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File : Era-Rep-03-2009-Saf.doc PAGE 1 OF 111

European Railway Agency

Final Report

Impact Assessment on the use ofDerailment Detection Devices in the EU Railway System

Reference: ERA/REP/03-2009/SAF Document type: Public

Version : 1.0

Date : 07 / 05 / 2009

Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by

Name Leading author:

Emmanuel Ruffin

Contributing authors:

Christophe Cassir

Torben Holvad*

Jean-Charles Pichant

Airy Magnien*

Anders Lundstrm

Position Safety Unit Project Officers

*Economic Unit Advisor

Head of Interoperability Unit

*Head of Economic

Evaluation Unit

Head of Safety Unit

Date

&

Signature

Signed Signed Signed


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IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE USE OF

DERAILMENT DETECTION DEVICES IN THE EU RAILWAY SYSTEM

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Amendment record

Version Date Section

number

Modification/description Author

0.1 18.03.08 All First Framework Document ER

0.2 03.06.08 All Inclusion of pre-existing working

documents

ER

0.3 14.11.08 All Framework update ER, CC

0.4 11.12.08 All 1st Draft of the Impact Assessment

report

ER, CC, TH

1.0 20.01.09 All Final draft Impact Assessment

report (issued under reference

ERA/REP/01-2009/SAF)

ER, CC, TH

1.0 07.05.09 All Final report on Impact Assessment

(issued under reference

ERA/REP/03-2009/SAF)

ER, CC, TH


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Table of Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 7

2.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION .............................................................................. 9

2.1 Background ................................................................................................................. 9

2.2 Consultations ............................................................................................................ 10

2.2.1 Consultations undertaken during the impact assessment study ....... 10

2.2.2 Formal consultation of social partners ................................................... 11

2.2.3 Other comments received by the Agency ............................................. 12

2.3 Expertise .................................................................................................................... 12

2.3.1 Expertise related to the Derailment Detection Devices ....................... 12

2.3.2 Expertise related to risk assessment of dangerous goods

accidents ...................................................................................................... 14

3. PROBLEM DEFINITION ............................................................................................................ 16

3.1 Problem mapping .................................................................................................... 18

3.2 Objectives of the present study.............................................................................. 20

3.2.1 General objectives ...................................................................................... 20

3.2.2 Specific objectives ...................................................................................... 20

4. POLICY OPTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 22

4.1 Prevention vs. Mitigation of derailment accidents ............................................. 22

4.2 Presentation of the considered options ................................................................ 22

4.2.1 Option 0 Present situation of EU freight derailments ....................... 22

4.2.2 Option 1 Voluntary use of the Derailment Detection Device .......... 23

4.2.3

Option 2 Required use of DDD on DG wagons ................................. 23

4.2.4 Option 3 Required use for all freight wagons .................................... 23

4.2.5 Option 4 Alternative - prevention - measures .................................... 23

5. IMPACTS ANALYSIS OF THE STUDIED OPTIONS....................................................................... 25

5.1 Overview of the three step impact analysis ......................................................... 25

5.2 Step 1: from EU railway traffic and accident data to the derailment

categorisation ........................................................................................................... 28

5.2.1 Statistics on traffic data and derailment accidents ............................... 28


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5.2.2 Studied derailment categories ................................................................. 31

5.3 Step 2: from a severe derailment to the risks of dangerous substance

involvement .............................................................................................................. 39

5.3.1 Potential involvement of a given category of substance ..................... 40

5.3.2 Apportionment of the DG accident scenarios ....................................... 41

5.3.3 Risk estimates from DG accident scenarios ........................................... 42

5.4 Step 3: Assessing the costs and benefits according to quantified and

qualified impacts ..................................................................................................... 45

6. RESULTS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION (EU27-2008) AND THE

STUDIED OPTIONS ................................................................................................................... 486.1 The derailment likelihoods .................................................................................... 48

6.1.1 Present situation Option 0 ..................................................................... 48

6.1.2 Measurement of the options impacts on derailment likelihoods ...... 49

6.2 The derailment severities........................................................................................ 50


6.2.2 Measurement of the options impacts on derailment severities ......... 51

6.3

Overall derailment risks and associated costs ..................................................... 51


6.3.2 Measurement of the options impacts on derailment risks and

costs ............................................................................................................. 52

6.3.3 Min-Max sensitivity analysis ............................................................... 55

6.3.4 Influence of input parameter on final results ........................................ 57

6.3.5 Impacts due to false alarms of the DDD ................................................ 57

6.3.6 Inputs for the Cost Benefit Analysis ....................................................... 58

7. ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS IMPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK .... 59

7.1 Safety and Risk policies in the concerned regulation frameworks .................. 59

7.2 Influence of the options on Safety , CST implementations and

derailment prevention ............................................................................................ 60

7.3 Influence of the options on implementation of Interoperability Directive

and TSIs ..................................................................................................................... 61

7.3.1 TSIs in relation with to derailment risks ................................................ 61


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7.3.2 Potential TSIs issues in case of DDD (mitigation)

implementation .......................................................................................... 62

7.3.3 Potential TSIs issues in case of preventive measure (Option 4) .......... 64

7.3.4 Inputs for the Cost Benefit Analysis ....................................................... 65

7.4 Other potential legal issues .................................................................................... 65

7.4.1 Driver licence directive ............................................................................. 65

8. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS........................................................................................................ 66

8.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 66

8.2 Core assumptions for the CBA .............................................................................. 66

8.3

Quantitative results for options 2 and 3 ............................................................... 69

8.4 Other impacts ........................................................................................................... 72

8.5 Stakeholder perspectives ........................................................................................ 74

8.6 Min-Max sensitivity analysis for the net present value ................................. 76

8.7 CBA conclusions ...................................................................................................... 78

9. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................ 79

9.1 Effectiveness of studied options ............................................................................ 79

9.1.1 Overall assessment .................................................................................... 79

9.1.2 Option 2a RID Committee of Experts provision ................................ 79

9.1.3 Other options ............................................................................................. 80

9.2 Other conclusions .................................................................................................... 80

9.2.1 Conditions for voluntary use of the DDD in other situations

than field experiments .............................................................................. 80

9.2.2 Local management of risks instead of the harmonised DDD

provision ..................................................................................................... 81

9.3 The situation in the Baltic States (EE, LT, LV) ..................................................... 82

10. REFERENCES AND DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................. 83

10.1 Reference Documents .............................................................................................. 83

10.2 Terms and definitions ............................................................................................. 88

11. LIST OF ANNEXES .................................................................................................................... 89

11.1

Annex 1 Text provisionally adopted during the 44th session of theRID Committee of Experts meeting in Zagreb .................................................... 90


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11.2 Annex 2 Consultation of NSA and NIB Networks on derailments of

freight wagons & Recording of answers .............................................................. 91

11.3 Annex 3 Formulas for Event tree analysis of the Derailment Detection

Device ........................................................................................................................ 94

11.4 Annex 4 Synthesis of answers on freight derailments received from

National Safety Authorities and National Investigation Bodies ....................... 99

11.5 Annex 5 List and values of parameters included in the Min-Max

sensitivity analysis of quantified risk assessments ........................................... 103

11.6 Annex 6 Analysis of the application scope of the RIDCE proposed

provision ................................................................................................................. 104

11.7 Annex 7 Detailed results on severities calculation for the Options 2

and 3 ........................................................................................................................ 105

11.8 Annex 8 Results on the formal consultation of social partners.................... 110


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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the present restructuring phase of the European Railway System it is of primary importance to

ensure a coherent and harmonised development of the Safety and of the Interoperability of the Community

railways while allowing new organisational or technical developments provided these are efficient.

Following the provisional adoption, by the RID Committee of Experts, of a new requirement imposing the

use of a derailment detection device (hereinafter referred as DDD) on dangerous goods wagons carrying

the most hazardous substances, the RISC Committee decided that it was necessary that the Agency assesses

the potential impacts of such a new provision on the EU Railway System.

This assessment takes place in the following context:

- today there is no existing EN standard defining the functionalities and the required performances for

derailment detection devices. Imposing such devices now may thus give undue competitive

advantages to the few suppliers of DDD existing today. The DDD aims at mitigating the severity of

occurred derailments, by automatically venting the brake pipe when a derailment is suspected,

instead of preventing derailments, while the Article 4 of the EU Railway Safety Directive 2004/49

gives clear preference for accident prevention measures.

The present impact assessment relates to the potential use of the DDD in EU-27 and includes the study of the

following policy options:

- Option 0; The reference situation of freight train derailments in EU-27 2008, without the use

of DDD,

- Option 1; Voluntary application of the DDD,

- Option 2a; Mandatory application of the DDD on the wagons carrying the most hazardous

dangerous goods as required in the proposed RID 2011 provision,

- Option 2b; Mandatory application of the DDD on all wagons carrying dangerous goods

(enlargement of the proposed application scope),

- Option 3; Mandatory application of the DDD on all freight wagons,

The assessment of these options includes detailed analysis of the following aspects:

- Potential impacts on the risk level for human safety, environment and railway system (tracks and

rolling stock),

- Potential impacts on the EU legal framework, including interoperability aspects,

- Expected economic impacts of each option taking into account both qualitative and quantitative

impacts.

The potential improvements offered by the use of the DDD were assessed in comparison to the reference

situation (Option 0) after having taken into consideration the experience acquired from the use of the DDD

in Switzerland, information on some 691 past freight train derailments occurred within the EU over morethan 10 years, as well as relevant information on risk assessments relating to the transport of dangerous


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goods. Particular attention was devoted to fulfil the EC Guidelines on Impact Assessment as well as the RID

Committee of Experts Generic guidelines for the calculation of risk inherent in the carriage of dangerous

goods by rail. It is important to note that conservative assumptions overestimating the potential benefits of

the DDD were made for complementing the necessary input data as well as for some methodologicalaspects.

The results of the impact assessment can be summarized as follows:

- From the safety point of view, and despite the above mentioned favourable assumptions it was

assessed that the proposed RID 2011 provision (Option 2a) does not significantly contribute

(< 0.01 %, i.e. far less than 1 fatality per year) to the reduction of the overall human risk level

applicable to the railway systems of the EU Member States, in accordance with the Directive

2004/49/EC. Knowing the specific nature of the major hazards relating to the transport of dangerous

goods and according to the subsidiarity principle the impact assessment suggests that, to the

exception of construction requirements on wagons, the concerned EU Member States should rather

find local solutions, when and where local risk levels are considered too high.

- From the point of view of Technical Specifications of Interoperability (TSI) relating to the trans-

European conventional rail it was identified that the RID 2011 provision would require several

induced amendments of the existing TSI relating to the subsystem "Rolling stock Freight wagons".

It would also require modifications of rules and procedures by infrastructure managers and by

railway undertakings regarding the implementation of the relevant existing requirements in the TSI

relating to the subsystem Traffic Operation and Management. This might result in some

unnecessary regulation and expenses for the sector with respect to the low safety benefits mentioned

above.

- From a sector economic perspective it was estimated that the open line freight train derailments in EU

27 cost more than 200 million Euros per year, and are almost entirely related to infrastructure and

rolling-stock damages as well as operation disruption impacts. However, in the particular case of the

proposed RID provision, the implementation costs might not be compensated by the expected

benefits.

In conclusion, the present impact study and the above mentioned results are supporting the final Agency

recommendation (ERA/REC/01-2009/SAF) which advises the Commission not to adopt the new provision

proposed by the RID Committee of Experts. However, in view of the potentially important benefits which

could be achieved in reducing costs incurred by derailments it would be advisable for the sector to explore

solutions offered by prevention measures besides any mitigation measures.


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2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION

2.1 Background

The present impact assessment (IA) examines the potential effects of the introduction in the EU railway

system of a new technical system the Derailment Detection Device (DDD) which automatically acts on

the main brake pipe of a freight train when a derailment of a wagon equipped with that device is suspected.

At the 44th session of the RID1 Committee of Experts (RIDCE) held in Zagreb on the 21 st of November 2007, a

technical study about the performance of a DDD [22,50] was presented and a new provision, reported in

annex 1of the present report, was provisionally adopted by the RIDCE and recorded in the report [20] of

the meeting with the intention to include this new provision in the RID 2011.

If adopted, this new provision would require the use of a DDD on every tank-wagon or battery-wagon,

constructed from the 1st January 2011, devoted to the transport of specific categories of dangerous

substances. The provisionally adopted text specifies the detailed application scope.

Before the meeting in Zagreb, the Commission underlined the need for a consistent approach and invited the

Railway Interoperability and Safety Committee (RISC)2, according to the EU Directive on the EU Railway

system interoperability [2], to agree on the need for coordinating the Community position before anydecision is taken for the RID 2011.

The RISC meeting agreed on the potential impact of this new RID provision on the EU Railway System,

which in case of adoption would be mandatorily applicable to the EU member states according to the EU

Directive on Inland Transport of Dangerous Goods [3].

After the meeting in Zagreb, a collaboration principle was agreed during the Committee on Transport of

Dangerous Goods. In the particular case of the DDD, the EU consultation principle proposed first by the

RISC meeting was agreed by the Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) Committee, and the European

Railway Agency (Agency) was asked to examine further the potential impacts and benefits of the DDD.

1 International regulation on the carriage of dangerous goods by rail, appendix C of the COTIF (Convention

sur le transport international ferroviaire - Convention on international railway transport).2 Minutes of the RISC meeting - 96/48-PV46 version EN01


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On February 2008, the RISC meeting was informed that the Agency would issue to the Commission a

recommendation3 supported by the present impact study, according to the Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Agency

regulation.

On this basis, a EU consultation procedure shall be organized, and the Commission should take a decision

about the new provision proposed by the RIDCE.

2.2 Consultations

2.2.1 Consultations undertaken during the impact assessment study

2.2.1.1 Consultation of the National Investigation Bodies (NIBs) and of the NationalSafety Authorities (NSAs)

Of particular interest for this study was to look at the differences between the various kinds of freight train

derailments which can occur. For example, some derailments will result immediately in an accident with a

high degree of severity (and will therefore be immediately detected), while some other derailments will take

time before they are detected. The latter type includes those derailments for which the DDD would be

expected to bring benefits. It has therefore been necessary for the impact analysis to collect data about the

relative frequency and the average consequences of such types of derailments.

To that end a specific questionnaire was prepared by the Agency and used to collect more information on

the derailments of freight trains, carrying or not carrying dangerous goods. This questionnaire is reported in

annex 2.

The consultations of the NIB and NSA networks were launched respectively on the 06/02/08 and the 20/02/08

during the plenary meetings, and the consultation objectives were explained. The deadlines for the NIB and

NSA networks were respectively set to the 14 th March and to the 31st March, however the Agency took into

account the answers received up to the end of May, thus allowing nearly three and half months consultation.

The Agency received 251 filled-in questionnaires from AT, DE, EE, ES, FI, HU, LT, LV, PL, SE, SK, UK and

NO.In addition the Agency received comprehensive surveys on freight train derailments as follows:

- IT reported a comprehensive list of 45 derailments over 7 years,

- DK reported its synthesis from 235 derailments,

- FR reported a comprehensive list of 160 derailments over 10 years.

In total, information on 691 derailments, with various level of details, were collected covering a period of

over more than 10 years.

3 European Railway Agency Recommendation on the provision proposed by the RID Committee of Expertsrequiring the use of the Derailment Detection Devices (ERA/REC/01-2009/SAF)


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Rough information on operation disruption as well as environmental (in case of dangerous goods

involvement) impacts of freight train derailments were also obtained.

2.2.1.2 Consultation of the OTIF

On the 17th of January 2008 the OTIF secretary was invited to provide the Agency with all the reports,

minutes and informal documents the RID Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology (WGTVT) had

discussed or issued on derailments. The Agency informed the OTIF secretary that is was important not to

forget any document the OTIF would like the Agency to take into account for its study.

In response to this invitation the OTIF prepared and sent to the Agency a CD-ROM containing the reports of

those meetings of the RIDCE and the WGTVT in which the item derailment detectors has been treated as

well as the related documents [12to39].

2.2.2 Formal consultation of social partners

According to Article 6 of the Agency regulation [4], the Agency is carrying out the present impact

assessment to support its recommendation to the Commission. In application of Article 4 of the Agency

regulation, and in a view of the potential implication of the recommendation on the working conditions of

railway staff, the Agency is required to consult the social partners. In the present case CER, EIM and ETFshall be consulted.

This consultation was officially launched on the 30th January 2009 and was closed on the 20 th March 2009. In

meantime a reminder was sent by the 10th March 2009.

The Agency received comments from EIM which fully support the draft recommendation and the draft

impact assessment report. The full comment is reported in annex 8.

CER informed the Agency that it has no comments from its members to report to the Agency. ETF did not

report any comment nor information to the Agency.

As a result, the Agency considered that in doing so CER and ETF have given their assent to the conclusions

reported in the two documents.

The Agency has taken due consideration of consultation comments to issue its final recommendation to the

European Commission.


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2.2.3 Other comments received by the Agency

Besides the formal consultation the findings of the draft impact assessment and the conclusions of the draft

recommendation were presented in the following meetings:

- 14th Plenary meeting of the National Safety Authorities on the 3rd February 2009,

- 51st Railway Interoperability and Safety Committee (RISC) meeting on the 5th March 2009,

Following a proposition made during the 51st RISC meeting the Agency accepted to organise a one day

informal meeting with the experts on transport of dangerous goods by rail. This meeting was held on the

2nd April 2009 in Lille.

The Agency has taken due considerations of the comments received from NSAs and from the RISC meeting

as well as from the informal discussions held in the dedicated meeting to issue the present final report and to

issue its final recommendation to the European Commission.

2.2.3.1 European Commission consultation process

The European Commission will organise the formal consultation of the Member States and of the relevant

Committees on the basis of the final recommendation of the Agency.

2.3 Expertise

2.3.1 Expertise related to the Derailment Detection Devices

Field experiments from SBB in Switzerland

In the beginning of the 90s the occurrence of three severe derailments of petroleum tank-wagon in

Switzerland resulting in large fire events had caused concerns in the public. Since that period [13, 14] the

Swiss Federal Office of Transport decided to adopt a series of prevention and mitigation measures to reduce

the risk of catastrophic railway accidents and to reduce the general public concerns about such risks.


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Amongst a set of possible measures, it was decided to experiment, on 620 tank-wagons of the SBB fleet, the

use of the DDDs as a mitigation measure4, to reduce the potential effects of derailments involving dangerous

goods wagons.

The SBB was invited to provide the Agency with the experience they have acquired in the fields of DDDinvestment, operation and maintenance.

The Agency received information that were used to estimate the investment, operation and maintenance

resources that have to be considered with regards to the various studied options.

Derailment tests carried out with goods wagons

In the November 2007 meeting of the RIDCE in Zagreb, the Technical University of Berlin (TUB) presented

the tests carried out with the EDT1015

derailment detection device. There was a long discussion about theDDD behaviour and the TUB answered the questions asked at the meeting. The Agency was attending the

meeting and thus is fully aware of the results obtained during these tests. The tests results are reported in the

references [22,50].

Field experiment of false alarms

In conclusion of the RIDCE meeting in Zagreb one supplementary test was considered necessary to give

more information on the EDT101 behaviour under low temperature condition in relation with the possibility

of false alarms.

In the RISC meeting on 26th November 2008, the representative of Sweden informed the meeting that the

new tests concerning the low temperatures might be available by the end of 2008. The present report and the

Agencys recommendation do not take into account these new tests as the results are not available yet.

It is also important to notice that the informal discussions with experts on transport of dangerous goods by

rail did not allow to conclude on the actual rate of false alarms.

UIC leaflet 541-08 4th edition

This leaflet [49] describes the characteristics that a mechanical derailment detection device should fulfil to be

approved by UIC. Annex I of the leaflet provides the list of approved devices which only contains the

EDT101 from the manufacturer referenced in [38, 39]. The leaflet does not define any quantified requirement

on reliability or on the maximum tolerable rate of false alarms.

4 The DDD acts after a derailment has occurred with the objective to mitigate the potential consequences.

5 It is important to note that the EDT101 is indirectly referred to in the DDD Provision, through a reference to

the UIC leaflet 541-08 4th edition, as a possibility to fulfil the provision. This was the reason why the testswere only devoted to the EDT101.


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This leaflet does not report the characteristics that an electronic derailment detection device should fulfil,

even if a place is reserved in the leaflet for future complements.

Other derailment detection technologies

In the minutes [12, 17] of the RID Committee of Experts meetings, the following technologies were

discussed:

- Electronic detectors without cable along the train (Telematic applications),

- Active pneumatic-mechanic detectors (independent mechanical-pneumatic system), (Knorr Bremse),

- Pressure pulsation transmission system (pressure signal transmission to the driver cabin), (Sintro) ,

- Electronic detectors with cable along the train, (Schindler Waggon - Altenrhein),

The advantages and disadvantages of these technologies were discussed by RID WGTVT who considered

that the independent mechanical-pneumatic system was the technology gathering more advantages than

disadvantages and was, at that time the only technology on the market.

Other norms or standards

The provision proposed by the RID Committee of Experts gives, in principle, the possibility to use other

derailment detection devices than the DDD approved in accordance to the UIC leaflet 541-08.

However, in practice, there are no other norms or standards specifying the functional requirements and the

performance objectives of the derailment detection devices in conformity with the foreseen RID provision.

2.3.2 Expertise related to risk assessment of dangerous goods accidents

The Swiss decision to implement the DDD on highly dangerous goods tank-wagons was supported by

assessment studies on the potential risk reduction achievable with various safety measures, and the DDD

was considered by these studies as a cost-effective measure in the Swiss context.On the Agency invitation, the Swiss Federal Office of Transport accepted to provide the Agency with

relevant study reports [40to45] on the risk based assessment of the potential DDD benefits.

In addition to these reports, the Agency also used the opinions exchanged in the framework of the RID

Working Group on Standardized Risk Analysis.


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Since 2004 this working group has produced relevant documents and other information that can be used in

the present impact study to estimate the specific risks associated with the dangerous goods involvement in

railways accidents or even in road transport6.

It is important to mention that the Agency assessment model for the potential risk reduction associated with

the use of the DDD is fully compliant with the Swiss adopted approach mentioned above, the French [51]

and Dutch [52] frameworks, as well as with the Generic Guidelines [48] established by the RID Working

Group and adopted by the RID Committee of experts in its 42nd session in November 2005.

The Agency model complies also with the final recommendation on Common Safety Methods, according to

the EU Directive on EU Railway Safety. The detailed information on the specific model developed by the

Agency for the present impact study are given in section 6.

6 Similar risk assessment methods have been reported in specific Guidelines for the road transport ofdangerous goods.


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The RIDCE is convinced of the need for measures to prevent derailments in the transport of dangerous goods. It will

get in touch with the other competent bodies dealing with the subject of derailment in order to develop the best suitable

measures. In connection with this, RID should include a general description of the objective, the entry into force of

which is planned for 2009, subject to the resolution of technical problems.

During the same meeting the Chairman confirmed that various technical solutions are vital. The decision of

principle should provide the basic conditions for the development of alternative systems .

Today, the Agency considers that the application of the new DDD provision does not respect, to a large

extent, the initial decision of principle of the RIDCE because of the following reasons:

- the expression of the necessity to adopt the new provision was strongly driven by the Swiss

experience and by the related risk assessment studies, in regards to the public concerns expressed

following important Swiss derailment accidents. After detailed consideration of the Swiss studies

by the Agency, it is clear that although these studies assess the potential achievable risk reduction at

Swiss level, they do not demonstrate the need to adopt a new provision at OTIF or EU level.

- the basic conditions for the development of alternative systems are not guaranteed with the proposed

DDD provision since its fulfilment is for the time being mainly based on the opportunity offered by

the only DDD approved by the UIC so far (another one shall be approved soon), without any other

available standard. Furthermore the DDD provision focuses on a single set of technological

products aiming only at mitigating the derailments, and the technologies aiming at preventing the

occurrence of derailments are not considered.

It should also be mentioned that the background situation appears to have slightly changed in Switzerland,

since the decision of principle by the RIDCE in 2004. A new study report [45] issued in 2006 showed that

actually no part of the Swiss network presented an unacceptable8 risk any more. According to this report the

updated results from the risk assessment mainly came from changes in Chlorine9 traffic composition, a

downward trend in derailments statistics and from new safety measures, including the use of the DDD10.

The following section summarises the different key parameters it is necessary to re-consider, at EU level, to

study the general problem of freight derailments, as well as the particular issue of using a derailment

detection device.

8 In the Swiss study acceptable risks are defined thanks to a Frequency/Fatality risk diagram (FN diagram).

The cumulative risk curve calculated on some portions of the Swiss appeared to lie within the unacceptable

region in the FN diagram.

9 Following a number of chlorine factory closures in Switzerland, the transport by train of chlorine has

indeed decreased, thus making the event of a catastrophic accident involving chlorine less likely.10 623 wagons of the SBB fleet were equipped with the DDD since mid 2002.


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3.1 Problem mapping

A detailed problem mapping has been developed in the course of the present study. In particular, across thepotential social, environmental and economic impacts the following dimensions were considered:

Railway system perspective (as technical system);

Safety perspective;

Railway market and competitiveness.

This analysis allowed a better understanding of the links between the various issues to consider. This way it

is possible to better express the general and specific objectives of the impact assessment.

In summary the following important issues have to be considered.

From the Railway System perspective:

The DDDs should not prevent the development of interoperability and has to be consistent with the

existing TSIs

The DDDs can mitigate the consequences of some derailments,

however it is necessary to quantify the potential achievable risk reduction, at EU level, as well as the

nature of the main risks.The efficiency (cost-effectiveness) needs to be measured with respect to the changes required on the

EU Railway system, and the effects of various application scopes have to be considered.

In case it would be possible to achieve a similar reduction of risks with similar cost effectiveness with

derailment prevention measures, it would be preferable to encourage, according to the Railway

Safety Directive, the improvement of safety with cost-efficient prevention measures.

The resources allocated to mitigation measures could reduce the resources available for prevention

measures, even though alternatives exist to prevent derailments,

All the necessary safety related requirements and revision of operational procedures need to be

fulfilled when a new safety device, like the DDD, is introduced. This is part of the impact

assessment.

From the Safety perspective:

The Railway transport is already safe, and all the derailments (passenger and freight) represent a

small share of the railway accidents (EU27 2006 557 over 4928) and of victims fatalities and

injuries - (EU27 2006 24 over 2599)

The freight wagon derailments do not induce, in average, more than 1 fatality per year, as referred toin EUROSTAT. The corresponding average for DG freight railway accidents is even lower.


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The safety strategy of each EU member states and the related (new) safety measures will influence the

achievement of the Common Safety Targets. It is not certain that a commonly imposed new safety

measure (as proposed by the new RID provision) corresponds to the most effective safety

improvement that can be achieved at EU level.In addition to the human impacts the TDG accidents can result in potential damage to the

environment, to the railway system and to surrounding built-up areas.

As it has been clearly demonstrated in the Switzerland risk studies, some locations are more

vulnerable than others in case of a TDG accident, however the criticality of a given location can vary

rapidly11 in function of the traffic, local urbanism, and even acceptance criteria.

The number of railway TDG accident (including derailments) - 50 declared in EU25 2006 - is low, with

around 25 releases of dangerous substance declared per year.

The TDG accidents are rare, however high consequences can occur in all modes of transport and it

remains a political issue to answer public concerns about such risks.

From the Railway market and Competitiveness perspective:

Today the new proposed RID provision is, in practice, only applicable with one type of commercial

products (with so far only one product approved by UIC as referred to in the annex I of the UIC

leaflet 541-08 OR). This may impair the development of other types of product by creating unfair

conditions for competition, unless suitable standards are developed. According to the White paper

on transport12, rail transport should increase to satisfy the overall demand with reducedenvironmental impacts. However such increase depends, among others, on the social acceptance of

railways, and therefore on the perceived risks induced by railway traffic.

Both for specific transport situations (for example vulnerable sites) or in case of a general application it

is necessary to consider, on the one hand, the optimum application scope, and on the other hand,

the efficiency and the feasibility of the investment for the sector.

The reduction of track and rolling stock damages, as well as the reduction of operation disruption

could be beneficial for the sector. Even if the DDD mitigation measures would be beneficial in the

short term, it is necessary to assess whether the development of prevention measures could be more

beneficial.

The overall risk presented by dangerous goods transport should be considered, in accordance with

Article 1.4.b) of the new Directive on Inland transport of dangerous goods, with a view not to over-

11 After review of the initial risk study the locations considered as critical in Switzerland are now considered

as acceptable [45].

12European Commission Transport White Paper from 2001 European Transport Policy for 2010: time to

decide.


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regulate with new provisions of general application the safer modes of transport. Over-regulation

could even increase the use of more risky modes and might consequently increase the overall risks.

In general the railway transport is reputed safer than road transport, then intermodal competitiveness

have to be taken into account in order not to over regulate the railway sector.

3.2 Objectives of the present study

3.2.1 General objectives

Before any detailed assessment of the potential reduction of derailment risks, the problem mapping allowsthe Agency to give the following preliminary comments:

- Imposing one type of mitigation measure such as the DDD referenced in the new RID provision might

be seen as discriminating against other type of derailment risk reduction measures, including

derailment prevention measures. ,

- the DDD Provision might infringe the proportionality principle as it is not clearly demonstrated that

the proposed measure is necessary and in adequate proportion to the considered risks.

- the requirement of a EU-wide safety measure to reduce public concerns about the risks in a specific

location of a given railway network is a priori in contradiction of the EU subsidiarity principle,

especially if a local solution exists at state level.

For these reasons the general objectives of the present study are the following:

- study the suitable conditions to better prevent (or mitigate) derailment accidents in a market-neutral

way,

- study the conditions in which the proportionality principle would be satisfied, according to the risk

potential presented by the derailments at EU level, and recommend on potential effectiveness of a

new safety requirement to prevent or mitigate derailment accidents.

- study the conditions in which the subsidiarity principle would be respected, according to the EU legal

framework, including EU railway safety and interoperability, and advise on the legal feasibility to

require a new specific regulation regarding freight train derailments.

3.2.2 Specific objectives

According to the problem mapping, the present study did not address the possibility to solve the following

linked key issues:


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4. POLICY OPTIONS

4.1 Prevention vs. Mitigation of derailment accidents

According to the present study objectives, the Agency had examined the possibility to carry out an impact

assessment of derailmentprevention measures, in addition to the particular case of the DDD mitigation

measure.

It was, however, necessary to give priority to the assessment of the DDD impacts, with regard to the agenda

of the decision making process for the RID 2011.

Taking into account the timeframe required for gathering detailed information on derailments (including

the consultations presented in section 2.2) and the time required for assessing, in sufficient details, the

potential benefits of the use of a DDD, the Agency has foreseen to split the freight derailments study in two

steps, as follows:

1st step:

assessment of the DDD mitigation measure

1st recommendation of the Agency focussing on the RID DDD provision

2nd step:

assessment of prevention measures for derailments

2nd recommendation on a EU development plan for freight train derailment management.

The present document mainly reports on the first step related to the potential use of the DDD (see Options 1

to 3 in next section) and mentions, only for information, what could be the approach of Option 4 which takes

into account the development of derailment prevention measures.

4.2 Presentation of the considered options

A detailed consideration of the options to be selected for this study was undertaken in the initial phase. The

following options were identified as pertinent for the study:

4.2.1 Option 0 Present situation of EU freight derailments

Even if a continuous safety improvement (where reasonable and practically applicable) has to be considered

in application of the Railway Safety Directive, this option 0 corresponds to the present situation of the

derailment impacts in EU 27. The impacts are described in a suitable form to allow comparison to the otheroptions. This option gathers in a readable form the available data on EU derailments, including the results of


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- define specific objectives for derailment impacts reduction,

- study the most promising prevention measures with the help of both rolling stock and infrastructure

technologies development,

- open the market for innovations and technology by developing suitable EN standards.

Besides the alternative technologies, it is also necessary to consider operational procedures as safety

measures which could be reviewed or reinforced in order to better prevent derailments.

The study of Option 4 by the Agency would however only take place, upon Commission request, after

having issued the final recommendation which will only focus on the proposal of the RID Committee of

Experts.


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5. IMPACTS ANALYSIS OF THE STUDIED OPTIONS

This chapter describes the methodology and the input data that have been used for estimating the risks and

consequences associated with freight train derailments, for each of the policy options considered. The

methodology uses a three steps approach, whereby:

- first the likelihoods of different derailment scenarios are estimated,

- then the average consequences arising from each derailment scenarios are estimated in terms of

severities (human and material impact)

- and finally, all the severities are aggregated with the likelihoods, and are then monetarised to provide

an estimation of the costs associated to the risks

It is important to stress that due to the large scope of the study (EU27) and the lack of some detailed data

received for this study, some simplifying assumptions were necessary for the estimation of average risks.

The estimates were however always made either on the conservative side or such as to maximise the

expected benefits of the DDD. Therefore, it must be understood that the present model used in the study will

tend to produce risks (and consequently risk reduction) figures which are probably overestimated.

However this should not affect the comparative analysis of the options nor the conclusions of the study, all

the quantified assessments being supported by a min-max sensitivity analysis.

5.1 Overview of the three step impact analysis

This section explains the different steps that are followed in the present analysis in order to estimate the total

costs and benefits achieved by the railway sector for each policy options.

In the first step, an analysis of the general data of EU freight traffics development is made (see diag. 1) in

order to derive (from these data and from the data on past railways accidents) the likelihood of involvingnormal freight wagons as well as dangerous good wagons in severe or less severe derailments. The

influence of the derailment detection device on the likelihoods of the different derailment scenarios

outcomes is analysed during this step, both for normal freight trains and DG freight trains14.

14 DG freight trains are defined as freight train hauling at least one DG wagon.


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Assessment of Freight train derailment risks depending on the following

parameters :

- involvement or not of DG wagons,

- Application scope of DDD.

Inputs for comparison with overall EU railway system risks.

The derailment risk assessment depend of the general traffic

parameters:

- EU- 27 railway traffic structure (2000 - 2020),

- Policy options for DDD use (PO 1-3),

Freight trains

traffic

Passenger

trains traffic

DG Freight

trains

Normal

Freight trains

Derailment accident event tree

taking account the potential

benefits of the derailment

device

And

Aggregation of outcomes in

severe and non severe

derailment categories for bothDG and normal freight wagons

EU Rail Traffic

[Eurostat 2000 - 2006]

Likelihood to have a

severe derailment of DG

wagons (overturning of

one or more wagons,

potential substancerelease)

Likelihood to have a non

severe derailment of DG

wagons (every wagon kept

on track, no substance

release)

Likelihood to have a

severe derailment of

normal freight wagons

(overturning of one or

more wagons, potential

substance release)

Likelihood to have a non

severe derailment of

normal freight wagon

(every wagon kept on

track, no substance

release)

Not in thestudy

scope

Diagram 1: Likelihood assessment of freight wagon derailments

The second step (see diag. 2) derives, from the first step, the potential average severities of the expected

derailment scenarios. This second step results in an estimate of the leading derailment risks that are: the

societal risk for human life (fatalities), the environmental risks and the economic risk for the railway system

(tracks, rolling stock and operation disruption). In this part there is no supplementary assumptions made onthe potential benefits of the derailment detection device, since these benefits are all studied in detail in the

first step in accordance to the past EU derailments lessons as well as the knowledge acquired on the DDD

itself. This approach allows a common estimate of the leading impacts for each policy options, making them

comparable.


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Accident data:

Source ERA estimates from Eurostat raw data

Data Folder Railway transport - Accidents Present study

Table

Name

RAIL_AC_CATNMBR = Railway transport - Annual number of

accidents by type of accident (number)

RAIL_AC_DNGGOOD = Railway transport - Annual number of

accidents involving the transport of dangerous goods

(number)

EU 27

Year 2004 2005 2006 originac = derailmt(Derailments)

(2008)

EU27 - - 557 number 500

Year 2004 2005 2006 type_acctot_acc_dg

Accidents involving

railway vehicle

transporting

dangerous goods

(2008)

EU27 - - 51 number 50

Year 2004 2005 2006 type_acc acc_dgAccidents in which

dangerous goods

are released

(2008)

EU27 - - 24 number 25

Remark The reported derailments are both those of the passenger trains and of the freight trains.

The reported dangerous goods accidents are not specific to the derailments but in relation with all

kind of railway accidents.

The 500 significant derailments/year that were used in the study concern both passenger trains and freight

trains. It is assumed in the study that about 60% of all derailments are freight train derailments 16. This gives

an estimate of about 300 significant freight derailments per year. It was then further estimated (see section

5.2.2.4) that about 50% of all open line derailments will be significant, to the point that they would be

included in the EUROSTAT statistics17. This finally yields about open line 600 freight train derailments per

16 The 60% figure is an expert assumption reflecting the expectation that there would tend to be more

derailments occurring on freight trains than on passenger trains, as the latter are considered in general to be

submitted to more stringent safety measures and control. In any case, variations of about +/-10% around this

figure are not expected to change significantly the results nor the conclusions of the study. This would make

the number of open line derailments vary between 500 and 700 per year in Europe. The effect of these

variations on the results are briefly analysed in section 6.3.4.

17 We may further consider that all significant derailments reported in EUROSTAT are open line derailments,

as it appears unlikely that a derailment occurring in a shunting or marshalling yard will result in significantdamages, according to the EUROSTAT definition of significant.


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year to be considered in the study as input to the freight train derailment branch in the event tree reported in

section 5.2.2.2.

5.2.2 Studied derailment categories

A model based on an event tree of the derailments has especially been set up by the Agency in order to

estimate the expected frequencies of different categories of derailment. These categories were defined

beforehand such as to reflect appropriately the impacts or benefits that the DDD would be expected to bring

for each policy option analysed.

5.2.2.1 Main expected benefits of the DDD

Safety risk benefits

The primary safety benefit of installing the derailment detection device lies in its potential for preventing an

initially non-severe derailments from evolving into a more serious derailment, because it is not timely

detected. According to the Swiss study, 40% of severe or potentially severe freight train derailments are not

initially detected. The other 60% correspond to cases where the derailment is immediately or swiftly

detected by staff, due to the severity of the derailment. This situation arises typically in the following cases:- The derailment is initially so severe that the brake pipe is ruptured, triggering an emergency brake.

- The derailment is otherwise swiftly detected by the driver or some other staff and the emergency

brake is applied

This means that the DDD would bring some benefits only in those cases where the device can detect a non

severe initial derailment and brake the train before a more serious accident might occur, for example when

running over a switch. From a safety point of view, it is therefore expected that a system with installed DDD

will reduce the amount of severe derailments potentially resulting -in case of DG trains derailments- in a

release of dangerous goods. One of the aims of the analysis is to estimate the percentage of severe

derailments that can be avoided by the DDD, and to estimate in the next step the number of fatalities thatcan be prevented by such reduction of severe derailments.

Other risk benefits

Further to the safety benefits, another potential benefit of the DDD is, in those cases where the derailment is

not immediately severe, to reduce the damages on the track caused by derailed train running until it is

eventually stopped (either following detection from the driver or through the severity of a subsequent

aggravated derailment). Given the high reliability of the device -compared to the awareness of a driver and

the longer time it takes the driver, on average, to detect a derailment- some benefits can be expected in


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The corresponding event tree diagram

Below is a representation of the event tree used for the risk analysis. All the parameters mentioned above are

shown in the diagram, as well as the different derailment outcomes. The last parameter P6 is calculated

differently depending on the type of severe derailments (see annex 3), hence the different subscript, a),b) and

c). Also the probability of DG substance involvement is calculated for each class (hence the sub-parameter

[cl]), as this is necessary to calculate subsequently the probabilities of different DG accident scenarios and

their associated risks.


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5.3 Step 2: from a severe derailment to the risks of dangerous

substance involvement

Some of the severe derailments (categories SD1 and SD2) will possibly result in a release of dangerous

substances when the derailment accident involves a DG wagon. The conditional likelihood to have a release

of hazardous substance in case of a severe derailment a DG wagon, as well as the related potential impacts

on human and environment have been quantified according to the methods commonly used in the following

references:

- Switzerland references [40to45],

- Netherlands references [52]

- French reference [51].

The Netherland study provided the conditional probabilities to have a release of dangerous goods from an

impacted DG wagon, and the conditional probabilities to have a specific DG scenario.

The DG accident scenarios were derived from the following representative hazard categories (HazCat):

- Flammable liquids,

- Flammable gases,

- Toxic gases,

According to the Netherland and the French studies, the following specific DG scenarios (SC) were

considered to be representative of the main potential impacts of the dangerous good substances:

- Pool fires,

- Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE),

- Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE),

-Jet fires of Liquefied Petroleum Gases (LPG),

- Chlorine releases,

- Ammonia releases,

- Solid fires (from class 4),

- Pollution to environment

In addition the present study categorized as less significant the scenarios derived from less hazardous

substances, in respect of the UN classification of the dangerous substances, those scenarios not being

represented in the previous scenarios.

The Class 1 (explosives) and Class 7 (radioactive material) were not considered, these not being within the

proposed scope of the new DDD provision.


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Following these assumptions, the particular case of the DDD provision scope is analysed in annex 6. From

the reported table one can establish that 18% of the UN classified substances are in the DDD scope and

belong to the most hazardous toxic gases and flammable liquids with subsidiary hazards20. It was assumed

that these substances are in the same proportion in terms of DG traffic.Taking into consideration the different designs of tanks (TankHaz parameter) carrying highly hazardous

substances or less hazardous substance, like fuels, and assuming an even distribution of the tank impact

speed below and above 40 km/h, the conditional probabilities given by the reference [52] to have a breach

(PCond breach (TankHaz. j)) of given tank category was used.

According to these assumptions the probability to involve a substance of a hazard category j from the

involvement of a DG wagon carrying a substance of class i, in a severe derailment, is given by the following

expression:

P6(Cl.i) x PCond breach (TankHaz. j) x MatTrafficShare (HazCat. j ; Cl. i)

5.3.2 Apportionment of the DG accident scenarios

Making a precise link between the actual traffic of dangerous goods and the probability to reach one or

another DG accident scenario (SC) is nearly impossible without detailed consideration on the substances

themselves. For this reason we refer to representative scenarios as listed in the top of the present section 5.3.

Each category of hazard can lead to various kinds of DG accident scenarios, which mainly result in the

following effects:

- pressure effects from deflagrations, detonations, vapour cloud explosion VCE or from boiling liquid

expanding vapour explosion - BLEVE,

- thermal effects from explosions and also from solid, pool and jets fires,

- toxic effects from toxic gases or liquids releases or, for example, induced by a decomposition of the

substance in a fire.

The table below (extracted from the reference [51] and complemented by the Agency) identifies the potential

scenarios which are likely to occur, alone or in combination with another scenario, in case of involvement of

a substance from a given class. In the right hand column, we provide a reference to the corresponding share

of mass railway transport by class.

20 Subsidiary risks means that in addition to a main hazard, e.g. flammable, the substance can also have toxic,corrosive or asphixiant properties, etc


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Considered DG accident scenario Considered

impact distance

(m)

Considered impact area

(m2)

(Referred as IA)

Considered lethality

(%)

(Referred as VUL)Pool fire 2 x 10

(both side of

tracks)

320 100%

Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) 2 x 60

(both side of

tracks)

11 300 100%

Boiling Liquid Expanding in

Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

2 x 120

(both side of

tracks)

44 000 100%

VCE of Liquefied Propane Gas

(LPG)

2 x 75

(both side of

tracks)

18 000 100%

Jet fire of LPG 120

(single side)

2 400 100%

Chlorine release 2800

(single side)

540 000 50%

Ammonia release 340

(single side)

20 000 50%

Class 4 fires 2 x 20

(both side oftracks)

1 200 100%

Less significant scenario (with or

without DG substance

involvement)

2 x 10

(over estimated)

320 100%

Class 1 Not Quantified Not Quantified Not Quantified

Class 7 Not Quantified Not Quantified Not Quantified

Finally, using all the above described relationships, the expected risks resulting from the severe derailments

of DG wagons are calculated as following:

R human / year = POPDENS

x SUMk [ IA (SC. k)x VUL (SC. k)

x [ SUMj PCondSCe (SC k, HazCat. j) x PCondBreach (TankHaz j)

x [ SUMi ((P6(Cl. i) x MatTrafficShare (HazCat. j ; Cl. i) ]]]

With:


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5.4 Step 3: Assessing the costs and benefits according to quantified

and qualified impacts

Overall, the assessment of costs and benefits is derived from the Agency Economic Evaluation Guidelines

[11]. Furthermore, the structure of the assessment also follows closely the recommendations included in the

European Commissions Impact Assessment Guidelines[9].

The key principle of the impact assessment is the comparison of the current situation (generally without

DDD, with some local exceptions) against the different options discussed above (with DDD at different

scales). This will allow identification of effects on key variables caused by introducing the DDD. In

particular, the assessment concerns comparison of the current situation with the planned situations. Thisform of comparison does not take into account any effects during the transition period from current to

planned situation, e.g. the possible effect of resource or supply shortage in case of rapid transition are

ignored. The chosen approach is consistent with the overall methodology used in this study where the

introduction of DDD is assessed in the best possible light. The core impact assessment is based on a cost-

benefit analysis (CBA) involving consideration to the monetarised costs and benefits. Non-monetarised

impacts are considered as appropriate.

In accordance with the ERA Economic Evaluation Guidelines, the assessment of impacts examine main

benefits and costs for different categories of stakeholders (e.g. railway undertakings, infrastructuremanagers, rail manufacturers, Governments, rail users etc.) coming from the introduction of the DDD on

different scales.

The following variables have been identified to be examined as part of the impact assessment:

Monetarised elements Non-monetarised elements

- Fatalities and injuries (*)

- Environmental damage costs (*)

- Costs of damaged track repair (*)

- Costs of freight wagons repair or

replacement (*)

- Traffic operation disruption (*)

- RUs acquisition, installation and

maintenance costs for DDD (*)

- Training of IM and RU staff

- Maintenance of tracks

- Maintenance of Rolling stock

- Revision of internal procedures (IMs and RUs)

- RU administrative costs (certification part A and B)

- EC Administrative cost (impact study of DDD)

- Monitoring of effectiveness for the chosen option

- Revision of TSI

- EU MS administrative costs (certification part A and B)

- Cost of lost cargo


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The monetarised costs are of course included in the CBA. Other items are considered qualitatively. Outputs

from the risk assessment provide quantitative measures of the consequences of DDD with respect to the five

monetarised costs.

It should be emphasised that all quantitative estimates provided as part of the impact assessment should be

viewed as order of magnitudes and not precise figures. However, conclusions drawn from the estimates are

robust as uncertainty has been taken into account through testing of key parameter values in the form of a

Min-Max analysis (see section 8.6). This involves two tests: (1) lowest likely value of the NPV based on a

combination of pessimistic (input) values; (2) highest possible value of the NPV based on a combination of

optimistic (input) values.

All impacts of options are measured by comparing them to the present situation, and the impacts are

quantified in monetary terms and combined in order to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of each

option. This will allow a comparison of the alternative options according to the NPV. In principle, a negative

NPV value would imply that the situation without DDD is the best performing option in terms of monetary

impacts, while positive NPVs imply that the alternative options lead to an improvement relative to the

without DDD situation. The alternative option with the highest positive NPV value would be the preferred

option according to the monetary impacts. If no positive NPV value is identified, the without DDD situation

is the preferred choice. This is because overall impact of non-monetarised costs is likely to favour the status

quo (changes to the railway system will induce most of the non-monetarised costs). In addition to the NPV

the Benefit-Cost (B/C) ratio are also computed for the options considered.

Detailed consideration to stakeholder perspectives is addressed as part of the examination of consequences.

The focus in the assessment is on the concerns of the following groups:

- Railway undertakings

- Infrastructure managers

- Rail manufacturers

- Governments / National Safety Authorities

- Rail users

- Non-users

- Other parties (e.g. maintenance suppliers, wagon keepers, service providers and procurement entities)

This analysis is important in order to examine who the likely winners and losers are. Particular attention

is given to the stakeholders: railway undertakings / infrastructure managers, governments / National Safety

Authorities.


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6. RESULTS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE PRESENT

SITUATION (EU27-2008) AND THE STUDIED OPTIONSIn the restricted time frame of the present impact study, it was not possible to develop a quantitative

analysis of option 4 which might require a detailed examination of each possible preventive measure of

derailments in the short and the long term.

Options 1, 2 and 3 (all considering mitigation with the DDD) have been quantified on the basis of the data

input consultation results and complementary assumptions. It will be possible to quantify the effectiveness

of the option 4 in a further stage if this is required by the Commission.

The main objective of this section is to bring sound information on the potential risk reduction in case ofimplementation of options 1 to 3.

The analysis investigates the potential achievable reduction for the following risks:

- Human risks, expressed in terms of expected fatalities and injuries per year, then converted in

monetary unit using the so-called VPF (Value for Preventing a Fatality)

- Railway system risks, expressed in terms of

Average damages (costs) to the track following a derailment

Average damages (costs) to rolling stock following a derailment

Average hours of operation disruption ( train delays) then converted in monetary units- Environmental risks, expressed in terms average costs to the environment

6.1 The derailment likelihoods

6.1.1 Present situation Option 0

In order to have an estimation of the present situation regarding the apportionment of derailments into the

different categories specified in the previous chapter, the event tree is used first without the detection device

(probability of equipped vehicle, P3=0). The results obtained in terms of expected frequency and percentage

of each derailment category out of a total of 600 open lines derailments occurring in EU-27 are shown in the

table below:


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6.2.2 Measurement of the options impacts on derailment severities

The breakdown of damages and severities for all the options with the DDD is included in annex 7. Following

what had been described previously regarding the impacts on derailment likelihoods, it is worth noting that

the application of the RID provision scope would hardly save any fatalities from severe derailment involving

dangerous goods. This is due to the very small probabilities of having DG scenarios with catastrophic

consequences on a number of events (2 prevented severe derailments with DG wagons per year) which is

already small. The high consequence, low frequency scenarios are included but their contribution to the risk

reduction is so small that it can be almost neglected, considering that these rare scenarios could only apply

to 2 potentially hazardous events per year that can be prevented by the DDD.

On the other hand, extending the scope to all DG wagons would save about 1 fatality per year. This is due to

the higher frequencies and lower consequences DG scenarios associated with dangerous substances out of

the RID scope, which will be involved in the extra 13 severe DG train derailments prevented by the

extension of the scope to all DG wagons.

The disruption of service operations, and the related costs, has been assessed to be the main indirect impact

of derailments (see section 6.3.2) while the track damages is the main direct impact.

Regarding this direct impact, the main effect of the DDD, is to reduce track kilometre damages in two ways:

- By reducing the number of undetected (potentially severe) derailments. The tables in annex 7 show

that this corresponds to a reduction ranging from 10 km/year (option 2) to 520 km/year (option 3)

- By detecting derailments earlier than staff would do otherwise for non severe derailments. This

corresponds to a reduction ranging from 8km (option 2a) to 43km (option 2b) per year. The impact

of option 3 on non-severe derailments is less clear to identify, since the category of non severe

derailments becomes significantly bigger (from 281 to 401), due to the large transfer in this category

of derailments that would go undetected without the DDD.

For similar reasons the DDD also reduce the rolling stock damages.

6.3 Overall derailment risks and associated costs

6.3.1 Present situation Option 0

On the basis of the previous results in terms of frequencies and consequences, and using average cost values

for each type of consequences, the costs arising from each type of freight derailments in the present situation

are estimated as follows:


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Concerning the human impacts, the detailed results are the following:

- The absolute value of human impacts per year is estimated to be 3 fatalities per year from DG

involvement and 1 fatality per year from the normal freight transport. These figures seems to be

already high (probably overestimated) compared to the DG accident that have been reported, as

already stated.

- From this basis the potential reduction is assumed to be one fatality per year as a maximum for the

Options 2b and 3 and very low (3% reduction 0.1 fatality/year) for the proposed RID application

scope (Option 2a). This is explained by the fact that this application scope focuses on the most

hazardous substances, which represent a small proportion of the total transport, in order to reduce

their potential involvement in case of (rare) major DG accidents. Also the potential big impacts of

such rare events, which are estimated to occur only once every 100 or 1000 years, are considerably

diluted when taken as an average over one year period.

- In terms of value to prevent a fatality the reduction of human impacts is smaller than 0.3 M/Y in

case of the RID application scope (Option 2a) and, at a maximum, of 4 M/Y if the derailment

detection device would be installed on all the freight wagons.

Therefore, in pure economic terms the investment in the derailment detection device for human impact

reduction cannot be justified22. Only the integration of aversion criteria for major DG accidents might justify

the investment for human impacts reason.

22 The monetarisation using value of a preventable (statistical) fatality (VPF), does not put a value on a

human life, but merely expresses the willingness of citizens to pay for avoiding a fatality somewhere in the


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Abs. Value MEExp.

Change

+/- % +/- MEExp.

Change

+/- % +/- MEExp.

Change

+/- % +/- ME

Expected fatalities (Fat./Y) 12 18,3 0,3 -3% -0,5 3,8 -31% -5,6 5 -62% -6,9

Expected injuries (Inj./Y) 122 24,3 3 -3% -0,7 38 -69% -7,5 46 -62% -9,2

Expected fatalities (Fat./Y) 1 1,5 NQ NQ NQ NQ NQ NQ

Expected injuries (Inj./Y) 4 0,8 NQ NQ NQ NQ NQ NQ

to infrastructure (km/Y) 1345 241 17 -1% -3,1 101 -7% -18,9 1035 -77% -193,4

to rolling stock (Nb/Y) 4245 67 20 -0,5% -0,7 122 -3% -4,2 1254 -30% -23,4

induced operation disruptions

(h/Y)26146 495 130 -0,5% -3 780 -3% -17 7999 -31% -172

to environment (ME/Y) NQ 21 NQ -2% -0,4 NQ -31% -6,4 NQ -38% -7,8

868 -8 -59 -413

Environment

EU Railway

system

Damages to the infrastructure, the rolling stock and traffic operation

disruption

Victims from DG wagons derailments vs related costs

Humans

Damages from derailment involving the dangerous goods

Limited - Not

Quantified

Expected changes from the options 2, 2b and 3 compared to the present situation (orange

cells highlights the highest changes for each option)

Option 2 (a) - Proposedprovision RID 2011

Option 2 (b) -Application scope extended

to all DG wagons

Victims from normal freight w agon derailments

Option 3 - Application toall freight wagons

Opt. 2a --> Opt 2b --> Opt. 3 -->

EU legal framework in force, including RID 2009 provisions

Option 0 - Present situation

Overall derailment costs and potential

benefits of changes in Million Euros

Expected risks over the reference year (EU 27 - 2008)

Very limited -

Not

Quantified

Very limited -

Not

Quantified

The results obtained with these parameters do not change very much the interpretation of the reference

results: the overwhelming part of economic (monetarised) benefits are achievable on the railway system and

not with respect to human and environmental impacts. On the other hand the absolute values of the

estimated benefits (cost reductions) do vary quite considerably, and this will be taken into account in the

ensuing Cost-Benefit analysis. However, given the conservative model used (which tends to overestimate

the benefits of the DDD), real benefits would be expected to lie somewhere more between theminimising and the reference set of values, rather than between the reference and maximising ones.


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6.3.4 Influence of input parameter on final results

As indicated previously, there is also some uncertainty regarding the number of open line freight train

derailments expected to occur every year in the EU. Using EUROSTAT figures as a basis, a reference number

of 600 derailments per year was used in the study. This figure was derived in part thanks to an assumption

made about the proportion of freight train derailments with respect to passenger train derailments. It was

assumed that 60% of all open line derailments will be freight train derailments. The table below shows what

the influence of a variation of +/- 10% around this 60% assumption, has on the final results for option 0

(without the DDD). Such variation would correspond to +/- 100 derailments per year.

Influence of number of derailments as input of the event tree on the reference situation (Option 0)

Apportionment(unchanged) Safety Impact/year Economic impact/year

Immediate severe derailmentof DG wagons with

involvement of the DG (SD1)4% +/- 0,3 fatalities +/-6.7 ME

Delayed severe derailment of

DG wagons with involvement

of the DG (SD2)3%

+/-0,2 fatalities +/- 6,3 ME

Immediate severe derailment

of normal freight wagons

(SD3)29%

+/- 0,1 fatalities +/- 31 ME

Delayed severe derailment of

normal freight wagons (SD4) 17% +/- 0,04 fatalities+/-27 ME

Non severe derailment of DG

or normal freight wagons(NSD2) 47%

+/- 5,8 ME

Sum of All the

categories100% +/- 0,64 fatalities +/-78,8 ME

The effect of such variation in the input is reflected proportionally, across the different derailment categories

and overall, in the final results. Overall a change of +/- 100 freight train derailments ( which

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