure, described by Wulff (1991, p. 635) as ‘the transcendental contemplation of the mystic’, it ispossible to realize how to ascend to God, how to achieve the experience of the Absolute up to the moment in which ‘the apprehension of theInvisible Real’ will repay the effort made in following the path towards theInvisible.

Dissociation as a Voluntary Cultural Phenomenon

Culture determines how specific actions are interpreted and whether ornot different religious activities are seen as evidence of ecstasy, devotion,or psychopathology.

The modern concept of religion no longer rests on an inner thrusttowards aggregation similar to the one described by Cicero (2nd century AD) who used the term ‘religion’ in the Latin sense of religare (‘ to holdtogether, bind’ ), which refers to the binding together of a group of persons

who share common ideas, but which has evolved into the connotationfound in Tertullian’s usage (2nd–3rd century AD), who came to considerreligion as a state of dependence on a superior entity. This second definitionis now the core of modern spiritually as expressed by Miller and Martin(cited in Hughes & Wintrob, 2000, p. 30): ‘As a working definition, wepropose that spirituality entails the acknowledgement of a transcendentbeing, power, or reality greater than ourselves. . . . Furthermore spiritual-ity involves an attempt to align and conform one’s life (both covert andovert behaviour) toward this higher power.’

Surrendering to God, and the transcendental thrust that oneness withthe Absolute creates, opens the way for a new religious era. This becamefor Christians a distinguishing of their new faith, compared to pagan cults.Christianity was characterized ‘by the bondage of pity and of dependence


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seen as a duty of faith paid to God. Thus the old concept of the Romanreligio disappears making way for its modern meaning’ (Frighi, 1996,p. 465), and for its ever changing acceptance of the ‘ethics’ of extreme

behaviours.The believer’s inclination towards martyrdom, the heroic act performed

by someone who puts her or his life at stake in order to save anotherhuman being, the hermitic and cenobitical withdrawal from life thatbecame the exemplary behaviour of saintly men, the rejection of socialconvention on the part of members of sects – all reflect an intertwining of values and existential radicalisms that are difficult to interpret. The senseunderlying these actions depends on the perspective taken in making theinterpretation, on whether it is religious, humanistic, philosophical or, as

in our case, psychological.Far from being considered pathological, those who have mystical experi-

ences may be considered as having special abilities. The mystic exemplifiesthe ‘miraculous’ possibility of coming back from his self-dissolution, fromanother world ‘out there’. From this point of view the mystic may becredited with the extraordinary ability to approach the divine, meet thesacred and not be blinded by its light. The fact that the mystic demonstrateshim or herself to be an expert in handling the holy makes him or her acharismatic figure intrinsically apt for healing or becoming a thaumaturge.

Such was the case of Padre Pio described by Bartocci and Littlewood (2004).But is there any opposite side of the coin? Is the cultural road that led tothe acquisition of the ability to switch between two great systems (mundaneand extramundane) safer than a self that may ‘only’ deal with the mundaneworld? Vernant (1975) very clearly depicts the ascetic when he points outthat the ascetic is ‘already cooked’ once he identifies himself with theUniversal Self and breaks away from creativity and action.

On the contrary, rather than actively engaging in training themselves tomanage a rapprochement to an institutional spiritual agency, as occurs in

monotheistic religions in order to seek oneness with the Absolute, many of the so-called traditional populations show the tendency to avoid therepresentation of a fully transcendent ‘Being’ and to remain in a magic-like world of very powerful intentions coming from material entities.

As an example of the slow-paced transition that led to an understand-ing of the experience of evil possession as being produced by an internalsplit of consciousness, a form of dissociation, rather than through the‘uncouth’ influence of external factors, Osterreich (1930, p. 91) pointed toa deep-seated difference in the functioning of possession phenomenapresented among traditional versus modern cultures:

Much more probably it was rather the conviction of being possessed whichbrought about a real division of the mind, whereas in the divisions observed


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today the relation is reversed: first there arises a genuine division of theinner life, and then the individual declares himself ‘dual’.

This observation, even if it deals with possession states, may be useful

also for understanding mystical states, insofar as both are included withinthe framework of trance states. Osterreich’s statement supports the possi-bility of a culturally tuned process, leading to the construction of a‘genuine division of the inner life’ that might subsequently facilitate thepresentation of a wide range of ‘dual’ performances embracing a largevariety of phenomena: possession, mystical states, dissociative identity disorder, hysteria or, in cultural anthropology, a dual register in interpret-ing a dual truth (theological and scientific).

We can say that technologically advanced populations refrain fromstaging medieval-like possession trances but nonetheless disclose aconsiderable inclination towards wanting to experience a polymorphoustypology of ‘suspended states of consciousness’ that are often accompaniedby a high level of gullibility vis-à-vis miraculous healings. Little does itmatter if such states are achieved by means or techniques promoted by secular medicine, temple incubation among Greek Asclepians, biofeed-back, virtual reality therapy, transcendental meditation, free associationtechniques, ‘active imagination’ in which the patient is asked to continuein waking fantasy an interrupted dream or imagine a dialogue with extra-mundane figures, or simply represent a fashionable hybridization withexotic remedies or the quasi-religious stages required either by new religious movements or by far-fetched religious sects: the aim is to tran-scend, however high the cost might be.

Vernant (1982) attempted to identify the driving force that determinedthe transformation of the polytheistic religious universe into a mono-theistic one in the 7th century BCE. He found the most likely reason forthe religious innovation that occurred in far-remote civilizations such as

China, India, Iran, Judea and Greece (involving Confucianism, Buddhism,Zoroastrianism, Jewish prophetism, and the philosophical search for theAbsolute in Greece) to be a general ‘quest for transcendence’: a search fora God with a special characteristic – invisibility – a God not representablein images or through easy concepts. A new set of endowments made thisinvisible God much more apt than pagan idols to absorb the transcendenceattitude of human beings. Wulff (1991) shared the same opinion, to theextent that he suggested the need to incorporate the ‘principle of theinclusion of the transcendent’ into the methodology used in the psycho-

logical investigation of religious trance.In order to gain a deeper understanding of the quest for the transcend-ence, we must reconceptualize the notion of dissociation,7 seeing it not justas a response to trauma but as a voluntary process which can temporarily


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enhance psychological well-being. Trance states, individual or triggered by a shaman, are evidence of the capacity to voluntarily make use of detach-ment as a technique to gain a ‘suspended state of consciousness’ rooted in

a momentary dissociation. In this case, dissociation can be considered asa mental attitude subject to cultural influence to ‘allow detachment of awareness from the immediate passage of events’ (Littlewood, 2002,p. 132).

This kind of dissociation is not a reaction to unexpected trauma, butdepends on a conscious act of volition reinforced by spiritual training. Itfollows that detachment and dissociation are no longer seen as ways toavoid experiencing trauma but rather as a means to generically detachoneself from events; dissociation can be resorted to without the existence

of a threatening external stimulus, and it can be enhanced through trainingor by complying with specific cultural factors.

The role of culture in this process is enormous. Through cultural andrelational conditioning that is often of a religious nature, the detachmentmechanism shifts from being a purely defensive function of the mind tobeing a pre-emptive attitude aimed to protect the self from the negativeeffects of external realities. Like most other cultural processes, transcend-ence becomes the norm that contributes to the shaping of the state of consciousness: ‘Out of the alternative possibilities of human awareness a

culture selects its “ordinary consciousness,” its characteristic and habitualpatterning of mental functioning that adapts the individual, more or lessconsciously, to survive in his culture’s consensual reality’ (Tart, 1980,p. 249).

Mystical States and Psychopathology

There has been much written attempting to compare mysticism withpsychosis. William James (1983 [1902], p. 426) argued that spiritual and

psychotic experiences were broadly distinguishable but involved import-ant areas of correspondence.

It is evident from the point of view of their psychological mechanisms thatclassic mysticism and these lower mysticisms spring from the same mentallevel . . . that religion contains every kind of matter: Seraph and Snake abidethere side by side.

In this passage he also mentions how there are abundant cases in whichmystical ideas are cited as characteristic symptoms of enfeebled or deluded

states of mind. ‘In delusional insanity or paranoia we may have some kindof diabolical mysticism. A sort of religious mysticism turned upside down.’These views concerning the similarity between the two phenomena areshared by many commentators (Clarke, 2001; Jung, 1960; Laing, 1967;


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Prince, 1979; Underhill, 1930; Wooton & Allen, 1983). Certainly it cannotbe denied that there are some similarities between the two types of experi-ence (Buckley, 1981; Sedman & Hopkinson, 1966).

For instance, both mystical experience and psychosis often sharereligious or paranormal content, or association with a divine calling. Bothinvolve a sense of presence or experience of discarnate entities and a senseof being guarded by external power. Visions and voices may occur inboth. There are some phenomenological parallels between the two typesof experience (Jackson & Fulford, 1997). The central characteristics of mystical states, including noesis, can be experienced at the onset of psychosis (Bowers & Freedman, 1966; Buckley, 1981). Both may share asense of disruption of time. The mystic may claim to be in the presence of

God for what seems like hours whereas the psychotic may experiencetrance-like lapses of time (Kemp, 2000).

However, some reject the idea that spiritual and psychotic experiencesare significantly related and argue instead that the apparent parallels arepurely superficial. For instance, Greeley (1974) suggests, in relation tomysticism, that ‘it is a different kind of consciousness change, both in thenature of the experience . . . and its after effects. To compare mysticismwith schizophrenia is like comparing bread with steak because they areboth foods.’ Littlewood (1997) argues that the concepts of psychotic and

spiritual experience are both cultural constructions, each potentially refer-ring to a wide range of heterogeneous phenomena. He argues that theexpectation that anyone’s particular experience will fall neatly into one orother category is to inappropriately reify these constructions.

Spiritual experiences are sub-culturally based and socially accepted,whereas psychotic experiences are idiosyncratic, bizarre and alienating.There are other significant differences between them in such dimensionsas: the degree of agency involved; the level of insight; the type of halluci-nations; and the associated affect. Mystics often experience joy and sweet-

ness, or ecstasy, while people with psychosis can be terrified or indifferentto their psychotic experiences. James (1983[1902], p. 426) says in relationto psychosis that ‘the emotion is pessimistic; instead of consolations, wehave desolations; the meanings are dreadful, and the powers are enemiesfor life.’ Although ecstasy is often present initially in psychosis, it is thenreplaced by dread (Bowers & Freedman, 1966). The mystical experience istransient, usually lasting for a few hours and resolved completely, whilepsychotic states may last months or years and will often leave residualdelusions, flattening of affect or reduced social functioning. The with-drawal of the mystic is described as facultative, meaning entering themystical state is induced by choice, unlike the psychotic state, which visitsa person involuntarily. Perhaps the most important distinction is thatalthough the psychotic is unable to observe the distinction between inner


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and outer world, the well-adjusted mystic lives happily and productively in both (Heehs, 1997).

Conclusion: Religious Experience and Healing

Prince (1979) argued that both psychosis and religious experience couldbe seen as endogenous attempts to heal the psyche and that a spontaneoushealing mechanism is also apparent in a good proportion of mysticalexperiences. He provided as evidence the experiences of a number of people such as Arthur Koestler, Claire Myers Owen and MalcolmMuggeridge, who experienced these mystical states during periods of psychological upheaval. Prince viewed religious experience as a homeo-

static self-healing mechanism of the brain, which has evolved to resolveacute stress.

The view that religious and spiritual experiences are adaptive psycho-logical processes is shared by other authors (Batson & Ventis, 1982; Grof & Grof, 1986; James, 1983 [1902]; Jung, 1960; Storr, 1996). Persinger(1983) argued that the capacity for such experiences evolved as a speciesspecific buffer against death anxiety. For Batson and Ventis (1982)spiritual experience is a problem-solving process triggered by existentialcrises involving both emotional and cognitive tension. In the case of

benign spiritual experience, the problem-solving process is homeostaticand reduces the level of tension.

Some have advocated a similar process occurring in psychosis, arguingthat psychotic experience is a solution in the more limited sense of containing symbolic information which has potential use for the subject.For instance, in his study of Schreber’s psychosis, Freud suggested that ‘thedelusional formation, which we take to be the pathological product, is inreality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction.’

However in psychosis the initial insights (James’s ‘noetic quality’) fail to

resolve the triggering crisis and result in increased levels of stress. It canindeed be argued that both mysticism and psychosis involve attempts toresolve crises. In the former the experience may be adaptive in so far as itis represented within the orthodox framework of the socially sharedcultural inherited conglomerate; in the latter, due to lack of ties withcultural idioms or images, it ultimately fails.

Notes

1. For a discussion of mysticism as pure consciousness see Forman (1998). Heargues that mystical experiences may represent a pure form of consciousnesswhereby one suspends all mental content, yet emerges from the experienceconfident that one has remained fully awake inside, fully conscious.


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2. For a good discussion of the neurophysiology of ASC see Winkelman (1986,1992). Spiegel (1989) argues that humans have an innate drive to seek alteredstates of consciousness. In contemporary Western society it may be that

alcohol and drug consumption may replace this need for altered states of consciousness.3. Katz (1978), however, rejects the idea that all mystical experiences are the

same. According to him all experiences are shaped by preconceptions that theexperiencing person possesses prior to any experience. These preconceptionsare culturally based. To this extent all mystical states are culturally dependent.

4. Religious groups differentiate between union and identification. Unlike someEast Asian religious traditions, in Judaism and Christianity it is not accept-able to call oneself God during this mystical experience. Identification withGod is rejected not only by Jewish mystics but by nearly all Christian mystics,

by orthodox Sufis and by monotheistic Hindus.5. The notion of martyrdom and murder, intended as the sacrificing of life for

sacred aims, is deeply rooted in the religious history of the three prevailingmonotheitic creeds: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Yehoshua (2000, p. 7)points out how the rhetorical instruments of literature may ‘influence thereader in a way that he accepts moral issues that, in other circumstances,would have been strongly refused.’ The fact that Genesis begins its narrationwith a gratuitous murder never provoked any reaction or protest, thusbearing witness to the power of the sacred in suspending our sense of justicewhen dealing with facts handed down in texts presumably inspired by God.

Yehoshua points out that the slaying of Abel by the hand of Cain (Genesis 4:1–17) is not only destined to remain unpunished, but the fate in store for thevery first murderer in Biblical history actually proves to be quite rewardingas, having obtained protection from God, Cain built a city that he named afterhis son, Enoch.

6. The handbook describing ‘how to die’ deployed by the suicide bombers in theattack on the twin towers in New York on 11 September 2001, which has beenfound by the FBI, describes how special states of consciousness are resortedto on approaching physical death. This manual contains guidelines aimed at

helping hijackers self-induce a state of consciousness that provides them withthe psychic instruments to carry their action through. The first step usually consist of a general prayer: ‘Oh God, I believe in you. Oh, God, I am in yourhands: I am asking you to guide me, with the light of your faith that has litup the world and the darkness of the Earth.’ The meditation culminates withthe last page in the manual that consists of the compulsory repetition of theformula: ‘There is no God but God. There is no God but God. We belong toGod and will return to God.’ No one was very surprised by the use it makesof religious formulae to legitimate acts that go well beyond their originalpurpose and that lie outside the religious context in which they originated.

7. For an excellent discussion of psychiatric disorders and dissociation seeSpiegel (1994) and especially the chapter by Kirmayer in this book on culturalaspects of dissociative states. Kirmayer notes that social forces serve to makethe most of underlying dissociative abilities. Dissociative states illustrate the


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fact that identity is in many ways a non-unitary phenomenon contrary to how it is usually conceptualized in the West. Like these authors, we may ask whether dissociation is a single unique state or process. Dissociative states

rarely consist of a discrete, enduring state or process, but generally involveruptures in conscious flow, behaviour repertoire or self-identity. Krippner(1997) in fact extends his definition of dissociation to encompass mysticalstates.

There are some similarities between mystical states and ‘dissociative’ statessuch as spirit possession: the loss of agency (and the attribution of actions tothe possessing spirit), altered state of consciousness, loss of self-conscious-ness, loss of identity, and their potential for psychopathologization. However,unlike ‘dissociative’ states such as those found in dissociative identity disorderor spirit possession, which can be understood as fragmentation of the sense

of self, mystical states can be understood both as a peculiar aftermath of detachment techniques, a sort of oneirism , or a dreaming state similar tonear-death experiences.

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House Street, London W1N 8AA, UK. [E-mail: [email protected]]


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