DEPENDENCE AND

INTERDEPENDENCE

IN THE WARSAW PACT

by

DR. DANIEL S. PAPP

T hroughout most of the post-WorldWar II era, European internationalaffairs have been dominated by thereality of East-West confrontation and

the cold war. In recent years, however, thishas changed. In August 1970, the SovietUnion and West Germany signed anonaggression treaty, and in December of thesame year, Bonn and Warsaw signed anagreement which formalized, for all practicalpurposes, the Oder-Neisse border. InSeptember 1971, a four-power pact on thestatus of Berlin was finalized. Since then, thepace of East-West negotiations has been fastand furious, though not always successful.The acronyms of the negotiations-SALT,MBFR, CSCE-have in several instancesbecome nearly household concepts.

Almost inevitably, the image which hasbeen projected is one of two blocs ofdissimilar unity conflicting and cooperatingin an effort to reduce potential areas ofconfrontation and increase European securitywhile at the same time seeking to protect blocinterests and, on occasion, preserve blocsuperiority. One bloc-NATO-is generallyviewed as a group of 15 nations, led by theUnited States, hammering out a commonnegotiating position. The other bloc-theWarsaw Pact, or WTO-is the subject ofmore debate.

At the time of its creation and immediatelythereafter, the WTO was almost universallyregarded as a body of Soviet satellites andnear-satellites giving pro forma ratification toMoscow's policy positions; however, changes

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and perceived changes in Soviet-EasternEuropean relations have given rise to somespeculation that intra-Pact relations havemoved from dependence to interdependence.Thus, on the one hand, proponents of thedependency viewpoint maintain that theEastern European WTO members stilldepend on the men in the Kremlin for bothpolitical stability and policy direction. TheSoviet intervention in Czechoslovakia ispointed to as proof of this position. On theother hand, proponents of theinterdependency viewpoint argue that boththe Soviets and the Eastern Europeans nowrecognize a mutual dependence. Supportersof this perspective see the November 1976WTO meeting in Bucharest as proof of theirinterdependency theme. At this meeting, heldin Romania for the first time since 1966, thePact members established a formalCommittee of Foreign Ministers and aUnified Secretariat to "continually improvethe mechanism of political collaboration."

What, then, is the state of intra-WTOrelations? Have the Warsaw Pact members­the Soviet Union induded-in fact movedfrom a dependent relationship to aninterdependent one, and if so, whatimplications does this have not only forEastern Europe, but indeed for East-Westrelations and the world?

DEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCEAND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Before we can even begin to address the

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preceding question, it first is necessary to askwhat "dependence" and "interdependence"mean. In recent years, a vast literature onboth concepts has developed which,unfortunately for ease of analysis, seldomyields any definitive conclusions.

Since some analysts have definedinterdependence as simply one manifestationof "mutual dependence,''' we will firstexamine dependence. Benjamin Cohen hasargued that two necessary characteristics forthe existence of dependency are a "highmeasure of sensitivity to external forces" anda "high measure of irreversibility ofimpact."2 A dependent nation may thus becategorized as a nation which is greatlyaffected by decisions made by anothernation-state while at the same time havingonly a limited ability to affect the dominantnation. Using this interpretation, then, thereis little doubt that during the Stalinist periodthe Eastern European states were clearlydependent. Stalin regularly dictated thepolitical, economic, military, and socialpolicy which was to be followed in the newlyCommunistic states, and it was quite clearlyimpossible for them to have anything morethan an extremely limited influence on Sovietpolicy.' Dependency, at least if Cohen'sdefinition is used, was a fact of life in EasternEurope.

Other analysts, without denying thelegitimacy of Cohen's interpretation ofdependency, have gone one step further.Marshall R. Singer has delineated types ofdependencies, thereby implying that it ispossible to be dependent in one way, but notnecessarily in another. Singer identifies fivetypes of potential dependence: political,military, economic, communication, andperceptual/identity.' Under Singer'sdependency scheme, then, there exist not onlyvarying degrees of dependency, but alsovarying degrees of types of dependencies.

This awareness has two major effects.First, by being cognizant of the differenttypes of dependencies, analysts should beable to achieve a more accurate reading onthe relationship between two nations. To saythat an Eastern European nation is politicallydependent on the Soviet Union is a very

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different thing than to say that an EasternEuropean nation is dependent on the SovietUnion. Second, and to a degree qualifying theimproved credibility that a microanalysis ofdependency gives, is the fact that the"balance sheet of dependencies," if it may betermed that, is almost as subjective as was theanalysis before the components ofdependence were dissected. Is it moresignificant, for example, that country A'seconomic dependence on country B isincreasing, or is it more significant thatcountry A's political dependence on countryB is decreasing? To reiterate, although amore accurate measure of the relationshipbetween two nations may be achieved by amicroanalysis of dependence, theinterpretation of the significance of all thepertinent factors may be no less subjective.

W hat, then, of interdependence?Defined solely as "mutualdependence," the concept is overly

simplistic. Most authors recognize themultifaceted nature of interdependence,although its economic aspects usually receivegreatest emphasis.' Gerhard Mally, however,views interdependence in its broader sense.According to Mally, interdependence maybest be defined as a "complex transnationalphenomenon" which involves"pluridimensional, multisectional patterns ofinteractions" between nations which result in"enhanced mutual sensitivity orvulnerability."6 "PIuridimensional,' , toMally, indicates a global, regional, andcontinental scope of impact, while"multisectional" implies that a broadspectrum of political, environmental,economic, technical, and socioculturalactivity is involved. It is a complexphenomenon, since it is both objective andsubjective; interdependence may be aphysical reality and!or a subjectiveacknowledgement of mutual dependence. 7

Thus, just as it is possible to examinedependence by analyzing its constituent parts,it is similarly possible to examineinterdependence.

A word of qualification is necessary here.

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

While in a theoretical sense it may beadvantageous to analyze dependence andinterdependence in each of their componentsegments, on a practical level this is clearlyimpossible. Military actions, for instance,have political consequences.' The same is truefor the other factors, and vice versa. Since theWTO is a political-military organization, ourexamination will center on the political andmilitary components of the debate overdependence and interdependence in theWarsaw Pact. Further reflection will reveal,however, that only part of the overall picturewill have been uncovered.Perceptual/identity, communication, andeconomic relationships all will have beenignored-and, as pointed out earlier in thediscussion of dependency, the final "balancesheet," if it is to have any hope of beingaccurate, must consider all the relevantparameters. Put simply, considerationsbeyond the political-military realm have ameaningful impact on the question ofdependence and interdependence in theWarsaw Pact.

This by no means denigrates theimportance of either political or militaryconsiderations. Rather, it places them in amore realistic perspective and consequentlyrenders them even more valuable. In the finalanalysis, it must once again be stressed~ thatthe delineations themselves are artificial.Political dependence or interdependence hasmilitary, economic, communications, andperceptual implications. The same is true foreach of the other types of dependence.

From a Western perspective, the WarsawPact itself must be viewed as a political­military organization operating amid anumber of other transnational entities and inturn being affected by them. From a Marxist­Leninist perspective, however, the outlook isquite different. To further our understandingof the WTO self-image, we now turn to thedependence-interdependence question as seenfrom the Pact itself.

THE PACT'S VIEW:SOCIALIST INTEGRATION

The Western debate over the dependent or

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independent nature of the WTO is, notsurprisingly, rejected by Pact members.According to a Soviet source, socialistcooperation in the Warsaw Pact andelsewhere "refutes the bourgeois revisionistmyths of the allegedly supranational orcoercive nature of their relations.'" Publicly,Eastern Europeans take similar stances. ACzech paper described the WTO as an"alliance of partners with equal rights," lO

while a Hungarian paper informed its readersthat Pact members "always work inconcert. "11 International relations within thePact are theoretically based on "proletarianinternationalism," and consequently, at leastto the Pact members, "an entirely new kindof international relations" exists within theWarsaw Treaty Organization."

This "entirely new kind of internationalrelations" has come into existence becausesocialism has "eradicated the causes [which]disunite people [and which] breedexploitation of some nations by others.""New types of ties between socialist countriesare based on "objectiveinterdependencies"-such as publicownership of the means of production andthe alleged unity of the interests of theproletariat-and "economic, political andideological relations ... consciouslyorganized by the parties and governments" ofthe socialist countries; these ties serve to rule

Dr. Daniel S. Papp is currently on leave from hisposition as Assistant Professor of Social Sciences atGeorgia Institute of Technology and is serving as aResearch Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, USArmy War College, A graduate of Dartmouth College,he earned the Ph.D. in International Affairs at theUniversity of Miami's Center for AdvancedInternational Studies. Dr. Papp has published articleson Soviet foreign policy in anumber of journals, includingSoviet Union, Socia! ScienceQuarterly, InternationalJournal, Resource Policy, andParameters. The author spentmuch of last year as a visitinglecturer in Australia, and herecently completed amanuscript entitled "Vietnam:The Perspective from ThreeCapitals."

59

out the possibility of exploitation of onesocialist nation by another. 14 Hence,dependence in a socialist commonwealth istheoretically impossible. One Soviet authorhas even gone so far as to argue that theindependence which only socialism can givewill disappear if socialism is not ardentlypursued."

Nevertheless, some Soviet sources inparticular have recognized that nationalismdistorts socialist cooperation by leading tothe emphasis of the interests of one countryover another. Indeed, it has even beenadmitted that "The solution of thenationalities question in some of the socialistcountries has proved more complex thanCommunists expected.''' 6 Despite thisrecognition of imperfection in the socialistworld, however, it is still avidly maintainedthat dependence does not exist. The reason,of course, is simple: Manifestations ofnationalism have appeared in EasternEurope, according to the Soviets, not theSoviet Union.

Thus, while the concept of socialistcooperation is carefully nurtured in Sovietand Eastern European ideology, it is at thesame time argued that this cooperation cannever lead to dependence. Nationalsovereignty is guaranteed by the socialistunderpinning of the WTO nations. Thequestion of Eastern European dependence onthe Soviet Union is consequently moot, atleast in theory.

S till, both Soviet and Eastern Europeansources recognize that their relationshipis dynamic. This dynamism is

incorporated within the theory of sblizhenie,or gradual rapprochement. In EasternEurope, the process of sblizhenie is alreadyunder way, and it will lead eventually tomerger. 17 It must be stressed, however, thatthroughout the sblizhenie stage nationalsovereignty will be maintained. The role ofsovereignty in the merger stage has beenunderstandably glossed over.

How will this curious sort ofrapprochement be attained? First, on apolitical level, it will be attained through the

60

Political Consultative Committee (PCC) ofthe Warsaw Pact and through interpartyrelations. Second, on an economic basis,COMECON (the Council for MutualEconomic Assistance) will serve as the basisfor a nonexploitative integration of thesocialist economies. Third, on a social basis,multilateral and bilateral agreements willserve as the vehicles through which contactsare carried out. Military rapprochement isconspicuous by its absence from therapprochement literature.

Soviet preeminence, as Teresa Rakowska­Harmstone has vividly pointed out, is anintegral part of this theory. I' Interestinglyenough, at least in public discussions, EasternEuropean WTO members concur with thisdeference to the senior Soviet partner. 19

Again, it must be stressed that under socialistdefinitions, Soviet leadership does not implySoviet dominance or Eastern European.dependence.

The Warsaw Pact may thus be viewed asone agent among many leading to gradualrapprochement and an eventual poorlydefined merger of Eastern Europe and theSoviet Union, all carried out under theauspices of Soviet leadership-at least ifviewed through orthodox WTO eyes. Thedifficulties of this task are recognizablyimmense, and it is not our task to examinethem here. Rather, since we have seen theirrelevance of the dependence­interdependence debate from the WarsawPact's public perspective, we will nowexamine it from the somewhat morecomplicated Western perspective. The resultsmay prove quite different.

POLITICAL-MILITARY QUESTIONS:THE MAIN ISSUES

Ever since the 1955 creation of the WarsawPact, it has been abundantly clear thatpolitical-military issues are its paramountconcern. Article 5 of the original treatyestablished a Joint High Command of thePact Armed Forces to "protect peacefullabors ... ,guarantee the inviolability oftheir frontiers and territories, and providedefense." Article 6 established a Political

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

Consultative Committee (PCC) to "consultamong the Parties [and examine] questionswhich may arise in the operation of theTreaty."" Since that time, adjunct bodies ofthe PCC have also been created, as providedfor in Article 6.

Throughout the existence of the Pact, itsmembers have sought to stress that theWTO's military component exists onlybecause of the "NATO threat," whereas thepolitical component is a natural by-productof socialist cooperation. The WTO hasoffered to disband its military aspects inexchange for a reciprocal dissolution ofNATO on numerous occasions, most recentlyfollowing the November 1976 Bucharestmeeting of the PCC. While numerousauthorities have pointed out that such anagreement would permit Soviet-EasternEuropean military planning on the basis ofthe numerous bilateral treaties extant in thebloc-an arrangement which NATO does nothave-it has less often been noted that thepolitical component of the WTO would notbe affected by the proposal.

Nonetheless, the military aspects of theWarsaw Pact remain of most concern to theWest. In the past, the Soviet Union has actedas military planner, commander, and supplierfor the Eastern European WTO nations, andthere is little evidence to indicate that thissituation has changed. It is true thatCzechoslovakia and Poland provide some oftheir own military equipment, and thatRomania has recently joined Yugoslavia in abilateral effort to produce military aircraft,but these efforts at self-sufficiency areminiscule when compared with Sovietmilitary aid to the WTO nations. Sovietequipment may be dated, and repair partsmay be scarce, but the Eastern Europeannations are nonetheless dependent on theSoviet Union for most of their militaryequipment. One need only scan The MilitaryBalance, 1977-1978 to verify this elementaryfact. "

Similarly, in command considerations, theEastern European nations appear heavilydependent on the Soviet Union. The 1969reorganization of the Pact placed the JointHigh Command under the command of thenewly created Committee of Defense

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Ministers, thereby effectively reversing theprevious chain of command,22 but there issome doubt whether this change carried withit any operational significance. 23 The JointHigh Command itself is composed of acommander-in-chief and a military council.The commander, who has always been aSoviet officer, chairs the council, which iscomposed of a chief of staff (who has alsoalways been a Soviet officer) and apermanent representative from each of thePact nations. Additionally, the Pact includesa multinational military staff. Key positions,again, are held by Soviet officers. In a war,Eastern European Pact forces would beoperationally subordinate to the Soviet HighCommand in Moscow." The entire WarsawPact air defense system is under the control ofthe commander of P va Strany, the Soviet airdefense forces.

I na strictly military sense, then, the non­Soviet WTO appears heavily dependenton the Soviet Union. Even more

strikingly, the Soviet Union seems toconsciously seek to minimize its ownpotential military dependence on the EasternEuropeans. Thus, the four Soviet groups offorces in Europe have their own independentlines of logistics stretching back to the SovietUnion, above and apart from those of theEastern European forces. In almost everysense of the word, then, under peacetimeconditions, military dependence isunidirectional. The non-Soviet WTO isdependent on the Soviet Union; the SovietUnion is not dependent on the non-SovietWTO. Military interdependence does notexist.

The key phrase in the above paragraph, lestit be overlooked, is "under peacetimeconditions." Once conflict breaks out,military necessities change, and the picture isaltered. During conflict conditions, the SovietUnion in fact does become dependent on theEastern European states, as we shall see,though the degree of dependence would varydepending on both the type and area ofconflict.

To start with, as we have already seen, theWarsaw Pact is not a wartime command

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organization. During a war, militarycommand will be transferred to the SovietHigh Command. As John Erickson pointsout, recent WTO maneuvers have impliedthat certain non-Soviet WTO forces may beearmarked for direct subordination to Sovietcommand." If this is, in fact, a legitimateassumption, then it is apparent that Sovietplanners to some degree depend on EasternEuropean military support in a projectedconflict situation. In essence, EasternEuropean military dependence on the SovietUnion will have been transformed intoEastern European-Soviet interdependence.

What if the assumption is not legitimate?What if, using an extreme worst-caseanalysis, recent Soviet efforts to upgradetheir combat divisions and logistics succeed ingiving Soviet forces in Europe the ability toachieve their military objectives (whateverthey may be) without the necessity of activeEastern European military support? Doesinterdependence then disappear?

Logically, the degree of interdependencewould be reduced, but it would notdisappear. In either case, regardless of thedegree of Soviet reliance on direct non-SovietWTO military support in the event of aconflict, Soviet front-line forces must beresupplied and reinforced by support linesrunning through the Eastern Europeannations. 26 At the very least, then, the SovietUnion must rely on a lack of active hostilitywithin Eastern Europe toward their resupplyand reinforcement efforts. This still meansthat the outbreak of hostilities in Europe willlead to Soviet-Eastern Europeaninterdependence. One might argue that it is ageographical imperative.

T he transition of Soviet-EasternEuropean relations from dependence tointerdependence during a war carries

with it political implications with relevance topeacetime. From the Soviet viewpoint,interdependence would be less onerous if thereliability of its partners were more certain. Itis in this context that we may betterunderstand the Soviet drive to increase thepolitical credibility of the WTO. 27

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The Soviet effort to increase the politicalcredibility of the WTO began shortly after the1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. It has beenwell-documented that non-Soviet WTOnations participated in the invasion onlygrudgingly, and Romania did not participate.The entire affair cast the Soviet shadow overEurope-West and East-once again. TheWarsaw Pact itself appeared little more thanan agent of Soviet hegemony.

To counter this image, the earlier­mentioned WTO Committee of DefenseMinisters was created and placed above theJoint High Command. In theory, then, amultinational body was placed above aSoviet-dominated body. Whether this hadany policy impact is a moot question; theintent was to alter perceptions. It is possibleto view the November 1976 creation of theCommittee of Foreign Ministers and theUnified Secretariat as a continuation of thisprocess. Since the goal of these bodies is toimprove political collaboration, and sincetheir decisions are not binding, there is someroom to speculate that these mechanisms arelittle more than "window dressing." Indeed,the brevity of the PCC meetings themselves­none have lasted longer than two days-hasgiven rise to speculation that decisions aremade before the PCC meets, and then thePCC sanctions the decisions.

Still, it must be stressed that appearancesare important, especially in politics, and thegradual proliferation of political bodieswithin the WTO has undeniably given it atleast the appearance of being a multinationaldeliberative body during time of peace. It hassimilarly been observed that "Majorinternational negotiations conducted byBrezhnev are preceded by talks with Girekand Honecker."28 This, of course, impliesinterdependence, and from the Soviet pointof view, perceived political interdependenceduring peace may aid actual militaryinterdependence during war.

P erceived political interdependence maybe strengthened, of course, by takingmutually beneficial actions. Recent

American criticisms of human rights

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violations in the Soviet Union and EasternEurope, for example, may have enhanced theperception of political community andinterdependence within the WTO. A March1977 Sofia meeting of Communist Partyofficials from the Warsaw Pact countriesconcluded with a call for a "decisive" battleagainst human rights activists in EasternEurope.

Even mutual action, however, should nothide the fact that there are enormousdifficulties confronting Soviet efforts-andthe efforts of certain Eastern Europeangovernments-to build politicalinterdependence. The presence of Sovietmilitary units in the non-Soviet Pact nations,even if justified by treaty, may well be amajor example. Soviet urging precipitated theinterventions in Hungary andCzechoslovakia, and Soviet uni ts dominatedthe interventions. The threat of Sovietmilitary action hung over Poland in 1970.These incidents undoubtedly influenceEastern European attitudes.

Similarly, it has not escaped notice in theWTO that following the 1968 invasion ofCzechoslovakia, five Soviet category Idivisions-including two tank divisions­remained in the country.29 Three-quarters ofall Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europeare stationed near major populationcenters. 3O While this does not suggest thatSoviet forces in Eastern Europe are primarilyconcerned with political and populationcontrol in Eastern Europe, it does suggestthat efforts to create a feeling of politicalinterdependence have encountered somedifficulties. As the Soviets themselves said,"The solution of the nationalities question insome of the socialist countries has provedmore complex than Communists expected.''''

Indeed, pressures which have been exertedthrough unknown means by unknowncountries or coalitions of countries within theWTO have made it exceedingly apparent thatpolitical interdependence is at best anuncertain quantity. One recent exampleoccurred during the November 1976 tour of aUS congressional fact-finding commissionthrough Europe. The commission was barredfrom entering all Communist countries save

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Yugoslavia, itself not a Pact member. On theday the tour began, the Soviet Unionexplained its rejection of the commission'srequest by saying that the request was a USattempt to "sow distrust and arouse hostilityagainst the socialist countries." After thetour concluded, the commission revealed thatRomania had earlier granted permission forthe group to enter, but had rescinded theoffer after the other WTO nations rejectedthe commission's request. In order to savesome face, Romania told the congressmenthey could enter individually, but not as agroup."

Despite Romania's vaunted independentforeign policy line, Ceausescu and theRomanian leadership apparently feltsufficiently pressured to rescind their offerand risk political embarrassment in theWest. 33 The Romanian incident becomes allthe more instructive when it is realized thatBucharest had only recently "joined" thePact" and that the PCC was scheduled tomeet in Bucharest later in the same month.Whichever WTO nations influencedCeausescu to change his position mustthemselves have been willing to risk potentialembarrassment if the Romanian reactedadversely to their pressures.

The point to be made here is that the degreeof political interdependence between theEastern European Warsaw Pact states andthe Soviet Union varies widely on an issue-by­issue basis, on a country-by-country basis,and on the basis of any of a number of otherobjective and subjective parameters. Thereare apparent instances of interdependentpolitical action without coercion on issueswhere interest is shared, but there is,conversely, an apparent lack ofinterdependence where interests are notshared.

P olitical dependence is similarlybifurcated, with the Soviet Union beingcast in the dominant position. On a

country-by-country basis, on some issues,there is apparent Eastern Europeandependence on Soviet political support. It isreasonably safe to argue, for example, that

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Honecker recognizes the political utility ofthe 21 Soviet divisions stationed in hiscountry, and he responds by offering almostfawning support for Soviet politicalpositions. While the Soviets undoubtedlywelcome his support, it cannot be argued thatthey are dependent on it. Honecker himself,however, quite possibly is dependent on thepolitical impact of the Group of Soviet Forcesin Germany to continue his rule. 35 At thesame time, it has often been observed thatTodor Zhivkov of Bulgaria faithfully followsthe Soviet lead on any and all issues, domesticor international. While the Soviets againundoubtedly welcome his support, they areby no means dependent on it. Zhivkov, on theother hand, is quite evidently reliant onSoviet support. 36

It may be helpful at this time todifferentiate between willing dependence andenforced dependence. In both of the aboveexamples, it is quite probable that, forobvious reasons, the Eastern European leaderwillingly offers his support for Sovietpositions. In other cases, however, it is clearthat some form of pressure has been appliedto achieve enforced support. The example ofRomania's rescinded visitation offer to anAmerican congressional delegation hasalready illustrated this. Indeed, Dubcek's"socialism with a human face" fell victim toa most extreme form of enforced dependenceunder the guise of socialist internationalism.

It must be stressed again that even enforceddependence is a sometime thing, regardless ofwhether it is at the covert level of pressure onRomania or the overt level of an invasion ofCzechoslovakia. Hungary and Poland pursuetheir own relatively independent economicpaths despite Soviet displeasure, andRomania follows its own druthers on foreignpolicy. To be sure, the non-Soviet WTO'spolicies are proscribed in certain areas anddirections, but to argue that this proscriptionis tantamount to dependence would be toblink at reality or to alter the meaning ofdependence. In a political sense, EasternEuropean dependence on the Soviet Union isextremely relative, just as wasinterdependence; in most cases, it may onlybe discussed on a country-by-country andissue-by-issue basis.

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There is one interesting exception to theabove discussion which should be noted inpassing. In a diplomatic sense, it may beargued that the Soviet Union is somewhatdependent on non-Soviet WTO politicalsupport to maintain a unified socialist frontvis-a-vis the West. If, for example, theEastern European WTO members were tounanimously withdraw their support fromSoviet policy, the impact would be trulyawesome. This, of course, presupposeswidespread Eastern European cooperationagainst Soviet tutelage, and thispresupposition is so remote as to border on

. the ridiculous. As noted by Jacek Kuron,spokesman for the Polish dissident WorkersDefense Committee, Eastern Europeans havea healthy respect for "the Soviet tankfactor. "37

W hat, then, may be concluded aboutpolitical and military dependence andinterdependence within the Warsaw

Pact? Beyond the obvious bromide that thesituation is exceedingly complex andcontinually changing, it appears that incrises, and particularly in crises involving thepossibility of military conflict in Europe,political and military interdependence withinthe Warsaw Pact will increase. The Sovietawareness of this reality (as well as otherfactors, such as ideology) has led the Kremlinto increase its stress on spreading theappearance of particularly politicalinterdependence. There is some doubt aboutthe effectiveness of these efforts. Indeed, at apolitical rally in East Berlin in early October1977, shouts of "Out with the Russians!"forced military police to intercede. 38 Whilethe significance of such attitudes should notbe overstated, the existence of such attitudesnonetheless illustrates that even theperception of political interdependence is farfrom a reality.

In many respects, our analysis indicatesthat the non-Soviet WTO members areheavily dependent in both a military and apolitical sense on the Soviet Union. It alsopoints out, though, that there is a certaindegree of Soviet dependence on EasternEurope in both these areas. Before we can

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make any definitive conclusions, however, wemust first turn to issues of economic,communicative, and perceptual dependenceand interdependence. Although none of theseissues are directly subsumed within the Pact,they all nevertheless impact upon it.

ECONOMIC, COMMUNICATIVE, ANDPERCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS:

THE SIDE ISSUES

Before the "side issues" are brieflydiscussed, it must be stressed that they areside issues only in that they are notspecifically addressed by the Pact itself. Inmany ways, as factors determining thepresent state and future course of EasternEuropean-Soviet relations, they are moreimportant than either the military or thepolitical factors.

This is particularly true of the mostsubjective of these issues, perceptions. Wehave dealt briefly with mutual EasternEuropean-Soviet perceptions in the precedingsection and have seen how the Soviet Union,in particular, has sought to strengthen theperception that a political and militaryinterdependence exists within the WTO. Theissue of perceptual dependence andinterdependence goes much deeper than theattempted manipulation of viewpoints,however. It approaches the much morefundamental question of how individuals andgovernments view each other; consequently itbecomes the most subjective of all measuresof dependence and interdependence.

It is well-documented that strong currentsof historical antipathy run between theRussians and Eastern Europe. 39 Memories ofRussian invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968,Hungary in 1956, and even Poland in 1939and 1830 are far from dead. The storm ofprotest which erupted over Gierek's attemptto amend the Polish constitution in 1976 toinsert a phrase stressing Poland's"inseparable and unbreakable" ties with theSoviet Union illustrates the point well,40 as dothe more recent anti-Russian shouts in EastBerlin.

Still, one must wonder how widespreadsuch sentiment is, and how deeply it runs.

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After more than 30 years of pro-Sovietpropaganda, some abatement of traditionalEastern European-Soviet enmity must haveoccurred. The question is, of course, howsignificant is the abatement?

The impact of the perceptual dependence­interdependence issue on the Warsaw Pact isimmense. It is also, unfortunately,unmeasurable. Will non-Soviet WTO forcesfollow Soviet orders? Will they fight outsidetheir home countries? How reliable andeffective will they be? Would they even takeadvantage of an outbreak of hostilities toturn on the Russians (and Russian supplylines) in their respective countries? Thequestions are important; the answers areimponderable.

The communicative dependence­interdependence issue plays a major role inthe perceptual debate. In the past, Sovietcontrol or veto power over Eastern Europeancontacts with the West enabled the Russiansto fashion information which wascommunicated to the Eastern European statesto fit the Soviet's needs. Clearly, acommunicative dependence existed. Duringthe past decade, this dependence has brokendown, and the Kremlin has proven unable (orunwilling) to replace it with even the facadeof interdependence. While it is undeniablethat the Soviet-oriented and Soviet-originatedinformation enjoys by far the greatestdissemination throughout Eastern Europe, itis nonetheless apparent that Sovietdomination of information dissemination hasbeen reduced. The impact of this alteration,again of so obvious an importance for thePact, is again imponderable.

An analysis of economic dependence andinterdependence, on the other hand,leads to much more concrete

conclusions. Ever since the April 1969COMECON conference adopted a 25-pointagreement on the coordination of economicactivities, Soviet stress on economicintegration has been increasing. In additionto the 1969 agreement, notable milestones inthe integrative process include the July 1971"Comprehensive Program of Socialist

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Economic Integration" and the June 1975"Agreed Plan for Multilateral IntegrationMeasures. "

There is no doubt that the Russians are wellaware of the political and militaryramifications of economic integration withinCOMECON. One Soviet source has arguedthat "Economic integration serves as a goodbasis for the deepening of [the COMECONnations'] political cooperation,'''' whileGeneral Sergei Shtemenko, the late Chief ofStaff of the Warsaw Pact Forces, has pointedout that economic integration "strengthensthe defensive capacity of the Warsaw PactOrganization."" COMECON, then, cannotbe overlooked when the WTO is discussed.

How significant is the vaunted economicintegration within COMECON? While anydetailed analysis of it is far beyond the scopeof this article, it is nonetheless possible togive a brief overview of the economic linksbetween Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion." Figure I indicates trade relationsbetween the two areas, as compiled from bothSoviet and United Nations sources. 44

Figure 1. Eastern European trade in 1975(in"billions of US dollars)

SovietTrade Trade/with Total TotalUSSR Trade Trade

Bulgaria 5.6 10.1 .55Czechoslovakia 5.4 17.5 .31East Germany 7.8 21.4 .36Hungary 4.4 13.3 .33Poland 6.7 22.8 .29Romania NA 10.8

By comparison, Eastern European trade(excluding Romania) comprised 42 percent ofthe total Soviet trade turnover of $70.3billion. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, EastGermany, Hungary, and Poland respectivelycomprised 8, 8, 11, 6, and 9 percent of thetotal Soviet trade turnover. It may thus beargued that, as a group, the EasternEuropean nations are roughly as dependenton the Soviet Union in their trade relations as

66

the Soviet Union is on them. Individually,however, the Eastern European nations aremuch less important to the Soviets as tradingpartners than the Soviet Union is to them.

A somewhat similar conclusion is reachedwhen bilateral trade with the Soviet Union isexamined within the context of its role in therespective national economies. Figure 2undertakes this examination. 45

Figure 2. The role of bilateral trade withthe Soviet Union in Eastern European economies

(in billions of US dollars)

Trade Sovietwith Approx imate Trade/USSR GNP GNP

Bulgaria 5.6 23 .24Czechoslovakia 5.4 57 .09East Germany 7.8 70 .11Hungary 4.4 28 .15Poland 6.7 90 .07Romania NA 51

Eastern European trade, again excludingRomania, collectively amounted to only arather paltry three percent of the Sovieteconomy, with the shares of individualcountries being too insignificant to list. Thus,if Soviet-Eastern European trade is examinedin the role of its importance to the respectivenational economies, a picture of much greaterEastern European dependence emerges.

A sector-by-sector analysis of nationaleconomies again implies Eastern Europeandependence on the Soviet Union. In the areasof natural resources and energy resources, inparticular, the Soviet Union enjoys astranglehold over its Eastern Europeanpartners. For example, .all of the oilconsumed in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia isimported from the Soviet Union. EastGermany, Poland, and Hungary are onlyslightly less dependent on the Soviet Union inthis regard, respectively importing 95, 90,and 75 percent of their total oil consumptionfrom the USSR. Romania, again, is theexception, meeting all of its national oil needswithout importing Soviet oil. 46

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

AII of these figures, of course, mean littleif the Soviet protestations of socialistcooperation are legitimate and exclude

the possibility of the Kremlin using itseconomically superior position to pressurethe non-Soviet WTO nations into line. TheKremlin points out, and rightfully so, that itsells raw materials to its Eastern Europeanallies at rates less than the world marketprices, often receiving in return inferior­quality goods from the recipient nation.However, the Kremlin does not point out thefact that since 1975 it has sharply increasedthe oil prices charged its Eastern neighborsand taken advantage of skyrocketingincreases on the world market. Indeed, on 6January 1977, the Hungarian Governmentannounced that the Soviet Union was onceagain raising prices, this time from $7.15 perbarrel to $8.90 per barrel, a 22.5-percentincrease." While this was still well below theprevailing rate of $12 to $14 per barrel on theworld market, it was nonetheless a ratherprecipitous increase.

By now, the Eastern European nations areaccustomed to such increases, but in 1975,when the Kremlin first raised its prices, theywere not. The 1975 increases, coming in thelast year of national plan periods, shockedthe bloc nations. It became nearly impossiblefor Eastern European nations to reachnational target figures. East Germanyestimated that a 43-percent price rise for itsindustrial products was necessitated by higherprices for major Soviet exports" andinformed the Russians that, if the priceburden was not eased, then East Germanycould no longer guarantee deliveries to theUSSR under the 1976-80 plan." To theEastern Europeans, the price rise was anotherinstance of Soviet efforts to force price andother concessions, an effort which extendedback into the 1960's."

Indeed, one measure of the political intentof Soviet integrative claims may be the fate ofCOMECON cooperative energy programs.The "Friendship Pipeline" continues tosupply Eastern Europe with low-priced Sovietfuel; yet Eastern Europeans could not havefailed to notice that in 1976 COMECONemphasized cooperative energy production,

Vol. VIII, No.2

while in 1977 COMECON emphasized thedevelopment of domestic energy resources.During the same time frame, Soviet oilexports to the more lucrative Western marketsurpassed exports to COMECON countries(1.5 million barrels per day to 1.3 millionbarrels per day).51 Cooperation is fine, theRussians may reason, but hard currency isalso requisite.

What import does this have for the WarsawPact? Put simply, it limits the credibility ofthe Soviet assertion that proletarianinternationalism leads to trueinterdependence. Limiting this credibility inthe economic sphere must similarly limit it inthe military and political spheres for, as wehave seen, these areas cannot be legitimatelycompartmentalized.

Nonetheless, in the economic sphere, thehard fact of life remains for the EasternEuropean nations that the Soviet Union ismore important to them than they are to theSoviet Union. They need the less expensiveSoviet resources, and they need the Sovietmarkets for their products. Economicallyspeaking, it is abundantly clear that adependence relationship exists. Integration isproceeding apace, but integration at the levelwhich exists in COMECON does not implyinterdependence, despite Soviet protests tothe contrary.

Rakowska-Harmstone has observed thatCOMECON's economic integration has beeneconomically unprofitable for the SovietUnion, but that, from the Soviet perspective,the political advantages outweigh the cost. 52

This remains as true today as it was in thepast. What should not be overlooked,though, is that if the Soviets are too ardent intheir attempts to ease their own economicburden of Eastern European-Soviet"interdependence" through 'programs suchas fuel price adjustments and jointinvestment,53 they may well lose some of themilitary and political advantages which haveaccrued to their account. This would by nomeans be fatal to the WTO, but it woulddefinitely reemphasize the dependence side ofthe relationship. And, as we have seen, theKremlin has been striving to conceal this verything.

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CONCLUSIONS: THE PREEMINENCEOF DEPENDENCE

To a great extent, Eastern Europe as awhole is still dependent on the Soviet Unionfor most of its material needs. Almost allWTO military equipment is of Soviet origin.The Soviet Union similarly supplies most ofEastern Europe's resource and fuelrequirements. On the political side, it may beargued that at least some of the leaders ofEastern European nations depend on Sovietsupport for their political survival. On thebasis of these very significant parameters,then, it would appear that while EasternEurope is not entirely dependent on theSoviet Union, dependence is preeminent. Forthe Pact itself, Roman Kolkowicz' 1969observation is still fundamentally valid:

In a larger sense, the Warsaw Pact serves asan alliance system through which the Sovietleaders seek to entangle their unwilling alliesin the web of Soviet national interests."

Kolkowicz' statement is interesting notonly for what it says, but also for what itimplies. The Soviet leaders "seek" toentangle; they are not always successful. TheSoviet allies are "unwilling"; therefore, theyare not reliable. Dependence may bepreeminent, but it is not all-pervasive.

What, then, of interdependence within thePact? With the Soviet Union still holdingmost of the trump cards in intra-Pactrelations, are there any discernible trendswhich may lead to increasedinterdependence?

Ideologically, the Soviet Union iscommitted to cooperation and eventual"merger" with the rest of the bloc. However,there are obstacles to this commitment, notthe least of which is Soviet great-powerchauvinism, to borrow a Chinese phrase.Does the Soviet Union genuinely wantinterdependence, or is it satisfied with thecurrent dependent situation?Interdependence implies loss ofindependence, and any great power may beexpected to jealously protect whatindependence it has.

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Still, the Kremlin recognizes the difficultieswhich it will face in a crisis with WesternEurope if a sense of interdependence is notdeveloped with its non-Soviet WTO allies.Consequently, the Soviet leadership is facedwith a perplexing problem of cost-benefitanalysis: Is increased interdependence worththe loss of independence, in view of theincreased reliability such interdependencewould theoretically bring? So far, at least, theKremlin's response has been to subsidizeEastern European economies throughCOMECON while at the same time verballystressing military and political collaborationin the WTO. In sum, the answer is a qualifiedyes.

Soviet attitudes may not be the onlyobstacle to comprehensive interdependence.Even though Eastern Europe is largelymaterially dependent on the Soviet Union,other areas of dependency--notablyperceptual--are at most questionable. Whenall is said and done, this lack of mutualperceptual dependence may prove moresignificant than political, military, oreconomic dependence.

F or the foreseeable future, then, we mayexpect dependency to be preeminentwithin the WTO. Interdependence and

the appearance of interdependence will ebband flow as the Soviet and Eastern Europeanleaderships perform their respective cost­benefit calculations. But interdependenceitself probably will not supercede dependenceas a force in intra-WTO relations untilEastern Europeans--and Russians as well-­overlook the fact that the new uniform-gaugerailroad connecting the USSR and Poland-­and implicitly all of Eastern Europe--canspeed the delivery of Soviet guns as well asbutter. And that may be some time.

NOTES

1, See, for example, James W. Howe, Interdependenceand the World Economy, Headline Series No. 222 (New York:Foreign Policy Association, October 1974), p, 9.

2. Benjamin Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (NewYork: Basic Books, 1973), p. 190.

3. Indeed, under Stalin, Soviet personnel held whatamounted to veto power over policy actions and decisions in

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

Eastern Europe. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc:Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1969).

4. Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Power(New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 89~364.

5. Richard N. Cooper, The Economics ofInterdependence(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Lester R. Brown, TheInterdependence of Nations, Headline Series No. 212 (NewYork: Foreign Policy Association, October 1972); and RobertO. Keohane and loseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., TransnationalRelations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress,1971).

6. Gerhard Mally, Interdependence (Lexington: LexingtonBooks, 1976), p. 5.

7. Ibid.8. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan have

pointed this out exceedingly well in their The Use ofthe ArmedForces as a Political Instrument (Washington: BrookingsInstitution, 1976).

9. B. Ladygin and Yu. Pekshev, "Law of GradualRapprochement Among Socialist Countries," Kommunist(March 1977), 20-31.

10. Bratislava Pravda, 26 November 1976, trans. in FBISDaily Report (Eastern Europe), 1 December 1976, p. AA6.

11. Esti Hurlap, 27 November 1976, trans. in FBIS DailyReport (Eastern Europe), 30 November 1976, p. AA6.

12. A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces oj the Soviet State(Moscow: [n.p.}, 1975), p. 324; Sh. Sanakoyev, The WorldSocialist System (Moscow: Progress, 1972), p. 118; and TheWorld Socialist System and Anti-Communism (Moscow:Progress, 1972), p. 15. See also L 1. Brezhnev, On the Policyof the Soviet Union and the International Situation (Moscow:Novosti, 1973), p. 51, where the Soviet leader speaks of"socialist internationalism" as a basis for the "new type" ofrelations.

13. Sanakoyev,p.116.14. The World Socialist System and Anti-Communism, pp.

15-16.15. E. Usenko, "International Legal Principles of Relations

Between Socialist Countries," International Affairs (August1973),51.

16. V. V. Zagladin, ed., The World Communist Movement.'Outline ofStrategy and Tactics (Moscow: Progress, 1973), pp.450-52.

17. For a good Soviet view of this process, see Ladygin andPekshev, pp. 20-31. An excellent Western analysis appears inTeresa Rakowska~Harmstone, '''Socialist Internationalism'and Eastern Europe-A New Stage," Survey, 22 (Winter1976),38-54.

18. Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 39. See also Grechko, p. 339.19. See, for example, "Statement by the SED Central

Committee Politburo and the GOR Council of Ministers on theMeeting of the Political Consultative Committee of theWarsaw Pact States," in FBIS Daily Report (Eastern Europe),3 December 1976, pp. AAI-3, particularly in reference todetente.

20. A complete text of the Warsaw Pact treaty is providedin Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies inCommunist Conjlict Resolution (Cambridge: The MIT Press,1971), pp. 201-06.

21. International Institute for Strategic Studies, TheMilitary Balance, 1977-1978 (London: International Institutefor Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 13-15.

22. Before 1969, the respective national ministers ofdefense, as individuals, were to respond to the loint HighCommand. The 1969 reforms combined the individualministers into a committee, and made the Joint HighCommand subordinate to that committee.

23. See V. Kulikov, "Soviet Military Science Today,"

Vol. VlIl, No.2

Kommunist, trans. in Strategic Review, 5 (Winter 1977), 127.See also lohn Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined ArmsConcept," Strategic Review, 5 (Winter 1977), 39.

24. It is interesting to note that Soviet military doctrinemaintains that multinational armies are unreliable whenengaged in offensive warfare. See Christopher D. Jones, "JustWars and Limited Wars: Restraints on the Use of the SovietArmed Forces," World Politics, 28 (October 1975), 44~68.

25. John Erickson, Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels(Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1976), pp. 65­67. Even so, there is speculation in the West that non-Sovietformations would be kept within combined battle groups and"corseted" by Soviet units. Lawrence L. Whetten, ed., TheFuture oj Soviet Military Power (London: MacDonald andJane's, 1976), p. 150.

26. The ongoing Soviet effort to upgrade their ownindependent support lines running through Eastern Europemay, in this interpretation, be intended to reduceinterdependence during war as well as eliminate it duringpeace.

27. "Better understand" does not imply "exclusivelyunderstand." As will be shown, other considerations are alsooperant.

28. Arthur R. Rachwald, "Poland Between theSuperpowers: Three Decades of Foreign Policy," Orbis, 20(Winter 1977), 1063.

29. Category I divisions, in Soviet parlance, are betweenthree-fourths and full strength, with complete equipment. SeeThe Military Balance, 1977~1978, p. 9.

30. US Congress, Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 2dSess., 1976, 122, E1735.

31. Zagladin, pp. 450*52.32. "Warsaw Pact nations bar U.S. panel," Facts on File,

27 November 1976, p. 880.33. There is, of course, a school of thought which argues

that the independent Romanian foreign policy course is moresmoke than fire. See Vladimir Socor, "The Limits of NationalIndependence in the Soviet Bloc: Rumania's Foreign PolicyReconsidered," Orbis, 20 (Fall 1976), 701-32.

34. Again, see Socor, pp. 713*17 for an analysis ofRomania's military participation in the Warsaw Pact.

35. This is not to say that East Germany would necessarilyrise in revolt against Honecker if Soviet support for him werewithdrawn. Rather, it is to imply that within the SED(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the Soviet~oriented

Socialist Unity Party) there are individuals who would welcomea hypothetical withdrawal of Soviet support for Honecker inorder to further their own political ambitions.

36. There are numerous indications that the Soviets placemajor importance on the political impact of their military unitsand military presence in Eastern Europe. General SergeiShtemenko, late chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, wrote inMay 1976 that "suppression of counter~revolution" in EastEurope is a major role of the Pact. Za Rubezhom, 7 May 1976,trans. in FBlS Daily Report (Soviet Union), 13 May 1976, pp.D2*5. See also Grechko, p. 324, and Usenko, p. 51, for similarobservations.

37. Quoted in Peter Osnos, "The Polish Road toCommunism," Foreign Ajjairs, 56 (October 1977), 219.

38. CBS news broadcast on 7 October 1977.39. Not to mention between certain Eastern Europeans

themselves, of course!40. See Osnos, pp. 211-15, for an interesting analysis of the

constitutional discord.41. Y. Nalin and A. Nikolayev, The Soviet Union and

European Security (Moscow: Progress, 1973), p. 46.42. Za Rubezhom, 7 May 1976.43. For detailed analyses of COMECON, see Henry

Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics ofIntegration (New York:

69

Praeger, 1972); Michael Kaser, COMECON: IntegrationProblems of the Planned Economies (New York: RoyalInstitute of International Affairs. 1967); and Hans HermannHohmann, et a1., The New Economic Systems of EasternEurope (London: C. Hurst, 1975).

44. The UN source was the 1976 United Nations StatisticalYearbook (New York: United Nations. 1977). The Sovietsource was the 1975 annual foreign trade report compiled byEkomicheskaya gazeta, contained in part in "U.S.S.R. records'75 trade deficit," Facts on File. 15 May 1976, p. 340.

45. Ibid.46. Ibid.47. "Soviet oil export prices rise," Facts on File, 29

January 1977, p. 67.

48. "Price Rise Barred by East Germany," The New YorkTimes. 30 November 1975, p.19.

49. Financial Times, 23 June 1975.50. Andrzez Korbonski, "Detente, East~West Trade and

the Future of Economic Integration in Eastern Europe,"World Politics (July 1976),581.

51. Soviet Foreign Trade. May 1977.52. RakowskaMHarmstone. p. 47.53. Daniel S. Papp, "Foreign Investment Resources. and

the Tenth Five Year Plan," Resources Policy (September1977),195-202.

54. Roman Kolkowicz, "The Warsaw Pact: EntanglingAlliance," Journal ofEastern European Studies, p. 101.

70 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College