Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs
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Transcript of Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs
Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski Marie Curie-Sklodowska U., Poland
Background Philosopher of science
Investigating superstitious, magical and religious beliefs and practices As cognitive, evolved phenomena Their relation to science and human rationality
PhD from Monash Uni, Australia Teaching in Lublin, Poland Fellowship at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for
Evolution and Cognition Research
Background Two developments make my approach possible The cognitive turn
1960’s onwards Positing mental mechanisms to explain behaviour Applied to religious & superstitious practices
Evolutionary explanations of human behaviour 1970’s onwards Ultimate vs. proximate explanations Behaviours as adaptive, byproducts, etc. Cultural as well as genetic evolution Applied to religious & superstitious practices
Background Cognitive Science of Religion
Pascal Boyer, Justin Barrett Religion as byproduct Evolutionary psychology Massive modularity Dual-process accounts of
reasoning Other approaches exist Approach pursued by me
Religion as a cultural adaptation that exapts/recruits existing cognitive byproducts
Dual inheritance theory Bounded rationality theory
Plan How can misbeliefs be adaptive? In what ways can misbeliefs be protected? What makes certain misbeliefs plausible? Why are some misbeliefs potentially
desirable? What effect does investigating misbeliefs
have?
Adaptive misbeliefs Misbeliefs can motivate adaptive behaviour
Fear of Fri 13th leads to avoiding train crash Coincidental Only significant if systematic
Possible systematic examples Magical contagion Religion
Adaptive misbeliefs Magical Contagion (Paul Rozin)
Cardigan example (Bruce Hood) Fear of ‘catching’ evil Invisible vehicles of contagion passed by
contact Very useful given bacteria & viruses False explanation, partly true (overgeneralised)
correlation Role of explanation?
Ideas of magical contagion motivate behaviour Ideas of magical contagion post hoc
explanation of behaviour Studied extensively by Paul Rozin
Misbelief explained as byproduct of cognitive heuristic
Adaptive misbeliefs McKay and Dennett, BBS 32.6 (2009) The “boy who cried wolf” problem
Misbelief in the face of counterevidence Misbelief unstable due to
counterevidence Can not be systematically adaptive
Disproved misbeliefs Rejected Reinterpreted
Contagion example Belief that you can catch evil not adaptive But, belief in contagion in general is
Protecting misbeliefs Misbeliefs can be protected against
counterevidence Talmont-Kaminski, BBS 32.6 & Teorema 28.3
(2009) Protected misbeliefs stable Can still motivate behaviour
Three ways to protect misbeliefs Content Social context Methodological context
Protecting misbeliefs Content of stable misbeliefs
Avoid content in direct conflict with experience Claim epistemic impediments
Invisibility – ghosts, Christian god Shyness – faeries Distant locale – dragons, Olympic gods Shape-shifting – Olympic gods Vagueness – New Age beliefs
Semi-propositional content (Sperber) Holy Trinity
Apparent problem Belief in the face of the lack of evidence
Protecting misbeliefs Social context of misbeliefs
Make investigation of misbeliefs socially unacceptable The sacred – religious and magical beliefs
Religious relics Respecting religious beliefs above other beliefs
Disparage curiosity Oppose rational criticism
Problem Stultifies progress
Protecting misbeliefs Methodological context of misbeliefs
Related to social context Limit development of science
Scientific theories Scientific methods/equipment Scientific attitudes
Problem Limited access to science
Not such an issue traditionally
Plausible misbeliefs Why believe without evidence?
Not really a problem Only problem with perfectly rational beings Boundedly rational beings will have systematic
biases Why believe without evidence the things we
do? Primarily: Due to the particularities of human
cognitive system Due to the particular heuristics humans use
Secondarily: Due to function of the beliefs
Plausible misbeliefs By-products of cognitive heuristics
Type I errors (Skinner) Error Management Theory (Haselton) Smoke alarm principle
Magical contagion (Rozin) Contagion heuristic
Cognitive science of religion Minimally counterintuitive concepts
(Boyer) Hyperactive agency detection device
(Guthrie) Enormous scope for further empirical
research
Desirability of misbeliefs What, if anything, is the
function of misbeliefs? Not to accurately represent the
world Protecting against disconfirmation
ensures truth of a belief is coincidental
Allows noncognitive functions to determine popularity of belief
Function must depend upon the behaviour motivated by the belief
Desirability of misbeliefs Several possibilities
Adaptive for individuals Costly-signalling (Sosis)
Adaptive for groups Prosocial behaviour (D. S. Wilson)
Adaptive for beliefs Memetic virus (Dawkins, Blackmore)
Not directly functional Simply a byproduct (Boyer)
Desirability of misbeliefs Which thesis about function is correct?
Need to investigate religion to find out Answer may be complex
Superstitions – byproducts Religions – prosocial exaptations (ancestral traits?)
Is religion is something desirable for us? Universally assumed by religious individuals
Dennett’s “Belief in belief” Need to investigate religion to find out Not necessarily even if an individual-level
adaptation Dennett’s question: Who thinks that their goal in life is to
have as many kids as possible? Issue is somewhat more complex, of course
Still, Dennett has a point
Investigating misbeliefs Even if religious is desirable
There is a problem Investigation of religion
Requires scientific attitude Maintaining positive effects of religious claims
Requires maintaining belief in those claims Which requires protecting those beliefs
Investigation of religion undermines its function Even if that function happens to be individually
desirable But to determine if religion is desirable we must
investigate it
Thank youKonrad [email protected]/KonradTalmontKaminski
McKay & Dennett, Evolution of Misbelief, BBS 32.6 (2009)
Talmont-Kaminski, Effective untestability and bounded rationality help in seeing religion as adaptive misbelief, BBS 32.6 (2009)
Talmont-Kaminski, Fixation of superstitious beliefs, Teorema 28.3 (2009)