Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

38
Deploying a Secure Deploying a Secure Network Access Network Access Infrastructure Infrastructure Part 2 Part 2 Romano Jerez Romano Jerez Support Professional Support Professional Directory Services Directory Services Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Corporation

Transcript of Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

Page 1: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

Deploying a Secure Network Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure Access Infrastructure Part 2Part 2

Romano JerezRomano JerezSupport ProfessionalSupport ProfessionalDirectory ServicesDirectory ServicesMicrosoft CorporationMicrosoft Corporation

Page 2: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

2

ObjectivesObjectives

Provide information about Microsoft® Provide information about Microsoft® Windows® .NET networking components that Windows® .NET networking components that you must consider when deploying a secure you must consider when deploying a secure network access infrastructurenetwork access infrastructure

Page 3: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

3

AgendaAgenda

Technologies and key conceptsTechnologies and key concepts Before you startBefore you start Directory and authentication modelsDirectory and authentication models Securing wireless and wired linksSecuring wireless and wired links Securing against rogue systemsSecuring against rogue systems VPN deploymentVPN deployment Updating proprietary VPN deploymentsUpdating proprietary VPN deployments

Page 4: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

4

Technologies and ConceptsTechnologies and ConceptsThe PartsThe Parts

Making correct choicesMaking correct choices InteractionsInteractions DependenciesDependencies ArchitectureArchitecture SecuritySecurity

IAS

ActiveDirectory

Client

802.11AP

RRAS

MS CA

Goals:Goals:TransparencyTransparencyMinimize complexityMinimize complexity

Goals:Goals:TransparencyTransparencyMinimize complexityMinimize complexity

Page 5: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

5

Technologies and ConceptsTechnologies and ConceptsTrust and AuthorizationTrust and Authorization

Authentication types and methodsAuthentication types and methods Single versus multifactorSingle versus multifactor Passwords (shared secrets) Passwords (shared secrets)

versus tokens versus tokens versus certificates versus certificates versus biometrics (users)versus biometrics (users)

Secure deployment models requiredSecure deployment models required Minimize trust models (simplicity)Minimize trust models (simplicity)

Page 6: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

6

Technologies and Concepts Technologies and Concepts (2)(2)

Trust and AuthorizationTrust and Authorization

Examples of supported trusts:Examples of supported trusts: RADIUS – computer trust with shared secrets RADIUS – computer trust with shared secrets

onlyonly IPSec – computer trust with single certificate, IPSec – computer trust with single certificate,

Kerberos ticket, and shared secretKerberos ticket, and shared secret PPTP, Dial – single method user trustPPTP, Dial – single method user trust L2TP – single method user trust and IPSec trustL2TP – single method user trust and IPSec trust 802.1x – user trust or computer trust802.1x – user trust or computer trust

Page 7: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

7

Technologies and ConceptsTechnologies and ConceptsUsing and Protecting Shared SecretsUsing and Protecting Shared Secrets

Strong channels versus offline attacksStrong channels versus offline attacks CHAP models alone are not encryptedCHAP models alone are not encrypted Need mutual authentication to be part of modelNeed mutual authentication to be part of model MS-CHAP inside PEAP or L2TP/IPSec is protected MS-CHAP inside PEAP or L2TP/IPSec is protected

and includes mutual authenticationand includes mutual authentication

DistributionDistribution Users – think of their own secretsUsers – think of their own secrets

UserID provides clue to secretUserID provides clue to secret Computers – require transfer and protectionComputers – require transfer and protection

WEP, IPSec – no user hints for multiple secrets WEP, IPSec – no user hints for multiple secrets without compromising securitywithout compromising security

Refreshing is difficult to manageRefreshing is difficult to manage

Page 8: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

8

Technologies and ConceptsTechnologies and ConceptsUsing Certificates for Secure Network Using Certificates for Secure Network InfrastructureInfrastructure

Secure deployment models definedSecure deployment models defined Auto-enrollmentAuto-enrollment PKCSPKCS Users versus computersUsers versus computers

Use if possible: stronger storage modelsUse if possible: stronger storage models Smart cards versus user store on computerSmart cards versus user store on computer

Conceptual contentsConceptual contents Identity – who the user/computer isIdentity – who the user/computer is Purpose – what this certificate is good forPurpose – what this certificate is good for

Not all systems treat purpose the sameNot all systems treat purpose the same Interoperability issuesInteroperability issues

Page 9: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

9

Infrastructure TechnologiesInfrastructure TechnologiesStrong Authentication ProtocolsStrong Authentication Protocols

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Generalized authentication “framework” protocolGeneralized authentication “framework” protocol Carrier for one or more authentication methodsCarrier for one or more authentication methods Can establish session keysCan establish session keys

Driven by authentication methodDriven by authentication method Transport Layer Security (TLS) services can Transport Layer Security (TLS) services can

encrypt channelencrypt channel Driven by authentication methodDriven by authentication method

Standard bindings for PPP and 802 (802.1x)Standard bindings for PPP and 802 (802.1x) Protected EAP (PEAP)Protected EAP (PEAP)

EAP authentication methodEAP authentication method Tunnel for EAP method(s) after thatTunnel for EAP method(s) after that Establishes protected channel and keyingEstablishes protected channel and keying

Page 10: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

10

Infrastructure TechnologiesInfrastructure TechnologiesLink and Network Layer SecurityLink and Network Layer Security

Secure wirelessSecure wireless 802.11: encrypted (WEP) wireless link802.11: encrypted (WEP) wireless link

Weak preshared key authenticationWeak preshared key authentication Weak encryption model because of keying and Weak encryption model because of keying and

modelmodel 802.1x: EAP authentication to solve weaknesses802.1x: EAP authentication to solve weaknesses

IP Security ProtocolIP Security Protocol Network layer authentication, integrity, encryptionNetwork layer authentication, integrity, encryption

Computer trust (certificates, “preshared key”)Computer trust (certificates, “preshared key”) Encryption keys using Diffie-HellmanEncryption keys using Diffie-Hellman

End-to-end End-to-end –– transport mode transport mode Gateway-to-gateway Gateway-to-gateway –– tunnel mode tunnel mode

Page 11: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

11

Infrastructure TechnologiesInfrastructure TechnologiesSecure Remote Access (VPN) ProtocolsSecure Remote Access (VPN) Protocols Point-to-Point Tunneling ProtocolPoint-to-Point Tunneling Protocol

Link layer (PPP+GRE) tunneled connection with Link layer (PPP+GRE) tunneled connection with authentication and encryptionauthentication and encryption User trust (passwords, smart cards, and so on)User trust (passwords, smart cards, and so on) Encryption keys partially from authentication credentialEncryption keys partially from authentication credential

Client-to-gateway and gateway-to-gatewayClient-to-gateway and gateway-to-gateway

Layer 2 Tunneling ProtocolLayer 2 Tunneling Protocol Link layer (PPP) tunneled connection with Link layer (PPP) tunneled connection with

authenticationauthentication User trust (passwords, smart cards, and so on)User trust (passwords, smart cards, and so on)

Relies on network layer wrapper (IPSec) for Relies on network layer wrapper (IPSec) for integrity and encryptionintegrity and encryption IPSec delivers computer trustIPSec delivers computer trust

Client-to-gateway and gateway-to-gatewayClient-to-gateway and gateway-to-gateway

Page 12: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

12

Before You StartBefore You Start

Must start with clean infrastructureMust start with clean infrastructurein corporate networkin corporate network Well-managed DHCP scopesWell-managed DHCP scopes Functional DNSFunctional DNS Clean routing infrastructureClean routing infrastructure

No address conflicts between connected No address conflicts between connected networksnetworks

Page 13: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

13

Directory and Authentication ModelDirectory and Authentication ModelSingle Forest DomainSingle Forest Domain

ADSI withLSA log on

ADSI withLSA log on

RADIUS

Use when:Use when:

• Gateways are Gateways are Windows-basedWindows-based

• There are few There are few gatewaysgateways

• Gateway has Gateway has integratedintegratedaccess policies access policies (example: (example: RRAS withRRAS withIAS engine)IAS engine)

Use when:Use when:

• Gateways are not Gateways are not Windows-basedWindows-based

• There are many There are many gatewaysgateways

• Gateway has no Gateway has no integrated access integrated access policiespolicies

Access Point to DirectoryAccess Point to Directory Access Point to RADIUSAccess Point to RADIUS

Page 14: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

14

Directory and Authentication ModelDirectory and Authentication ModelSecuring RADIUS AuthenticationSecuring RADIUS Authentication

RADIUS is an encrypted channelRADIUS is an encrypted channel Requires shared secret to access pointsRequires shared secret to access points

TrustTrust KeyingKeying

Establish management model for updatesEstablish management model for updates

RADIUS can be protected by IPSecRADIUS can be protected by IPSec Do this where possibleDo this where possible

ProxiesProxies RADIUS server to Active Directory®RADIUS server to Active Directory® RADIUS server to RRASRADIUS server to RRAS

Page 15: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

15

Directory and Authentication ModelDirectory and Authentication ModelMultidomain Single ForestMultidomain Single Forest

ADAD ADADCross domain trustCross domain trust

IASIAS

Conditions:Conditions: Two-way cross domain trust within single forestTwo-way cross domain trust within single forest

What to do:What to do: IAS member of one of the domainsIAS member of one of the domains Enable IAS: member of IAS servers groupEnable IAS: member of IAS servers group Scale out as required by access pointsScale out as required by access points

IAS can run on DCIAS can run on DCIAS can run on DCIAS can run on DC

Page 16: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

16

Directory and Authentication ModelDirectory and Authentication ModelMultiforest DomainMultiforest Domain

ADAD ADAD

IASIAS

Conditions:Conditions: Multiple forestsMultiple forests Want geographic failoverWant geographic failover Outsourced network accessOutsourced network access Very high scale—distributed RADIUS trust managementVery high scale—distributed RADIUS trust management

What to do:What to do: IAS member in each forestIAS member in each forest Enable IAS: member of IAS servers groupEnable IAS: member of IAS servers group IAS proxy need not be domain memberIAS proxy need not be domain member Scale out as required by access pointsScale out as required by access points

IASIASIASIAS

ProxyProxy

IAS can run on DCIAS can run on DCIAS can run on DCIAS can run on DC

Page 17: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

17

Directory and Authentication ModelDirectory and Authentication ModelSelecting Authentication MethodsSelecting Authentication Methods

VPN and dialVPN and dial EAP if possibleEAP if possible

Smart cards, user certificates, third-party Smart cards, user certificates, third-party plug-inplug-in

MS-CHAP if passwords are requiredMS-CHAP if passwords are required

WirelessWireless PEAP if possible (supports all methods)PEAP if possible (supports all methods) EAP if PEAP is not possibleEAP if PEAP is not possible Computer versus user trustComputer versus user trust

User if no computer trust or user policy is User if no computer trust or user policy is requiredrequired Use same credential as VPN and dialUse same credential as VPN and dial

Page 18: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

18

Securing Wireless/Wired LinksSecuring Wireless/Wired Links

Never use 802.11 without Never use 802.11 without 802.1x and WEP802.1x and WEP

Try to use 802.1x in new Try to use 802.1x in new wired deploymentswired deployments No WEP hereNo WEP here

Use PEAP if passwordsUse PEAP if passwordsare requiredare required

Corpnet

802.11 AP802.11 AP• 802.1x802.1x• WEPWEP

User versus computer authenticationUser versus computer authenticationCertificate versus password credential Certificate versus password credential

IASIAS

ADAD

802.1x 802.1x SwitchSwitch

AP vendors:AP vendors:Support RADIUS/IPSec and helpSupport RADIUS/IPSec and helpimprove authentication channel securityimprove authentication channel security

Switch vendors: move to 802.1xSwitch vendors: move to 802.1x

AP vendors:AP vendors:Support RADIUS/IPSec and helpSupport RADIUS/IPSec and helpimprove authentication channel securityimprove authentication channel security

Switch vendors: move to 802.1xSwitch vendors: move to 802.1x

Page 19: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

19

Securing Against Rogue SystemsSecuring Against Rogue SystemsEavesdropping / Unauthorized AccessEavesdropping / Unauthorized Access

Rogue issues – not everything is 802.1x todayRogue issues – not everything is 802.1x today Undetected clear wireless APUndetected clear wireless AP Rogue computer on non-802.1x portRogue computer on non-802.1x port

Solution 1: IPSec transport modeSolution 1: IPSec transport mode Pros:Pros:

Can block all nonsecured communicationCan block all nonsecured communication Strong integrity and encryptionStrong integrity and encryption Simple credential model (Kerberos or auto-enroll)Simple credential model (Kerberos or auto-enroll) User transparencyUser transparency

Cons:Cons: Limited to IPSec-capable systemsLimited to IPSec-capable systems Domain trust work in multiforest deploymentsDomain trust work in multiforest deployments Policy requires careful thoughtPolicy requires careful thought No firewall inspection with ESP unless on end systemNo firewall inspection with ESP unless on end system

AP Vendors:AP Vendors:Deprecate non-802.1xDeprecate non-802.1xAPs and help end roguesAPs and help end rogues

AP Vendors:AP Vendors:Deprecate non-802.1xDeprecate non-802.1xAPs and help end roguesAPs and help end rogues

Page 20: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

20

Solution 2: Secure critical systems with VPNSolution 2: Secure critical systems with VPN Put critical systems in network secured by RAS-VPN Put critical systems in network secured by RAS-VPN

gateway (with optional firewall)gateway (with optional firewall) Pros:Pros:

Broader end-system supportBroader end-system support Firewall inspection possible in secure server zoneFirewall inspection possible in secure server zone Strong integrity and encryptionStrong integrity and encryption Simple credential model (Kerberos or auto-enroll)Simple credential model (Kerberos or auto-enroll)

Cons:Cons: Significant network re-architectureSignificant network re-architecture Scalability consideration for very large deploymentsScalability consideration for very large deployments Concurrent peer-to-peer and secure server accessConcurrent peer-to-peer and secure server access Less transparent to userLess transparent to user

Can integrate using WinLoginCan integrate using WinLogin

Securing Against Rogue SystemsSecuring Against Rogue Systems (2)(2)

Eavesdropping / Unauthorized AccessEavesdropping / Unauthorized Access

Page 21: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

21

VPN DeploymentVPN DeploymentDeployment ModelsDeployment Models

Site-to-siteSite-to-site Recommend L2TP/IPSec if using RRASRecommend L2TP/IPSec if using RRAS IPSec tunnel mode for IP-unicast only trafficIPSec tunnel mode for IP-unicast only traffic Computer trust is enoughComputer trust is enough

RAS VPN (client to gateway)RAS VPN (client to gateway) Internet connectivity architecturesInternet connectivity architectures Authentication architecturesAuthentication architectures Multihoming and scaling modelsMultihoming and scaling models Address managementAddress management VPN protocol selectionVPN protocol selection Certificate deploymentCertificate deployment Client deployment modelClient deployment model Split tunnels or notSplit tunnels or not Updating earlier VPN deploymentsUpdating earlier VPN deployments

Page 22: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

22

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentInternet Connectivity ArchitecturesInternet Connectivity Architectures

Internet firewall before VPN is unnecessaryInternet firewall before VPN is unnecessary Requires firewall port opening planRequires firewall port opening plan

Private Network

Internet

Page 23: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

23

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentAuthentication ArchitecturesAuthentication Architectures

Options: RADIUS or Active Directory Options: RADIUS or Active Directory (if no central policy is required)(if no central policy is required)

Options: Active Directory? (exposes domain in DMZ), Options: Active Directory? (exposes domain in DMZ), RADIUS, RADIUS with IPSec protection (if gateway can do this)RADIUS, RADIUS with IPSec protection (if gateway can do this)

Page 24: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

24

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentMultihoming and Scaling ModelsMultihoming and Scaling Models

Private

Single HomeSingle HomeGatewayGateway

Dual HomeDual HomeGatewayGateway

Private

Offload NICs – watch limits on concurrent SAsOffload NICs – watch limits on concurrent SAs

Connections and throughput function of egress performanceConnections and throughput function of egress performanceSessions for 10 percent of authorized RAS usersSessions for 10 percent of authorized RAS users

Page 25: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

25

Private

Single HomeSingle HomeGatewayGateway

Dual HomeDual HomeGatewayGateway

Private

MultihomeMultihome(throughput)(throughput)

GatewayGateway

Private

MultihomeMultihome(availability)(availability)

GatewayGateway

NLBNLB

Private

Consolidate “back-side” NICs (routing considerations)Consolidate “back-side” NICs (routing considerations)Scale up and out for “server area/client area” network partitioningScale up and out for “server area/client area” network partitioning

RRAS snap-in considerations for scale upRRAS snap-in considerations for scale up

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentMultihoming and Scaling ModelsMultihoming and Scaling Models

Page 26: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

26

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentAddress Management ArchitecturesAddress Management Architectures

Private network DHCP assigned Private network DHCP assigned - - BestBest Offers more than IP addressesOffers more than IP addresses

Pooled addresses from gateway Pooled addresses from gateway - - OkayOkay Static using Active Directory Static using Active Directory

user properties user properties - - AvoidAvoid Static configured on clientStatic configured on client - - NeverNever Make sure it is routable/consistentMake sure it is routable/consistent

Look out for default private addressesLook out for default private addressesat corporate and remote networksat corporate and remote networks

Page 27: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

27

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentVPN Protocol SelectionVPN Protocol Selection

L2TP/IPSecL2TP/IPSec First recommendation for best securityFirst recommendation for best security Requires computer trust infrastructureRequires computer trust infrastructure

(PKI or shared secrets)(PKI or shared secrets) Use PKI instead of shared secretsUse PKI instead of shared secrets

PPTPPPTP Second recommendation understandingSecond recommendation understanding

Use with strong user authenticationUse with strong user authentication Passwords may be workable if PEAP can be completed Passwords may be workable if PEAP can be completed

for VPN scenariosfor VPN scenarios

Least cost because trust model is based on user Least cost because trust model is based on user identityidentity No computer trust infrastructure to deployNo computer trust infrastructure to deploy

(PKI or share secrets)(PKI or share secrets)

Page 28: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

28

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentCertificate DeploymentCertificate Deployment For computer authentication when For computer authentication when

L2TP/IPSec is usedL2TP/IPSec is used Gateway and client have common trusted root CAGateway and client have common trusted root CA GatewayGateway

Auto-enroll if possibleAuto-enroll if possible Domain accessible to perimeter network (also known Domain accessible to perimeter network (also known

as DMZ, demilitarized zone, and screened subnet) as DMZ, demilitarized zone, and screened subnet) serversservers

Gateway is RRAS instead of third partyGateway is RRAS instead of third party PKCS if gateway supports itPKCS if gateway supports it SCEP if PKCS is not supportedSCEP if PKCS is not supported

ClientClient Auto-enroll if possibleAuto-enroll if possible PKCS if client never connects to domain before PKCS if client never connects to domain before

requiring a VPNrequiring a VPN Certificate must be in local computer certificate storeCertificate must be in local computer certificate store Must have administrative privileges to installMust have administrative privileges to install

Page 29: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

29

For user authenticationFor user authentication Certificate is recognized in Active DirectoryCertificate is recognized in Active Directory Use smart cards if possibleUse smart cards if possible Use local user certificates if not using smart Use local user certificates if not using smart

cardscards Certificate must be in local USER certificate storeCertificate must be in local USER certificate store Install using log on script bootstrap if possibleInstall using log on script bootstrap if possible Install using Web or PKCS if log on scripts are not Install using Web or PKCS if log on scripts are not

possiblepossible

RAS VPN Deployment RAS VPN Deployment (2)(2)

Certificate DeploymentCertificate Deployment

Page 30: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

30

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentClient Deployment ModelsClient Deployment Models

Connection Manager Administration KitConnection Manager Administration Kit Use where possibleUse where possible

Sequenced connectionsSequenced connections Managed phonebooksManaged phonebooks Bootstrap certificates and toolsBootstrap certificates and tools Support for earlier platformsSupport for earlier platforms Client configuration setupClient configuration setup

New Connection WizardNew Connection Wizard Automatic protocol setupAutomatic protocol setup

Page 31: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

31

RAS VPN DeploymentRAS VPN DeploymentSplit Tunnels or NotSplit Tunnels or Not

Only deploy with ICF on client public Only deploy with ICF on client public interfaceinterface

Managing client routesManaging client routes Administrators should control themAdministrators should control them Use DHCP classless static routesUse DHCP classless static routes

Permits update at connection timePermits update at connection time Support in Windows XPSupport in Windows XP

Use Connection Manager for down-level onlyUse Connection Manager for down-level only Updates only at client reprovisioningUpdates only at client reprovisioning

Consider Internet and private addressesConsider Internet and private addresses Printing to home printer and Internet while connectedPrinting to home printer and Internet while connected

Page 32: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

32

RAS VPN Deployment RAS VPN Deployment (2)(2)

Split Tunnels or NotSplit Tunnels or Not

Cannot split to home if corporate addresses Cannot split to home if corporate addresses conflictconflict Resource address conflicts between home and Resource address conflicts between home and

corporatecorporate Default gateway conflicts between home NAT and Default gateway conflicts between home NAT and

corporatecorporate Non-split connections will still workNon-split connections will still work

Page 33: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

33

Gateway Authentication/Encryption ModelsGateway Authentication/Encryption Models• IPSec tunnel modeIPSec tunnel mode

• Requires gateway specific clientRequires gateway specific client• Preshared IPSec trust (aggressive mode)Preshared IPSec trust (aggressive mode)• Certificate-based IPSec trustCertificate-based IPSec trust

• L2TP/IPSecL2TP/IPSec• No EAP for PPP user authenticationNo EAP for PPP user authentication• Passwords are best Passwords are best

(if any user authentication)(if any user authentication)

Gateway Authentication/Encryption ModelsGateway Authentication/Encryption Models• IPSec tunnel modeIPSec tunnel mode

• Requires gateway specific clientRequires gateway specific client• Preshared IPSec trust (aggressive mode)Preshared IPSec trust (aggressive mode)• Certificate-based IPSec trustCertificate-based IPSec trust

• L2TP/IPSecL2TP/IPSec• No EAP for PPP user authenticationNo EAP for PPP user authentication• Passwords are best Passwords are best

(if any user authentication)(if any user authentication)

Updating Proprietary VPNsUpdating Proprietary VPNs

LDAPLDAP

FilePrint

Database

E-mailWeb

ERP

Third-Party CA

Third-PartyDirectory

VPNGateway

Active Directory orWindows NT 4.0 Domain

Page 34: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

34

Third-Party CA

Third-PartyDirectory

VPNGateway

Updating Proprietary VPNs Updating Proprietary VPNs (2)(2)

LDAPLDAP

FilePrint

Database

E-mailWeb

ERP

IPSec authenticates with userIDIPSec authenticates with userID• Trust user so trust computerTrust user so trust computer• If preshared keyIf preshared key• Separate distribution modelSeparate distribution model

• If certificate-based authenticationIf certificate-based authentication• Certificate enrolled using WebCertificate enrolled using Web• Certificate contains LDAP userIDCertificate contains LDAP userID

•Gateway verifies certificate revocationGateway verifies certificate revocationand presence of userID in LDAPand presence of userID in LDAP

Gateway local authorizationGateway local authorization

IPSec authenticates with userIDIPSec authenticates with userID• Trust user so trust computerTrust user so trust computer• If preshared keyIf preshared key• Separate distribution modelSeparate distribution model

• If certificate-based authenticationIf certificate-based authentication• Certificate enrolled using WebCertificate enrolled using Web• Certificate contains LDAP userIDCertificate contains LDAP userID

•Gateway verifies certificate revocationGateway verifies certificate revocationand presence of userID in LDAPand presence of userID in LDAP

Gateway local authorizationGateway local authorization

Active Directory orWindows NT 4.0 Domain

Page 35: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

35

Third-Party CA

Third-PartyDirectory

Updating Proprietary VPNs Updating Proprietary VPNs (3)(3)

LDAPLDAP

FilePrint

Database

E-mailWeb

ERP VPNGateway

• VPN userID is separate fromVPN userID is separate fromIT infrastructure userID, wireless, IT infrastructure userID, wireless, and dialand dial

• DoS risk to gatewayDoS risk to gateway• No central access policyNo central access policy

• Separate administrator for wireless and dialSeparate administrator for wireless and dial• Group membership policiesGroup membership policies

require replicating Active Directory require replicating Active Directory groupsgroups

• Blind computer trust if there is userBlind computer trust if there is useridentity theftidentity theft

• VPN userID is separate fromVPN userID is separate fromIT infrastructure userID, wireless, IT infrastructure userID, wireless, and dialand dial

• DoS risk to gatewayDoS risk to gateway• No central access policyNo central access policy

• Separate administrator for wireless and dialSeparate administrator for wireless and dial• Group membership policiesGroup membership policies

require replicating Active Directory require replicating Active Directory groupsgroups

• Blind computer trust if there is userBlind computer trust if there is useridentity theftidentity theft

Active Directory orWindows NT 4.0 Domain

Page 36: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

36

Active Directory orWindows NT 4.0 Domain

Third-Party CA

Updating Proprietary VPNs Updating Proprietary VPNs (4)(4)

FilePrint

Database

E-mailWeb

ERP VPNGateway

Add IAS

ADADAuto-enrollAuto-enroll

• Use Windows XP built-in L2TP/IPSec Use Windows XP built-in L2TP/IPSec VPN clientVPN client

• Move to AD for certificate deploymentMove to AD for certificate deployment• Integrate CA with AD for auto-enrollIntegrate CA with AD for auto-enroll• Issue computer certificatesIssue computer certificates• Microsoft CA can reduce certificate license costMicrosoft CA can reduce certificate license cost• Alternate: out of computer certificateAlternate: out of computer certificate• Ideally, use smart cardsIdeally, use smart cards

•Alternate 1: user store certificatesAlternate 1: user store certificates•Alternate 2: user passwordsAlternate 2: user passwords

• Add IAS to Windows infrastructureAdd IAS to Windows infrastructure• Point gateway to IASPoint gateway to IAS

• Requires EAP if certificates for userRequires EAP if certificates for user

• Use Windows XP built-in L2TP/IPSec Use Windows XP built-in L2TP/IPSec VPN clientVPN client

• Move to AD for certificate deploymentMove to AD for certificate deployment• Integrate CA with AD for auto-enrollIntegrate CA with AD for auto-enroll• Issue computer certificatesIssue computer certificates• Microsoft CA can reduce certificate license costMicrosoft CA can reduce certificate license cost• Alternate: out of computer certificateAlternate: out of computer certificate• Ideally, use smart cardsIdeally, use smart cards

•Alternate 1: user store certificatesAlternate 1: user store certificates•Alternate 2: user passwordsAlternate 2: user passwords

• Add IAS to Windows infrastructureAdd IAS to Windows infrastructure• Point gateway to IASPoint gateway to IAS

• Requires EAP if certificates for userRequires EAP if certificates for user

Page 37: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

37

Additional ResourcesAdditional Resources

http://www.microsoft.com/http://www.microsoft.com/vpnvpn// http://www.microsoft.com/security/http://www.microsoft.com/security/ http://www.microsoft.com/ipv6/http://www.microsoft.com/ipv6/ http://www.microsoft.com/net/http://www.microsoft.com/net/

Page 38: Deploying a Secure Network Access Infrastructure

Thank you for joining today’s Microsoft SupportThank you for joining today’s Microsoft Support

WebCast.WebCast.

For information about all upcoming Support WebCasts, For information about all upcoming Support WebCasts,

and access to the archived content (streaming mediaand access to the archived content (streaming media

files, PowerPointfiles, PowerPoint®® slides, and transcripts), visit: slides, and transcripts), visit:

http://http://support.microsoft.com/webcastssupport.microsoft.com/webcasts//

Your feedback is sincerely appreciated. Please send any Your feedback is sincerely appreciated. Please send any

comments or suggestions about the Support comments or suggestions about the Support

WebCasts to WebCasts to [email protected]@microsoft.com..