Department of National Defense National Defense College of ...

Department of National DefenseNational Defense College of the Philippines

Academic Affairs Division

NDCPFACULTYPAPER

ISSN: 2719-0773No. 1 (July) 2020

National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP)Gen. Arturo Enrile Avenue, Camp Gen. Emilio AguinaldoQuezon City, Philippines 1110+63 (2) 8912 [email protected]

Duterte’s Gambit: How the Two-Level Game Theory Explains the Odds of Terminating the US Visiting Forces Agreement

Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase

NDCP Faculty Paper, No. 1 (July) 2020ISSN: 2719-0773

Using Putnam’s two-level game theory, this study seeks to explain Philippine President Duterte’s gambit of terminating the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States (US), and the odds of negotiating a better deal with the Philippines. It addresses research questions on what value judgement and conception of national interest prompted Duterte to send his 180-day notice of VFA termination on 11 February 2020 and suspend it after 112 days; on the extent of his rational egoism to abrogate the VFA or accommodate concessions from the US; and, on what factors and conditions determine the win-sets of the two parties in the VFA negotiation.

Abstract

About the author: Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase, DPA is the Professor III of the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) and the Course Director of the National Security Policy Analysis Course in the Master in National Security Administration (MNSA) Program of NDCP. She holds a bachelor of arts degree in Journalism and masters (with honors) and doctoral degree in Public Administration, which are all from the University of the Philippines (UP) in Diliman, Quezon City. She is also a graduate of the Advanced Security Cooperation Course at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, and the Harvard Kennedy School’s (HKS) Executive Education Courses on Mastering Negotiation, and on National and International Security for Senior Executives at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. The views expressed in this NDCP Faculty Paper, which was accomplished by the author on 18 June 2020, are hers alone and do not represent the opinion and/or position of the NDCP.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 1

A.Backgroundofthestudy 2

B.Researchquestions 4

II. Game Theoretical Approach as Framework of Analysis 4

A.Theoreticalperspectivesonthegameofpoliticsininternationalrelations 5

B.Putnam’stwo-levelgametheoryininternationalnegotiations 7

1.Win-setsintwo-levelgames 8

2.Determinantsofwin-setsintwo-levelgames 11

3.Keyassumptionsonthepresidentaschiefnegotiatorintwo-levelgames 14

III. Explaining Duterte’s Policy Move and Motivation on the VFA Termination 15

A.HowDutertemovesinthestrategicgame 16

B.WhatmotivatesDutertetosendandsuspendhisnoticeofVFAtermination 17

C.WhyDutertemovesthewayhedoesinthetwo-levelgame 20

IV. Determining the Deal and No-Deal Sets of the Philippines and the US in the VFA Negotiation A.Perspectiveonpossiblewin-setsforPhilippines-USdefenseagreement 21

B.Strategicimplicationsandpandemiccomplications 25

V. Summary 27

VI. Reference List 30

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Introduction Ambiguitiesanduncertaintiesmakeusinsecureaboutthefuture.Wefearwhatwedonotunderstandorknowverylittleabout,amaximthatappliestothestudyofsecurityininternationalrelations.1Nowmorethanever,weliveinaworldthatisuncontrollableandunpredictable.2Asitisinconstantchange,wegrappleandgamblewiththeoddsthatlieahead.Butwiththeoreticalframes,wetrytomakesenseofcomplexrelationsinordertoexplaincausations,especiallyinconflictsituations.Andwithanalyticaltools,westrivetoweighinourpolicychoicessoastopredictlikelyconsequences,evenwithlimitedinformation.3Nomatterwhat,difficultdecisionsthatwilltriggeractionsandreactionsonotherplayershavetobemadewithagrainofsaltandabitofluck.4Suchisthenatureofforeignpolicyinagameofbothskillandchance.

Withthiskeynote,IwouldliketodelveonceagainonthetopicofPhilippinePresidentRodrigoDuterte’spuzzlingpolicypreference,thistimeonhisgambittoabrogateacrucialdefensepactwiththeUnitedStates(US).JustasIwrotein2017,thestrongrevisionisttoneofhisindependentforeignpolicyrhetoric—whichhadsentshockwavestotheinternationalcommunityin2016—isindeedaveryenticingsubjectofanalysisforacademicsinthefield.5Mycontinuinginterestonthissubjectisdrivenbyatleasttworeasons,asIstatedinpreviousarticlesonthePhilippines’NationalSecurityStrategy(NSS).6Firstisthathisforeignpolicydefinesthecountry’sstrategicdirection,afterhesetasidethe2016PhilippinevictoryinthePermanentCourtofArbitration’s(PCA)rulingagainstChina’sterritorialclaimsintheSouthChinaSea(SCS)andunderminedtheUS-Philippinesalliance.SecondisthathisforeignpolicyconductdirectsustowardsinsightfulresearchpuzzlesonhowandwhyaweakcountrylikethePhilippinesbehavesinsurprisingways.7

1TherelationsoffearandnationalsecurityininternationalrelationscanbefoundinBuzan’sclassictextbookonthissubject,whichisafoundationalreadingforstudentsofSecurityStudies.[SeeBarryBuzan,People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations(Brighton,Sussex,GreatBritain:WheatsheafBooks,Ltd,1983).] 2Onthefearfactorininsecurity,CaldwellandWilliamswrotethat“(h)umansoftendreadtheunknownandtheuncontrollableevent,suchasarandombombing,outofallproportiontotheactualthreatsuchasaneventposes.”[DanCaldwellandRobertE.Williams,Jr.,Seeking Security in an Insecure WorldThirdEdition(London,UK:RowmanandLittlefield,2016),p.2.] 3Indiscussingtheimportanceofpolicyanalysisinnationalsecurityaffairs,KuglerwrotethattheUSmustfigureoutbeforehandwhetheritspoliciesarewiseandlikelytosucceed.ThisisbecausetheUScannotriskfailurebytryingoutplansandstrategiesjusttoseewhethertheywouldwork.[RichardL.Kugler,Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era(Washington,DC,USA:CenterforTechnologyandNationalSecurityPolicyNationalDefenseUniversity,2006),p.1.] 4AsKuglerwroteaboutmakingdecisionsdespitetherisks:“Althoughconsiderableanalyticaleffortwasdevotedtodeveloping(theUS)strategyanditsmultiplecomponents,decisionshavetobemadeinthefaceofconsiderableuncertainty.Oncetaken,theysetirreversiblyintomotionawidespreadchainreactionthattheUnitedStatescouldonlypartlycontrol.”(Underlineprovided.)[Ibid,p.2] 5AnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“ReinterpretingDuterte’sIndependentForeignPolicyRhetoric,”University of Nottingham’s Asia Dialogue,29March2018,https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/03/29/reinterpreting-dutertes-independent-foreign-policy-rhetoric/. 6AnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“StrategicAmbiguity:DeconstructingDuterte’sNationalSecurityStrategy,”University of Nottingham’s Asia Dialogue,1October2018,https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/10/01/strategic-ambiguity-deconstructing-duter-tes-2018-national-security-strategy/. 7ForananalysisofwhythePhilippinessetasideitsvictoryinaninternationalarbitrationrulingagainstChina’sterritorialclaimsintheSCS,seeAnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“DiplomaticEngagementandNegotiatedAgreementBetweenPhilippinesandChina:AConstructive-RealistApproachinPost-Arbitration,”Daniel K Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI-APCSS) Alumni Perspectives,13April2017,http://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Diplomatic-Engagement-and-Negotiated-Agree-ment-final.pdf.

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Background of the study

ThatDuterte’sforeignpolicybehaviorispuzzlingcanbeseeninthefollowingchronologyofkeyeventsandpronouncementssincehisassumptiontoofficeattheendofJune2016.InnotimeafterthePhilippineswonitscasewiththePCAinmid-Julyofthesameyear,newlyelectedPresidentDutertepivotedtowardsChinaandupsetthePhilippines’historicalliancewiththeUS.SlightedbyUScriticismofhiscontroversialwaragainstillegaldrugs,8DuterteorderedtheUSforcestoleaveMindanaointhesouthernpartofthePhilippinearchipelago,stopjointpatrolswiththePhilippineNavyintheSCS,andlimitmilitaryexercisestohumanitarianassistanceanddisasterresponse(HADR).9

In2017,withDonaldTrumpelectedasthenewUSPresident,DuterterekindleddefenseandeconomicrelationswiththeAmericans.Inthesameyear,DuterteagreedontheconductofadditionalmilitaryexercisesandintelligenceexchangeoncounterterrorismwiththeUS.10Thelatter,ontheotherhand,pledged$15milliontohelprebuildMarawi—thecityinMindanaobesiegedin2017byterroristattacksandensuingbattlesbetweengovernmentforcesandIslamicmilitants.11In2019,thePhilippinemilitary,whichhadreceivedUSmilitaryassistanceamountingto$300millionsince2015,signeddealswiththeUSandlinedupmorethan300securitycooperationactivitiesfor2020.12ButDutertewarnedtoabandonallthisiftheUSdoesnotreverseitsvisacancellationforPhilippineSenatorRonalddelaRosa,theformernationalpolicechiefandimplementorofthePhilippines’drugwar.

InJanuary2020,DutertethreatenedtoterminatetheVisitingForcesAgreement(VFA)withtheUS,13atreatythatprovidesthelegalframeworkfortheUSarmedforcesanddefensepersonnelwhowillbevisitingthePhilippinesforjointmilitaryexercisesandotherdiplomaticengagements.14ItmustbenotedthatwithouttheVFA,whichhadbeennegotiatedaftertheclosurein1991oftheUSbasesinthePhilippines,the1951MutualDefenseTreaty(MDT)betweenthetwocountrieswouldbepointless.PresidentDutertealsogaveorderstohisCabinetnottotraveltotheUSasaprotestagainstthelatter’scancellationofSenatordelaRosa’sUSvisa.15Priortothis,DutertehadalreadymadeinstructionstotheimmigrationbureautobanentrytothePhilippinesofthreeAmericansenators16forbackingaUSmeasure 8DharelPlacido,“ObamatoDuterte:Dowarondrugs‘therightway’,”ABS-CBN News,8September2016,https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/08/16/obama-to-duterte-do-war-on-drugs-the-right-way. 9TedRegencia,“DutertetoUSforces:GetoutofsouthernPhilippines,”Aljazeera,13September2016,https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/duterte-forces-southern-philippines-160913003704576.html. 10InanarticleontheroleconceptionandconductofDuterte’ssecuritypolicy,Iwrotethatdespitehisanti-Americanrhetoric,hisNationalSecurityPolicygivesimportancetotheMutualDefenseTreatywiththeUSandthelatter’sroleinregionalsecurity.[AnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“RoleConceptionandConductofDuterte’sSecurityPolicy,”University of Nottingham’s Asia Dialogue, 31 January 2018, https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/01/31/role-conception-and-strategic-orientation-in-dutertes-philippine-securi-ty-policy/.] 11PaternoEsmaquelII,“USdonatesP730milliontohelprebuildMarawi,” Rappler,5September2017,https://www.rappler.com/nation/181195-united-states-donation-marawi-rehabilitation-relief. 12PatriciaLourdesViray,“Philippines,USplan300‘securitycooperationactivities’in2020,”Philstar,13September2019,https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/09/13/1951508/philippines-us-plan-300-security-cooperation-activities-2020. 13XaveGregorio,“DutertethreatenstoterminateVFAifUSdoesnotreversecancellationofDelaRosa’svisa,”CNN Philippines, 23 January 2020, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/1/23/Rodrigo-Duterte-Bato-dela-Rosa-visa-Visiting-Forces-Agree-ment-VFA.html. 14SeeAgreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Treatment of the United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines,https://www.chanrobles.com/visiting-forcesagreement1.htm#VFA. 15JasonGutierrez,“DuterteOrdersCabinetNottoVisitU.S.AfterOfficial’sVisaIsDenied,”The New York Times,30January2020,https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines.html. 16“ThirdUSSenatorBarredfromPhilippinesUnfazedby‘StrongmanTactics’,”Coconuts Manila,3January2020,https://coconuts.co/manila/news/third-us-senator-barred-from-philippines-unfazed-by-dutertes-strongman-tactics/.

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tobanFilipinoofficialswhohadbeensaidtoparticipateinwrongfulimprisonmentofSenatorLeiladeLima,Duterte’spoliticalopponenttaggedinthedrugtrade.

DismayedaboutUSinactiononhisdemandtowithdrawitsvisacancellationforSenatordelaRosa,DuterteturnedthetablesontheUSbysanctioningtheentryandexitofitsarmedforcesinthePhilippineterritory.Thiscompletelychangedtheagendaofnegotiationsandraisedthestakesinthegame.

On11February2020,PresidentDutertecarriedouthisthreattoendthePhilippines-USmilitaryalliancewhenhesenthis180-daynoticeofVFAterminationtoWashington.17Thewaitingperiodofaboutsixmonthswastogivethetwopartiestimetorenegotiatecontentioustermsofthe1998defenseagreementbeforethedeadlinesetinAugust2020.SecretaryTeodoroLocsinJr.oftheDepartmentofForeignAffairs(DFA)inthePhilippinesthenproposedareviewoftheVFAtoaddresslegitimateissuesandconcernsinsteadofabrogatingitcompletely.18

On9March2020,thePhilippineSenate—throughapetitionfordeclaratoryreliefandmandamus—calledontheSupremeCourttodeterminethevalidityofDuterte’streatyabrogationandcompelhisofficetoreferthenoticeofwithdrawaltothechamberforconcurrence.19Inreactiontothis,thefirebrandPresidentissuedastatementthathedoesnotwanttobecompelledbecauseasfarasheisconcerned,heisalreadycountingthe180daysfortheAmericanstopackupandgo.20

ThecountdownfortheUSforces’exitfromthePhilippineshadsincebeentickingbeforethecoronaviruspandemicforcedcommunities,cities,andcountriesaroundtheglobeintoquarantineandlockdowninthemiddleofMarch2020.21Asthewholeworldstruggledtosurvivefromthewidespreaddiseaseanddeaths,diplomaticattemptstosalvagethedefensepactacrossdomestictablesofthePhilippinesandtheUSseemedtofallbetweenthecracksintheseuncertaintimes.22

17ArianneMerezandKhristineSabillo,“PhilippinessendsnoticeofVFAterminationtoUS,”ABS-CBN News,11February2020,https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/11/20/philippines-sends-notice-of-vfa-termination-to-us. 18JimGomez,“DutertesaysPhilippinescansurvivewithoutAmerica,”Associated Press,27February2020,https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2020-02-26/duterte-says-philippines-can-survive-without-america. 19Nicole-AnneC.Lagrimas,“SenatorsurgeSupremeCourttoruleonSenateroleinterminationoftreaties,”GMA News, 9March2020,https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/728914/senators-urge-supreme-court-to-rule-on-senate-role-in-termination-of-treaties/story/. 20Asquotedbymediareporters,thefirebrandPresident’sno-nonsensestatementwas:“Theycannotcompelme.Irefusedtobecompelled.Ihaveterminatedit.Tapos ang problema ko(Myproblemisfinished)...AsfarasI’mconcerned,wearebeginningtocountthe180daysforthemtopackupandgo.IamnotrenegingontheVFAandI’mnotgoingtoAmericatodiscussitwithany-body.”[DarrylJohnEsguerra,“DuterterefusestochangestanceonVFA,”INQUIRER.net,9March2020,https://globalnation.inquirer.net/186039/duterte-i-am-not-reneging-on-vfa.] 21KnownasCOVID-19,thenovelcoronavirusdiseaseiscausedbysevereandacuterespiratorysyndromewithcommonsymptomsofflu,fever,andshortnessofbreaththatcouldleadtopneumoniaandmulti-organfailure.ThefirstcaseoftheCOVID-19wasidentifiedinWuhanCityinChinainDecember2019andtravelledquicklyto210countriesandterritories,forcingcitiesandcommunitiesaroundtheworldintoquarantineandlockdownforthefirsttime.On30January2020,theWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)declaredapublichealthemergencytoalerttheinternationalcommunityabouttheexistentialcrisisoftheCOVID-19.Morethanamonthlater,on11March2020,theWHOraisedthealarmatthelevelofapandemic,whichmeanstheepidemichasbecomeworldwide,crossednationalboundaries,andaffectedlargenumberofpeople.InmidJune2020,8,251,224millionpeoplegotinfectedbythevirus,while445,188diedofthedisease.[“COVID-19CoronavirusPandemic,”Worldometer,18June2020,https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/.] 22ThehardesthitistheUSwith2,208,400millioncasesofCOVID-19and119,132deathsduetothediseasebythemiddleofJune2020.InthePhilippines,therewere26,781casesofinfectionand1,103deathsrecordedsincethevirushadarrivedinthiscountryinlateJanuary2020.[Ibid.]

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Nevertheless,whilethecoronaviruscatastrophetooktheexistentialproblemwiththeVFAoutofthepicture,therewasquietdiplomacyworkingbehindthescene.On3June2020,theDFASecretaryannouncedthePhilippinegovernment’ssix-monthsuspensionoftheVFAabrogation,uponinstructionofPresidentDuterteand“inlightofpoliticalandotherdevelopmentsintheregion.”23Giventherealitythatthefutureofthedefenseagreementissubjecttotheforcesofpoliticsandpandemic,thenegotiatingenvironmentbetweenthetwooppositepartiesisthushighlydynamic.

Research Questions

Withtheforegoingbackground,IaskthefollowingquestionstoanalyzePresidentDuterte’spolicygambitwiththeUSthis2020.WhatvaluejudgementandconceptionofnationalinterestpromptedhimtosendthePhilippines’180-daynoticeofVFAterminationandtosuspenditafter112days?TowhatextentcouldhisrationalegoismabrogatetheVFAoraccommodateconcessionstoextendit?Whatdeterminesthepossibledealandno-dealsetsforthePhilippinesandtheUSontheVFAorasimilararrangementforvisitingAmericanforcesinthishostcountryinthefuture?

Theseresearchqueriesaimtogeneratetheoreticallysubstantivediscussionsonthepoliticsanddynamicsofnegotiatingadefenseagreementatinternationalanddomesticlevels.Inthebackground,eventsanddevelopmentsarechangingthecircumstancesofthegameandthecontoursofpolicychoices,butIassertthatthelogicofpolicyanalysisremainsthesameintheepistemicframe.

Game Theoretical Approach as Framework of Analysis Intreatynegotiation,aswellasconflictresolutionininternationalrelations,possibleagreementbetweenoramongpartiesisdecidednotjustbyforeignpolicyactorsonthetablebutalsoapprovedbypolicy-makersathome.Anyagreementthatcanbereachedattheinternationallevelhastoberatifiedbylegislativebodiesatthedomesticlevel.Particularly,therangeofratifiableagreementininternationalnegotiationsiswhatHarvardProfessorRobertPutnamcalledasthewin-setsizeintwo-levelgames.24Histheoryrecognizesthatwithinthisnegotiatingspace,domesticconstituents—withtheirownvaluepreferencesandeveninternaldifferences—haveavoteinthefinaloutcomeofaninternationalagreement. Putnam’sgametheoreticalmodelin International Relations(IR)25iskeytounderstandingtheextentand/orlimitsofDuterte’sbargainingrangeinthestrategicdomain.Hence,IwillbeusingthelogicofPutnam’stwo-levelgamesasframeworktoanalyzeDuterte’spolicygambitofbreakingitoffwiththeUS,andtheoddsofgainingsomecompensatingadvantagefromsuchariskymove.Thiswillclarify 23Accordingtonewsreport,thediplomaticnotestatesthatthesuspension“shallstartonevendateandshallcontinueforsixmonths,”whichcanbeextendedbythePhilippinegovernmentforanothersixmonths,“afterwhichthetollingoftheinitialperiodinNoteVerbaleNo.20-0463dated11February2020shallresume.”[ArgyllCyrusGeducos,“SuspensionofVFAabrogationsurfacedtwoweeksago—Palace,”Manila Bulletin,3June2020,https://news.mb.com.ph/2020/06/03/suspension-of-vfa-abrogation-surfaced-two-weeks-ago-palace/.] 24RobertPutnam,“DiplomacyandDomesticPolitics:TheLogicofTwo-LevelGames,”International OrganizationVol.42,No.3(Summer,1998),pp.427-460. 25InternationalRelationsorIR,whichissingularandspelledwithinitialcapitals,referstotheacademiccourseoninternationalrelations.HavingaclaimofequalstatuswithotherestablishedcoursesinSocialSciences,IRisaninterdisciplinarystudyofthepowerdynamicsandrelationsofsovereignstates,aswellasnon-stateactors,inaninternationalpoliticalsystemwithnosupremeauthority.Asidefromtraditionalthreatstonationalsecurityandinternationalorder,IRisalsoconcernedwithtransformationsinglobalaffairsandemergingchallengestoglobalcommons.[ForbasicintroductiontoIR,seeKarenA.MingstandIvanM.Arreguin-Toft,Essentials of International Relations 5thEdition(NewYork,USA:Norton,W.W.&Company,Inc.,2011).SeealsoCharlesJones,International Relations: A Beginner’s Guide (London,England:OneworldPublications,2014).]

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Duterte’sstaunchposition,andalsounravelcomplexpoliticalgameswherepolicybetsaremadeandnegotiatedbymultipleplayers.

BeforeIdiscusstheconceptualmechanicsofPutnam’stwo-levelgameintreatynegotiation,26IwillfirstprovideacursoryreviewofhowdominanttheoreticalperspectivesinIRseethepoliticalgameininternationalrelationsandsettheacademicstageforForeign Policy Analysis (FPA).27Eveniftheyleaveoutthesmalldetails,worldviewsallowustoseethebigpictureandtoprobedeeperinsearchforanswerstoquestionsaboutintricaterelationsofpoliticsandpoliciesininternationalaffairs.

Theoretical perspectives on the game of politics in international relations Asimplistic,neo-realist theoryinIRexplainsthatanarchystructurestherulesofthegameforsovereignunitsoftheinternationalpoliticalsystem.28Theabsenceofacentral,governingauthorityaboveindependentstatesallowsthelattertopursuetheirnationalinterests,butitalsorequiresthemtohavetheirownstrategiestoprotectwhattheirnationsvaluemost.29Thisself-helpsystem30drivesstatestoacquireeconomicandmilitarypowerinorderforthemtothriveandsurviveinananarchicpoliticalsystem.31

Inastrategiccontest,thosewiththepowertodowhattheycanhaveclearadvantageoverthosewhoaresmalland/orweak—unlessthelatterallyoralignwithstrongonestosurvive.32Itmustberecalledthatwhennationsconferredtoestablishsovereignstates33andfoughtwarstosecuretheirinterests,smallstateswerethosethathadnovoice,defensecapabilities,andsignificantcontributiontointernationalorder.Theywerethosethathadnochoicebutto“obeytherulesofthegame,becausetheyweretooweaktobetakenseriouslywhenruleswerenegotiated,”asWiveletal.wroteinsettingthesceneforsmallstatesininternationalsecurity.34 26Auser-friendly,scholarlyworkonPutnam’stwo-levelgameapproachthatIcanrecommendtostudentsisthatofToshiyaNakamura,“ExplanatoryPoweroftheTwo-LevelGameApproach,”Journal of Global CommunicationNo.8(2007). 27InAldenandAran’sForeign Policy Analysis: New Approaches,FPAisdefinedas:“thestudyoftheconductandpracticeofrelationsbetweendifferentactors,primarilystates,intheinternationalsystem...FPAisnecessarilyconcernednotonlywiththeactorsinvolvedinthestate’sformaldecision-makingapparatus,butalsowiththevarietyofsub-nationalsourcesofinfluenceuponstateforeignpolicy.”[ChrisAldenandAmnonAran,Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches(NewYork,USA:Routledge,2012),p.1.] 28Ibid.,p.16. 29Indiscussinghowstatecapacitydeterminesforeignpolicyautonomyordependency,Iwrotethatneo-realisttheoryexplainstheinternationalsystemasastructuralorderwherepowerdisparityandabsenceofacentralgoverningauthoritycreatetension,competition,andsecuritydilemmaforsovereignstates.Independentcountriesmakeforeignpoliciesandsecuritystrategiesfornationalsurvival,maximumgains,andstrategicstability.Perceivedasrationalactors,self-interestedstatesuseforeignpolicytoolstobuilduptheireconomies,defensecapabilities,andinfluentialpowerinordertosurviveandthrive.[Almase,“ReinterpretingDuterte’sIndependentForeignPolicyRhetoric,”2018.] 30AsHarvardProfessorJosephNyewroteaboutunderstandinginternationalconflicts:“Becauseinternationalpoliticsisintherealmofself-help,andsomestatesarestrongerthanothers,thereisalwaysadangerthattheymayresorttoforce.Whenforcecannotberuledout,theresultismistrustandsuspicion.”(Underlineprovided.)[JosephS.Nye,Jr.,Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History(Boston,MA,USA:PearsonLongman,2007),p.4.] IncludedinJones’listofstereotypesinrealismisthebeliefthat“(e)achstatemustrelyinthelastresortonitsownresourcestosurvive.”[Jones,p.43.] 31Asstatesbuilduptheirowndefensecapabilitiestothwartthreatsagainstthem,theirindependenteffortstomakethemselvessecurecreateasecuritydilemma—aconditionthatisrelatedtoanarchyastheessentialcharacteristicofinternationalpolitics.Writinginthe17thcenturyEnglandembattledbycivilwar,EnglishphilosopherThomasHobbescalledtheanarchicsystemofinternationalpoliticsasthe“stateofnature.”InNye’sessayaboutHobbes,thestateofnaturewasdescribedas“awarofallagainstallbecausethereisnohigherruletoenforceorder.”[Nye,pp.3-4,&15.] 32Afamouslineinclassicalrealismthatthe“thestrongdowhattheycan,andtheweaksufferwhattheymust”camefromtheMelianDialogueinThucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.Thepassageisaquintessentialexampleofagreatpowerwiththemotiveandincentivetopursueitsself-interestunderconditionsofanarchy.[See“TheHistoryofthePeloponnesianWarbyThucydides,”Project Gutenberg,7February2013,https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142-h/7142-h.htm.] 33EndingtheThirtyYearsWar(1618-1648),theTreatiesofWestphaliaestablishedsovereignterritorialstatesandgrantedmonarchsandnationsintheWesttochoosetheirownreligionasappropriatefortheirownpeople.[MingstandArreguin-Toft,pp.21-24.] 34AndersWivel,AlysonJ.K.BailesandCliveArcher,Small States and International Security:Europe and Beyond(NewYork,

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Realistsbelievethattheonlywaytoachieveandmaintainstabilityintheinternationalsystemisthroughbalanceofpower—which,intherealsenseoftheword,meanstheuseorthreatofforce.Thisisdespitethefactthattheactionandreactionofmilitarybuild-upforself-preservationcanalsoresultinacycleoftensionandinsecurityforall.Nomatterwhat,realistsviewthatpowerpolitics,alongwithitsconsequentsecuritydilemma,isthestateofnatureininternationalrelations.Accordingly,thisisalsothenecessarysubstanceofforeignpolicydecisionsandthenaturalinclinationofhumanactorsbehindthese.

Anoptimistic,neo-liberal and institutional theory35inIR,ontheotherhand,explainsthatdemocraticprocessesandinstitutionsfacilitatefunctionalmechanismswherebystates,aswellasnon-stateactors,canworktogetherforcommoninterestsofpeaceandprosperity.Internationalinstitutionsupholdnationalsovereignty,buttheyalsobindsovereignmemberstosubscribetointernationallawsandpromulgatetreatiesaccordingtoagreedrulesofthegame.Continuousdiplomaticinteractionsandeconomicinterdependencebetweenandamonginternationalactorsinstitutionalizecooperationandatthesametimedisincentivizedefection.36

Therealistbeliefthatpolicyactorsinananarchic,self-helpsystemhaveanincentivetocheatiscancelledoutbythefactthattheywillhavetomeetagaininanotherpoliticalgame.Surely,thetemptationtodefecthasundesirableeffectinatit-for-tatsystem,aforethoughtwhichchiefnegotiatorscountintheirstrategiccalculus.Thus,itismorelikelythatrationalplayerswillopttocooperateand/ornegotiatetoassurethemselvesofmutualalbeitsuboptimalgains.Thisway,theyavoidtherisksofpooroutcomesthatwillleavethemnothingiftheydonotcollaborate.37

Itmustbeunderstoodthattheidealistconstructionofaninternationalorderisfoundedonthesameanarchicpoliticalsystemandvolatilesecurityenvironment.Giventhisreality,strategicactorsusetheirforeignpolicytoolstoshapethedirectionoffunctionalcooperationinwaysthatpromotetheirinterests.Theyestablishnormsofconductandcreaterules-basedregimesinanattempttoregulateandpredictbehaviorofself-governingstates.Regularityandpredictabilityintheiractionsandreactionsprovidestabilityandsomesenseofsecurity.Butmaintainingtheneo-liberalandinstitutionalsystemisthemajorchallengeandsourceofinsecurityaswell.Itisforthisreasonthattheproponentsthemselves,i.e.thegreatpowersintheWest,constructedasecurityorderandbuiltalliancesagainstthreatstotheiridealinternationalcommunity.38

Consideringtheforegoing,therealistrecoursetocompeteandbalancepowerisandwillalwaysbecentraltointernationalrelationsandforeignpolicyoptionsespeciallyofpowerfulnations.Theneo-liberalorderonlyprovidesinstitutionalmechanismsforageopoliticalgameinwhichoutcomesarenegotiatedthroughpowerpoliticsandsecuritystrategies.Itdoesnotseektochangethestateofnatureinthestrategicsetting.ButletmesettlethedebateontherealandidealnatureofinternationalpoliticalgameswiththefollowingpropositionfromJones’guidetoIR:USA:Routledge,2014),p.3. SeealsoAlmase,“SmallStateSecuritySyndrome...” 35MingstandArreguin-Toft,pp.76-80. 36AsPutnamwrote:“Theprospectsforinternationalcooperationinananarchic,‘self-help’worldareoftensaidtobepoorbecause‘unfortunately,policymakersgenerallyhaveanincentivetocheat.’ButasAxelrod,Keohane,andothershavepointedout,thetemptationtodefectcanbedramaticallyreducedamongplayerswhoexpecttomeetagain.”[Putnam,p.483.] 37Jones,p.177 AldenandAran,p.17. 38Takenotethatwhilethiscanunitecountriesforcommonsecurity,itcanalsoalienateotherswithdifferentworldviews.Whenothersoutsideofthecoalitionlookattheworlddifferentlyfromtheirownideologicalprisms,theycouldbeperceivedasthreat—especiallywhentheyhavethepowerandintenttorevisethestatusquo.

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Backin1977RobertKeohaneandJosephNyesuggestedaface-savingcompromiseinaninfluentialbookaboutglobalco-operation:wecanlookattheworldeitherastheplayofstatepower,inwhichco-operationisregulatedbystateswithrelativeadvantageinmind,orasaspaceinwhichco-operationcreateswebofinterdependence,limitingorreconfiguringthepowerofstates.Whichinterpretationsisthemoreappropriateguidetoactionatanypointintimeisamatterofjudgement.39(Underlineprovided.)

GiventherealistandliberaldimensionsofIR,foreignpolicycanthusbeexplaineddeeplyandcomprehensivelybyusingbothoftheseperspectives,alongwithotherrelevantanalyticaltoolsatdifferentlevelsofanalysis.Thisbringusthentothenextapproachinunderstandingthedynamicsofforeignpolicy:pluralism.Thistermreferstoaphilosophicalandpoliticalthoughtthatconceptualdisagreements,competinginterests,andconflictingpositionsarenaturallyembeddedinasocialsystem.40Tomakesenseofallthis,avarietyofmethodologicalapproachesisneededinsteadofasingleone.Consideringthediversityandirreducibilityoftheworkingsofpoliticsinforeignpolicy,thepluralistmethodologycanprovidefullaccountofthecomplex“anatomyofnormativedifferences.”41Similartosystemsthinking,pluralismcanhelpusanalyzehowkeycomponentsworkaspartsofthewhole.

Aholistic,pluralist approach inFPAaimstoexploresignificantdriversofstatebehaviorfromvarioussourcesofexplanation.Asidefromlookingatthepoliticalandeconomicrelationsatthestrategiclevel,FPAscholarsalsolookintoindividualandgroupdecision-makingprocessestounderstandreasons,motivations,andevenemotionsbehindthepolicyoutput.Theyunpacktheblackboxofpolicy-makingtoexaminehowandwhydecisionmakersarrivedatanegotiatedpolicyoutcome.Itmustbenotedthatwhenpresumablyrationalactorstakecertaincoursesofaction,theydonotjustrelyontheircalculationsofhardfactsintherealworld,butalsoontheirperceptionsofrealitiesinthecognitiverealm.42

Putnam’s two-level game theory in international negotiations

AquintessenceofthepluralistapproachisPutnam’stwo-levelgametheory,whichdelvesinto linkage politics43ofinternationalnegotiation.AldenandAran’ssynopsisofPutnam’sgametheoreticalapproachhighlightsthearenasofpoliticalactivitiesacrossthe“domestic-statist-transnationalaxis”offoreignpolicy-making.44Astheauthorswrote:

RobertPutnam’s‘two-levelgame’attemptstocapturethechallengesimposedbycomplexinterdependencyonforeignpolicydecisionmakers.Writingintherationalisttradition,hesuggeststhatthedecision-makingprocessinvolvesbothadomesticarenawhereonesetofrulesandinterestsgovern,andaninternationalarena,whereadifferentsetofrulesandinterestsprevail.Balancingthelogicanddemandsofthetwoarenas,whichoftenareinconflict,formsthecentraldilemmaoftheforeignpolicymakingasseenbythepluralists.45(Underlineprovided.)

39Jones,pp.43-44. 40AccordingtoJackson,pluralismpositsthatthereisnoconceptualconsensusandnosingle,originalparadigmthatcanexplainit,only“acolloquyofdifferentacademicvoices,eachoneattemptingtofastenthereader’sattentiononrecommendedwaysofunderstandingandrespondingtonormativeissuesthatariseinthecourseofinternationalrelations...”[RobertJackson,“PluralisminInternationalPoliticalTheory,”Review of International Studies18(1992),p.1.] 41CarlaYumantle,“Pluralism,”The Encyclopedia of Political Thought1stEdition,ed.byMichaelT.Gibbons(NewJersey,USA:JohnWiley&Sons,Ltd.,2015),p.1. Lookinhttps://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cyumatle/files/c.yumatle-pluralism.pdf. 42Foracomprehensiveandin-depthstudyoftheroleofperceptions,emotions,andcognitivelimitationsindecision-makinginIR,seeRobertJervis,Perception and Misperception in International Politics(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,2017). 43“Linkagepolitics”pertainstostrategicinteractionsbetweenandamongactorsatinternationalanddomesticlevels.Anactor’sbehavioriscontingentuponanotheractor’smoveatanyleveleveninadifferentissuearea.Questionsaboutthecircumstancesandconditionsofpoliticalrelations,aswellasbargainingstrategies,makelinkagepoliticsanexcitingareaofresearchforFPAscholars.[ArthurA.Stein,“ThePoliticsofLinkage,”Princeton Institute for International and Regional StudiesVol.33,Issue1(October1980),https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/politics-of-linkage/04BA7C929EAF435863B33613808FDDE8.] 44AldenandAran,p.10. 45Ibid,p.8.

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Fromhisoriginalworkin1988,Putnamexplainedtheentanglementsofdiplomacyanddomesticpoliticsusingthelogicoftwo-levelgames.Hewasparticularlyinterestedinhowmulti-partydeals46becamepoliticallypossibleratherthanwhethertheywereeconomicallywise.Theobjectiveofhisstudywastofindouthowmutuallyinteractingactorsandfactorsatinternationalanddomesticlevelsbecameintertwinedinnegotiatingtradeagreements.Putnam’stheorydrawsourattentiontokeydeterminantsofapossibleagreement,whichcanbedigestedasfollows:chiefnegotiators’perceptionsofnationalinterests;domesticpressures;bureaucraticpolitics;powerstructures;politicalsurvival;systemicchallenges;and,internationallobbying.

Significantly,thepluralistapproachtoanalyzingpoliticalgamesattwolevelsdirectsustoquestionsofwhatvariablescoalescetoformaconsensusorhinderit,andhowdomesticandinternationalpoliticsenmeshinthewholeprocess.47TheinterconnectednessofthesetwopoliticaldomainsinforeignpolicymakingisthepremiseandnottheproblemofPutnam’stwo-levelgames.Thepuzzleishowdiplomacyanddomesticpoliticsbecomeentangledviainternationalnegotiation,mostespeciallyinmulti-partytalks.Themetaphoroftwo-levelgamesisusefulindeterminingthewin-setsoftwoormorepartiestoanagreementthatcanberatifiedbytheirlegislativebodiesbackhome.

Win-sets in two-level games.Inbusinesseconomics,thewin-setscanbelikenedtothezoneofpossibleagreement(ZOPA)48wherenegotiatorsmakebargainsandconcessionstoreachanagreementand/orsettlement.Theobjectiveistofindacommongroundthatincorporatestheinterestsofpartiesandallowsthemtostrikeadeal.Rationally,thisishowitworksinafieldwherestakeholdersnegotiatetheirtermsandconditions,andcalculatetheprospectandutilityofwhatisatstake.Whennegotiationsgosour,theycanopttowalkawayfromthetableandfallbackonabestalternativetoanegotiated-agreement(BATNA)49somewhereelse.Itisassumedthatarationalplayerwhomakesthismoveistheprincipalactorratherthanapoliticalagentofacomplexclusterofcompetinginterestgroups.Moreorless,thisishowitworksinaone-levelgameinthebusinesssetting.Thesituationchangeswhenthenegotiationgameisplayedoutatdifferentlevelsofforeignpolicy-making.

InPutnam’sgametheoreticalmodel,theZOPAistheareawherechiefnegotiatorscooperatewitheachotheroncommonconcernsandatthesametimeaccommodatedomesticdemandstosatisfytheirrespectiveconstituents.50ForPutnam,determiningthewin-setsofnegotiators,alongwiththeirrespectivestakeholders,isimportantinworkingonatheoryofratification.Tobeginwith,hedecomposedthenegotiation 46PutnamusedtheexampleofhowdiplomacyanddomesticpoliticsintertwinedattheBonnsummitconferencein1978.Thisclassiccasewasalsothesubjectofanalysisinpreviouspapers[i.e.“TheBonnSummitof1978:HowDoesInternationalEconomicPolicyCoordinationActuallyWork?”(1986),and“HangingTogether:CooperationandConflictintheSevenPowerSummits”(1979)],whichheco-authoredwithotherscholars.[Putnam,p.1.] 47InanalyzingtheBonnaccord,Putnamwrote:“...thosepolicychangeswouldprobablynothavebeenpursued(certainlynotthesamescalewithinthesametimeframe)intheabsenceofinternationalagreement...Thus,internationalpressurewasanecessaryconditionforthesepolicyshifts.Ontheotherhand,withoutdomesticresonance,internationalforceswouldnothavesufficedtoproducetheaccord,nomatterhowbalancedandintellectuallypersuasivetheoverallpackage.Intheend,eachleaderbelievedthatwhathewasdoingwasinhisnation’sinterest—andprobablyinhisownpoliticalinterest,too,eventhoughnotallhisaidesagreed.”(Underlineprovided.)[Putnam,pp.429-430.] 48DeepakMalhotraandMaxBazerman,Negotiation Genius(NewYork,USA:BantamDell,2008),p.23. MarcelaMerino,“UnderstandingZOPA:TheZoneofPossibleAgreement,”Harvard Business School Online,14September2017,https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/understanding-zopa. 49MalhotraandBazerman,pp.20-211. 50Inmyview,thisdescriptionisjustonedimensionofstrategicnegotiations,whichisideallyliberalandinstitutional.Inreality,policy-makingismessyeveninthedomesticpoliticalarenawhereconflictsofinterestsandcompetitionforlimitedresourcesarearchetypal.Whosepreferencesshouldprevailandgetmoreresourcesattheexpenseofothersisaconstantbattle,especiallyinaliberaldemocracy.Themessinessisfurthermagnifiedintwo-levelgamesofdiplomacyanddomesticpoliticswheremultifariouspolicyactorsplayandpushtheirownindividual,group,andnationalinterests.

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processintotwostages:(1)bargainingbetweenchiefnegotiatorstoreachtentativeagreementat Level I,and(2)separatediscussionswithineachgroupofconstituentstoratifyornottheagreementatLevel II.Putnam’swritingsbelowexplainmoreaccuratelythedynamicsbetweenthesestages:

Thissequentialdecompositionintoanegotiationphaseandaratificationphaseisusefulforpurposesofexposition,althoughitisnotdescriptivelyaccurate.Inpractice,expectationaleffectswillbequiteimportant.TherearelikelytobepriorconsultationsandbargainingatLevelIItohammeroutaninitialpositionfortheLevelInegotiations.Conversely,theneedforLevelIIratificationiscertaintoaffecttheLevelIbargaining.Infact,expectationsofrejectionatLevelIImayabortnegotiationsatLevelIwithoutanyformalactionatLevelII...Inmanynegotiations,thetwo-levelprocessmaybeiterative,asthenegotiatorstryoutpossibleagreementsandprobetheirconstituents’views.Inmorecomplicatedcases,...theconstituents’viewsmaythemselvesevolveinthecourseofthenegotiations.Nevertheless,therequirementthatanyLevelIagreementmust,intheend,beratifiedatLevelIIimposesacrucialtheoreticallinkbetweenthetwolevels.51(Underlineprovided.)

Putnamdefinedthewin-setsforLevelIIasthesetsofallpossibleagreementsatLevelIthatcanbeapprovedwithanecessarymajorityvotebylegislatorsincountriesinvolved.HecitedtworeasonsastowhythecontoursofLevelIIwin-setsarecrucialforaLevelIagreement.First,largerwin-setsofdomesticconstituenciesmakeLevelIagreementmorelikely,withotherconditionsremainingthesame.ThismeansthatagreementispossibleonlyifLevelIIwin-setsoverlap.Logically,thelargerthewin-sets,thewiderthelatitudethattheyaretoconverge.Thesmallerthewin-setsofcountriesinvolved,thegreatertheriskthatnegotiationswouldfail.52Bethatasitmay,asmartplayerwithasmallwin-setatLevelIIcanstillleverageonhisinabilitytomakeconcessionsatLevelIinarusetopresstheotherpartytogivein.Whilethiscangivehimthenegotiatingpowertosetthetermsandconditionsofapossibleagreement,hisimmovableposition—whichnarrowsdownthewin-sets—canalsoincreasetheriskofabreakdownofcooperation.ThesecondreasonwhyLevelIIwin-setsactasthebaselineforaLevelIagreementisthattheformeraffectthedistributionofjointgainswithinthebargainingrange.53

ImodifyPutnam’sgametheoreticalmodelinFigure 1toillustratethewin-setsinazerosumgameoftwopartynegotiations.MyillustrationshowstwoparallelarrowsrepresentingseparatepolicytracksofpartiesAandB.Theoppositedirectionsofthearrowsbarethepredeterminedmaximum(A2 –A1,B1–B2),sub-maximal (A3–A2,B2–B3),andminimum outcomes(A4 –A3,B3–B4)thatcanbereachedandratifiedbybothAandB.Wecanseethattheircombined win-setsarebetweenA4andB4,theareawherebothpartieswillhavetomakeconcessionsand/ortrade-offsiftheyintendtomakeanagreement.Towit,eitherAorBcangetasub-maximal outcome,leavingtheotherwithonlyaminimum outcome.ItcanbeseeninFigure I thatthepre-setoutcomesandnegotiatingspacesinthetwoarrowsarenotuniformasthesedependonthevaluepreferencesofnegotiatorsandtheirconstituents.Policypositionsandperceptionsarevariableandalsoflexible,whichmeansthatthesecanbemanipulatedand/orinfluencedintheprocessofnegotiation.

51Putnam,p.436. 52Putnam’sgametheorymakesimportantdistinctionbetweenvoluntary defection andinvoluntary defectioninthecaseofafailednegotiation.Astheauthorexplained:“Voluntary defectionreferstorenegingbyarationalegoistintheabsenceofenforceablecontracts—themuchanalyzedproblemposed,forexample,intheprisoner’sdilemmaandotherdilemmasofcollectiveaction.Involuntarydefectioninsteadreflectsthebehaviorofanagentwhoisunabletodeliveronapromisebecauseoffailedratification.Eventhoughthesetwotypesofbehaviormaybedifficulttodisentangleinsomeinstances,theunderlyinglogicisquitedifferent.”(Underlineprovided.)[Ibid,p.438.] 53AsPutnamsuccinctlyexplained:“Thelargertheperceivedwin-setofanegotiator,themorelikelyhecanbe‘pushedaround’bytheotherLevelInegotiators.Conversely,asmalldomesticwin-setcanbeabargainingadvantage:‘I’dliketoacceptyourproposal,butIcouldnevergetitacceptedathome.’Lamentingthedomesticconstraintsunderwhichonemustoperateis(inthewordsofoneexperiencedBritishdiplomat)‘thenaturalthingtosayatthebeginningofatoughnegotiation.’”[Ibid,p.440.]

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Withinthecombinedwin-sets,strategicactorsnegotiatetoincreasetheoddsofgettingmorebenefitsthantheother.Outsideofthisarea,eitherplayerwillwinorloseasthevalueofthemaximumgainstheyindividuallysetforthemselvesisequaltothevalueofthemaximumlossoftheother.Sinceplayersdislikelosing,asprospect theory54 willtellus,theytendtoberiskaverseandtosettleforlessthantheiroptimalchoices—unlesstheyarefacedwithbadoutcomes.IfAandBhadknowledgeofeachother’swinsets,theywouldknowwhichonewinsorsacrificesmorethantheothertoreachamutuallysatisficingaccord.55

Obtaininginformationabouttherealscoreintheothercamp’swin-set,whichisamatterofintelligencework,willincreaseone’sroomformaneuver.ButasPutnamhimselfasserted,governmentsgenerallydonotdowellinanalyzingtheLevelIIdynamicsoftheotherside.Thatforeignpolicyactorsmakedecisionsonthebasisoflimited,availableinformationisagivenreality.56Hence,whatdecisionmakerscandotomanagethislimitationistorelyontheirperceptionsandintuitionto“definethesituation.”AsAldenandAranwroteaboutthechallengestorationaldecision-making:

...foreignpolicydecisionmakersoperateinahighlycomplexworldandtheirdecisionscarrysignificantrisks.Theseincludelinguistic-culturalbarriers,stereo-types,highvolumesof,yetincomplete,information.Hence,throughprocessesofperceptionandcognition,decisionmakersdevelopimages,subjectiveassessmentsofthelargeroperationalcontext,whichwhentakentogetherconstituteadefinitionofthesituation.Thesedefinitionsarealwaysadistortionofrealitysincethepurposeofperceptionistosimplifyandordertheexternalenvironment.Policymakerscanthereforeneverbecompletelyrationalinapplyingtherationalists’imperativeofmaximizationofutilitytowardsanydecisions.57(Underlineprovided.)

54JackS.Levy,“ProspectTheory,RationalChoice,andInternationalRelations,”International Studies QuarterlyVol.41,No.2(March1997),pp.87-112. 55Putnamexplainedthatuncertaintyaboutthewin-setsizecanactbothasabargainingdeviceandastumblingblockintwo-levelgames.Henotedthatnegotiatorshaveanincentivetounderstatetheirwin-sets,especiallywhentheyexploitpoliticaldivisions“bysayingineffect,‘You’dbettermakeadealwithme,becausethealternativetomeisevenworse.’”[Putnam,pp.452-453.] 56AldenandAran,p.20. 57Ibid.,19.

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Strategicplayersmanagetheso-called"boundedrationality"58ofagametheoreticalmodelbysupplementinglimitedinformationwithintelligentguess,inter-subjectiveperceptions,andintuitivelogic.Togeneratemoreinformationandinsights,theyalsoconferandcollaboratewithoneanotherthroughinformal,diplomaticchannelslikeacademicforaandcontrolledintelligenceexchanges.Withconfidence-building,playerswilllikelyopttoworktogethertominimizelossesintheoutcomeofnegotiationandalsotobenefitfromlong-termrelations.Thisneo-liberalandinstitutionalperspectiveisnormativeandprescriptive,whichisthenatureofFPAinIR.

Determinants of win-sets in two-level games. InPutnam’sstudyoftwo-levelgames,theresearchquestioniswhatfactorsandcircumstancesaffectwin-setsize.59IdigestPutnam’sanswersbyabstractingkeyconstructsinthreebroadareasofconcern:(1)powerdistribution,politicalpreferences,possiblecoalitions,andbureaucraticpoliticsatLevelII;(2)politicalsystem,policy-makingprocesses,andlegal-institutionalframeworksatLevelII;and,(3)strategicskillsandbargainingpowerofchiefnegotiatorsatLevelI.

(1)Inthefirstareaofwin-setdeterminantsatLevelII,theconstituents[i.e.legislators,politicalparties,bureaucrats,interestgroups,thinktanks,the(social)media]havetheirownperceptionsandpositionsregardingthestakesinaninternationalagreement.Ifconstituentsareinterestedandwell-informed,morelikelytheywillbeactiveinpolicyarticulationandagendasettinginsteadofbeingquietinpolicyconsultationsorconversations.Forthosewhohavepoliticalinvestmentonaforeignpolicyissue,theperceivedgainorlossfromtheoutcomeofnegotiationishigh.Inthiscase,constituentscanpressureand/oraffectanegotiator’sbargainingpower.Butforthosewhohavenopoliticalparticipationand/orinterest,thecostofnoagreementislow.Here,thelackofpoliticaltensionandevenpolicypositionamongconstituentsatLevelIIhaveatleasttwoeffects:thenegotiatorwillbeonhisowntomanipulatethewin-setatLevelI,andtheotherpartythatneedstheagreementmayhaveahardtimegettingit.

Ifpoliticalconflictonapolicyissueishighamongtheconstituents,thereisapossibilitythatagreementwillnotbereachedonthetableorratifiedbylegislativebodyatLevelII.Ifthestakesarehighforapartyinthenegotiationgame,astalematewillbecostly.ButitwillbeadifferentstoryifthecauseofnoagreementisthepreferenceforastatusquoorforsomeBATNAthathasgreatervalueforthepartythatwalksaway.

Putnamdistinguishedbetweenhomogenousandheterogenouspoliticaldivisionsthataffectwin-setsizeindifferentways.HomogenouspoliticaldivideisaconditionwhereinstaunchoppositionfromconstituentsatLevelIIexertspressureonachiefnegotiatorwho,asaresult,triestomeetdomesticdemandsandexpectationswhennegotiatingatLevelI.60Heterogeneouspoliticalcleavages,onotherhand,aredisagreementsamongconstituentsonwhatpolicypositionshouldbetakenbytheagentatLevelI.WhatisinterestinginthistypeofpoliticalconflictisthatthelackofconsensusamongconstituentsatLevelIIcanbeexploitedbynegotiatorsatLevelIandswayedtowardssupportingmutuallybeneficialoutcomes. 58AtermcoinedbyHerbertSimon,“boundedrationality”recognizesthecognitivelimitationsandcomputationalcapacityofadecision-makerincomingupwitharationalchoice.[SeeHerbertSimon,“BoundedRationality”inUtility and ProbabilityedbyEatwellJ.,MilgateM.,andNewmanP.(London,UK:PalgraveMcMillan).Lookinhttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-20568-45#citeas.] 59NakamurawrotethatPutnam’swin-setscanbeexplainedfullybycombiningpoliticaltheories,e.g.bureaucraticpolitics,classanalysis,andneo-corporatism.HealsocitedMilner’sthreeexplanatoryfactorsindeterminingwin-sets,whichareinterest, institutions, and information.[Nakamura,pp.168-169.] 60IndescribingthepoliticaldynamicsbetweenLevelIandLevelII,Putnamwrote:“GlancingoverhisshoulderatLevelII,thenegotiator’smainprobleminahomogenousconflictistomanagethediscrepancybetweenhisconstituents’expectationsandthenegotiableoutcome...Theeffectofdomesticdivision,embodiedinhard-lineoppositionfromhawks,istoraisetheriskofinvoluntarydefectionandthustoimpedeagreementatLevelI.Thecommonbeliefthatdomesticpoliticsisinimicaltointernationalcooperationnodoubtderivesfromsuchcases.”(Underlineprovided.)[Putnam,p.444.]

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AccordingtoPutnam,groupswhoarelessworriedaboutthecostofno-agreementcanbeactivatedwhentheissueispoliticized,atacticthathasstrategicimplicationsonenlargingwin-sets.DiplomatscanalsotargetconstituentsontheothersideinorderforthelattertohelpinfluencetheirgovernmenttowardsadoptingfavorableoutcomesatLevelI.Transnationalalignmentsandcross-tablealliancesonparticularissuearea(s)mayemergethroughvariousdiplomaticchannelsbetweencounterpartsingovernmentaswellasnon-governmentorganizations(NGOs)atLevelII.61

Significantly,functionalmeetingsandcooperationamongforeignconstituentsprovideopportunitiesforbothsidesatLevelIItoshapeeachother’spolicypreferencesaswellasdomesticcoalitionsaroundparticularissuesofconcern.62Knownasreverberation,positivepoliticaleffectcanberealizedusingthesuasiveelementofdiplomacyininternationalrelations.Whendomesticaudiencesperceivetheforeignmessengerasanally,theywillregardpersuasivemessagesfromthelatterasimportantinputstoanindispensableagreement.Butwhentheyseetheotherasanadversary,morelikelytheywilltakethepoliticaltacticasundueinterferenceindomesticaffairs.Inthiscase,internationalpressureswithouttrustbuildingcouldcreatedomesticbacklashandresultinpossiblebreakdowninnegotiation.63

(2)Inthesecondareaofwin-setdeterminantsatLevelII,Putnamdiscussedratificationproceduresunderademocraticregimeofseparationofpowers.Theconstitutionalrequirementforatwo-thirdsvoteinthesenateiscertainlyachallengetonegotiatorsatLevelI,whichisverytrueinapluralistdemocracy.Notwithstandingthislegal-institutionalframework,politicalcultureandtraditionalpracticesalsodefinetherulesofthegameatLevelII.Ifconstituentsdefertotheirnationalleader’spartyleadershipandpolicydirection,adealheenteredintoatLevelIwilllikelyberatified.Conversely,ifthereisstrongopposition—orwhatPutnamdescribedashomogenouspoliticaldivision—atLevelII,anarrangementagreedinprincipleatLevelIwillbestalledorevenscrappedbydomesticconstituents.Whenthishappensorislikelytohappen,anegotiatorwhoiscaughtinpoliticalconflictathomewillnotonlyhavetograpplewithinternaldemandsfromopposingblocatLevelII,hemightalsolosehiscrediblepostureatLevelIorworse,hisseatatthenegotiatingtable.

ThedegreeofindependenceordependenceofachiefnegotiatoratLevelIIcanverywellaffectthecountry’swin-setsize.Itmustbenotedthatinhighpoliticsofdiplomacyandnationalsecurity,achiefnegotiator—whoisalsoachiefofstate—exercisessomedegreeofautonomyandevensecrecyininternationalnegotiation.Strategicdecision-making,inthisregard,isexclusivetotheexecutivedomain.Itwillbeverycostlyifachiefofstateiscapturedbysocietyandbureaucracyinmattersofdefenseandsecuritypolicy.64Havingsaidthis,weshallnowgotothenextareaofwhatdetermineswin-setsize,thistimeatLevelI.

61That“domesticdivisionsmayactuallyimprovetheprospectsforinternationalcooperation”wasexplainedbyPutnamwiththisexample:“...considertwodifferentdistributionsofconstituents’preferencesasbetweenthreealternatives:A,B,andno-agreement.If45percentoftheconstituentsranktheseA>no-agreement>B,45percentrankthemB>no-agreement>A,and10percentrankthemB>A>no-agreement,thenbothAandBareinthewin-set,eventhoughBwouldwininasimpleLevel-II-onlygame.Ontheotherhand,if90percentrankthealternativesA>no-agreement>B,while10percentstillrankthemB>A>no-agreement,thenonlyAisinthewin-set.Inthissense,agovernmentthatisinternallydividedismorelikelytobeabletostrikeadealinternationallythanonethatisfirmlycommittedtoasinglepolicy.Conversely,toimposebindingexanteinstructionsonthenegotiatorsinsuchacasemightexcludesomeLevelIoutcomesthatwould,infact,beratifiableinbothnations.”(Underscoreprovided.)[Ibid,pp.444-445.] 62Ibid,p.449,454. 63Ibid,p.456. 64Putnamalsorecognizedthat:“ceteris paribus,thestrongerastateisintermsofautonomyfromdomesticpressures,theweakeritsrelativebargainingpositioninternationally.”Thisisadouble-edgedswordfordiplomatsfromentrencheddictatorshipwhocannotclaimthatpoliticaldivisionsatLevelIIcanprecludeadisadvantageousdeal.Thismeansthatanegotiatorcannolongeruseasanalibiorthreatthepossibilityofaninvoluntarydefectiontopushformaximumgains.[Ibid.]

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(3)Thethirdandlastareaofwin-setdeterminantsisfocusedontherole,skills,andstrategiesofachiefnegotiatoratLevelI.HisformallinkbetweenLevelIandLevelIImakeshispositionuniqueandstrategic,allowinghimtomaneuverintwopoliticaldomains.Operatingintwoworlds,achiefnegotiatorcautiouslylooksatinternationalaffairsforthreatsandopportunities,andatthesametimeconsciouslykeepsaneyeondomesticpoliticsforpolicydemandsandalsoforhisownpoliticalsurvival.

Achiefnegotiator’soutlookintwo-levelgamesdependsonhisroleplayorroleperceptioneitherasagentorprincipal ofhisdomesticconstituents.Ifheactsasagent,hewillbringtothetablethevaluepreferenceofhisconstituents,mindfulofapossibleratificationstrugglethatcanundercuthisabilitytoresetthenegotiatingspace.Ontheotherhand,ifheplaysasprincipal,hewillpursuehispreferredpolicyandstrategicdirection,confidentofhisstrongpoliticalstandingathomeandimplacableimageabroad.ThiscorrelateswellwithPutnam’stheorythatachiefnegotiatorwithhightrustratingscaneasilysecuretheformalitiesofratificationforhisforeignpolicyinitiativesatLevelI.65

Asidefromroleperformance,achiefnegotiator’sskillsarecrucialtowin-setsizeandpossibleinternationalagreement.Igathersomeessentialstonegotiatewinningoutcomes,andtheseare:informationprocessing;sense-making;strategicthinking;multi-disciplinaryknowledge;cost-benefitanalysis;criticalinsights;effectivecommunication;interpersonalrelations;and,leadership.Askillednegotiatorissomeonewhoisseasonedinthefieldandexperiencedinthewaysofpoliticsanddiplomacy.Heisalsostrategicinemployingwaysandmeansinhistoolkittoshapeperceptions,swayopinions,recalibrateoptions,buildrelations,exploitleveragepoints,andevenrestructurethenegotiation.Heisalso,asIwouldexpect,well-educatedonrelevanttheoriesandlogicalframesoftwo-levelgames.

PutnamdiscussedthatachiefofstatewhonegotiatesatLevelIhasthepowertogiveconventionalside-payments,inducements,and“genericgoodwill”toencourageratificationandexpandthewin-setatLevelII.66Withthis,thepoliticalleadercanrevamphiscabinet,reorganizethebureaucracy,and/orevenaskmajoritypartyinthesenatetochangecommitteechairmanshipsinabidtotipthebalancetowardshispreferredagreement.Hecanalsotargetconstituentsontheothersidebywooingopinionleaders,establishingcontactwithoppositionbloc,andofferingforeignaidinamovetorelaxdomesticconstraintsoftheoppositeparty.67

Insomeinstances,astrategicnegotiatoralsotriestoreinforcethedomesticpoliticalstandingoftheoppositeplayeratLevelIbypubliclygivingthelatterdiplomaticcompliments.Itmustbenotedthatnegotiatorshavealwayshadstronginterestineachother’spopularityasafactorofincreasingwin-setsize.68Nonetheless,Putnamwarnedthatwhilelargewin-setsaredesirabletoreachanagreement,aninitiallylargeoneforanegotiatorcouldweakenhisbargainingpositionvisavistheotherparty.Thismeansthathehasatendencytoeasilygiveintoproposalsthat,unknowingly,yieldmaximumoutcomesfortheotherside.69 65Ibid,p.451. 66Ibid.,p.450. 67Ibid.,p.454. 68Ibid.,pp.451-452. Thistacticofpraisingasovereigncounterparttoinfluenceone’spreferenceonthenegotiatingtablecanbeseeninPhilippinePresidentDuterte’scomplimentsofUSPresidentTrumpaftertheformer’snoticeofVFAterminationinFebruary2020.Dute-rtecalledonFilipinosintheUStovoteforTrumpinthecomingelectionsinNovemberofthesameyear,sayingthelatterdeservestobereelectedforhisfavorablereactiononthePhilippines’movetoterminatetheVFA.[KarenLemaandHelenPopper,“Philippines’DutertesaysTrumpdeservestobere-elected,”Reuters,15February2020,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa-de-fence/philippines-duterte-says-trump-deserves-to-be-re-elected-idUSKBN2090FL. SeealsoGenalynKabiling,“DutertetellsFilipinosintheUS:VoteforTrump,”ManilaBulletin,10March2020,https://news.mb.com.ph/2020/03/10/duterte-tells-filipinos-in-the-us-vote-for-trump/. 69Ibid.,p.450.

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Key assumptions on the president as chief negotiator in two-level games.IwouldliketoendmyreviewofPutnam’stheoryofdiplomacyanddomesticpoliticsintwo-levelgamesbystressingtwokeypointsonthemotivesofachiefnegotiatorinthepersonofapresident.First,hehashisownindependentconceptionofthenationalinterest,perceptionofwhatisbestforthecountry,andinterpretationofthewaythingsare—whichhehasthepowertomeldwiththecountry’sofficialposition.70ThebeliefthatachiefnegotiatoractsasagentofhisconstituentsatLevelIImaynotalwaysbetrueeveninademocracy.71ThatachiefnegotiatorplaysmoreasprincipalatLevelIisobviousintheperformanceofhisotherimposingrolesasthechiefofstate,chiefexecutive,chiefarchitectofforeignpolicy,chieflegislator,commander-in-chief,andeven"voiceofthepeople"inthedomesticdomain.72

Second,achiefnegotiatorcanalwaysusehispoliticalresourcesatLevelIIandhisdiplomaticprivilegesatLevelItopursuehisagendainthestrategicsetting.Aspresident,hewillseetoitthathispolicychoiceswillbeenactedwithenduringpoweratLevelII.Hewillstrivetostrengthenhisbargainingpositionandmobilizepublicopinionthroughpoliticalcoordinationandpublicaddresses.73HewillshiftthebalanceofpoweratLevelIIinfavorofdomesticpoliciesthatheprefersforexogeneousreason,orinsupportofaninternationalagreementthatheinsistsforastrategicpurpose.

AsPutnamwrote:“internationalnegotiationssometimesenablegovernmentleaderstodowhattheyprivatelywishtodo,butarepowerlesstododomestically.”74TosaythatchiefnegotiatorsareinstrumentalinreachingLevelIagreementisanunderstatement.Theyareinfacttheconduitsoflinkagepoliticsnotonlywithintheirownpoliticaldomains[i.e.verticalrelationsbetweenLevelIandLevelII]butalsoacrossdiplomatictables[i.e.horizontalrelationsbetweennegotiatorsatLevelIandbetweenforeigncounterpartsatLevelII].ItisthroughthisstrategythattransactionalrelationsamongLevelIIplayerscreatepoliticalentanglementsandsynergisticlinkages,whicharethesubstanceofPutnam’stwo-levelanalyticgame.

70Ibid.,p.457. 71Despitetheconstitutionalseparationofpowersamongtheexecutive,legislature,andjudiciaryinademocraticrepublic,astrongandenergeticpresidentiscentraltoestablishgoodgovernment.Notably,itwasAlexanderHamiltonwhosuccinctlystatedintheAmericanFederalistPapersinthe18thcenturythat“energyintheexecutiveisaleadingcharacteristicofgoodgovernment.”Thus,neithercongressnorthejudiciarycanprovidetheneededenergythattheexecutiveiscapableofdoingasthelatterisdesignedforthepurposeofensuringthejobandsurvivalofgovernment.[AnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“ThePresidentWhoAddressestheNation:UnderstandingPresidentialRoleinAgendaSettingandLegislation,”A Saga of Administrative Thought in Presidential Rhetoric: An Analysis of the State of the Nation Addresses and Speeches of Philippines Presidents, 1935-2006(Unpublisheddissertation,NationalCollegeofPublicAdministrationandGovernance,UniversityofthePhilippines,2007),pp.22-23.] 72Inmyreviewoftheliteratureontheroleofthepresidentaschieflegislatorandpolicyleader,Iwrotethatthepresidentcandirectlyinitiate,influence,andaffectthelegislaturewithimposingmessagesandaddressestocongress.Hislegislativepowerisnotjustlegitimizedbyconstitutionalprovisions,butalsobolsteredbytraditionalnotionsthatthepresidentisthe“voiceofthepeople”orthemoralspokespersonwiththeprerogativetoarticulatetherealsentimentofthepublic.Thisistheprincipleofvox populi vox dei,i.e.thevoiceofthepeopleisthevoiceofGod,andthemajorpremiseofthetheoryofrepresentationforthepeoplecannotgovern,andthepresidenthasbecometheirsurrogate.Thepersonificationofthispoliticalauthorityonandinbehalfofthepeoplecanbeseenwhenthepresidentspeaksex cathedrafromatophispyramidofvotes.Butsuchawe-inspiringandinfalliblepresidentialinfluencecouldbeeasilycorrodedbywaningpublictrust,especiallyinamulti-partyelectoralsystemwherepresidentsgotelectedbymarginalvotesofplurality.[Ibid.,pp.25-26.] 73Ibid.,p.24. 74Putnam,p.457.

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Explaining Duterte’s Policy Move and Motivation on the VFA Termination

Putnam’stwo-levelgametheorycanhelpexplainthepoliticaldynamicssurroundingPresidentDuterte’spolicygambitondomesticandstrategicboards.Thegametheoreticanalysiscanalsounravelthecognitiveforcesatworkattheleveloftheindividual—suchastheunderlyingreasonwhytheplayerbehavesinaparticular,puzzlingway.Hence,questionsabouttheplayer’smotivationanddefinitionofthesituationcannotbeleftoutintheequation.75HowDutertedefinestheoperationalcontextofthegameiskeytounderstandingwhatmotivatedhimtosendthe180-daynoticeofVFAterminationon11February2020,andtosuspendthisafter112days.

ItcanbenotedthatthepolicymotivationofthefirebrandPhilippineleaderisself-explanatory,forhemakessurehisreasonsandintentionsaredeliveredloudandclearfromhispresidentialpulpit.Duterte’sstrongandsharpmessagingdoesnotlieinthesubtextofhisrhetoricaldrama,butthereisalwaysatendencythatthiscouldbemisreadbyethnocentriccritics.76Itisinthislightthattheanalysisofdecision-maker’scognitionandcultureisincludedinPutnam’stwo-levelgametheoryforinsightsintoforeignpolicyandstrategy.

AccordingtoProfessorRobertJervis,inhis1976bookonPerception and Misperception in International Politics,thegoodreasonforlookingintoanationalleader’sperception,judgment,andchoiceisthatthesesetforeignpolicyand,ultimately,internationalpolitics.ToquotefromJervis’prefaceofthe2017editionofhisclassicbook:

Itwouldseemhardtoexplaininternationalpolitics,letalongtheforeignpolicyastatefollows,withoutinvestigatingitsdecisions,whichpresumablyrestinpartonitsperceptionoftheenvironment.Morespecifically,exceptfortherareinstancesinwhichthestatehasadominantstrategy—thatis,onethatisbestnomatterhowtheothersidedoes—inferringothers’intentionsandmotivesiscrucialforsettingforeignpolicy.77(Underlineprovided.)

ForHaroldandMargaretSprout,intheirtheoryoftherelationshipofhumancognitionandinternationalpoliticsinthe1950s,foreignpolicycanbeexplainedwithreferencetothepsychological,situational,andsocio-politicalmilieuofindividualsinvolvedindecision-making.78Particularly,thetwoauthorsdistinguishedtheoperational environmentwherepoliticalgamesareplayedout,fromthepsychological environmentwhereimagesoftheotherareformedandmadeasgroundsforpolicydecisions.79Sprouts’ecologicalperspectiveofhumanaffairsintheinternationalpoliticalsystemusheredinanewgenreofexplainingforeignpolicychoicesotherthantherationalapproachtoFPA.Relatedly,StanfordProfessorEmeritusAlexanderGeorgeassertedthatdecision-makershavetheirownoperationalcode[i.e.setofprinciplesandperceptions],whichtheyusetoassessproblemsanddeveloppolicyresponses.80 75ItcanbearguedthatDuterte’sperceptionofwhatmattersmosttotheFilipinonationisalsoaproductofsocialconstruction.Thismeansthathisconceptionofnationalinterest,alongwithhisdefinitionofthesituation,isinfluencedbyhisgeographiccommunitywithcommonsenseofhistory[e.g.commonsentimentsofMindanaoansinsouthernPhilippinesaboutthe20thcenturyAmericancolonialism],evenifhissocialgroupdoesnotnecessarilyrepresentthenationalpsyche. 76PinarBilgrin,The International in Security, Security in the International(711ThirdAvenue,NewYork,USA:Routledge,2017),p.20. 77Jervis,p.xvii. 78ValerieM.Hudson,“TheHistoryandEvolutionofForeignPolicyAnalysis,”Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, and Casesed.bySmith,Hadfield,andDunne(Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),p.14. 79AldenandAran,p.19. 80Ibid.,p.23.

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Onthewhole,asidefromlookingatthreatsandpowerpoliticsinthesecurityenvironment,anotherwayofexplainingaforeignpolicydilemmaistounpackpowerfulmodesofthinking[e.g.valueformation,self-characterization,intentions,conceptionsofsecurity,perceptionsofthreat]inastateactor’spsychologicalmilieu.IfFPAscholarsopttousebothrealistandconstructivistlenses,asthepluralistapproachsuggests,theywillbeabletoseeclearlyandcomprehensivelythefunctionofstrategic culture indeterminingnationalsecuritypolicy.81

How Duterte moves in the strategic game

Atthisjuncture,IwouldliketoreviewsomekeypointsfrommypreviousexpositorywritingsonPresidentDuterte’sdefenseandsecuritypolicies,whichledtothistwo-levelgameanalysis.Ina2018articleonDuterte’sindependentforeignpolicyrhetoric,Iconcludedwithastatementthatinspiteofhisidiosyncraticconductininternationalaffairs,whichisobviouslyatypicalforaweakstate,heknowshowtobargainandplaythegame.82Ifollowedthroughwiththisobservationina2020articleonDuterte’spoweracesandpolicybetsforPhilippinesecurity,whichIexplainedusingthemetaphorofcardsonthetable.83ThefollowingarequotedfromthisarticleasthesequeltothiscomprehensiveanalysisofDuterte’sgambitontheVFA:

Atthetwo-tiergameofnationalsecurity,PhilippinePresidentRodrigoR.Duterteisshowinghishandwiththecardsface-up.Astheprimarysecuritisingactorinthedomesticsphere,heplayshistrumpcardofusingtheforcesofthestatetowagewaragainstillegaldrugsandcriminalityinsidethecountry.Butasarationalsecurityplayeratthestrategicarena,hecalculatestheoddsandconcedestheweaknessofhisarmedforcestochallengeChina’sassertivenessinterritorialwatersandfeaturesclaimedbythePhilippinesinthecontestedSouthChinaSea(SCS).

ThePhilippines’2016victoryininternationalarbitration’srulingontheSCSissuecouldbeanaceforDuterte,butheknowstoowellthiscanbeoutmaneuveredbyagreatpowerwiththehighcard.Hiscountry’salliancewiththeUnitedStatescouldalsobeanadvantageforDuterteto“notmissatrick”inthestrategicgame.ButDuterte’sstrongassertionofanindependentforeignpolicyawayfromtheUS,whichhadonceoccupiedthePhilippinesascolony,hasledtoapivottoChinaevenaftertheSCSarbitration.84(Underlineprovided.)

Intheforegoingarticle,IdiscussedthatDuterte’sstratagemtobandwagonwithChinaandplaytoughonhisnegotiatingpositionwiththeUSthis2020canaffectthepoliticalcalculationsofbigplayersandtheirwaysofshapingstrategicoutcomes.85Despiteitslimitedpowercapabilities,thePhilippinescanstillleverageonitsmodestsourcesofinfluencetomaximizeeconomic,diplomatic,andsecuritybenefitsfromgreatpowers.ButIalsowrotethattherearestrategicrisksinbettingonextremebalancing[i.e.abandoningdefenceagreementswiththeUSandbandwagoningwithChinaasitsrivalpower],whichPresidentDuterteneedstooffsetwithcountermitigatingmeasures.Howhewillhedge86throughcapacitybuildingandconstructiveengagementsonotherfronts[e.g.economic

81Fordiscussionsonhow“strategicculture”significantlyshapesnationalsecuritypolicy,seeAnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“FromPolicytoStrategy:TheQuestforaRealNationalSecurityStrategyinthePhilippines,”Philippine Public Safety Review Vol.2,No.2(2016),pp.18-23. 82Almase,“ReinterpretingDuterte’sindependentforeignpolicyrhetoric.” 83AnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“Cardsonthetable:Duterte’spoweracesandpolicybetsforPhilippinesecurity,”University of Nottingham Asia Dialogue, 14February2020,https://theasiadialogue.com/2020/02/14/cards-on-the-table-dutertes-power-ac-es-and-policy-bets-for-philippine-security/. 84Ibid. 85Ibid. 86Fordiscussionsonweakstates’hedgingbehaviorwithChina,seeCheng-ChweeKuik,“HowDoWeakerStatesHedge?:UnpackingASEANStates’AlignmentBehaviorTowardChina,”Journal of Contemporary ChinaVol.25,No.100(2016),https://www.

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tradeandmultilateraldiplomacy]isanenduringchallengeforthePhilippinesthatexhibitswhatIcalledthesmall state security syndrome.87

Inagameofcards,playerswhoholdtheaceswillwiniftheyplaytheirhandwellandshowthehighcardatthemostopportunetime.Butunlikethegameofcards,thepoliticaldynamicsofinterdependentsovereignactorsarenotgovernedbyaone-time,zero-sumcontestinwhichthewinnertakesallandleavesthetable.Intheinternationalsystem,politicalgamescontinuetoplayoutindifferentpolicyregimeswherevariousinterestsareatstakeandnegotiated.AsIwroteinthepreviousarticle,internationalpoliticsisallaboutbettingone’scardswithothersandgettingasmuchstakesaspossiblewithintheircommonwin-sets.Towardsthisend,asovereignactorlikePresidentDutertewillhavetoplaysmartinamovetoproducemodestoutcomeswithminimallosses,ifmaximumgainsarenotreallypoliticallyattainable.88

What motivates Duterte to send and suspend his notice of VFA termination

FrommyanalysesofPresidentDuterte’ssecuritypoliciesandspeechactssince2016,Iwouldsaythathispolicymovesareconceivablyrationalalbeitegoist.Duterte’sgameplantopivottoChinaanddisengagefromtheUSisconvincedbyhisownvaluationofthenationalinterest—evenifhisforeignpolicydirectionisalsocoloredbyhissentimentsagainsttheAmericans.89HisgameplaywiththeUSmaybedeemederraticbyhiscritics,butIwouldarguethathisfocusoncoreinterestsisdeterministic.ThisisbecauseofthecognitiveconsistencyinPresidentDuterte’sperceptionofwhatisbestforthenation,whichguideshisdomesticandforeignpolicies.Specifically,thefocalinterestsinhispolicystatementsareasfollows:Filipinowelfareathomeandabroad;publicsafetyandorderinthecountry;self-determinationandsovereignty;economicgrowthanddevelopment;and,nationalsurvival.90

InthePhilippines’NationalSecurityPolicy(NSP)for2017-2022,theforemostnationalsecurityinterestispublicsafety—alongwithlawandorderandcriminaljustice—followedbyabroadspectrumofsocio-politicalandeconomicconcernsinsidethecountry.Securityfromexternalthreatisalsooneofthenumerousconcernsintheinternallyfocusedanddevelopment-orientedNSPoftheDuterteadministration.91Nevertheless,itisclearfromthePresident’scandidandconsistentpronouncementsthattheuseofforcetocountertraditionalthreatfromanotherstateisnotpartofhisstrategiccalculus.92Infact,thetandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132714. 87Almase,“Smallstatesecuritysyndrome...,” 88Almase,“Cardsonthetable.” 89GregoryPoling,DirectoroftheAsiaMaritimeTransparencyInitiativeattheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,wasquotedforhisopinionthatPresidentDuterte“hasbeenanti-AmericanhisentireadultlifeandhasbeenconsistentlysayinghewantstosevertheallianceandbringthePhilippinesintoastrategicalignmentwithChina.”PrashanthParameswaran,SeniorEditorattheDiplomat,alsostatedthatDuterte’sdecisiontoabrogatetheVFA“ischieflytheproductofDuterte’sdeep,decades-longanti-USsentiment.”[ChristopherWoody,“Amajorally’sdecisiontoscrapanimportantdealwiththeUSraisesthestakesincompetitionwithChina,”Business Insider,24February2020,https://www.businessinsider.nl/philippine-vfa-exit-raises-stakes-in-pacific-competition-with-china-2020-2/.] 90Almase,“Cardsonthetable.” 91NationalSecurityCouncil,2017-2022 National Security Policy for Change and Well-Being of the Filipino People,http://nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP-2017-2022.pdf. 92Forinstance,inPresidentDuterte’sStateoftheNationAddress(SONA)inJuly2017,followingthereleaseofthePhilippines’NationalSecurityPolicy(NSP)inApril2017,theuseofforceinthedomesticdomainwasclearintherolegiventothemilitary,butthefunctionofdefenseinthestrategicsettingwasambiguous.InpromotingPhilippineinterestsintheinternationalcommunity,therewasnoreferencemadetodefenseasacomponentofnationalsecurity.WhatthePresidentreportedtothenationwasthewarmingofrelationswithChina,theimprovednegotiatingenvironmentontheSouthChinaSea(SCS)issue,andtheeasingoftensionsintheSCSpostarbitration.Apparently,thePresident’sSONAin2017didnotcommunicateanythreatperceptiononthecontestedmaritimeareathatcouldwarrantastrategicdefensepolicy.[SeeAlmase,“ExplainingthePhilippines’DefensePolicy.”]

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USpresenceintheSCS,whichisaimedatbalancingChina’smilitarythreatinthedisputedwaters,wouldmakehimallthemoreinsecure,accordingtohim.ThiswashisreactiontosuggestionsthatthePhilippinesinvolvetheUSintheSCS.Dismissingthisasacademiccrap,PresidentDutertesaidcallingtheAmericanswillbringthePhilippinesonthevergeofwarwithChinaandendangerthelivesof110millionFilipinosunderhisresponsibility.93

Aself-determinednationalleaderandinternationalagendasetter,PresidentDutertehadsincedeclaredin2016aPhilippineforeignpolicyindependentfromtheUSbutcontroversiallyinclinedtoChina,whichtheUSseesasarivalpowerinAsia.94WhatdroveDuterte’srecentpolicymaneuvertorevisethelong-standingdefensepactwiththesuperpowercanbeexplainedbyadeeperunderstandingoftheunderlyingcauseasidefromtheproximatecause.ThismeansthatweneedtolookbeyondtheeventsandcircumstancesthathappenedthewaytheyhappenedbeforeDuterte’snoticeofVFAterminationon11February2020.

PresidentialspokespersonSalvadorPanelostatedthatPresidentDuterte’sdecisiontoabrogatetheVFAwasa“consequenceofaseriesoflegislativeandexecutiveactionsbytheUSgovernmentthatborderedonassaultingoursovereigntyanddisrespectingourjudicialsystem.”95TheactionsmadebytheUS,whichweresaidtooffendDuterte,areasfollows:itsaccusationofextra-judicialkillingsandhumanrightsviolationsinthePhilippines’waragainstillegaldrugs;itscondemnationofwrongfularrestandimprisonmentofDuterte’sstaunchpoliticalcritic,SenatorLeiladeLima,forherallegedinvolvementinthedrugtrade;and,itscancellationofUSvisaforSenatordelaRosa,theformernationalpolicechiefanddrugwarimplementor.

ThesanctionoftheUSagainstSenatordelaRosa,aloyalpoliticalallyofDuterte,was“thelaststrawthatbrokethecamel’sback,”accordingtoPanelo.96This,ineffect,wastheproximate causeofthetreatyabrogation,butnottheunderlying causethatmustbeunraveledandresolved.Certainly,thenon-revocationoftheUSvisacancellationforthePhilippineSenator—whichprecededtheterminationnotice—isnotequaltothevalueofwhatisconsequentlyatstake:thefateoftheUS-PhilippinesallianceandthePhilippines’defenseposturewithouttheUS.97Theunderlying cause ofDuterte’spolicydecisionishisutterlysensitivedispositiononissuesofself-determination,nationaldignity,andsovereignrulethatshouldbefreefromoutsideinterferenceandintimidation.Asasentimentalleaderofacountrywithapainfulmemoryofitscolonialhistory,DuterteisoffendedwhentheUSthrowsitsweightaroundtheformercolony.Thatbeingsaid,thePhilippinePresidentdemandsnolessthanduerespectfromforeignpolicyactorstransactingbusinesswithhisgovernment.AsPanelospokeforthePresident, 93PresidentDutertesaid:“WhywillyoucallAmerica?Thatwillallthemorebringustothevergeofwar...Ihavetoprotecttheinterestofmycountry,thelifeoftheFilipino,110million.”[DonaMagsino,“Duterte:DraggingUSintoSouthChinaSeadisputewillbringPhilippinesclosertowar,”GMA News Online,27June2019,https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/699167/duterte-dragging-us-into-south-china-sea-dispute-will-bring-philippines-closer-to-war/story/.] SeealsoAnandaDeviDomingo-Almase,“Fishingintroubledwaters:DefencestatusasanexplanatoryfactorforDuterte’ssoftstanceintheWestPhilippineSea,”University of Nottingham Asia Dialogue,16August2019,https://theasiadialogue.com/?s=fish-ing+in+troubled+waters+almase. 94Almase,“ReinterpretingDuterte’sindependentforeignpolicyrhetoric.” 95DarrylJohnEsguerra,“Malacanang:Dutertewon’tentertainUSinitiativetosaveVFA,”Inquirer.net,11February2020,https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1227322/fwd-malacanang-duterte-wont-entertain-us-initiative-to-save-vfa. 96OfficeofthePresidentialSpokesperson,“Sen.Bato’svisacancellationlaststraw—Palace,”27January2020,https://www.facebook.com/notes/office-of-the-presidential-spokesperson/sen-batos-visa-cancellation-last-straw-palace/1075275506140834/. 97InWoody’sreport,theVFAterminationwillendangerhundredsofmilitaryexerciseswithUSvisitingforcesinthePhilippines,consideringalsothatthelatterhasbeenhostingUStrainingwithothercountriesintheregion.Moreover,USSpecialForcestroopsstationedinthePhilippineshavebeenhelpinginthefightagainstISIS-linkedmilitantsinthesouthernpartofthiscountry.[Woody,“Amajorally’sdecisiontoscrapanimportantdealwiththeUSraisesthestakesincompetitionwithChina.”]

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thelatter“terminatedtheVFAbecausehedoesn’twant(theAmericans),asamatterofprideandprinciple,tosteponoursovereignty.”98

Duterte’sbehaviortosavefaceistypicalofarationalegoist99whowillwalkawayfromthetableifhumiliated.Alongthisline,itisnoteworthytorecognizewhatcriticalFPAscholarspointedoutaskeybutneglecteddriversofforeignpolicy:honor,status,andrespectofanationalleader.100Facesavingthencanmakeorbreaknegotiations,andifthishappens,theaffectednegotiatorwilljusthavetorelyonhisBATNAthatcouldupsetanotherplayer'sinterest.

Notably,PresidentDuterte’spressreleasethatthePhilippinescansurvivewithoutAmerica101givespremiumtopolitical security102[i.e.sovereigntyandself-determinationofthestate,legitimacyandcapacityofthegoverningauthority,autonomyandefficacyofitspolicies,andhonoranddignityofafreenation].Duterte’spivottoChina—whichcanbeinterpretedasbandwagoningwithastrongadversarialpower-turned-partner—ismotivated,onotherhand,byeconomic security103[i.e.tradeandinvestment,accesstomarketsandresources,jobcreation,andsustainablelevelsofgrowth].Whilemilitary security104isalsobeingsoughtthroughlong-termmilitarymodernizationoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP),hisavoidanceofawaragainstChina105isdrivenbyhisconceptionofthenationalinterestaswellascalculationofnationalsurvival.

Duringthepandemiclockdown,thePhilippinesfoughthardtoprotectandsavelivesofFilipinosinthiscountryandoverseas.Atthesametime,italsomadesurethatpublicsafety,astheforemostnationalsecurityinterest,isinorderinthehomeland.ItispreciselyforthisreasonthatDuterterelaxedhisstaunchpositionandsuspendedfor180dayson3June2020hisnoticeofVFAterminationthathehadsenttotheUSon11February2020.Withthis,PhilippineDefenseSecretaryDelfinLorenzanawasquotedassayingthatUSaid[e.g.equipmentinquarantinefacilities]tohiscountryisexpectedtoincreaseinthenextsixmonths,followingDuterte’ssuspensionorder.Alongthisline,itwasreportedthatearlyinMay2020,thePhilippineshadreceived$5.9millionfromtheUStocurbthespreadofthecoronavirusdisease,bringingthetotalamountofassistancetomorethan$15.2million.106 98GabrielPablicoLalu,“TalksonpossibleVFAreplacementdoesn’thaveDuterte’sblessing—Panelo,”Inquirer.net,1March2020,https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1235231/talks-on-possible-vfa-replacement-doesnt-have-dutertes-blessing-panelo. 99Adecision-maker’srationalityisconstrainedbylimitedinformationandknowledge,aswellaspersonalexperienceandexistingperceptionsthatactasscreentoseeingandinterpretingnewevidence.Perceptions,whicharecalledasbeliefsystem,“haveanintegratingfunction,permittingtheindividualtosynthesizeandinterprettheinformation,”asMingstandArreguin-ToftwroteinEssentials of International Relations.Themind-setalmostalwaysstriveforcognitiveconsistencytoreinforcecertainpredisposedthinkingpatterns.[MingstandArreguin-Toft,p.164.] 100Jervis,p.xxiv. 101See“DutertesaysPhilippinescansurvivewithoutAmerica,”Sunstar,27February2020,https://ph.news.yahoo.com/dute-rte-says-philippines-survive-without-040700360.html?guccounter=1. 102InCopenhagenschoolofthought,threatstonationalsecurityemanatefromvarioussectors:military,political,economic,societal,andenvironmental.Thereferentofpoliticalsecurityisnationalsovereignty,whichistheconstituentprincipleofthestate,alongwithnationalideologyandidentity.AccordingtoBuzan,Waever,anddeWilde,“sovereigntycanbethreatenedbyanythingthatquestionsrecognition,legitimacy,orgoverningauthority.”[BarryBuzan,OleWaever,andJaapdeWilde,Security: A New Framework of Analysis(Boulder,Colorado:LynneRiennerPublishers,Inc,1998),p.22.] 103Comparedtopolitical security,whichistraditionallyacomponentofnationalsecurity,theideaofeconomicsecurityisrecentlyconstructedaspartofthesecuritydiscourse.Threatofeconomiccrisisandregression,whichhasbroadconsequencestostatesurvival,canalsobetakenasamatterofnationalsecurity,especiallywhenthepresidentsayssoandmakesitacorenationalinterest.[Fordiscussionsontheeconomicsecurityagenda,seeBuzanetal,pp.95-117.] 104Likepoliticalsecurity,military securitytakesthestateasthereferentthatthearmedforcesprotectanddefend.But military securityisalsoaboutthemilitaryitselfthatmustprevailovertheenemy.[Fordiscussionsonthemilitarysecurityagenda,seeBuzan,etal,pp.49-70.] 105Almase,“Fishingintroubledwaters..." 106Geducos,“SuspensionofVFAabrogationsurfacedtwoweeksago—Palace,”Manila Bulletin,3June2020,https://news.

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Why Duterte moves the way he does in the two-level game

Ideally,acountryrepresentativewhonegotiatesonandinbehalfofhisdomesticconstituentsworkswithinthelatter’sexpectationsoftheminimumandmaximumoutcomesthatcanbeagreeduponatLevelIandratifiedatLevelII.Atthesametime,healsotakesintoaccount,asmuchaspossible,thewin-set(s)oftheotherplayerinabilateralnegotiationtoknowtherangeoftheircombinedwin-sets.Thisway,achiefnegotiatorisabletoassessthewindowofpossibleagreementsthatcanbeworkedoutinsimultaneousinternationalandintranationalpoliticalgames. Putnam’sgametheoreticalmodelexplicateshowdomesticpressures,otherthantheperceptionandprerogativeofachiefnegotiator,cansignificantlyaffecthiswin-setandnegotiatingpower.Thisisespeciallytrueinawestern,liberaldemocracywhereinternationalagreementsaresubjecttodomesticpoliticalprocessesandgovernmentalbalanceofpower.Butthismaynotbetrueinalldemocraciesintheworld.

InanAsiancountrylikethePhilippines,traditionalpractice,leadershipstyle,andpersonalityfactorblendwithdemocraticstructuresofpolicy-making.ThiscanexplainwhyPresidentDuterteconsistentlyreceivedexcellenttrustratingsfromFilipinos107despiteUScriticismofhisundemocraticmethods.Asamatteroffact,hispatrimonialleadershipoftherulingpartyenableshimtoplaytoughonterminatingtheVFAasagambittogainadvantagedespitetherisk.

NotwithstandingtheSenate’spetitionfortheSupremeCourttodeterminetheformer’sauthoritytoapprovetreatyabrogation,PresidentDutertecanstillinfluencethedomesticwin-setthroughside-payments,institutionalarrangements,andspeechacts.Withoutre-election,whichisacriticalfactorforachiefnegotiator’spoliticalsurvival,healsohaslessworrytodowhathepersonallywishestodoviahisforeignpolicyuntiltheendofhistermin2022. AccordingtoTherosWong,inher2019studyonthepowerofethnicpoliticsinforeignpolicymaking,“Duterte’sdecisiondoesnotrequirehimtoproducetrade-offsbetweenPutnam’stwo-levelgame:internationalanddomesticstakeholders.”108Inparticular,shefoundthatthePhilippinePresident’seconomicinterestinforeignpolicyisalignedwiththeneedsofhisconstituents.Thus,Duterte'spopularityamongtheFilipinopeoplegiveshimpoliticalboostandsupportforhisforeignpolicyinitiatives.

mb.com.ph/2020/06/03/suspension-of-vfa-abrogation-surfaced-two-weeks-ago-palace/. 107See“SWSsurvey:MostFilipinossayDutertedoingan‘excellent’jobasPresident,”CNN Philippines,21January2020,https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/1/21/sws-duterte-satisfaction-excellent.html?fbclid. 108TherosWong,“ThePowerofEthnicPoliticsinForeignPolicyMakingDecisions:AComparisonofMalaysia’sMahathirandthePhilippines’DuterteontheBeltRoadInitiative,”NYU Abu Dhabi Journal of Social Sciences(October2019),p.11.Lookinhttps://sites.nyuad.nyu.edu/jss/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/JSS-19-20-Submission-1-5.pdf.

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Determining the Deal and No-Deal Sets of the Philippines and the US in the VFA Negotiation

AdeeperunderstandingofthedynamicsintheVFAnegotiationrequiresmeldingrealistandliberalpremisesatinternationalanddomesticlevels,withcognitivefactorsattheindividuallevel.Thiswhole,pluralistpackageprovidesintellectualordertoanalyzingpossiblewin-setsforadefenseagrementbetweenthePhilippinesandtheUSinthemidstofachangingsecuritylandscapethis2020.

Perspective on possible win-sets for Philippines-US defense agreement

Withreferencetotheconceptualwin-setsoftwopartiesinazero-sumgameinFigure 1,IwillattempttoapproximateandillustratethedealandnodealsetsofthePhilippinesandtheUSintheVFAnegotiation.ThiswillgivesubstancetoPutnam’sgametheoreticalmodelinwhichtwooppositepartiesnegotiatewithintheiroverlappingwin-setstoreachanagreementwithvaryingoutcomes[e.g.maximum,submaximal,minimum]foreachplayer.Duterte’s180-daysuspensioninJune2020ofhisnoticeofVFAterminationgivesthetwopartiessufficienttimetostraightenoutissuesandbargainabetterdealonthenegotiationtable.

TheframeworkinFigure 2isparsimoniousandperceptual.Here,Iintendtocapturethebigpictureratherthantheunknownscalesofwhateachpartyvaluesthemostandtheleast.TheoutlookisoncommonandcontrastinginterestsbetweenthePhilippinesandtheUS.Thiswillgiveusanideaonpossiblewin-setsthatbothcountriescanaffordtomakeortake,givenPresidentDuterte’sdemandsandsentiments.Twoparallel,oppositearrowsinredandbluerepresentthepolicydirectionsofthePhilippinesandtheUSasthetwopartiestotheVFA.Followingthelogicofthezerosumgame,thewin-setsofthetwopartiesinFigure2canbefoundinthemiddleorbetweenthecolumnsoftheirrespectiveareasofmaximum outcomeandno-agreement.Thecombined win-sets aretheZOPAwherethetwocountriesarewillingtomakeand/oracceptconcessionsevenifthesearelessthantheirdesiredmaximum outcome.Theoretically,rationalactorsarenotexpectedtomaketrade-offsthatarebelowtheirsubmaximalinterests,whichmeanstheycanforgeanagreementonlywithintheirallowablenegotiatingroom.

Outsideofthecombined win-setsaretheno-dealsetsofbothparties,whereeitheroneofthemcanwalkawayfromthetableandtakeanalternativecourseofaction.Thisisthelogicofagamewherethemaximumgainsofaplayerismoreorlessequaltothemaximumlossoftheoppositeside.Hypothetically,ifthestakesinnegotiationarehighforbothparties,theywillbewillingtomakeconcessionsand/ortrade-offstoavoidthehugecostofhavingnoagreement.Underthiscondition,theycanrestructurethegameintoawin-winnegotiationusingdiplomacyasastrategyforcooperation.

Letusstartoffbyspecifyingthemajorconditionsintheareaofno-agreementforthePhilippines,whichcanbefoundontheleftsideoftheredarrowinFigure 2.Specifically,theseare:UScriticismofDuterte’swaragainstillegaldrugs;USdenialofDuterte’sdemandtorevoketheUSvisacancellationforSen.DelaRosa,theformernationalpolicechieftaggedinthePhilippinedrugwar;and,perceivedUSinterventionindomesticpolitics.OnthesideofthePhilippines,whichPresidentDuterterepresents,allthiswasperceivedtobedetrimentaltothecountry’sself-determinationtodecideoninternalsecuritymatters,toitsself-imageasanindependentnationthatisnotsubordinatetoAmerica’spolicyimpositionand,mostofall,tothenationalleaderhimselfwithareputationofexecutinghiswill.

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Belowtheno-agreementsideofthePhilippines,astheframeofreferenceinFigure 2,istheassumedmaximum outcomefortheUS.Thelatter’spolicydirectioninbluearrowpointstotheleft,whichisoppositetothePhilippines’courseofactionthatgoestotheright.Usingamirror-imagingperspective,themaximum outcomefortheUScanbetakenasfollows:policyconditionsattachedtoUSmilitaryaid;increaseinburden-sharingfromallies;109militaryalliancetobalancerivalpowers[e.g.ChinaandRussia];110andattainmentofUSPresidentTrump’sNationalSecurityStrategy(NSS)thatplacesAmericaninterestsaboveanyothernation.111

RegardedasanimportantwindowintoTrump’sthinking,the“AmericaFirst”NSSisaimedatoptimizingtherealistinterestsoftheUSinaworldthatisbelievedtobenefitfromunparalleledAmerican

109PeterFeaver,inhisarticleonTrump’sNationalSecurityStrategy(NSS)inDecember2017,wrotethat:“WhiletheNSSdoeshavesomeboilerplatelanguageaboutwhatwehaveachievedwithourallies,Isuspectthatourallieswillalsonotethattheyarejustasoftenreferredtoasrivalsastheyareaspartners–andjustasoftencalledoutfornotdoingenoughastheyareacknowledgedforwhattheyhavedone.”(Underlineprovided.)[PeterFeaver,“Trump’sNationalSecurityStrategy,”Foreign Policy,18December2017,https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/five-takeaways-from-trumps-national-security-strategy/.] TheUSinteresttoincreasecost-sharingfromadefenseallyisevidentinthecaseofitsrecentnegotiationwithSouthKorea.[SaheliRoyChoudhury,“TrumpsignalshewantsSouthKoreatopaymoreforUSmilitarypresencethere,”CNBC,21April2020,https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/21/trump-signals-he-wants-south-korea-to-pay-more-for-us-military-presence-there.html.] 110ThatChina,alongwithRussia,isviewedasacompetitorchallengingAmericanpowerandattemptingtoerodeUSsecurityandprosperityisstatedinTrump’sNSS.[SeeNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,December2017,p.2.Lookinhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.] 111IntheAmericanNSS,thefourvitalinterestsare:(1)protectingtheAmericanpeopleandsecuringthehomeland;(2)strength-eningtheAmericaneconomy;(3)preservingpeacethroughmilitarystrength;and,(4)advancingAmericaninfluence.[Ibid,p.4.]

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progressandpower.112Theimpressedmaximum outcomefortheUS—initsrelationswithallies—canbetakenfromtheAmericanNSS,whichdeclaresthefollowinginterest:

...wewillpreserve peace through strengthbyrebuildingourmilitarysothatitremainspre-eminent,detersouradversaries,andifnecessary,isabletofightandwin.Wewillcompetewithalltoolsofnationalpowertoensurethatregionsoftheworldarenotdominatedbyonepower.WewillstrengthenAmerica’scapabilities—includinginspaceandcyberspace—andrevitalizeothersthathavebeenneglected.Alliesandpartnersmagnifyourpower.Weexpectthemtoshoulderafairshareoftheburdenofresponsi-bilitytoprotectagainstcommonthreats.113(Underlineprovided.)

Themaximum outcomeforthePhilippinesontherightsideoftheredarrowinFigure 2isthereverseofitsno-agreementstanceontheleftside.Thefollowingcomprisethiscountry’smaximum outcome:unconditionalliftingoftheUSvisarevocationforSenatordelaRosa;non-interferenceoftheUSinthePhilippines’domesticpoliticsandinDuterte’spolicychoices—whichshouldbefreefromUScriticism,pressure,andsanction;unconditionalUSmilitaryaidandprotection;and,enhancedeconomicanddiplomaticbenefitsfromtheUS,aswellasfromotherregionalpowers[e.g.China,Russia,Japan].Belowthismaximum outcomeforthePhilippinesarewhatIassumeasthewalk-awaypointsoftheUSwithreferencetoitscoreinterests.Hypothetically,theUSwilloptnottomakeadealifthecostofmaintainingtheUSmilitarypresenceinthePhilippinesiswaytoohigh,andifthe“AmericaFirstPolicy”istobesacrificedandsubordinatedforthesakeofanothercountry’snationalinterestand/orforthebenefitofarivalpower.114

Judgingfromthegroundsforno-agreementoftheUS,whicharenotactuallycontrarytotheconditionsforno-agreementofthePhilippines,IreckonthatthereisaworkableZOPAbetweenthetwopartiesforresolvingissuesregardingtheVFAorforcomingoutwithasimilararrangementforUSvisitingforcesinthePhilippinesinthefuture.ItcanbeseeninFigure 2thattheentriesinthecombined win-setsofthetwocountriesredressDuterte’sunderlyingcauseforterminationaswellasaddresstheallies’commonconcerns—withouthavingtosacrificeAmerica’ssecurityandgeo-politicalinterestsintheIndo-Pacific.115

Thecombined win-setsincludethefollowingagenda:duerespectforthePhilippineleadershipaspartnerandhosttovisitingUSarmedforces;USrevocationofvisacancellationforthePhilippinesenatorthatfollowedlawfulordertoimplementthepresident’sinternalsecuritypolicy[i.e.waragainstillegaldrugs];non-interferenceoftheUSinPhilippinedomesticpolitics;and,continuanceofamodifieddefensepartnership,alongwithenhancedfunctionalcooperationindealingagainstnon-traditionalthreatstopublicsafetyandglobalcommons[e.g.terrorism,pandemic,naturaldisasters,etc.].

Iftheabove-mentionedconditionsareseriouslyconsideredandtakeningoodfaith,thesewillfacilitatepossibleresolutionoftheVFAproblemand/ormodificationofthedefenseaccordbetween

112Feaver. 113NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,p.4. 114Hanson,inhisinterpretationofUSPresidentTrump’s“AmericaFirstPolicy,”wrotethefollowing:“Thisisnotabandoningourroleasleaderinpositivechangesaroundtheworld.ItisanunderstandingthatwewillnotsubordinateU.S.intereststoanyorganization,entity,orothernation.Wewillexpectgroupswebelongto,liketheUnitedStates,toproduceoutcomesthatpositivelyaffectthesecurityandprosperityofAmericancitizens.Wheretheydonot,wewillmovetochangethem.ThisistheessenceofAmericaFirst,astrongcountrythatservesitsownpeopleandindoingsomakestheworldasaferandbetterplaceforall.”(Underlineprovided.)[JimHanson,“AnAmericaFirstNationalSecurityStrategy,”Security Studies Group,18December2017,https://security-studies.org/america-first-national-security-strategy/.] 115SeeUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,1June2019.https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

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thetwoalliesinachangedsecuritylandscape.Gettingthepartiesonthetableenlargestheroomfornegotiation,whichcanaccommodatebroaderwin-sets.ThePhilippinesandtheUSwillhavetomeethalfwayiftheirdiplomaticanddefenserelationsaretoendureamidthesechallengingtimes.

UnderstandingPresidentDuterte’ssensitivitiesandtargetinglong-timeFilipinopartnersinthesecuritycommunityarekeyfortheUStomaintaincloserelationswiththePhilippinesandcontinuetalksonamodifieddefenseagreement.116TheUS,withhightrustratingsfromtheFilipinopublic,candosomuchtopositivelyreverberatestrategicbenefitsfromanenduringalliancebyplayingsoftandsmartacrossthesecondlevelgameinthePhilippines. WhattheUSstatedinitsNSSregardingthepillarofadvancingAmericaninfluenceintheworldisimportantinliftingitspoliticalsanctionagainstthePhilippinesenator,asdemandedbyPresidentDuterte.AccordingtotheUS,itmustcompeteforpositiveandlastingrelationshipsaroundtheworldbyencouragingaspiringpartnersandstrengtheningdiplomatic,economic,andsecuritytieswithalliesandlong-timefriends.Furthermore,theTrumpadministrationwrotethefollowinginitsNSS:

Wearenotgoingtoimposeourvaluesonothers.Ouralliances,partnerships,andcoalitionsarebuiltonfreewillandsharedinterests.WhentheUnitedStatespartnerswithotherstates,wedeveloppoliciesthatenableustoachieveourgoalswhileourpartnersachievetheirs.

AlliesandpartnersareagreatstrengthoftheUnitedStates.TheyadddirectlytoU.S.political,economic,military,intelligence,andothercapabilities.Together,theUnitedStatesandouralliesandpartnersrepresentwelloverhalfoftheglobalGDP.Noneofouradversarieshavecomparablecoalitions.117(Underlineprovided.)

IftheabovepolicystatementsinTrump’sNSSaretobetakenatfacevalue,therewillbenogoodreasonforthePhilippines-USrelationstodriftapartjustbecausetheirdemocraticgovernmentshavepeculiarvaluepreferencesandexecutiveprerogativesinadministeringtheirowninternalsecurityaffairs.Moreover,itwillbecontrarytothepromotedprinciplesinitsNSSiftheUSinsistsonimposingitsvaluesonthePhilippinesbycriticizingPresidentDuterte’spublicsecuritystrategyandpenalizingFilipinoofficialsinvolvedinthesecuritizationofthedrugproblemwithintheirownjurisdiction.

Trump’scandidreactiontotheVFAtermination,whichheshruggedoffasanopportunityfortheUStosavealotofmoney,118wasaconspicuousdivergencefromtheUSstrategyofstrengtheningandre-energizinglong-standingmilitaryrelationswithimportantallieslikethePhilippinesinSoutheastAsia.119LettinggoofastrategicalliancewasalsoamarkeddeparturefromthepublicizedAmericanNSStoworkcloselywithalliesandpartnersinordertomagnifyUSinfluenceandsustainfavorablebalancesofpowerincompetitiveregions.120

116ToquotefromWoody’sarticle:“ThereareanumberofreasonstheVFAmayultimatelysurvive.Philippinemilitaryandsecurityforcesvaluetherelationship,underwhichtheyreceivemilitaryassistance,training,educationandweapons.”[SeeWoody,“Amajorally’sdecisiontoscrapanimportantdealwiththeUSraisesthestakesincompetitionwithChina.”] 117NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,p.37. 118See“TrumpshrugsoffPHDecisiontoendmilitarypact:Wesavemoney,”CNN Philippines,13February2020,https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/2/13/Visiting-Forces-Agreement-Philippines-US-Duterte-Trump.html. 119NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,p.47. 120Ibid.,p.46.

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Strategic implications and pandemic complications

SeniorcolumnistPrashanthParameswaran, inhisarticleon thesignificanceofending theUS-Philippines’VFA,articulatedthatthiswillcreatebroaderconsequencesforbothcountries.Andashewrote:

ForWashington,whilealliancemanagementhasneverbeenaneasyaffair,thiswouldconstitutethebiggestblowtoanyofitstreatyalliancerelationshipsinAsiasincetheendoftheColdWar,atpreciselythetimewhentheUnitedStatesistryingtorefocusitselfongeopoliticalcompetitionwithmajorpowers,principallyChinaandRussia.ForManila,thiswoulddegradeasignificantsourceofsecuritythatithascontinuedtorelyonevenasitsmilitarycapabilitiesremainlimitedandthethreatposedbyChinaremainsinspiteofDuterte’smuch-ballyhooedcharmoffensivetoBeijing.121(Underlineprovided.)

IagreewiththeviewthatDuterte’snoticeofterminationhasdamagingimplicationsonthePhilippines’defenseposture,butIwouldarguethattheperceivedcostofnoagreementcouldbehigheronthepartoftheUSratherthanthePhilippines—especiallywhenDutertedoesnotseeChinaasthreat.InthecaseoftheUS,itwilllosenotonlyitsclosemilitaryrelationswiththePhilippines,whichithadonceoccupiedasastrategicterritoryinthewesternPacificOcean,butalsoitsself-proclaimedstatusaspreeminentpowerandsecurityguarantorinthisregion.Duterte’sabrogationoftheVFAwouldalsoserveasprecedentforothercountriestoreassesstheirsecurityrelationswiththeUS,especiallyitspolicyconditionsformilitaryaid.122

WithChinaposingasanattractivealternativeforcountriesintheperiphery,itmaybeinthebestinterestoftheUStotinkerwiththediplomaticactofliftingitspoliticalsanctionagainstthePhilippines.ThismeansreversingtheUSvisarevocationforthePhilippineSenatorandrespectingDuterte’spolicyautonomy,evenifthisentailssettingasidehumanrightscontroversyinhisdomesticwaragainstillegaldrugs.IftheUSvisaforthesubjectsenatorisgivenbackasanactofgoodwilltothePhilippinesashosttoUSvisitingforces,thiswillboostAmericaninfluenceandalsoattractothercountriesinChina’sneighborhood.Itmustbenotedthatthe“AmericaFirst”NSSpointedtoChinaasarivalpowerthatundercutsandthreatensUSinterestinAsia.123JusthowhighistheUSpremiumonimposingitsbrandofdemocracyandruleoflawonthePhilippines,attheexpenseofAmerica’srealistprinciple,isarhetoricalquestionthatmattersinthestrategicequationoftheVFAnegotiation.

Thegeopoliticalcompetition,inwhichtheUSiscommittedtowin,becameevenmorecomplexduetocomplicationsbroughtaboutbythe2019strainofthecoronavirusdiseaseorCOVID-19.Theunimaginableonslaughtofthispandemic—whichsweptandshockedcountriesregardlessofsizeandstrengththis2020—testedthemettleofgreatpowerstoleadinmanagingtheglobalcrisis.ThespotlightwasontheUS,whichhasthehighestnumberofcasesanddeathsduetoCOVID-19.BymidJune2020, 121PrashanthParameswaran,“TheSignificanceofEndingtheUS-PhilippinesVisitingForcesAgreement,”The Diplomat,12February2020,https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/the-significance-of-ending-the-us-philippines-visiting-forces-agreement/. RabenaandSilverbergacknowledged,amongothers,thattheVFA’sabrogationcouldjeopardizeongoingconstructionofmilitaryfacilitiesandadvancedinstallationofdefensearticlesinthePhilippines.[AaronJedRabenaandElliotSilverberg,“IstheUS-PhilippinesAllianceObsolete?,”The Diplomat,22April2020,https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/is-the-us-philippines-alliance-ob-solete/.] 122UriFriedman,“AmericaIsAloneinItsColdWarWithChina,”The Atlantic,17February2020,https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/us-china-allies-competition/606637/. 123The“AmericaFirst”NSSwrotethat:“ChinaandRussiachallengeAmericanpower,influence,andinterests,attemptingtoerodeAmericansecurityandprosperity.Theyaredeterminedtomakeeconomieslessfreeandlessfair,togrowtheirmilitaries,andtocontrolinformationanddatatorepresstheirsocietiesandexpandtheirinfluence.”[NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,p.2.]

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theUSrecorded2,208,400millioncasesand119,132deaths,comparedtoChinawith83,221casesand4,634deaths.124Inretrospect,thefirstcaseoftheCOVID-19hadbeenidentifiedinWuhanCityinChinainDecember2019andtravelledquicklyto210countriesandterritories.Thepandemichadforcedcitiesandcommunitiesaroundtheworldintoquarantineandlockdownforthefirsttime.Accordingtosomestudies,effectivecontrolofthepandemicinChinahadresultedinflatteningthecurveofCOVID-19casesinthiscountryasearlyasMarch2020.125

Iftheeffectivesecuritizationofthepublichealthcrisiswerethesubjectofageopoliticalcompetitioninthisregion,theUSwouldnotwinagainsttheAsiangiant.GivenitsmotivationtobalanceifnotcontainChina’srise,theUScouldbeontopofthingsifithadperformedimpressivelyinthefightagainstCOVID-19ontheworldstage.ButthelacklusterperformanceoftheUSinsecuritizingthisnon-traditionalsecuritythreatatdomesticandinternationallevelsupsetitspopularandpowerfulimageasworldleader.Moreover,theUSthreattowithdrawitsfundingsupporttotheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO),overwhatPresidentTrumpsawasamishandlingofthepandemic,126wasviewedasuntimelyandunbecomingofanationthatwantstoleadtheworld.127IftheUSrenegesonitspledgetotheWHO,thiswillweakenthepillarofadvancingAmericaninfluenceandencouragingpartnerstowardsitscauseand/orcrusade. Alongthisline,itisworthnotingthepowerfulintroductorymessageinTrump’sNSS;towit:“astrongAmericaisinthevitalinterestsofnotonlytheAmericanpeople,butalsothosearoundtheworldwhowanttopartnerwiththeUnitedStatesinpursuitofsharedinterests,values,andaspirations.”128Thispassagefromthe“AmericaFirst”NSShasthevestigeofsoftpower,whichHarvardProfessorJosephNyepopularizedforUSforeignpolicyinadifferenttimeofAmericanleadership.Softpower,accordingtoNye’stheoryofpowerinworldaffairs,flowsfromacountry’sattractiveculture,constructivepolicies,andpositiveimagethatcangetotherstocooperateforacommoncause.Softpowerappliesemotionalandintellectualpersuasiontoallureotherstowardsitspolicydirection,whichisoppositetohardpowerthatusesforceprojectiontomakeanimpression.129

Itmustbetakenintoaccountthatinthistimeofgreathumanitariancrisis,thekindofpowerthatcanattractotherswillcomenotfromthemostformidablemilitarythatcancontainarival,butfromthemosteffectivepolicythatcanfightthevirusandhelphealtheworld.TheCOVID-19catastropheisagamechanger,forcingplayerstoshiftpositions,reconsideroptions,andrecalibratenationalstrategies.Thisisthenewsecuritylandscapeonwhichnegotiatorswillhavetonavigatetogetabetterdealfrominternationalagreements.

ForRichardHaass,PresidentoftheCouncilonForeignRelationsandformerPolicyPlanningDirectorfortheUSDepartmentofState,theideathattheworldhaschangedwiththepandemicoutbreakisincorrect.Thetitleofhisarticlecapturesthisargument:“thepandemicwillacceleratehistoryratherthanreshapeit.”FromtheperspectiveoftheveteranAmericandiplomat,USleadershiphasalreadybeenwaningandthatitsmodelhasalsoalreadylostitsappeallongbeforetheCOVID-19.130 124See“COVID-19CoronavirusPandemic,”Worldometer,18June2020,https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/. 125K.K.RebeccaLaiandKeithCollins,“WhichCountryHasFlattenedtheCurvefortheCoronavirus?”,The New York Times,19March2020,https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/03/19/world/coronavirus-flatten-the-curve-countries.html. 126ChristineWang,“TrumpthreatenstopermanentlycutoffWHOfunding,withdrawU.S.membership,”CNBC,18May2020,https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/19/trump-threatens-to-permanently-cut-off-who-funding-withdraw-us-membership.html. 127See“Factbox:GlobalreactiontoTrumpwithdrawingWHOfunding,”Reuters,15April2020,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-trump-who-reaction/factbox-global-reaction-to-trump-withdrawing-who-funding-idUSKCN21X0CN. 128NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,p.1. 129JosephS.Nye,Jr.,Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics(NewYork,USA:PublicAffairs,2004). 130Haass’viewofwhathecalledasapost-Americanworldisasfollows:“Onecharacteristicofthecurrentcrisishasbeen

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Haass’notionthata“post-Americanworld”isunfoldinghasseriousimplicationsonthepoliticalcalculationsofkeyplayersandstakeholdersintheVFAnegotiation.WhetherornotAmerica’spowerarsenalisactuallydiminishingisbesidethepoint;thefactthatitsattractivenessiswaningisthepolicyissue.PerceptionsaboutadecliningAmericanleadership,bothfromwithinandoutsideoftheUS,areawake-upcallforthelattertorecalibrateitspowerprojectionandstrategiccommunicationtoallureothersandinfluencetheirbehavior.Realitymattersinthestrategiccalculus,butperceptionsmattermostinwinningthetrustandconfidenceofalliesandaspiringpartners.Powerfulcognitivefactorsshapenationalinterestsandpriorities—allofwhichdeterminethedealandno-dealsetsofthePhilippinesintheVFAnegotiationgameatthetimeofthepandemic.

Summary UsingPutnam’stwo-levelgametheory,IendeavoredtoexplainPresidentDuterte’sgambitofterminatingtheVFAwiththeUS,andtheoddsofnegotiatingabetterdealforthePhilippines.Inthefirstpartofthestudy,Iprovidedabriefbackgroundofeventsthatledtoresearchinquiriesonthefollowing:whatvaluejudgementandconceptionofnationalinterestpromptedDutertetosendhis180-daynoticeofVFAterminationinFebruary2020andsuspenditafter112days;theextentofhisrationalegoismtoabrogatetheVFAoraccommodateconcessionstoextendit;and,whatfactorsandconditionsdeterminethewin-setsofthetwopartiesintheVFAorasimilararrangementforUSvisitingforcesinthePhilippinesinachangedsecuritylandscape.Iaddressedthesequestionsincomprehensiveandstand-aloneessaysintheacademicpaper.

Thesecondpartofthestudyisonthegametheoreticalapproachastheframeworkofanalysis.Here,Ireviewedrelevanttheoriesoninternationalpoliticsasthebeginningofunderstandingthedynamicsofinternationalnegotiations.Fromrealismtoliberalism,Idiscussedthevalueofnegotiatingtoavoidconflict,resolveissues,andcooperateoncommoninterests.Ialsoemphasizedthatnegotiators,aswellaspolicyactors,makedecisionsbasedontheirobjectivecalculationsoffactsandeventsatnationalandinternationallevels,andalsoontheirsubjectiveperceptionsofrealitiesattheindividuallevel.Intersubjectivityorsocialagreementvalidatesandreinforcesindividualbeliefs,whicharepowerfuldriversofpolicychoices.

Withthisconceptualbackdrop,ImovedtoPutnam’stwo-levelgametheorytoexplainhowdomesticandinternationalpoliticsenmeshinthenegotiationprocess,andhowcognitivefactorscoalescetoformaconsensusorhinderit.IillustratedinFigure 1theideaofcombined win-setsinazerosumgamemodeloftwopartynegotiations—withmaximum, sub-maximal,andminimum outcomes.IclarifiedthatPutnam’spluralistapproachdoesnotintendtopredicttheturn-outofnegotiation;rather,itaimstoprovideaframeworkofanalyzinggeneralpatternsofbehaviorandpossibledeterminantsofparties’win-sets.Significantly,Putnam’sgametheoreticalmodelgivesintellectualordertothestudyofDuterte’sforeignpolicygambitamidthedynamicpolitical,security,andnaturalsettingsofthetwo-levelgames.AsIstressedinthebeginning,thelogicofpolicyanalysiswillremainthesameintheepistemicframeevenwheneventsanddevelopmentschangethecontoursofpolicychoicesandthecircumstancesofthegame.

amarkedlackofU.S.leadership.TheUnitedStateshasnotralliedtheworldinacollectiveefforttoconfronteitherthevirusoritseconomiceffects.NorhastheUnitedStatesralliedtheworldtofollowitsleadinaddressingtheproblemathome.Othercountriesarelookingafterthemselvesasbesttheycanorturningtothosepastthepeakofinfection,suchasChina,forassistance.”(Underlineprovided.)[RichardHaass,“ThePandemicWillAccelerateHistoryRatherThanReshapeIt,”Foreign Affairs,7April2020,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-07/pandemic-will-accelerate-history-rather-reshape-it.]

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ThethirdpartofthestudyexplainedhowPresidentDutertemovesinthestrategicgame,whatmotivateshimtomakethegambitinabrogatingtheVFA,andwhyhemovesthewayhedoesinthetwo-levelgame.Duterte’snoticeofterminationcommunicatesanexpresssentimentagainsttheAmericans,followingaseriesofeventsthatchallengedhiswillandegotodefendwhathesawasanaffronttohiscountry’shonorandsovereignty.IcharacterizedDuterte’sidiosyncraticconductininternationalaffairsasatypicalforaweakstate,butassertedthatheknowshowtobargainandplaythegame.Despitebeingsmall,relativetobigplayers,Duterteiscapableofaffectingthepoliticalcalculationsofthosewiththepowertoshapestrategicoutcomes.ByplayingtoughinsendingthenoticeofVFAtermination,heisabletosetthetermsandleverageonhisBATNA,e.g.pivottoChina,whichheknowshasstrategiccosttotheUS.Inthisregard,DuterteisabletowinAmericanaidforhiscountryevenashisnoticeofVFAterminationremainshanging.

PresidentDuterte’sfocusonthePhilippines’coreinterestsisunfailing,evenifhispolicydecisionsappeartobeswerving.Inhisspeechacts,thenon-negotiableintereststhatdeterminehispolicyactionsareasfollows:Filipinowelfareathomeandabroad;publicsafetyandorderinthecountry;economicgrowthanddevelopment;self-determinationandsovereignty;and,nationalsurvival.TheexplanatoryfactorsthatempowerDutertetopushforhisforeignpolicyinitiativesarehisdominantpersonality,excellenttrustratings,andpatrimonialleadershipoftherulingparty.Thusfar,hisstrongdispositionandpopulardomesticsupportmagnifyhisnegotiatingpowertomanipulatethewin-setandmakeasmartdealatthetwo-levelgameofdefenseagreement.

Thefourthpartofthestudyisonthepossibledealandno-dealsetsofthePhilippinesandtheUSintheVFAnegotiationwhichIillustratedinaparsimonious,conceptframeinFigure 2.Myintentionwastocapturecommonandcontrastinginterestsbetweenthetwopartiesinordertogiveusanideaofthecombined win-setswithinwhichbothcountriescanaffordtotakeconcessionsandmakeanagreement.Consideringthattheconditionsforno-agreementofthePhilippinesarenotactuallycontrarytowhatIassumedasthegroundsforno-agreementoftheUS,IreckonedthatthereisawindowofresolvingissuesontheVFAand/orcomingoutwithasimilararrangementforUSvisitingforcesinthePhilippinesinthefuture.

AscanbeseeninFigure 2,thekeyareasofconcerninthecombined win-setsofthetwocountriesredressDuterte’scauseforterminationandatthesametimeaddresstheallies’commoninterests—withouthavingtosacrificeAmerica’ssecurityandgeo-politicalambitionintheIndo-Pacificregion.Toreiterate,thecombined win-setsincludethefollowing:duerespectforthePhilippineleadershipaspartnerandhosttovisitingUSarmedforces;USrevocationofvisacancellationforSenatordelaRosathatfollowedlawfulordertoimplementthePresident’sinternalwaragainstillegaldrugs;non-interferenceoftheUSinPhilippinedomesticpolitics;and,continuanceofamodifieddefenseagreement,alongwithenhancedfunctionalcooperationinnon-traditionalsecurityconcerns[e.g.terrorism,COVID-19pandemic,naturaldisasters]topublicsafetyandglobalcommons.

Inthelastpartofthestudy,IaddedapostscriptonthestrategicimplicationsoftheVFAterminationnotjustonthePhilippinesandtheUSaspartiesinnegotiation,butalsoonChinathathasastakeinitsoutcome.Nodoubt,iftheVFAisterminated,thiswillhavedamagingeffectsonthePhilippines’defensepostureandalsoontheAmericanfootholdinaregionwheretheUSispoisedtocompetewithChina.However,IarguedthatthecostofnoagreementcouldbehigheronthepartoftheUSthanthatofthePhilippinesthathasalreadypivotedtoChinafordiplomaticandeconomicbenefitssince2016.IftheproblemwiththeVFAwerenotaddressed,Duterte’sdefectionwouldserveasprecedentforperipheralcountriestobandwagonwithChinaasanattractivealternative.

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Moreover,giventheperceptionofadecliningAmericanleadership,IsurmisedthatitisinitsbestinteresttotinkerwiththediplomaticactofliftingitspoliticalsanctionagainstthePhilippines[i.e.reversingtheUSvisarevocationforthePhilippineSenator],asdemandedbyPresidentDuterte,andrespectinghissecuritizationofthedrugprobleminthePhilippines.JusthowmuchvaluedoestheUSgivetoimposingsanctiononthePhilippines'drugwar—attheexpenseoflosinganallianceamidgreatpowercompetitionintheAsianregion—isarhetoricalquestionthatmattersinthestrategicequationofstakeholdersintheVFAnegotiation.Further,theensuingCOVID-19pandemicisagamechanger,forcingplayerstoshiftpositions,reconsideroptions,andrecalibratenationalstrategies.AndasIearlierwrote,negotiatorswillhavetonavigateonthisnewsecuritylandscapeofglobalhealthemergencytogetabetterdealfrominternationalagreements.

ItcannotbedeniedthatPresidentDuterte’sgambittoterminatetheVFAmadeanimpactonthepsychologicalenvironmentoftheUSsecuritystrategy.Iftheproblemisnotdeconstructedinthisdimension,theimpendingseparationofthePhilippinesfromthealliancewillhaveseriousstrategicimplicationsontheoperationalsetting.IassertedthatDuterte’spoliticalgrievanceandsensitivitiesmustbedeeplyunderstoodinordertogettothebottomoftheVFAterminationnotice.Furthermore,IpropoundedthatalignmentacrossdomestictablesofFilipinoandAmericandefensepartnersiskeytomaintaindiscreet,diplomaticdiscussionsonamutuallybeneficialdefenseagreement.GivenAmerica’sverygoodtrustratingsfromtheFilipinopublic,131theUScandosomuchtopositivelyreverberateattractivegainsfromtheVFA,orasimilararrangementofUSvisitingforcesinthehostcountry,byplayingsoftandsmartatthesecondlevelgameoftransnationalpoliticsaswellasinformaldiplomacy.

Asthepraxisinaneo-liberalandinstitutionalorder,diplomacyandculturalsensitivityareessentialtounravelDuterte’sadversarialmoodinhispolicymove.Thisisespeciallywarrantedtoavoidafalling-outbetweenallies,andalsotohelpmaintainstrategicstabilityintheirregion.Nothingcanbeatdiplomacyasaconstructivetoolofengagingahardlineactorandinfluencinghisbehaviortokeephimonthenegotiatingtable.132Withoutthiscrucialstartingpoint,noagendacanbetalkedaboutforapossibleagreementonwhethertocontinueorchangeahigh-valuedefenseallianceinAsia.Thejourneytowardsthisendisthroughcontinuousdialoguesandfunctionalcooperationonotherfrontsthatcanbeusedasplatformsforanegotiatedagreementatthehighestlevel.Diplomaticengagementsandpositiveinducementsarethusneededtorekindlewarmrelationsandenableoppositepartiestomanagesolutionstodisagreements.

131ChristinaMarieRamos,“SWS:UStrustrating‘verygood’,China‘neutral,’”Inquirer.net,16April2019,https://globalnation.inquirer.net/174516/sws-us-trust-rating-very-good-china-neutral. 132Inthe2017articleon“DiplomaticEngagementandNegotiatedAgreementBetweenPhilippinesandChina:AConstructive-RealistApproachinPost-Arbitration,”Iwrotethefollowing:“Gettingthepartiestothenegotiatingtableproducepositiveresultsandincrementalchangesovertime.Whenpartiesconcernedareconciliatoryratherthanhardline,itiseasytogettoanagreement,comeupwithrealisticsolutions,andcultivatelong-termrelations.Ifthereistrust,theywillnotbelockedtotheirhardcorepositions;ifthereismutualrespectofeachother’sself-imageandface-saving,itiseasytoagreeandcooperate.”[Almase,“DiplomaticEngagementandNegotiatedAgreementBetweenPhilippinesandChina...,”p.8.]

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