1

Design of a Transoceanic Cable

Protection System

Mission Control

Undersea Fiber-Optic Cables

Surveillance System

Isaac Geisler, Kumar Karra, Felipe Cardenas, Dane Underwood

Project Overview

[TeleGeography, 2015] [Carter, 2011] [Ruggeri, 2014] [Burnett, 2014] [Khazan, 2013] [Main, 2015]

2

• Submarine fiber optic cables carry 99% of all international communications.

• Billions of dollars are invested into the network, causing it to grow by 36%

annually since 2007.

• Between 100 and 150 cable damages occur each year.

• Up to 21% of causes are never identified.

• Each fault incurs millions of dollars in repair and loss of bandwidth.

• Our project seeks to monitor cables, identify threats, decrease cable

downtime and prevent damage whenever possible.

Agenda 1. Concept Definition

1. Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need

2. Operational Concept

Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design

Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks

3. Simulation and Analysis

Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility

4. Project Management

WBS, Current Status

3

International Submarine Cable Network

Status 2015

343 Cable systems in service

53 Transoceanic, ‘long-haul’ systems

$11.8 billion investment in new

cables from 2008-2014

31 New cable systems worth $4.8

billion will come online by 2017.

[TeleGeography, 2015] [Ruggeri, 2014] 4

Wide Variety of Cable Systems

FLAG Atlantic-1 Cable

Connects US, UK and France

2.4 Tbps Capacity

14,500km total length

6500m max depth

$1.1 Billion Install cost

Known spying incident by

UK government

Jonah Cable

Connects Italy and Israel

7 Tbps Capacity

2,300 total length

4500m max depth JASUKA Cable System

Interconnects Indonesia

and Malaysia

0.16 Tbps Capacity

10,860km total length

120m max depth

[TeleGeography, 2015] [NOAA, 2015] [Submarine Networks, 2015] [White, 2014] 5

Growing Bandwidth Demand

Transoceanic capacity was 87 Tbps at year end 2013

Rate of capacity increase from 2007-2013 is 36% per year.

Projects planned to bring total capcity to 742 Tbps by early 2020’s

[Ruggeri, 2014] 6

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Acti

vate

d C

ap

acit

y i

n T

bp

s

Transoceanic Bandwidth Projected Growth 2007-2020

Sub-Saharan AfricanIntercontinental

Austrailia & NewZealandIntercontinental

North America - SouthAmerica

South Asia & MiddleEast Intercontinental

Pan-East Asian

Transpacific

Transatlantic

Cables are Vulnerable to Threats

Transoceanic/transregional cables - FLAG Atlantic-1

SeaMeWe-3 Cable System

Connects 39 countries

0.48 Tbps Capacity

39,000km Total Length

7500m max depth

12 Reported Faults from 2005-2015

Over 1 year of cable downtime since 2005

Reported to have been spied on by the

Australian Government

[TeleGeography, 2015] [NOAA, 2015] [Submarine Networks, 2015] [SubTelForum, 2015] 7

Causes of Cable Faults

Approximately 150 faults reported per year.

Over 20% are cause unknown. Even when

the cause is known, identifying a

responsible party is difficult.

70% of faults occur in water of less than

200m deep.

Each fault costs millions of dollars in lost

bandwidth revenue and repair costs.

No central database or logging of

threats/faults exists.

New FCC regulations will mandate

reporting of US based cable faults.

[Carter, 2011] [Carter, 2009] [Hawn 2015] 8

962

315

155 149 116

460

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Fishing Anchoring ComponentFailure

NaturalCauses

Other Unknown

Sources of 2,162 Faults, 1959-2006

Intentional Sabotage and Espionage

[Bustraan, 2015] [Gertz, 2015] [Sanger, 2015] [Reuters, 2015] [Kirk, 2013] [Cahyafitri, 2013] [Malta Today, 2011] 9

Increasing fears of intentional cable damage

Known incidents of sabotage, damage or

theft in Indonesia, Egypt and Libya.

Very difficult to prove intentional damage

after the fact

Russian ship Yantar, equipped with 2

submersibles capable of cutting cables

Increasing fears of cable espionage

Cable system transmits valuable financial

data, government communications

Known incidents of underwater devices

capable of reading data from the cables

Cable Protections - Armor

Advantages

Good protection against threats

Outer layers can be damaged without affecting cable

function

Unarmored Single Armor Double Armor

[Carter, 2011] [Burnett, 2014] [AKORN, 2012] 10

Tradeoffs

Significantly more expensive

Significantly heavier - complicates installation

Problems

Not possible at all depths –heavy cable will snap itself

More likely to entangle on anchors or fishing equipment -

still causes a fault, but more damaging to the cable and

the ship.

Cable Protections - Burial

Advantages

Provides good protection against most threats

Makes sabotage or espionage more difficult

Can be buried in up to 2000m of water

[Burnett 2014] [Carter, 2011] [KIS-ORCA, 2015] 11

Tradeoffs

Very slow process: 0.2-0.5 km/h burial rate

High cost - ~$12,000 per hour

Disrupts marine environment

Can slow and increase cost of fault repairs

Problems

Only possible in soft seabed

Becomes exposed over time

Little protection against anchors

Cable Protections - Legal

Cables are protected by international organizations and treaties

● International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC)

● Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA)

● North American Submarine Cable Association (NASCA)

Protections include:

● Cable protection zones

● Up to $300,000 fines

● Liability of repair costs

● Civil or criminal charges

[Carter, 2011] [Burnett, 2014] [Carter, 2009] 12

Repair Process and Delays

Find Fault Location,

Notify Repair Ship

Delays due to inaccurate

or slow fault location info

Not enough repair ships

to service all faults

Delays due to permitting

and contracting ships

Repair Ship Travel

Delays due to

inaccurate or slow

fault location info

Delays due to poor

weather

Repair

Delays due to

inaccurate or slow

fault location info

Delays due to poor

weather

Threat Causes Fault

Poor data collection,

difficult to determine

threat causes and fault

probabilities

[Rain, 2009] [Carter, 2011] [Kokusai, 2010] 13

Repair Delay Distributions

Fault finding and

Notification Delay

1 + WEIB(6.78, 1.07)

Repair Ship Travel

1 + WEIB(2.07, 1.26)

Telegeography Study

Delay and Travel times

2008 - 2012

Data from 456 faults

Data from 40 countries

Analyzed data with Arena Input Analyzer

Repair Time On-Site

3 + LOGN(1.73, 2.02)

Tyco Telecommunications Estimates

Generated distribution based on Tyco

Telecommunications estimates

Lognormal shape

Minimum of 3 days

Mean of 4 days

Possibility of long delays

[Telegeography, 2014] [Rain, 2009] 14

[Ruggeri, 2014] 15

Insurance

Companies

Shipping

Companies

Fishing Industry

Ports

Risk / Damage

Large Technology Companies

Financial

Institutions

Service

Service

Telecommunication

Companies

Service

$$$

Economic Growth

$$$

/ US Gov . Agencies

Latin

America Europe

Southeast

Asia

Middle

East North

Africa

Espionage

Threat of Espionage

Cable Maintenance

Cable Installation

$$$

( ) Benefit Operating

( - ) Benefit Non Operating

Threat

Cable Service Submarine Fiber - Optic Cables

Installation

/

Repair

Damage / Service Disruption

End Users

$$$

$$$

Political Capital

Economic Growth

$$$ —

Litigation for damages

Major Stakeholder Interactions

Interactions

Performance Gap

• Reduce the number of cable damages by 30% per year.

• Increase surveillance on cables from 0% to 80% of the entire

length of the cable.

• Reduce mean notification time by 2 days.

[Carter, 2011],[Telegeography 2015] 16

Ca

ble

Da

ma

ges

Time

Expected Cable Damages vs. Time

Current

Desired

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2015 2020 2025 2030

Noti

fica

tion

Tim

e (D

ays)

Year

Expected Mean Notification Time

Current

Desired

Problem Statement

• There are over 150 cable faults every year

• Primary causes are fishing and shipping incidents

• 21% go undetected and unidentified

• It takes roughly 3 weeks and over $3 million to locate and fix

a damaged cable

[Burnett, 2011]

17

Need Statement

There is a need to increase surveillance of cables in order to

decrease the number of faults, increase the rate of detection, and

improve the mean notification time of damaged cables.

Win-win scenarios will be achieved by:

• Minimizing damage by preventing identified threats

• Minimizing down time by increasing fault reaction time

• Mitigating threats through identification

• Increasing the value of investment through long-term savings

in cost

18

Agenda 1. Concept Definition

1. Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need

2. Operational Concept

Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design

Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks

3. Simulation and Analysis

Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility

4. Project Management

WBS, Current Status

19

Operational Concept

1. Identification

● Identify surface-level threats

● Identify underwater threats

● Identify fault locations and extent of damage

2. Prevention

● Prevent damage before it happens by monitoring shipping and fishing.

● Detect underwater threats prior to fault

● Provide deterrance to both accidental and intentional through identification

3. Organization of Repair

● Notify reparair companies of fault type and location

20

21

OPSCON - Model Framework

OPSCON - Model Framework

22

23

Mission Control

[Ruggeri, 2014] 24

Insurance

Companies

Shipping

Companies

Fishing Industry

Ports

Risk / Damage

Large Technology Companies

Financial

Institutions

Service

Service

Telecommunication

Companies

Service

$$$

Economic Growth

$$$

/ US Gov . Agencies

Latin

America Europe

Southeast

Asia

Middle

East North

Africa

Espionage

Threat of Espionage

Cable Maintenance

Cable Installation

$$$

( ) Benefit Operating

( - ) Benefit Non Operating

Threat

Cable Service Submarine Fiber - Optic Cables

Installation

/

Repair

Damage / Service Disruption

End Users

$$$

$$$

Political Capital

Economic Growth

$$$ —

Litigation for damages

Stakeholder Changes

Interactions

[Ruggeri, 2014] 25

Insurance

Companies

Shipping

Companies

Fishing Industry

Ports

Loss Prevention

Large Technology Companies

Financial

Institutions

Service

Service

Telecommunication

Companies

Increased Uptime

$$$

Economic Growth

$$$

/ US Gov . Agencies

Latin

America Europe

Southeast

Asia

Middle

East North

Africa

Espionage

Increased Security

Cable Maintenance

Cable Installation

$$$

( ) Benefit Operating

( - ) Benefit Non Operating

Threat

Cable Service UISS Protected Cables

Installation

/

Repair

Damage Prevention

End Users

$$$

$$$

Political Capital

Economic Growth

— No litigation

Stakeholder Changes

Interactions Reduced Revenue

System Manufacturers

Environmental Groups

New Market

Environmental Damage

Prevent Agency Espionage

Positive

Negative

[Ruggeri, 2014] 26

Entity Current System With System

Owners Low Reliability Increased Uptime

Governments Threat of Espionage Increased Security

Maritime Industry Vessel Damage/Litigation Prevention/Clarity

System Manufacturers No Market Increased Revenue

Entity Problem Solution

Repair Companies Reduced Revenue Shift Resources from Repair

to Monitoring/Installation

Environmental Groups Disruption of Ecosystem Extensive Testing/Minimal

invasiveness

Stakeholder Changes

Surface Identification Alternative

[MarineTraffic, 2015] [USCG, 2010] 27

Automatic ID System (AIS)

Capabilities

Required on all ships over 299 tons

Tracks location, speed, ID

GPS updates every 10-180 seconds

Limitations

100-200 nm range

Only tracks surface ships

Ships must have active transponder

Marine Traffic Monitoring and Warning (MTMW)

Underwater Identification Alternative - Active

[NOAA, 2015], [WHOI, 2015],[Garmin, 2015] 28

Kongsberg Seaglider

Kongsberg Seaglider with

Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS)

Seaglider Capabilities

1,000 meter depth rating

7,200 hour battery life

0.9 km/hour cruise speed

Returns to surface to relay information

SAS Capabilities

300 meter signal range

3 cm resolution

6,000 meter depth rating

Underwater Surveillance and Threat Detection (USTD)

Underwater Identification Alternative - Active

[Oceaneering, 2015], [Raytheon, 2015], [Kongsberg, 2015], [ASI-Marine, 2015] 29

Platform Alternatives

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV)

Raytheon AQ/ANS-20A Minehunting Sonar

Kongsberg REMUS 6000 AUV

Kongsberg HUGIN AUV

Klein System AUV 5000 V2

Remote Operated Vehicles (ROV)

ASI Falcon ROV

Oceaneering NEXXUS ROV

Oceaneering Millenium Plus ROV

Sonar Alternatives

Compressed High Intensity Radar Pulse

(CHIRP)

Widely used in sport and commercial fishing

Very high-resolution images

Up to 300 meter signal range

Side-scan and Multibeam

Used heavily for oceanographic purposes

Very reliable and tested extensively

Lower resolution but greater coverage area

Underwater Identification Alternative - Passive

[NEC, 2014] 30

Underwater Surveillance and Threat Detection (USTD)

Node Network with Hydrophones

Network Capabilities

Stationary nodes installed along cables

Communication with surface buoys

Up to 3 year life span

Hydrophone Capabilities

Listens for noise instead of emitting signal

Up to 16 km listening range

Several localization techniques

3,500 meter tested depth rating

Underwater Node Network

Prevention and Repair

Organization

[Steward, 2015] [Fachot, 2012] 31

Prevention

• All identification alternatives will relay data on threats to

mission control

• Mission control will send messages based on threat type:

• Messages to marine traffic to prevent accidental damage

• Messages to relevant authorities (e.g. USCG) to intervene

for sabotage or espionage threats.

Organization of Repair

• In case of faults, mission control will relay

accurate fault type and location data

gathered by identification alternatives to

repair companies.

• Aim to significantly reduce location finding

and repair notification delays.

Mission Requirements

MR 1.0 The system shall prevent cable damage and reduce incidents by

30% per year.

MR 1.1 The system shall survey and monitor 80% or the total cable

length.

MR 2.0 The system shall identify the potential threat to the cable.

MR 3.0 The system shall reduce cable downtime by 30%.

MR 3.1 The system shall identify location of cable damage 50% faster.

32

Functional Requirements

FR 1.0 The system shall monitor and survey cables.

FR 1.1 The system shall be able to operate at depths greater than 1,000 meters.

FR 1.2 The system shall have at least a 95% uptime.

FR 2.0 The system shall identify threats.

FR 2.1 The system shall aggregate collected information to determine safety of

cables.

FR 3.0 The system shall detect cable faults.

FR 4.0 The system shall allow communication with outside stakeholders

FR 5.0 The system shall perform self-monitoring to ensure the safety of the system.

33

Design Requirements

DR 1.0 The system shall have an above water subsystem.

DR 1.1 The system shall have servers that manage all collected data integrally.

DR 1.2 The system shall have data processing technology.

DR 1.3 The system shall display the data to the operator.

DR 1.4 The system shall have communication equipment.

DR 2.0 The system may have an underwater subsystem.

DR 2.1 The system shall have communications equipment for exchanging

information with the above water subsystem.

DR 2.2 The system shall have threat detection technology.

DR 2.2.1 The system shall have sonar sensor technology.

DR 2.2.2 The system shall have a platform for sonar sensor technology.

34

System Risks - FMEA

Failure S L D RPN Mitigation

Tapped Cables: Human action

undetected and cables are

tapped.

10 4 8 320 Use logged surveillance data to

identify suspicious activity in

above surface and underwater.

System Self-Security: System

is damaged by human threat.

10 9 2 180 Surveillance must be covert and

hidden from human threats. Be

prepared for maintenance in case

damage occurs.

Communication: Cannot

communicate through technical

means or language barrier.

9 10 1 90 Maintain and provide difference

communciation means.Learn local

language to warn ships and

fishing vessels.

Severity (S): 1 (less severe) - 10 (very severe)

Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)

Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)

35

System Risks - FMEA

Failure S L D RPN Mitigation

Intentional Damage

Undetected: Human action

undetected and cables are cut.

8 5 1 40 Use logged surveillance data to

identify suspicious activity in

above surface and underwater.

Accidental Damage

Undetected: Ship and fishing

vessels not warned of CPZ,

damages cable.

6 3 1 18 Keep constant monitoring of ship

traffic in CPZ. Inform ships in

vicinity of fault and identify cause.

Natural causes and disaster

on System: System and/or

subsystem(s) is inoperable

because of natural disaster.

8 1 1 8 Keep constant monitoring of ROV

and sonar system to determine

functionality. Have maintenance

ready to be performed if

damaged.

Severity (S): 1 (less severe) - 10 (very severe)

Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)

Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)

36

Agenda 1. Concept Definition

1. Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need

2. Operational Concept

Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design

Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks

3. Simulation and Analysis

Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility

4. Project Management

WBS, Current Status

37

Simulation Requirements

SR 1.0 The simulation shall model a representative cable system as closely as possible.

SR 2.0 The simulation shall generate threats at interarrival times based on research

data.

SR 3.0 The simulation shall determine the utility of various design alternatives by

tracking cost, detection chances, fault prevention and cable downtime reduction.

SR 4.0 The simulation shall generate all possible data from random distributions based

on collected research.

SR 5.0 The simulation shall output results to a comma separated text file that can be

analyzed.

SR 6.0 The number of simulation replications shall be determined by a 10% halfwidth

and 95% confidence interval.

38

Design of Experiment Inputs Cable Active Alt(s) Passive Alt(s) Surface Replications

1 FLAG Atlantic-1 None None None 7700

2 FLAG Atlantic-1 Seaglider AUV w/ SAS None None 7700

3 FLAG Atlantic-1 Remus 6000 AUV w/ SAS None None 7700

4 FLAG Atlantic-1 None Hydrophone None 7700

5 FLAG Atlantic-1 None None AIS System 7700

6 FLAG Atlantic-1 Seaglider AUV w/ SAS Hydrophone None 7700

7 FLAG Atlantic-1 Seaglider AUV w/ SAS None AIS System 7700

8 FLAG Atlantic-1 Seaglider AUV w/ SAS Hydrophone AIS System 7700

9 FLAG Atlantic-1 Remus 6000 AUV w/ SAS Hydrophone None 7700

10 … … … … …

11 Jonah Cable None None None 7700

12 Jonah Cable Seaglider AUV w/ SAS None None 7700

13 … … … … …

39

Simulating the FA-1 Cable

FLAG Atlantic-1 (FA-1) Cable System

NOAA Bathymetric Map

Estimates of depths through

long cable sections

[Telegeography, 2015] [NOAA, 2015] 40

Java Simulation Model

41

Implemented

Design

Alternatives

Implemented

Cable Model

Estimating Poisson Interarrival Estimate probability of each fault based on data from 2,162 fault

study. Allocate unknown threats to other types, add in sabotage and

espionage threats.

For 1 Cable:

Serious threats per year 6.3

Threat interarrival rate 1390.4 hours

Poisson mean λ 0.00750628

Probability of

Fault Type

Normalized

Probability of Fault

type

P * 0.5

faults/year

Est. Prob. threat

results in fault

Threats per year of

each type

Threats per hour of

each type

Threat

Interarrival rate

in hours

Fishing 0.444 0.541 0.2704 0.05 5.408 0.000617356 1619.8

Anchoring 0.156 0.190 0.0950 0.25 0.380 0.000043382 23051.2

Component 0.072 0.088 0.0438 1.00 0.044 0.000005006 199776.7

Natural 0.069 0.084 0.0420 0.10 0.420 0.000047970 20846.3

Espionage 0.04 0.049 0.0244 0.00 0.024 0.000002740 365000.0

Sabotage 0.04 0.049 0.0244 1.00 0.024 0.000002781 359598.0

Total 0.821 1 0.5 2.4 6.300 0.000719234 1390.4

[Carter 2011] 42

Java Simulation Parameters

Detection probabilities:

Based on platform, sonar, other

parameters

Interaction of UISS Agent and

threat type, location and depth

Still being implemented

Delay, Travel, Repair and Downtime Calculations

Based on distributions, specific to the FA-1 Cable

downtime = notifyDelay + travelTime + repairTime

Lost Bandwidth and Repair Cost Calculations

capacity = 2.4 Tbps

10 Gbps rental rate = bandUnitCost = $25,000 (est)

shipCost = $12,000 per hour (est)

bandwidthCost = downtime * bandUnitCost * capacity

repairCost = (travelTime + repairTime) * shipCost

[Carter, 2011] [Carter, 2009] [Burnett 2014] [Rain, 2009] [Burnett, 2010] 43

Threat

Probability

Loiter time

Distributions [N(μ, σ)]

Fault Conversion

Probability

Fishing 0.541 N(2, 0.5) 0.05

Anchoring 0.19 N(12, 6) 0.25

Component 0.088 0 1.00

Natural 0.084 N(48, 24) 0.10

Espionage 0.049 N(4380, 1095) 0.00

Sabotage 0.049 N(4, 1) 1.00

Example Normal Dist

Fishing Loiter Time

N(2, 0.5)

FA-1 Simulation Output: As-Is

44

For the As-Is case:

66 threats and 4 faults over 10 years

301 hours (12.5 days) of downtime per fault

$2.4 million in repair costs per fault

$2.4 million in lost bandwidth per fault

Validation

[37] 45

As-is Simulation

• Outputs “as-is” simulation compared to

historical data

• z-distribution with 95% confidence interval

UISS Simulation

• No hard data on system (does not exist)

• Ensure “as-is” simulation is accurate

• Ensure accuracy of input data and parameters

• Clearly layout assumptions of model

Utility Analysis

Stakeholder Prevention Identification Downtime Lifespan

Private 0.40 0.29 0.23 0.18

Government 0.40 0.23 0.26 0.11

●Prevention > Identification > Downtime ~ Lifespan

●Specific utility function for each model scenario

●Based on stakeholder needs

●Further decomposition

46

Agenda 1. Concept Definition

1. Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need

2. Operational Concept

Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design

Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks

3. Simulation and Analysis

Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility

4. Project Management

WBS, Current Status

47

Work Breakdown Structure

48

Project Management

Current Status

● Phase 7 completed

● EV: $36,180

● AC: $34,200

● Cost Variance: $1,980

● Ahead of schedule

49

CRITICAL TASKS

Status: Late Status: Future Task

Name Start Finish Remaining

Work

Resource Names

Practice Presentation Sun 10/4/15 Sun 10/4/15 2 hrs Dane,Felipe,Isaac

,Kumar

R&U Project Plan Sun 10/4/15 Tue 10/6/15 5 hrs Isaac,Kumar

R&U Concept Definition Sun 10/4/15 Mon 10/5/15 1 hr Dane

R&U System Alternatives Sun 10/4/15 Mon 10/5/15 1 hr Isaac

R&U CONOPS Tue 10/6/15 Thu 10/8/15 10 hrs Isaac,Kumar,Felip

e

R&U System Model Mon 10/5/15 Thu 10/8/15 10 hrs Dane

R&U SOW Wed 10/7/15 Thu 10/8/15 5 hrs Kumar

Practice Presentation Sun 10/25/15 Sun 10/25/15 4 hrs Dane,Felipe,Isaac

,Kumar

R&U System Alternatives Sun 10/25/15 Mon 10/26/15 4 hrs Felipe,Isaac,Kum

ar

R&U System Model Mon

10/26/15

Tue 10/27/15 10 hrs Dane,Felipe,Isaac

,Kumar

R&U Utilitiy Analysis and

Recommendations

Tue 10/27/15 Wed 10/28/15 4 hrs Kumar

utility function extension Thu 11/5/15 Fri 11/6/15 8 hrs Dane,Isaac,Felipe

,Kumar

R&U System Model Fri 11/6/15 Sat 11/7/15 6 hrs Dane,Felipe,Isaac

,Kumar

R&U Utility Analysis and

Recommendations

Sat 11/7/15 Sat 11/7/15 6 hrs Dane,Felipe,Isaac

,Kumar

R&U Sensitivity Analysis Sat 11/7/15 Sun 11/8/15 12 hrs Dane,Felipe,Isaac

,Kumar

A task is critical if there is no room in the schedule for it to slip.

Learn more about managing your project's critical path.

Questions?

50

WBS

●Deliverable Oriented-Phased Planning system

●Allows for Review and Update process

●Granular control over scheduling/cost variances

●3 hour work day per member (21hrs per week)

●$60 per hour for each resource

51

Timeline

52

Critical Tasks

53

Validation

54

Sim Confidence Interval Actual

# Faults/Year 0.49 per year 0.4272 per year

Downtime 12 days 11 days

• Test Sim “as-is” with historical data

• As sim expands, add more statistics

• Z distribution (n>1000)

• 95% confidence interval

Earned Value Management

●Assuming 21 hour work weeks.

● Overhead - 1:1 Ratio of Indirect costs to direct costs.

● $30/hr X 2 = $60 hourly rate.

● Project duration: 9/13/15 - 5/13/16

Individual Total (9/13-

5/13)

Team Total (9/13-

5/13)

Planned Time

(Hours)

623.8 2495.2

Planned Value (PV) $37,428 $149,712

55

EVMS (10/25/15)

Current Status

● Phase 4 completed

● EV: $21,900

● AC: $18,403

● Cost Variance: $2,640

● Ahead of schedule

56

Project Management Risks

Risk S L D RPN Mitigation

Critical Tasks 9 8 5 360 Start early and allot extra time for critical

tasks.

Requirements

Inflation and

Unexpected Scope

Expansion

8 8 5 320 Have weekly meetings to ensure project

is still in scope and progress is made.

Misspecification and

Errors

10 5 5 250 Team members meet weekly to discuss

progress of project and hold each other

accountable.

Simulation 9 5 5 225 Set objectives before simulation begins

to clarify goals of simulation. Research

thoroughly beforehand. Start before Fall

semester ends and work through winter

break. Severity (S): 1(less severe) - 10 (very severe)

Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)

Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)

57

Project Management Risks

Risk S L D RPN Mitigation

Background

Information

8 7 3 168 Use open source data and sensible

estimations.

Stakeholders 8 5 3 120 Justify solution by achieving

stakeholder's feasible objectives.

Communication with

Sponsor

3 5 6 90 Allow ample time for sponsor to

respond.

Severity (S): 1(less severe) - 10 (very severe)

Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)

Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)

58

Functional Block Diagram

59

Design Alternative Matrix

60

Alternative Platform Sonar Traffic Monitoring

1 None None MTMW

2.1.1 AUV SAS None

2.1.2 AUV CHIRP None

2.1.3 AUV HP None

2.1.4 AUV SSM None

2.2.1 ROV SAS None

2.2.2 ROV CHIRP None

… … … …

2.n.m n-platform m-sonar None

3.1.1 AUV SAS MTMW

3.1.2 AUV CHIRP MTMW

… … … …

3.n.m n-platform m-sonar MTMW

Design Alternative 1: Marine Traffic

Monitoring and Warning (MTMW)

Marine Traffic Monitoring

and Warning

Mission Control

Warning Message to

Vessel

61

Design Alternative 2: USTD

Platform Alternative

Mission Control

Sonar Alternative

62

Design Alternative 3: MTMW and USTD

Images copyright www.wikimedia.com, www.unmanned.co.uk, www.adweek.com

Ship-based Communication Platform Alternative

Mission Control

Sonar Alternative

63

[1] Synthetic Aperture Sonar

● Objective: to produce very high resolution

images along with bathymetry (depth

information).

● Up to 10X higher resolution than current

sonar.

● Uses consecutive pings along with acoustic

beams to determine depth.

● Current status: relatively new and could

replace side-scan sonar.

Image copyright whoi.edu

64

[2] CHIRP

● Compressed High Intensity Radar

Pulse

● Objective: to produce detailed images of

fish, objects, or seabeds.

● Uses bursts of signals to help compensate

for inconsistencies in sonar detection,

primarily with fish.

● Current status: used mostly for fishing.

Also used for producing detailed images

in shallow water.

Image copyright www.garmin.com

65

[3] Side-scan and Multibeam

● Multibeam sonar ● Transmits signal directly below ship’s

hull.

● Return signal is converted to depth.

● Side-scan sonar ● Energy is transmitted in the shape of a

fan that sweeps the seafloor, usually 100

meters wide.

● Return echo produces an image of the

sea floor.

Image copyright www.whoi.edu

66

Sonar Design Alternatives

[1] SAS [2] CHIRP [3]

Hydrophones

[4] Side-

scan and

Multibeam

Max Depth 6,000 m 6,800 m 3,500 m 4,000 m

Signal

Range/Listening

Range

300 m 300 m 1-15,000 Hz

Up to 16 km 400 m

Resolution 3 cm 15 mm 204 dB re 1

V/µPa 30.5 cm

Frequency 175 kHz 350-650 kHz 46 kHz 150-1800

kHz

67

Platform Design Alternatives

[1] AUV/UUV [2] ROV (Ship-

towed)

[3] Sonar

Network

Max Depth 4,000 m 4,000 m Up to 7,000 m

Operating Time Up to 6,000 hours

0.25-2 m/s

Dependent on ship

capabilities 833-1290 days

Range

Dependent on

Speed and

Operating Time

Up to 10 km by

tether Unlimited

Cost ~$1.2-2 million

ROV cost +

$26,000-

$55,000/day

operating cost

Very High and

Dangerous

68

[4] Hydrophones

● Objective: To listen for sounds, rather than

emitting signals and listening for echos.

● Used heavily in marine biology and

submarines - anti-submarine warfare and

navigation.

● First used in WWI

● Relays detection information to an on-board

or on-shore monitor.

Hydrophone vs. Microphone

Image copyright www.ccrma.stanford.edu

69

[1] Autonomous/Unmanned Undersea

Vehicles

● AUV/UUV ● Can be programmed to travel specific

routes, record data, scan for objects,

etc.

● Equipped with on-board computer

and sonar, cameras, and other sensors.

● Lithium-ion battery is most common

power source..

Images copyright asi-group.com 70

[2] Remote Operated Vehicles

● ROV ● Large fleet of ROVs with multiple

capabilities.

● Connected via tether and contains

propulsion engines to maneuver.

Images copyright asi-group.com 71

[3] Sonar Network

● Uses a network of sonar nodes

(hydrophones) and communicates

with on-board or onshore station.

● Long Baseline Localization: Fixed

location of nodes along with time

delay allow for localization of

objects.

● Extremely comprehensive and

would provide excellent coverage.

● Very costly to install at depths

greater than 200 meters.

● Can provide accuracy within 5

meters.

Image copyright www.nec.com

72

Further Simulation Work

73

In Progress

Complete implementation of agents

Calculate detection probabilities of

alternatives

Account for various movement

patterns of AUVs/ROVs

Determine costs for alternatives

Model additional cable systems

To be Implemented

Add dimensions to cable model to

account for vertical and lateral movement

Add movement of appropriate threats

Design Alternatives - Control Center

●Need for a control center to operate, monitor and communicate

with the system.

●Could also serve as a base to communicate with outside

stakeholders. ● Shipping and fishing vessels

● Law enforcement

● Military, etc.

●Centers of operation would be regional and offer faster and

more reliable communication.

74

Positive Changes Entity Current System With System

Owners Low Reliability Increased Uptime

Governments Threat of Espionage Increased Security

Maritime Industry Vessel Damage/Litigation Prevention/Clarity

System Manufacturers No Market Increased Revenue

Negative Changes

Entity Problem Solution

Repair Companies Reduced Revenue Shift Resources from

Repair to Monitoring

Environmental Groups Disruption of Ecosystem Extensive

Testing/Minimal

invasiveness

75

Sources [1] TeleGeography. (2015, September 15). Submarine Cable Map [Online]. Available: http://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/

[2] Reuters. (2015, August 26). Libya's land phone line system breaks down after cables were damaged [Online]. Available:

https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Aug26/312843-libyas-land-phone-line-system-breaks-down-after-cables-were-damaged.ashx

[3] J. Kirk. (2013, March 27). Sabotage suspected in Egypt submarine cable cut [Online]. Available:

http://www.computerworld.com/article/2495954/internet/sabotage-suspected-in-egypt-submarine-cable-cut.html

[4] F. Cahyafitri and R. Cahyafitri. (2013, June 29). Indosat spends Rp 10 billion replacing stolen underwater cable [Online]. Available:

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/29/indosat-spends-rp-10-billion-replacing-stolen-underwater-cable.html

[5] Malta Today. (2011, November 14). Damaged GO submarine cable repaired [Online]. Available:

http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/13804/damaged-go-submarine-cable-repaired#.Vhkz3_lViko

[6] M. Islam. (2015, May 8). Submarine Cable plans to sell bandwidth to Italian firm at low price [Online]. Available:

http://www.thedailystar.net/business/submarine-cable-plans-sell-bandwidth-italian-firm-low-price-80342

[7] J. Hawn. (2015, September 18). FCC considers new rules for submarine cables [Online]. Available:

http://www.rcrwireless.com/20150918/policy/submarine-cables-may-get-new-fcc-rules-tag15

[8] L. Hedges. (2015, March 19). Top five telecoms projects [Online]. Available:

http://www.hibernianetworks.com/corp/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Top-five-telecoms-projects-2015_Capacity-Magazine_April-2015.pdf

[9] F. Lardinois. (2015, May 11). Microsoft invests in 3 undersea cable projects to improve its data center connectivity [Online]. Available:

http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/11/microsoft-invests-in-3-undersea-cable-projects-to-improve-its-data-center-connectivity/#.hhwwya:w2DQ

[10] L. Carter et al. “Submarine cables and the oceans: connecting the world” UNEP-WCMC/UNEP/ICPC. Cambridge, UK, Biodiversity

Series No. 31, 2009.

[11] L. Carter and D. Burnett. (2011). About Submarine Telecommunications Cables [Online]. Available:

https://www.iscpc.org/documents/?id=1752

76

Sources [12] W. Rain. (2009, December 14). Problems faced by Industry in the repair of damaged submarine

telecommunications cables inside maritime jurisdictional claims [Online]. Available:

http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Wolfgang-Rain-Session-3.pdf

[13] Y. Ruggeri et al. “Submarine Telecoms Industry Report” Terabit Consulting. Cambridge,MA, Issue 3, 2014.

[14] “Global Bandwidth Research Service Executive Summary” TeleGeography. Washington D.C. 2015

[15] “Australia & Pacific Bandwidth Review” TeleGeography. Washington D.C. February, 2015.

[16] US Coast Guard. (2010, July 13). Types of Automatic Identification Systems [Online]. Available:

http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=typesAIS

[17] “Technical characteristics for an automatic identification system using time-division multiple access in the VHF maritime mobile band” Intl.

Telecommunication Unit –

Radiocommunication, Geneva, Switzerland, Recommendation, ITU-R M.1371-4, April 2010.

[18] Kokusai Cable Ship Co. (2010) Optical Submarine Cable Repair Method [Online]. Available: http://www.k-

kcs.co.jp/english/solutionRepairingMethod.html

[19] D. Burnett. Submarine Cables: The Handbook of Law and Policy. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014.

[20] A. Chang. (2013, April 2). Why Undersea Internet Cables Are More Vulnerable Than You Think [Online]. Available:

http://www.wired.com/2013/04/how-vulnerable-are-undersea-internet-cables/

[21] O. Khazan. (2013, July 16). The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping [Online]. Available:

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/the-creepy-long-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855/

[22] W. Landay, “The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan,” Nov. 2004. [Online]. Available:

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf

[23] "Side Scan Sonar." NOAA's Office of Coast Survey. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/hsd/SSS.html.

[24] "Harbor Monitoring Network System." NEC.com. N.p., 2015. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.

http://www.nec.com/en/global/solutions/safety/critical_infra/harbormonitoring.html.

77

Sources [25] “Harbor Monitoring Network System,” NEC, 2015. [Online]. Available:

http://www.nec.com/en/global/solutions/safety/critical_infra/harbormonitoring.html.

[26] “Autonomous Underwater Surveilance System Network,” L3 Oceania, 2014. [Online]. Available:

http://www2.l-3com.com/oceania//products/maritime_aussnet.htm.

[27] “ROV Fleet,” ASI-Marine, 2015. [Online]. Available:

http://www.asigroup.com/system/assets/attachments/000/000/181/original/ROV_Fleet.pdf.

[28] D. Main. (2015, April 2). Undersea Cables Transport 99 Percent of International Data [Online]. Available:

http://www.newsweek.com/undersea-cables-transport-99-percent-international-communications-319072

[29] S. Whitehead. “Submarine Cable Testing” Anritsu Corp., Richardson, TX, Application Note MW90010A, Dec. 2010.

[30] D. R. Burnett, “Recovery of Cable Repair Ship Cost Damages from Third Parties That Injure Submarine Cables,” Tul. Mar. L.J., vol. 35, p.

103, 2011 2010.

[31] A. Palmer-Felgate et al. “Marine Maintenance in the Zones - A Global Comparison of Repair Commencement Times” presented at the

SubOptic Conference

Presentation, Paris, France, May 2013.

[32] G. White. (2014, November 20). Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ [Online]. Available:

http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq

[33] B. Gertz. (2015, September 22). Russian Spy Ship Makes Port Call in Caribbean [Online]. Available: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russian-

spy-ship-makes-port-call-in-caribbean/

[34] D. Sanger and E. Schmitt. (2015, October 25). Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close For U.S. Comfort

[Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html?_r=0

[35] L. Stewart. (2015, February 2). 20,000 leagues under the sea... a trawler hit an internet cable and sent broadband into meltdown [Online]. Available:

http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/technology/20000-leagues-under-the-sea-a-trawler-hit-an-internet-cable-and-sent-broadband-into-meltdown-31009132.html

[36] M. Fachot. (April 2012). Safety at sea from shore and space: Additional and improved international standards for maritime safety [Online]. Available:

http://iecetech.org/issue/2012-04/Safety-at-sea-from-shore-and-space

[37]

https://www.google.com/search?q=validation&rlz=1C1CHWA_enUS642US642&espv=2&biw=1536&bih=825&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahU

KEwi-9NL4oZ7JAhWGPCYKHWxcDEgQ_AUIBygC#imgrc=NaXG1PmRWU9SrM%3A

78

Causes of Cable Faults

79

Approximately 150 faults reported per

year.

Over 20% are cause unknown. Even

when the cause is known, identifying a

responsible party is difficult.

70% of faults occur in water of less than

200m deep.

Each faults costs millions of dollars in

lost bandwidth revenue and repair costs.

No central database or logging of

threats/faults exists.

New FCC regulations will mandate

reporting of US based cable faults.

Design Alternatives - Ship Monitoring

and Communications

Image copyright marinetraffic.com 80

● Automatic ID system (AIS) transponder

required on all vessels larger than 299 tons

● Live GPS updates every 10sec to 3 minutes

[16]

● Ship ID, position, speed, navigation status

[16]

● Can send text messages [16]

● Marine VHF radio system required on all

commercial vessels and all vessels over 20m

in length

● 100-200 nm range

● Required monitoring of Channel 16 for

emergency and safety messages

Design Alternatives - Fault Location Finding

Images copyright Advantest

Shunt Fault (electrical)

● Use PFE (power feed equipment) to vary

voltage at CLS to find approximate location

of cable fault based on known voltage drop

per km.

● Onsite at all CLS servicing cables with

repeaters.

● Not very accurate, many additional factors

Optical Fault [29]

● Use Coherent / Optical Time Delay

Refractometer (COTDR/OTDR)

● Test pulse of known pulse width, measure

light backscattering to determine fault

location

● Can quickly determine fault segment and

linear location of fault to as close as 10m

● Not equipped at most CLSs

81

EVMS

82