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Designing Utility Regulation to Promote Investment in Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency Dale S. Bryk...
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Transcript of Designing Utility Regulation to Promote Investment in Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency Dale S. Bryk...
Designing Utility Regulation to Promote Investment in Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency
Dale S. Bryk
Natural Resources Defense Council
Pennsylvania PUC Discussion
December 7, 2006
Overarching Goals
Safe, reliable, affordable energy service
Minimize environmental impacts
Economic efficiency– Customers and utilities invest in all cost-effective energy
efficiency
Policy Context
Rate Regulation/ Decoupling
Portfolio Management– Portfolio Standards
System Benefit Charge Programs– Secure minimum amount of energy efficiency
– Market Transformation
Codes and Standards
Transmission and Distribution System Planning
Emerging Policy Context
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
CA Emissions Cap on Electricity Sales/ Procurement
New Requirements to Manage Carbon Risk
Traditional Regulation
Rewards sales / encourages consumption
Discourages utility support for efficiency
Recovery of fixed costs uncertain
Decoupling
Severs link between profit and sales– Modest true-ups in both directions vs. rate cap– Assures recovery of fixed costs– Removes incentive to increase sales
Rewards safe, reliable service; public goals– Customizable to reward/ penalize based on performance
Decoupling Objectives
Align consumer and shareholder interests
Promote investment in least cost efficiency
Assure recovery of fixed costs
Reduce gas prices by reducing demand
Energy Efficiency: Benefits & Barriers
Cost-effective efficiency investments– 5:1 cost benefit ratio– likely to reduce load by 1%/ year
Market barriers– Lack of knowledge, access to efficient products– Split incentives– Customers require 40-100% return, < 3 yr payback
Energy Efficiency PotentialExisting and New EE Strategies Can Offset ISO
Forecasted Energy Requirements (GWH) and Beyond
100,000
105,000
110,000
115,000
120,000
125,000
130,000
135,000
140,000
145,000
150,000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GW
h
ISO GWh Forecast (w/out DSM) 1.2% Avg. Annual Increase at
Marginal Avoided Energy Supply Cost of 9.4¢/kWh
Actual Energy Requirement (2003)
Existing EE Programs at
3.1¢/kWh
Building Codes at 2.9¢/kWh
Standards at 1.0 ¢/kWh
Addt'l EE Can Offset Growth (at 3.1¢/kWh)
Total Achievable Energy Savings Potential -1.38% Avg. Annual Reduction
Addt'l Savings Opport. Beyond
Offsetting Growth (at 3.1¢/kWh)
Total EE Potential in 2013 Can Reduce
Energy Req. to 1993 Level
Decoupling Objectives
Environmental Benefit– Energy efficiency competes directly with supply– Reduced consumption = reduced environmental impact– Lower gas prices put more competitive pressure on coal
Consumer Benefit– Utilities more likely to help customers reduce demand, lower bills – Reducing demand reduces electric and gas prices for all (ACEEE study)
Utility Benefit– Guaranteed fixed cost recovery– Reduced risks associated with economy, weather, efficiency standards – Better service to customers
Improved Reliability– More efficiency means less strain on system
Alternatives to Decoupling
Increase fixed customer charges – Reduces reward for end-use efficiency– More disruptive to rate structures than modest true-ups that decoupling would require
Lost revenue recovery mechanisms– Asymmetrical; fails to recapture “found” revenues from excess sales– Does not address disincentive to promote efficiency beyond programs (e.g., codes and
standards)
Codes and standards; SBC programs– Current regulation discourages utility support – Funding uncertain
Massive subsidies for coal gasification; LNG– Much more expensive than promoting efficiency