Democracy Promotion Bad - Michigan7 2015 (1)

7/25/2019 Democracy Promotion Bad - Michigan7 2015 (1)

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LinksDemocratic Transition economic growth Foreign Aided: Why DemocratizationBrings Growth When Democracy Does Not

Hariri, Jacob Gerneriew !ro"#e$ British Jo%rna# o& !o#itica# 'cience()$* +Jan -*).:)/01*$


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Working


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Brazi# 2o%nter3#an


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1NC


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OfThe Federative Republic o Brail should pro!ote goodgovernance in "rica# "sia# Latin "!erica# and Oceania$

The Counterplan solves de!ocrac% but the "f doesn&t ' aBrailian ca!paign or good governance activates global!odeling(tuenkel# )h* )olitical (cience# +1,+4#i5er 't%en6e# ho#ds a !hD in3o#itica# science &rom the 7ni5ersity o& D%isb%rg08ssen in Germany, and a 9aster in!%b#ic !o#icy &rom the ennedy 'choo# o& Go5ernment at Har5ard 7ni5ersity, wherehe was a 9c2#oy 'cho#ar$ He is an Assistant !ro&essor o& ;nternationa# o!a%#o branch o& the 'choo# o& History and 'ocia# 'cience +2!D42. and the e?ec%ti5e3rogram in ;nternationa#


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order not to estrange the host go5ernment*-) +&or e?am3#e by 3romoting good go5ernance or by strengtheningci5i# society *-M., may 3ro5ide more room &or co##aboration between estab#ished democracy 3romoters and risingdemocracies$ For e?am3#e, when 7' !resident Barac6 4bama 5isited ;ndia, the 7'A and ;ndia signed an 43enGo5ernment !artnershi3 to start a dia#og%e among senior ocia#s on o3en go5ernment iss%es and to disseminateinno5ations that enhance go5ernment acco%ntabi#ity$*-1 These #ess 5isib#e a33roaches are #i6e#y to be moreacce3tab#e to rising democracies than being as6ed to oin estab#ished 3owers in condemning a%tocrats o3en#y$

!erging po-ers& position !atters greatl% because the% are located in

regions o the -orld -here de!ocrac%&s ooting is not %et 5r!$ 0naddition#there are indications that Brail&sand ;ndias credibilit% a!ong poor countries!a% e6ceed that o the rich -orld4perhaps precisel% because the% arerarel% perceived as overl% paternalistic or arrogant$ !erha3s !ost i!portantl%Brail&sand ;ndias societal structures4high ine7ualit%, a highdegree o& i##iteracy+in ;ndiascase.and pockets o povert%4are si!ilar to those in !an% countries that arestruggling to establish de!ocrac%$'een &rom this 3ers3ecti5e,Brailianand ;ndianpolic% !akers have !uch !ore e6perience in !aking de!ocrac% -ork inadverse environ!ents$ 0n Brail&s case an additional asset is a ver% recente6perience o successul transition to de!ocrac%$ !erging po-er such asBrail and 0ndia are thereore in a !uch better position to share their

e6perience o de!ocrac% than urope or the 2("# -hose de!ocratisationlies in the distant past# and -hose societies look ver% diferent ro! thosein the rest o the -orld$ Finall%# in a -orld -here an increasing nu!ber onational leaders look to China as an econo!ic and political !odel to cop%#0ndia and Brail provide po-erul counter3e6a!ples that political reedo!is no obstacle to econo!ic gro-th$189 0n this sense# as )ratap :ehtapoints out# Brail&s and 0ndia&s o-n success !a% do ar !ore orde!ocrac% pro!otion than an% overtl% ideological push in that directioncould ever hope to acco!plish$18;


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Net Bene5t2$($ de!ocrac% pro!otion destabilies the international orderand incites perpetual -arare ' all de!ocratic progress hasoccurred in spite o# and not because o "!erica

(!ith# con )roessor at /ale# &1 and


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ro! the start$;nstead, eorts to recti&y the &ai#%res at conce3t%a#izing state0 and nation0b%i#ding t%rned o%tto be Chow ton or ##can do publicationsthat on#y prolonged and deepened a !isplaced"!erican sel3con5dencethat it was 3ossib#e *- %se the window o& o33ort%nity at the co%nUtry sdis3osition as the wor#dSs so#e s%3er3ower to changc the #ogic o& internaUtiona# re#ations &ore5er$ 9%ch the same

mi?t%re o& arrogance# sel3interest# and sel3delusion characteried theargu!ents underl%ing the ?Washington Consensus@which bo#d#y saw the 6ey to wor#d3ros3erity and 3eace in the interde3endence generated by economic g#oba#ization with its trinity o& conce3tsV3ri5atization, dereg%#aUtion, and o3enness$ To be s%re, economic interde3endence was indeed ca3ab#e o& de#i5eringon its 3romise, as the integration o& the 8%ro3ean 7nion and the growth in wor#d trade and in5estment centered onthe &ree0mar6ct democracies so 3ower&%##y demonstrated &or ha#& a cent%ry a&ter Wor#d War ;;$ Howe5er, a serio%s3rob#em #ay in the inabi#ity o& 3o#itica# &orces, either nationa##y or inUternationa##y, to contro# the ca3ita#ist genieonce #et o%t o& its bott#e$ For in d%e co%rse, dereg%#ation t%rned against the 5ery system that had gi5en birth to it,%n#eashing a ight o& techno#ogy, ca3ita#, and obs to co%ntries in Asia es3eUcia##y and 3ermitting the irres3onsib#eban6ing 3ractices that engendered in the 7nited 'tates and the 8%ro3ean 7nion +a&ter ha5ing aected 9e?ico,


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gi5ing increasing e5idence that it might 3ro5e more s%ccess&%# in creating nationa# 3ower than the &ree0mar6etdemocratic b#%e3rint 3re5a#ent in the West$ Not on#y 2hina b%t a#so 3 K881I# Lui lnacio Lula da(ilva


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internationa#isms dedication to democUracy 3romotion might sti## ha5e #i&e whate5er the re5ersa#s in ;raL andA&Ughanistan, so too was economic re&orm 3ossib#e whate5er the damage inicted by the crisis that began in --Y$For it is in the interest o& ca3ita#ism to be reg%U#ated@ eecti5e mar6ets cannot e?ist witho%t the same 6ind o&acco%ntabi#ity and trans3arency we e?3ect &rom democratic go5ernments$ 9ore, s%3ranaUtiona# instit%tions maye?3erience growth as they ta6e on the tas6 o& s%3er5isUing at regiona# or internationa# #e5e#s re&orms that wi## a#soin5o#5e increased 3o#itica# harmonization, i& not integration$ Whi#e the ho#d o& cor3orate in%Uence on 3o#itica# e#itesin the 7nited 'tates and nationa# dierences in the 8%Uro3ean 7nion co%#d b#oc6 the 5ery changes that it wo%#d beto their #ong0term bene"t to ha5e, 3erha3s dramatic inno5ations co%#d be ado3ted, sho%#d the Democrats insist onthoro%ghgoing re&orms in the s3irit oi the !rogressi5e 8ra or the New Dea# when this 3arty ga5e critica# #eadershi3,or sho%#d the 8%roU3ean 7nion manage not on#y to s%r5i5e the cha##enges to the %nity o& the 8%ro zone b%t act%a##yto grow 3o#itica##y in the 3rocess$


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(olvenc% 6tensionThe counterplan solves de!ocrac% pro!otion co!parativel%better than the plan -ithout linking to our 2(3speci5c turns(tuenkel# )h* )olitical (cience# +1,+4#i5er 't%en6e# ho#ds a !hD in

3o#itica# science &rom the 7ni5ersity o& D%isb%rg08ssen in Germany, and a 9aster in!%b#ic !o#icy &rom the ennedy 'choo# o& Go5ernment at Har5ard 7ni5ersity, wherehe was a 9c2#oy 'cho#ar$ He is an Assistant !ro&essor o& ;nternationa# o!a%#o branch o& the 'choo# o& History and 'ocia# 'cience +2!D42. and the e?ec%ti5e3rogram in ;nternationa#


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to #i5e in a democracy, b%t they ha5e rare#y e?3erienced democratisation in their home co%ntries, th%s o&ten ha5ing#itt#e 3ractica# %nderstanding o& the 3rocess$ ;n addition, see6ing to em%#ate s3eci"c characteristics o& 7' or

8%ro3ean democracy may ha5e negati5e conseL%ences as it does not allo- or localpeculiaritiesM +:an% "!ericans conuse&, one s3ecia#ist writes,+the or!s o"!erican de!ocrac% -ith the concept o de!ocrac% itsel&$ ( ;n order to em%#ateWestern0sty#e 5oting cyc#es, democracy 3romoters are o&ten in &a5o%r o& r%shing to an e#ection, e5en in 3ost0conictsocieties$ Oet e#ections can ha5e an inherent#y disr%3ti5e eect, in 3artic%#ar in winner0ta6ea## scenarios$(/ As2arothers 3oints o%t, being im3atient to organise e#ections reects the tendency o& the internationa# actorsengaged in aiding the conict reso#%tion to 5iew e#ections as a strategy &or an ear#y e?it$ Oet at #east sometimes,ear#y e#ections can be a reci3e &or &ai#%re$ (( The ne?t section ana#yses which o& the arg%ments #aid o%t here are%sed by rising democracies, and how this in&orms their &oreign 3o#icy$ Do rising democracies 3romote democracyQ

The case o& Brazi# and ;ndia Western de!ocratic govern!ents and organisationsspend billions o dollars ever% %ear on de!ocrac%3related proects#() t%rningthem into the dominant actors in the "e#d o& democracy 3romotion$/et a notable shit o po-er istaking place to-ards countries that are !ore hesitant -hen it co!es tos%ste!atic de!ocrac% pro!otion$Ha5e Brazi# and ;ndia 3romoted democracy in the 3astQ Howdo ana#ysts and 3o#icy ma6ers in emerging democraciesV%sing Brazi# and ;ndia as an e?am3#e in this ana#ysisVthin6 abo%t democracy 3romotionQ How can we characterise their arg%ments in re#ation to the critiL%es cited

abo5eQ Brazi# and democracy 3romotion Brail accounts or over hal o (outh "!erica&s

-ealth# population# territor% and !ilitar% budget# -hich suggests that it isrelativel% !ore po-erul in its region than China# 0ndia and .er!an%are intheir res3ecti5e neighbo%rhoods$(M Oet, des3ite this dominant 3osition, it shied away &rom inter5ening in itsneighbo%rs interna# aairs be&ore the *-s$ The 3reser5ation o& nationa# so5ereignty and non0inter5ention ha5ea#ways been and remain 6ey 3i##ars o& Brazi#s &oreign 3o#icy,(1 so any attem3t to 3romote or de&end se#&0determination and h%man rights abroadVa commitment enshrined in Brazi#s *Y constit%tion(YVstands inconict with the 3rinci3#e o& non0inter5ention$( The tension arising &rom these two o33osing 5isionsVres3ectingso5ereignty and ado3ting a more asserti5e 3ro0democracy stance, 3artic%#ar#y in the regionVis one o& theim3ortant di#emmas in Brazi#ian &oreign 3o#icy o& the 3ast two decades$ ;n &act, 3artic%#ar#y d%ring the *-s, Brazi#abstained se5era# times &rom 3romoting or de&ending democracy$ ;n *-, %nder !resident Fernando 2o##or de 9e##o+*-. and #arge#y beca%se o& economic interests, Brazi# b#oc6ed ca##s &or a mi#itary inter5ention in '%rinamea&ter a mi#itary co%3 there$ A year #ater it o33osed mi#itary inter5ention to reinsta## !resident Aristide in Haiti$ ;n* it remained si#ent o5er a 3o#itica# crisis in 8c%ador$ ;n *(Vwhen a member o& the 7N 'ec%rity 2o%nci#Vitabstained &rom 'ec%rity 2o%nci#


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L%ite s%33orti5e o& eorts to 3rotect democracy in the Americas since *-$ M- This tendency has been &%rtherstrengthened in the *st cent%ry$ ;n --/ !resident K%#a +--/ -*-. swi&t#y engaged to reso#5e a constit%tiona#crisis in Bo#i5ia and, in --), he sent his &oreign minister to E%ito to dea# with a crisis in 8c%ador$ ;n the same yearBrazi# s%33orted the 4A' in ass%ming a mediating ro#e d%ring a 3o#itica# crisis in Nicarag%a, inc#%ding "nancia#s%33ort &or the e#ectora# monitoring o& a m%nici3a# e#ection there$ ;n -- the internationa# debate abo%t how todea# with the co%3 in Hond%ras was 5ery m%ch a res%#t o& Brazi# and the 7'A c#ashing o5er the terms o& how best tode&end democracy, rather than whether to de&end it$M* 45er the 3ast two decades Brazi# has systematica##y b%i#tdemocratic re&erences and c#a%ses into the charters, 3rotoco#s and dec#arations o& the s%bregiona# instit%tions o&which it is a member$ The im3ortance o& democracy in the constit%tion and acti5ities o& the


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Transition Wars (cenarioven i the% -in that the af spreads de!ocrac%# 2$($ policiesare disproportionate ' guarantees transition -ars.olds!ith# Jarvard (enior Fello-# +9+Arth%r A$ Go#dsmith was +when he

wrote this. a 'enior


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engagement does ha33en on an im3ro5ised basis, b%t it co%#d be done better with coordination and anac6now#edgment o& the theoretica# &o%ndation &or doing so$ ;n genera#, this a33roach wi## not 3rod%ce L%ic6 3ayos,b%t beca%se 3otentia##y 3rod%cti5e regime transitions can occ%r s%dden#y and %n3redictab#y, the 7nited 'tates sti##

m%st be 3re3ared to ad%st its bi#atera# strategies as circ%mstances dictate$ Third, the 2nited (tatesshould adopt a lo-er pro5le$ This !eans li!iting the sel3righteousorator% about reedo!# because it triggers a deensive response in !an%

corners o the globe that da!ages 2$($ standing and inuence$There sho%#d bea s%bt#e shi&t in orientation, &rom cam3aigning &or democracy to s%33orting it, ta6ing c%es &rom #oca# democratic &orces and avoiding one sided eforts to push de!ocratiation in directions aoreign countr% is unprepared to go$ A #ower 3ro"#e a#so means red%cing e?3ectations &or 7$'$citizens so they do not t%rn against democracy 3romotion 3rograms that may wor6 at the margins, s%ch as

technica# assistance &or go5ernance re&orm in certain co%ntries$ 0n the end# rule3boundde!ocrac% is largel% produced ro! -ithin# not spread ro! the outside ina standardied !anner$Blustering# all3e!bracing de!ocrac% pro!otion isnot a -a% to enhance national securit% because it -astes 2$($ resourcesand can prove counterproductive in urthering the ulti!ate goal, which is to addto the wor#d 3o3%#ation o& 3#%ra#istic maoritarian states$ The em3irica# research on this iss%e demonstrates thatte?t%red s%33ort &or go5ernment re&orm has a m%ch better chance o& ser5ing 7$'$ nationa# interests than does ana##0inc#%si5e &reedom agenda$


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China War (cenario

*oesn&t link to the counterplan ' Brail has strong BR0C( andtrade ties -ith China

Choi &1=+e#win 2hoi is an editoria# assistant at The Di3#omat, C2hina and Brazi#'ee6 to Boost Ties, htt3:PPthedi3#omat$comP-*(P-1Pchina0and0brazi#0see60to0boost0tiesP, J%#y *1, -*(.

Pi Ginping is seeking to boost ties -ith Brail -ith a state visit to thecountr% this -eek$ While in the countr% or the BR0C( su!!it# Pi is !akinga state visit to Brail -here he -ill !eet -ith Brailian )resident *il!aRoussef$This is is "rst 5isit to Brazi# since becoming 3resident +he 5isited theco%ntry as 5ice 3resident in --., and comes as 2hina and Brazi# ce#ebrate their(-th anni5ersary o& bi#atera# ties$ Be&ore #ea5ing &or Brazi#, Pi stated in a -rittenintervie- that he attaches ?great i!portance to gro-ing the global

strategic partnership -ith Brail@ and believes ?China is read% to -ork-ith Brail under the principle o !utual bene5t to pro!ote sustainedt-o3-a% trade$ He e?3#ained that during his trip# he and Brailian leaders-illbe disc%ssing to urther strengthen e6changes and cooperation in allaspects o (ino3Brailian relations$i reiterated his goa# o& im3ro5ing 2hina0Brazi# re#ations short#y a&ter #anding in the co%ntry, when he to#d re3orters that he isC#oo6ing &orward to cond%cting wide e?changes with Brazi#ian #eaders and 3eo3#e&rom a## wa#6s o& #i&e, &oc%sing on common de5e#o3ment, boosting 3ractica#coo3eration and acce#erating the de5e#o3ment o& 2hina0Brazi# com3rehensi5estrategic 3artnershi3$ 4ne o& is goa#s this wee6 wi## be to "nd new o33ort%nitiesto boost 2hinas in5estment in Brazi#s in&rastr%ct%re$ :oderniing Brail&stransportation and energ% inrastructure presents a -in3-in scenario orBrail and China$;ndeed, modernizing in&rastr%ct%re wi## s%bstantia##y red%ce thetrans3ortation costs, which wi## bene"t Brazi#s entire economy e5en as it ma6es it amore 3ro"tab#e trade 3artner &or 2hina$ Beiing a#so has dee3 e?3ertise in this areaowing to its own de5e#o3ment as we## as its eorts in other 3arts o& the wor#d #i6eA&rica$ 4n other hand, Brazi# wi## %se is state 5isit to try and red%ce its tradeimba#ance with 2hina$ ;n -*, Brazi# im3orted a#most ^* bi##ion more &rom 2hinathen Beiing im3orted &rom Brasi#ia$ Brazi# wi## a#so %se is tri3 this wee6 to try andreba#ance its e?3orts to 2hina away &rom raw materia#s, #i6e soybeans and iron ores,and towards more man%&act%red goods$ Brazi# is trying to mo5e its economy %3 the5a#%e chain and brea6ing into the 2hinese mar6et wi## be essentia# &or achie5ing thisgoa#$ Bilateral ties bet-een China and Brail have increased substantiall%

in recent %ears# going above and be%ond their oint !e!bership in theBR0C( bloc$ 0n


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2( )ro!otion C)s


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"dvantage C)


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1NCTe6tM the 2nited (tates Federal .overn!ent should ocusde!ocrac% pro!otion eforts on countries -hich aresuDcientl% stable and eature pro3de!ocratic reor! coalitions

that can be e!po-ered b% de!ocratic conditionalit% andassistance and assist target states in reducing theiras%!!etric interdependence on illiberal regional po-ers$

C) resolves proble!s -ith de!ocratiation ' builds credibilit%Brel &1> _-*)$ Tana A$ B`rze# ho#ds the chair &or 8%ro3ean ;ntegration at theFreie 7ni5ersitt Ber#in$ 'he recei5ed her !hD &rom the 8%ro3ean 7ni5ersity ;nstit%tein F#orence, ;ta#y in *$ From * to --(, she cond%cted her research andta%ght at the 9a? !#anc6 ;nstit%te &or


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stabilit%$ The de!ocratiation3stabilit% dile!!a see!s to be so!e-hat

unavoidable and under!ines the capacit% o Western de!ocrac%

pro!oters to design credible de!ocrac% pro!otion policies based onconsistent criteria and reliable re-ards$Howe5er, de!ocratic e6ternal actorsshould at least ackno-ledge the dile!!a and develop strategies on ho-

to balance the diferent goals$ Other-ise reproaches o double standardsand h%pocris% -ill continue to under!ine their credibilit% and legiti!ac% $

9oreo5er, de!ocrac% pro!otion should ocus on countries like Tunisia# -hich

are suDcientl% stable and eature pro3de!ocratic reor! coalitions that

can be e!po-ered b% de!ocratic conditionalit% and assistance$Where s%chconditions are absent, democracy 3romotion %s%a##y &ai#s$ Besides em3owering #ibera# &orces, Westernde!ocrac% pro!oters should assist target states in reducing theiras%!!etric interdependence on illiberal regional po-ers$Y .eorgia usedits appro6i!ation -ith 2 energ% policies to diversi% its energ% suppl%$Y/Ki6ewise, the 87 has been trying to com3ensate &or the energy c%ts im3osed by


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*e!ocrac% )ro!otion Bad '.eneric


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Terror


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.eneric!erging de!ocracies breed terroris!)iaa 9+James !iazza, De3artment o& !o#itica# 'cience, 7ni5ersity o& North2aro#ina at 2har#otte, CDo Democracy and Free 9ar6ets !rotect 7s From TerrorismQ,

;nternationa# !o#itics, --Y, (), +1*., htt3:PPwww$3a#gra5e0o%rna#s$comPi3Po%rna#P5()Pn*P&%##PYY---a$htm#, mm.

Non3partisan# acade!ic studies o the relationship bet-een politicall% andecono!icall% closed societies and terroris! generall% do not support the!odel :uravchik outlines$ ;n &act, most e!pirical studies o terroris!tend to

de!onstrate a positive relationship bet-een political de!ocrac% and

terroris! $ The re#ationshi3 between terrorism and macroeconomic 3o#icies o& states V whether they are#ibera# or state0dominated V has not been em3irica##y ana#yzed and so m%ch #ess is 6nown abo%t how 3romotion o&economic &reedom might aect terrorism$ 8%ban6 and Weinberg +;(, --i. and 'chmid +*. arg%e that rather

than ser5ing as a b%#war6 against terrorism, de!ocratic governance e6acerbates terroristactivit% b% providing a -ide range o avenues through -hich radicals can

advance their political agendas through# +propaganda b% deed $ 'chmid +;.e?3#ains that an open and ree !ediaV a centra# L%a#ity o& democratic go5ernance V acilitatesthe co!!unication obective that all terrorist groups have -hile thes%ste! o legal rights institutionalied in !ost de!ocracies !oreefectivel% shield terrorist suspects and perpetrators ro! detection#apprehension and prosecution$ *e!ocracies also acilitate theunrestricted and un!onitored !ove!ent o people# creation o reeassociations and ac7uisition o -eaponsS all o -hich assist terroristgroups$ 9ore0 o5er, the #egitimacy o& democratic go5ernment rests %#timate#y on the 3%b#ics 3erce3tion o& howwe## it can 3rotect its citizens, and in a democracy citizens can 3%nish e#ected ocia#s at the ba##ot bo? &or &ai#%re to

3rotect the 3%b#ic$ This 7ualit% o public responsiveness !akes de!ocracies !ore-illing to negotiate -ith terrorists$ ;n two statistica# st%dies o& the 3resence o& terrorist gro%3sin co%ntries, 8%ban6 and Weinberg +*(, --i. 5a#idated these 3ro3ositions in obser5ing that &rom Wor#d War ;; to

;Y1, !ore terrorist groups -ere ound in de!ocracies than in non3de!ocracies$ The researchers also ound that no !atter ho- durable orstable the de!ocrac% in 7uestion is# it is !ore likel% to have terroristactivit% in it than a non3de!ocrac%$2om3atib#e res%#ts were 3rod%ced by !iazza +--1. in atime0series ana#ysis o& 9idd#e 8astern states and to an e?tent by Ki +--(., a#tho%gh his st%dy did "nd that whi#es3eci"c com3onents o& democracy, s%ch as go5ernment e?ec%ti5e constraints, increased the 3robabi#ity o&terrorism, democratic 3artici3ation red%ced it$ 8yerman +*Y. adds com3#e?ity to the L%estion in his em3irica#st%dy o& terrorist acts &rom *MY to *YM$ 7sing a series o& statistica# ana#yses, he &o%nd that two ty3es o& stateswere most im3er5io%s to terrorist attac6s, we##0estab#ished democracies and entrenched dictatorshi3s$ Howe5er,

ne- non3consolidated de!ocracies -ere actuall% !ore likel% to e6perienceterroris!in 8yermans st%dy, 3rod%cing a non#inear re#ationshi3 between terrorism and degree o& democracyand dictatorshi3$

)ro!oting de!ocrac% increases terrorsi!)iaa 9+James !iazza, De3artment o& !o#itica# 'cience, 7ni5ersity o& North2aro#ina at 2har#otte, CDo Democracy and Free 9ar6ets !rotect 7s From TerrorismQ,;nternationa# !o#itics, --Y, (), +1*., htt3:PPwww$3a#gra5e0o%rna#s$comPi3Po%rna#P5()Pn*P&%##PYY---a$htm#, mm.
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Credibilit%


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:iddle astLack o 2( credibilit% deters de!ocratiation ' onl% ocused on2( interestsJinnebusch &1>_9arch (, -*)$


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*e!ocrac% pro!otion in the :iddle ast ails ' the -ar onterror has destro%ed 2( credibilit% in the region*urac and Cavatorta &8;_Dr incent D%rac #ect%res in 9idd#e 8ast !o#iticsand De5e#o3ment in the 7ni5ersity 2o##ege D%b#in 'choo# o& !o#itics and;nternationa#


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-hich "!erican policies arethemse#5es part o the proble!in the 9idd#e 8ast$ B%treusal to recognie the relevance o 2( policies in relation to the0srael!a#estine L%estion, the war on 0ra7# and the +-ar on terror& has the conse7uence that

7' 3o#icy0ma6ers &ai#, or re&%se, to see the e?tent to which the credibilit% o the 2( as an agent

o de!ocrac%3romotion in the 9idd#e 8ast is called into 7uestion, both within the region and

witho%t$ Oet, as Nee3 obser5es, the 2( has lost all +!oral standing in the e%es o!ost "rabs ollo-ing its%ncritica# support or 0sraeli repression o the)alestinians, its in5asion o& 0ra7# andthe ab%se o& 3risoners at "bu .hraib&$1 Howe5er, thegreatest diDcult%7' 3o#icy on democracy 3romotion &aces in the 3ost0'e3tember **, --*, era ste!s

ro! the logic o the +-ar on terroris!& $ The Nationa# 'ec%rity 'trategy o& the 7' &rom theo%tset identi"es the need to strengthen a##iances to de&eat g#oba# terrorism$Y Howe5er, herein #ies the 3rob#em$

9ost commentators are agreed that the !ost obvious bene5ciaries o politicalliberaliation in the :iddle ast -ould be 0sla!ist, and to a #esser e?tent, nationa#isto33osition &orces$ For e?am3#e, Ga%se arg%es that &%rther democratization in the 9idd#e 8ast wo%#d most #i6e#ygenerate ;s#amist go5ernments #ess inc#ined to coo3erate with the 7nited 'tates on im3ortant 3o#icy goa#s $$$

Jo-ever# these are precisel% the orces that -ould oppose not onl% the 2(-ar on terroris! but also !an% other aspects o 2( oreign polic% in the

region, not #east the American 3osition on !a#estine$ This means that there is a gaping

contradiction at the heart o 2( de!ocrac% pro!otion in the 9idd#e 8ast$

(uccessul pro!otion o de!ocratic political reor! clearl% -ill bene5t theene!ies o the -ar on terror and the -ar on terror is a non3negotiableele!ent o the oreign polic% o this 2( ad!inistration$The necessary tensionbetween maintaining the g#oba# coa#ition against terrorism and the democracy im3erati5e was recognized ear#y bysome$ ;n a reection on the im3#ications o& the e5ents o& 'e3tember **, --*, &or the &%t%re direction o& 7' &oreign

3o#icy, 'te3hen Wa#t arg%ed that because the 2nited (tates needs help ro! anu!ber o states and groups -ith poor hu!an rights records $$$ the -ar onterroris! -ill re7uire it to do-ngrade its concern or hu!an rights tem3orari#y$/- 4ne o& the res%#ts o& this is what has been characterized as the instr%menta#ization o& democracy in

7' &oreign 3o#icy$ Rather than being interested in de!ocratic reor! or its o-nsake# the 2( propounds de!ocrac% in the hope and e6pectation that it -illdeliver outco!es -hich the 2( desires$ Dennis


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Russia Backlash


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ThreatRussia uses !ilitar%# econo!ic# and energ% threats to counter2( de!ocrac% pro!otion eforts ' leads to conicts like2kraine

Baba%an &1>_Ne##i Babayan is a senior researcher at the 2enter &orTransnationa#


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!ove served as a clear -arning to "r!enia that Russia !a% no longer

support it in the ra!e-ork o the conict$ Regularl% pla%ing t-o sides o

the conict against each other using the pro!ise or threat o ar!s sales #

Russia has !anaged to keep the (outh Caucasus divided and hinderedregional proects o the 87 and the 2($ Armenia bac63eda##ed on AA a&ter two years o& 3re3arations

and 3re5io%s#y e?3ressed con"dence by the Armenian a%thorities that Cthe AAs with some 3artner co%ntries,inc#%ding Armenia, wi## be initia##ed in No5ember -*/$M) The 87 de#egation in Armenia con"rmed that the #atterwas on trac6 &or signing the AA$ Former !rime 9inister Tigran 'ar6isian a#so re3eated#y arg%ed against Armenianentry into the 2%stoms 7nion, d%e to the #ac6 o& common borders with


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Trade ConictRussia eels threatened b% de!ocrac% pro!otion ' leads tointervention# !ilitar% threats# and trade -arsBaba%an &1>_Ne##i Babayan is a senior researcher at the 2enter &or

Transnationa#


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teleco!!unications# energ%# electricit% net-orks# and bankingindustries$(Y Th%s, itinter a#ia engaged in speci5c business develop!ent basedon its o-n strategic interests# ho-ever# ra!ing those as serving thedevelop!ent o its neighbours$This strateg% has underlined thee!plo%!ent o non3!ilitar% instru!ents in reinorcing RussiaEs 3o#icies and

obtaining a do!inant status in the econo!ies o its or!er satellites $ 0t hasalso presented the post3(oviet countries -ith potentiall% less cu!berso!eopportunities or econo!ic gainsM unlike 2 and 2( policies# RussiaEscooperation has not been tied to do!esticall% costl% political reor!s orlength% har!oniation processes$


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econo!ic interests)M and to so!e e6tent co!pete -ith RussiaEs gas

e6ports$ Russia pro!ised "erbaian ?serious conse7uences@ or its

participation in the 8a! and the Nab%cco 3i3e#ine 3roect and by b%ying the gas intended &or Nab%cco

basica##y #e&t the 3i3e#ine witho%t s%33#y$)1 Whi#e seeming#y a more 3ro"tab#e dea# &or Azerbaian, sellinglarge a!ounts o gas to Russia has the potential o endangering the

or!erEs e6port diversi5cation plans and decreasing its bargaining po-eragainst Russia$)Y


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China Backlash


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CC) CollapseCC) backlashes against de!ocratiation eforts3 belligerentnationalis!Chen and Uinelbach 1> _Dingding 2hen0 assistant 3ro&essor o& Go5ernment

and !%b#ic Administration at the 7ni5ersity o& 9aca%, atrin inze#bach0 associatedirector o& the G#oba# !%b#ic !o#icy ;nstit%te +G!!i. in Ber#in, 9arch -*),CDemocracy 3romotion and 2hina: b#oc6er or bystanderQhtt3:PPwww$tand&on#ine$comPdoiP&%##P*-$*-Y-P*/)*-/(1$-*($/, mm

;n the 3eriod co5ered by this s3ecia# iss%e +-**-*(I# pro3de!ocrac% activis! in China has beens!all in scale overall and onl% loosel% organied$ At the same time, the resilienceo authoritarian rule in China has been testedby economic de5e#o3ment trends, changes in2hinese 3o#itica# c%#t%re, com3etition among 2hinese #eaders, and the eects o& g#oba#ization$( Andrew Nathan obser5ed in -*/that consens%s was Cstronger than at any time since the *Y Tiananmen crisis that the resi#ience o& the a%thoritarian regime in the!eo3#es


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recent years$ This is not on#y beca%se "nancia# reg%#ations ha5e changed$ ChinaEs rapidl% increasinginternational -eight, which was &%rther acce#erated by the s%b3rime mortgage crisis in the 7' and the so5ereigndebt crisis in 8%ro3e, changed the d%na!ics o international politics# andsigni5cantl% decreased the part%3stateEs vulnerabilit% to internationalpressure$ According#y, high3ranking leaders in Beiing no- dis!iss Western

criticis! o ChinaEs governance !odel rather con5dentl%$For e?am3#e, according to

con"dentia# acco%nts o& 87 ocia#s, W% Hai#ong +since -*( 2hinas _Dingding 2hen0 assistant 3ro&essor o& Go5ernment

and !%b#ic Administration at the 7ni5ersity o& 9aca%, atrin inze#bach0 associatedirector o& the G#oba# !%b#ic !o#icy ;nstit%te +G!!i. in Ber#in, 9arch -*),CDemocracy 3romotion and 2hina: b#oc6er or bystanderQhtt3:PPwww$tand&on#ine$comPdoiP&%##P*-$*-Y-P*/)*-/(1$-*($/, mm

The )eopleEs Republic o China is both a decisive blocker as -ell as anindiferent b%stander o de!ocratiation$ ;n this artic#e, we #oo6ed at whether and how 2hina

co%nter5ai#s 87 and 7' democracy 3romotion at home and in its immediate neighbo%rhood$ ;n terms o& domestic 3o#itics, the

CC) is clearl% deter!ined to -ithstand# repress# outperor!# and

outs!art ho!e3gro-n as -ell as e6ternal pressures or de!ocratiation $ ;tis im3ossib#e to 3redict how #ong this a33roach wi## be s%stainab#e$ With regard to 2hinas &oreign 3o#icy, we tested the hy3othesisthat geostrategic interests or a 3ercei5ed ris6 o& regime s%r5i5a# at home wi## #ead the !eo3#es


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:aintains "uthoritarianis!


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Tunisia2( !aintains authoritarian regi!es in po-er regardless otheir abilit% to be de!ocratied ' Tunisia proves*urac and Cavatorta &8;_Dr incent D%rac #ect%res in 9idd#e 8ast !o#itics

and De5e#o3ment in the 7ni5ersity 2o##ege D%b#in 'choo# o& !o#itics and;nternationa#


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!romotionQ 8?amining the !arado? o& the 7' and 87 'ec%rity 'trategies: The 2aseo& Bin A#is T%nisia British Jo%rna# o& 9idd#e 8astern 't%dies, A3ri# -- /M+*., /*

'ec%rity First The 2 has been traditionall% !ore reluctant to co3operate openl%and directl% -hen it co!es to hard securit% issues, b%t the terrorist attac6s o& **'e3tember, the Derba tragedy, and the n%mero%s arrests a## o5er 8%ro3e ha5e triggered an intense debate in

8%ro3e abo%t interna# and e?terna# sec%rity meas%res in the "ght against terrorism$ ;n this conte?t, T%nisia is a3rimary a##y beca%se o& the e?3ertise o& its secret 3o#ice and its abi#ity in dismant#ing its own domestic ;s#amist

networ6$ ;t is there&ore no s%r3rise that the 2 Counter3Terroris! Coordinator announced!uch tighter co3operation -ith all the North "rican govern!ents$MY Whilethis !ight !ake sense ro! a strictl% securit%3related point o vie- in theshort0term, it sho%#d not be &orgotten that it is 3recise#y the T%nisian securit% and intelligence

services that are to bla!e or their hold on the political s%ste! and their

repression o all do!estic opposition# thereb% under!ining the long3ter!

de!ocratiation re7uire!ents the 87 3%r3orts to 3romote$ 4n its 3art, the 7' has been m%chmore acti5e in dee3ening the #in6s with the T%nisian regime with a 5iew to strengthening its coa#ition against terror$The threat o& ;s#amism in T%nisia does indeed e?ist, b%t not in the e?tremist and 5io#ent &orms that ma6e the

head#ines these days$ ;n s3ite o& this, the 2( supports the heav%handed practices o Bin

"li and Tunisia has beco!e an i!portant all% in the -ar on terror $ 'ince **

'e3tember --*, contacts bet-een the t-o countries have reachedunprecedented depth#with Former 'ecretary o& 'tate !owe## 5isiting T%nisia in --/ and T%nisianForeign 9inister 5isiting Washington in --($ D%ring that 5isit the 2( (tate *epart!ent declaredthat +Tunisia has been a voice or !oderation$ Tunisia has been a voice orregional har!on%$ Tunisia has been a voice or putting eforts andresources into develop!ent&$M 4n its 3art, the T%nisian go5ernment asserts that +Tunisia andthe 2( have been strengthened -ithin the ra!e-ork o co!!onadherence to the values o libert%# de!ocrac% and ree enterprise&$1- Thestrength o& these days was con"rmed when Bin A#i 5isited Washington in Febr%ary --( and !resident B%sh #a%ded

him &or his eorts in the "ght against terrorism$1* As we can see, de!ocratiation o the countr%

should be at the heart o 2(3Tunisian relations because# according to theBush doctrine# it is onl% through de!ocrac% that terroris! -ill beulti!atel% deeated$ ;n &act, co0o3eration occ%rs in the mi#itary and inte##igence domains,1 whi#e

:)0 unding does not appear to !ake an% i!pact on the Tunisian political

s%ste!$ Again, short3ter! goals override such long3ter! belies$ The 2 and

the 2( share the sa!e obective and thereore their de!ocrac% pro!otion

strategies are bound to ail $The !aintenance o the international status

7uo # the enorce!ent o neo3liberal econo!ic arrange!ents and the

absolute control over the de5nition o -hat constitutes securit% !ake it

i!possible or these t-o actors to credibl% pro!ote de!ocrac% as the 3robab#eo%tcome is #i6e#y to throw %3 3arties and mo5ements that wo%#d contest 3recise#y s%ch obecti5es$ !re5io%s

e?3eriences are not enco%raging in this sense$ The F;' 5ictory in the A#gerian e#ection in December ** weregreeted with st%nned 3reocc%3ation in Western ca3ita#s and the s%bseL%ent mi#itary co%3 de3ri5ing the F;' o&

3ower was hai#ed in the West as the means to sa5e democracy$1/ The !ore recent case o theshunning o Ja!as obe%s to the sa!e logic o +bo%cotting& -hatde!ocrac% in the region produces because it does not conor! to the 2and 2( vision o international peace and securit%$Th%s, in terms o& obtaining bothsec%rity and materia# gains, T%nisia 3ro5ides the 3er&ect 3aradigmatic 3artner: economica##y integrated, b%t non0threatening +%n#i6e the Asian tigers., co0o3erati5e on sec%rity matters, b%t not de5io%s +%n#i6e 'a%di Arabia or


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!a6istan., mi#itari#y wea6 and accommodating, b%t s%cient#y strong to withstand 3otentia# ;s#amist 3ress%re, and"na##y, doci#e when it comes to the Arab;srae#i conict$ ;& on#y the who#e o& the Arab wor#d co%#d be %st #i6e T%nisia


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Backsliding


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.enericBacksliding -ill produce electoral authoritarianis!# notdictatorship4it&s the ne- nor!$(hirah 1< _ and


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H%mbo#dt07ni5ersitt z% Ber#in and the 7ni5ersity Heide#berg$ CThe nob#e west andthe dirty restQ Western democracy 3romoters and i##ibera# regiona# 3owersDemocratization, :/, )*0)/)

The87 and 2( ailed at pro!oting de!ocrac% -hen the% supported

authoritarian elites in Tunisia and g%pt beore the% -ere s-ept a-a% b%

the "rab (pring# re!ained silent -hen a de!ocraticall% elected

govern!ent -as overthro-n b% the !ilitar% in g%pt# and stood b% -hen

authoritarian regi!es violentl% suppressed political opposition in Bahrain

and (%ria $ This &ai#%re cannot be attrib%ted to


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3#ace, but can also boost or stabilie the po-er o incu!bent autocratic

elites$ Ki6ewise, illiberal po-ers !a% not onl% ail in pulling transition or

de!ocratiing countries a-a% ro! Western de!ocrac%# the% !a% end up

pushing the! in this ver% direction $


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"utocrac% .ood


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)revents Conict)art%3based autocrac% best prevents civil conict through abalance o coercion and co3optationFelde


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ar!ed challenges to their authorit%$ 8?3#oring these res%#ts &%rther, howe5er, ; 5nd that!ulti3part% electoral autocracies have !inor conicts but tend to avoidlarge3scale civil -ars$4ne e?3#anation is that the need &or e#ectora# s%33ort in these regimes restrains thedictators %se o& &orce$ Kast#y, 0 5nd that the efect o political transitions inauthoritarian regi!es is !ore co!ple6 than assu!ed b% previous

research, and conditioned by the ty3e o& regime ta6ing 3ower$

For !ilitar% regi!es# the risk islo-est i!!ediatel% ater a regi!e change and then increases over ti!e$The opposite see!s to be the case or !ulti3part% electoral autocracies$

)art% autocrac% utilies the best balance o coercion and co3optation4the% can channel dissent -hile also !onitoringopposition and cracking do-n -hen necessar%$Felde


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+Broo6er, ---@ Kai and '#ater, --M.$ The intrusiveness o the part% institution intoall aspects o civil# !ilitar%# and political lie !akes it e6tre!el% diDcult to!obilie an eDcient rebel orce able to overthro- the govern!ent$ 0tprovides single3part% regi!es -ith a orceul inrastructure to suppressopposition -ithin the -ider societ%# and -ithin the state apparatus itsel+'#ater, --/.$


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)revents Terror"utocracies ke% to co!bat terroris!3 de!ocracies not efectiveWilson and )iaa 1, _9atthew 2$ Wi#son, James A$ !iazza, !ennsy#5ania'tate 7ni5ersity, CA%tocracies and Terrorism: 2onditioning 8ects o& A%thoritarian


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some &orm o& re3ression to co%nter or e#iminate threats +Da5en3ort --1.$


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Transition War


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.enericTransition to de!ocrac% is -orse than transition to autocrac%3de!ocratiation results in -ar:ans5eld and (n%der < _8dward 9ans"e#d0 H%m


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witho%t instit%ting &%## democratic acco%ntabi#ity to the a5erage 5oter$ 8?3#oiting what remains o& their go5ernmenta#, economic, and media 3ower,

these elites !a% succeed in establishing ter!s o inclusion in politics thatorce opposition groups to accept nationalis! as the co!!on currenc% opublic discourse$ For e?am3#e, Bis!arck and his successors in )russia and.er!an% used nationalist# !ilitar%# and colonial issues to rall% !iddleclass and rural voters against the -orking classeswhi#e 3er3et%ating a system o& r%#e that 6e3t the3ower to name _8nd !age go5ernment ministers in the hands o& the hereditary aiser rather than the e#ected #egis#at%re$ * 9oreo5er, whi#e ederalis! may generate certain bene"ts &or mat%re democracies, the decentra#ization and &ragmentation o& 3ower in ne-l%de!ocratiing regi!es is likel% to e6acerbate the proble!s attendant tode!ocratic transitions$ "s the blood% breakups o /ugoslavia and the(oviet 2nion sho-# divisive nationalis! is especiall% likel% -hen thestateEs po-er is dispersed a!ong ethnicall% de5ned ederal regions $ Hence, noneo& the mechanisms that 3rod%ce the democratic 3eace among mat%re democracies o3erate in the same &ashion in new#y democratizing states$ ;ndeed, in

their im3er&ect condition, these mechanisms ha5e the o33osite eect$ ;n short, ne-l% de!ocratiing countries otene6perience a -eakening o central state institutionsbeca%se their o#d instit%tions ha5e eroded andtheir new ones are on#y 3artia##y de5e#o3ed$ "utocratic po-er is in decline 5is0j05is both e#ite interest gro%3s and massgro%3s, and de!ocratic institutions lack the strength to integrate thesecontending interests and vie-s$ Not a## new#y democratizing states s%er &rom instit%tiona# wea6ness, b%t &or those that

do the res%#ting 3o#itica# dynamic creates conditions that enco%rage hosti#ities$ ;n the &ace o& this instit%tiona# de"cit, 3o#itica# #eaders re#y on e?3edientstrategies to co3e with the 3o#itica# im3asse o& democratization$ '%ch tactics, which o&ten inc#%de the a33easement o& nationa#ist 5eto gro%3s or

com3etition among &actions in nationa#ist bidding wars +or both., can breed reckless oreign policies and the

resort to -ar $

*e!ocratic Transitions escalate to transition -ars:ans5eld ;_8dward D, 2hristo3her H$ Browne 2enter &or ;nternationa# !o#itics,7ni5ersity o& !ennsy#5ania, Jac6 'nyder, De3artment o& !o#itica# 'cience, 2o#%mbia7ni5ersity, C!athways to War in Democratic Transitions, ;nternationa# 4rganization,o#%me M/ , ;ss%e -, A3ri# --, 33 /Y*0/-, 2ambridge Jo%rna#s, mm

We ha5e arg%ed in 8#ecting to Fight and other writings that an incom3#ete de!ocratic transitionincreases the risk o international and civil -ar in countries that lack theinstitutional capacit% to sustain de!ocratic politics$ The co!bination oincreasing !ass political participation and -eak political institutionscreates the !otive and the opportunit% or both rising and declining elitesto pla% the nationalist card in an atte!pt to rall% popular support againstdomestic and &oreign rivals$ki3in Narang and


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involve!ent orincom3#ete#y de!ocratiing stateswith wea6 3o#itica# instit%tions between*Y*M and *# the greater propensit% o de!ocratiing states to engage in!ilitaried interstate disputes# and the increased risk o civil -ar ininco!pletel% de!ocratiing states$ We ha5e a#so 3%b#ished case st%dies o& a## o& thedemocratizing great 3owers since the French


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Russia*e!ocratiers participate in intense nationalis! ' sparksinternational -ars and adventuris! ' speci5call% Russia:ans5eld ;+8dward D, 2hristo3her H$ Browne 2enter &or ;nternationa# !o#itics,

7ni5ersity o& !ennsy#5ania, Jac6 'nyder, De3artment o& !o#itica# 'cience, 2o#%mbia7ni5ersity, C!athways to War in Democratic Transitions, ;nternationa# 4rganization,o#%me M/, ;ss%e - , A3ri# --, 33 /Y*0/-, 2ambridge Jo%rna#s, mm.

4%r theory disting%ishes between two 6inds o& incom3#ete#y democratizing states: +*. those that ha5e genera##ywea6 3o#itica# instit%tions and +. those that ha5e strong administrati5e instit%tions b%t wea6 instit%tions &or

re3resentati5e go5ernment$*- ;ncom3#etede!ocratiers -ith -eak institutions areprone to belligerent ethnic nationalis! or sectarianis! that inducesneighboring states to attack$ ;n s%ch settings, !oves to e6pand popular politicalparticipation oten spur the nationalis! o ethnic !inorities# -hich see achance to escape do!ination b% culturall% alien groups that control thestate$At the same time, ethnic or statist nationalis! o do!inant groups is also

likel% to intensi% in an efort to regain control $11 0nternational violence!a% arise because politicall% !obilied ethnic populations straddleinternational borders and because nationalis! !akes the diplo!ac% o thede!ocratiing state rigid or belligerent$ Recent cases sho-ing this patterninclude the triggering o Russian attack b% de!ocratiing .eorgias ri5a#nationa#isms and JebollahEs provocation o 0sraels attac6 on democratizing Kebanon$k"diferent path-a% to -ar is !ore co!!on a!ong inco!pletede!ocratiers -ith strong ad!inistrative institutionsb%t wea6 or biasedre3resentati5e ones, s%ch as Germany %nder 2hance##or 4tto 5on Bismarc6 and aiser Wi#he#m$ '%ch states are

more #i6e#y to ha5e &air#y ad5anced economies, dierentiated socia# c#ass str%ct%res, and strong mi#itaries$ The%are a#so more #i6e#y to develop -hat -e called counterrevolutionar% nationalis!$ ;nthis 3attern, ruling elites are struggling to retain po-er in the ace o rapid

social change$ Nationalist ideolog% ofers the! an attractive alternative toclass3based appeals# and the e6aggeration o oreign threats and rivalriescan help the! rall% popular support$ (trong !ilitar% institutions provide ate!pting tool to reinorce this strateg% o rule$ This kind o de!ocratieris#ess #i6e#y to be the target o& attac6s than those with genera##y wea6 domestic instit%tions and more likel% toinitiate -ars, in the narrow sense o& crossing the border "rst with their reg%#ar army$* 8?am3#es disc%ssedin detai# in 8#ecting to Fight inc#%de nineteenth0cent%ry France as we## as !r%ssiaPGermany$ 9ore recent e?am3#esinc#%de states that a#ternate between mi#itary and ci5i#ian regimes s%ch as 3ostWor#d War ;; T%r6ey and Argentina$


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:iddle ast!pirics )rove *e!ocratic Transitions lead to transition -ars#:id3east -ar# and prolieration:ans5eld ;+8dward D, 2hristo3her H$ Browne 2enter &or ;nternationa# !o#itics,

7ni5ersity o& !ennsy#5ania, Jac6 'nyder, De3artment o& !o#itica# 'cience, 2o#%mbia7ni5ersity, C!athways to War in Democratic Transitions, ;nternationa# 4rganization Po#%me M/ P ;ss%e - P A3ri# --, 33 /Y*0/-, 2ambridge Jo%rna#s, mm.

Narang and Ne#son arg%e that recent history oers &ew, i& any, e?am3#es that s%33ort o%r theory$ To address this

iss%e, -e consider the set o -ars that have broken out since 1;;


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*e!ocrac% in the !iddle east is inefective or checkingconictJirsh 11> +9ichae# Hirsh, chie& corres3ondent &or Nationa# Jo%rna# with e?3ertiseon the war on terror, inc#%ding on0the0gro%nd re3orting, CWhen Democracy DoesntWor6, *P*)P*(, htt3:PPwww$nationa#o%rna#$comPde&ensePwhen0democracy0doesn0t0

wor60-*(-**), mm.

B%t the ball o libert% is looking prett% deated these da%s# especiall% in the:ideast$ Des3ite m%ch editoria#izing that ho#ds a neo0iso#ationist 4bama res3onsib#e &or this, the trend has #itt#eto do with 7$'$ 3o#icy$ ;t has &ar more to do with the emerging rea#ity that not on#y isnt de!ocrac%a 3anacea,it so!eti!esVa3ostasy a#ertlVdoesnEt -ork -ell at all$ ;ndeed, insome %nready 3arts o& theg#obe #i6e the "rab -orld# de!ocrac% !a% not be the best -a% or-ard, at #eastright now$kThat is especiall% true in countries -here tribal and sectarianpolitics still rule the national sensibilit%# and the groups that -in electionsare !ainl% interested in stiing# disenranchising# or even killing their out3balloted rivals, as in 8gy3t, ;raL, and 5ery #i6e#y 'yria$ !#ain#y, the 4bama administration has ada3ted its3o#icy according#y$ We are th%s at a high tide o& rea#3o#iti6$k
http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/when-democracy-doesn-t-work-20140115http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/when-democracy-doesn-t-work-20140115http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/when-democracy-doesn-t-work-20140115http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/when-democracy-doesn-t-work-20140115


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"TM (tudies Fla-edOtto!an !pire proves transition -ars ' doesn&t !ake studiesa-ed:ans5eld ;+8dward D, 2hristo3her H$ Browne 2enter &or ;nternationa# !o#itics,

7ni5ersity o& !ennsy#5ania, Jac6 'nyder, De3artment o& !o#itica# 'cience, 2o#%mbia7ni5ersity, C!athways to War in Democratic Transitions, ;nternationa# 4rganization,o#%me M/, ;ss%e - , A3ri# --, 33 /Y*0/-, 2ambridge Jo%rna#s, mm.

Narang and NelsonEs principal criti7ue o our statistical anal%sis is that&o%rcases o& incom3#ete democratization and war in5o#5ement by the Otto!an !pirein *Y11, ***, **,and **/ are statistical outliers that e6ert disproportionate leverage on ourresults$ They assert that Cthese obser5ations are inconsistent with the 9ans"e#d and 'nyder theory, since ineach case the 4ttoman 8m3ire [ was being re3eated#y attac6ed and am3%tated by other 3owers$*/ k0n act#as we show be#ow, the Otto!an cases conor! e6tre!el% -ell to the causalpath-a%s to -ar that -e e6pect or inco!plete de!ocratiers -ith -eakinstitutions$ "s such# there is no reason to discard these cases$ 'tatisticians ha5edisting%ished between two ty3es o& o%t#iers: +*. discordant obser5ations, which are discre3ant or s%r3rising, and +.contaminant obser5ations, which are 3rod%cts o& a dierent data0generating 3rocess than the remaining

obser5ations in a sam3#e$ (tatisticians and !ethodologists are virtuall% unani!ousin reco!!ending against discarding an observation unless a researcher isabsolutel% sure that the observation is a conta!inant$ 9oreo5er# the% agreethat this evaluation can onl% be conducted -ith considerable substantivekno-ledge about the !atter at hand$*( The historical record reveals thatthese cases are not conta!inant observations$kThe Otto!an casese6e!pli% the dangers o inco!plete de!ocratiation -hen institutional-eaknesses create the !otive and the opportunit% or ethnic !inoritiesand state elites to !obilie popular support through nationalist appeals$The 4ttomans democratizing re&orms ga5e minorities a chance to organize aro%nd ethnic identities and to #in6 %3

with c%#t%ra##y simi#ar gro%3s abroad$ At the same time, the re&orms were designed to rationa#ize, strengthen, andcentra#ize state 3ower in the hands o& T%r6ish nationa#ists, which threatened the minorities a%tonomy andmoti5ated them to rebe#$


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they had agreed to, might be t%rned into a noose &or themse#5es$ Whi#e the e?cited mob in the streets ca##ed &or war, the ministeria# co%nci# re5ised the3eace &orm%#a$*k Narang and Ne#son s%ggest that the ***, **, and **/ wars sho%#d be co##a3sed into a sing#e case$ Howe5er, standard historica#st%dies and databases a## #ist them as distinct wars$ The three wars had dierent initiators, a##iances, and o%tcomes$ ;n the First Ba#6an War, 'erbia,B%#garia, and Greece attac6ed and de&eated the 4ttomans$ A&ter a ten0wee6 ga3 "##ed with %ns%ccess&%# negotiations o5er the s3oi#s o& 5ictory, B%#gariaattac6ed 'erbia to initiate the 'econd Ba#6an War$ The 4ttomans then attac6ed B%#garia, e?3e##ed non09%s#im 3o3%#ations &rom 5ario%s towns and cities,

retoo6 the city o& Adriano3#e, e5en in5aded the territory o& B%#garia 3ro3er, and retained many o& these gains in the 3ostwar sett#ement$k ;n short ,

the /oung Turk period# as -ith its precursor in 19H# illustrates !an% othe causal !echanis!s o our theor%$ 0nco!plete de!ocratiation

occurring in the ace o -eak institutions deepened political actionalis!#pushed state elites to use nationalist appeals to legiti!ate and strengthentheir rule# touched of a co!petition bet-een nationalis!s propounded b%ne- and old elites# created incentives or internal groups to link up -ithe6ternal oes# and triggered ethnic violence# genocide# and -ar$ (incethese are precisel% the causal !echanis!s that link inco!pletede!ocratiation and cross3border violence in various conte!porar% cases4including .eorgia# )akistan# and the :iddle ast4the Otto!an cases aree6e!plar%# not outliers to be discarded$X

)reer our ev ' their studies ignore de!ocratic -ar

.eis 1,+Anna, 3ro&essor o& 3o#itica# science at 4tto05on0G%eric6e 7ni5ersity, andHara#d 9%##er, 8?ec%ti5e Director and Head o&


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Wars are even !ore likel% in the uture ' ourth -ave -illinvolve ideological challenges:ans5eld >+8dward D, 2hristo3her H$ Browne 2enter &or ;nternationa# !o#itics,7ni5ersity o& !ennsy#5ania, Jac6 'nyder, De3artment o& !o#itica# 'cience, 2o#%mbia7ni5ersity, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, --), 3$*-,

mm.

There is little reason to believe that the longstanding link bet-een de3!ocratiation and nationalist -ar is beco!ing obsolete$ 4n the contrary, uturetransitions !a% be even !ore diDcult and dangerous$ The Sthird wa5e o&democratization in the *Y-s and *-s conso#idated demo0 cratic regimes main#y in the richer co%ntries o& 8astern

8%ro3e, Katin America, 'o%thern A&rica, and 8ast Asia$ " ourth -ave -ould involve !orechallenging casesM countries that are poorer# !ore ethnicall% di3 vided#ideologicall% !ore resistant to de!ocrac%# -ith !ore entrenchedauthoritarian elites# and -ith a !uch railer base o govern!ental institu3

tions and citien3skills$ Botched de!ocratiations in such settings could

give rise to grave threats to international peace and securit% $ Wars o de3

rnocratiation are thereore likel% to re!ain a central proble! o interna3tional relationsin the coming years$


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!erging *e!ocrac% Wars


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0srael

Regional de!ocrac% dra-s 0srael into -ar ' destro%s peacetalks

Fa-cett 1,+Ko%ise, Associate !ro&essor o& !o#itics, Wi#&rid na33 Fe##ow, 't2atherines 2o##ege, 9arch *, -*/, International Relations of the Middle East,Goog#e Boo6s, mm.

As a res%#t o& the Arab '3ring, the )alestinian 7uestion !a% beco!e central to thecontinued nor!aliation o relations bet-een 0srael and those "rab states-ith -hich it has peace treaties, rather than the 3otentia# &or 3eace treaties$ The Western mediamay &oc%s on ;srae# and ;ran, but the "rab public has no- ound a voice in severalstates via the recent upheavals and elections, as ha5e occ%rred in T%nisia and 8gy3t$ Thespread o de!ocrac% to "rab states -ill likel% push ne- govern!ents tode!and greater 0sraeli concessions# rather than to ac7uiesce to 2(3led

peace efortsthat ha5e &ai#ed$ '%ch a change in re#ationshi3s has a#0 ready occ%rred between ;srae# andT%r6ey, which has c%t mi#itary ties to ;srae# o5er an ;srae# commando assa%#t on re#ie& shi3s heading to Gaza &romT%r6ish 3orts in --$ Arab media a#ready com3are ;srae#s re3ression o& !a#estinian 3rotests to the Assad regimescr%shing o& demonstrations in 'yria$ The sit%ation is &ar more %id than the a33arent stando between ;srae# andthe !a#estinians wo%#d s%ggest, 3rimari#y owing to maor changes in Arab state systems, as witnessed by 8gy3ts

9%s#im Brothers ca##ing &or ;;amas moderation$ "s this situation develops, its o%tcome admitted#y%ncertain, the 2(40sraeli links regarding the peace process# bound in part b%their de!ocratic political s%ste!s# !a% 5nd the!selves challenged b% therise o de!ocrac% else-here in the region$ The age o co!pliant "rabdictators bo-ing to Washington&s -ill on the "rab40sraeli peace process#as -ell as other issues$ #!a% be on the verge o disappearing$


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and socia# modernization is a#so im3ortant in order to b%i#d democracy$ As Gat shows, de!ocrac% in itsel is not

able to lead to a de!ocratic peace unless such actors have ul5lled in

advance$ ;n this regard, it has been &o%nd that economica##y de5e#o3ed democracies ha5e been &ar more #i6e#y than 3oordemocracies to be 3eace&%# toward one another$-) 'imi#ar to 9ans"e#d and 'nyder, 9eierhenrich a#so has the same conc#%sion$

He arg%es that the ne- !illenniu! sa- urther evidence o the dangers ode!ocratiation$ The pro3de!ocratic intervention in "ghanistan# ollo-ingthe attacks o 11 (epte!ber


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eas% to -in and cheap to 5ght$ A more 3#a%sib#e rationa#istic arg%ment &or their wars is that elites intransitional states are ga!bling or resurrection# that is, taking a risk atlong odds that oreign polic% conrontations -ill help the! avoid losingpo-er$Ded%cti5e arg%ments o& this ty3e 3ro3ose that e#ites in&ormationa# ad5antages re#ati5e to their mass a%dience he#3them carry o%t s%ch gamb#es$ /* 8m3irica# research s%ggests that the strength o& the incenti5e &or downward#y mobi#e e#ites togamb#e de3ends on the regime ty3e and on the e#ites abi#ity to %se their in%ence o5er the media to ma6e the rec6#ess strategy

seem 3#a%sib#e to their constit%ents$ / 4%r arg%ment e?3#ains why the !otive and opportunit% to usethis strateg% are especiall% likel% to be present -hen inco!pletetransitions to de!ocrac% occur in states -ith -eak institutions$ ;n short, elitesin ne-l% de!ocratiing statesty3ica##y &ace the dic%#t 3o#itica# tas6 o& cobb#ing together a heterogeneo%scoa#ition o& e#ite and 3o3%#ar s%33orters in a conte?t o& wea6#y de5e#o3ed democratic instit%tions$ 9any o& the e?3edients that they

ado3t, s%ch as #ogro##ed o5ercommitments and nationa#ist o%tbidding strategies, heighten the risk o e6ternal

conict$ These o%tcomes are most #i6e#y when threatened e#ites interests cannot be easi#y ada3ted to a &%##y democraticsetting and when mass 3o#itica# 3artici3ation increases be&ore the basic &o%ndation &or democratic instit%tions is "rm#y in 3#ace$7nder s%ch conditions, 3o#itica# entre3rene%rs ha5e both the incenti5e and the o33ort%nity to 3romote conict0ca%sing nationa#istmyths$ We &oc%s on two distinct 3hases in the 3rocess o& democratization: the transition &rom a%tocracy to a 3artia##y democraticregime and the shi&t to a &%##y instit%tiona#ized democracy$ As we e?3#ain &%rther be#ow, these 3hases are meas%red %sing se5era#

indicators o& regime ty3e deri5ed &rom the !o#ity ;;; database de5e#o3ed by eith Jaggers and Ted


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achieve avorable results in )ales3 tine# Uash!ir# and other disputed areas$A#tho%gh m%ch o& the be##iger0 ence o& the ;s#amic 3%b#ic is &%e#ed by resentment o& the 7$'$0bac6ed a%0 thoritarian

regimes %nder which many o& them #i5e, si!pl% renouncing these authoritarians andpressing or a 7uick de!ocratic opening is un3 likel% to lead to peaceulde!ocratic consolidations$ 4n the contrary, un3 leashing 0sla!ic !ass opinionthrough a sudden de!ocratiation could onl% raise the likelihood o -ar$C

"ll o the risk actors are thereM the !e3 dia and civil societ% groups areina!!ator%# as old elites and rising oppositions tr% to clai! the !antleo 0sla!ic or nationalist !ilitanc%$@ The rule o la- is -eak# and e6istingcorrupt bureaucracies cannot serve a de!ocratic ad!inistration properl%$The bo%ndaries o& states are mis0 matched with those o& nations, !aking an% push or nationalsel3 deter!ination raught -ith peril$

*e!ocratic transitions in the :iddle ast escalate to -arFa-cett 1,+Ko%ise, Associate !ro&essor o& !o#itics, Wi#&rid na33 Fe##ow, 't

2atherines 2o##ege, 9arch *, -*/, International Relations of the Middle East,Goog#e Boo6s, mm.

Opti!is! that the establish!ent o liberal de!ocrac% -ould bring peaceto the :iddle ast !ight -ell be te!pered b% 7uantitative studies thatinvestigate the likelihood o -ar during the initial stages ode!ocratiation$ 8dward :ans5eld andJac6 (n%der +*). sho- that, e5entho%gh mat%re democracies seem to ha5e no chance o& going to war with oneanother, states that are ust starting to de!ocratie ace intense pressureto act belligerentl%$And i& things were not a#ready m%r6y eno%gh, the7uantitative literature also de!onstrates that dictatorships are ust aslikel% to keep the peace a!ong the!selves as are de!ocratic regi!es

+!eceny and Beer --.$


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:arket Reor! ' :iddle ast


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Net-orks o )rivilegeForced de!ocratiation re3entrenches net-orks o privilege#co!bining -ith lack o 2( credibilit% to under!inede!ocratiation

Jinnebusch &1>_9arch (, -*)$


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-ere !anipulated to e!po-er bourgeois partiess%33orti5e o& neo0#ibera#ism andmargina#ize 3o3%#ist ones, with sa&ety 5a#5e o33osition 3arties &or the midd#e c#ass to#erated on#y within strict #imits@and cor3oratist arrangements, which in the 3o3%#ist era had a##owed mass organizations access to decisionma6ers,

becoming instr%ments &or disci3#ining and demobi#izing mass strata$(/ 0t -as against this ?post3populist authoritarianis!@ that the "rab intiada o& -** !obilied$ A%thoritarian3ersistence was rein&orced by the ro#e o& the region in the wor#d system$ *e!ocrac% develops -hen

govern!ents need their citienr% to pa% ta6es or to 5ght in -ars but in the:iddle ast !an% states depended on the outside: on rents+oi# re5en%es or &oreignaid. in lieu o ta6es and on oreign basesand sec%rity treaties instead o citien

ar!ies$ *e!ocrac% achieves hege!on% -hen associated -ith nationalis! ,

as in the French and American re5o#%tions@ but :N" regi!es oreited nationalist

legiti!ac% through their align!ent -ith the 2( , which was, with ;srae#, the most

%n3o3%#ar state in 9idd#e 8ast 3%b#ic o3inion$(( Th%s, -here de!ocratiation even partl%proceeded in :N"# it unleashed antiWestern or anti30sraeli senti!entsthat challenged regi!es& Western3aligned oreign policies and -hich

0sla!ic !ove!ents e6ploited, pro!pting a halt or reversal o these

e6peri!ents$ The case o Gordan sho-smost dramatica##y ho- a regi!e&sresponsiveness to Western de!ands &or 3eace with an ;srae# %nwi##ing to concede !a#estinian

rights -as necessaril% paralleled b% a contraction o do!estic

de!ocratiation$2on5erse#y, the ?-ar on terror@ ce!ented ne- politicalalliances bet-een the 2(, Britain and France and :N" authoritarian regi!esagainst the common threat &rom radica# ;s#am$ ;n some cases +'yria., a%thoritarian %3grading too6 ad5antage o& acertain a%thoritarian so#idarity +_9arch (, -*)$


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investors to bu%%3 3rime 3arts o& 8gy3ts inrastructure and 3%b#ic ser5ices$M) ;n this conte?t,

the least bad outco!e -as the ?lo- intensit% de!ocrac% that appeared

possible in Tunisia where #ong0term Western c%#t%ra# 3enetration may indeed ha5e assisted democraticconso#idation ironica##y, even -hen the West supports the authoritarian leader, aswas the case with Ben A#i$ ;& democracy is conso#idated in T%nisia, it wi## be beca%se moderates were ab#e to reach a3act to margina#ize the radica#s on both sides, des3ite the French s%33orting anti0c#erica#ists and the G%#&

s%33orting 'a#a"sts$ B%t even in Tunisia# nostalgia set in or the stabilit% andrelative prosperit% o the Ben "li period@ all that had changed or theune!plo%ed -as increased political reedo! to e6press their rustrations$0n g%pt# -here political co!petition -as diverted ro! econo!ic inustice

to identit% issues&ramed in destabi#izing zero0s%m terms and backed b% co!petitive

intererence ro! the 2(# 'a%di Arabia and Eatar, the result -asa hybrid regime: mi?ing

li!ited political pluralis! -ith doses o authoritarian po-er needed to

!anage identit% conicts and turn back de!ands or social usticethatcould not be acco!!odated in a global neo3liberal econo!ic order$


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Neo3"uthoritarianis!Neoliberalis!Forced de!ocratiation b% the 2( leads to neo3authoritarianis! and a de3politicied societ%+note this card says neo#ibera#ism is bad.

Jinnebusch &1>_9arch (, -*)$


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activists# to spread nor!s do!esticall%$ H%ntington*( identi"ed a Csnowba##ing eect inwhich the de3legiti!ation o authoritarian governance !ade de!ocrac%appear to be the onl% legiti!ate or! o rule and


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have the inside track in elections because the% represent a a!iliarideolog% that has not been discredited in the !inds o a !aorit% o:usli!s$ We can no longer aford to be bound b% a Cold War argu!entagainst Co!!unis!that has o%t#i5ed its %se&%#ness, es3ecia##y once #ibera#s t%rned #e&t and de&ected&rom a nationa# sec%rity consens%s$ 2niversal de!ocrac% has proven to be about as

universal a panacea as international la- or the 2nited Nations$

:iddle astern de!ocratic transition leads to regionalinstabilit%)eter 1


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Conict o 0nterests


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.eneric*e!ocratiation ails ' illiberal regional po-ers and securit%dile!!aBrel &1> _-*)$ Tana A$ B`rze# ho#ds the chair &or 8%ro3ean ;ntegration at the

Freie 7ni5ersitt Ber#in$ 'he recei5ed her !hD &rom the 8%ro3ean 7ni5ersity ;nstit%tein F#orence, ;ta#y in *$ From * to --(, she cond%cted her research andta%ght at the 9a? !#anc6 ;nstit%te &or


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*e!ocratic and non3de!ocratic regi!es -ill co!e in conict-ith their interestsBrel &1> _-*)$ Tana A$ B`rze# ho#ds the chair &or 8%ro3ean ;ntegration at theFreie 7ni5ersitt Ber#in$ 'he recei5ed her !hD &rom the 8%ro3ean 7ni5ersity ;nstit%tein F#orence, ;ta#y in *$ From * to --(, she cond%cted her research and

ta%ght at the 9a? !#anc6 ;nstit%te &or


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-hich !e!bership in the 2 and N"TO is the biggest incentive the 2 and2( have on ofer or pro!oting de!ocrac%$ 2o%nter5ai#ing 87 and 7' democracy 3romotionin its near abroad is, hence, !%tins strategy to de&end


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2 :odel Fails ' :iddle ast


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cono!ic Focuscono!ic interests perpetuate authoritarianis! -ithoutleading to reor!*urac and Cavatorta &8;_Dr incent D%rac #ect%res in 9idd#e 8ast !o#itics

and De5e#o3ment in the 7ni5ersity 2o##ege D%b#in 'choo# o& !o#itics and;nternationa#


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and his eforts to !odernie the countr%$ The 5ery #ogic o& a neo0#ibera# economic integrationthat strong#y &a5o%rs 8%ro3ean b%sinesses o5er T%nisian ones +agric%#t%re is e?c#%ded &rom the AssociationAgreement. and the en&orcement o& r%#esPreg%#ations that are 3ercei5ed to be %n&air by sectors o& T%nisian societyma6e an a##iance with Bin A#i necessary$ There is 5ery #itt#e incenti5e &or the 87 to %se the h%man rights c#a%ses thatare 3resent in the agreement to 3%nish T%nisia beca%se the economic bene"ts that the 87 now deri5es &rom there#ationshi3 might be eo3ardized with a change at the to3$ 'ome data wi## s%ce to high#ight the 3ositi5e o%tcomesthat e?ist &or the 87 when it comes to economic e?changes with T%nisia$ The 87 re3resents by &ar the #argest

mar6et &or T%nisian goods +1Y$M in -- rising to Y( in --). and the 87 is a#so the 3rimary e?3orter to T%nisiawith 1-$/ o& goods in --, rising to 1 in --), coming &rom 87 co%ntries$ The ba#ance o& 3ayments hea5i#y&a5o%rs the 87, which had a s%r3#%s o& a#most ( mi##ion T%nisian dinars in --$ ;n addition, it sho%#d be high#ightedthat the 87 a#so donates 1Y$( +--. o& a## &oreign aid to the co%ntry$M) The 87 itse#& states that T%nisia is one o&the 6ey bene"ciaries o& "nancia# co0o3eration in the 9editerranean, beca%se, than6s to its absor3tion ca3acity, ithas recei5ed aro%nd */ o& the 98DA b%dget whi#e ha5ing on#y ( o& the 3o3%#ation o& the 9editerraneanregion$MM Fina##y, it sho%#d be noted that whi#e T%nisia is high#y de3endent on the 87, T%nisian goods re3resent a

risib#e 3ercentage o& 87 im3orts$ A## this shows how strong the hand o& the 87 is 5is0a05is T%nisia$ 0t isthereore all the !ore surprising#i& we are to ta6e the 87 rhetoric at &ace 5a#%e regardingdemocratization and h%man rights, that the 2 is incapable o pressuriing Bin "li&sregi!e into pro!oting serious liberaliing and de!ocratiing reor!s$ "!ore convincing e6planation&or the absence o& 3ress%re rests on the 2&s interestto ull% integrate Tunisia in the econo!ic +region&the 87 is b%i#ding in the

9editerranean$ This region sees the 87 itse#& as the centra# actor and main bene"ciary o& the #ibera# re&ormsocc%rring in third co%ntries$ ;t is again no s%r3rise that in the Nationa# ;ndicati5e !rogramme &or T%nisia 3%b#ished by

the 87 in --), the vast bulk o the !one% the 2 provides+(Y$M. is destined tostrengthen econo!ic reor!s and !arket econo!% institutions, with the rest

going to h%man reso%rces de5e#o3ment +s%ch as 5ocationa# training. and to economic in&rastr%ct%re$ There is

al!ost nothing in the ;ndicati5e !rogramme about hu!an rights and

de!ocratiation aside &rom a brie& statement abo%t the 87s be#ie& in the 3romotion o& democracy and

res3ect &or h%man rights as core obecti5es$ ;n its --M re3ort on T%nisia, "!nest% 0nternational&ore?am3#e indicatesthe &o##owing: +a. Freedo! o e6pression re!ained severel%curtailed&@ +b. Ju!an rights deenders continued to ace harass!ent andso!eti!es ph%sical violence&, and +c. %dges acti5ities and right to &reedom o& e?3ression were&%rther restricted$M1 At the more genera# 3o#itica# #e5e#, Bin A#is contro# o5er the 3o#itica# system has a##owed him

to modi&y the constit%tion to enab#e him being re0e#ected to the 3ost o& !resident des3ite an origina# ban on more

than two mandates$ Opposition parties are not per!ittedand the popular 0sla!istpart% is still outla-ed$ A## this occ%rs des3ite the #ega# ob#igations in the Association Agreement with

the 87 to res3ect h%man rights and 3romote democratization$ The 2 has never punished

Tunisia by en&orcing the h%man rights c#a%ses 3resent in the Agreement$ 2 polic%3!aking

to-ards Tunisia indicates 7uite clearl% that !aterial interests are !ore

i!portant than de!ocratiation and hu!an rights despite the rhetorical

co!!it!ent to it in both the uropean (ecurit% (trateg% and the region3speci5c initiatives such as the recentl% launched uropean Neighbourhood)olic%$


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Botto!32p "pproach

2 de!ocrac% pro!otion relies on the 2( but is substantiall%-eaker

*urac and Cavatorta &8;_Dr incent D%rac #ect%res in 9idd#e 8ast !o#iticsand De5e#o3ment in the 7ni5ersity 2o##ege D%b#in 'choo# o& !o#itics and;nternationa#


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so !an% areas -here enhanced cooperation is sought it beco!es ver%diDcult to develop a de!ocrac% pro!otion strateg% that does not conict-ith eforts that re7uire consent and collaboration in other areas$(M This# in

turn# leads to a preerence or a cautious botto!3up approach to political

change which is e?3ressed in s%33ort &or ci5i# society organizations$ Howe5er, the li!itations o a

botto! up# gradualist approach have been !ade clear$ 2 strateg%in thisregard hasbeen criticized &or its a-ed conception o civil societ% in the :iddle ast-hich is usuall% li!ited to secular# liberal groups# e6cluding those inspiredb% religious aith and the -illingness to li!it civil support to partners thatare kno-n to and approved o b% +partner& govern!ents$(1 4ne o& the 3rimaryconseL%ences o& this a33roach is that the 2# like the 2(# is e6posed to the charge o

double standards $ 2ho%ro% arg%es that a&ter si&ting thro%gh a## the rhetoric, one can identi&y 8%ro3esthree rea# concerns in the 9editerranean: oi#, mar6ets and immigration$(Y Howe5er, e5en i& the 87 managed to

o5ercome 3rob#ems o& coherence and consistency in its 3romotion o& democracy in the 9idd#e 8ast, it is

doubtul that 2 polic% has the potential to ofer an% signi5cant

alternative to that o the 2( in the short to !ediu! ter!$ Des3ite some 3oints o&

dierence, %s%a##y e?3ressed thro%gh rhetoric rather than actions# bet-een the 2 and the 2( onaspects o oreign polic% in the region# there is little evidence o either the

desire or the capacit% on the part o the 2 to do !ore than assert its

+right& to a greater role in the region# in partnership -ith# rather than in

opposition to the 2($As a res%#t, the maor 3owers _inc#%ding 8%ro3ean ones and their 3o#icies are3ercei5ed by most 9%s#ims as being 3rimari#y res3onsib#e &or 6ee3ing 9%s#im societies in the sad 3#ight they are intoday$( Writing in *Y, !erthes noted that, in the 3ast, 8%ro3e critiL%ed 7' 3o#icy on the 9idd#e 8ast on an%mber o& 3oints, inc#%ding the American tendency to demonize certain actors in the region, its &ai#%re to act in ane5en0handed &ashion in re#ation to ;srae# and !a#estine, and its ass%m3tion that on#y one e?terna# 3#ayer, name#ythe 7' itse#&, co%#d 3#ay a 3o#itica# ro#e in the region$ Nonethe#ess, he arg%ed that, contrary to some Arab ho3es,

the 2 and the !aorit% o uropean polic% !akers have no intention ocounterbalancing 2( policies in the :iddle ast&$)- This is con"rmed in 3o#icy doc%ments

and ocia# statements$ The 8%ro3ean 'ec%rity 'trategy commits the 87 to an internationa# order based on eecti5em%#ti#atera#ism, b%t m%#ti#atera#ism in this conte?t 3#aces a 3artic%#ar#y high 5a#%e on the 87s good re#ations withthe 7nited 'tates$ As the 8'' notes: 4ne o& the core e#ements o& the internationa# system is the transat#anticre#ationshi3$)* The strategy doc%ment im3#icit#y recognizes some o& the re#ati5e wea6nesses o& the 87 in &oreign3o#icy matters in asserting that a more ca3ab#e 8%ro3e is within o%r gras3, tho%gh it wi## ta6e time to rea#ize o%r &%##3otentia#, and in ac6now#edging the cha##enge to bring together the dierent instr%ments and ca3abi#ities o& the87 and its members in order to 3romote sec%rity and de5e#o3ment$) The im3ortant, i& %nintended eect o& this, as

Toe 3oints o%t, is that +the (( illustrates that the 2 -ill continue to rel% on 2(

agenda setting& $)/ 9ore recent#y, Benita Ferrero0Wa#dner, the 87 2ommissioner &or 8?terna#


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*e!ocrac% )ro!otion Bad ' 2(


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Transition Fails


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*estabiliation ' :iddle astForced de!ocratiation leads to backlash and dra-ing in ooutside po-ers# urther destabiliing the regionJinnebusch &1>_9arch (, -*)$


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democratization, and the Arab %3rising: the internationa# &actor in 98NAs &ai#eddemocratization Democratization, :, //)0/)1

The West hascertain#y #e&t a 3ro&o%nd im3act on 98NA b%t it has not been benign andhasthere&ore ine5itab#y generated resistance$ ;n a "rst wa5e o& g#oba#ization the West i!posedan arbitrar% and a-ed states s%ste! !ade up o ragile regi!eswherein ear#y

#ibera# e6peri!ents rapidl% ailedand more indigeno%s hybrids o& neo03atrimonia#ism and 3o3%#ismbecame the main state b%i#ding &orm%#as$ The second wa5e o& globaliationat the end o& the 2o#d Ware6posed these regi!es tothe po-erul ho!ogeniing !aterial orces+5nance capital# !arkets., triu!phant liberal ideolog%+via transnationa# #in6ages andthe new g#oba#ized comm%nications technolog%. and the do!inance o a #ibera# g#oba# hegemon,

the 2(, which increasing#y 3enetrated the region$ Howe5er, rather than these rein&orcing each other # the

incongruence in the Western proect prevented achieve!ent o hege!on%

over the region$ Thecores e6port o de!ocrac% sufered#"rst o& a##, ro! a built3in contradiction bet-een the global ine7ualit% generated b% neo3liberalis!

and the de!ocratic nor! o e7ualit%$ The 2( hege!on cannot bridge this

contradiction beca%seit lacks both the hard and sot po-er to control the

region and provokes anti3hege!onic balancingby g#oba# and regiona# 3owers$ Theincoherence o global liberalis! ine5itab#y generates regional backlashes#-ithco%nter0ideo#ogies# nationalist populis! and 0sla!is!# retaining remar6ab#e 3ower in98NA@ the #atter remains the on#y credib#e co%nter0hegemonic ideo#ogy o33osing tri%m3hant wor#d #ibera#ism$9oreo5er, 3re0Arab %3rising regimes 3ro5ed e?treme#y resi#ient in the &ace o& g#oba#ization, and indeed ade3t in

%sing g#oba# reso%rces in5estment, arms, techno#ogy to ada3t$ 0nthe oi#03oor re3%b#ics, regi!es, suchas the Tunisian and g%ptian ones, se#ecti5e#y e6ploitedg#oba# neo3liberal

pressuresto reconstitute statist authoritarian regi!es in inegalitarian cron%

capitalist or!s 7uite resistant to de!ocratiation$ ;n 3ara##e#, theArab regi!es

!ost incorporated into Westcentric global 5nancial net-orks, the Arab G%#& state

-ere the least de!ocratic , not on#y interna##y, b%t a#so in their %se o& "nance ca3ita# to 3romote anti0

democratic &orces$ To be s%re, the vulnerabilities o the authoritarian republics -eree6posed in the "rab uprising# -hen co!!unications globaliation, enablingthe e6port o de!ocratiation discourses 3%shing &or the em3owerment o& 3o3%#ationse5en as regiona# incarnations o& neo0#ibera#ism generated grie5ances among them precipitated the"rab revolt, 3ro&o%nd#y destabiliing the region$ The "rab uprisings -ere botha s%!pto! o globaliation and a backlash against it# a continuation andintensi5cation o struggle bet-een those seeking to !akeregiona# statestransmission be#ts o& neo3liberalis! and those -anting to protect the indigenous!oral econo!%$ ;n s3ite o& the o33ort%nity 3resented by the %3risings to ti#t interna# 3ower ba#ances,Western and regiona# intervention in the "rab uprisingsstates pro!oted not

de!ocratiation but intensi5ed destabiliation $Neither leverage or

linkage gave the West the inuence to peaceull% pro!otede!ocratiationwhi#e !ilitaried intervention proved disastrous in Kibya, as it had

ear#ier been in ;raL, with the state demo#ished, e!po-ering !ilitias andtrans0stateihadistsrather than de!ocrats@ e5en when inter5ention was e?3ected b%t not de#i5ered, as in 'yria, itenco%raged rebe##ion and with simi#ar res%#ts$ F%rther di#%ting any democratizing normati5e im3et%s was the g#oba#norm &ragmentation dee3ened by the Arab %3rising, 3itting the Wests C#ibera# im3eria#ist Ch%manitarianinter5entionism against


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other$ 85en the 3resence o& an as3irant #ibera# ;s#amic hegemon, T%r6ey, was %nab#e ma6e democracy normati5e#yhegemonic$ _9arch (, -*)$


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to be Chow ton or ##can do publicationsthat on#y prolonged and deepened a !isplaced"!erican sel3con5dencethat it was 3ossib#e *- %se the window o& o33ort%nity at the co%nUtry sdis3osition as the wor#dSs so#e s%3er3ower to changc the #ogic o& internaUtiona# re#ations &ore5er$ 9%ch the same

mi?t%re o& arrogance# sel3interest# and sel3delusion characteried theargu!ents underl%ing the ?Washington Consensus@which bo#d#y saw the 6ey to wor#d3ros3erity and 3eace in the interde3endence generated by economic g#oba#ization with its trinity o& conce3tsV

3ri5atization, dereg%#aUtion, and o3enness$ To be s%re, economic interde3endence was indeed ca3ab#e o& de#i5eringon its 3romise, as the integration o& the 8%ro3ean 7nion and the growth in wor#d trade and in5estment centered onthe &ree0mar6ct democracies so 3ower&%##y demonstrated &or ha#& a cent%ry a&ter Wor#d War ;;$ Howe5er, a serio%s3rob#em #ay in the inabi#ity o& 3o#itica# &orces, either nationa##y or inUternationa##y, to contro# the ca3ita#ist genieonce #et o%t o& its bott#e$ For in d%e co%rse, dereg%#ation t%rned against the 5ery system that had gi5en birth to it,%n#eashing a ight o& techno#ogy, ca3ita#, and obs to co%ntries in Asia es3eUcia##y and 3ermitting the irres3onsib#eban6ing 3ractices that engendered in the 7nited 'tates and the 8%ro3ean 7nion +a&ter ha5ing aected 9e?ico,


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peace$, Kibera#ism may ha5e been its own worst enemy, b%t there were other &orces that cha##enged its &%t%rero#e as we##$ As the &ate o& the


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the Turkish !odel4-here responsible govern!ent# econo!ic gro-th#0sla!ic secularis!# and social ustice -ere e!erging -ith a character that-as indigenous4!ight have inuence in !an% countries -herehistoriAcall% the Otto!an !pire has let its !ark$ J%st as it was 3ossib#e that #ibera#internationa#isms dedication to democUracy 3romotion might sti## ha5e #i&e whate5er the re5ersa#s in ;raL andA&Ughanistan, so too was economic re&orm 3ossib#e whate5er the damage inicted by the crisis that began in --Y$

For it is in the interest o& ca3ita#ism to be reg%U#ated@ eecti5e mar6ets cannot e?ist witho%t the same 6ind o&acco%ntabi#ity and trans3arency we e?3ect &rom democratic go5ernments$ 9ore, s%3ranaUtiona# instit%tions maye?3erience growth as they ta6e on the tas6 o& s%3er5isUing at regiona# or internationa# #e5e#s re&orms that wi## a#so

in5o#5e increased 3o#itica# harmonization, i& not integration$ Whi#e the hold o corporateinuAence on political elites in the 2nited (tatesand nationa# dierences in the8%Uro3ean 7nion could block the ver% changes that it -ould be to their long3ter! bene5t to have, 3erha3s dramatic inno5ations co%#d be ado3ted, sho%#d the Democrats insist onthoro%ghgoing re&orms in the s3irit oi the !rogressi5e 8ra or the New Dea# when this 3arty ga5e critica# #eadershi3,or sho%#d the 8%roU3ean 7nion manage not on#y to s%r5i5e the cha##enges to the %nity o& the 8%ro zone b%t act%a##yto grow 3o#itica##y in the 3rocess$

Transition -ars ' 2( de!ocrac% pro!otion uels violence and

instabilit%.olds!ith# Jarvard (enior Fello-# +9+Arth%r A$ Go#dsmith was +when hewrote this. a 'enior


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c#ear#y %nderscores the dic%#ty o&de!ocratic regi!e changeand the riskso& hal-a%de!ocratiation#s%ch as sectarian conict# #oca# hu!an rights abuse#dislocated populations# territorial disputes# and transnational terroris!$;n3artic%#ar, more tho%ght needs to be gi5en to how to dea# with the 3re5a#ence o& mi?ed regimes in the Greater9idd#e 8ast and to the sec%rity 3rob#ems that this creates, with #ess re#iance on a %ni5ersa# remedy o& moredemocracy to treat these i##s$ The L%antitati5e st%dies re5iewed here s%ggest three broad #essons &or 3o#icyma6ers$First, on#y %nder the rarest o& circ%mstances sho%#d mi#itary 3ress%re be em3#oyed 3reem3ti5e#y to ad5ancedemocracy$ ;n some sit%ations mi#itary inter5ention may be %na5oidab#e, #ea5ing the 7nited 'tates and its a##ies#itt#e choice e?ce3t to try to he#3 another co%ntry constr%ct or reconstr%ct its 3%b#ic instit%tions$ B%t it wo%#d be a

&a##acy to ass%me that the res%#t wi## %s%a##y be a moderate 3#%ra#istic 3o#itica# system$ 'econd, 2$($ oreignpolic% needs to be adapted better to particular countries& individualcircu!stances$This is a#ready being done in the 9idd#e 8ast, according to a recent 2ongressiona#


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Terror


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:iddle ast

Terror turn ' "!e

Democracy Promotion Bad - Michigan7 2015 (1)

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